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−	= Whiteboard =	+	'''CURRICULUM OF'''<br />
		+	'''THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''<br />
		+	'''PART 1'''
−	#title Ecological Direct Action and the Nature of Anarchism	+	'''THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''
−	#subtitle Explorations from 1992 to 2005
−	#author Michael Duckett
−	#date 2005
−	#source <[[https://theses.ncl.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/10443/237/1/duckett06.pdf][theses.ncl.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/10443/237/1/duckett06.pdf]]>
−	#lang en
−	#topics green anarchism, direct action, earth liberation front
−	** Abstract	+	''For University and College Students''
−	In this thesis I study the radical environmental movement, of which I am part, by combining the analysis of texts and the textual record of discussions with my own extensive participant observation. More specifically, I look at the direct action undertaken by radical eco-activists and examine the relationship between this and the anarchist tradition.	+	''Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
−	My research demonstrates, first, that anarchism is alive and well, albeit in a somewhat modified form from the ‘classical anarchism’ of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In researching today’s direct activists, therefore, I have also been examining the nature of anarchism itself. I show that anarchism is to be found most strongly in the dialogue that takes place between activists on the ground, engaged in practical struggles. It is from here, in the strategic debates, self-produced pamphlets, and open-ended discussions of radical environmentalists focussed on practical and immediate issues, that I draw much of my data and ideas.	+	'''FIRST ENGLISH EDITION'''
−	In pursuing this project, I present an understanding of anarchism as a pluralistic and dynamic discourse in which there is no single, correct line on each issue. Instead, the vigour of anarchism is revealed through the dissent and reflexive debate of its practitioners. This understanding of anarchism, while contrary to a static project of ideological mapping or comprehensive summary of a tradition, may be in keeping with both contemporary theory, and also the anarchist tradition itself. To pursue this understanding of anarchism, I elaborate an ‘anarchist methodology of research’ which is both collective and subjective, ethically-bounded and reflexive. This draws on the experience of politically engaged researchers who have sought to draw lines of consistency between their ideals and the practice of research.	+	Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen
−	The various forms of ecological direct action manifested in the UK between 1992 and 2005 provide the main source material for this thesis. I survey the practice and proclamations of anti-roads protesters, Earth First!, GM crop-trashers, peat saboteurs, Reclaim the Streets and others, particularly my own local group, ‘Tyneside Action for People and Planet’. Also considered are the explicitly anarchist organisations of the UK, and the direct action wings of related social movements. Comparison with these non-ecological movements serves to highlight influences, alternatives and criticisms across the cultures of anarchistic direct action, and contributes to the overall diversity of the anarchism studied.	+	Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad
−	** Acknowledgements	+	Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman
−	My parents, Tim Gray, Laura, Suzy, assorted Palais people, friends and TAPPers for their support, as well as everyone else who’s asked ‘have you not finished it yet?’ And of course to that small minority of people who continue to put their bodies on the line, refuse to accept passivity and despair, and make good our connection to the earth. I am privileged to have met a lot of wonderful people involved in grassroots politics and EDA. Ross McGuigan, June Wolff and Joe Scurfield are just three of those that have inspired and given me hope. RIP.	+	Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson
−	<br>	+	Proofread by David Peat
−	** Acronyms	+	Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books
−	| ACF | Anarchist Communist Federation (until 1999) |	+	Published in association with ''The International Magazine''
−	| AF | Anarchist Federation (formerly Anarchist Communist Federation)  |
−	| ALF | Animal Liberation Front |
−	| CD | Civil Disobedience |
−	| CJA | Criminal Justice Act |
−	| CJB | Criminal Justice Bill |
−	| CND | Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament |
−	| CNT | Spanish Anarcho-Syndicalist Union |
−	| CPRE | Campaign for the Protection of Rural England |
−	| CW | Class War |
−	| DA | Direct Action, magazine of the Solidarity Federation |
−	| DAN | Direct Action Network |
−	| DANE | Disabled Action North East |
−	| DD | Discussion Document |
−	| DIY | Do It Yourself |
−	| DOT | Department of Transport |
−	| DSEI | Defence Systems Equipment International (arms fair) |
−	| DTEF! | Dead Trees Earth First! (Publishing Collective) |
−	| EDA | Ecological Direct Action |
−	| EF! | Earth First! |
−	| EF!A | Earth First! Action  |
−	| EF1SG | Earth First! Summer Gathering (UK) |
−	| EF1US | Earth First! USA |
−	| EFIJ | Earth First! Journal (USA) |
−	| ELF | Earth Liberation Front |
−	| ENGO | Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation |
−	| EZLN | Zapatista Army of National Liberation |
−	| FoE | Friends of the Earth |
−	| GA | Green Anarchist, UK anarchist magazine |
−	| GAy | Green Anarchy, US anarchist magazine |
−	| GE | Genetic Engineering / Genetically Engineered |
−	| GEN | Genetic Engineering Network |
−	| GM | Genetically Modified |
−	| GMO | Genetically Modified Organism |
−	| GS | Genetix Snowball, accountable direct action campaign against GM crops |
−	| GVGS | Gathering Visions, Gathering Strength, activist conference |
−	| HLS | Huntingdon Life Sciences, animal experimentation centre |
−	| ICFL | International Centre for Life |
−	| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
−	| IWW | International Workers of the World, Anarcho-Syndicalist Union  |
−	| JI8 | June 18<sup>th</sup>, Carnival Against Capitalism, London and around the world |
−	| JSA | Job Seekers Allowance |
−	| MEF! | Manchester Earth First! |
−	| N30 | November 30<sup>th</sup> 1999, International day of action against the WTO summit |
−	| NALFO | North American Liberation Front Office |
−	| NSM | New Social Movement |
−	| NUS | National Union of Students |
−	| NVDA | Non Violent Direct Action |
−	| OPM | Free Papua Movement  |
−	| PA! | Peat Alert! |
−	| PGA | People’s Global Action |
−	| RA! | Road Alert! |
−	| RBE | Radical British Environmentalism, 1998 activist-academic conference |
−	| RMT | Rational Motivations Theory |
−	| RSPB | Royal Society for the Protection of Birds |
−	| RTS | Reclaim the Streets |
−	| SDEF | South Downs Earth First!, UK group |
−	| SHAC | Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty |
−	| SM  | Social Movement |
−	| SMO  | Social Movement Organisation |
−	| SolFed  | Solidarity Federation |
−	| SWP | Socialist Worker Party, UK’s largest Leninist-Trotskyist party |
−	| TAPP | Tyneside Action for People and Planet |
−	| TGAL | Think Globally, Act Locally, activist newsletter |
−	| TLIO | The Land is Ours |
−	| TMEF | Toxic Mutants Earth First! |
−	| TP | Trident Ploughshares (formerly Trident Ploughshares 2000) |
−	| TP2000 | Trident Ploughshares 2000 |
−	| U | Update (UK) |
−	| WCEF | Working Class Earth First! |
−	| WT | Wildlife Trusts |
−	| WTO | World Trade Organisation |
−	| Other acronyms are titles of texts listed in the bibliography. |
−	<br>	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-2.png]]
−	* 1. Introduction	+	=== License ===
−	** 1.1 Introduction	+	This work is licensed under a<br />
		+	Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
−	In this introductory chapter I state the aims and central themes of my project of research into environmental direct action and its relationship to anarchism. I consider the reasons why I got interested in the topic, and the approaches I have taken to it. I situate my own project in relation to seven flawed approaches to combining environmentalism and anarchism. I then introduce the methodology I use, and I ground it in an anarchist ethics, which I introduce in terms of my approach to anarchist theory itself. I present my understanding of anarchism as not a fixed, static system, but a diverse, dynamic flux of arguments, ethics and practice that is constantly re-constituted through debate. I then provide an outline of chapters before moving into Chapter 2, Anarchist Theory, which provides the theoretical background for the thesis.	+	You are free to:
−	** 1.2 The Project: Anarchism in Environmental Direct Action	+	'''Share''' — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format
−	In this thesis I am treating environmental direct action (EDA) as an anarchist phenomenon. I maintain that it belongs in the anarchist tradition and can be best understood according to anarchist terms. This	+	'''Adapt''' — remix, transform, and build upon the material
−	challenges positions both within the anarchist camp, and within standard studies of environmental protest and green radicalism. My thesis refutes those anarchists who consider anarchism to be an outgrowth from and intimately tied to class-struggle, and those who consider the only ‘real’ anarchism to be that of the explicit anarchist organisations. It also refutes those who consider ‘traditional’ anarchism to be outdated, and no longer connected to the ‘post-anarchist’ or new ‘pro-anarchy’ expressions (POO 1998:2). I also argue against interpretations of environmental protest that view it in state-centric terms as ‘lobbying by other means’ - an expression of civil society and NGOs - and those who dismiss green radicalism as a merely single-issue or ‘bourgeons’ radicalism.	+	The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
−	It is my view that anarchism can be found in the dialogue of activists talking and acting together. I am therefore challenging the tendency to conflate anarchism with a ‘canon’ of recognised thinkers and texts, and anarchist history with a history of the ‘official’ anarchist movements. I also oppose those who seek to construct a static ‘system’ of anarchist thought, and those who exclude insufficiently orthodox, ‘coherent’ or explicit actors from the anarchist fold. My approach stands as the opposite to those who would discount every ‘hybrid’ or ‘woolly’ anarchist perspective, and build walls around the accepted anarchist positions. To me, there is no <em>pure</em> anarchism, only a <em>living</em> anarchism: one that is grounded in real situations and practices, and which can be heard, seen and felt in actual life. I apply a dialogic perspective that maintains it is the meaning produced between actors, between positions, and done so in the real world as applied to practice, that constitutes the strength and substance of anarchism today. I will state more of my view of the existence and theoretical basis of anarchism in section 1.5, and explore it at more length in Chapter 2.	+	Under the following terms:
−	I undertook this thesis project as an environmental activist interested in exploring and interrogating the ideas and practices that, at the end of the twentieth century, I was getting ever more involved in. My background values therefore already included ecological ethics (low- or anti-consumerism, conservation activities, a ‘holism’ that seeks congruity between personal and political practices, a prioritisation of ‘free’ nature over notions of economic ‘progress’ or ‘mankind knows best’) and proclivities for autonomous, self-directed action (including an occasionally romantic identification with past heretic, anarchist and alternative movements). I had read and absorbed much of the basic ‘lessons’ of anarchism, but my practical experience came more from environmental protest and lifestyle or co-operative ventures than the ‘traditional’ class-struggle anarchist movement These background factors undoubtedly influenced my reading of anarchism, and my reading of EDA.	+	'''Attribution''' — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
−	As an interpretative theory, I believe anarchism can hold its own against its rivals today, and provide a framework through which the political events of the world can be viewed. It is from this assumption that I began this research, because in a personal sense I consider myself to be an anarchist. My sensibility, my ethical principles and my critical view of the world are all informed by my reading of anarchist theory. In a certain sense therefore I consider anarchist political theory to be ‘true’. So while I did not deliberately undertake this research in order to prove the validity of anarchism, it has naturally resulted in such a consideration. This is not to say that I consider anarchist perspectives (any more than anarchists themselves) are automatically correct in every sense. Rather it means that I concur with the general thrust and direction of anarchist inquiry, and I share in many of the underlying values that inform it. I consider that this background ‘feel’ for anarchism does not blunt the critical eye, but rather informs it and guides it to the salient places of stress, contradiction and innovation.	+	'''NonCommercial''' — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
−	** 1.3 Literature Review	+	'''ShareAlike''' — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original.
−	I have integrated my literature review throughout the chapters of this thesis, so my consideration of other writers’ views is contained within the chapters for which they are relevant. However, in order to show how my thesis is positioned within the literature, I will now present two brief surveys. First, I present a somewhat abstract and stereotyped outline of seven alternative approaches that have been brought to bear on the relationship between anarchism and environmentalism. I do this in order to highlight the flaws and limitations of these (necessarily simplified) approaches, and to position my own approach against them. This is followed by a survey of those contemporary researchers who have studied subjects in a manner most similar to my own approach. My aim in these two surveys is to clarify my approach in relation to what it is not, and what it shares similarities with.	+	'''No additional restrictions''' — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
−	Assessments of the connections and affinities between anarchism and environmentalism tend to shallowness, abstraction or tangentiality. It is not that there is a dearth of such assessments - both celebration and critical analysis - but to those of us engaged and experienced in both anarchist and environmental practice, they often fail to ring ‘true’. I will here criticise seven generic attempts to join the two, beginning with the two forms closest to my own perspective.	+	The full text of this license is available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
−	(1) Attempts to link anarchism and environmentalism that have been advanced by anarchist writers such as Bookchin (1971), Woodcock (1974), Purchase (1994) and the ACF (cl991), have tended to abstraction, reductionist readings, and uncriticality. They speak of ‘anarchism’ in an overgeneralised and oversimplified way, as if it can be captured within a neat, static characterisation, and they apply it to an equally simplified, indeed bowdlerised version of’ecological thought’. They tend to rely upon a few quotes and examples from a very limited selection of green texts, and a highly selective reading of ‘ecology’ which is scientifically suspect and, in its theoretical ungroundedness, fails to add to our appreciation of the actual, real complementarities between the two discourses. I challenge these readings by characterising and operationalising an anarchism and green thought/practice that is defined by a diverse, context-specific and contested interplay of positions, and also by drawing for my sources from a broader and intrinsically diverse range of green, anarchist and activist voices, the context of which I take pains to include.	+	<br />
−	(2) One might think the above deficits might be remedied from studies coming from within the academy - particularly from theorists sympathetic to the values and intentions of anarchist/green practitioners. It is true that such studies often confirm the potential anarchism of green activists and serve to deepen our understanding of certain aspects of activist practice. Yet they rarely go beyond a recognition of’these greens are anarchist’: they treat this as a conclusion instead of a hypothesis to be demonstrated (O’Riordan 1981; Hay 1988; Pepper 1993; Eckersley 1992; Dobson 1995). In my thesis I seek to establish this affinity early on and then utilise the case studies to draw out ‘what happens next’: what exactly the recognition of green anarchism might mean, in what ways it is expressed, what consequences it might have for activist strategy and impact, and for our understanding of anarchism itself. I also seek to demonstrate and contextualise specific perspectives and sites of anarchism, constructing a bridge to take specific arguments (more in-depth than generalised abstractions) into	+	<blockquote>
		+	“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.”
−	new contexts - specifically EDA - to see how and whether they apply, and what can be learnt from the attempt. This is an anarchism of real arguments; an anarchism of ethical context and practical application. It is not an empty rhetorical position hypothesised between other (Marxist or liberal) green positions, nor an essentialised label that ignores actual practice and discourse.	+	''- Ho Chi Minh''
		+	</blockquote>
−	(3) Those who seek to ‘build’ a picture of green thought (Goldsmith et al, 1972; Porritt 1986; Naess 1991; Hayward 1994; Dobson 1995) have earnestly struggled to apply the right words, the right values and the right political perspectives to their project Many of these values and perspectives are either drawn from anarchism or coincidentally restate anarchist themes, yet the conscious recognition and consequent nuancing of these themes tends to be lacking, and so the anarchism remains archaic, static or incomplete (not joined together), and the anarchist perspectives are prone to recontextualisation within a non-anarchist, ahistorical and even mystical theorisation. The structures of green thought thus presented are abstracted from practice, rarefied and generalist like the anarchist models in (1), above. The political repertoires linked to them, furthermore, have failed to address or accept the anarchist view in its depth: this means they either remain outside my orbit in their electoralist or capitalist liberalism, or they again take the need for anarchist repertoires as conclusion, instead of starting point.[1] I discuss anarchist and green strategies further in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.	+	=== Support for This Work ===
−	(4) Others addressing the same topic of green radicalism, having perceived this lack of criticality and historical awareness, have unfortunately tended to utilise not anarchist but Marxist perspectives and lessons to fill the gap, to draw upon for critique, and to provide advice (Pepper 1993; Martell 1994; Luke 1997; Red-Green Study Group 1995). The Marxist heritage (productivist, anthropocentric, economistic) has proved highly unsuitable for this role, and the strategic lessons it provides are woefully inappropriate (Bookchin 1971; Atkinson 1991; Eckersley 1992; Marshall 1992b; Carter 1999). Anarchism, in taking the question of social relationships and power structures as central, can give us much more insight into the possibilities and problems of grassroots environmental practice.	+	Translating, annotating, and typesetting this book has taken three years, which would not have been possible without the support of our supporters on GoFundMe. GoFundMe is also the reason we are able to make the digital version of this entire text available for free online. We would therefore like to recognize all of our supporters:
−	(5) Uber-critical eco-anarchists, seeking to avoid any and all problematic or ‘impure’ examples from the anarchist past, have sadly resorted to the simplest but crudest solution: jettison the lot (<em>Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed} Green Anarchy}</em> Black 1997; Jarach 2004). Thus the primitivist school, for example, presents us with a confusing and frustrating mixture in which thorough critical analysis and healthy anarchist attitudes are framed within an unnaturally bounded and codified ‘ism’ (Moore 1997; Watson 1998; BGN 2002). I have found the tendency to precious separation from and hostility to, other anarchist and libertarian green currents particularly frustrating in that much genuine and profound theorising is taking place amongst primitivist or anti-civilisation circles. I discuss the primitivist stream further in section 2.3.3	+	{|
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		+	|}
−	(6) Others, anarchists of different schools or eco-activists seeking to build their radicalism anew, have also tended to reify and render static their own position/tradition and that of their opponents (Bradford 1989; Bookchin & Foreman 1991; Bookchin 1995a; Clark [J] 1998; Bonanno c2000). In the worst examples, this has resulted in the absurd position of a reductionist, false anarchism being pitted against a reductionist, false eco-radicalism. If nothing else, these examples provide proof that partisan, engaged analysis is not automatically superior to the academic form. Even within UK activist discussions, textual expressions tend to follow the mistakes of this tendency, solidifying and simplifying particular versions of anarchism or ‘correct’ green practice - which are in reality only possible expressions at one particular time - in order to pit them against even more simplified readings of opponents’ views (EEV 1997; GA 2000).	+	There is still plenty of work to be done to complete the translation of this entire curriculum. If you would like to financially support our efforts, you can support us at:
−	(7) Militant environmental practitioners, who have produced their anarchism spontaneously and intuitively, have failed to appreciate the diversity and roundedness of historical anarchist lessons. Thus US EF! which, in the early nineties, presented the most inspirational, energetic and influential practice for UK EDA, and which developed intuitively anarchist organisational and political practices with remarkable success, allowed stereotype and prejudice to inform its view of anarchism instead of taking a more ‘generous’ approach: and drawing the best from the tradition (which I seek to do). Practical implications of this were seen in its early years when US EF! allowed racist and severely authoritarian statements to go uncombatted, not least because it had avoided applying anarchist ethics out of a distinctly American fear of revolutionary leftism. Within the UK grassroots EDA milieu, the tradition of anarchism and radical revolts has more readily been embraced, albeit often in a self-consciously	+	BanyanHouse.org
−	non-industrial version (in the US, the situation has now also shifted in this direction), but misunderstandings and simplifications are still widespread.	+	=== Dedication and Gratitude ===
−	It is because of the flaws in the above approaches that I consider eco-anarchism to require another assessment, and I have adapted my own approach to seek to remedy these flaws, or at least to avoid repeating them. With this in mind, I feel compelled to note that, in this very survey, I have demonstrated a similar over-generalisation, over-simplification, and general ‘over-doing’ of the certainty of my critical assessment It is intended only to clarify the perceived errors that have informed my own approach. I do not wish to suggest that I am somehow above and beyond the above readings, and I do not reject the commentators and texts cited above. Rather I use characterisations and critical tenets presented by them to inform my own work, seeking to take the best and the most useful elements, and re-apply them in a dialogue with activist debate.	+	This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three ''years'' of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.
−	Having identified the flaws and limitations in the above approaches, I wish now to look at those individual researchers who have conducted research in a manner which, when viewed together, I would suggest might constitute an appropriate anarchist approach to research, and to theory, and with which I wish to affiliate my own project. I will draw upon their insights at relevant points in the thesis, but my intention in these next few paragraphs is to distinguish their approaches, and topics of concern, from my own.	+	Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.
−	It is a critical realist (Wall 1997: 9-10) who has produced the most in-depth analysis of nineties EDA (Wall 1999a), but in Chapter 3 I distinguish my approach from that of critical realists - including those with some sympathies for anarchism, such as Wall and Cox (1998). Wall’s work, while crucially valuable as a historical document of the processes by which Earth First! and the anti-roads movement developed (an achievement which I do not seek to repeat here), has an artificially narrow field of vision when viewed in anarchist terms. I consider it damning of the broader approach of social movement analysis that, as Goaman states, Wall fails to capture the “ethos, spirit and impulse that underpins people’s involvement in Earth First!”. His deployment of a “Theoretical approach deeply lodged in conventional sociological concepts ... tends to ‘suffocate’ his account of living movements with irrelevant intellectual baggage” (Goaman 2002:15). The same could be said of many academic accounts. Plows records that Wall “employs the ‘standard toolbox’ of social movement theories to explain and contextualise direct action mobilisations” (2002b), and Goaman criticises that this means that “Earth First! ideas, with their profound ethos of libertarianism and the rejection of scientific reason and instrumentalism, are reduced to a set of instrumental scientific processes - diagnosis, prognosis and a calling to action” (2002: 16). As Plows indicates, however, Wall is by no means the worst offender (Plows 2002b), and similar condemnations have been made of overly formal and instrumental SM research - of Jordan by Welsh (1997: 77-79); of Lent by Plows (Social Movements List 1998); of Melucci by Heller (2000:9); and of Gathering Force by <em>Do or Die</em> (1998: 139-144). Such SM approaches show a tendency both for a “theoretical overextension of concepts” and an “empricial overextension... the tendency to make broad statements about movement dynamics” (Jasper 1999:41). These critiques, expressive of an anarchist perspective, have all informed my own approach.	+	Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!
−	Karen Goaman’s own thesis focussed on the situationist current within anarchism. She places more emphasis on ideas than on action (2002:58), and views texts as the primary location of anarchist ideas and identity (2002:1-5), arguing that “It is the critical ideas and their dissemination through texts that form common links between persons who participate in oppositional currents” (Goaman 2002: 13). While I recognise, celebrate and benefit from the texts which, Goaman accurately notes, are commonly produced even for “activist oriented interventions” (2002: 58), I position these within a broader context of activism, communal endeavour and experience which cannot be completely captured within the text. I share Goaman’s view that Wall’s study “would have greatly benefited from... an exploration of key texts, ideas, attitudes and affinities that would have been afforded by periodicals such as <em>Do or Die</em> and even the activist-oriented newsletter Action Update” (2002: 59), but unlike Goaman, I do not prioritise certain ‘influential’ periodicals within anarchist circles. Instead I seek to utilise a diverse range of the most articulate or ‘telling’ of the ephemeral pamphlets, ‘discussion documents’ and gathering debates which arise from the milieus and concerns of EDA: this allows a reading of anarchism that contains more nuance and difference. I would also suggest that a problem with Goaman’s project is that it focuses on the individuals involved in producing texts and zines, as if an understanding of their (self-declared) biographies explains the ideas. It is, furthermore, dangerous to pin anarchism on a few selected individuals (although she emphasises she has only used names	+	Thanks also to ''The International Magazine'', who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with ''The International Magazine'' on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.
−	already in the public domain (2002:255)), both in terms of their personal safety, and in terms of the ongoing vitality of the movement.	+	We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.
−	Mick Smith’s approach is a little further removed from my own study of direct action, focussing on ethics and the theoretical formalisation of ethics, but I wish to cite him here as an inspiring example of how to take the anarchist approach and use it to engage with and refuse the assumptions of dry theory (1995; 2001a; 1997). His prioritisation of context, experience and personal intuition against abtract theoretical expressions has informed my understanding of environmentalism. Where Smith writes my intended argument in the language and concerns of ethics, Jeff Ferrell writes it in terms of space, spontaneity and experience (Ferrell 2001). Situating himself as a full participant of the marginal street cultures of his topic, he views the margins of the city - the margins of power - as “locations of radical openness and possibility” (Soja quoted in Ferrell 2001:241). But while I share an empathy with Ferrell’s approach and would ally myself with many of his insights, Ferrell’s work is an inspiring celebration not a critical analysis, concerned with an evocation of the anarchist practices of marginal elements in society who practically contest the policing of space. Despite the crossovers, therefore, his project is distinct from mine both in its theoretical concerns, and also in its subject matter (not least for being a study of the US, not the UK).	+	Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.
−	David Heller’s (2000) examination of peace movement direct action, including Faslane Peace Camp and Trident Ploughshares, includes considerations of the links between action and ideology; the symbolic power of material practices; and the concrete effects of symbolism. His study has taken on board many of the anarchist lessons for social movement analysis. The differences from my own project lie in his subject matter- peace movement direct action not environmental direct action - and his anthropological concerns, in which the rich detail of experience takes the place of a closer and more conscious theoretical engagement with the anarchist tradition. But I consider Heller an exemplary anarchist researcher, and he is very useful for many of the concepts he uses, such as intersubjectivity, non-protest forms of resistance, and practical (and contested) forms of power-with, and other positive forms of (anarchist) power, such as the expression of communal solidarity through song and selforganisation (2000: 145) (see section 2.2.5). It is not that he has invented these concepts, which are quite widespread in EDA, but he gives them a practical academic application and convincingly contextualises them in real settings.	+	March, 2023<br />
		+	Luna Nguyen
−	Alex Plows has produced a plethora of articles and papers that celebrate and examine various forms of EDA. These began with articles speaking from her subject position as Alex Donga the road-protester (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 88-89; Plows 1995; 1997), and developed according to an ever-greater immersion in the language of SM theory (2002a; Wall, Doherty & Plows 2002). She is perhaps the researcher who I have referenced most frequently and been inspired by most regularly, although the shift toward ever- greater technicality in utilising SM theories at first appeared, to me, to erode much of the power in her earlier work. As with the case of Wall, I found that the dry language created a distance from the ground-level of EDA, and that the frameworks were often more concerned with their own theoretical and disciplinary disagreements than an engagement with the dialogue and practice on the ground: it was in reaction to this, and similar SM-framed approaches to EDA that I immersed myself deeper in an anarchist and not an SM approach. However, more recent papers Plows has undertaken with Doherty and Wall have succeeded in re-transcribing SM language onto what I view as anarchist concerns and anarchist arguments, particularly through the application of Welsh’s (2000) concept of’capacity building’ to EDA, and by supporting the anarchist (not liberal) conceptualisation of direct action which I consider in section 6.2.1 (Doherty, Plows & Wall 2003).	+	=== Foreword ===
−	Jonathan Purkis is another of the researchers whose research into EF!’s practice has positively informed my own work. Purkis has focussed particularly on the holistic and micro-political aspects of EF! practice, providing a corrective to studies that view direct action solely in terms of moments of conflict In Chapter 5 I draw upon some of his insights, particularly with regard to the radicality or revolutionary quality of EF!. Purkis’ subject matter differs from mine practically, in that he focussed on EF!ers in a different part of the country, and at a period that was at some remove from the bulk of my own fieldwork (2001). He also pursued a sociological line of inquiry which, while similarly grounded in anarchist tenets, was expressive of a discipline and language to which I have had relatively little engagement I consider some of his, and other writers’ analysis of the social ecology — deep ecology variations in EDA to be ‘done’, accepted, and requiring no further academic explanation. Indeed the pursuit of this and similar academic investigations into green ideology (such as ‘post-materialism’ or green consumerism) has enabled me to choose my own area of concern much more finely.	+	In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7<sup>th</sup> Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:
−	Purkis is identified with those academically-situated anarchists committed to a pluralistic and activistsupporting anarchism (Welsh & Purkis 2003: 12; cf Chesters 2003b), many of whom have written in the journal <em>Anarchist Studies,</em> Another of these, Graeme Chesters, presents another exemplary example of a partisan activist-academic (he is also a member of the <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> collective), for example by contributing his academic authority to the defence and public understanding of Reclaim the Streets (2000a; 2000c). Chesters has engaged more with the anticapitalist movement than EDA, and he has proved more concerned with the application of innovative theories to activist practice, such as Melucci’s work on collective identity (1998), or the resonance between complexity theory and antiglobalisation networking (2005). I have not found the neologistic or zeitgeisty terms that excite other theorists (Jordan (2002) is another example) to have had such a marked appeal or connection to my research, however. I have remained more firmly grounded (earthed) in the interplay between the fields of environmentalism and the terms of the anarchist tradition. It is my combination of academic analysis and investigation with a commitment to the interplay of anarchism and environmentalism that makes my work distinct	+	<blockquote>
		+	We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.
		+	</blockquote>
−	** 1.4 Methodology	+	Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.
−	Chapter 3 is the chapter in which I introduce my methodological approach, and consider the links between my experience, anarchist theory, and their relationship to various ‘progressive’ theoretical approaches to research. I introduce anarchist perspectives on knowledge (and thus on academic activity), and ally this with elements of the feminist epistemological challenge. I demonstrate the sophistication of anarchism’s traditional hostility to top-down, ‘neutral’ perspectives, using the critique of law as example. I find myself unable to usefully apply a purist and ‘more revolutionary than thou’ critique, however, and so I use feminist research tools instead, to chart a path of least-oppressive, least- hierarchical and least-compromised practice. Amongst the qualities cited by feminist researchers, I take the validation of experience over abstract theory to justify my use of practical experience to augment and ground my analysis.	+	During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.
−	I argue that feminist tools of research, typified by notions of ‘partisanship’; the inclusion of the voices of the researched; and their participation in the research process, are characterised by an anarchist ethic. I distinguish my use of such notions from previous feminist frameworks, however, in that EDA activists are not suppressed subjects requiring kid gloves, but active, dynamic and able agents quite capable of critical assessments and interventions themselves. I also distinguish my approach from the radical aspirations of critical theory and what I consider to be over-simplified leftist urges to ‘unify thought and practice’. Instead, I embrace reflexivity to support a more open-ended, incomplete dialogue with my research subjects.	+	In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.
−	I apply anarchist analyses to academia, to my own research and also to the notion of activism itself. This serves to situate my position within the research process, and to prioritise my relationship to the activist group ‘TAPP’. Here I ground my ethical considerations by considering how my involvement in the group affected my intellectual development and perspectives; how TAPP’s experience of research throws up aspects of the activist critique of research (such as the irrelevance, the apoliticism, the power relationship, the exploitation of subjects). I conclude with a consideration of how even the ‘best’ research strategies (which I group according to the themes of’limits’ and security; the dilemmas of the insider researcher; usefulness; and dialogue) remain problematic to a full anarchist ethics.	+	Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.
−	Ultimately I gave much less attention to fieldwork, ethnographic research and interviews than I had originally considered, but shifted my primary source of’data’ onto publicly available (or at least ‘nonprivate’) expressions, such as gathering debates, ‘discussion documents’, press releases and reports. I then used my extensive insider research and ‘observant participation’ to <em>quietly</em> inform my thesis, and sought to find a liveable, non-disruptive and non-distorting methodology of research. I had to accept an imperfect match, therefore, between the academic urge to record, collate and analyse; and my own life.	+	Dr. Vijay Prashad.<br />
		+	5 March 2023<br />
		+	Caracas, Venezuela.
−	** 1.5 Anarchism in this Thesis	+	=== Preface to the First English Edition ===
−	In this section I shall state my approach to anarchism, clarify what is not my approach, and consider how we may recognise anarchism. I must insert a disclaimer, however (the first of many): this is my particular reading of anarchism, and I claim no greater ‘authority’ for it than that For me, the recognition of anarchism comes from the recognition of arguments, not of boundaries: there is no tight definition surrounding what is legitimate and what is not legitimate anarchist practice. Rather there is an identifiable and coherent corpus of ethics, argument and strategy that can be applied - to different degrees - to many different situations.	+	The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.
−	I view anarchism as a mutually supportive matrix of sentiment, critique and practice. Its hallmarks are (1) an opposition to authority and social domination in all their guises; (2) an ideal of social freedom: an optimism by which the inequities of currently existing society can be critically judged; (3) a drive to act freely, to rebel, to refuse to either passively accept exploitation and domination, or to take part in power games; (4) a faith in the capability of one’s fellow human beings, to agree and to work things out better when there are no interfering state structures; (5) a view of power as corrosive, and a corresponding injunction to develop ways of working that counteract build-ups of power or the exercise of power over others. There are certain outgrowths of these central tenets (which I look at in turn in Chapter 2), including an opposition to liberal institutions such as parliament; anti-capitalism; and direct action, but such particular doctrines are not definitive in themselves: they are merely conclusions drawn. I consider anarchism to have a compatibility - though not a fixed equivalence - with radical environmentalism. Fundamentally, I consider it to be plural and dynamic, capable of embracing many contested and conflictual positions, and I consider also that anarchism can be revealed through practice as much as it can be through text In the following paragraphs I will explain how I have approached anarchism as dialogical and plural discourse, evidenced in texts and practice, debate and application.	+	The entire curriculum consists of:
−	A key component of my interrogation of the relationship between anarchism and environmental direct action is the belief that anarchism can be found in the dialogue of activists talking and acting together. I argue that this is the same essential anarchism as was formerly expressed in the ‘classical’ anarchist movements - not identical, but akin at its core. Rather than write a monolithic ‘grand narrative’ of anarchism - fixing it for good; speaking of it in a static way; ‘synthesising’ it into a model -1 deal with anarchism according to what I consider to be its own values - fluidity, collective criticality, an ‘ethic’ underlying discourse and practice. This approach stands opposed to the idea that anarchism essentially consists of certain fixed tenets which can then, like a rulebook, be systematically and identically applied to every case. In the next chapter I do detail key tenets of anarchism (anti-authority; freedom; rebellion; human nature; and power, cited above), but I emphasise the variety of interpretations and combinations that can be assembled out of these. A focus on tenets serves as a way-in to understanding anarchism, not as a conclusion or end-point	+	Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)
−	The way I have attempted to present an understanding of dialogic and pluralistic anarchism is by presenting and sourcing my argument on the debates of activists. I therefore present opposed voices from newsletters, activist reports, photocopied and re-distributed pamphlets, discussions at gatherings, email discussions, and ‘discussion documents’. These are ephemeral texts rarely covered in the ‘above ground’ literature, ie. they are rarely repeated in their ‘original’ form outside the campaigns and activist circles they come from, despite the fact that they strikingly and consistently reproduce central anarchist concerns, arguments and understandings. The discussions and the activist intelligence and ethos communicated in these circles is distinct from how anarchists (or anarchist ‘interpreters’) tend to ‘present’ anarchism to the outside/public world. Yet these discussions - even though they might be narrowly strategic and tactical; exaggerated and overblown; or rooted to obscure points or miniscule sites of struggle - are precisely where anarchism may be found revealed. I strive to present these debates ‘in context’, so far as possible, because decontextualised they become meaningless. The above points do not mean that I relegate anarchist texts or anarchist history to irrelevance, however. Rather, 1 consciously re-apply perspectives from these sources, and I emphasise how traditional anarchist arguments are re-articulated from within EDA.	+	Part 2: Historical Materialism
−	EDA also shows many conscious links with anarchist history, and I consider these of inestimable importance. If EDA is to have relevance for future anarchism it needs to keep this interaction/continuity going - to take part in the historical thread of hope, generosity and anger that is the anarchist tradition. I am reintegrating EDA into the anarchist frame, and not in an abstract irrelevant way but through the <em>actual,</em> expressed, recognised and restated demonstrations. I use historical anarchism as a critical judge for EDA practice and attitudes, identify the contrasts in context, and assess what <em>remains</em> linked. This may be seen as a reconstruction of anarchism. Because -1 argue - anarchism is being constructed/reconstructed all the time, that process by which the construction/reconstruction is demonstrated <em>is</em> the anarchist tradition.	+	Part 3: Political Economy
−	Instead of talking about anarchism in the abstract, I take voices from different contexts and see how they fit Much of the editing of these is obviously ‘pre-chosen’ by myself -1 have chosen those which I think fit, support, add depth to, or bring up an interesting clash. I believe they tell a truer, closer story of anarchism than an overarching or a uniform framework - to allow the voices available to guide my structure and argument I celebrate this diversity and draw out the shared, in-common lessons it has for our understanding of anarchism.	+	Part 4: Scientific Socialism
−	There are many positions on anarchism that I distance myself from: I will here list three of the most simple of these. First, I refute those eco-anarchists who say ‘ecology is anarchist’, as if that clears up the matter once and for all. True the two streams appear very sympathetic, and there is enough common ground to allow activists to perform eco-anarchism, but it is worthless (false) to speak of it in the abstract.	+	In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.
−	Second, instead of high theory - whether critical or ‘postmodern’ -1 focus on actual practising ecoanarchists. This indicates that I refuse to conflate anarchism with trendy contemporary theorisations, but rather keep anarchism’s priority - from which position some themes and tools of postmodern theory may then be used (but within an anarchist framework).	+	However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.
−	I do not (as some class-strugglists do) say anarchism is only the movement - that anarchist practice equates to the explicit anarchist movement only - and that anarchism emerged, as if spontaneously, from the movement But nor do I exclude those classical/historical/class struggle voices as inherently dead or irrelevant (as some ‘post-left’ anarchists do). Instead I utilise statements from these sources to critically engage with EDA and other anarchist positions. They are a vital part of the whole - legitimate voices within anarchist debate (which, in my view, is close to synonymous with anarchism per se).	+	As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.
−	I do not think that all anarchisms are equal (ie. that all viewpoints on anarchism are fine). Rather some arguments are superior in some contexts; more impressively coherent; avoid contradictions and pitfalls of other arguments; relate more closely to (what I view as) central anarchist themes and values; and some practices and organisational methods have proved more successful in some contexts (those which have related best to ‘working class’ needs do gain extra merit here). There is a tendency for all sides to overblow their positions - and all of these exaggerations can be pricked as I endeavour to do.	+	It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are ''not'' present in the original Vietnamese work.
−	Everything can be criticised (and super-criticality is another of the avowed characteristics of anarchism), but some arguments are more valid than others -1 plump for these as I go. However, this never means the argument is ‘done, finished’ - the other voices in the argument are not invalid if they also reflect anarchist themes and feelings, and intuitive arguments of the anarchist ethos. When one position or tendency appears the weaker, it may, under another light or in another context, appear the stronger, and it can (and does) modify and strengthen its position in the light of the opposition and criticism it faces. I do not suggest there is a developmental ‘progress’ in anarchism - on the contrary, the earlier arguments are often the stronger (and frustratingly, often the weaker arguments have demonstrated most appeal and applicability).	+	We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:
−	To judge whether an argument or practice is anarchist, certain criteria do apply (see for example Bowen & Purkis (2005:7)). The study of the anarchist conception of direct action as the most useful handle/portal to anarchism is especially useful here, as it contains the ethical tenets of means-ends congruity, self-valorisation, direct not indirect, social not political or bureaucratic, collective and capable of being extended by both existing and other actors. A checklist should include the questions: is anyone being repressed/manipulated? Was the organisation free/ spontaneous/ bottom-up? Are there ulterior motives? Does the practice extend the practice and possibilities of freedom or does it close them down for others? These are themes that I explore in Chapters 5,6 and 7, where I examine the contemporary expressions of eco-activism in terms of the anarchist conceptualisation of direct action as the best guide for assessing the EDA of the case studies.	+	* As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
		+	* As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
		+	* As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.
−	My reading of anarchism allows large margins - not every voice needs to be consistent with every other, hybrids and contradictory or woolly expressions may all float within the space. So long as they are engaged in dialogue on anarchist terms, share an understanding that reveals key anarchist themes (whatever their particular conclusions), and keep this anarchist argument and dialogue going, I include them. Others - perhaps the majority of explicit anarchists - would disavow such an approach, arguing that only those who are consistently, coherently, tightly anarchist (on their particular readings) deserve to be so called. This is a reasonable position to take, and may be strategically crucial (to keep out misguided, misleading or recuperative tendencies), yet for my academic (non-strategic) reading a broader approach is required.[2]	+	Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.
−	** 1.6 Outline of Chapters	+	This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.
−	The theoretical grounds of the reading of anarchism I presented in section 1.5 are explored and interrogated in Chapter 2, Anarchist Theory. Chapter 2 provides the background and theoretical support for the thesis as a whole, identifying both the key concepts within anarchist ideology (sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.5), and also the nature of anarchism in a broader, more philosophical sense (sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.6). In the first band of sections (those that begin with ‘2.2’) I consider the distinctive anarchist conceptualisations, or key ideological tenets, of anti-authoritarianism; freedom; rebellion; human nature; and power. I consider some of the implications of these tenets for our analysis and understanding of anarchism, and in the sections of the second band (beginning with 2.3), I argue that all these conceptualisations are interrelated in a matrix of mutually supporting — but not tightly systematised and static - values, arguments and attitudes. The theoretical groundwork established in Chapter 2 introduces the approach and values within which this thesis has been conducted. It justifies my attention to the practice, of diverse (non-orthodox) forms of anarchism and affirms a notion of pluralistic anarchism; of anarchism-as-practice; and the ethos and argumentative ‘spirit’ of anarchism. This chapter, therefore, justifies my placing of EDA within anarchism, and introduces the critical tools with which we ‘think about’ anarchism in this thesis. I endeavour in this chapter to move away from conventional or static mappings of ideology, and instead lay out a basis on which a fully dialogic and enacted anarchism of multiple sites and voices may be understood. Instead of practice being deformed to fit the theory, the practice can be shown to demonstrate and explore the meaning of the theory.	+	This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:
−	Chapter 3, Methodology, provides the first demonstration of my anarchist approach, as I consider how feminist, postmodern, critical realist and other politically-engaged perspectives may be used to develop research that challenges and is less saturated by statist, capitalist and faux-objective norms. I situate myself within my own research and I introduce the local Newcastle group, TAPP, as the context in which much of my activism and research was situated. I emphasise that I could not conduct research which is either ‘pure’ (free from negative impacts, free from negative power dynamics) or ‘transformatory’ of my subjects, but I do argue that my research has remained true to anarchist ethics. Considerations for a libertarian research methodology characterised by anarchist ethics include a sensitivity to the dangers of ‘representation’ and exploitation, and a commitment to genuine dialogue with actors who are not streamlined to fit hypotheses, but are recognised as rational and complex actors.	+	''Karl Marx'' and ''Friedrich Engels''... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.
−	Chapter 4, Green Radicalism, considers the legitimacy of saying greens are anarchist by reviewing the relations between anarchist thought (and practice) and green thought (and practice). It also introduces the impact of anarchist analysis on practice by detailing the anarchist critique of most green	+	''...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin'', who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.
−	strategies, and then marking out the strategic thinking of anarchism in terms of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘direct’ action. Environmentalism may be understood and identified through its practice as well as through recognised ‘green texts’, and the thought and practice of anarchism and environmentalism are engaged in a process of dialogue, hybridisation and contestation: it is within this process that grounds are provided for eco-anarchism to exist Environmentalism and anarchism are broadly compatible, and each gains by the application of the insights and ethos of the other (although no final synthesis is possible - they exist in an <em>ongoing</em> process of dialogue). I consider what radicalism is inherent to ecological thinking, and assess the relationship of environmentalism to different traditions: specifically anarchism. In the latter part of the chapter, I then outline the eco-anarchist critiques of capitalism, the state, and all green strategies that fail to systematically oppose those factors. This is followed by a presentation of the anarchist approach to ‘true’ revolutionary action. Here I emphasis the place of freedom at the heart of all legitimate anarchist approaches to change: a point that will follow us through the ensuing chapters.	+	Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.
−	In Chapter 5, Activist Anarchism: the case of Earth First!, I provide a detailed assessment of an actual example of experiential, ecologically-motivated activism, one that defines itself on anarchist terms and holds its debates according to recognisably anarchist terms. I first consider the dynamics involved in the creation of anarchistic activists and activist organisations such as Earth First! The chief two factors here are the institutionalisation - the co-option, neutralisation, bureaucractisation and state-ification of environmental organisations - and the radicalisation (both alienation and empowerment) of activists engaged in extra-institutional struggle to defend the places they love. I also introduce DIY Culture, as the counter-cultural milieu out of which EF! emerged, and as die clearest example of an informal anarchist movement that was bound by deeds not words, and was therefore able to accommodate difference at its very heart. In the second band of sections I assess Earth First! as the most clearly eco- anarchist organisation in the UK. I characterise the activist anarchism of Earth First! as a compound of many varieties, none overbearing, and I demonstrate that the arguments of many anarchist currents have been practically re-expressed in the EF! network I chart Earth First!s ‘revolutionary’ qualities through a critical examination of notions of ‘success’; I note its strategic rationale and note how it demonstrated traditional dualisms of individualism vs community, red vs green and lifestyle changes vs social objectives, to be irrelevant to an anarchist practice. Finally, I look most fully at Earth First!’s organisation and identity, as expressed through an anarchist process of dialogue and dissensus at the 1999 Winter Moot. Here we may glimpse many traditional and divergent elements of anarchist ideology, and witness how they are accommodated to a contemporaiy ecological context.	+	It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.
−	Chapter 6, Conflictual Strategies of Action: Violence, GM Crops, and Peat, moves to questions of strategy, violence, and the tensions that arise between some of the divergent strategic frameworks that co-exist within an activist anarchist plurality. I begin by clarifying the definition of anarchist direct action, first by constrasting it to liberal or indirect forms, and second by drawing out some of its positive ethos from the context of anarcho-syndicalism. I then move to look at the issue of violence in direct action, beginning with the polarised and unhelpful ‘fluffy’-’spiky’ opposition that was held in EDA. I gain a more nuanced approach by assessing views of violence in the historical anarchist tradition as expressed, for example, through refutations of the of’propaganda of the deed’. Having distinguished anarchism from pacifism, I conduct a dialogue between anarchism and CD discourse, the dominant theoretical influence on the peace movement which has, in turn, had a positive influence on EDA. I then look at sabotage, viewing it as the marker point between liberal and radical environmentalisms, but itself surrounded by issues of violence and noncompatibility with certain other EDA strategies.	+	At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at ''BanyanHouse.org'' — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.
−	In the second half of the chapter I move to concrete examples of debates concerning strategy, elitism and violence within nineties EDA. First, with Anti-GM direct action, I consider the forms of anti-GM activism that hold most relevance to an anarchist strategy. Centrally, I present the covert-overt debate as a case of dialogue between ideological and strategic positions that, despite their marked opposition, are both able to exist <em>within</em> a broad field of anarchism, sharing and expressing anarchist values even as they contest each other. Secondly, with Peat and the ELF, I consider the place of sabotage in EDA, and evaluate it according to the terms of anarchist ethics and principles. I contrast two organisational forms of ecosabotage, characterising the ELF as ‘representative’ and founded upon a social division, and Peat Alert! as participatory, grounded and fully in keeping with my anarchist assessment of EDA.	+	=== Introduction ===
−	Chapter 7, Reclaim the Streets and the Limits of Activist Anarchism, turns to the forms of nineties EDA most celebrated by anarchists, and then most criticised and commented upon by press, politicians, and EDA practitioners. Reclaim the Streets was the site of 1990s EDA that was most celebrated by anarchists, for holding the most promise of a truly confrontational, anti-authoritarian challenge in society. I establish the anarchist basis of the critical mass and street party tactics deployed by RTS in London and then spread around the world (using Newcastle as a provincial example). In addition to drawing out the anarchism contained in the practice, I also look at the anarchism contained in the diverse ideology promoted by RTS, including elaborations such as the revolutionary carnival, the TAZ and the Street Party of Street Parties. I argue that their development into a more abstract, static and repetitive practice of anticapitalism eroded many of the grounds of their success. This demonstrates the tension that still pertains between ideological anarchism and EDA practices, and between the ideals of anarchist organisation and the practicalities of’successful’ action. I conclude by utilising the example of Mayday 2000 as the much-heralded conjoining of traditional ideological anarchism and the looser activist anarchism of EDA. I focus mostly on the problems that were perceived to arise on this occasion, and I return to the strengths of earlier EDA to identify reasons what had been lost.	+	Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.
−	<br>	+	No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.
−	* 2. Anarchist Theory	+	Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.
−	** 2.1 Introduction	+	Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.
−	This chapter introduces the theory with which - and <em>within</em> which -1 will be working throughout the thesis. This involves (a) grounding the reader in the central tenets of anarchist discourse, (b) evaluating the idea of ‘anarchism’ itself and (c) introducing some of the critical tools of anarchism. The subject of this thesis is not just the counter-cultural activists engaged in environmental defence, but also the body of arguments, values and experience termed anarchism.	+	Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, ''Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'', a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.
−	The first part of this chapter looks at the distinctive conceptualisations or key tenets held by anarchists, and explores some of the implications for our study of anarchism. 2.2.1, Against Authority, Against Definition, negotiates the initial problems faced when gaining a grasp of anarchism’s identity. I introduce the ‘sources’ of anarchism that I shall be drawing on in this thesis, and use the first principle of anarchism (anti-authority) to sound a note of caution concerning our ability to authoritatively define anarchism. The next four sections establish a further four key tenets and hallmarks of anarchism, namely 2.2.2 Freedom, 2.2.3, Rebellion, 2.2.4, Human Nature and 2.2.5, Power. I present a case for anarchism in which these tenets are interrelated, distinctive and, I argue, both coherent and accurate. The distinctive anarchist perspectives on these issues go a long way to revealing the essence of anarchism. Yet it is not my aim to fix these tenets, but rather to use them to aid the exploration of possibilities later in the thesis. Moving to the nature of anarchism, the next three sections, 2.3.1, Strength in Flexibility, 2.3.2, History and the Idea, and 2.3.3 Orthodoxy and Second Wave Anarchism, identify apparent inconsistencies and problems of a closer definition of what anarchism is. I argue for anarchism’s flexibility - its fundamental simplicity making it capable of great complexity when applied. I also argue for an anarchism that it is practical not purist, and I argue that it manages to be both diverse, yet coherent, and I insist that it should not be simplistically equated with any of its particular historical or doctrinal versions. By understanding these aspects of anarchist ideological ‘structure’, and examining how the construct of’anarchism’ relates to reality, we find ourselves more accurately situated within anarchism, and less likely to make mistakes of reductivism, over-literalism, confusing a part for the whole, and so on. Finally, I assess how anarchism is expressed through 2.3.4, Emotion, 2.3.5, Reason, and 2.3.6, Practice. These are the facets of anarchism that are manifested through EDA, and they are also the <em>signs</em> by which we might get to know anarchism.	+	For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.
−	By working within a broadly anarchist framework, this thesis might run the danger of uncritical self- referentiality. I do note criticisms of anarchism, but when these rest on foundations antithetical to anarchist values, I have generally found they are a case of talking <em>past</em> the ideology, rather than to it This means they can be dismissed by anarchists as either ‘reformist’ or ‘authoritarian’, a position I elaborate in the environmentalist context in Chapter 4. Much more severe and hard-hitting critiques have been launched from <em>within</em> the anarchist camp, however: between the many different camps- within-the-camp. An incessantly critical and questioning attitude is integral to anarchism. Thus anarcho-syndicalists condemn eco-anarchists, class-struggle anarchists critique anarcho-pacifists, individualist anarchists attack anarcho-communists and so on: anarchism is no placid philosophical scene but a cockpit of competing, impassioned and vigorous viewpoints, and it is tested daily <em>on-the-ground.</em> It is this lively and contested terrain that forms the substance of this thesis.	+	Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
−	In studying the forms of anarchism deployed by today’s environmental activists, I shall also be noting which elements of’classical’ anarchism have been left behind, and which have re-emphasised. In so doing, I will be considering what constitutes the ‘core’ of anarchism - what cannot be left behind without losing the title. I will also be paying strict attention to the manner in which the ‘key tenets’ are adapted to their environment-of-use and how, in so doing, they become modified - sometimes almost completely estranged - from their nineteenth-century or early-twentieth-century meanings. The concept of ‘direct action’ constitutes the main object of study in this regard, but I shall also consider such conceptualisations as sabotage, revolution, organisation, solidarity and anticapitalism. This thesis presents an exploration of the nature of ideological continuity and coherence in the context of almost	+	Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.
−	wholesale change. This chapter provides a foundation for this process by exploring the central tenets and key aspects of the anarchist doctrine.	+	March, 2023
−	** 2.2 Key Tenets of Anarchism	+	Dr. Taimur Rahman<br />
−	*** 2.2.1 Against Authority - Against Definition	+	=== Editor’s Note ===
−	“Beware of believing anarchism to be a dogma, a doctrine above question or debate, to be venerated by its adepts as is the Koran by devout Moslems, No! the absolute freedom which we demand constantly develops our thinking and raises it towards new horizons ... takes it out of the narrow framework of regulation and codification” (Emile Henry, written before his execution, quoted in Calendar Riots c2002: 8<sup>th</sup> November).	+	Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.
−	Defining anarchism is a difficult task: whatever definition I adopt will be given the lie by one or other variety of anarchist. Almost every attempt at definition begins with a disclaimer, such as the following from the first ‘Anarchist Encyclopaedia’: “There is not, and there cannot be, a libertarian Creed or Catechism. That which exists and constitutes what one might call the anarchist doctrine is a cluster of general principles, fundamental conceptions and practical applications” (Faure in Woodcock 1980: 62; cf Bonanno 1998:2). We must limit the ambitions of what is being attempted here. Even the most standard definition of ‘Anarchism’ is only the definition of <em>one type</em> of anarchism.	+	Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.
−	There are nevertheless certain statements that can be made about anarchism, as the Encyclopaedia goes on to do: the “many varieties of anarchist... all have a common characteristic that separates them from the rest of humankind. This uniting point is the negation of the principle of Authority in social organisations and the hatred of all constraints that originate in institutions founded on this principle” (in Woodcock 1980:62; cf Sylvan 1993:216; Walter 2002: 27; <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003:27; Makhno et al. 1989: General Section). Anti-authoritarianism will be our first point of contact with anarchism.	+	In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.
−	Anarchy is opposed to authority, as demonstrated by the etymology of the word “‘an-archy’: ‘without government’: the state of a people without any constituted authority” (Malatesta in Woodcock 1980: 62; cf Morland 2004:24). Others may translate the Greek slightly differently, as ‘against authority’, ‘without rule’ or ‘absence of domination’, but the gist at least is clear. Woodcock notes that Faure’s statement in the Encylopaedia (‘Whoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist’)	+	I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.
−	“marks out the area in which anarchism exists...[ but ] by no means all who deny authority and fight against it can reasonably be called anarchists”. Thus he states that both ‘unthinking revolt’ and ‘philosophical or religious rejection of earthly power’ cannot be called anarchism. In this thesis we will encounter many claims of what does and does not make an anarchist, and it will be clear that I myself am also engaged in various attempts at constructing a border around the term. All such attempts at definition are by their nature problematic and liable to critique, although the family resemblances of the various branches of anarchism are, at least in my view, reasonably clear-cut.	+	As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.
−	Within the revolutionary socialist tradition, anarchism distinguished itself by declaring “the viewpoint that the war against capitalism must be at the same time a war against all institutions of political power”, such as parliament (Rocker C1938:17; cf Kropotkin 2001:49). This division was most clearly displayed in history by the “famous, definitive and prognostic” split in 1872 between Marx and Bakunin in the International (Ruins 2003:2; 1871 Sonvillier Anarchist Congress, quoted in Woodcock 1986:229), when the anarchists rejected the proto-state being formed within the international revolutionary organisation. In Bakunin’s terms, “The smallest and most inoffensive State is still criminal in its dreams” (Bakunin quoted in Camus 1951:126; cf Bakunin 1980: 143), and anarchists consistently argue that an instrument of oppression cannot be used for the liberation of the oppressed. For this reason, anarchists rejected revolutionary strategies aimed at ‘capturing the state’ and insisted instead that “Freedom can only be created by freedom, that is, by a universal popular rebellion and the	+	March, 2023
−	free organisation of the working masses from below upwards” (Bakunin 1981:42-3; cf Goldman 1980:154).	+	Emerican Johnson
−	I do not wish to examine traditional anarchist history in any depth, however. In line with the assessment of Woodcock that I shall consider in section 2.3.2,1 feel that anarchy is best understood as an <em>ideal,</em> which provokes and inspires many different manifestations according to different historical circumstances. None of these is ‘pure’ anarchy - a correct model for all descendants to copy - but an attempt to realise unbounded freedom within a specific context The historical situation, the technology and culture, the needs and desires of the people of the time and the challenges they face all play a part in the form of anarchism which they develop (Welsh & Purkis 2003:5). As Purkis & Bowen put it, “Anarchy has many masks which are all important and this diversity cannot be united under one banner” (1997:1). In exploring specific contemporary examples of anarchism in this thesis, and offering insights that affect our understanding of anarchism as a whole, my intention is to enlarge and diversify our understanding of anarchism, and <em>not</em> to attempt an everlasting or definitive analysis. There are, however, five recurring tenets of anarchism that may be used to help identify it. We have here introduced the first, anti-authority, and I will now turn to the second, freedom.	+	=== A Message From ''The International Magazine'' ===
−	*** 2.2.2 Freedom	+	''The International Magazine'' began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.
−	“to look for my happiness in the happiness of others, for my own worth in the worth of all those around me, to be free in the freedom of others - that is my whole faith, the aspiration of my whole life” (Bakunin 1990b: xv-xvi; cf Kropotkin 1987:222).	+	Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.”
−	The one substantive principle we have thus far is that anarchists are opposed to authority. The converse of this is that they are in favour of a type of freedom in which there is no authority. John Henry Mackay sums up what this ideal signifies in a couplet:	+	To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”
−	“I am an Anarchist! Where I will	+	We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.
−	Not rule, and also ruled I will not be!” (quoted in Goldman 1969:47).	+	After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.
−	Thus anarchist freedom is not the same as individual license, which can be oppressive and exploitative (Ritter 1980: 24). The libertine or ‘negative’ liberty of individualism may reach its apotheosis in both antisocial egotism, and in neo-liberal, unregulated capitalism. Both of these are antithetical to anarchism (Chan 2004: 119; <em>TCA</em> 7(1) 2005: 31; Zerzan 1991: 5).[3] For anarchism to make any sense, one’s individual liberty must be matched by a social freedom, in which no-one is denied their own liberty by, for example, lack of resources and opportunities: “freedom to become what one is”, in Read’s terms (1949:161; cf Berlin 1967:141; MacCallum 1972). Carter extends this anarchist conceptualisation of freedom into the green sphere, where he argues “the freedom to act so as to compromise ecological integrity is, in the long run, freedom-inhibiting” (1999:302; cf Wieck 1973:95). We shall see this argument deployed particularly in the case of cars (section 7.4), but also underlying much green activism.	+	We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.
−	Representing the viewpoint of social anarchism, Bakunin argues that our individual freedom is given us by society, and that “this liberty... far from finding itself checked by the freedom of others, is, on the contrary confirmed by it” (quoted in Bookchin 1995a: 74; cf ACF c 1991:42; Woodcock 1992: 82[4]).	+	If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of ''The International Magazine'' online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!
−	Such is the hope of social anarchists, summed up by Malatesta when he states that their ideal is “complete liberty with complete solidarity” (in Woodcock 1980: 64; cf Malatesta 1974:27; Walter 2002:29; Ritter 1980:3; Hill 1973:35). Such is the noblest ideal of anarchism, and it emerges in all	+	In solidarity,
−	kinds of ways throughout anarchist theory and practice. In 4.3.4 we will underline the place of freedom within the anarchist method of revolution.	+	The Editorial Team of ''The International Magazine''
−	I am only touching here upon an issue that is of the highest importance to some anarchist individualists, who part company with social anarchists on precisely these grounds of individual liberty (Miller 1984: 14; cf Carroll 1974:47; Caudwell 1977:72). To my own project, however, this issue has proved largely irrelevant, which perhaps demonstrates how far within the realm of social anarchism (not individualism) the eco-activists of my study are. The reason for this could be that the very impulse to and practice of activism is an embodiment of individual social responsibility. Zinn sums this up with the idea that, “To the extent that we feel free, we feel responsible” (1997:632).	+	=== Notes on Translation ===
−	Brown explains how the anarchist understanding of freedom moves one into an opposition to state power and domination:	+	Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.
−	“Anarchists understand that freedom is grounded in the refusal of the individual to exercise power over others coupled with the opposition of the individual to restrictions by any external authority. Thus, anarclu’sts challenge any form of organisation or relationship which fosters the exercise of power and domination. For instance, anarchists oppose the state because the act of governing depends upon the exercise of power, whether it be of monarchs over their subjects or, as in the case of a democracy, of the majority over the minority” (1996:150; cf Brown 1989: 8-9).	+	One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.
−	We will examine the anarchist view of power in 2.2.5, but let us for now recognise that the anarchist hostility to government lies not in a grasping desire for personal power, but is based on an <em>ethical</em> desire for social freedom. If there are self-proclaimed anarchists who act solely for their own gain, then they have little relation to anarchism as a political theory.	+	I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).
−	*** 2.2.3 Rebellion	+	As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.
−	“As man seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy” (Proudhon in Woodcock 1980:10).	+	March, 2023
−	The key belief held by anarchists is that government is at best useless, and more commonly the source of society’s ills and suffering. The converse of this belief is that people without government are able to create a just society that caters to everyone’s needs (Bookchin 1989a: 174; Barclay 1986). Thus Harper states that “Anarchy is pretty simple when you get down to it - people are at their very best when they are living free of authority, co-operating and deciding things among themselves rather than being ordered around” (1987: vii).	+	Luna Nguyen
−	[[m-d-michael-duckett-ecological-direct-action-and-t-58.png][Figure 2.1 The Circled A]]	+	=== Guide to Annotations ===
−	This is where the symbol of anarchy, the circled A illustrated in Figure 2.1, acquires one of its interpretations: ‘Anarchy is Order’[5]. This is a counter-intuitive statement when anarchy is so universally associated with chaos and rebellion. But within a society warped by authority and law, anarchists champion spontaneous expressions of revolt and creativity: “Anarchists are forced to become what politicians describe them as: ‘agents of disorder’“ (Meltzer 2000; cf Jasper 1999: 359). In a world so upside-down that following normal, everyday life means conniving in oppression and exploitation, the expression of a ‘natural’ or ethical order may well take the form of protest or resistance. As Wilde phrased it: “Disobedience, in the eyes of anyone who has read history, is man’s original virtue. It is through disobedience that progress has been made, through disobedience and through rebellion” (in Woodcock 1980: 72; cf Chumbawamba in <em>Schnews</em> 1999; Heller 1999 [C]: 108-109). A demonstration that this theme is still current is demonstrated in Figure 2.2.	+	This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.
−	[[m-d-michael-duckett-ecological-direct-action-and-t-57.jpg][Figure 2.2 ‘Disobedients’ flyer produced for anti-war protests, 31.10.2001]]	+	These annotations will take the following forms:
−	Here we are provided with a justification for focussing on direct action and protest, because this is the place where, according to anarchist theory, the right life of society takes place. In Chapters 4 and 7, however, we will see that protest - and even direct action - is not a sufficient ingredient for anarchism. Values from elsewhere in anarchism may therefore be brought to bear on the practice of activism, and are used to critique it. I clarify this point in my characterisation of ‘anarchism through practice’ in 2.3.6.	+	* Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].
−	While the actual proclivities of anarchists may often be for rebellion and spontaneous creativity, the ultimate goal of a free society is defined by order and peace. With this end in view, Kropotkin in the 1910 <em>Encyclopaedia Britannica</em> gives perhaps the most authoritative definition of anarchism[6]:	+	-----
−	“a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government - harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilised being” (1910: 914).	+	Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.
−	We may note that this is an <em>organisational</em> definition: perspectives on organisation occupy a central place within anarchist political theory, and we will encounter the issue of both theoretical and practical organisation in every chapter of this thesis. What ; wish to make clear here is that, notwithstanding the many peaceful and constructive attempts to build anarchist structures and cultures in the here and now, anarchism more than any other ideology is one of contestation, opposition and active resistance. As an ideological support for the kind of protests and actions covered in this thesis, from sit-down protests to inner-city street-fighting, anarchism is unsurpassed.	+	-----
−	<br>	+	We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.<br />
−	*** 2.2.4 Human Nature	+	=== Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note ===
−	Anarchists are commonly accused of having an over-optimistic view of human nature (Adams 1993: 172-3; Heywood 1994:28). This is because they have argued that, left to its own devices, humanity would naturally choose a non-exploitative society based on natural solidarity: “This does not mean that anarchists think that all human beings are naturally good, or identical, or perfectible, or any romantic nonsense of that kind. It means that anarchists think that almost all human beings are sociable, and similar, and capable of living their own lives and helping each other” (Walter 2002:28; cf Woodcock 1980:18; Heller [C] 1999:85-88[7]).	+	In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.
−	Carter states that the supposedly over-optimistic account in anarchism is “an over-simplification” and “a perennial half-truth that deserves to be critically examined” (1971:11-16; cf Miller 1984:76-7). Instead, “Anarchists are proprietors of a double-barrelled conception of human nature”, in which “Egoism is balanced by sociability” (Morland 1997a: 12-13). Humans are neither intrinsically good nor bad, but they have the <em>potential</em> for both. As Proudhon writes:	+	With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:
−	“Authority and liberty are as old as the human race; they are bom with us, and live on in each of us. Let us note but one thing, which few readers would notice otherwise: these principles form a couple, so to speak, whose two terms, though indissolubly linked together, are nevertheless irreducible one to the other, and remain, despite all our efforts, perpetually at odds” (quoted in Purkis & Bowen 1997: 6; cf Marshall 1989:45; Walter 2002:53).	+	Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism
−	Even Kropotkin (generally considered the most optimistic of the classical anarchists) balances his identification of innate solidarity with an equally natural tendency to ‘self-assertion’ that can lend itself to authoritarianism (2001:110; Miller 1984:73).	+	Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought
−	The anarchists’ double-barrelled concept of human potential is seen as a “central tension within their ideology”, and has been claimed as a healthy thing and a strength (Morland 1997a: 16; cf Morland 1997b). Miller states that the anarchists view ‘human nature’ not as a fixed quality, but rather as something that varies (within limits) according to the social and political context in which particular members of the species find themselves (1984:63-69). Faith in the potential of human nature is essential to all projects of radical change (Ball & Dagger 1991: 13-16; Porritt 1986: 195; Pepper 1993: 113; Doherty 2002; 77), and is commonly expressed in contemporary EDA: “We are all weapons of mass construction” (Our Mayday 2003b). The anarchist position on human nature is what underlies and justifies the anarchist strategies for social change and their vision of a harmonious future society without the need for authority. It is the anarchists’ distrust of power, meanwhile, that explains their distinctive political strategies, and it is this that we will look at now.	+	Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
−	*** 2.2.5 Power	+	Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.
−	“authority depraves, submission to authority debases” (Bakunin to a nurse on his deathbed, quoted in Skirda 2002:38).	+	We hope this book will be of use to you.
−	Taken out from its liberal heritage, Lord Acton’s statement that “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (quoted in Purkis & Bowen 1997:19) is one with which anarchists heartily agree (Martin 1998). In a sense, it sums up the anarchist message, and justifies the anarchist political vision. If the more power one has, the more likely one is to abuse it then, so argue the anarchists, power must be ‘destroyed’ (or dispersed) so that everyone has an equal amount (TCA 7(1) 2005: 27). Bakunin argued on this basis that “Power must be dispersed ... not so much because everyone is always good, but because when power is concentrated some people tend to become extremely evil” (in Woodcock 1980:109; cf Carter 1999: 99; May 1994:13; Kropotkin 1972:135; Bakunin 1990a: 134-6; Martin 1998). We thus have a negative grounding for anarchism even if we cannot hold onto the positive hopes of the nineteenth century: “Nobody is fit to rule anybody else” (Meltzer 2000:19).[8]	+	April, 2016
−	Bakunin expresses most clearly the anarchist position by pinpointing their notion of domination:	+	NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT
−	“Whoever talks of political power talks of domination... and those who are dominated quite naturally detest their dominators, while the dominators have no choice but to subdue and oppress those they dominate. This is the eternal history of political power, ever since that power has appeared in the world. This is what also explains why and how the most extreme of democrats, the most raging rebels, become the most cautious of conservatives as soon as they attain to power” (in Maximoff 1953:218; cf Bookchin 1980: 76; Winstanley 1973:78).	+	=== Original Vietnamese Preface ===
−	Anarchists view the state as the most nefarious source of power, but it is not solely against the state that their opposition is directed.[9] Brown states that “Anarchism goes beyond other liberatory movements in opposing oppression in whatever form it takes, without assigning priority to one oppression over another” (1996:154; cf Dominick 1997:11; ACF 1990; Morland 2004: 28). Anarchist writers commonly include in their critique such realms as psychotherapy, criminology, urban planning and technology. Even in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, for example, Bakunin was warning of the dangers of ‘scientism’ in addition to his personal <em>bete noires</em> of religion and the state (1990a: 210-214).	+	To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5<sup>th</sup>
−	Anarchism’s affinity with feminist lines of thinking can be found here. Brown states that, “As anarchism is a political philosophy that opposes <em>all</em> relationships of power, it is inherently feminist. An anarchist who supports male domination contradicts the implicit critique of power which is the fundamental principle upon which all of anarchism is built. Sexist anarchists do exist but only by virtue of contradicting their own anarchism” (1996:153). Feminist theorists analyse power in manner comparable to anarchists, and to certain postmodernists. Pratt, for example, has written that “Instead of a system of patriarchy, we see more local and specific relations of gender domination that are interlocked but fundamentally fragmented and sometimes working in opposition to each other” (1993: 57). I will draw on feminist theorisations and practical tools further in Chapter 3.	+	Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
−	Todd May has done most to argue that anarchism and post-structuralism make excellent bedfellows (1994:13; cf Amster 1998; Franks 2003:23), and suggests that “Micropolitical theory... must be seen as carrying through the anarchist critique of representation” (1994:98; cf Best & Kellner 1991:4; cf Bakunin 1990: 37; Proudhon quoted in Hoffman 1973:52; Morland 2004:25; <em>Evading Standards</em> 1997), illustrated in figure F2.3. Others have sought to draw out the affinities between anarchism and Lyotard and Derrida’s work (Gordon 2000), and the work of Deleuze & Guattari (Bey 1994: 1-6; Newman 2001; Call 1999:100).	+	The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:
−	It is possible to view the development of post-structuralist and deconstructive analysis as providing additional tools for the anarchist tool box. They can reveal hidden forms of domination in places that	+	Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,
−	political struggle might miss (Spivak 1996; Gordon 2000:2.1). The most significant aspect to take onboard is Foucault’s view that “Power not only intervenes in many places; its intervention is of different types” (May 1994:50; cf Foucault 1990:11; Welsh & Purkis 2003: 6). Foucault states that “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (1990: 93). He argues that there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled (no universal ‘class war’), but that power is exercised from innumerable points and is embedded in every relationship (1990:94). Some anarchists have taken Foucault’s work to suggest a support for their own attention to multiple forms of domination and power relationships (Brown 1996: 154; London Anarchist Forum 2000), although his politics have not been felt to match anarchism’s revolutionary optimism (Chomsky & Foucault 1971).	+	Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang
−	Moore is one anarchist who defends the traditional anarchist attitude: “Whether power is suppressive or productive, it is still power: that is to say, it still uses force (whether overtly or insidiously) to construct and define individuals and make them think or act in particular ways. Whether power says ‘thou shalt not...’ or ‘here are your options...’, coercion is involved” (1997:160; cf Carter 1999:94, 99; Bonanno 1998:6; SmartMeme Project 2003: 28; Martin 2001:18; Grassby 2003:109). To the anarchists, a capitalism of consumer choices and manipulated desires is still one of oppression (X in <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 162; IE 2005: 8; Clark 1981:4; cf Marcuse 1969:23; Bauman 1988: 221-223). May, while emphasising the common ground between post-structuralists and anarchists in seeing the “political character of social space... in terms of intersections of power rather than emanations from a source”, is also careful not to imply that this undermines the anarchist prioritisation of the state, because “some points of power, for instance the state, may be more determinative for the social configuration than others” (1994: 5). Heller also raises the activist optimism (contra his reading of Foucault), that it <em>is</em> possible “to open up <em>discursive</em> spaces that do not depend on the use of discourses of domination” (2000:143).	+	Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate
−	Foucault’s particular theorisation of power need not be read in such a way that it undermines the anarchist opposition to power concentrations: rather it has been appropriated and interpreted to support it Thus, while the concept of’power over’ is a zero-sum game, Heller in his study of Faslane Peace Camp has emphasised the many activist manifestations of ‘power with’: a form of power in which everyone benefits through cooperation (2000: 7; cf Cattleprod c200Ia: 2; ESI 2001: 2; Starhawk 1990; Clark [H] 1998: 10-11; Arendt 1958:200; Carter 1999:91; Marshall 1992b: 452; <em>AT</em> 1999; Morris 1998). Heller argues that “the process of resistance is not simply the stripping away of domination, or ‘power’ more generally, to reveal some nascent ‘freedom’, but involves die active creation of a web of relations distinct from that involved in domination” (2000: 8). The notion of’power with’ fits perfectly into anarchist frameworks, and can be used to describe the positive developments that emerge from collective sites of protest. The hope exists, therefore, that forms of positive ‘empowerment’ and collective practices of ‘power-with’ that are manifested in EDA might serve to develop alternatives to the power-over paradigm (Holloway 2002:36).	+	Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,
−	[[m-d-michael-duckett-ecological-direct-action-and-t-56.jpg][Figure 2.3 The Meaning of ‘Representation’ (Bakunin & Warren 1981: 19).]]	+	Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.
−	Best & Kellner support the anarchist dismissal of ‘party, parliamentary, or trade union politics’ (as an outdated ‘modem politics’), in favour of a ‘“postmodern politics’ associated with locally based micropolitics that challenge a broad array o ‘ discourses and institutionalised forms of power” (1991: 5; cf Jordan & Lent 1999: 8; Franks 2003: 29; Brown 1996: 154). Such a position not only justifies my focus on activism in this thesis, but also encourages paying attention to the small-scale micro-level (this is relevant insofar as I APP, for example, was never a ‘big player’ on the national political scene).	+	After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.
−	May notes that, “as Foucault lias seen, the project of political action is not total liberation from oppression, but an expanding of local spaces of situated freedom” (1994: 116; cf Bowen & Purkis 2005: 36). He interprets Foucault to argue that “The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give one’s self the ethics, the ethos, the practice ol self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum o f domination” (May 1994: 123). May’s reading of Foucault’s position that Liberty is a practice” (May 1994: 117) is used to move the terrain of debate onto ethical grounds. I follow him in this, and consider the ethical content of the anarchist tradition equal to the task here given it. I will explore this in section 4.3.4. Anarchist analysis adds ‘bite’ to the pluralistic postmodern attempts at an ethics of freedom, and provides a constant reminder not to brget the larger factors of state and capitalism: I look at this further in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Having looked at the distinctive anarchist views on authority, freedom, rebellion, human nature and power, I will now move away from discussion of the tenets of anarchism to look at the more ideological and existential of anarchism. I will here be addressing such fundamental questions as What is anarchism? What is its source? And how do its ideas relate to reality?	+	MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
−	** 2.3 The Nature of Anarchism	+	=== Table of Contents ===
−	*** 2.3.1 Strength in Flexibility	+	'''Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
−	“anarchism is in essence the least sectarian of doctrines” (Carter 1971:110).	+	'''I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism'''
−	Many people consider anarchism to be an antiquated theory that properly belongs to the nineteenth century and can have no relevance today (Adams 1993: 321; Suskind 1971: 171; Lichtheim 1967: 264). In contrast to other theories, however (particularly Marxism), anarchism has never become ossified into one set doctrine. Woodcock notes that “As a doctrine it changes constantly; as a movement it grows and disintegrates, in constant fluctuation” (1980: 15; cf Cahill quoted in Goaman 2002: 35). The reason for this fluidity lies in the very essence of anarchist theory, as Faure noted in his Encyclopaedia definition quoted in 2.2.1. Anarchism is a flexible array of mutually reinforcing principles that can be applied to any social situation and which can create numerous different applications (Ritter 1980:71). Greenway writes that, “anarchism ... as an approach, a critique, a set of questions to be asked about power relations, rather than a theory or set of answers ... can escape the fate of yesterday’s discarded ideologies” (1997: 177; cf Weir in Bonanno 1990: 11; Cohn & Wilbur 2003). It is this sense of anarchism that I am engaged with in this thesis.	+	1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts
−	In this and the following sections I will argue that the nature of anarchism is practical, not purist; that it is diverse, yet coherent; that it is fundamentally simple, but capable of great complexity, and that it remains a relative approach and not therefore a fixed or essentialised corpus. Unlike the ‘victorious’ ideologies of the twentieth century, “Anarchism can claim ... the equivocal merit of never having really been tried out Not having come to power, it was never discredited in power, and in this sense it presents an untarnished image” (Woodcock 1992:50). Carter states that “Their political failure is also the anarchists’ strength” (1971:1), and Apter notes that this gives anarchism “exceptional moral power. They are released from the burdens of past error” (1971:4). Here, then, anarchism is associated with unworldly ‘purity’ and it is on this basis that critics have condemned it for ineffectuality (Manuel & Manuel 1979: 740; Carter 1971: 107; Nomad 1968:402). However, the movements covered in this thesis are eminently practical, not averse to getting their hands dirty, and have very specific, historically-grounded perspectives to offer. By identifying these movements as anarchist, and charting how they apply anarchist principles to their contexts, I am also therefore demonstrating anarchism to be alive and well, and <em>useful.</em>	+	2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism
−	Commentators (particularly Marxists) have criticised the vagueness and diversity of anarchist doctrine, as “amorphous and full of paradoxes and contradictions” (Miller 1984:2). Indeed some have considered that “The disagreements and differences between anarchisms ... overwhelm the single point on which they agree” (Ball & Dagger 1991: 19; cf Miller 1984:2-3). In this thesis I am arguing the case for at least some coherence and continuity of the anarchist tradition: that it is not a mere mishmash of contradictory romantic ideas. It is nonetheless true that anarchism may be viewed as an exemplar of the definition of ideology made by Adams, who states that	+	'''II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
−	“it is a mistake to regard ideological thinking as a body of accumulating knowledge or wisdom in the manner of science... ideas that are convincing at one time may come to be outmoded and useless at another, but then may be revived with new vigour at yet another time” (1993: 7).	+	1. Objects and Purposes of Study
−	Others, furthermore, view anarchism’s lack of a fixed, theoretically complex ideology (that is complex in the manner that a bureaucracy is complex) as vital to its success. Thus Woodcock notes that “the very nature of the libertarian attitude - its rejection of dogma, its deliberate avoidance of rigidly systematic theory, and, above all, its stress on extreme freedom of choice and on the primacy of the individual judgement - creates immediately the possibility of a variety of viewpoints inconceivable in a closely dogmatic system” (1977: 15; cf Wieck in Hoffman 1973: 95). Anarchist theory’s non-rigidity is the reason why more complex applications are made possible on the ground. Anarchism’s lack of a fixed, top-down blueprint is the reason why innumerable grassroots solutions are made possible.	+	2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method
−	Rocker, furthermore, argues that anarchist theory refuses to set itself in stone, because it has a relativistic (socially contextualised) basis:	+	3. Excerpt from ''Modifying the Working Style''
−	“Anarchism recognises only the relative significance of ideas, institutions, and social forms. It is, therefore, not a fixed, self-enclosed social system, but rather a definite trend in the historic	+	'''Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism'''
−	development of mankind, which, in contrast with the intellectual guardianship of all clerical and governmental institutions, strives for the free unhindered unfolding of all the individual and social forces in life. Even freedom is only a relative, not an absolute concept” (cl938:28- 29; cf Grassby 2002:136).	+	'''I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism'''
−	While Woodcock explains anarchism’s flexibility with reference to the individual’s centrality (and creativity), therefore, Rocker emphasises the position of the theoiy in providing relative, not absolute guidelines. By contrast, the grand theories of Marxism, with their totalising metaphysics and ‘scientific’ methods, have suffered far more from the verdict of history than has anarchism, with predictions proved false and Marxist scholars anxiously rewriting the textbook every few years (May 1994:18; cf Gombin 1979: Holloway 2002: Laclau& Mouffe 1985; Hall & Jacques 1989:14-15; Waterman 2002: 6-7; Kellner 1981). Those strands of anarchism that adopted Marxist theories most wholeheartedly have also suffered, and are under attack from ecological and post-left anarchists, as we shall note in 2.3.3 and 4.2.4.	+	1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues
−	It is important to note that this flexibility is <em>inherent</em> in the essential nature of anarchism, and not a convenient side-effect of having a loose and contradictory bundle of ideas: “a jumble of beliefs without rhyme or reason” in Miller’s terms (1984:3; cf Sylvan 1993:233). Anarchism is the negation of all authority, and the antithesis of fixed systems. As a theory, therefore, anarchism can be applied not only to the political world but also to the very world of theory itself, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter. It will be seen that this anarchist approach does not result in an ‘anything goes’ position, but a deeply ethical matrix of drives. In 2.3.61 will also present a contrast between practical and ideological anarchisms, in which the latter form is critiqued by the former. The fact that such a critique is possible is an indication of the overflowing of anarchist attitudes and arguments beyond any fixed theoretical basis. It is my argument and assumption within this thesis that anarchism is the antithesis of abstraction: it is dynamic, it is lived and it only has substance through its relationship to the real world. Any exposition of anarchism that is removed from this reality is not really about anarchism at all.	+	2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism
−	*** 2.3.2 History and the Idea	+	'''II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'''
−	“Anarchism properly has no history - i.e. in the sense of continuity and development. It is a spontaneous movement of people in particular times and circumstances. A history of anarchism would not be in the nature of political history, it would be analogous to a history of the heart-beat. One may make new discoveries about it, one may compare its reactions under varying conditions, but there is nothing new of itself’ (Spark quoted in Haiper 1987: vi).	+	1. Matter
−	Anarchism claims to be relevant to every age, from the time before histoiy began to the unimaginable worlds of the future. The ideal of complete freedom, and the use of that yardstick to judge contemporary structures/strictures inadequate to the full realisation of humanity, is a perspective that cannot age with time. Only its particular manifestations and historical expressions alter. Despite its flexibility and fluidity, anarchism nonetheless constitutes a tradition still. Apter notes that “Anarchism may appear to be dead when it is dormant and exceptionally fresh when it springs to life” (1971:2). Even critical commentators like Green recognise that “Anarchism has had more lives than the proverbial cat. It is as old as resistance to oppression” (1971:19; cf Woodcock 1980:453).	+	2. Consciousness
−	In 1961, Woodcock wrote an obituary of the ‘classical’ anarchist movement whose greatest moment had been Spain, and whose irrelevance to the modem world was being made apparent by its ever- dwindling following (1992:42). In 1968, however, he returned to these words in a state of astonishment, because the late sixties had witnessed an upsurge in the popularity of anarchism amongst a new constituency (‘second-wave anarchism’). This renewed enthusiasm for anarchist ideals might appear to have rendered his gloomy prediction false, yet it actually underlined an important point he had made. As he explains, “The anarchists of the 1960s were not the historic anarchist movement resurrected; they were something quite different, a new manifestation of the idea” (1992:45; cf Perlin 1979:27; Bonanno 1998: 15). We may view the EDA of this thesis in the same light	+	3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness
−	The anarchist view of history is quite different from that of Marxism, because for anarchists, history is ultimately a matter of will (Miller 1984:79; Clark 1981:3; Pouget 2003: 7-8). Morland writes that “The course of history cannot be mapped out according to the development of the relations and the forces of production” (1997a: 14), and Marshall states that there “is no pre-ordained pattern to history, no iron law of capitalist development, no straight railroad which we have to follow. Although it is always made on prior circumstances, history is what we make it; and the future, as the past, can be either authoritarian or libertarian depending on our choices and actions” (1992b: 144; cf IE 2005:6; Routledge & Simons 1995:481). This, in common with much anarchist theoiy, is remarkably simple as a basic idea, but it becomes highly complex once applied, as the strategic debtes of EDA activists considered later in the thesis will reveal.	+	4. Meaning of the methodology
−	Even in a nineteenth century ‘modernist’ world, anarchists rejected any simple faith in ‘progress’, so that “the anarchist theory of history is not linear but dualistic” (Miller 1984:73-75). The dualism lies between authority and freedom. Proudhon, for example, disagreed with Hegel, holding that thesis and antithesis are <em>not</em> be resolved in a synthesis, but rather exist in an unstable balance (Proudhon 1970: 229; cf Gordon 2000:4.2). Woodcock suggests that “the formula is almost Heraclitean; it suggest the flux of never-ending change rather than the dialectical forward movement of the Hegelians and the Marxists... it suggests contradiction as a positive and productive element, and equilibrium as a dynamic condition in a world that changes constantly and never reaches the stillness of perfection because imperfection is a cause and consequence of its everlasting movement” (1977:27; cf Best & Kellner 1991: 81; Deleuze & Guattari 1983: 157). I take this notion of non-stillness and the acceptance of difference on board for this thesis — both for the practice of EDA, whose acceptance of difference is demonstrated in section 5.2.3, and in theory, as I will consider further in Chapter 4.	+	'''Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics'''
−	The anarchist perspective on history sees a constant struggle between liberation and authority, between freedom and oppression (Bookchin 1971:211; cf Mumford 1973:465). The role of the anarchist in each age is therefore to seek to extend freedom in every way possible, because if freedom is not practised and tested, it will be taken away. As Morland writes, “History has taught anarchists that they should be prepared to grasp any opportunity that presents itself for moving in the direction of a freer society, whilst paying attention to human nature and avoiding any repetition of past mistakes in the twenty-first century” (1997a: 21). The chief’mistake’ in this regard (and the historical trump card traditionally raised against Marxists in debate), is the corruption of the Russian Revolution into a party dictatorship. In Chapter 5 I will explore these perspectives in the terms of institutionalisation and radicalisation.	+	'''I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics'''
−	Anarchist theory thus supports a strategy which continually presses against society in search of its weak-points, trying to open up areas that would make revolutionary change possible (Kropotkin 2001: 143). The view of history as determined by will is logically an activist standpoint - it justifies action, on however small a scale. Anarchists thus hold onto their belief in the infinite possibility of mankind. “Given the right circumstances, human nature can be transformed from that which corresponds to the climate of economic liberalism to that which maintains the establishment of an anarchist-communist society” (Morland 1997a: 15). This perspective has been criticised as ‘the voluntarist fallacy’ by both internal and external critics (<em>CW</em> 1997: 12; <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003:14; <em>Schnews</em> 2004: 1;	+	1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics
−	Thompson 1978: 99; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:197; Atkinson 1991:214), yet it stands at the heart of activist anarchism and it has often achieved what the critical commentators are unable to predict. As an EF!er has argued, “it is only by attempting the impossible that real progress has been achieved” (Jeff 1998).	+	2. Materialist Dialectics
−	*** 2.3.3 Orthodoxy and ‘Second Wave’ Anarchism	+	'''II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'''
−	“It might naively have been imagined that anarchism would be the one school of thought where the very grounds for... proprietoriality were necessarily absent, but apparently not” (Gordon 2000:4).	+	1. The Principle of General Relationships
−	In this chapter, I have been utilising points made by a range of anarchist writers, but these do not all recognise each other as legitimate. Class-struggle anarchists denigrate Woodcock, for example, as the embodiment of mid-twentieth century ‘liberal’ anarchism (AF 1996a: 15; cf Franks 2003:36), and insist that “Now, as circumstances within capitalist society change, class struggle anarchism is reasserting itself’ (AF 1996c: 17). But the AF’s claim is as controversial as that of Woodcock. All claims regarding the truth or orthodoxy of anarchism are <em>actively contested</em> by other anarchists: I mustn’t allow this heterogeneity to be subsumed under my <em>own</em> viewpoint and authorial decisions. Indeed, the idea of ‘orthodoxy’ within anarchism is a contradiction within its own terms (Henderson 1998). Yet, frequently anarchists of various stripes <em>are</em> accused of attempting to impose such orthodoxies on the rest, and there are innumerable debates over what counts as legitimate anarchism and what does not. It is this range of anarchist streams that I wish to clarify now.	+	2. Principle of Development
−	When a particular stream of anarchism achieves dominance, however, this is only a relative dominance, based on numbers and persuasive power. It will almost immediately generate critics and opposition - hence the frequent cries of ‘ideologist!’ - and any bubble of’orthodoxy’ will quickly be pricked. In this way, the ongoing (and tempestuous) movement of’anarchism’ is perpetually rebuilt and reconstituted. Thus Kropotkin writes that anarchism “comprises in its midst an infinite variety of capacities, temperaments and individual energies: it excludes none. It even calls for struggles and contentions” (quoted in Gordon 2000:4.1). This ongoing dispute and dissensus hones the criticality of anarchism, but such conflict can also be damaging, as Plows notes in the case of the eco-activist movement (2002a).	+	'''III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'''
−	There are, then, many formulations of anarchism, or ‘anarchisms’ (Franks 2003:18; Bowen & Purkis 2005:11). I do not wish to spend much time over the separate schools. The historical differences that lie between Bakunin’s anarchist collectivism and Kropotkin’s anarcho-communism, or Proudhon’s mutualism and Rocker’s anarcho-syndicalism, are irrelevant to this thesis. As a rough guide, however, I feel it is useful to distinguish classical or class-struggle anarchism from ‘second wave’ currents of anarchism developed from the mid twentieth century, for which “The Situationists represent a convenient marker of the transition point” (Moore 1997:157; cf Goaman 2002:242). Second wave anarchism “is characterised, not by the narrow focus on class, the State and capitalism, but by a project which questions the totality, which seeks the abolition of all forms of control” (Moore letter to <em>Organise!</em> 44 1997:17; cf Moore 1997 :157; Goaman 2002: 62; Bowen & Purkis 2005: 12). The ‘anticivilisation’ or ‘primitivist’ currents of anarchism, which have moved away from a concern for state and capital toward the aim of dismantling industrial capitalism, most technology, most agricultural systems, and city-scale human habitation (for starters), may be placed in this latter bracket. I will look at distinctive aspects of primitivism in 2.3.5 (primitivism as ideology, and primitivism’s claims for being more radical than anarchism), 4.3.1 (views on technology), 4.3.4 (identification with the wild) and 6.5.3 (attitudes to violence). In general, however, I do not believe schools such as primitivism to have moved outside the anarchist orbit: they express recognisably anarchist arguments, engage in recognisably anarchist practice, and within the schools themselves they contain a diversity of views on all the issues dear to anarchists.	+	1. Private and Common
−	I consider it questionable whether the ‘second wave’ tendency is in any way <em>superior</em> to classical anarchism. Boookchin implies that classical anarchists have had their day when he states that “Despite their many insights, anarchosyndicalism, Proudhonianism, and Bakuninism belong to an irrecoverable past. They do not lack ideological coherence and meaning ... but they speak to epochs that have faded into history. There is much that they can teach us, but their significance has long been transcended by historically new issues” (1996:24). But ‘second wave’ anarchism has not, in my view, demonstrated itself to be more appropriate to contemporary conditions (Bowen & Purkis 2005:13), and it has certainly not eclipsed the ‘classical’ anarchism that it opposes. In the UK, class-struggle anarchism of the ‘classical’ kind still appears to be dominant[10]: the written contributions of’second-wave’ anarchists, for example, are generally disappointing. Representatives of both ‘classical’ and ‘second wave’ anarchism are, furthermore, involved in eco-activism (and contribute to the debates which I assess in this thesis), but neither define it[11].	+	2. Reason and Result
−	Nevertheless, there are some (non-essential and non-defining) elements of historical anarchism that have been dropped in recent decades. As I have noted, a view of human nature as essentially ‘good’ is both peripheral and discredited, and may accordingly be rejected. Also, in my view, the degree to which anarchists drew their succour from Marxist ideas, is the degree to which they have become outdated, specifically with regard to ‘productivism’; class-struggle as the over-riding theme; and the proletariat as revolutionary subject: see 4.2.4. Any “a-priori assumptions” and reductive elements in anarchism may also be criticised (May 1994: 61). I should note, however, that classical anarchism held a much stronger and more flexible notion of, for example, revolutionary change than the version critiqued by recent commentators. I shall consider something of this in later sections, where I shall also make clear that the really significant conflicts and disagreements amongst anarchists are those relating, not to ideology, but to strategy (Epstein 1991: 17). Now, I wish to move away from the ‘fixing’ of such streams to a more fruitful exploration of the <em>sources</em> of anarchism. I argue that anarchism is found in an emotion of’love and rage’, a super-criticality, and a distinctive practice.	+	3. Obviousness and Randomness
−	*** 2.3.4 Emotion	+	4. Content and Form
−	“The rationalist discourse of Enlightenment political philosophy can only hope to address the rational faculties ... If anarchism is to touch people then it must reach into their unconscious, and activate their repressed desires for freedom” (Moore 1998; cf Thompson 1978:367; Zinn 1997:655).	+	5. Essence and Phenomenon
−	I wish to state something of what I consider to be the core ‘spirit’, or ‘mood’ of anarchism. I do this because no purely theoretical elaboration of anarchism will capture its essence. I feel it is legitimate to address the question of what anarchism is in this way, furthermore, because anarchism allots an important place to the emotional and affective element of thinking. It is a doctrine of the heart as well as of the head.	+	6. Possibility and Reality
−	Joli notes that “The rationalist streak in anarchism is balanced through the history of anarchism by an anti-rationalist one” (1971:213; cf Ritter 1980: 68). Not all anarchists view themselves as ‘serious’. Rather, anarchists promote ‘play’ as an alternative paradigm to ‘work’ (‘Maybe’ 2000:3; Ward 1988: 88-94; Read 1954; Black 1996; Freedom Press 1997): I explore the ludic element of anarchism with the study of ‘Reclaim the Streets’ in section 7.4.	+	'''IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics'''
−	Of equal importance is the <em>moral</em> dimension of anarchism. Woodcock notes that “All anarchism has... a moral-religious element which distinguishes it from ordinaiy political movements” (1977:359; cf AF 2001a: 30). Apter pins this down for us: “The primitive core of anarchism is not so very different from Christianity. That is, it rests on the notion that man has a need, not just a preference, to love” (1971:3). Thus Malatesta, in the speech he made to an Italian courtroom in 1921 after 10 months in jail, defended his faith in “The idea of liberty, of justice, and of <em>love”</em> (in Nomad 1968:43, my italics; cf Richard Turner quoted in Goaman 2002:125; Heller [C] 1999: 6). The central place of this emotion in anarchist history means it is not just a ‘theory’ but a movement of much deeper solidarity (Cohn & Wilbur 2003).	+	1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality
−	Apter explains how most systems of belief prioritise either rationality or emotionality over the subordinated (and thus distorted) other. Within anarchism, however, neither the super-rationalism of a Godwin nor the anti-intellectualism of stereotype can be taken as full embodiments of the anarchist stance. Both tendencies exist, in some tension. Yet this tension can be creative when it encourages the stepping out of conventional ways of thinking and doing. Apter states, “For anarchists the appropriate	+	2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites
−	balance between the two is creativity” (1971:3). Creativity is central to the tactics used in EDA, as demonstrated by the strong emphasis on innovation and creativity in tactics and expression to be found in movement literature. Therefore, the anarchist ‘mood’ which Joli dismissed as “a desire to push things to extremes”, and to pursue “the act of revolution for its own sake” without concerning oneself with the consequences, is better thought of as an “insistence on spontaneity, on theoretical flexibility, on simplicity of life, on love and anger as complementary and necessary components in social as in individual action” (Woodcock 1980:459). It is for this reason that some UK Earth First!ers often sign off their emails or communiques with the words ‘love and rage’: a three-word summation of the anarchist urge.[12]	+	3. Law of Negation of Negation
−	I agree, therefore, that there is a certain temperament to anarchism, but I disagree that this is standardly one of hot-headed or short-sighted ‘extremism’. The attitude of anarchism is one of fierce independence, and one of extended empathy, it is one of anger, yet also one of love, and it is one in which critical reason is allied to emotion in a perhaps unique way. Anarchism is not opposed to rationality, no matter how strong the degree of emotionalism or play.[13] Apter notes that “Behind the appearance of anti-intellectualism there lies a presumptive belief in an ultimate rationality as the common and unifying property of all men if unfettered by an inappropriate system” (1971:6). It is this faith in humanity that underlies the anarchist injunction to allow the spontaneity of the masses to lead the way.[14] This stands in direct contrast to the Leninist conception of a theoretically enlightened vanguard destined to show the way. Anarchists instead talk of the ‘leadership of ideas’ (by which of course they mean <em>anarchist</em> ideas), and they also demonstrate a sincere faith in the power of dialogue and reason. It is on this basis that they reject state laws, as an imposition of arbitrary violence, in favour of the free dialogue and organisation by the people who, being those affected and nearby, are the ones best able to arrange things in the best way.	+	'''Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'''
−	*** 2.3.5 Reason	+	1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness
−	“for God’s sake, when we have demolished all a priori dogmas, do not let us think of indoctrinating the people in our turn” (Proudhon, letter to Marx 17<sup>th</sup> May 1846, in 1970: 1501).	+	2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth
−	It is on grounds of <em>rationality</em> that anarchists oppose <em>theory.</em> “Theory in the view of anarchists should not be an intellectual contrivance because this will reduce freedom and clutter the will with tempting injunctions” (Apter 1971:6; cf Woodcock 1980:14). It is for this reason that there are relatively few theoretical journals for anarchists: “in a future anarchist society we won’t need to read Kropotkin and Malatesta before going out of the house in the morning” (AF 1996a: 23). We might even say that in activist anarchism the place of the theoretical journal is replaced by the critical tool-kit (examples of which I utilise in each chapter), and by faith in the enlightenment that comes from experience and dialogue.	+	'''Afterword'''
−	In this chapter I have been using the terms ‘theory’, ‘ideology’ and ‘anarchwm’ loosely, and I shall continue to do so. I do not accept the complex Marxist definitions of ideology, and instead employ the term in a more narrowly functional capacity, loosely as “action-related systems of beliefs, norms, and ideas” (Rejai 1984: 7; cf Bell [D.S.A.] 2002). When I discuss ‘anarchist theory’ I do so as a matrix of	+	'''Appendices'''
−	<br>	+	Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics
−	arguments and values that are connected in diverse, overlapping and often contested ways: not as a scientific system that can be mapped out to any degree of accuracy. Abstraction does not help here, but che context of dialogue does. Ideology need not be expressed in dense theoretical works, furthermore, but in simple symbolism and through practice, as I shall consider in the next section.	+	Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism
−	First, we should recognise that ‘Ideology’ can be used as a swear-word amongst anarchists, and consider why this is so. Neal, for example, states that “the ideologue is a closeted authoritarian” (1997), and Vaneigem argues that “all ideologies are totalitarian. Cut off from the very life they are supposed to represent... they invariably take over a repressive power’ i. 1994: 7; cf IE 2005: 3). Ideology is condemned for its abstraction and its authoritarianism. <em>Organise!</em> contrast ideology to the process and needs of rational argument (AF 1996a: 42: cf Watson 1997; Minogue 2000: 94), and Jarach makes a similar distinction: “Critical thinking leads to theory, where life is examined with a mixture of objective and subjective analysis. Ideology, on the other hand, leads to pat answers that have been previously formulated according to particular agendas” (<em>Anarchy</em> 53 2002: 57; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 123; ‘cw(3po)’ 2002: 3; <em>TCA</em> 5(1) 2002: 6; POO 1998: 2). This commonly voiced rhetorical position leads to some interesting contradictions. Later in the thesis, for example, I will draw on <em>Green Anarchist’s</em> opposition to ideological anarchists, but GA’s own ideological output is considerable (demonstrated for example by 25% of their total articles being editorial articles) (Atton 2002: 109).	+	Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics
−	I join those like Laclau who condemn ‘ideology’ as the desire for total closure by political projects and movements < 1983: 24; Jasper 1999: 351-355). Anarchism is not about deciding what will and must happen, but about an open future in which we can all take part. Hence the Cunningham Amendment (<em>TCA)</em> state that they “are on guard against the blueprints of the Left and the Right. Context is always ongoing. New events unfold hour by hour’ (<em>TCA</em> 3(1) 2001: 19), and provide a warning against tendencies antithetical to the open dialogical spirit in F2.4:	+	Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge
−	ALWAYS identify the INTENTION of a Dominant voice. Mostly, you will find their words addressed to shoring-up their own standing. BEWARE!	+	Appendix E: Properties of Truth
−	The ELITE have no monopoly on the Dominant voice. Listen in to the ferocity of in-your- face Feminism or the DISEMBODIED drone of class-analysis.	+	Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism
−	The voice of the Other is not required	+	'''Glossary and Index'''
−	Beware the Monological voice. The voice ol the Utner is not rcqu.icu and answers are not expected. Encoding itself in high language the Monological voice will seek to impose limits on lesser voices. It declines to enter into dialogue with voices other than its own. And it deems itself sufficient to explain all the events of the world.	+	<br />
−	[[m-d-michael-duckett-ecological-direct-action-and-t-28.jpg][Figure 2.4 ‘Beware the Monological Voice’ (<em>TCA 5</em> 11 2002: 7).]]	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-3.png|''“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”'']]
−	The arrival of’Primitivism’ has supplied an interesting demonstration and clarification of the anarchist view on ‘ideology’. The primitivists denied that they were promoting a new political ideology because they opposed “all systems, institutions, abstractions, the artificial, the synthetic, and the machine, because they embody power relations” (Moore c 1997: 4). This opposition to all ‘ideologies’ also led primitivists to deny being “anarchists per se, but pro-anarchy, which is for us a living, integral experience, incommensurate with power and refusing all ideology’’ (<em>Fifth Estate</em> quoted in Moore c!997:2).	+	<br />
−	In a similar manner to the posturing of Situationists and other anarchists as being the ‘only’ revolutionary position in opposition to a totality of repression, primitivists claimed that “From the perspective of anarcho-primitivism, all other forms of radicalism appear as reformist” (Moore cl 997: 2). This <em>included</em> anarchism.[15] Yet the discourse in which primitivism phrased its own claims to	+	= Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism =
−	radicality bore a remarkable similarity to traditional anarchist arguments (Moore cl997: 5), and others were able to define primitivism’s opposition to the ‘totality’ of civilisation (as opposed to just capitalism and state), as an <em>extension</em> of anarchist principles (BGN 2002 : 13 >.[16] The primitivist condemnation o: anarchism actually demonstrated a continuity, in so far as it was grounded in anarchist values, and replayed anarchist arguments, albeit with new inflections, and some new vocabulary.	+	== I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism ==
−	However, it has been claimed that such representations of primitivism reified it into an ideology that never actually existed (Watson 1998: 60). Watson attacked those “tempted to establish a political tendency with its myth o ‘origins, canon, genealogy and pantheon of luminaries” (1998: 58). He states that Moore’s ‘Primitivist primer’ “borders on an attempt to codify a primitivist sensibility. Its catechism-like qtestion-and-answer format and its indirect suggestion of primitivist taxonomy gives it an ‘objective’, descriptive authority. It even comes with a kind of five-point action program, Phrases like ‘From the [ the? ][17] perspective of anarcho-primitivism’ and ‘according to anarcho-primitivists’ abound” (1998: 59). Although denying ideologism, the discourse of primitivists led them to be condemned as “fully-fledged ideologues” themselves (Roy Emery, letter, <em>Freedom</em> 24.1.2004: 6; ‘cw(3po) 2002: 3). As for my own view, I follow Black’s point that, “Like standards and values, the anarchist ‘isms’, old and new, are best regarded as resources, not restraints. They exist for us, not us for them” (2004: 6).	+	=== 1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts ===
−	I he fact that anarchism has no dominant strand means that it is breed to remain in dialogue, at least within certain boundaries. It therefore leaves ‘the answer’ open, and encourages a constant questioning, particularly of those who claim they do have an answer. This may make anarchism a paradigmatic example of discourse: “dialogic, dynamic and riven with contradictions, an interactive process of producing meaning witliin specific historical situations” (Doherty 2002: 89). The <em>TCA</em> employ Bakhtin’s dialogism to underline this aspect of anarchism: meaning lies between people and not within separate voices (5(1)2002: 10). This is illustrated in Figure 2.5.	+	Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx<ref>Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.</ref> and Friedrich Engels<ref>Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.</ref>, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin<ref>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.</ref>. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.
−	All language is social. Even in our thoughts we are in dialogue with other voices. Every utterance I make is unique to its own time and space. And only I can occupy the same unique time and space. No one else can do this for me. Because of this I accept some responsibility for the context of every encounter. Life is to be lived and engaged with. It is to be won by interactive dialogue with real people in real encounters.	+	Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: ''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics,'' and ''Scientific Socialism''.
−	][Figure 2.5 ‘All Language Is Social’ (<em>TCA</em> 5(1 I 2002: 11).]]	+	''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism'' studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.
−	There is no original source of authority within anarchism: the nearest that is commonly attempted is the authority of practice, and of what ‘the people’ (sometimes ‘the working class’) believe or do. This is the opposite standpoint from the ‘approved’ ideology of a regime or revolutionary vanguard. Class War state that vanguardists “never want to admit that maybe they have got it all wrong” (<em>CW</em> 1997: 16), and present their honest self-criticality as the anarchist contrast (1997: 2 i. In interview, TAPPers similarly condemned the SWP on these grounds, of pretending to have answers to every issue, and being dishonest to their followers: see Appendix.	+	Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, ''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics'' studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.
−	Bakunin writes that “As soon as official truth is pronounced ... why discuss anything?” (1972: 302; ci Bakunin 1990a: 220).[18] In Neal’s view, “the anarchist holds that 1’ruth tends to end up in the back pocket of the most powerful” (1997; cf AF 1996a: 23). He advocates that anarchists should hold truth as fundamentally subjective, and states that “Freethinking is the only methodology you can safely rely on, in the absence of external Truth - that is, thinking and evaluating for yourself what is and isn’t” (1997). Neal goes on to argue that this leads not to a-political relativism, but to the matrix of anarchist ethics: “Does anarchist rejection of Truth mean that anarchism, in turn, means anything goes? Yes, and no - that which destroys illegitimate authority is anarchistic; that which doesn’t, isn’t” (1997).	+	''Scientific Socialism''** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.
−	We are here returned to what is simultaneously the source and the end-point of anarchism: freedom. As a contributor to <em>Total Liberty</em> puts it, all forms of anarchism “spring from a single seed, no matter the flowering of their ideas. The seed is liberty. And that is all it is ... Anarchism is not normative ... Liberty is a space in which people may live. It does not tell you how they will live, It says, eternally, only that they can” (Bad Press 2002:13; cf Malatesta 1074:52). I will evaluate what this means in practice in sections 4.3.4 and 5.2.2.	+	-----
−	One more point should be underlined here: that the diversity of opinions within anarchism should be lauded as a strength (Roseneil 2000:123; <em>GA</em> 1997a: 12). Consensus is retained by many activist anarchists as a valued demonstration of collective will. Yet it is rarely prioritised over individual dissent. Lyotard’s celebration of dissensus may be employed here, as he charges that “Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is always bom of dissension” (1984: 75; cf Best & Kellner 1991:166). Many anarchists would agree with Lyotard’s point, and even those who would not (perhaps tired by incessant argument and factionalism), must still recognise the right of everyone to dissent, and to form a different view.	+	==== Annotation 1 ====
−	Anarchism’s reputation for factionalism and dissent is not wholly undeserved (Walter 2002: 51; Mayday2000 2000d). While this may have negative practical impacts for inter-anarchist organising, however, it is a demonstration of strength in the realm of ideology. In section 2.3.2 we noted how anarchism as critique is celebrated even when the manifest movement appears in a sorry state (Ritter 1980: 155; Shatz in Bakunin 1990a: xxxvii3). Apter, for example, states that “At its best [ classical anarchism contains a ] social critique of capitalism as a system and socialism as a form of bureaucratic tyranny’ (1971: 10; cf Goodway 1989:1). Apter hangs the strength and popularity of anarchism on its ability to articulate the reasons behind real faults in the system. He equates anarchism to an analysis that states present arrangements are responsible for these faults, and terms it “a language useful for identifying the more grotesque anomalies of these systems” (1971: 5-12). Apter’s argument is certainly supported in the environmental field, where anarchists lay the blame for environmental disasters on the logic of capitalism (see section 4.3.1). We might note that anarchism’s obsession with power provides it with the chief critical tool here. Jordan states that “‘Power’ is the term that fills the gap, which in one word allows reference to all of the diverse exploitations and oppressions of this world without implying that they are the same exploitations and oppressions” (2002: 146; cf Heller [C] 1999:73).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> A ''worldview'' encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.
−	One further point should be made about the strength of anarchist critique, and that is that it is equally adept at turning inward, and pointing the finger at the anarchist agitators themselves (Franks 2003:19). Young demonstrates this when he states that “It is the insidious counter-revolutionary forces residing ‘inside’ the anarchist movement that has the greatest potential for diverting us from our primary goal of agitating for world social revolution” (in AF 2001a: 3). Situationism has made the most useful contribution here, with the emphasis laid on the “constant danger of any idea being recuperated to the benefit of the present system” (AF 1996a: 23). We will employ this perspective at several points within the thesis, but for now we have said enough about theory. Super-criticality alone does not provide the source of anarchist thought Rather, anarchism is a discourse of practice, of experiment and real-world contestation. Anarchism seeks to be the expression of freedom, and it is with practical activity and relationships that anarchist thought is ultimately concerned.	+	<nowiki>**</nowiki> The word “science,” and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.
−	*** 2.3.6 Practice	+	However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from
−	“Anarchism knows the need for sober thinking, but also for that action which clarifies otherwise academic and abstract thought” (Zinn 1997: 655).	+	Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.”
−	I have already laid out the significance of emotionality and rationality in supporting the anarchist movement. I would now like to emphasise how they are joined by a third, and perhaps most important element of <em>action.</em> In keeping with the general down-grading of theory within anarchism, Meltzer writes that “There were never theoreticians of Anarchism as such, though it produced a number of theoreticians who discussed aspects of the philosophy. Anarchism has remained a creed that has been worked out in practice rather than from a philosophy” (2000:18). I concur that this is so.	+	“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.
−	<em>Organise!</em> are typical in arguing that “there is a reciprocal exchange between ideas and practice which grow from one another” (AF 1997b: 20; cf Bonanno 1998:2). In the ‘unofficial’ stream of anarchistic direct action, also, it is often the case, as at Greenham Common, that “theory and practice ... existed in	+	In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.
−	a feedback loop” (Roseneil 1995: 60). This is also taken to be the case with my own subject. Such an interaction between practice and theory is neither a smooth nor a painless process. What is, however, certain is that “The tightly assumed flow between given theory and advocated practice no longer obtains” (Freeden 2000: 320). Anarchist ideas are constantly formulated and adapted to their context,	+	-----
−	which almost inevitably means that they must compete with other, more dominant or ‘common sense’ ideas. The writers in <em>Organise!</em> recognise this: “Ideas do not spring from the air. Our ideology (and indeed all others) came from a contestation with the very physical forces of our opponents” (AF 1996a: 23). In observing this point, we should recognise that many of the ‘sources’ of anarchist discourse used in this thesis are made ‘on the hoof, and in contest with others. They are rarely equivalent to distant and balanced academic observations, but rather make their appearance as moving, rhetorical positions made in the midst of debate (Benton & Remie Short 1999:2). They therefore owe much of their meaning to their <em>political</em> context, and also to the place they hold within a <em>dialogue (</em> Godwin 1969:310; cf Cox & Barker 2002:12). This does not make them less ‘true’, but it does	+	Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.
−	underline the difficulty of taking such ideas out of context Where possible, I provide the bare bones of this context, and in the case studies I provide more than one expression from within each of the activist-anarchist dialogues.	+	=== 2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism ===
−	As figure F2.4 indicates, anarchists do not bemoan the necessarily contingent and partial basis of their expressions: rather they celebrate it Thus <em>Organise!</em> suggest to their readers, “If the contents of one of the articles in this issue provokes thought makes you angry, compels a response then let us know. Revolutionary ideas develop from debate, they do not merely drop out of the air!” (AF 2001a: 2; cf CW 1997: 2). Discussion is also held to improve thinking, perhaps an obvious point but one worth remembering with regard to my justification of this thesis to anarchists who are suspicious of academic writings. The EDA movement evaluated in the course of my research demonstrated this belief: “one of our strengths has always been that many heads are better than one...so, learn as a group, argue, criticise,	+	There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:
−	pull it apart and develop your own theory” (Notts ef! 1998). The pamphlets put together after Mayday 2000, June 18<sup>th</sup> 1999 and the G8 street party in May 1998 provide good textual demonstrations, the latter inviting people to	+	''1.'' ''Stage of formation and development of Marxism'', as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
−	“help other people learn from our mistakes and set backs	+	''2.'' ''Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism'', as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
−	stop the need for people putting on street parties to keep re-inventing the wheel help street parties be a relevant and effective part of the political process stop street parties disappearing up their own fundamentals and instead move forward boldly and heroically towards glorious eco-anarcho utopia” (GSP 1998:1; cf GTB 2001).	+	==== a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism ====
−	I will conclude this chapter by defining what I term ‘anarchism through practice’ by contrasting it to its proposed opposite of’ideological anarchism’. This borrows from Neal’s distinction between ‘ideological’ anarchists and ‘methodological’ anarchists. Neal argues that ideological anarchists view their anarchism as ‘a set of rules and conventions to which you must abide’, while the methodologists see anarchism as a matter of practice, ‘a way of acting’. His characterisation of the ideological anarchist is worth recording for the accuracy with which it describes such groups as Britain’s <em>Anarchist Federation (AF).</em> This kind of anarchist	+	-----
−	“stresses ideological conformity as the prerequisite for social revolution - in other words, you swallow A,B, and C doctrines and THEN you are an Anarchist Their plan of action revolves around: 1) creating a central Anarchist organisation; 2) educating (e.g. indoctrinating) the working class as to the tenets of Anarchism; 3) thereby building a mass movement; 4) creating a social revolution.	+	==== Annotation 2 ====
−	The [ ideological ] Anarchist is comfortable with the idea of a manifesto, platform, or other guiding doctrine as the means of ‘spreading the gospel’ - their emphasis is unity in thought and action, and ideological conformity as the basis for effective organisation” (1997; cf Bookchin 1995a: 60; <em>Door Die</em> 1999:123).	+	The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.
−	Adams divides the anarchist movement into two streams. One is the ‘specific and self-conscious’ movement (1993:168), the other less well-defined (‘intuitive’ or ‘activist’ in my terms (1993:169)). The ‘intuitive’ or ‘spontaneous’ anarchist movement is generally considered to arise first, and in some situations never declares itself as ‘anarchist’ (Heller [C] 1999: 85-7; Adams 2002; Goldman 1917; Newman 2003). In this thesis I am looking at EF! and the other ‘disorganisations’ and mobilisations that arose from the EDA movement as being rooted in this informal anarchism, and in this I am supported by other commentators (Purkis 2001; Wall 2001:154). This is not to imply that there can be <em>no</em> expression of anarchist ideology in these movements, however - far from it! It is the expressions of ideology, in text, in discussion, in repertoire, strategy and inter-personal practice, that constitute the subject of this thesis and I will be explicitly tying them to anarchist themes, ethics and principles. The crucial difference from an ideological anarchist organisation (or an ideological anarchist thesis), is that I am emphasising the <em>difference</em> and <em>incompleteness</em> contained within these expressions of anarchism (<em>Schnews</em> 1999a: 3). The informality of these activist milieus, the commitment to deeds over words, and the embracing of difference at their heart (<em>Do or Die</em> 1999:108; Hetherington quoted in Seel 1999:119), serves to keep them distinct from the explicit, official or rigid anarchist organisations. This remains true even once we recognise that a fruitful dialogue and interpenetration takes places between the two scenes: indeed the variations in anarchist backgrounds and interprations greatly increases the vitality and expressiveness of the manifestations of anarchism.	+	''- Social-Economical Conditions''
−	Neal states that for the ‘methodological anarchists’ “the methodology of anarchism is more important and vital than the ideology of it” (Neal 1997; cf <em>Black Flag</em> 221 2001:17; Komegger quoted in Epstein 1991: 168). He argues that methodological anarchists “hold that the <em>social struggle</em> itself - <em>propaganda by the deed</em> - politicises and radicalises the masses. When they get a sense of their own empowerment, attained through collective direct action, what you get are ‘anarchised’ people - folks who will understand the ideas of anarchism <em>in practice</em> rather than doctrinally, which is where it matters. You get empowered, active freethinkers, who are not afraid to engage in direct action - in other words, anarchists” (1997). In section 4.3.41 will show how direct action constitutes a threat to capital and state (Grassby 2002:186). The idea that experience can radicalise the subject in an anarchist direction crops up repeatedly in anarchist discourse. Sometimes it is given a class tinge (along the lines of ‘strikes develop class consciousness’), sometimes a democratic or non-violent one, but it is centrally placed in the worldview of anarchism. I will focus on this theme of ‘empowerment’ in section 5.2.2.	+	Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.
−	Another important aspect to the ‘methodology’ or practice of anarchism is that it is not, and cannot be, <em>purist</em> in the sense that anarchism’s opponents charge it with: see 2.3.1. Kropotkin stated “It is only those who do nothing who make no mistakes” (2001:143; cf Bowen 2005:122). Neal argues that “there is that which works, and that which doesn’t and degrees between those points. If one strategy doesn’t work, you adjust until you find one that <em>does</em> work” (1997). Anarchism as practised and performed is grounded by the realities of its lived context and environment It simply could not exist, in the vibrant and diverse ways that I explore in this thesis, if it was immediately self-defeating or unreal. This is why I consider the practice of activism and direct action so crucial to an understanding of anarchism today.	+	-----
−	Malatesta states that “its beacon is solidarity and freedom is its method. It is not perfection, it is not the absolute ideal which like the horizon recedes as fast as we approach it; but it is the way open to all progress and all improvements for the benefit of everybody” (1974:47). This idea, of performative freedom and of means-ends convergence, provides a rich source for ethical critique. I shall build on this understanding in the later chapters.	+	==== Annotation 3 ====
−	** 2.4 Anarchist Theory: Conclusion	+	Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.
−	In this chapter, I hope first of all to have established the key tenets of anarchism, defining distinctive anarchist perspectives on authority, freedom, rebellion, human nature and power, that will be used to inform our study of EDA. I also hope to have developed an understanding of the nature of anarchism’s existence (in text, history and sensibility): to have conveyed a sense of what it actually means to talk of an entity termed ‘anarchism’. Anarchism exists as both a pure ideal or standard, and as a rugged, hands-on practice; as both a site and expression of passion (outrage, anger, desire), and a rational critique constantly engaged in questioning, testing, and searching for better answers. I hope to have established that anarchism is both a body of coherent ideas, developed and refined through the ages, and also a practice of just ‘getting on with it’ in the here and now. It is deeply individual and fundamentally communal, cynical and generous, practical and idealist I have therefore presented anarchism not as a static, textbook ideology, but as a matrix of reason, values and experience that is fluid, flexible and ‘involved’, which means it is both grounded and fractured at the same time. As such, I shall not in this thesis be deciding for the reader which forms of protest and sentiment are officially, correctly anarchist, and gathering them together under a new eco-anarchist catechism for our times. Rather, I shall be exploring some of the places of contestation, experimentation and discussion, that have been the ‘hotbeds’ of anarchism in recent years. As W.S. Landor is quoted with regard to a Street Party, “Call those bodies of men anarchical which are in a state of effervescence” (<em>Guardian</em> 17.7.1996). Of course there are stronger and weaker expressions of anarchism, some more articulate and some less clear, but it is the interaction between all of these that constitutes the anarchism that I believe actually exists out there. Anarchism is found in the arguments around the campfire; in the moment when an individual places her body in the way of destruction; and in the relationships, sharing of skills and the mutual (often tense) development of ideas that EDA has provided so many vibrant sites of.	+	''Means of production'' are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. ''Capitalism'' is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.
−	In this chapter, I hope to have presented an anarchism that can be entered into, and brought to bear against the different contexts that I shall assess in this thesis. In examining anarchist practice from within an anarchist framework, I sidestep any assumptions of non-subjective, once-and-for-all ‘truth’. Indeed I suggest that anarchism, at least in a broad sense, must become our assumption (our premise and our framework) in order for us to examine its internal dialogues and manifestations. In other words, if we fail to move beyond the question ‘is this anarchist?’, then we will not be able to see the diverse richness of anarchism. Without claiming an exclusive right to name and define these practices, therefore, I am nonetheless examining eco-activist actions as expressions of anarchist ideology. The next chapter will define my approach and method for doing this. Carter laments that “to the extent that the political theory of many greens is anarchist, it is likely to be rejected out of hand by most academic political theorists, who, by and large, simply dismiss anarchism as lacking in any sophistication” (1999:332). The theoretical and strategic sophistication of anarchism is one of the chief foci of my study. By <em>not</em> dismissing anarchism as idle dreaming or naivete, I believe (like Carter and the anarchist researchers profiled in section 1.3) that we can gain a much better grasp of the true nature of today’s environmental challenge, and our responses to it. It is just possible that the anarchists are right - that a thousand ‘Earth Summits’ and inter-governmental treaties can do nothing in the face of global capitalism, and that authoritarian solutions only give rise to further problems. For this reason, if nothing else, the anarchistic perspective of the grassroots eco-activists must be given a hearing.	+	Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see ''The Principle of General Relationships'', p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.
−	Having established the theoretical framework for my thesis, I must now explain the methodology that I have used to obtain and analyse the data on which the thesis is based. This is the purpose of the next chapter. The next chapter will build on the theoretical foundations I have laid out in this chapter, and particularly: opposition to top-down authority; the underestimated capability of human actors; the pemiciousness of unequal power relations; flexibility; non-dogmatism; the validity of emotion; criticality; and a keen attention to practice.	+	The ''proletariat'' are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who ''do'' own means of production: the ''bourgeoisie''. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.
−	* 3. Methodology	+	According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the ''petty'' ''bourgeoisie'' and the ''lumpenproletariat''. Marx defined the ''petty bourgeoisie'' as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
−	** 3.1 Introduction	+	In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:
−	This chapter is grouped into three bands. In the first band, sections 3.2.1- 3.2.4,1 look at the salient theoretical and methodological issues involved in an anarchist project of research, as developed by previous researchers and theorists. I turn to my own experience in the later bands (sections 3.3.1 - 3.4.5), and contextualise my thesis within the actual practice of my research. My overall aim is to develop a methodology that remains ‘true’ to anarchist values, and to the activists who are the subject of the research process. In this introductory section I will first run through the content and progression of the different sections, and then introduce my personal approach to an anarchist methodology of research.	+	<blockquote>
		+	... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.
		+	</blockquote>
−	In 3.2.1, Anarchist Perspectives, I begin by establishing some basic anarchist perspectives on thought, knowledge and ideas, and I maintain that these are also the perspectives of many of the activists in this study, therefore allowing us to explore EDA on ‘home terms’. In 3.2.2, Critiques of Dominant Epistemology and Theory, I extend these perspectives with critiques developed by feminist and other socially-engaged academics, concerning the dominant norms of’objectivity’, more accurately viewed from the anarchist perspective as a power-encoded ‘epistemology of rule’. I use the traditional anarchist example of law to clarify the anarchist opposition to such statist objectivity. I then use the situationists to condemn abstract theory, and feminist perspectives to find practical ways out of the revolutionary-purist trap.	+	Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:
−	With the critique of orthodox theory, objectivity and neutrality established, I move on to a consideration of the alternative approaches developed by feminists, anthropologists, and critical geographers, amongst others, and define these according to criteria of partisanship, participation, and an anarchist ethic of dialogue. In 3.2.3, Political Approaches to Research, I consider views of the role of the intellectual put forward by anarchists, critical realists and postmodernists, and explain my distance from the latter two positions. Having recognised the activists of my study to be themselves capable, enquiring, active agents, I define the role of the researcher in terms of a dialogue founded on anarchist ethics and an equal social relationship: not speaking ‘on’ or ‘for’ activists, but ‘with’ and ‘as’ one of them. In 3.2.4, A Personal Approach to Research, I explain my own personal subject position, and justify using qualitative and reflexive techniques of participant observation and insider ethnography, albeit referenced with textual records of the discussions and ideas shared in EDA.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.
−	In the sections of the second band, I bring the theoretical considerations of the previous chapters into context: specifically, the context of my own research, and my own subject position. In 3.3.1, Anarchism and the Academy, I consider the academy as a non-neutral field, engrained with the logics of state and capitalism, and I note its exclusion and misrepresentation of anarchist perspectives. In 3.3.2, My Relationship to the Academy, I consider how my own research was able to remain relatively resistant to these impacts, and was conducted as much in antagonistic, extra-institutional sites as it was in the institutional space of the academy (although it needed both sites). In 3.3.3, My Relationship to Activism, I consider the limitations of the term activism, but I also situate my own, positive experience of activism within the Newcastle-based group Tyneside Action for People & Planet (TAPP).	+	The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.
−	In the sections of the third band, I apply the theoretical and methodological evaluations explored in 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 to bear on my own practice of research, and the specific, local activist group that was most affected by it. In 3.4.1, Researching TAPP, I situate TAPP’s central, if understated, place within this thesis. I detail how my approaches to research shifted, according to my experiences of activism, and also according to TAPP’s experience of research. I then consider the salient aspects of this experience for our consideration of the interaction between research and activism. First, in 3.4.2, Security Issues, I consider whether my insider status brought greater risks to the group than outside researchers, and I record TAPPers’ own views on security issues. In 3.4.3, Interviews, I position my own use of interviews with TAPP, in relation to my own experience of being interviewed as part of TAPP. In 3.4.4, Experiencing Insider Ethnography, I consider the confusion involved in seeking to	+	However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.
−	both research and ‘do’ activism at the same time, and I explain my own approaches in terms of a pragmatic personal negotiation of this issue. In 3.4.5, Usefulness and Reciprocation, I conclude with an assessment of the practical impacts of research on a researched group, and I seek to justify my own research on the terms laid out in the first band (sections 3.2.1 - 3.2.4).	+	Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.
−	I have been an active participant in many of the events and organisations covered in this thesis. I am an ‘activist’ as well as an ‘academic’, a participant and an insider with the potential benefits (ground-level insight) and dangers (not seeing the wood for the trees) which that involves. I have a sympathy for the movements I cover and my personal agenda is heavily informed by anarchist theory and attitudes. My methodology must take this on board.	+	In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.
		+	</blockquote>
−	If I were to research and write of environmental activism and anarchism as if it were a specimen, an ‘out-there’ object to be authoritatively described, and did not enter into dialogue with my study of it, then I feel I would be outside the spirit of anarchism and thus a fraud. I would also have to cut out all those aspects of my life that are intimately connected with activism, and with the people and ideas covered in this thesis. This would also distort the research, and create the pretence of a ‘distance’ that is both inaccurate and illegitimate.	+	Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.
−	In this chapter, I detail some of the arguments and perspectives that relate to and ground this position. These arise from the anarchist tradition, the radical feminist movement, and from politically engaged researchers working in various fields of social science. I also cite certain ‘authorities’ engaged in sophisticated theory, but it is not with these that I wish to stake my own claims to authority. Rather, it is with the activists on the ground who constitute my research subject	+	In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (''lumpenproletariat''), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”
−	Hostility to experts, ivory towers and intellectual theories is common amongst the DIY activist milieu (Schnews 1997: 2; <em>Do or Die</em> 1997:30; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998:143; Halfacree 1999:209; McKay 1998:11- 13; Bookchin 1995a: 2). Whitworth writes that “Academics seem to activists at times to be kin to politicians, having lost touch with the reality of grass-roots action, unaware of the frustrations and failures of real-world democracy, analysing to death the volatile and holistic nature of the issues, fragmenting them into specialist arenas and pet projects. The end result is the dilution of action and its co-optation into the very system it seeks to challenge” (1999:7). This empirical distrust relates to the traditional anarchist hostility to the academy (see section 3.3.1) which, I will argue, is not an unsophisticated case of anarchist anti-intellectualism (<em>CW</em> 1997:2; AF 200 Id: 10; EWAW 1996; ‘Jon’ 2002; <em>Social Anarchism</em> 1987-1988; Widmer 1995), but a sensitive appreciation of the logic of capitalist, authoritarian and mass-bureaucratic modes upon knowledge and thought In this chapter I will also assess the attempts to escape this dynamic.	+	''Political Theories'', an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:
−	** 3.2 Anarchist Perspectives on Research and Theory	+	<blockquote>
		+	It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.
−	*** 3.2.1 Anarchist Perspectives	+	Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.
−	As an anarchist writing about anarchism according to anarchist principles, I should also apply these principles to my own activity. In relation to academic research, this anarchist perspective manifests itself most strongly as a critique. Before I look at this, however, I wish to sketch out six preliminary points about how ideas and academic knowledge are viewed from an anarchist perspective. The first five points are (a) that anarchist theory is fluid and flexible, (b) that ideas are social products, (c) that the common person can be as wise as any expert, (d) that every idea is developed out of practical experience, and (e) that ‘objective’ knowledge is contaminated with authoritarian values. A final perspective (f) comes from the individualist school and raises the radical doubt that anything can ever be known about anything beyond one’s own experience.	+	History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...
−	(a) The fluid and flexible nature of anarchist theory, elaborated in Chapter 2, means there is nothing that may prevent an anarchist approach being brought against a new subject, and no particular piece of intellectual baggage need necessarily be brought along (Purkis 2001: 11). The whole point of being an anarchist, after all, is that you think for yourself and accept nothing on mere authority (Bakunin quoted	+	The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.
		+	</blockquote>
−	in Ritter 1980:11). It is in this light, also, that my presentations of ‘anarchist thought’ should be considered. My reading of anarchism is limited and I stake no claims to grand truth: in keeping with much activist reportage, the only truth I claim is the kind provided by an honest account (Merrick 1997: backcover; Schnews 2004:5; Purkis 2001: 11).	+	In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.
−	(b) One of the most important aspects of the (social) anarchist evaluation of ideas is that “Ideas are social products” (Brown 1994: 11; cf Kropotkin 2001: 125; Jasper 1999:373). No man is an island and no innovation is possible without the existence and support of society. Thus Kropotkin argued that even the intellectual faculty is ‘eminently social’, since it is nurtured by communication and accumulated experience (1915:220; cf Woodcock 1980:19; Kropotkin cl890:5). A practical demonstration of this sentiment has been the extension of the anarchist opposition to property into the information age, with activists and anarchists advocating positive notions of the ‘intellectual commons’, ‘copyleft’, and freely developed and distributed software (Ortellado 2002; Moglen 2003; WSISWS 2003:9; McCann 2005; Juris 2004).	+	The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.
−	(c) Anarchists hold great faith in the resourcefulness and ability of the common man. Bakunin writes that “there is much more practical sense and spirit in the instinctive aspirations and in the real needs of the masses of the people than in the profound intellect of all these learned men and tutors of humanity who, after so many efforts have failed to make it happy, still presume to add their efforts” (1990a: 19; cf Bakunin 1990a: 134). There is nothing about the ‘expert’, therefore (especially the ‘expert’ of ideas) that makes him any wiser than the common man or woman (Cattleprod & friend c2001: 1). A refinement in techniques, or ‘cleverness’, does not necessarily take one closer to the truth (Martin 1991), and perhaps more significantly, it takes us no closer to a better world (Bakunin 1986:3; Fox 2005:24).	+	During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word ''hiếu'', which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.
−	(d) A related point is that, for most anarchists, every idea has a contextual basis: “social techniques do not come from intellectual test tubes. Truly we learn in struggle” (Brown 1994: 7). This means that the ideas of anarchism as a political theory cannot be separated from anarchism as a political struggle because, as Harding states for the feminist case, “political struggle is a precondition for knowledge” (1991: 109).	+	During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as ''Bỉ'' ''Vỏ,'' a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and ''Chí Phèo'', the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel ''Lão'' ''Hạc'', the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.
−	A classic anarchist statement of this position can be found in the ‘Organisational Platform’ of Makhno et al: “anarchism does not derive from the abstract reflections of an intellectual or a philosopher, but from the direct struggle of workers against capitalism, from the needs and necessities of the workers, from their aspirations to liberty and equality” (1989). Black, however, disputes the claim that the idea of anarchism arose from class struggle, and not individual reflection. He satirises the Platform’s claim that intellectuals ‘discovered the idea of anarchism in the masses’ as ‘an extraordinary feat of clairvoyance’ (2002:15-16). Instead, Black highlights the influence of individual thinkers like Proudhon and Bakunin, and Goaman too highlights the “huge role” played by texts, both in transmitting anarchist ideas, and in binding the anarchist movement together (Goaman 2002:1-5). I do not feel I must reject their claims when I side with Kropotkin’s point that the philosopher too is a product of society (Kropotkin cl 890:5).	+	The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique ''material conditions''<ref>Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref>, and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.
−	The bookish work of intellectuals is indeed included and relied upon in this thesis, but it is outweighed by practical, movement-based expressions of anarchism. As I have expounded with my presentation of ‘anarchism through practice’ in the previous chapter, anarchists do place primary importance on practical experience (though not necessarily the class struggle that Black satirises), and it is this everyday, practical experience that anarchist intellectuals draw upon for their ideas.	+	The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.
−	(e) The anarchist critique of the state is extended to a hostility to ‘objectivity’, because for the state to accept something as ‘objective’, it must conform to the statist paradigm (Kropotkin 2001:197). Thus the anarchist website <em>Anarchist Faq</em> states: “Like the old priesthoods, only those members who produce ‘objective research’ become famous and influential - ‘objective research’ being that which accepts the status quo as ‘natural’ and produces what the elite want to hear (i.e. apologetics for capitalism and elite rule will always be praised as ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ regardless of its actual scientific and factual content...)” (1 2005).[19] I will consider this point more in section 3.2.2.	+	-----
−	(f) A final point, coming not from within the social anarchist camp but from the individualist, challenges the ontological basis of’objective knowledge’. Stimer (1995:134-135; cf Nietzsche 1967: 268) maintained that the indefinable individual is the only really knowable and important part of reality. One’s existence precedes all essences, and the individual is always contrary, always moving, impossible to pin down. Knowledge as we understand it (and the logic integral to academic research) can therefore never be comprehensive despite its pretensions because, at bottom, “the reality of the human condition is far too complex to be encompassed by propositions” (Carroll 1974:42). With the innovations of feminist and postmodern theory, we will see that such a case of radical doubt need not cripple our project of research, but rather serve a useful function in setting out the limits of what can be understood.	+	==== Annotation 4 ====
−	*** 3.2.2 Critiques of Dominant Epistemology and Theory	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> See: ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175.
−	Having sketched out these preliminary perspectives on ideas and academia from the anarchist tradition, I would now like to look at critiques of the dominant objective discourse that have emerged from the academic field. Bourdieu argues that “Symbolic systems are not simply instruments of knowledge, they are also instruments of <em>domination”</em> (in Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:13), and Bauman writes that the dominant epistemology has been “‘naturalised’ into something very close to a law of nature by the modem part of the globe” (Bauman quoted in Plows 1998a: 4; Bauman 1987). Anti-establishment groups are constantly engaged in a struggle for validity against this dominant worldview and valuesystem (Bourdieu 1991:127; Doherty 2002:16-17). Feminists and activists from many struggles are thus all involved in challenging the prevailing hegemony of’scientific’ objectivity, and each identify within it a certain ‘logic of domination’ (Plows 1998a: 4; cf Plows 1998b: 47; Plumwood 1993; 4; Bookchin 1982; Glendinning 2002). This dominant epistemology is also instituted in research whose apparently neutral objectivity actually promotes a built-in bias. Thus Zinn writes that, “Ironically, the university has often served narrow governmental, military, or business interests, and yet withheld support from larger, transcendental values, on the ground that it needed to maintain neutrality” (1997: 504). Plows writes that “Activists and feminists both challenge the raison d’etre of the dominant paradigm, and as a result are continually accused of political bias, whilst their accusers cover their tracks by retreating to the moral high ground of what Becker... has termed the ‘hierarchy of credibility’” (1998a: 5; cf Becker 1997: 181; Plows 1998b: 44).	+	<nowiki>**</nowiki> In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.
−	Feminist theorists and researchers have mounted a sustained assault on what they perceive as the patriarchal bastion of objectivity. They have been supported by arguments from the sociology of knowledge, that “all knowledge is produced in specific circumstances and that those circumstances shape it” (Rose quoted in Valentine 1998: 306; cf Mac Laughlin 1986:34; Gramsci 1971:244; Bourdieu 1991). Thus Benston charges that “The claim that science is value-free, objective and purely rational is ideology and not reality”: it is shaped by the “capitalist social relations” in which it is produced (1989: 62-74; cf Purkis 2005:40; Jones 1987). Stanley and Wise have even suggested that “‘objectivity’ is the term that men have given to their own subjectivity” (1993: 59). We might crudely suggest that where anarchists see the state, feminists see patriarchy, yet both condemn objectivity in the same way.	+	The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.
−	Plows writes that “feminism offers an epistemological challenge in the following ways: (1) the notion that there is only one valid way of knowing the world is challenged; (2) the ‘objectivity’ of this dominant epistemology is exposed as a myth; and (3) that this world view is hierarchical, exploitative and oppressive” (1998a: 4). These terms of feminist critique accord with my own notion of anarchism. For the purposes of my argument and methodology, we can consider them as arguments and values common to both discourses. However, I must admit that it is feminist theorists, rather than anarchists, who have provided the sharpest tools for discussion here. It is primarily to the feminist tradition, therefore, that I have looked for theoretical support for my methodology.	+	<nowiki>***</nowiki> Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.
−	Feminist theorists have particularly focussed their attacks on the notion of objectivity, the creation of dichotomies (Plumwood 1993:41-68; Miles & Finn 1989; Cixous 1981:102; Moulton 1983: 149-163;	+	Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.
−	Dubois 1983: 110-111), and the identification of cause-effect explanations (Harding and Hintikka 1983; Stanley and Wise 1993; Nielsen 1990; Hartman and Davidow 1991). On the latter issue, Roberts asks “What if the most fundamental error is the search for mono-causation? What if the world is really a field of interconnecting events, arranged in patterns of multiple meanings?” (in Stanley and Wise 1991:47; cf Purkis 2005: 52). Here I wish to look at the attack on objectivity.	+	-----
−	Parlee argues that “Concepts, environments, social interactions are all simplified by methods which lift them out of their context, stripping them of the very complexity that characterises them in the real world” (1979: 131; cfBleiker 2000:229; Scheman 1991: 193; Mishler 1979; Khayati 1998; <em>TCA</em> 5(1) 2002:9). Such attempts at objectivity - the “myth of disembodied vision” (Heller 2000:143; Jasper 1999: 377) - are thus criticised for their reductionism, and their inability to comprehend truths in their full, complex reality (Benston 1989: 64). There is also a strong connection between systems of classification and formulation, and the exercise of top-down, exploitative control (Holloway 2002:72; Smith 1997: 352; Smith 1998; Horkheimer quoted in Holloway 2002: 66). Greens condemn objectivism on similar terms (Begg 1991:2; Goldsmith 1988:162-3; Plumwood 1993:144-145; Des Jardins 1997:204-210), and anarchists have always argued against “‘grand theory* and ‘specious theorising*” (Mac Laughlin 1986:27; cf Kropotkin 2001:173; Bakunin 1990a: 133; Pepto-Dismal 2004: 64; Thompson 1978:216). Stanley and Wise argue that “The whole fabric of objectivity is flawed, and its continued use is bolstered by frequently obvious and simple techniques which transform ‘the subjective’ into ‘the objective’ by the use of particular forms of speech. For example, ‘it is thought’ for ‘I think’, and so on” (1993:42; cf Holloway 2002:2; Bell 2002 [D.S.]: 222). Here we are brought down to the nitty gritty of academic language, in which the patriarchal attempts at ‘objectivity* are embedded (Miles and Finn 1989:163-4; Daly 1978; Watson 1998). I will look further at the critique of’objectivism* and methods designed to counter it in section 3.2.4.	+	==== Annotation 5 ====
−	As we have noted, such a critique of academia and its objective language can also be found in the anarchist tradition. Kropotkin argued that “We have been brought up from our childhood to regard the State as a sort of Providence; all our education... accustom[s] us to believe in Government and in the virtues of the State providential... Open any book on sociology or jurisprudence, and you will find there the Government, its organisation, its acts, filling so large a place that we come to believe that there is nothing outside the Government and the world of statesmen” (1972: 67; cf Mac Laughlin 1986:28; Bakunin 1990a: 33; McCalla 1989:48; ‘Council for the Spreading/Advancement of Occupations’ quoted in <em>GAy</em> 14 2004:4). This theme is elaborated by eco-anarchist Murray Bookchin, who proffers the twin theorisation of an ‘epistemology of rule’, and ‘ontological structures of domination’. An ‘epistemology of rule* is defined as “the various ways of mentalising the entire realm of experience along lines of command and obedience ... Just as aggression flexes our bodies for fight or flight, so class societies organise our psychic structures for command and obedience” (1982: 89; cf Holloway 2002: 38). The notion of’ontological structures of domination’ suggests that the very theory and comprehension of being in general (ontology), is ‘structured’ by categories and formulations which integrate domination into our most basic conceptual understanding of the world (Bookchin 1982; Ely in Clark 1990:50; Smith 1987; Chistiansen-Ruffman 1989:130). Anarchists have thus identified a ‘political’ dimension to academic authority through an extension of their central analysis of domination. Cattleprod can consequently charge that “most intellectuals and academics are little more than stenographers to power” (c2001a: 25; cf Holloway 2002:22).	+	Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:
−	For anarchists, the paradigmatic example of state-supporting ‘objectivity’ comes with the case of law. Zinn notes that, in contrast to the ‘rule of men* that preceded it, “the rule of law... claimed to be impersonal, neutral, apply equally to all, and, therefore, democratic.” Yet “What was done before - exploiting the poor, sending the young to war, and putting troublesome people in dungeons - is still done, except that this no longer seems to be the arbitrary action of the feudal lord or the king; it now has the authority of neutral, impersonal law.” The law’s apparent objectivity thus serves to mystify: “because it has the look of neutrality, its injustices are made legitimate” (1997: 372-3; cf Winstanley 1973: 170; Bakunin 1986: 8).	+	'''Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:'''
−	Anarchists condemn the law on two grounds. First, for its tyrannical and rigid generality (Ritter 1980: 13) which, in its attempt to reduce the multiple actions of people to one universal standard, ignores the fact that “Every case is a rule to itself’ (Godwin 1796 (2): 393; cf Kropotkin 2000: 157; Kropotkin 2001:200). Second, law is attacked for supporting our ongoing exploitation and oppression - as another device of authority. They frame their own approach as the contrast to this - the negation of	+	In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”
−	authority (Berkman 1964:62). Carter links this anarchist perspective to that of the oppressed, and particularly those at the receiving end of such state-centric justice:	+	This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.
−	“There is an almost inescapable sense in which accepted theories of politics and law act as ideological justifications for the existing social hierarchy. They are largely accepted by those at the top who make and administer the laws, and provide them with the principles they need in the process; and these theories are often mutely or openly rejected by those at the bottom, who see the ‘law’ from the perspective of the police cell and the jail” (1971:44; cf Mac Laughlin 1986:11; Winstanley 1973: 101)	+	'''The Chartist Movement in Britain:'''
−	Kropotkin argued that the alternative approach of the anarchists looks “at society and its political organisation from a different standpoint than that of all the authoritarian schools - for we start from a free individual and reach a free society, instead of beginning by the state to come down to the individual” (2001: 180; cf Ward 1988: 22; Holloway 2002: 8).[20]	+	Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.
−	The situationists added to this critique, stating that the academy plays its part in the transformation of everything into objects, and the stripping away of all human values, by framing phenomena within	+	In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.
−	theories that, ultimately, support the capitalist syste	+	'''Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:'''
−	“an ideology in power turns any partial truth into	+	In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.
−	an absolute lie” (in Knabb 1981:178; cf Hollo way 2002:62-72). Even when the intentions of	+	In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.
−	researchers are good, therefore, the situationists warn that the language and practice of academia expresses a pathogenic intellectualism: “No doubt he would like to be regarded as an enemy of its rhetoric; but he will use its syntax” (Debord 1990:31; cf Maclntryre 1981:3; Smith 1995: 52; Heller [C] 1999:36). This relates to the attempts of activists like Plows to use academia as part of activism: “academia as a protest strategy” (1998b: 47). Plows quickly discovered that “to enable the views of protesters to be heard and understood by academia, it is necessary for oneself to become part of the academic establishment and to a large extent, play by those rules”‘ (1998a: 12). This is a dilemma which I too have had to negotiate.	+	It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.
−	If I accept wholesale the terms of the situationist critique, then I must view the act of researching radical challenges such as the environmental direct action movement with hostility. The situationists would argue that this research strips the subject of its revolutionary quality, which is grounded in the context, organisation and experience of the people involved, and renders it harmless, as an object amongst objects (Purkis 2005:41). It then places the object, rendered abstract and therefore toothless, within a framework or discourse which judges it and characterises it according to what are ultimately capitalist and authoritarian terms. My research thus stands condemned as an act of commodification, or spectacularisation (Duckett 2001c; Social Movements List 1998b; Plows 1998b: 74-5).	+	''- Theoretical Premises''
−	If I remain within the framework of situationist thought, then I have no answer to this charge. 1 must therefore dismiss certain elements of the situationist perspective in order to avoid becoming crippled. This situation of mine marks out a more general danger that comes with working within radical theories. A contradiction point is reached, at which I must choose against the radical theory in order to carry on my research: Academy 1: Anarchism 0. Here, then, I must soften the glare of the situationist critique and try to somehow ‘bring it on board’ in a manner which the original situationists would find contemptible. One way I will seek to do this is by utilising the critique of the situationists and others to condemn theory as abstract and therefore alienating, but then following non-situationist lines of escape from the theory-trap. My rejection of purist, super-revolutionary situationist perspectives is rooted in the “tension... between the perfect formula and the problem of living it” (Goaman 2002:119), a tension which contributed to the implosion of the Situationist International.	+	The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the ''quintessence''* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.
−	The situationists argued that a ‘unified theoretical critique’ must join with ‘a unified social practice’ (Debord 1994: 147; Knabb, ed, 1989:334)[21]. This rhetorical position - the unification of theory and practice - is common to much of the left, but I find it unacceptable: both unreal and unethical. Against	+	-----
−	the over-abstraction that this perspective can lead us into, feminist researchers ground theory much more firmly in the realities of their experience. Chester, for example, argues that “Radical feminist theory is that theory follows from practice and is impossible to develop in the absence of practice, because our theory is that practising our practice is our theory” (cited in Stanley and Wise 1993:56). Stanley and Wise warn against the tendency within politically engaged leftist discourse to become overly theoretical. This is a warning that I have done my best to heed, particularly with my attention to anarchism as practice. It is also in keeping with the feminist valorisation of experience, whose possible re-involvement with theory is stated by the Redstockings: “We regard our personal experience, and our feelings about that experience, as the basis for an analysis of our common situation. We cannot rely on existing ideologies as they are all products of male supremacist culture” (quoted in Roseneil 1995: 138; cf Seel 1999:101; Holloway 2002: 5). Unlike theories, experience is never limited or simplified (Henry James quoted in Jasper 1999:379), and in my research, I have drawn upon my own practical experience to augment and ground the theoretical analysis. I shall consider the re-evaluation of experience more in section 3.2.4.	+	==== Annotation 6 ====
−	In this thesis I have used largely empirical evidence to make a case about anarchist theory, and this represents a deliberate choice on my part At the same time, however, I utilise the theoretical literature to illuminate and critique the empirical practice. In this way I am endeavouring to use theory to say something about the practice (eco-activism), and the practice to say something to the theory (anarchist ideology). I wish to emphasise, however, that I have not plucked the anarchist theory from a world far distant from the eco-activists. Rather I would argue that this is the theory which <em>they</em> read, which can be found in <em>their</em> libraries (literally, in the library tent at EF! Summer Gatherings), and which is therefore the most relevant background against which to paint them.	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''tinh'' ''hoa'' is used, which we roughly translate to the word ''quintessence'' throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word ''quintessence'', it has an exclusively positive connotation. ''Quintessence'' should not be confused with the universal category of ''Essence'', which is discussed on p. 156.
−	An anarchist approach partakes of a language common to at least a substantial proportion of the eco- activist community, and it may thus provide the most fitting terms on which to study their activities (Purkis 2001: 11; Epstein 1991: 20; Welsh 2000:205; Doherty 2002: 8). Where Halfacree writes that “academics can learn from what takes place on the ground in order to invigorate their own theoretical endeavours and overcome some of the distance between theory and practice” (1999:209), I do not think this goes far enough. I believe that this distance need not exist when a common language and a common perspective and experience exists. I shall mark the difference between this and the abstract and over-optimistic position of’unifying theory and practice* in the following two sections.	+	German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel<ref>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.</ref> and Ludwig Feuerbach<ref>Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.</ref>, had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.
−	*** 3.2.3 Political Approaches to Research	+	-----
−	In this section I consider how anarchists (should) apply the intellectual and political implications considered above into a project of researching activists: namely by entering into a critical dialogue with the subjects which both acknowledges a “rigorous partiality” (Clifford 1986:25), and accepts responsibility for one’s role in the relationship. The ingredients of this approach have been chiefly drawn from theorisations developed by feminist researchers such as Mies, who elaborated an alternative epistemology for research grounded in (1) an avowed partiality (not disinterested objectivity); (2) a commitment to the voices of the studied (not the experts); and (3) participation in the movement being studied (1983:122-126). I will distinguish my approach from Marxist assumptions of critical theory and feminist standpoint epistemology as both simplistic and outside the spirit of anarchism laid out in Chapter 2.1 will also ground my research in anarchist, not postmodern positions, though I note a broad compatibility of Routledge’s third space approach in allowing research to be both useful and non-dominating of activism, while retaining a critical bite. Finally, I will consider the essential and unavoidable power relation that exists between researcher and researched, in order to avoid over-domineering assumptions of movement ‘approval* or ‘representation’ in this thesis.	+	==== Annotation 7 ====
−	Chomsky has spoken of the “responsibility of intellectuals” in terms of the privileged position that comes with political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us” (1969:324; cf 1996:56). To neglect that responsibility is to acquiesce in	+	German classical philosophy was a movement of ''idealist'' philosophers of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.
−	oppression. Zinn also emphasises the importance of knowledge in relation to an unjust world: “What we call the rise of democracy in the world means that force is replaced by deception... as the chief method for keeping society as it is. This makes knowledge important, because although it cannot confront force directly, it can counteract the deception that makes the government’s force legitimate” (1997: 501; cf Adorno 1990: 41).	+	One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.
−	Although Chomsky is perhaps the most famous anarchist ‘public intellectual’, there are many others in the academy who, like Zinn (1997:613), have ruminated upon their political responsibility. Touraine (1985) has described the importance of ‘committed research’; Katz (1992) has spoken of a ‘politics of engagement’; while hooks (1994: 54) has advocated an ‘ethics of struggle’ that exists both within the academy and beyond (Kitchin and Hubbard 1999). As we have noted, in an earlier age Kropotkin “insisted that the duty of socially-concerned sciences lay in articulating the interests of subordinate social classes and combating poverty, underdevelopment and social injustice wherever they existed” (Mac Laughlin 1986:11). Ata time when nationalism and jingoism were peaking, Kropotkin promoted a subversively anti-nationalist and anti-colonialist message (quoted in Mac Laughlin 1986: 32). Thus he embodied Chomsky’s ‘responsibility of the intellectual’, in opposing racist misunderstandings, colonial domination and international rivalry (Kropotkin 1972: 262).	+	-----
−	Foucault has posited a distinction between ‘specific intellectuals’ and the ‘universal intellectuals’ who theorise beyond their own experience and thus become the representatives of others (1980: 126-8). He suggests we should aspire to the former, and view the latter with suspicion. On a related theme, Bauman (1992a: 21) has advocated that the intellectual today should take on the role of’interpreter’ (1988: 229-30). This stands in contrast to the model of the intellectual in the era of modernism, as distanced ‘men of knowledge’, working hand-in-hand with the state to enshrine their ‘legislative authority’ (1988:219; Orton c2001). Foucault and Bauman’s re-definitions accord with a standard view held by the anarchist tradition, for whom “The social scientist had no claim to direct the revolutionary movement, but could only serve as its handmaiden” (Miller 1984: 80). My own view of the anarchist intellectual’s proper role may be referenced to these points made by Chomsky, Zinn, Foucault and Bauman.	+	==== Annotation 8 ====
−	It is with the innovations of feminist research that I am most interested in this section. Partly, this is because feminists have produced some of the most interesting and practically engaged forms of research. It is also, however, (and this might explain the reason for the former) because I view the feminist experience with the academy as providing an emblematic example for both the anarchist argument against institutions (Hartman & Messer-Davidow 1991:204; cf McDermott 1994; Crossley quoted in Cox & Barker 2002:2), and for the importance of micro-political ethics between people. McCalla explains that feminist researchers were not primarily “preoccupied with abstract methodological issues”. Instead, their critiques of method developed largely through hindsight, “as <em>reflections</em> on research <em>necessarily</em> done in a manner which violates many of the methodological canons of the researcher’s discipline” (1989:41). Similarly, the qualitative approach I shall consider in the following section represents a pragmatic not an ideological choice (Plows 1998b: 38).	+	Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Specific methods by which feminists addressed the research problematic included (1) <em>Action research,</em> where action and evaluation proceed simultaneously; (2) <em>Demystification research,</em> which assumes that the creation of alternative knowledge will partially set the conditions for change; and (3) <em>Participatory/ collaborative research,</em> where the research participants are part of the decision-making process and direct the course of research (Reinharz cited in Farrow, Moss & Shaw 1995: 72). I do not follow any of these models specifically, but we may note that, just as they stand radically apart from the traditional ideal of disinterested research, they accord with the traditional anarchist positions (1) that we learn through struggle and that ideas are social; (2) that a critique of domination can undermine its power; and (3) that everyone should participate in decisions that affect them.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Feminists like Mies, Roseneil and Harding have argued the case for research which is ethically and politically partisan, on the basis that ‘The question is not whether we should take sides, since we inevitably will, but rather whose side we are on’. Research which claims to be non-partisan often serves the interests of the dominant class. By denying that claim of neutrality, furthermore, partisan techniques of research also deny the validity of’objective’ analysis. As Mies argues, “The postulate of value-free research...has to be replaced by conscious partiality, which is achieved through partial identification with the research objects” (1983:122; cf Epstein 1991: 20).	+	<blockquote>
		+	But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.
		+	</blockquote>
−	One advantage claimed for this method of research is that it takes place on “the same critical plane” as the subjects being studied. Harding stakes this claim:	+	Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.”
−	“The best feminist analysis... insists that the inquirer her/himself be placed in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for scrutiny in the results of research. That is, the class, race, culture, and gender assumptions, beliefs, and behaviours of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he attempts to paint” (1987:9; cf Plows 1998b: 52-57; Clifford 1986:32).	+	Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
−	Harding goes on to consider the value of doing this: “the researcher appears to us not as an invisible, anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests.” The significance of this, she argues, is that “the beliefs and behaviours of the researcher are part of the empirical evidence for (or against) the claims advanced in the results of research. This evidence too must be open to critical scrutiny no less than what is traditionally defined as relevant evidence. Introducing this ‘subjective’ element into the analysis in fact increases the overall objectivity of the research and decreases the ‘objectivism’ which hides this kind of evidence from the public” (1987:9; cf Benston 1989:68; Becker in Emerson, ed, 2001:322). It is this claim for transparency leading to greater objectivity which, I feel, is the great strength of feminist approaches to research.	+	<blockquote>
		+	To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.
−	Plows, evaluating the merits and dangers of researching as such a ‘partisan insider’ within the environmental direct action movement, highlights for us the key difference between feminist and activist approaches to research: “Protesters are not the marginalised underdogs of classic feminist/critical theorist literature. The roads protest movement was initiated as a political force for change through Non Violent Direct Action (NVDA), with an intrinsic belief in the power of both individual (DIY - ‘Do It Yourself - culture) and collective action” (1998a: 1; cf Purkis 2001:11). Plows thus decided that, rather than copy the research practices of other feminists, she would adapt her own methods according to the needs of her research:	+	At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“not to ‘empower my subjects’ in this traditional sense, but to contribute to the academic understanding of the vie ws/values of a dynamic movement. Protesters are demonstrating about the domination and exploitation of nature/social groups -they are not demonstrating because they see themselves as oppressed” (1998a: 1).	+	Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
−	My experience has also supported Cox’s observation that activists participating in research “are fully capable of locating the activity of intellectuals and using it for their own purposes” (1998:9; cf Purkis 2001: 11; Harrington 2003: 598)[22]. In evaluating the potential ‘usefulness* and ‘aptness’ of my research to its subjects of study, therefore, I am dealing with complex and dynamic actors, not a static pool of ‘oppressed subjects’ waiting for a critical spark.	+	-----
−	It is worthwhile distinguishing my approach from that of critical theory, a perspective that dominates much left-research, and which is characterised by a criticality that is both epistemological and ethical (Eagleton 1994:17; Wall 1997:9-10). Hammersley notes that “its most distinctive feature [ is a ] commitment to political goals as part of an attempt to unify theory and practice” (1995:41). In the case of Marxist critical theorists, partisanship with working class organisations was given priority (sometimes to the exclusion of all other groupings). Cox justifies supporting certain positions within a social movement on the basis that, as knowledge involves a practical intervention, this intervention should be consciously recognised, in a manner that reflects the Marxist approach to political movements (1998: 5; cf Touraine 1981; Scott 1990: 63-4). Yet I find such a strong interventionist approach ethically uncomfortable and I refute the idea of the intellectual (or party) as ‘interpreter of the world’, seeking to expose to the researched their ‘false consciousness*. I share Routledge’s distrust of intellectuals who arrogate to themselves the authority to judge what resistance is right and what is wrong (Routledge & Simons 1995:473), and I share Seel’s dislike for situations within which “research participants become targets of research rather than active subjects with the power to interpret and change their own situations” (Seel 1999: 131).	+	For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.
−	If, as Cox argues, there is “an implicit parallel between organising modes and strategies of research” (1998:7), then I would adopt the anarchist DIY approach to revolutionary organising, rather than that of Marxist ‘guidance’ and articulation of the ‘real’ class interests, which so easily developed into	+	-----
−	‘official’ communist parties, and the myriad of Trotskyite splinter groups, each assured that it alone possessed the ‘correct* view of history. Notions of the ‘know-it-all party’ (Holloway 2002: 86) or of ‘vanguard intellectuals’ are opposed by Greens (Begg 1991:9), NVDA practitioners (Martin 2001: 75) and anarchists (Bakunin 1990a: 198-199; <em>CW</em> 1997:4) alike. Cox, a neo-Gramscian with anarchist sympathies, does not advocate the Leninist ‘vanguard’ approach, but it serves as a useful ‘straw man’ here, against which to present my own approach. Considering the role of the intellectual, Kropotkin states that “All we can do is to give advice. And while giving it we add: ‘This advice will be valueless if your own experience and observation do not lead you to recognise that it is worth following’” (2001:103). It will be clear in this thesis which are the modes of activism that most accord with my own sensibilities, but I have not adopted a ‘champion’ that best expresses the anarchist spirit. Rather, I celebrate the diverse expressions and modes of activism, on the basis that the more going on, the better, and the more voices in the debate, the better that debate will be (Ritter 1980:106; IE 2005:13; Reinsborough 2003:4). I also do not view my own voice as more objective (a higher synthesis) than the various expressions cited in the thesis, although it is, of course, more centrally placed.	+	-----
−	Common ground exists between critical theory and anarchist approaches, however, in the emphasis placed upon dialogue. Cox argues that “research should develop in dialogue with movements, even perhaps to the extent of directing research into areas that the movements themselves are interested in rather than areas decided by the ‘traditional intellectuals* of the academy” (1998: 7). At the EFISG in 2001, participants urged that academics should ‘study the powerful’ (Corporate Watch are an EF!- affiliated group who do just that, tracing connections and weakspots in the large corporations), but this is not a direction that I have followed. I have, however, endeavoured to keep my research activity in two-way communication, particularly with an activist-academic conference on ‘Radical British Environmentalism’ which I staged with Jenny Pickerill in 1999. One of the participating local activists stated at the end of the conference, that the day had “Helped demystify the academic process”. Several participants also expressed the sentiment, central to Cox’s Gramscian approach, that theorising and political activism are not binary opposites. One stated: “I’ve always had a problem with academic theorising. [ But I ] Realised today that we’re always theorising. In our direct action group we’re always doing it” (Pickerill & Duckett 1999: 85; cf Seel 1999:128).	+	==== Annotation 9 ====
−	Some feminist researchers adapted critical theorists’ (Marxist) notion of a privileged working class consciousness into ‘standpoint’ theories, which assume women to possess a superior perspective due to their subject position (Harding 1987:184-185, Hartsock 1983:285, Nielsen 1990: 10-11). The question is raised whether one can claim a privileged ‘activist standpoint’ that can see more into the world than can the detached, non-activist standpoint There are certainly insights and experiences that can only be encountered once one becomes politically and socially engaged, but I doubt whether this amounts to a qualitative epistemological difference from the rest of society. Anarchists typically think that every individual has die capacity to turn around and oppose the powers-that-be, and view the world in an anarchist light, no matter what place in society they hold (<em>CW</em> 1997:14). In a general sense, I disagree with the core positions of standpoint epistemology. Those of us who are white, western, middle-class and male, are not fore-ordained to adopt a certain role in relationship to class and gender politics (Bowen 2005:119; Collins in Hartman and Davidow 1991:104). My lack of attention to gender and class perspectives in this thesis, however, may provide a possible line of critique, particularly from feminist theorists whose insights I have sought to apply in a de-gendered way.	+	Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.
−	I admire the intentions of the critical theorists, but I do not share their confidence in the attainability of their project. I do not think that theoretical inquiry, of the kind that critical theorists are involved in, is the place where emancipation can happen. I assign myself a more limited role with this thesis, broadly in keeping with a hermeneutic framework, but with a consciously partisan (and ‘critical’) ethic.[23]	+	In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.
−	The radical framework that has challenged Marxist ‘critical theory’ in the halls of academe is that which tends to be called postmodernism. As a reaction to the uni versalising efforts of Marxist critical theory, this strand has emphasised the constructed character of narratives and their diversity.	+	Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Hammersley notes that “From the point of view of poststructuralism and postmodernism, critical theory is not critical enough. It is regarded as relying on the Enlightenment assumption that the exercise of reason can produce demonstrable moral truths about how society should be organised and how change can be brought about” (1995:34). Postmodernism is defined by its opposition to the modernist attempt at producing an authoritative corpus of universally valid knowledge, based on the self-reflection of a subject (individual or collective). This is rejected on the grounds that (a) it is not achievable, and (b) because the attempt to realise it involves the enforcement of a single point of view, and the persecution of those who refuse to accept it The critical attention of postmodern thinkers thus tends to focus on “attempts at epistemological grounding, which are seen as the source of modem political repression” (Hammersley 1995:33). This emphasis within postmodern endeavours has a clear resonance with anarchist themes.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.
		+	</blockquote>
−	I must emphasise that I have not in this thesis attempted a thorough or consistent examination of postmodernism. While there is much in postmodernism which I recognise as valuable, I also do not identify with ‘postmodern* positions wholeheartedly. This is demonstrated by my conventional style of prose: I have not sought either a poetically evocative style, nor used postmodern jargon in a painfully sensitive self-policing of my language, avoiding ‘suspect’ terms. In sections 2.2.5 and 2.3.61 thus positioned my approach according to the anarchist emphasis on dynamic, lived interactions, rather than on such techniques as Derrida’s deconstruction or Foucault’s genealogy. I will briefly now discuss the salient political and practical issues of the ‘postmodern’ approach, as perceived by certain activist- researchers.	+	Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in ''Capital (Volume 1)'':
−	Scheman argues that “Deconstruction can be a powerful tool to expose the logic of domination, as it lurks in the egalitarian rhetoric of the Enlightenment; it has a place in a revolutionary’s toolbox. But deconstruction is as undiscriminating a tool as were the shock tactics of the artistic avant garde. Its appeal is that it <em>can</em> dismantle the master’s house. But it dismantles <em>our</em> houses just as effectively” (1991:195; cf Pratt 1995:56; Benhabib 1992:230; Hammersley 1995:35; Holmwood 1999:288). As Heller puts it, there is a “danger that the destabilising process results in too forceful a challenge and destroys any form of agency” (2000: 144). I have argued in the previous chapter that the ethical and political matrix at the centre of anarchism can provide us with a ‘way out’ of this self-destructive avenue. The feminist experience, furthermore, provides us with an example of why political and social values should not be divorced from our modes of theorising.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
		+	</blockquote>
−	McDowell contrasts the bases for critique provided by academic postmodern theorists, and on-the- ground, practically engaged feminists. She charges that “by turning to postmodernism rather than feminism, the new anthropologists... have managed, whilst appearing to challenge it, to leave in place the legitimacy of their own claims to privileged knowledge” (1992b: 65; cf McCalla 1989:53; Bakunin & Warren 1981: backpage). As the old kings of theory topple, so new ones arise to take their place. Anarchists argue that it is what takes place on the ground, in our interactions and our social world, that is important I have therefore chosen to draw on feminist rather than postmodern writers for the bulk of my epistemological discussion. Where it is at its best, postmodern theory can provide us with tools for demystification and a dazzlingly sharp analysis of professedly ‘progressive* discourses. But when theory is only speaking to theory, it is of no concern to us. The experience of feminism, and of feminist researchers, has been eminently political at its base, and it is my belief that, even if it were just for this reason alone, feminism would share a deep affinity with anarchism. Having said this, it is with anarchism rather than feminism that my proclivities really lie. As Plows sketched out above, this brings my perspective more closely in line with that of my ‘research subjects’.
−	Routledge has theorised a research strategy that attempts to close the gap between research and activism (although he does so in a painfully jargoni Stic pseudo-poetic language (1996b: 412; Routledge & Simons 1995:484)). He posits the idea of a ‘third space’ that moves between the worlds of academia and activism, and from which a position of (non-dominating) critical engagement with both is possible (1996b: 400-407; cf Brewer 2000). Routledge’s ‘third space’ ties in well with both postmodern approaches to theory, and anarchist approaches to politics. It is not equivalent to a dialectic synthesising of positions. Rather, difference is at once validated and included in the strategy (Routledge 1996b: 414). Such practices can articulate “a refusal to know one’s place” (1996b: 403): a radical, potentially liberating quality. Academics can aid the subject, or the political cause, at the same time as they conduct their critical research, acting “as a catalyst for the movement’s strategic and tactical trajectory” (1996b: 411; cf Touraine quoted in Purkis 2005:49; Cox 1998:10). Denzin makes the additional valuable point that an interpretive ethnography, by making its values and criticisms public, is also characterised by vulnerability (1999: 510-513). This vulnerability is perhaps essential to keep a more equal power-relationship with the subjects of research, themselves rendered prone by heavy inspection.	+	-----
−	I will return to this theme of usefulness, reciprocation and identification in 3.4.5. For now I would like to mark the point at which this combination of ‘the political’ and ‘the academic’ becomes impossible, and should therefore stop. I have noted already that I do not think that the leftist imperative to ‘combine theory and action’ can always translate into meaningful action. It can also obscure important points of contradiction that are better learnt from than dismissed. I would like to add to this understanding, Hammersley’s observation that “If political goals are pursued consistently, the line of action engaged in is unlikely to be recognisable as a form of research” (1995:42; cf Routledge & Simons 1995: 472). If my thinking was entirely informed by anarchist theory, and if the impulse behind this thesis was indivisible from my desire to make it useful to the movement, then I would never have produced a thesis in this way. Rather, I would have produced a piece of propaganda (for the ‘external’ world), or of strategic and ideological analysis (for ‘internal’ use by the movement). My individual intellectual interests, and my location as a person whose future employability, and family relations, would be negatively affected by the non-completion of a thesis, are therefore additional ingredients.	+	Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.
−	Choosing a base within the academic world, feminist researchers have positioned their work as ‘for’ women rather than merely ‘on’ women (Klein in Bowles and Klein 1983: 90; cf Stanley and Wise 1993: 37). The intention is “to provide for women explanations of social phenomena that they want and need, rather than providing for welfare departments, manufacturers, advertisers, psychiatrists” (Harding 1987: 8). Routledge, however, warns that “It is all too easy for academics to claim solidarity with the oppressed and act as relays for their voices within social scientific discourse” (1996b: 413; cf Routledge & Simons 1995:483). The danger of personal bias is such that “it would be easy for politically, passionately engaged researchers ... to conduct research in such a way that our pre-existing beliefs, views about our research material is corroborated” (Plows 1998b: 46; cf Marcus 1986:182). This would entail the loss of critical ‘distance*, which I discussed above. Other problems arise from the issue of ‘representation’, opposition to which has long been expressed by anarchists in the political world, and more recently by feminists and postmodernists in the domain of theoretical analysis. Haraway argues that “representation depends upon possession of an active resource, namely, the silent object, the stripped actant”(1992:313). Clifford(1986) and Gitlin, ed,(1994) are amongst those who have condemned (as a form of domination) attempts to use partisan research as a form of political representation for the subjects of study. In contrast, they advocate that people be allowed to speak for themselves in research texts, even to collaborate in the research process (Hammersley 1995: 38). Such arguments agree with the basic values of anarchism, although in practice such an approach may prove problematic. I detail the degree and manner in which I have involved my own research subjects within the research process in the third band of this chapter, sections 3.4.1 to 3.4.5.	+	-----
−	Even for researchers who adopt a partisan outlook with their research, or share common experiences, the relationship of the researcher to the ‘researched* remains defined by a “social-political distance” (Moss 1995: 82; cf Roseneil 1995:12; Goaman 2002:32). Purkis notes that the anarchist concern “with analysing the construction of authority in a variety of different contexts” means that “from a methodological point of view, the relationship between the researcher and the researched must be central” (Purkis 2005:47). Stanley and Wise state that this is an ‘inevitable* power relationship (1993:168) that cannot be brushed aside. Moss argues that “It is imperative that we struggle toward some equitable distribution of power within each research situation: so that change is effected from within rather than being imposed from the outside; so that the status quo is challenged; so that we as researchers can be less exploitative, less oppressive” (1995: 89; cf Mies 1983:123). The tools we might use to try and reduce the ‘gap*, and to subvert the traditional top-down relationship, are the subject of the following section.	+	-----
−	In sections 6.2.1 and 6.5.3 we will note how the anarchist notion of direct action critiques those activists who seek to be “the voice for the voiceless”, particularly in animal and earth liberation when “the revolutionary subject... cannot ... participate in its own liberation” (Ruins 2003:16; cf Heller 2000:133). The anarchist mode of revolution emphasises that no-one can ‘do’ the revolution for anyone else (<em>GA</em> 1999:3) and that we should all, selfishly and honestly, place ourselves at the centre of the process. Activists are highly sensitive to the domination involved in “Speaking for Others” (<em>EF!J</em>23(8) 2003: 9; cf Goaman 2002: 26-27; Heller 2000: 139) and critique those who seek to represent others on anarchist grounds (Jarach in <em>GAy</em> 15 2004:35). For this reason, I am suspicious when the <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> collective, for example, recognise that they cannot speak for others, yet state that “these pieces have been read and commented on by the social movements themselves” (2003:15). I cannot imagine how a ‘movement’ can comment in that way, indeed I doubt whether such a reified ‘movement’ really exists. It is only <em>individuals</em> who have read and commented on my thesis, and though they cover a spectrum of issues and approaches they can never be ‘adequately’ representative. In the article featured in Figure 3.2,1 thus wrote “remember, no-one speaks for you — even the Action Update can’t really be representative” (EF.44C7No.64 2000: 5).	+	==== Annotation 10 ====
−	*** 3.2.4 A Personal Approach to Research	+	In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.
−	Now that we have explored the political side of the epistemological challenge, we can look at the other side of the coin, that of the personal. This focus on the personal is the more epistemologically radical aspect of the feminist/ postmodern/ anarchist challenge. As Stanley and Wise note, “alongside ethical issues and dilemmas concerning the use and abuse of’subjects’ are epistemological issues: these concern whose knowledge, seen in what terms, around whose definitions and standards, and judged by whose as well as what criteria, should count as knowledge itself’ (1993: 202).	+	Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues'' on page 48.
−	Stanley and Wise propose certain “epistemological precepts” for a feminist ethic of research (1993: 89). These include a “recognition of the reflexivity of the feminist researcher in her research as an active and busily constructing agent; insistence that the ‘objects’ of research are also subjects in their own right as much as researchers are subjects of theirs (and objects of other people’s); acceptance that the researcher is on the same critical plane as those she researches and not somehow intellectually superior; and, most fundamental of all, no opinion, belief or other construction of events and persons, no matter from whom this derives, should be taken as a representation of ‘reality’ but rather treated as a motivated construction or versions to be subject to critical feminist analytical inquiry” (1993:200).	+	In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as ''empiricism''. Empiricism holds that we can ''only'' obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).
−	A repeated strand of feminist argument is that we must avoid narrow, reductive analyses in order to allow more complex interrelationships and contexts to become visible. Thus DuBois writes that “To be open to... complexity and to see things in context means to move out of the realms of discourse and logic that rely on linear and hierarchical conceptions of reality... [ and ] on dichotomous modes of thought, discourse and analysis” (1983:110). Reinharz, for example, argues for an experiential research in which “The feminine mode draws on the interplay of figure and ground rather than on the dominance of either; on the contextualised, not dissociated. As interpretations are made and recorded, the remaining data are examined to see if and how they corroborate or refute the ongoing analysis” (1983:183).	+	One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the ''subjective idealism'' of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the ''skepticism'' of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.”
−	Bowles and Klein write that “One of the first claims of feminist scholarship was that male theories about women were biased. So we declared that since everything is biased we at least would <em>state</em> our biases” (1983:15). This is viewed as a key ingredient for creating ‘unalienated knowledge’ (Rose 1983): “‘good research’... should account for the conditions of its own production” (Stanley 1990: 13). Stanley argues that “the most pertinent dimensions of an ‘unalienated knowledge’ in feminist terms are where:	+	Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in ''A Treatise on Human Nature'': “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.”
−	- “the researcher/theorist is grounded as an actual person in a concrete setting;	+	Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”
−	- understanding and theorising are located and treated as material activities and not as unanalysable metaphysical ‘transcendent’ ones different in kind from those of ‘mere people*;	+	Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
−	- and the act of knowing* is examined as the crucial determiner of’what is known’” (1990:12).	+	<blockquote>
		+	... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.
		+	</blockquote>
−	We may observe that there are common themes in all these points, in that the context, the material position and the actual on-the-ground activities are prioritised over abstract reflection. This priority is supported by the anarchist perspective (Amster 2002; Glendinning in <em>GAy</em> 14 2004: 6; Bakunin 1990a: 135; Heller 1999 [CJ: 46; Holloway 2002:5). It may be used to support, and be supported by, both postmodern and empirical approaches. When Hall argues that “there is now no metatheory” (quoted in Jordan & Lent 1999: 205), I would suggest that the importance of empirical action, of activity,	+	This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.
−	increases in significance. Each of the anarchistically-minded researchers closest to my own project have foregrounded their own experience in the research process (Goaman 2002:34; Heller 2000:3; Seel 1999: 31).	+	Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of ''social relations'', which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in ''Capital Volume I'':
−	The combined precepts translate positively into tools that draw from the authority of personal experience (Valentine 1998:305; <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003: 14), such as autobiographical forms of writing (Stanley 1991; Okely 1992:5). Although theorists like Bourdieu are critical of such personalised approaches, Stanley and Wise argue that “to omit ‘the personal’ is to omit the central intellectual and practical experience of research” (1983:201). Such an omission has negative implications for the validity of the research data:	+	<blockquote>
		+	(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“One’s self can’t be left behind, it can only be omitted from discussions and written accounts of the research process. But it is an omission, a failure to discuss something which has been present within the research itself. The researcher may be unwilling to admit this, or unable to see its importance, but it nevertheless remains so... in doing research we cannot leave behind what it is to be a person alive in the world” (Stanley & Wise 1993: 161).	+	In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the ''first basis'' for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.
−	The inclusion of personal experience, and evidence of the researcher’s own self, on the other hand, helps avoid presenting faux-objective descriptions “as non-problematic and indisputably ‘true’” (1993: 175; cf McCalla 1989:46-50). The personal experience that Stanley and Wise urge us to include, furthermore, is not only our political perspective or narrative history. In contrast to the norm (Widdowfield 2000:200), feminist researchers have insisted upon the importance of the <em>emotional</em> experience of research (Johnston in Miles and Finn 1989: 377; cf McCalla 1989:46; Thompson 1978: 210; Zinn 1997:120-121).	+	It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected ''empiricism,'' they did not reject ''empirical knowledge'' nor ''empirical data'' which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from ''material'' processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section ''“Materialism and Dialectical Materialism”'' on page 48.
−	The above discussion indicates why methods of qualitative research might be highly regarded. Ward- Schofield provides us with a fuller advocacy:	+	-----
−	“At the heart of the qualitative approach is the assumption that... [ the ] research is very much influenced by the researcher’s individual attributes and perspectives. The goal is not to produce a standardised set of results that any other careful researcher in the same situation or studying the same issues would have produced. Rather it is to produce a coherent and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed study of the situation” (Ward-Schofield 1993:202).	+	Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.
−	There are risks in adopting solely qualitative research methods, however. The most common criticism is that valid generalisations cannot be made on the basis of small numbers (at worst, just a ‘sample of one’), and thus that representativeness is an insurmountable evaluative problem.	+	-----
−	My own approach is to combine my analysis of anarchist and eco-activist literature, with the insights that came through my participation in events and otherwise largely undocumented activist practice. I attempt to ally an explicitly <em>anarchist</em> theoretical insight to the practical experience of activism. It will become clear by reading the thesis that my arguments are mostly substantiated by the textual manifestations of EDA. By choosing this strategy (as opposed to a systematic series of interviews, for example, as practised by Plows and Wall) I might be in danger of presenting a distorted picture. Those who write texts (pamphlets, articles in <em>Do or Die,</em> or discussion documents on specific movement-wide issues), and also those who speak frequently and articulately at national gatherings, do not represent the whole of the movement (SPCA 1998; Cox 1999: 63). Indeed, I have found that written texts in particular display more <em>explicitly anarchist</em> thinking than I believe to be the norm in EDA. Bookstalls underline the point: a highly visible demonstration of allegiance to the anarchist tradition, in place at each major <em>EF!</em> gathering. However, my argument is that anarchism is <em>also</em> displayed in the workings of EDA events, and the process of EDA activism. Textual expressions are only a <em>part</em> of the anarchist dialogue, often constituting an application of self-conscious anarchism to the practices and matters at hand?[24] They thus reveal a highly significant point of anarchist analysis - a public application of anarchist principles to practice - and much of this thesis is dedicated to following the arguments expressed therein, of value for their own sake. In this thesis, therefore, texts are neither excluded nor relied upon. Rather they are given a specific place in dialogue with other sources such as campfire discussion and the actual practice of activism.	+	==== Annotation 11 ====
−	The format of this thesis, heavy with quotes and multiple references, might nonetheless mislead the reader into thinking they are the primary focus of the thesis. I have not, however, relied upon nor specifically followed the textual manifestations of activist anarchism: often they represent an ‘add-on’ to my argument, used solely to provide a public reference to the event, argument or theme. Life is dynamic and interrelational: it is more than a text. Ideas, words and actions, furthermore, are themselves “part of dialogical processes occurring in concrete historical settings” (Barker 2001:176). Used in isolation, the public texts of a movement present a distorted story (Roseneil 1995:33). They are designed for public consumption - often for persuasion or propaganda - and even the ‘internal* movement texts are a product of specific intentions and perspectives <em>within</em> a debate: they are never in themselves a reliable portrait of all the issues at hand (Duckett 2001b). It is therefore essential to participate in the activities that ground - and provide the subject for - these movement texts, in order to appreciate their full meaning (Seel 1999:42).[25] An additional problem with using movement texts alone lies in ‘fixing’ them into stasis: everything is written in a particular moment, and authors do not wish to be tied to that momentary expression for all time. When I cite, for example, <em>Green Anarchist (1999),</em> there is no way of indicating how the author may have moderated or rejected that opinion. I cannot entirely avoid the tendency in my thesis to ‘fix’ expressions (cf Ong 1982:91; Radley quoted in Thrift 1997:126), but I must express here that life, and movements, are fluid and ever-changing, and every individual has a multiplicity of opinions, responses and possibilities not well expressed by ‘referencing’ them (Wall 1997: 26; cf Heller 2000:144).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused ''humanist'' viewpoint.
−	In this thesis, I also cite many academic and journalistic commentaries but the latter in particular have proved an extremely partial, inaccurate and ideologically-loaded source. Academic articles certainly tend to more accuracy and depth of analysis but, in a manner comparable to the latter, often serve more as an outlet for academic concerns than as testaments to the actual beliefs, interactions and life-world of the activists themselves. The exceptions to this tendency are the most highly cited in this thesis, however, so this effect has largely been ‘edited out’. Here I will introduce the journalistic case as the more straightforward, but both the journalistic and academic cases partake of the same dangerous dynamic, antithetical to the anarchist ethos (and both the media and the “servile intellectual class” are likewise condemned together in activist anarchist circles (Rob Newman in <em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2000; cf London Greenpeace c2000; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998: 7)).	+	Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.
−	George Monbiot is the clearest example of the dangerous dynamics of journalistic spokespeople. An articulate and well-known commentator on EDA, Monbiot was heavily involved in ‘The Land is Ours’, produced a helpful ‘Activist’s Guide to the Media’, and was accorded respect in provincial activist circles such as Newcastle’s (this was demonstrated by our choosing to advertise his events (<em>TGAL</em> No.37 2000:12; cf <em>Freedom</em> 27<sup>th</sup> January 1996 57(2): np). Yet Monbiot’s celebrations of EDA turned to a harsh and somewhat unbalanced criticism after the Guerrilla Gardening action on Mayday 2000 (Monbiot 2000b; Monbiot 2001b), and this prompted many activists — without the same privileged access to mass media outlets, to articulate anarchist critiques of media, power and representation (Squall 2000: 1; RTS 2000d; RTS 2000e; Flood 2001). Academics can also use their own privileged status as ‘authoritative’ commentators on movements, to anger, alienate and misrepresent activists in a similar way. In the current world, it is the ‘weakness’ in anarchist organisation (its openness, its fluidity and its inability to ‘authorise’ statements), that allows such ‘outside’ spokespeople to speak ‘on behalf of the movement, often in direct opposition to its anarchist aims.[26]	+	-----
−	Epstein argues that “In order to understand in any depth the worldview of the movement, the meaning of its actions needs to be seen from the inside” (1991:20; cf Welsh 2000:205; Doherty 2002:8; Ferrell 2001[27]). Goaman laments that NSM theorists “neglect the texts and arguments produced by the movements, with the result that the perspectives, self-definitions, language and vocabulary of the latter do not enter the framework of sociological discourse” (2002:11; cf Hller 2000:62), and Welsh urges the combination of participatory research methods with an anarchist theoretical approach, on the basis that “Immersion in the movement life world ... frequently presents direct challenges to categories developed within the academy to analyse movements” and may thus lead to findings that stand against, or in a different world from, more straightforward academic analysis (1997: 80). I consider this perspective with regard to ‘direct action’ in section 6.2.1	+	==== Annotation 12 ====
−	It was on such an understanding of the limitations of texts that I undertook much of my research as an ‘insider ethnographer* (Jones 1970:251). Positive aspects of this approach include the greater likelihood that subjects of study provide the researcher with honest information (partly this is to do with trust, but it is also because die insider ethnographer would often know if they were lying). Negative aspects, however, include knowing perhaps too much about the group. Editing my research data was the most problematic aspect of my research, as I was interested in many different issues, campaigns and activities at the same time. With some of these, furthermore, I was interested in both an academic sense, and an activist sense, and would forget which one. I will return to these dilemmas in 3.3.3 and consider the experience of insider ethnography in 3.4.4.	+	Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.
−	Practical tools that I used in this approach include participant and non-participant observation, semistructured interviewing of groups and of individuals, and discussion of salient themes with other participants. I also used what Roseneil terms “‘opportunistic research strategies’... using one’s own ‘at hand’ knowledge, unique biographies, and situational familiarities” (1995: 8). Most of my research (interviews, participant observation, leaflet surveys) has taken place in ‘natural settings’. Reinharz argues that “Data gathering in natural settings can alert the researcher to the presence of information that is already available in the setting such as archives, reports, newspapers, posters, letters, diaries, photo albums, etc” (1983: 179). Such was undoubtedly true in my case, and it is made only more so when those photo albums belong to yourself, when you have put up the posters and when the ‘natural setting* is your living room. None of those things were solely personal to me, however. Rather, they were transformed into public, activist spaces through their use by the group (my photo albums were trawled to find shots for the ‘TAPP calendars’; I had a hand in many campaign posters; and TAPP meetings frequently took place in my living room). Goaman argues on anarchist grounds for an “inversion of traditional method of ‘participant observation’, in favour of what has been rather ‘observant participation*” (2002: 5), and a similar reversal of priority was true in my own case.	+	Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in ''The Essence of Christianity'': “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”
−	I combined the above approach to data gathering and discussion with a reading of the ‘technical literature’ (academic books and papers) and the ‘non-technical literature’ (propaganda, news reports etc..)[28].1 also undertook some quantitative research, with surveys of activist literature: leaflets available at activist gatherings, the <em>EFIA</em> t/, and the local newsletter <em>‘Think Globally Act Locally * (</em>	+	Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”
−	<em>TGAL) (</em> Grassby 2001: 109-111). I do not, however, premise much of my argument on this survey	+	In his ''Collected Works'', Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:
−	data because I did not find it illuminated much of interest. My central argument is not, for example, that eco-activists say anarchist things: that is too self-evident to require so much proof. Instead I took that as my initial premise and framework (my quantitative sources allowed me that assumption), while not of course assuming this to be universal. From this background position I then focussed on what, with my insider knowledge, I considered the most interesting tangents of anarchist expression, and focussed on the diversity <em>‘within</em> that anarchist framework I thus adopted a method comparable to my use of interviews, in which I decided against blanket interviewing as an unjustified use of the activists’ time (see 3.4.3). Instead, building from a bedrock of insider knowledge, I used interviews sparingly and precisely to discuss items of particular interest	+	<blockquote>
		+	Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (''absolut'' ''unmenschliches Wesen''). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (''von dir gedachte''). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.
		+	</blockquote>
−	The above techniques produced tentative explanations and propositions which I then tested and revised as I continued my research (and participation). Although I entered this research with certain strong notions and beliefs, it was only in the sixth year that I crystallised my arguments. At no time did my hypotheses become fixed and rigid, and while this at times made it hard to edit my data for ‘relevance’, it allowed me to stay open to new ideas, and to avoid distorting my data according to pre-set expectations. Only a fraction of the movements and sites of direct action which I have studied appear in the final thesis. On a personal note, I have been continually surprised (alternately delighted and dismayed) by the developments of the movements which I have studied: for this reason I assert no ‘predictions’ in the concluding chapter*.	+	Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.”
−	In arriving at this thesis, I have travelled a long journey of’reflexive’ research (Okely 1992: 24; Brewer 2000:128-130; Gouldner 1973). I will now consider the relevance of reflexicity for such an anarchist project of experiential research. Bourdieu argues that “to leave one’s thought in a state of unthought is to condemn oneself to be nothing more than the instrument of that which one claims to think” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:238). Maxey goes further to suggest “a link between the processes of critical reflexivity as a researcher and the processes of engagement, challenge and personal development that are part of’activism’” (1998:4; cf Pouget 2003: 5). This is a link which I consider to be central to my own activity. Both my activism and my study have been driven by the same need. I would also suggest that, perhaps more than any other theory except feminism, anarchist theory and anarchist practice speak to each other on eveiy plane. Experience feeds back on theoretical assumptions, and theoiy judges and frames our experience, creating an ongoing dialogue (Bonanno 1998: 25). Maxey noted that “The process of engaging in activism has led me to renegotiate and develop the way I perceive the world and my place within it... this process of personal development is one of the great strengths of non-violent direct action” (1998:10; cf Cox 1999: 52). I concur in this finding, although I would emphasise that the ‘personal development’ involved is not always an unproblematically good and positive one.	+	“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:
−	Reflexive research is rarely a smooth process (Maxey 1999:203), and does not eliminate the danger of ‘going native’, when a sense of’over-rapport’ develops between the researcher and those under study (Fuller 1999:221). Yet Fuller argues that “going academic” (1999:226) represents only one alternative. There is a space in which constant reassessment, renegotiation and repositioning of a researcher’s various identities allows the development of a collaborative position from which “the construction of flexible, practical relations of solidarity” (Pfeil 1994:225) can be “constructed through various forms of dialogue and struggle” (Routledge 1996a: 225; cf Fuller 2000:226). The bottom line here, is that we must use our research techniques impartially enough to ensure that they are allowed to disprove our most cherished notions. In my case, for example, I had to allow the possibility that the movements I was studying were demonstrated, by my research, to be distinctly ‘not anarchist’, or that anarchist methods of campaigning, organisation and lifestyle were shown to be wrong-headed and ultimately counter-productive. Certain preconceptions of mine have indeed been called into question: for example, that the ‘cliques’ in <em>Earth First!</em> are more apparent than real, and that conflicts between different forms of direct action are theoretically soluble, but my underlying values have only been strengthened.	+	The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the ''active'' subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are ''passive'' subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.
−	In this section we moved from our consideration of recommended research methods and related issues, to the actual practice of my own research. In the following sections I will contextualise this, with regard to ‘the academy* (3.3.1 and 3.3.2), with ‘activism’ (3.3.3), and then with the experience of TAPP as a researched group (3.4.1). In doing so, I will outline the strategies and dilemmas that I developed in the course of my research process.	+	According to Marx, humans are simultaneously ''active'' in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and ''passive'' in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
−	** 3.3 Situating My Own Research	+	<blockquote>
		+	He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in ''The Holy Family''.<ref>''The Holy Family'' is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.</ref>
		+	</blockquote>
−	*** 3.3.1 Anarchism and the Academy	+	Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”
−	As we have seen, feminist researchers have problematised the power relationship involved in the research process. In doing this they, along with critical geographers and sociologists, have identified that the academic institutions themselves have a marked impact on research (Cox 1998; Hartman and Davidow 1991; Sidaway 2000). Stanley and Wise, for example, bewail the “general flight of academic feminists into ‘theoretical’ and eminently traditional forms of analysis” (1983:201; McDermott 1994). Scheman, furthermore, warns that what might at first appear as sharp, political tools, can become denuded of their subversive weight once their ‘ownership* passes to the academic institutions (1991: 193; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2000: 213; Purkis 2005:41; Routledge 1995: 475). This process of co-option and de-radicalisation is looked at again in section 5.2.1 as the institutionalisation thesis.	+	-----
−	It is illuminating that the same process of institutional adoption, and co-option, has not taken place with the anarchist tools of critique (despite McKay’s hopes (1996:27; cf Ehrlich 1990)). Mac Laughlin thus writes that “The ‘state-centered’ tradition constitutes the mainstream of modem social science”,	+	The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith<ref>Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.</ref> and David Ricardo<ref>David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.</ref>, also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].
−	and “dissident minorities like anarchists, who provided anti-statist and anti-capitalist struggles with ideological and indeed * scientific’ support, were excluded from socially-strategic positions in the academic world” (1986:14-23). This situation of exclusion, rather than co-option, underlies Sylvan’s perception that “Most of the seminal and interesting work on anarchism has come from outside universities”, and academics “have contributed little original anarchist thought” (1993:215). Zinn characterises the academy’s exclusion of anarchism, “one of the most important political philosophies of modem times”, as an indictment of narrowness in education (1997: 644; cf Mac Laughlin 1986: 11; Purkis 2005: 40), and Javad cites Marxist partisanship as the major factor in anarchism’s exclusion from social theory (2002; cf Millet 1995; Mac Laughlin 1986:12).	+	Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.
−	This “Determinism and sectarianism” (Welsh & Purkis 2003: 9) is linked to the process of a) sociological institutionalisation, b) professionalisation of sociologists, and c) the reliance of both processes on the state (Javed 2002:2; cf Welsh & Purkis 2003:10). The sociological academy’s unquestioned Marxist assumptions lead it to ignore anarchism because of Marxists’ focus on ‘state domination’ instead of’critique of capital’ (Ojeili 1999:157). Javed writes that “when Marxism established its sociologicality within the academy ... its body of judgement over its rivals was accepted as a matter of fact rather than matters open to argument” For this reason, “what has gone under the name of critique of anarchism is confined to Marx’s critique of classical anarchism” (2002:3; cf Cox & Barker 2002:11). Absent from the sociological establishment, therefore, are both the classical anarchist critique “of Marx (Marxism) and statist theoreticians”, and also “more importantly.. the continuing critique by anarchists which is a vital part in contemporary social thought and social activism outside the university” (2002:2).[29] Perhaps this thesis will work in some way to remedy this fact, but the danger is raised that it might equally serve to aid the institutionalisation and de- radicalisation of anarchism.	+	-----
−	We have already noted the mistrust of academia that anarchists have historically expressed (Walter 2002:35; Goldman 1969:35). Thus Bakunin, in one address “To the Students of the University, the	+	==== Annotation 13 ====
−	Academy & the Technical Institute”, warns us to “Take notice of learning, in whose name men try to	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Historical Characteristic of Value'''
−	shackle you and strip you of your power. Learning of this kind must die together with the world of which it is an expression” (in Avrich 1987:10; cf Illich 1971: 124; Situationist International 1989: 74). It is my view that the experience of feminist researchers with the academy provides a ‘proof or testcase of the anarchist critique.	+	Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ''ahistoric'' view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in ''The Poverty of Philosophy:''
−	I do not wish to imply the simplistic position that academics are mere ‘lackeys of capitalism’, “socially and objectively related to the dominant sectors of capitalist society and consequently lacking in any intellectual autonomy or ‘manoeuvrability’” (Mac Laughlin 1986:11). Rather, I follow Mac Laughlin’s position that we should recognise the “capacity of dissidents in academia to produce antithetical knowledge less to the benefit of dominant social groups and more in the interests of’their own’ disadvantaged constituents” (1986:13; cf Gramsci 1971: 3-43; Gouldner 1979; Doherty 2002: 60; Bakunin 1990a: 216). Without resorting to simplistic, instrumental characterisations, however, Bourdieu reminds us that the academic field is a field of power, not of crystal-clear, unsullied objectivity (1988; cf Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:236; Bell [D.S.]: 222): this is something we should take on board.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bourdieu identifies three levels of bias that may blur the sociological gaze: 1) the social origins and coordinates of the individual researcher; 2) the position the analyst occupies within the academic field; and most importantly 3) “The <em>intellectualist bias</em> which entices us to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:39). I hope to at least limit the degree to which these three layers of bias affect this thesis, by reflexively examining my own social and academic position, and by exposing my personal voice amidst the intellectual analysis (although Bourdieu himself does not advocate using the first-person voice). While I view anarchist ethics and intent as the essential antidote to disengaged reflection, it is debatable whether it can break through the format of a thesis sufficient to remedy the third bias.	+	<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production'''
−	Sidaway argues that the making of connections between action and research is discouraged by a wider culture of academic production (2000:265), and Kitchin and Hubbard follow Bourdieu (1988) in noting that “the distinction between the pristine ‘ivory tower’ and the messy world of the ‘streets’ has	+	In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.
−	been important in maintaining the pedagogical authority of education, an authority that is seen to be compromised when academics attempt to bridge these two worlds” (1999:196; cf Sibley 1995). Thus Zinn charges that “We are accustomed to keeping our social commitment extracurricular and our scholarly work safely neutral. We were the first to learn that awe and honour greet those who have flown off into space while people suffer on earth” (1997:500; cf Holloway 2002: 9; Goaman 2002:31). Zinn argues that five unwritten rules mark out the a-politicism of the academy:	+	<nowiki>***</nowiki> Duality of Commodity Production Labor
−	“Rule 1: Carry on ‘disinterested scholarship’	+	In ''Capital'', Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:
−	Rule 2: Be objective	+	First, there is ''abstract labor'', which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is ''concrete labor'', which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.
−	Rule 3: Stick to your discipline.	+	Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.
−	Rule 4: To be ‘scientific’ requires neutrality	+	-----
−	Rule 5: A scholar must, in order to be ‘rational’, avoid ‘emotionalism’” (1997: 504-6).	+	Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.
−	We would do well to recall Kropotkin’s castigation of academics for their inattention to the plight of their fellow men. He compared them to drunkards for the way that they cared only for their personal gratification (2001:264).	+	-----
−	Sidaway links these aspects of academic practice to the capitalist logic underlying its economy and knowledge-production (2000: 263). This process has been analysed historically by Mac Laughlin, who argues that the “Professionalisation and ‘nationalisation’ of the social sciences in the West throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century created divisions of labour in the academic world that mirrored those in the world of industrial capitalism and colonial expansion” (1986: 20; cf Knabb, ed, 1989:319). In the present-day, Sparke highlights the “capitalist and bureaucratic imperatives of publication in contemporary academia” (1994; cf Mohan 1994). Thus the status of professors is judged according to the stacks of papers which they chum out: as Zinn comments, “the scholarly monographs and the social evils keep rising higher and higher in separate piles” (1997: 613). He states that “interests are internalised in the motivations of the scholar: promotion, tenure, higher salaries, prestige” (1997:503), and Stea charges that “The academic community... has taken on the values of the society which spawned it, substituting stacks of paper for stacks of money” (1969:1; cf Luke 1993: 98).[30] It is certainly unlikely that academics looking to their careers will find anarchist avenues of thought and research practice to be a promising direction (Goaman 2002:48).	+	==== Annotation 14 ====
−	Zinn frames this process in a form that restates the standard anarchist critique of’the system’: “these interests operate, not through any conspiratorial decision, but through the mechanism of a well-oiled system, just as the irrationality of the economic system operates not through any devilish plot but through the mechanism of the profit motive and the market, and as the same kinds of political decisions reproduce themselves ... year after year” (1997: 503; cf Smith 1995: 51; Routledge 1995:475; Gitlin 1980:4). Thus the logic of the state is sufficient to itself, without the need of any especially evil people at the top. Zinn makes the case that “There is no question ... of a ‘disinterested’ university, only a question about what kinds of interests the university will serve” (1997: 504). Here at Newcastle University, the army is allowed to actively recruit, British Aerospace run stalls at careers fairs, and ethically suspect multinational companies like Procter & Gamble, Nestle and Esso all provide sponsorship (SAPP 1998; cf Platform 2003; Monbiot 2000a: 284-289; <em>EF!J</em>24(5) 2004:22-24; Soley 1995; Ehrlich 1985). During my study at this university I have therefore been involved in demonstrations, leafleting and subvertising in (somewhat tokenistic) opposition to such aspects of the institution (<em>TGAL</em> No.52 2002: 9).[31] This was made most clear with Gene-no!’s opposition to the International Centre for Life, a combined university, business and infotainment project which we opposed on a range of grounds including “big business = bad science”, and the waste of money and corruption involved (Gene-No! 2000; <em>Do or Die</em> 1999:106; <em>TGAL</em> No.69 2006:6).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Commodity Production'''
−	The final point we should recognise about the academic field is that it is a domain of privilege, as well as prestige. Thus Routledge notes that “As academics we inhabit a place within society that enables us to enjoy many of the traditional benefits that such a profession provides, while also critiquing that society and profession... a privileged location that affords intellectuals the <em>possibility of</em> various kinds	+	''Simple commodity production'' (also known as ''petty commodity production'') is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. ''Simple exchange'' occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.
−	of political action” (1996b: 402; cf Adorno 1990:41; Holloway 2002: 63). It is my privileged position to have been able to look in depth at anarchism, and involve myself in various forms of activism, without being condemned as subversive and contemptible in the eyes of society. As Cox has put it, “Academia is a wonderful day job for an activist” (Social Movements List 2002; cf Heller 2000:6). I myself have not been employed by the academy, so I do not share the same relationship as Cox and others I have cited: I shall detail my own relations in the next section.	+	Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.
−	*** 3.3.2 My Relationship to the Academy	+	'''C→M→C stands for:'''
−	I would now like to briefly discuss how my own research activities have stood in relation to the academic fields of power. Amongst the salient forms of interference and control exerted by the academic field are (a) validation and the acceptable ‘norms’ of research, and (b) funding.	+	Commodity '''→''' Money '''→''' Commodity
−	Regarding the issue of validation, McDowell notes that “It is difficult to simultaneously be seeking validation from and critiquing the academy” (1992b: 59). I have not felt compelled to impose limitations on my own inquiries, however, in part because as they have not focussed on academic institutions themselves. The fact that I have not been seeking a career within the universities might also have helped to keep the ‘policeman in my head’ at bay. I <em>have</em> felt frustrated at the need to shoehorn analysis into a thesis format • I feel it has imposed a false rigidity on my consideration of arguments, forced me to overemphasise one aspect over another, and rephrase discussions into a more jargonistic language - but I cannot honestly pin a ‘political’ explanation on this. Zinn warns that the specialisation inherent to academic study “divorces fact from theory” and “Ensures the functioning in the academy of the system’s dictum: divide and rule” (1997: 505; cf Jonathan X 2000: 162; sasha k 2000). Yet committed scholarship should transcend these boundaries (Miles and Finn 1989:18-28). Throughout this thesis, I justify my subject matter and discursive diversions according to the values and logic of anarchist ideology: I am therefore fortunate in that anarchism is a loose and boundary-crossing canon, so that I have been able to select my sources of academic authority from a variety of fields (political philosophy, NSM theory, feminist epistemology), and I have sought to demonstrate the links throughout.	+	So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.
−	The core issue lays with funding, and I would like to discuss this now, leading into more general points about my relationship to the academy. I did not apply for funding, and so I was neither led to design my research topic, nor to conform to the requirements of a funding body. I came to choose research as an activity for more personal motives, including what could broadly be read as anarchistic values: I did not wish to sacrifice the freedoms of a ‘student lifestyle’ for the material remuneration of a nine-to-five job, and I wished to have a project with which to engage more deeply in environmental thinking and political activism. I have greatly valued the freedom that I have had in directing my own research according to my own motives and spontaneous desires. I had been warned at the beginning of the enterprise that my topics of interest were unlikely to gain funding, and I would certainly have felt less adventurous and full-of-choices had I been overshadowed by a funding body wishing me to keep to an initial funding proposal. There would also have been the danger that I would have adapted my study to fit the needs and criteria of institutions ultimately antithetical to the subjects of my study: for protest ‘management’, neutralisation, or refutation. The funding body can serve to bring in a ‘third party’ to the research process, with its own criteria and objectives, and I have gratefully been free of any hint of this.	+	In the C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.
−	I have obtained my funding from alternative, non-academic sources: parental support, temporary and part-time jobs, and state benefits. Implications of this include my privileged position of having parents whose economic position allowed them to support me when requested, and whose tolerant, liberal social views did not condemn the subject matter. Certain of my survival techniques have also involved a degree of dissembling to state, banking and other bodies This is one of the many informal ways in which my situation has shared common ground with the subjects of my study (Jonathan X 2000:168- 169). Many of the activists featured in this thesis tend to view such bodies with contempt (certainly with no loyalty), and are also often compelled to present an ‘official’ persona that leaves out much of what gives their lives meaning. I have also been enabled to pursue this thesis by a low-consumerist	+	''Capitalist commodity production'' and ''capitalist exchange'', on the other hand, are based on the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation.
−	<br>	+	'''M→C→M’ stands for:'''
−	lifestyle, and by being part of a mutually supportive community of friends amongst the green and counter-cultural milieus of Tyneside.	+	Money '''→''' Commodity '''→''' More Money
−	My position vis-a-vis the academy has thus been one of some i critical distance. I quickly came to view my project as antithetical to some tendencies within the academy-as-institution: of expert knowledge and elitism, of providing a service to state and corporate funders, of the implicit logic expressed by all institutions governed by economic or bureaucratic logics. After the first term of my first year of research 1 cut as many links as I possibly could with this side of the academy, so that most of my research activity has ended up taking place outside its walls. At the same time, however, I have benefited greatly by the academy-as-intellectual-community. Ingredients of this include the space for discussion provided by email lists and conferences and the imprint of this intellectual community left in journal articles and library shelves. This relates to the anarchist position that no idea is created in isolation by an individual, to be claimed as ‘his alone’ by right: see 3.2.1 (b).	+	Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining ''more money.''
−	My critical distance to the academy-as-institution has also enabled me to develop concerns with the norms of academic language and tone. Thus it is that I have felt affinity for both the critiques and the alternative epistemologies expressed by feminist and other researchers, which I outlined above. In questioning the political and institutional discourse of the academy I have been left more open to epistemological and ontological challenges to its discourse. This relates to the anarchistic values and ideals that I brought with me into the process at the start, of course, and which this chapter aims to explore.	+	Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.
−	Having thus discussed the academy as a powerful, very real body, we should note the simple dictum that “no simple opposition exists between academia and activism” (Routledge 1996b: 411). Thompson emphasises that “outside the university precincts another kind of knowledge production is going on all the time” i 1978: 200: cf Cahill 2003: 93). Most of my active thinking and discussion of ideas has taken place amongst other activists and sympathetic individuals, from the hurly-burly world of “the streets’. I have walked through the streets carrying flags for peace, and I have dodged through lines of riot police as, the press report, ‘anarchist mobs storm the streets’: see Figure 3.1.	+	<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Value-Form'''
−	][Figure 3.1 Images of author ‘in the streets’.]]	+	This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in ''Appendix of the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital, Volume 1'', but here are some of the fundamentals:
−	The moment o! dramatic action is not the only place where anarchists get together, however. Rather, there are the summer gatherings and festivals, there are debriefings and strategy meetings, and I concur with Blomley when he writes that “the life o the mind is often a lot healthier in many o the community settings” than in the academy (1994: 5). Although Thompson notes this is not universally true (1978: 200), it certainly was with my local group TAPP, considered in section 3.4.1. My ‘intellectual’ contributions outside the academy and within activism included working with an older, Newcastle bom-and-bred activist to produce a radical history ot Tyneside (TAPP 1998) - this was used for propagaii da. our group education and as a fundraiser; collating folders of news clippings and information for the TAPP office. I also edited copies of <em>TGAL</em> including a ‘special election supplement’ for the 2001 election which explored anarchist and other activist approaches to elections and democracy. I also wroie reflections on big events such the Carnival Against Capitalism (18.6.1999 । the ‘Reclaim Life’ day of action (27.5.2000) and the DSEI arms fair action (9.11.2001), and passed copies to interested people within TAPP. I contributed discussion documents to EF! Moots and <em>Dissent!</em> gatherings. After TAPP decided to dissolve itself, I produced a report on what TAPP members had discussed and expressed during the group’s existence, using material from my research archives and soliciting additions, disagreements and comments from other ex-TAPPers. 1 liis is provided in an Appendix, and gives a fuller impression of what the group was about.	+	One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.
−	Some of these reflections were purely personal, but others were intended to break down barriers between activism and academia, as Figure 3.2 illustrates:	+	Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:
−	][Figure 3.2 Fragment of article by author i <em>EF!AU</em> No.64 2000: 4-5]]	+	Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.”
−	[Illustration reads: F.F. Ridley ‘Crusaders and Politicians’, Parliarnentary Affairs, Vol 51, No \ Ju y 1998 A special issue of ‘Parliamentary Affairs’ looks …	+	Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s ''tangible form'' of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.
−	… the means to ‘heir differing ends.” “Much-of the thinking which underpins environmental movements’ demands sees the in- …
−	… the responsibility for the । the hands of the authoritic “Il the authorities are not lence on a scale sufficient lie, how cun protesters res that maximises their effee exposes ihe contrast beiw by the authorities and pro nunty? Eco-activists m B where have used icchnica facturc their own dangers …]
−	My contributions were by no means unusual: others in 1 Al’P also wrote and distributed reflect ions (TAPP 1999; TWNP 2000; Gene-no! 2000), wrote articles (Rabley 1999: 69-79; Thornton 1999/2000; Read 2000; AF 1999-2000; Chatterton 2002), debated in meetings and pubs, made flyers, changed plans, criticised each other and ruminated on the purpose and impact of our activism (Duckett 1999a; TAPP 2003). A list such as this cannot show the ongoing, mutually produced debate that takes place within activist networks, furthermore. My own thoughts were formatively influenced by this world of ideas.	+	Value, or the Value-Form, is the ''social form'' of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147].
−	*** 3.3.3 My Relationship to Activism	+	Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
−	We have now been brought to the nature of my relationship with activism, and so it is time to cast some doubt upon this term that I have been using so firmly in this chapter. Blomley writes that “As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity” (1994: 3; cf McLeish 1996: 39). Maxey similarly states that “activism is not a fixed term, but is actively constructed in a range of ways” (1999:199). I have found it fruitful to compare Maxey’s experience with my own.	+	Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: '''20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea'''
−	I, like Maxey, came to term myself an activist after being empowered by the experiences of activism. This moment of change, after which one feels the urge to talk ‘as an activist’, is worth some consideration. In my own case, there is a sense in which I felt a form of emotional release after doing my first ‘actions*. This came from bonding with a small group of allies, risking arrest and working together to ‘do something’ against the status quo. Up until this point, despite my extensive reading, talking and thinking about radical politics and ‘changing the world’, I had not done anything that I considered sufficiently ‘active’ about it Now, at long last, I had found a group of people with whom I could convert my theory into practice. It was only after this moment that I realised how much I had been ‘kept in’ by not feeling able to ally my thoughts with my actions. Now I felt a new sense of oneness with myself, and this relates to the ‘empowerment’ that many activists associate with their experiences. I consider this more in section 5.2.2.	+	These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the ''social form'' because it embodies relational equivalencies:
−	Together with the sense of empowerment that activists can feel having ‘done an action’, however, Maxey warns that less positive outcomes can also result He writes that his group was “actually producing a rather narrow, exclusionary... view of activism that emphasised dramatic, physical, ‘macho* forms of activism with short-term public impacts ... instead of opening up notions of activism to inspire, encourage and engage as many people as possible” (1999; 200; cf Pickerill 2001: 77). There were times this was also true in our case, although TAPP was always more fluid and interconnected with other circles, and other methods of activism, than the stereotypical ‘activist group*. Jonathan X warns that “The activist role is a self-imposed isolation from all the people we should be connecting to” (2000: 164), that it partakes of the same ‘specialism’ as the role of ‘intellectual’ (2000: 160; cf sasha k 2000), and that it acts counter to the anarchist notion of direct action by taking “on a role on behalf of others who relinquish this responsibility” (2000: 161).	+	1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.
−	Maxey came to adopt a more inclusive understanding of the term ‘activism’, one which could equally relate to his research activities. In Maxey’s scheme, “The social world is produced through the acts each of us engages in every day. Everything we do, every thought we have, contributes to the production of the social world. I understand activism to be the process of reflecting and acting upon this condition. We are in a sense all activists, as we are all engaged in producing the world” (1999: 201; cf TAPPer in Pickerill & Duckett 1999: 85; Jonathan X 2000: 161). In considering “the activist/academic dichotomy”, Heller, furthermore, raises “serious doubts that these positions exist as distinct categories” (2000: 6), and points out that his own position can change from day to day (2000: 4; Thrift 1992:136; Plows 1998b: 21; <em>TCA</em> 5(1) 2002: 8). The identities of’researcher’ and ‘activist’ are performative, and not distinct in an ontological way.[32]	+	2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.
−	So far in this chapter, I have been using a narrower understanding of ‘activism*, and I shall continue to do so as a convenient short-hand for the particular form of activity that ‘activists’ see themselves as engaged in. The activities of ‘research’ and ‘activism’ may not be as distinct as their conventional separation might imply, but nor should we imagine that they can be blithely combined without significant tensions arising: I consider this in section 3.4.4.1 wish to conclude my methodology with an account of the relationship that TAPP, the activist group, has held with the various projects of research that have drawn on it In doing this, I will also contextualise my own methodological approach, and provide some of the reasoning (and feelings) that lie behind it.	+	As Marx explains in ''Appendix to the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital'': “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”
−	** 3.4 Tyneside Action for People and Planet	+	Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.
−	*** 3.4.1 Researching TAPP	+	-----
−	Tyneside Action for People and Planet (TAPP) formed in 1998, after a small group came together to stage an action on Mayday in support of sacked workers at Magnet Kitchens. I attended the very first meeting, and kept in constant involvement until shortly before the group’s demise in Spring 2002. TAPP was not a fixed, structured group, and my participation waxed and waned from month to month, yet it was usually quite intense. It was with TAPP that I came to term myself an ‘activist*, because it was primarily with TAPP that I took part in demonstrations, blockades, meetings and the organisation of events. My identity during this research was strongly hooked into the TAPP group and our common experiences. The other participants were and are my friends, and my companions in the political world. Although we never agreed on every point, we managed to create a community of shared values in which to support each others* activism. I cannot state strongly enough how important this has been to me: at the very least it is TAPP that provides the chief source of my political experience.	+	British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.
−	TAPP also became the subject of several pieces of research during its brief history. Various discourses such as anthropology and new social movement theory thus interacted with a group that I knew in the ‘real world*. This gave me an interesting insight into the resources by which academic discourses can describe the world. In my view, they were only able to present very simple stories, and their findings suffered from not being able to take into account the complexities and contextualities of real life. On the positive side, however, by analysing and comparing their methodologies, I (the academic) became better able to understand and adapt my own. Aspects of TAPP that I (the activist) had overlooked were also brought under scrutiny by these accounts, and the conclusions drawn from previous years could be compared to the then-current situation.	+	==== Annotation 15 ====
−	In the following discussion, I will focus on the methodological issues of security (3.4.2), interviews (3.4.3), the experience of insider ethnography (3.4.4), and the use-value of research to the studied group (3.4.5). I would first, however, like to note the strong reservations that I had about researching TAPP: indeed at its beginning I decided that I would not use it in my research at all. Faced with such a good source of data on my own doorstep, however, over time I was led to modify this and include ‘insights’ from TAPP as an unnamed local group. Other TAPP participants then suggested to me that it would make much more sense for me to use TAPP as a focus of research, rather than search elsewhere in the <em>Earth First!</em> network I therefore extended my self-imposed limits again. This time, I told myself that I would only use data from the ‘past history’ of TAPP. This meant that I could tell my friends that I was not actively researching them, but was just sifting through what we’d already done. The date at which this post-dated research stopped was then brought forward again and again as more years ticked by. This approach represents a less systematic approach than Roseneil’s strategy of ‘retrospective autoethnography’ (1995:8) but in its favour I can argue that it was more collectively grounded, in that other TAPP participants recurrently influenced my research strategy (not always consciously).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.
−	The greatest reason for me choosing to only research TAPP’s past in this way, was that I felt it would just be too hard to simultaneously ‘do’ and ‘research* things. Every time I wrote a leaflet, would I have to record the factors leading me to do so? How could I discriminate between useful information on the email lists if I was trying to record everything ‘potentially significant’ for academic reasons as well as just keep up with events? How could I ‘turn off* my research head to think about what was useful to a meeting, rather than what I should be memorising for my research?	+	Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.
−	The strategy I adopted, of backward-looking research, worked for me in the sense that I was able to get through the week without clogging up my life with data-gathering. I wished very much to free myself up to just act, spontaneously and with the flow of the group, rather than impose the ‘control* and ‘ordering* that thorough research implies: for one period I gave away every photo I took, for example (although more recently I re-gathered many of them from the defunct TAPP office). It was only in the fifth year of research that I finally collated my scattered TAPP materials into a folder for research, and I only very rarely wrote research notes after TAPP events. This deliberate restraint in ongoing notetaking was balanced by the collection of leaflets and newsletters we produced. It is possible that, by	+	==== Annotation 16 ====
−	relying more on these more public and collective documents I reduced my own authorial interpretations.[33]	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.
−	In the end, I decided to limit the use of TAPP in this thesis to a supporting role - as local examples and local ‘grounding’ for the themes discussed in each section. I also chose not to use participant observation ‘up-front’ in the thesis, but as a largely undisclosed background to the textual references which I have introduced in section 3.2.4. This paralleled my turn from a more ‘sociological’ analysis to a greater focus on ‘ideological’ expression. These shifts in emphasis have made the security issues discussed in the following section less contentious, and they made the overall thesis less invasive and exploitative, at least on my terms. I cannot claim my primary motivation in this shift was ethical, however, but merely what suited the ongoing development of my thesis. It means that the urgency given the questions below may sound somewhat unbalanced, but I have kept them in, because during most of the time I spent researching this thesis they dominated my reflection on methodological practice: I also think the themes have an enduring value.	+	Utopianism'''' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon<ref>Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref>, François Marie Charles Fourier<ref>Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref> and Robert Owen<ref>Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.</ref>. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism<ref>The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the M'''→'''C'''→'''M mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.</ref> and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.
−	*** 3.4.2 Security Issues	+	==== Annotation 17 ====
−	Ed Hunt was the first researcher of TAPP[34] (which he gave the pseudonym of WAG, ‘World Action Group’), arriving before the group had grown accustomed to being the object of research. He announced himself, at the outset, as a researcher wanting to do an anthropological study of the group. He wished to add some ‘field work’ to his own experience, and his reading of activist and academic literature. As he explains his approach: “Fieldwork with WAG was conducted from late October 1998 to January 1999 and consisted primarily of participant observation. I was present at weekly meetings and at a significant number of the actions that WAG was involved in during the three months of field work” (1999:3). There are no interviews in his work, and little concrete detail. Hunt asked remarkably few questions of the group, but was content to rely on group observation and discussion between ourselves, instead of direct interrogation. His method was to extrapolate certain aspects of the group’s practice and then relate them to more abstract theories. In many ways, therefore, ‘WAG’ has an air-cushion that separates it from reality.	+	The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century drew up similar plans which also failed.
−	Hunt had decided that, due to his sympathies with our form of activism, he would pursue an explicitly overt research agenda (as opposed to a covert one). Due to the way in which he was open, even formal, in the way that he approached us for research, we were more wary with Hunt than with any of TAPP’s later researchers. This was the only time that I remember the group discussing together the issue of being researched, and it was the only time that we asked for conditions to be put on the research: “The group was keen that I should not mention names in my paper so as not to incriminate any individuals. I accepted this from the outset and in this essay I mention no names of individual informants and have also changed the name of the group that I studied” (1999: 5). By announcing himself as a more-or-less detached observer, before we knew him as a fellow activist, Hunt made himself an object of some distrust As he sat with us in the meetings, watching and listening, we were quite aware that he had another agenda, and we were therefore led to impose quite heavy restrictions on his research.[35] I was at least as insistent as anyone else that he take these measures, and it is ironic in this light that he made the group quite anonymous, and ‘protected’ us far more than other researchers, particularly myself.	+	Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.
−	One is immediately struck by the difference between Hunt’s presentation of TAPP (WAG) and my own. A few months after his research, which he had made anonymous at our request (and also because it did not interfere with the essence of his study), I produced two detailed accounts of how TAPP works, one ‘academic’ for the RBE conference (Duckett 1999a i, and one for publication in the activist journal <em>Do or Die (</em> 1999b).[36] In some ways, therefore, I lunt’s confidentiality and protectiveness puts my own approach to shame, and it is me (the insider) who put TAPP much more at risk than him (the outsider). There is a sense in which all of Hunt’s security measures are undermined by my ‘revelation’ of the truth behind his disguise[37]. I have wrestled with this dilemma many times, as I shall discuss. An aspect worth noting now is that due to my intimate relationship (friendship) with the group, they were both less likely to censure me, and also less guarded in what they said. Conversely, they were also more likely to give me honest feedback (especially when drunk), and to provide useful criticism and comment throughout the research process.	+	Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.
−	At the RBE conference, a sympathetic academic and occasional TAPPer organised a discussion at which participants (who were both activists and academics) were asked to consider what an ‘activist’ would want from an academic. The following questions resulted:	+	As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
−	We’d want to know o: the people researching us:	+	<blockquote>
		+	(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Where are they coming from? (sympathetic, hostile) Who’s funding them? public/private, eg. dodgy companies What will they do with the information?	+	Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving ''too early''. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.
−	Where will it be published? might he different	+	In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into ''philosophical utopianism'' in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”
−	obscure journals might be fine, but a trade journal	+	-----
−	How accessible will the information be to non-academics? can you get it from the university library?	+	The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.
−	- to comment on etc. eg.	+	''- Natural Science Premise:''
−	- Security - what mechanisms will be usal? - eg. names, confidentiality The researcher should sign a contractual agreement, if either side breaches it, they’re both covered (if tbe researcher s information is followed up in court, they need to be protected.)	+	Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.
−	- Is it mutually beneficial? - put across group’s message	+	==== Annotation 18 ====
−	- What biases will the academic bring ini	+	''Natural science'' is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.
−	would we accept it if it was negative?	+	Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:
−	<em>eg.</em> if BNHL wanted to research you, how would you respond to it? maybe ‘ exchange system - they visit you and then you visit them!	+	''•'' ''The law of conservation and transformation of energy'' scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.
−	How could we respond to the paper / comment - we’d like to be able to read it, edit it?	+	''•'' ''The theory of evolution'' offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.
−	Knowledge that research is happening affects the rescarched s actions or response but don’t believe in objectivity anyway	+	''•'' ''Cell theory'' was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.
−	][Figure 3.3 Questions to ask a Researcher (Pickerill & Duckett 1999: 27-28 [amended copy]).	+	These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.
−	This discussion represented the high-point of fAPP’s questioning and critical engagement with researchers. After this event, concern and curiosity waned, and ennui began to set in, as myseli again (1999b). then Kate Gridley (1999), Susannah Waters once (2000), and twice । 2001), and Gonzales (2002), all produced pieces of research on the group (see Figure 3.4). Others did articles on aspects of TAPP activity, such as the eclectic city squats (Read 2000; Chatterton 2002) and Reclaim the Streets (Hughes-Dennis 2001). Although Harrington notes that “many groups find it identityenhancing to be studied by a sympathetic outsider” (2003: 610), with APP this proved true only for the first couple of cases.	+	==== Annotation 19 ====
−	Access to the group came more easily to Gridley and Waters than it did to Hunt because Gridley was on the same university course as a member of I’APP and Waters was an occasional participant. They were thus introduced to the group by friends[38]. Waters, researching TAPP a year after Hunt and Gridley had concluded their research, noted that “Secrecy is an important issue within the group. Consent for this research was granted because, as a member of TAPP I could be trusted to take security into consideration” (Waters 2001:10). I am in the same position of trust as Waters, and so the same imperative applies to my own work. Video-activists have noted with worry how “our work can so easily turn into surveillance footage ... useful to the enemy” (‘Surveillance Watch* in <em>Schnews</em> 1999), and Waters notes the equivalent dilemma for investigative research: “One cannot judge what exactly the police would find useful” (2001:10). It is very hard to judge at what point one is becoming too paranoid, or being too lax: “the anthropologist cannot avoid the political consequences of his or her research” (Okely quoted in Waters 2001:10; cf Scarce 1994:133). Waters was led to the doubt (pertaining to her own research topic) that “No one needs to know about TAPP recruitment except for TAPP members” (2001: 10-11). I hold the conceit that the themes in this thesis are worth spreading far and wide, but it is not within my power to decide what the eventual impacts of my research are. There is no firm reply to the point that Okely raises, just a series of security measures and issues to take into consideration. I would suggest that, in situations of sympathy and trust, the researcher should hand the decisions over to the group that is at risk This will at least allow them the chance to highlight a revealing gaffe that the researcher has missed.[39]	+	For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
−	Waters includes, in her consideration of security, a quote that she ascribes to a different interviewee from myself, yet which I am sure is something that I also said, in interview. As the recorded interviewee was a close friend of mine, it is probable that, having discussed it together in the period immediately before the interview, we both expressed near-identical opinions to Waters. Whatever the case, this quote also represents my general approach to living with the risk and paranoia of activism, and is worth re-quoting:	+	Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.
−	“If ‘they’ wanted to know they could find out easily enough. I don’t think there’s been any sign of them bugging houses, certainly not to the extent that its stopped us doing anything about it too far in advance... I don’t personally think we do anything that dodgy. I know I’ve probably got a small file somewhere but I’ve kind of got certain limits on what I do and I don’t step over them” (TAPPer quoted in Waters 2001:10).[40]	+	Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.
−	Heller, in considering the security issues of his ethnographic research with the Faslane Peace Camp, was faced with the situation that “legal problems might arise if I even admitted knowledge of certain actions” (2000:4), and he did not mention certain actions because he was asked not to.[41] I do not feel I am in this situation (although earlier in my research I did expect to find myself in this situation), and the only interest the police might have for my data would be from a more general, evidence-gathering point of view. If I begin to worry about possessing ‘dodgy’ literature or evidence, then I remind myself that the only time TAPP ever got into trouble was when we blatantly asked for it (like refusing to move until we’re arrested). The secrecy involved in direct action (certainly where TAPP was concerned), is practically motivated by the risk of ‘them’ finding out before the action has happened and making it more difficult Finding out, after the event, that we have our own records of these things happening is not going to be of much additional use to a security force that already has photos, videotape, convictions and addresses of us doing those exact same things.	+	In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.”
−	If I was an outside researcher unaware of the real nature of TAPP then it would be irresponsible to take the above position and a more rigid guide would be more appropriate. As it is, I know TAPP well enough to know I have not risked much. If I had possessed evidence of something that individuals I know could get in trouble for, then I would not have kept it Fortunately I am confident that no TAPP members are wanted for serious offences. As regards the more borderline and arrestable acts that, hypothetically, TAPP members could have been involved in (like criminal damage or ‘conspiracy to cause’ some form of protest) then photos or records would not have been made in the first place. We discussed in TAPP whether a more general knowledge of our internal dynamics might in some way be useful to security forces, but did not reach a firm conclusion. We rarely saw ourselves as very important on the political scene.	+	Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.
−	I would now like to move from these general considerations on security (which, we may note, cannot be separated according to ‘researcher’ and ‘activist’ roles) to detail the actual security measures which	+	As Engels wrote in ''On Dialectics:''
−	I have employed as a researcher. Interview tapes have been wiped, individuals have been renamed, and personal details have not been included: I have avoided including specific details, and personal characteristics that might identify individuals. My chief strategy was to hand over ‘the evidence’ to the now-defunct but still identifiable group, so that we could collectively decide whether anything should be excluded,[42] but the group’s demise made these issues less pressing. Indeed one TAPPer joked that I created TAPP for my thesis and therefore folded it when I had enough information. The biggest omission from this thesis is an examination of the direct action group which formed after TAPP’s dissolution: I decided not to research, record or analyse this group for security reasons, and to eliminate all the quandaries I had had to negotiate during TAPP’s existence. It is not because I view this subsequent group (or network, or forum) as any less important than TAPP, but rather because I respect the people involved in it, and because it was not necessary for my arguments.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical ''thinking'' can be of assistance.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Maxey has noted that ‘informed consent’ is not a possibility when you live amongst the people you are ‘researching’. He notes that, even after informing his ‘subjects’ of his research project, they would often forget about this once he took on the more long term roles of neighbour, fellow-campaigner and friend (1999:205; cf Plows 1998b: 16). Most TAPPers and EF!ers did not see me primarily as a researcher: I was more often representing a certain campaign, or introduced as a regional contact point: . in go-rounds at Earth First! gatherings I’ve been ‘Mike from Newcastle’ since 1997. It is not realistic to say ‘Is it alright to use that joke in the Phd’ every time you chat over a cup of tea. I therefore found it impossible to acquire a reliable case of’informed consent’ from those with whom I had an ongoing and multi-layered relationship.	+	As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In ''Dialectics of Nature,'' Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework'':''
−	I did, however, repeatedly mention my research, making it known not only to TAPPers but also to Earth Firstlers and other activists. After putting up a poster at the 2002 EF! Moot, announcing my thesis and inviting people to read a draft, a typical comment came from one EF!er: “It’s good you’re doing that, but I doubt anybody will bother” reading it (EF! Moot 2002). Asking for consent would not work for every kind of research, and was possible for me only because of my intimate and longterm relationship with the local group studied. It was because I recognised my thesis to share the underlying values and political direction of its subject-matter, therefore, that I felt able to expose it to the attention of the researched. We can imagine a different situation in which the piece of research was subjected to a brutal process of criticism,[43] and distorted into a piece of propaganda or butchered into badly-fitting contradictory fragments.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.
		+	</blockquote>
−	As it is, however, TAPP interest in this piece of research did not extend to such criticism: the response was, as Heller noted in his own case, “amusement or indifference” (2000: 6). Maxey warns that, in trying to involve the researched in the research process, we must consider “the extent to which this is actually an inappropriate imposition on people who really do not have the time or interest in such things” (1999: 206). He records that in his case, “In trying to pursue a more participatory approach, I was in danger of imposing my project on others” (1999: 205). With TAPP, similarly, the chief result of being researched was an ennui with being researched. Thus Waters records that four of her eight interviewees replied “Not another one!” when they heard she was doing research on TAPP (2001:15). She states that “I was aware that TAPP had been ‘studied to death’ over the past few years, by various academics. Most of them seemed to come to meetings, come on actions and then, vanish back into the world of academia never to be seen again” (2001:9). The group expressed no explicit <em>hostility</em> to being researched again, yet a feeling for this mood in the group deterred me from undertaking a series of interviews at that time and with that format.	+	So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.
−	Waters records that contentious issues did later arise concerning the value of research: “Many people involved in TAPP raised the contentious issue that if someone was doing research they were spending more time on that than on actions” (2001:3). In my experience, also, doing research is one of the many ways that a person (myself) can feel they are keeping up their involvement in ‘politics’, while at	+	-----
−	<br>	+	These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.
−	the same time not achieving or contributing anything to that ‘politics’ (Bakunin 1990a: xiv). Certain participants in TAPP did, on occasion, express irritation at me for turning up on actions, but not contributing to the organisation of them. They also compared the time that I spent on research with the time I devoted to the TAPP group. I he culmination of this was expressed in a satirical email sent around the TAPP network, reproduced in Figure 3.4:	+	-----
−	PH.D. PROPOSAL: THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF A DIRECT ACTION GROUP	+	==== Annotation 20 ====
−	Tyneside Action for People and Plane! (TAPP) is a direct action group that has existed in the north east of England since 1998 (?). In this time it has become the subject of what must be an unprecedented amount of academic study. A huge variety of different aspects of TAPP have been researched by both undergrads and postgrads alike. In fact, so much research has been done on TAPP that it has now become possible, nay imperative, to research the researchers. This thesis will examine those who have researched TAPP in respect to their:	+	''Endlessness'' refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. ''Self-existence'' means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. ''Self-motivation'' and ''Self-transformation'' refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.
−	sex	+	Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	age	+	<blockquote>
		+	Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.
		+	</blockquote>
−	social class
−	ethnicity	+	-----
−	length <em>of</em> dreds	+	In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.
−	number of dogs owned	+	==== b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism ====
−	consumption of lentils	+	Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.
−	length of time dreds have been sported	+	Many famous works such as ''The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'' (Marx, 1844), ''The Holy Family'' (Marx and Engels, 1845), ''Thesis on Feuerbach'' (Marx, 1845), ''The German Ideology'' (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.
−	This data will then be used in relation to the following questions:	+	-----
−	1. Why is it that academics themselves not only allow this kind of research but actually seem to encourage it?	+	==== Annotation 21 ====
−	2. How do those who research TAPP and involve themselves in it simultaneously see their own position?	+	There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).
−	3. What comes first, the political involvement or the research?	+	With works such as ''The Poverty of Philosophy'' (Marx, 1847) and ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.
−	4. What’s more important, the political involvement or the research?	+	-----
−	5. Does anyone (apart from people in TAPP and people who desperately need a topic for their final year humanities degree dissertation) actually give a flying fuck about TAPP?	+	==== Annotation 22 ====
−	These responses will be used in an attempt to answer the fundamental question, an answer which will radically alter the very way occidental society perceives knowledge, ideology and the world.	+	According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:
−	Why is it that so many people think that a very small group of people organising a few things over a small length of time warrant so much fucking attention?	+	<blockquote>
		+	1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
−	There will also be a slightly more metaphysical bit where I attempt to study myself doing this study of people who have studied TAPP. After gazing at people gazing at their navels, I will then vanish in a puff of paradox up my own derriere.	+	2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
−	][Figure 3.4 Mock ‘Phd proposal’ 200 1	+	3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
		+	</blockquote>
−	These considerations of the ethics and implications of participant research record the salient issues as I viewed them until September 2005, at which point I was compiling my bibliography in readiness for submission. Unbeknownst to me (which demonstrates the degree to which the process of writing up a thesis had separated me from activism), a symbolic protest involving a giant ‘id card’ was planned to take place outside a meeting of EU ministers in Newcastle. Ironically, this protest against the removal of civil liberties and the right to protest was prevented by the arrest of all participants as they stepped out of their vehicles, followed by 20 hours in police cells, and the simultaneous and thorough search of each individual’s home. While most of the individuals involved found this more comical than frightening, it caused me severe worries precisely because of my research. At the time my room was scattered with carefully ordered and half-catalogued piles of pamphlets, notes, newspaper clippings and leaflets. If my house had been raided I would have lost several weeks o work by the mess created; my compilation of activist and anarchist literature including some ‘extreme’ items such as Green Anarchist) might have been confiscated; and my diaries, photographs and notes would have intimately revealed the friendship groups, names and associations of TAPP and other Newcastle activists. This was brought especially home to me for two reasons, f irst, my girlfriend was lodging with one o the	+	These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.
−	<br>	+	In the book ''The Poverty of Philosophy'', Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.
−	arrested individuals and all of her academic and personal possessions were searched, and several removed, including a video TAPP had made which included me speaking to camera of how we stopped nuclear convoys, and shots of such an obstruction in action: if this was of interest to the police, then so would my photo albums, diaries, and collected artefacts including activist videos collected over the last ten years (see Figure 6.7). Second, this wave of raids was not done because of any wrong-doing or intended wrong-doing on the part of the individuals arrested, but rather bore the hallmarks of a more general intelligence-gathering operation: indeed the circumstances of the arrests, made before the individuals even began their protest, was suggestive of some prior knowledge.[44] All the ethical principle discussed in the preceding pages would be insufficient to remedy the ‘gift’ my research would have provided for the police and other governmental intelligence agencies.	+	-----
−	I was prompted to re-read the salient literature on security and participant research, of which Rik Scarce’s account of his imprisonment for refusing to divulge information gained by ethnographic research is perhaps the most salient (1994). I found his account insufficient for my concerns, however, in that the punishment was centred solely upon his person, and the information at stake was entirely within his command (I do not know how he would have managed to hide or protect his records and written data from police raids: it is possible that he was much more careful than myself in solely exploring matters of public knowledge, principle and belief, in a manner that was abstracted from local context). The consequences of my compiled research going into the files and computer systems of the police and other governmental agencies would be much more diffuse, and I would not be able to gather all the penalties back into my own body. Other considerations are that Scarce sought to use the authority of academically-defined sociological principle and his position within the academy to fight his comer (1994: 145), whereas I have sought to occupy a territory mostly outside the academy and would have to bend some principles of anarchism to use that privileged, protected position as the basis for protecting my data. Scarce’s focus upon the scenarios in which the possibility of going to jail might be confronted (1994:134), furthermore, cannot answer the power and propensity of the police to raid houses and collect information without formal recourse to the court process or public scrutiny. The waves of additional state legislation and counter-terrorist intelligence activity of the last few years has made notions of academic neutrality even more naive than when I started this research. I am therefore left in the position (which has a disturbing echo of familiarity) where I consider that the anarchist principles (laid out above) are sound and ethical in themselves, but would not stand up to the interventions (attention/assault) of the state. This will have a bearing on my intended future (extra- institutional) projects of research.	+	==== Annotation 23 ====
−	In the next section I will discuss how the group was involved in research interviews: the primary and most clear ‘experience* of research. I will follow this with a consideration of the tension and confusion that can arise from conducting insider ethnography within a group like TAPP, and I will consider the potential ‘usefulness’ of such research for the group involved.	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current ''material conditions'' [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
−	*** 3.4.3 Interviews	+	''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.
−	Gridley, like Hunt, openly announced her status as researcher during a TAPP weekly meeting, and invited people to step forward for interview. Those who were <em>not</em> interested in being researched, therefore, could largely avoid it, while those who were interested in articulating their ideas and motivations were given that chance. This worked well, and I sought to follow her example of giving this choice concerning participation over to the research subjects. Gridley’s interviews were the first experience that TAPP had of being interviewed. Waters also conducted several interviews, and I took part in these latter sessions as an interviewee.[45]	+	-----
−	For my own research, however, I did not rely upon such individual interviews. This was partly because my knowledge of the group and their views was deep enough already, and partly because the group had become tired of them. Instead, I conducted infrequent and occasional interviews, once with a group of six TAPPers (which incidentally included two other academics), but usually with specifically chosen individuals. These interviews were designed to pursue particularly interesting perspectives that I’d heard from those TAPPers in more casual conversation. I used these interviews both to gain consent for using those points of view, and also to encourage those individuals to articulate their view more precisely. The most in-depth of these was with a Green Party ex-TAPPer who lamented the conflict between Green Party and anti-electionists in the group. Others covered the motivation behind direct action; the role of Earth First!; activism in Newcastle before TAPP; the state of the UK’s anarchist movement; the value of squatting and the reasons for the demise of TAPP. In addition to these preplanned and ‘announced’ interviews (only 8), there were over a hundred informal conversations in which consent was <em>not always</em> specifically requested or granted, but which I afterwards used to inform my notes. Also there were innumerable dialogues and group experiences which were not recorded, but which echo around the group’s texts, explicit conversations and background assumptions. Many group dialogues (planning meetings, fundraising socials, debriefings) in which I was a participant but not the orchestrator were also recorded: these merge with participant observation / observant participation, but were more explicit, formal and reflexive than ethnographic methodology assumes, often organised systematically, for example with a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats).	+	==== Annotation 24 ====
−	Even though I did not personally participate in Gridley’s original interviews, as a member of the group I could recognise the voices of those who were then quoted. This relates to an issue raised in the methodological literature: “It is not uncommon for a whole town or community to be able to identify participants in a research project even when fictitious names are used” (Frankfort-Nachmia and Nahmias 1992: 85). It is tempting to reveal the background behind those who were interviewed, in order to give an otherwise inaccessible depth and context for their statements (for example, how experience in particular groups and movements informed attitudes to issues like the media and violence), but ethically I felt I could not justify taking this study of TAPP onto this individual level. Early on, I decided this as a general policy for my ‘insider’ research: it would never go below the level of the ‘group’ processes and details, and I would leave out specific individuals’ identities. I sought instead to use my own individual experience and understanding, combined with the analysis of public texts and events, to create an interaction between insider experience (behind-the-scenes knowledge), and the recorded or public layers of activism.	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> The laws of movement in history are the core principles of ''historical materialism'', which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
−	Gridley recognised that her sample of interviewees was not representative, and I concur with this. An interesting split revealed itself between those in TAPP who were more keen to be interviewed and those who were less keen. It is a simplification to say this is a split between ‘doers’ and ‘thinkers’[46], yet it is true that some members of TAPP were more interested in discussing things, and some preferred just to ‘do* them. I also found it interesting that some of those who were not interviewed then felt left out, and were thus prompted to take part in later interviews to see what they were missing. I can quote my own experience in this regard, as I declined to be interviewed by Gridley, but then asked to be interviewed by Waters ‘for the experience’. It was both gratifying and strange to find my words recorded in somebody’s work: a comparable experience to reading a newspaper report of one of our protest actions. In addition to her interviews, Waters (like Hunt but unlike Gridley) also took part in several TAPP events (both political and social). Her research was thus performed as a form of insider ethnography, and this brings her experience, to a degree, into the same realm as my own.	+	The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and ''social consciousness'' of a society.
−	*** 3.4.4 Experiencing Insider Ethnography	+	-----
−	Waters notes that insider ethnography puts one in an unusual position: “Ethnographers studying another culture have to learn and negotiate how to become a participant, and then how to step in and out of that position. When you are a participant to begin with you have to do the reverse of normal ethnography, trying to learn how to be an observer without alienating yourself from the group entirely” (2001: 13). Waters found this process to be a confusing one. She cites the discomfort, experienced by many researchers, of having to go back into academia and discuss, as ‘scientific objects’, these people that have become friends (or, in my case, who were friends first of all). Waters raises the ethical question: “do these friendships mask our exploitation and ulterior, personal and academic motives of these people?” (2001:9). Roseneil’s experience at Greenham Common is instructive here: her insider status gave her “more opportunity to exploit the interviewees than an outsider could ever have achieved” (1995: 12; cf Mascia-Lees 1989; Harrington 2003: 597; Plows 1998b: 21). She admits that, despite her best wishes, “I have not conducted a truly <em>collective</em> piece of research. I have <em>exploited</em> and <em>used’</em> and retained “the power of authorship” (1995:13). The process of research impels one to this.	+	==== Annotation 25 ====
−	I also found researching my own social circle and actions strange. As Waters comments: “studying an aspect of your life will inevitably include an assessment and increased awareness of your position within the social group or situation” (2001:11; cf Clifford 1986:2). One way in which Waters did this was, like other ethnographers, to keep a diary of research. While I myself did not keep a specific diary for the ‘research’ part of my life, I integrated occasional reflections and analysis of my dilemmas into the diary/scrapbook that I already kept (indeed which I had kept since my early teens).	+	''Social consciousness'' refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.
−	A diary by its very nature is personal, private and therefore, in a sense, covert. It is not the same thing as a covert investigation, however. Episodes and judgements about friends and activists that I know might appear in my diaries, but it is only if such accounts are then used in a research project that they become a political and ethical issue. This is something, therefore, that I have not done, and such accounts were written to satisfy my impulsive <em>need</em> to write, not a coldly calculated research project When I was consciously engaged in taking notes about an issue relevant to my thesis, or writing up an account of an EF! gathering or protest event, then I deliberately did this in a separate place. By thus marking such records as separate I endeavoured to keep my diaries as a largely personal and self- reflective space untroubled by worries of’invasive’ research. This was chiefly done (as with most of the measures here discussed), for my own psychological wellbeing and clarity of thought.	+	''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.
−	Waters expresses the existential dilemma of trying to be a researcher and a participant at the same time: “I found it very hard to find a balance between observing and mentally taking notes but also being a ‘normal’ member of the group. I often forgot I was doing research, which I think is necessary, as you cannot remain in your social group continually observing. You have to be a participant, and ... to do that you have to switch off and step back in from time to time” (2001: 9). Hunt also noted the effect that doing research had on his experience of protest actions. He contrasts the activist with the academic state of being: “the fact that I was now looking at these protests from a new perspective, from that of an academic, shifted my perceptions on how I viewed protests. Outside of fieldwork I would become fully caught up in the emotional drive of the protests, but during my fieldwork I became more detached” (1999:3; cf Seel 1999:128). I too encountered both these feelings, alternately of emotional involvement, and of academic detachment The latter was perhaps more in keeping with traditional methodological requirements, but it ‘felt wrong’, and was not a good basis from which to engage in continuing research / life. The former is out of keeping with the expected ‘objectivity’ of traditional researchers, but it represents a human response.	+	By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.
−	I found researching what I was simultaneously just trying to ‘do’, a confusing and sometimes debilitating position to be in (Social Movements List 1998a). To negotiate this situation, I adopted a temporal strategy: I would ‘turn off my research into TAPP for significant periods as I just got on with ‘doing’ it, while in other periods I ‘turned off my involvement in activism in order to get research done. It was never as neat as this, but there would be definite periods when I would actively be pursuing one activity, to the occlusion of the other. It may be possible for others to both research and be ‘active’, but for me it was just too tiring to effectively combine the two for long stretches of time.	+	-----
−	*** 3.4.5 Usefulness & Reciprocation	+	==== Annotation 26 ====
−	I would like to conclude this discussion with a consideration of the potential usefulness (or not) of these pieces of research to the local group, TAPP, This reflects what Mac Laughlin terms “The Anarchist Quest for Relevance” (1986:25). We can begin with Gridley’s piece, which can be read in two different ways (this is true for all the analyses). One is from the perspective of (in her case) social movement theory, to see how her findings support theoretical hypotheses and illuminate that discourse. The other is from the perspective of the activist group. The key questions Gridley phrased at the end of her piece were designed to be directly relevant for TAPP. TAPP here was the audience.[47] A TAPP participant at the RBE conference thus stated the hope, with regard to my own research, that “It’ll be a mutually beneficial thing — if critical of the group, then that’s good for us. Looking at things like that is an important part of activist groups” (in Pickerill & Duckett 1999:31).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.
−	Waters justified her own research in part by endeavouring to feed back her conclusions to the group. In 2001 she stated that “Lengthy late night kitchen-table discussions will follow at various points between myself and members of the group, past and present, individuals in the wider network, or those completely unassociated with TAPP”,[48] If these did indeed happen, they did not have a noticeable impact on the activities or thinking of the group. Instead of assuming such dialogue would successfully happen in my own case, I produced documents such as the post-TAPP pamphlet (in the Appendix), and distributed it around the old group members. Not only was I thus assured of its being read, but I could also use it to prompt other ex-TAPPers to write on TAPP. An additional benefit of this for the research process is that, as Cox notes, “there is no better way to improve your thinking than to have it criticised by people who know the situation you are talking about” (1998: 10).	+	So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.
−	The issue of whose voice is expressed in my research project is here raised: with Waters I could note that my perspective “is only my interpretation from my viewpoint” (2001: 19; cf Merrick 1996:4). I was at an advantage over Waters, however, in that I was more confident of my active role in the group, so that I had fewer qualms about expressing my own perspective of it[49]. My voice may only be my voice, and I do not seek to speak for the others in TAPP, but my voice <em>does</em> have as much a right to be heard as anyone else’s. I had always felt confident disagreeing with others in TAPP, and it was never a group that expected obedience to one common view.	+	-----
−	My opinions and approach are well known to ex-TAPPers and drawing the distinction between these and my more academic analysis has only a formal meaning. It was with this attitude in mind that I wrote the following for my 1999 account of TAPP analysis and communication:	+	==== Annotation 27 ====
−	“Most importantly, for me, this paper stands at the beginning of a process, in which other activists in the group will comment on what I have written about them. Already the criticisms I have made have generated significant discussion within the group, and I’d like to emphasise that this piece is a part of activist self-reflection as much as it is of academic appraisal. I hope, therefore, that this lies at the beginning of a mutually beneficial collaborative effort, (between researcher and researched) and is a part of the very process of debate and analysis which is the subject-matter” (Duckett 1999a: 21; cf Heller [C] 1999: 8; Smith 2002).	+	Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.
−	Now, standing at the end of this process of research, I can only re-emphasise the sentiment of this passage, and lament only that I did not make <em>more</em> concrete efforts toward our conscious, collective self-reflection.	+	The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in ''Capital''<ref>''Das Kapital:'' Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing ''Das Kapital'' in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). ''Das Kapital I'' was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published ''Das Kapital IV'', also known as ''Theories of Surplus-Value'', in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.</ref> by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.
−	Waters made the following plea for the practical relevance of her research paper for the group: “It may have revealed some insights into different members’ opinions on mobilisation [ her research topic ] that may not have come out in a group discussion assessing the problem, due to dominating speakers, members being absent, or there not being sufficient time for everyone to put all their views forward” (2000). I believe this is where the ultimate relevance of such research is to be found: in providing a space for reflection which lies outside the hurly burly of collective debate. Interviews in particular provided an arena in which individual voices could be heard at length: we rarely got that chance in a meeting, on an action or even socially. It is also for this reason that I see my various pamphlets as vital attempts at feeding back ideas, in a format in which they can be understood outside of the here-and- now urgency of activism. I intend to edit elements of this thesis into pamphlets to distribute at activist gatherings, and I am involved in additional projects of converting my research data into accessible formats/[50]	+	-----
−	To conclude, I would like to re-emphasise that analysis in the form of academic and formal papers is only one strand of a much more active and engaged analysis (Wombles 2004b: 3; cf Cox & Barker 2002: 12). TAPP as individuals, and as the group in its heyday, were constantly communicating, expressing, re-thinking and arguing about what we were doing, in many different ways. This is the gist of my 1999 paper and has been confirmed with time: I view it as empirical support for the strength of anarchist criticality, argued for in section 2.3.5.1 wish to frame this thesis, furthermore, on these terms of ongoing activist debate within activist circles: this contradicts the lazy accusation of ‘antiintellectualism’ levelled at DIY activism.	+	==== Annotation 28 ====
−	** 3.5 Methodology: Conclusion	+	Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing ''Capital'' was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
−	In Chapter 1,1 defined the anarchist discourse that I am looking at in this thesis as the product of ‘activists-in-struggle talking to each other’. It is on this basis that I have focussed on the debates that have taken place amongst activists for the primary material of my study. With this definition in mind, it is particularly relevant that my thesis is understood in the way that I have elaborated above. My thesis is a commentary upon, and a contribution to, the reflexive discussion of individuals and networks engaged in environmental direct action. It is written on the same critical plane as that of anarchist values, the experience of activism, and the logic of anarchist/activist argument. While I do not claim to have established a formula for ‘anarchist research* that is valid in all cases, for all time, I do feel that my efforts have remained within the ‘spirit’ of anarchism.	+	According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.
−	In this chapter, I have situated my research both in the theoretical terms of anarchist, feminist and other politically-engaged researchers cognisant of the state-centric bias of the academy, and also in terms of (my own) activism, particularly with the Newcastle-based TAPP group, in which I played a full part from 1998 to 2002. Theoretically, I have drawn upon a foundation of traditional anarchist perspectives on ideas, in 3.2.1, and a more sophisticated critique of accepted ‘objectivity’ as statist and pernicious from an anarchist point of view, in 3.2.2. In 3.2.3 and 3.2.41 then assessed the counter methodologies and epistemologies advanced by feminists, anarchists and others, highlighting those elements most fitting to anarchist ethics, and also most applicable to my research needs. Amongst the validated themes are: the inclusion of subjective experience; a commitment to reflexivity and dialogue instead of on-high pronouncements; and an attitude to the research subjects that is both partisan and critical, respectful and honest, and which will accept the need for people to sometimes just be left alone.	+	-----
−	In the sections of 3.3 I used this theoretical grounding to assess the two fields in which my research has been conducted - the academy and activism. In the sections of 3.4,1 paid particular attention to the latter in its local form as the TAPP group, because it was here that my research responsibilities were primarily felt to lie. I do not claim to have revolutionised or empowered this group of individuals, however, despite my efforts to effect the most careful, ethical and communicative practices of research. I can, however, claim to have enacted my research in an anarchist frame, independent, politically- engaged, participatoiy and founded upon dialogue, and adapting to shifting contexts and experiences. As such, on my personal terms, I can view the research process as a positive, not a disempowering experience.	+	==== Annotation 29 ====
−	<br>	+	The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).
−	* 4. Green Radicalism	+	Marx viewed society as composed of an ''economic base'' and a ''social superstructure''. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.
−	* 4.1 Introduction	+	In the preface to ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explained:
−	In chapter 21 laid out the framework of an anarchist theoiy that is plural, flexible, dynamic and dialogical. In this chapter I shall bring a similar approach to bear on radical green thought. I shall also be exploring the interactions and conversations that go on between anarchism and green radicalism, demonstrating that eco-anarchism is a product of dialogue between radical ecology and anarchism, and the environment is a field in which anarchism has made its influence felt	+	<blockquote>
		+	In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
		+	</blockquote>
−	I begin in 4.2.1, Radical Environmentalisms, by establishing various ways in which ‘green* thinking has been claimed as radical (and non-radical environmentalism dismissed as illegitimate), and I situate the anarchist perspective within the range of green positions. In 4.2.2, Environmentalism through Practice, I connect this understanding of a plural, fluid ecologism with the sense of ‘anarchism as practice’ which I established in Chapter 2.1 wish to avoid misconceptions of green thought either as a static, self-contained, or ‘natural* ideology. The next two sections are concerned with the relationship between, on the one hand, the inherent radicality of ecology, and on the other, the agency of political radicals in influencing its development with ideas from other political traditions. In 4.2.3, the Environmental Problematic, I introduce the key elements that environmentalism introduced into political discourse, namely the ‘environmental problematic’ and the notion of’limits to growth’, and I assess how such tenets encouraged a radicalism to take hold in green thought (although they did not determine its particular manifestations). In 4.2.4, Green Ideas and Political Traditions, I assess the relationship between the ‘new’ radicalism of green thought and traditional political discourses, and I emphasise the especial connection that exists between ecologism and the anarchist tradition. In 4.2.5, Deep Ecology, I assess the strongest claim for a green radicalism that is solely derived from ecological thinking (as opposed to other political influences). I note two streams of deep ecological politics, liberal and militant, both of which have proved subject to critique from anarchists. In 4.3.1, EcoAnarchist Critique of Capitalism, and 4.3.2, Eco-Anarchist Critique of the State, I establish the basis for green opposition to all capitalist or state-centric processes, and in 4.3.3, Inadequate Green Strategies, I identify the anarchist critique of most green strategies for change. This prepares us for a fuller understanding of what anarchists consider legitimate or revolutionary practice in 4.3.4, Anarchist Action.	+	RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION
−	** 4.2 The Nature of Green Radicalism	+	POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE
−	*** 4.2.1 Radical Environmentalisms	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-4.png|''The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.'']]
−	In this section, I introduce dualistic definitions of environmentalism, a common method used by green theorists to define ‘true* environmentalism in contrast to pseudo-varieties. However, rather than viewing these as a definitive naming and pigeonholing - as a system of categorisation -1 use these dualisms as a starting point to sketch the identity of a fundamentally fluid and pluralistic environmentalism. Identifying some of the different ways in which environmentalism has been defined as radical, will provide us with the initial points of connection with anarchist theory.	+	In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — ''determines'' the superstructure, while the superstructure ''impacts'' the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.
−	To begin with Dobson’s definition, ecologism is presented as a fully-fledged ideology in contradistinction to environmentalism, which he regards as “not an ideology at all” (1995:2). In Dobson’s view there is nothing either new or challenging about the ‘environmentalism* that has been adopted by the existing political elites, which consists of an entirely reformist, managerial agenda that	+	The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.
−	reinforces, instead of calling into question, the key issues of technology and affluence in society.	+	-----
−	Ecologism, on the other hand, represents a much more fundamental challenge, which cannot be isolated into manageable components, but requires an ‘all-or-nothing* shift in direction: “radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life” (1995: 1). It is this ideology that was articulated by such thinkers as Porritt & Winner in revolutionary terms: “the most radical [ green aim ] seeks nothing less than a non-violent revolution to overthrow our whole polluting, plundering and materialistic industrial society and, in its place, to create a new economic and social order which will allow human beings to live in harmony with the planet. In those terms, the Green Movement lays claim to being the most radical and important political and cultural force since the birth of socialism” (1988:9). Dobson suggests that green politics actually represents a <em>more</em> profound challenge than socialism, as the early socialists already had much of their ideas laid out for them by the liberal tradition. In contrast, Dobson argues, “the radical wing of the green movement... is self-consciously seeking to call into question an entire worldview” (1995:9-10; cf Porritt 1986). I have used the term ‘ecological’ in my thesis title in reference to this definition, and I view the cases of EDA I deal with as a radical challenge in this sense. However, in the text I tend to refer to ‘radical environmentalism* not ‘ecologism*, in order to avoid the danger of misidentifying social radicals with pure ecocentrism (see below), or indeed with the science of ecology.	+	==== Annotation 30 ====
−	Dobson is not the only writer to divide the green movement into radical and non-radical strands, and to use these distinctions to define what is legitimate (radical), and what is to be dismissed from the fold. Naess’s 1972 essay, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement’ did the same, opposing the shallow ecology of a strategy that relied on legal and institutional fixes, with the deep ecology project of fundamental changes in human relations with non-human nature (Naess 1995a; 1991; 1988; 1993). O’Riordan provides a variation on this dualism by contrasting ‘ecocentrism’ (pursuing diversity, stability and the small scale) with an ‘arrogant technocentrism’ (1981:1; cf Pepper 1996:37). Cotgrove, on the other hand, opposes ‘new’ or ‘radical environmentalism’, to the reemergence of older forms of conservationism (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 338; Cotgrove 1982; cf Dalton 1994: 46-7), and Atkinson outlines a similar contrast between conservationism and radical Utopianism (1991: 20). Bookchin, similarly, contrasts mechanistic or instrumental environmentalism with his own project of social ecology, which “seeks to eliminate the concept of the domination of nature by humanity by eliminating the domination of human by human” (1988b: 130). The radical activists of my study tend to fall on the radical side of each of these equations, but to be a ‘radical’ green one does not need to radical in all the ways here identified. How the radical camp is defined, furthermore, varies in significant ways, but I shall not go into the differences at length. The most important contrast for me to mark is between those who seek to derive all content from a logical ‘working out’ from ecological, purely green principles, and those who more consciously draw on political arguments and ideas from existing political traditions. Section 4.2.4 addresses the latter issue, and section 4.2.5 addresses the former.	+	As Lenin explains in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:''
−	I would like to conclude by considering the place of anarchism within the field of environmental ideologies. Pepper’s Marxist analysis of environmentalist ideas (1996) sorts them into the camps of ‘ecosocialist’ (including the anarchistic forms) and ‘ecofascist’. Anarchists assign themselves the role of countering any and all tendencies toward authoritarianism, and any potentially fascistic elements. In the green field these characteristics have been identified both as allegiance to authoritarian ‘solutions’, and as tendencies toward determinism, mysticism, racism or misanthropy (Biehl & Staudenmeier 1996; Martell 1994; Bookchin 1988c)[51]. The writings of Hardin (1968), Ophuls (1977) and Heilbroner (1975) have been labelled as eco-fascist in this way (Martell 1994:142-4; cf Pepper 1996; AF 1996c), as has the “explicit misanthropy of James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia hypothesis’” (Bookchin 1998c; cf Martell 1994: 146).	+	<blockquote>
		+	Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.
−	O’Riordan suggests a four-fold typology for the political postures associated with environmentalism. First, the vision of a ‘new global order’ with powerful global institutions. Second, ‘centralised authoritarianism’, in which governments would enforce the necessary projects for sustainability (perhaps by rationing and population control). The third position is the ‘authoritarian commune* (to which Goldsmith leans), and finally there is the ‘anarchist solution’, which is fundamentally egalitarian and participatory (1981:303-307). O’Riordan’s schema is more useful to my project than	+	-----
−	Pepper’s more simplistic left-right division because it demonstrates that from the anarchist frame of analysis it is not just ‘eco-fascist’ variants of green thought that are to be opposed, but all analyses and proposed solutions that do not commit themselves to a future of complete social freedom. As we shall see in section 4.3.3, these include all projects of reforming the capitalist system (such as green consumerism); all strategies that rely upon state-like infrastructures (such as electoral campaigns); and all strategies that do not define themselves as a fundamental political challenge (such as ‘consciousness-raising’ divorced from a struggle for material changes).	+	''Capital'' is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in ''Critique of Gotha Programme'' (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.
		+	</blockquote>
−	*** 4.2.2 Environmentalism through Practice
−	By introducing the various poles or tensions that have been identified within green discourse, I hope to avoid any monolithic assessment of ‘this is Green Thought’. Instead, green thought is “not a singular voice but a chorus” (Benton & Short 1999:132; cf Goodin 1992:11). The full range and diversity of these varied voices will not be covered in this thesis: not even those on the radical edge. I am only able to consider a selective tangent, and these only for the points of relevance to anarchism. Yet I will argue for the same fluidity, flexibility and dynamism that I established for our understanding of anarchism.	+	-----
−	In this section I wish to add to the above summary mapping of green ideas by returning our focus to action. The subject of my study is not only <em>radical</em> environmentalism, but also <em>grassroots</em> environmentalism: thus our focus remains pinned to action. In keeping with my assessment of ‘anarchism through practice’ in section 2.3.6,1 argue that political ecology (or ‘ecologism’: the precise term is unimportant here) is also performed through action. Thus Rodman argues that “ecological sensibility ... is a mode of experience expressed by the practice of’ecological resistance’” (quoted in Torgerson 1999: 35). By embracing this notion we must accept (again, as with our theorisation of anarchism) that ecologism is a dynamic and contested discourse that <em>cannot</em> be set in stone (Naess 1991: 160-1; Merchant 1992:238; Benton & Short 1999: 136). I share Pepper’s argument here that ecologism “shares with anarchism the tendency to resist neat categorisation, having shifting beliefs and, as a ‘new social movement’, embracing many groups” (1993: 210; cf Doherty 2002: 1). The implication of this is that ecologism, like anarchism, is indefinable in the strict sense of the word, and the reason for this is that it is <em>live,</em> the emanation of collective involvement and interaction (Wall 1997: 26). This sense of a discourse grounded in the activity of its movement should inform how we identify green thought: ‘thought* here is not abstracted and opposed to ‘practice’, but exists in a feedback loop. This informs the framework of my thesis, which is not a static conceptual mapping but an assessment in keeping with positions grounded in practice and context.	+	==== Annotation 31 ====
−	Hajer explains that “The reconstruction of paradigms or belief systems excludes the intersubjective element in the creation of discourse. It overlooks that in concrete political situations actors often make certain utterances to position themselves <em>vis-a-vis</em> other actors in that specific situation, emphasise certain elements and play down others, or avoid certain topics and agree on others” (1995:79). In agreement with this view, I limit the mapping or reconstruction of green ideology in this thesis to a minimum. I assess the ‘texts’ of ecological direct action in relation to their context - particularly those other (and competing) arguments, analyses and visions against which and influenced by which, the first text gains its meaning. One implication of this stance is to demonstrate that those who argue that “Green theoiy is poorly developed” (Knill 1991:238; cf Wall 1994b: 1), speak from a position whose claim to ‘truth’ and superior perspective is open to question. Who is to say what needs ‘developing’? How do they know what direction to develop it in? They are informed either by a theoretical basis, of which there are many in conflict, or from a reading of experience, which is equally diverse and contestable.	+	When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does ''not'' mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.
−	Several theorists of ecologism have embraced the idea of a dialogic and contested discourse (Hajer 1995: 72; Merchant 1992:238), and emphasise the defining importance of struggle and disagreement in producing ideas. Laclau and Mouffe argue that “The forms of articulation of an antagonism ... far from being pre-determined, are the result of a hegemonic struggle” (1985:168). Green political thought should therefore be viewed, not as spontaneously or necessarily radical, but as <em>made so</em> through discursive struggle. This highlights the importance of anarchist arguments and anarchist practice (in	+	==== c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism ====
−	competition with the other political camps), for their constitutive influence on green thought. Thus Carter notes that “one reason for the existence of tensions within the green movement is that these contributory traditions have often been highly antagonistic towards one another” (1999:199). We gain a greater understanding of green thought by assessing the positions of one of its component parts, or fields of influence. For me, the fact that environmental thought is not automatically linked to radical or revolutionary ideas makes it even more interesting that such a widespread convergence has been achieved. I will develop our understanding of the relationship between anarchism and ecology in section 4.2.4, but first I will lay out two definitive (and ‘new’) elements of green ideology, and chart how this encouraged a radical base of values into which anarchism could easily gel.	+	''- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism''
−	*** 4.2.3 The Environmental Problematic	+	In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.
−	A defining factor of green thought, and what has made the environmental movement historically unique, was the growing evidence of ecological crisis (Doherty 2002:27). Atkinson writes that “In spite of general differences in approach... in general an analysis, in the form of a scenario and a prescription, with certain well-defined contours, emerged from the environmentalist literature of the early 1970s” (1991: 17). These included a recognition of the implications of world population increase, of economic growth, and the resulting increase in pressure on natural resources, which were forecast to run out. Atkinson refers to this as the ‘environmental problematic’ and states that “Political ecology starts from an acknowledgement of the environmentalist warning that our cultural trajectory is potentially catastrophic” (1991:4; cf Carter 1999:19; Dobson 1995:22). Ecologism can be viewed as the political expression of this realisation. Where opposition to authority may be viewed as the central territory of anarchism, perception of environmental crisis is constitutive of environmentalism.	+	During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.
−	Evemdon argues that the ‘environmental crisis’ is as much a <em>social</em> phenomenon as it is a <em>physical</em> one (1992; cf Beck 1995:47). The role of environmental activists and radicals in ‘creating* the environmental crisis is crucial: “Environmental problems do not become such by virtue simply of their objective existence; they do not become environmental problems until they are defined as such” (Martell 1994: 120; De Shalit 2000: 90). This is not to dismiss the role of environmental disasters, and an increase in environmental awareness, in provoking critical responses to dominant society. Yet I believe Torgerson, for example, is broadly correct when he argues that “Ecology’s subversive character comes not from the shifting ground of particular findings, but from orienting metaphors that challenge the presumptions of the administrative mind” (1999: 100). This understanding of ecology’s power and potential has implications for its political strategy, as we shall consider in section 5.2.1.	+	-----
−	Cotgrove argues that green activists “want a different kind of society. And they use the environment as a lever to try to bring about the kind of changes they want” (quoted in Carter 1999:328). With Duff, he outlined the hypothesis that	+	==== Annotation 32 ====
−	“What differentiates the environmentalists ... from the general public is not primarily their awareness of environmental dangers. Rather, it is the use to which they have put environmental beliefs... They are opposed to the dominant values and institutions of industrial society, and want to change them. Now such a challenge faces enormous odds. But the environment has provided ammunition for their case” (Cotgrove & Duff 1980:338).	+	==== Imperialism ====
−	This is a hypothesis that I accept, at least for EDA. The environment provides a symbol and justification through which radicals can attack the existing system: an umbrella and a shared vocabulary for reflecting a range of problems, anxieties and tensions that lie deep within modem industrial society (Grove-White 1992:10).[52] Cotgrove and Duff emphasise the political aspect of this, and O’Riordan notes that radical environmentalists have challenged “certain features of almost every aspect of the so-called western democratic (capitalist) culture - its motives, its aspirations, its institutions, its performance, and some of its achievements” (1983:300). The specific sights of environmental struggle covered in this thesis therefore partake of the character of battles in a wider	+	Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”
−	<br>	+	==== Subjective and Empiricist Idealism ====
−	struggle. Yet I am not therefore accusing radical greens of not being real environmentalists: rather they are <em>both.</em> In section 5.2.2 I shall present an anarchist framework for understanding how the two modes combine.	+	In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.
−	The key question arises of whether ‘greenness’ (or ecocentrism ;■ is inherently and essentially radical in and of itself (because of nature), or whether that radically is only contingent, and derived from outside influences (such as the movement politics amidst which the green movement emerged). Weak argues that “Once the conventional wisdom about the relationship between the environment and the economy was challenged other elements os the implicit belie ‘system might also begin to unravel” (! 992: 31). Thus it is that, to radical greens at least, “The critique of environmental destruction necessarily becomes a critique of contemporary society” (Smith 1995: 52; cf Harr£, Brockmeier & MUhlhMuser 1999). In this sense “Ecocentrists ... are inherently radical” I Peet and Thrift 1989: 89 j.[53]	+	The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as ''empirical idealism'' or ''Machism'')'''' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be ''subjective idealism'' because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially ''subjective'' in nature.
−	One illustration of this ecological radicalisation is the formulation of alternative values to the dominant norm. Cotgrove argued that the ‘Environmental Problematic’ could not have become articulated as a problem if it were not for the formulation of alternative value systems and alternative criteria of evaluation based on environmental rather than economic goals (1982). Such alternative value systems are widely acknoweldged amongst Greens. They may be used to explain the rejection of quick-fix technocentric or autocratic solutions Eckersley 1992: 172; Doherty 2002: 76), and they may provide an ethical foundation for anarchist political positions. The table illustrated in figure 4.1 is typical of attempts to define the radical alternative that lies behind the environmentalists’ challenge.	+	Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.
−	<em>Competing Social Paradigms</em>	+	''Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book:'' Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.''
−	CORE VALUES	+	Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.
−	ECONOMY	+	Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.
−	POLITY	+	Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:
−	SOCIETY	+	<blockquote>
		+	The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?
		+	</blockquote>
−	<em>Dominant Social</em>	+	Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.”
−	<em>Paradigm</em>	+	Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”
−	Material (economic growth)	+	Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:
−	Ntirural environment valued <strong>uk</strong> resource Domination over nature	+	<blockquote>
		+	The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Murket farces	+	Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:
−	Ride and reward	+	<blockquote>
		+	The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Rewards for achievement	+	In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:
−	Differentials	+	1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.”
−	Individual $eif-hclp	+	2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”
−	Authoritative structures (experts influential)	+	3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”
−	Hierarchical	+	4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.
−	Law and order	+	At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.
−	NATURE	+	In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.
−	KNOWLEDGE	+	''- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.''
−	Centralized	+	Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.
−	Large-scale	+	From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists<ref>Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.</ref>. His book ''What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894)'' criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.
−	Atisociiitional	+	==== Annotation 33 ====
−	Ordered	+	The ''populist'' philosophy was born in Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).
−	Ample reserves Nature hostilc/ncurral Environment controllable	+	With the book ''What is to be Done?'' (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.
−	Confidence in science and lechnology	+	==== Annotation 34 ====
−	Rationality of means Septiranon of fact/value, thought/feeling	+	In ''What is to be Done?,'' Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,” as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.
−	<em>Alter native Environmental Paradigm</em>	+	Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in ''A Talk With Defenders of Economism:''
−	Non-matcrial (self- acriiflliznrion)	+	<blockquote>
		+	The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Natural environment intrinsically valued	+	''The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam'', published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”
−	Harmony with nature	+	Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in ''What is to be Done?:''
−	Public interest	+	<blockquote>
		+	He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.”
−	Safety	+	-----
−	Inconieti relui<*d it) need	+	The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Egalitarian	+	==== Annotation 35 ====
−	Collective/social provision	+	From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.
−	Parlicipative struct ures (citizcn/worker involvement)	+	In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.
−	Non-hierarchical	+	Lenin wrote ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' in 1905 in
−	Liberation	+	Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.
−	Decentralized	+	In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.
−	Small-scale	+	Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.
−	Communal	+	Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.
−	Flexible	+	It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.
−	Earth’s resources limited	+	In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.
−	Nature benign	+	From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century in his book ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'' (1913). He also talked about dialectics in ''Philosophical Notebooks'' (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book ''The State and Revolution'' (1919).
−	Nature delicately balanced	+	The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.
−	Limits to science	+	In a series of works including: “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'' (1920),
−	Rationality* of ends	+	''Once Again on the Trade Unions'', ''The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin'' (1921), ''The Tax in Kind'' (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.
−	Integration of fact/value, thought/feeling	+	==== Annotation 36 ====
−	][Figure 4.1 ‘Dominant Social Paradigm’ contrasted to a Counter Paradigm (Jotgrove & Dufi 1980: 341).	+	In ''Anti-Dühring'', Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:
−	<br>	+	1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.
−	The confluence of these anti-authoritarian and co-operative values has provided sufficient grounds on which the libertarian revolutionary tradition and the new radical green generation could meet and cross over. We must consider whether or not it is coincidence that the ‘Alternative Environmental Paradigm’ presents so many of the traditional anarchist values. It is certainly true that typical green politics includes many anarchist themes. Thus Carter argues that “the most strongly defended elements of radical green political thought commonly include decentralisation, participatory democracy, egalitarianism ... self-reliance ... alternative technology, pacifism and internationalism” (1999: 197-8). He notes that each element is valued because it serves the end of environmental protection. Doherty, on the other hand, argues that “green ideology [ is ] based on three principles: ecology, egalitarianism and democracy” (2002: 82), and that only the first of these values is derived from nature. I accept Hajer’s argument that democracy and community are not outgrowths of ecology (1995; cf Martell 1994: 51; Ryle 1988: 6; Kenny 1996:20), and yet the radical <em>potential of</em> ecology may indeed be found in certain of its central ecological values (Moos & Brounstein 1977:267; Marshall 1992b: 443.	+	2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.
−	Opposition to economic growth is perhaps the most central innovation of a specifically green politics, and one that is not a part of the mainstream left tradition. The 1970 report, <em>Limits to Growth</em> (Meadows et al. 1972) famously made the argument that the growth economy could not, ecologically, continue forever (Martell 1994:24-25). Although critiqued and mistrusted by many on the left for its failure to deal with social issues (Cole, ed, 1973:139-156; cf Naess 1991:136-152; Pepper 1986), and despite its clear antipathy to anarchist thinking in that it advocates top-down, centralising solutions (Hajer 1995: 80-85), <em>Limits</em> nevertheless set the tone for the environmentalist critique of’economic thinking’. It quickly became commonplace for environmentalists of all political shades to argue against the very logic of large-scale industrial development, and to critique those who claimed that an improved GNP would solve the world’s ills (Daly 1977). The limits to growth principle has also tended to lead, as we shall see, to a rejection of piecemeal, reformist strategies, which are viewed as inconsequential in the face of the systemic nature of capitalism. Thus Porritt & Winner argue that “The danger lies not only in the odd maverick polluting factory, industry or technology, but in the fundamental nature of our economic systems” (1988: 11; cf Porritt 1997: 68; McBurney 1990; Doherty 2002: 70).	+	''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the ''comprehensive'' and ''historical'' viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
−	Market capitalism and the advocates of economic progress thus encountered, with the advent of the green movement, another adversary to their worldview. Moos and Brounstein, for example, argue that on ecological grounds “it would be difficult to see how anything less than egalitarian distribution of goods and resources could either be legitimated or prove politically tolerable” (1977: 18). The green critique thus added weight to the older socialistic opposition that rooted its condemnation in human, social impacts, and the potential of human progress. This remains true even once we recognise with Pepper that this opposition cannot always be viewed as full-blown ‘anti-capitalism’ (1986: 118-9; cf Doherty 2002: 70). The thrust of <em>Limits</em> and the other Green critiques provide a spur towards anticonsumerist and anti-capitalist positions, and this is true for both <em>political</em> green thinkers, and also environmental scientists (Moos & Brounstein 1977: 268).	+	''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
−	Doherty reminds us, however, that this is not in itself sufficient to explain “why the green movement took a particular anti-authoritarian and pro-egalitarian strain” (2002; 32): political traditions also played a crucial role in informing green discourse. I will look at this in the next section, and in section 5.2.21 shall add a consideration of how the experience of environmental activism contributes to anarchist themes.	+	Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.
−	*** 4.2.4 Green Ideas and Political Traditions	+	-----
−	The major issue we face when discussing green thought in terms of political traditions (anarchism, in my case), is the aspect of ‘newness’ to green discourse. Hay, for example, argues that “Despite attempts to incorporate it within existing traditions, environmentalism is probably most appropriately seen as a new and separate ideological stream, in competition with the older contenders, and stemming	+	==== Annotation 37 ====
−	from radically different base principles” (1988: 28; cf Dryzek 1988: 91). Porrit expressed this with the proclamation that the green movement was ‘Neither right, nor left, but forward!’:[54]	+	The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'', Lenin wrote:
−	“We profoundly disagree with the politics of the right and its underlying ideology of capitalism; we profoundly disagree with the politics of the left and its adherence, in varying degrees, to the ideology of communism... The politics of the Industrial Age, left, right and centre, is like a three-lane motorway, with different vehicles in different lanes, but all heading in the same direction. Greens feel it is the very direction that is wrong, rather than the choice of any one lane in preference to the others” (1986:43; cf Porritt & Winner 1988: 256).	+	<blockquote>
		+	This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Naess sums up this situating of green thought (in his case ‘deep ecology’) with a diagram illustrated in Figure 4.2:	+	So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:
−	][Figure 4.2 Relationship of Green to Left and Right Politics (Naess 1991: 134).	+	<blockquote>
		+	Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.
		+	</blockquote>
−	In focussing on the similarities rather than the differences between the existing political traditions (what Porritt termed the ‘superideology’ of industrialism) greens could thus locate themselves as the one really radical challenge to the status quo. What I find most interesting here, however, is that the terms of this challenge were phrased in a manner remarkably similar to anarchist discourse. Porritt, for example, argued that “Both [ left and right-wing ideologies ] are dedicated to industrial growth ... to a materialist ethic as the best means of meeting people’s needs and to unimpeded technological development”. He linked this to their shared reliance “on increasing centralisation and large-scale bureaucratic control and co-ordination” (1986:44). The ‘Left’ position signified centralised planning and control, and <em>not</em> the libertarian leftism of the anarchists. Most tellingly, those aspects of supposedly <em>right-wing</em> ideology praised by the greens included a distrust of planning, control and bureaucracy, and the valuing of freedom and diversity (1986: 81-89). Similarly for Naess, the ‘right-wing’ values embraced are personal initiative and the despising of bureaucracy: also shared by anarchists (1991: 133). In addition to these values, Naess adopts from the left tradition such notions as social responsibility, opposition to hierarchical structures and an ethical critique of capitalism: these are sufficient to distance his deep ecology from any truly right-wing positions. I would therefore follow Sylvan (both an anarchist and a deep ecologist) in his redrawing of the traditional left-right spectrum:	+	Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'':
−	<center>	+	<blockquote>
−	(old right) blue	+	At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.
−	</center>	+	</blockquote>
−	][Figure 4.3 Green as an Equally Radical Position to Left (Sylvan 1993: 232).	+	He continues later in the text:
−	The greens’ re-formulation of many anarchist ideas and arguments supports the understanding of anarchism as discontinuous and capable of remarkable new flowerings, as established in section 2.3.1. Yet Pepper sounds a note of warning relevant to anarchists when he argues that green advocates such as Porritt, in presenting green thought as fundamentally new and unlinked to political tradition, “may mislead us into forgetting a whole lineage of socialist and populist thinkers who ... emphasised both	+	<blockquote>
		+	The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.
		+	</blockquote>
−	decentralisation and internationalism” (1986:117). The anarchists, who emphasised anticonsumerism, self-sufficiency and decentralisation (Kropotkin quoted in in Gould 1974b: 262; Woodcock 1992:119-120; Purchase 1998:6; Marshall 1992a: 307) are the most notable of these.	+	With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.
−	I follow Martell’s argument that the ‘newness’ of green political thought may be simplified into the introduction of nature “in two mould-breaking ways” for political theory. The first of these is the idea of natural limits, and the second is the idea of intrinsic value in non-humans. Martell argues that “They are revolutionary for political theory in the same way that the feminist insistence on including the personal in political thinking is, because they imply the need for bringing in previously excluded issues of concern” (1994:138-9; cf Gamer 1996: 75; Doherty 2002: 72). However, he does not believe that ecological ideas displace those prior political theories because, although “Radical ecology revolutionises traditional social and political thinking... it also requires it” (1994:198).	+	==== d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement ====
−	My own approach, assessing green activism in terms of the anarchist tradition, follows Martell’s point, and also Ryle’s argument that “The political meanings attributed to ‘social ecology’ or ‘the ecological paradigm’ really derive from, and can only be discussed in terms of, traditions and debates (individualism versus collectivism, competition versus mutuality, authority and hierarchy versus liberty and equality) which long predate the emergence of ecology as a scientific discipline” (1988:12). I will now assess how green ideas relate to left and right-wing traditions.	+	The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.
−	Doherty emphasises the influence of the alternative and New Left milieus on the green movement (2002:33-38; cf McCormick 1995: 75-77; Roseneil 2000: 13), and argues that “Greens have been shaped by a broader left discourse on egalitarianism and democratisation” (2002: 84). Carter suggests that most radical green values have their sources in the earlier political traditions of feminism, socialism and anarchism (1999 198; cf Carter 1993:39; Doherty 2002:4). Thus greens (as opposed to environmental managers, conservationists and moderates), should be placed within the left/libertarian tradition: “a new variant within the traditions of the left rather than an alternative to the left/right divide” (Doherty 2002: 67).	+	-----
−	However, the left and libertarian themes of green politics have not gone uncontested (Doherty & de Geus 1996:11). Some greens have sought to exclude them from their strictly ‘green’ politics (Irvine & Ponton 1988; Capra & Spretnak 1984), and environmentalism may alternatively be linked with traditional conservatism (Freeden 1996; Porritt 1986: 231; Bliese 1996). The central theme here is the idea of a right place in ‘natural’ order (Dobson 1990:30). Thus <em>Blueprint for Survival</em> “especially emphasises [ (a) ] the importance of returning to ‘natural* mechanisms”, praises (b) “traditional hierarchy and authority... [ and (c) ] explains environmental and social problems in terms of natural laws and physical factors such as the size of communities” (Sandbach 1980:22-23; cf Pepper 1996: 44; Gamer 1996: 62). This direction for green thought has led to such expressions as Goldsmith’s “socially paleo-conservative views” (Zegers 2002; cf Goldsmith 1998: 424). Pepper sums up the overall case, however, when he states that the “persistent strand of conservatism” in ecologism exists “despite the <em>emphasis</em> on left-liberalism” (1996:44; cf Peet and Thrift 1989:89; Begg 1991:13). Notwithstanding the conservative and right-wing possibilities in green politics, left-libertarianism is the strongest and most dominant pole of attraction. Doherty demonstrates the strength of this emphasis when he records that “while some environmentalists have favoured the kind of authoritarian measures suggested by the eco-survivalists, they have generally been excluded from green movements” (2002: 33).	+	==== Annotation 38 ====
−	Clearly, “environmentalists are not necessarily allies in all situations” (Torgerson 1999:46). Where Knill warns of “The damage that serious inter-issue conflict could do to the Green cause” (1991:241), however, I maintain that conflictual dialogue is a sign of vitality: indeed in terms of radical environmentalism: I would argue that it is a sign of <em>existence.</em> For the case of eco-anarchism, perhaps the most important conflictual dialogue is that between Marxism and ecologism. Historically, anarchism was heavily influenced by Marxism, but ecological insights have, in my view, undermined the fundamental framework of Marxism, such as its anthropocentric opposition of man to nature (Marshall 1992b: 315-316; Martell 1994:152; Atkinson 1991:30); its narrow conception of human beings as workers (Gamer 1996: 66; Carter 1999:48 Griffin 2002: 6); and its linear view of’progress’ (Atkinson 1991:182; Zerzan 1995a). Anarchists add to this their traditional opposition to narrowing	+	The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.
−	revolutionary agency to the urban proletariat, and the premising of strategies for change on a productive basis, to the neglect of the role of the state.[55]	+	During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.
−	Eckersley argues that “an ecocentric perspective cannot be wrested out of Marxism, whether orthodox or humanist, without seriously distorting Marx’s own theoretical concepts” (1992:94). In her study of the potential alliances between different political theories and ecocentric environmentalism, she found that eco-Marxism was the least ecocentric, expressing “the most <em>active</em> kind of discrimination against the nonhuman world” (1992:180), and “ecoanarchism proved to be the most ecocentric” (1992: 179). It is the compatibility of ecology and anarchism that I shall look at now.	+	In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.
−	The anarchist tradition expressed three central ecological concerns long before these were fashionable or supported by the sense of an ‘environmental problematic’ (Proudhon quoted in Marshall 1992b: 306; Reclus quoted in Purchase 1998:14; Hayward quoted in Carter 1999:105). First, Woodcock notes that “alone among the parties of the left the anarchists ... were uncommitted to the goal of constant material progress, to the philosophy of the growth economy” (1992:123). Second, Atkinson states that green ideology is distinguished from all others by the importance laid on the evils of consumerism. Yet anarchists have long advocated anti-consumerism, defined by Woodcock as the “inclination towards the simplification rather than the progressive complication of ways of living” (1992:121), both to avoid becoming dependent on markets and corporations, and also to avoid the corrupting influence of a grasping materialism. This was not just expressed in the writings of individuals, but demonstrated by the example of anarchism as a popular movement (Purchase 1988: 85; Bookchin 1977; Bookchin 1974: xix; Bookchin 1971: 82). In pre-revolutionary Spain, anarchist villages expressed a practical anti-consumerism in which “their goals seemed to be moral as well as politico-economic; they welcomed the unavailability of luxuries like alcohol and even of coffee with the feeling that their lives had not merely been liberated but had also been purified” (Woodcock 1992: 123; cf Woodcock 1980: 343).	+	In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].
−	As Gamer notes, the third key ingredient in anarchism’s historic greenness is that “all of the varieties [ of eco-anarchism ] are based on the fundamental principles of decentralisation and self-sufficiency” (1996: 69; cf Kropotkin quoted in Gould 1974b: 262). Yet it is not only the anarchists for whom this is a tenet of faith. As Dobson writes, “The decentralisation of social and political life is fundamental to the Green vision of a sustainable society” (1991:73); Pepper notes that “Central to ecocentrism is a belief that revising the scale of living will solve, at root, many theoretical and practical problems” (1993; 306; cf Porritt 1986:168; Goodin 1992: 185); and Atkinson points out that the various ‘Green manifestos’ invariably speak of the need for decentralisation” (1991:182; cf Bahro 1982; Sale 2000; Naess 1991:142; Red-Green Study Group 1995:41). The power of this connection remains even once we recognise that many green advocates of decentralisation do not go the whole way, but often retain (or even strengthen) some elements of centralised infrastructure (Porritt 1986: 87; Martell 1994: 55; Naess 1991: 145).	+	-----
−	Pepper emphasises the “persistent anarchist streak in ecocentrism” (1993:80; cf 1996:45; 1986:120-1). An interesting point to note is that he views anarchism both as a contributory tradition, and as an <em>inherent</em> constituent element of green thought (1990:210; cf Hayward quoted in Carter 1999:105). O’Riordan recognises that “The classic ecocentric proposal is the self-reliant community modelled on anarchist lines” (1981:307) and Hay claims that the “‘typical’ set of environmentalist social values has obvious compatibility with contemporary anarchist theory” (1988:22). Commentators on the green movement thus include eco-anarchism as one of its most accepted, and long-standing strands, and eco-anarchists maintain “not only that anarchism is the political philosophy that is most compatible with an ecological perspective but also that anarchism is grounded in, or otherwise draws its inspiration from, ecology” (Eckersley 1992: 145). This is a more ambitious claim than just that of compatibility between environmentalism and anarchism, arguing that ecology in some manner <em>Justifies</em> anarchism: I consider this further in section 4.2.5	+	==== Annotation 39 ====
−	What is perhaps most important, is not that anarchists have contributed their activism to the green movement, but that the green movement itself has thrown up anarchistic ideas and practitioners. Green	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.
−	ideas are not universally accepted in the anarchist movement, and anarchist ideas are not universally adopted in the green movement, but the dialogue between anarchism and Green thought/practice is especially vital (Chan 1995:48). Figure 4.4 displays the location of eco-anarchism within such dialogues.	+	The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.
−	][Figure 4.4 The Location of Eco-Anarchism, as Constituted by the Interplay of Anarchist and Green Practice and Theory (Duckett 2003: handout).	+	The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.
−	Some anarchists make the bolder claim that the green movement as a whole is <em>implicitly</em> anarchist even when it doesn’t <em>explicitly</em> title itself as such (Purchase 1994:4). Purchase states that	+	These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.
−	“Deep Ecology (the biological equality of all living things), Social Ecology (the ecoregionally integrated community as opposed to capitalist individualism and the nation state), and Ecofeminism (the need to repair the social and environmental damage resulting from patriarchal attitudes and structures) are all inherent in anarchist philosophy” (1994:5).	+	However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.
−	It is on such an interpretation that “anarchists believe that Greens are implicitly committed to anarchism, whether they realise it or not, and hence that they should adopt anarchist principles of direct political action rather than getting bogged down in trying to elect people to state offices” (<em>Anarchist Faq</em> 1).	+	Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.
−	Anarchists have been influential on the environmental movement in three ways. First, in their vision of a future society, which Carter terms ‘cooperative autonomy’ (1999:303) and which Bookchin argues “has become a precondition for the practice of ecological principles” (1971: 76); second, in their analysis of the causes of, and the solutions to the ecological crisis, and particularly the anarchist critique of power (Carter 1999: 63); and third, in their strategic advice, and the political methods by which to oppose environmental destruction (Marshall 1992b: 461; Tokar 1988:139-140). We will look at the strategic advice of anarchism in setion 4.3.6, once the theoretical background has been explored. The three elements interlock and connect as the core dynamics of anarchist ideology. If an anarchist vision, analysis and practice are all in place, therefore, it is possible for us to say that anarchism exists. All three elements may be found within the green movement.	+	The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. ''According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”''<ref>''Delegate Document of the 11<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
−	*** 4.2.5 Deep Ecology	+	-----
−	In contrast to the politically-informed projects of eco-anarchism, in this section I will assess the	+	==== Annotation 40 ====
−	strongest attempt to ‘translate’ ecological ideas into the political realm. As opposed to liberal or shallow environmentalism, ‘deep ecology’ has become identified as the continuation of the radical project of environmental thinking: the logical articulation of full-blooded ecocentrism. Some “use the term to label themselves the real, bold, and serious environmentalists”, while there are “others who use the term <em>deep</em> simply as a substitute for <em>radical”</em> (Rothenber 1995: 203).	+	Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:
−	The motivations behind the development of ‘deep ecology* were rooted in the perception that ecological values required a more radical philosophical approach than was extant. Naess famously stated that “The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions”, and these deeper questions were elaborated into “a critique of reformist or shallow environmentalism and a critique of industrial society” (Benton & Short 1999: 133). In regard to the content of deep ecology, we should note the central importance of biocentrism, and the consequent idea that intrinsic value pertains to non-humans.	+	''•'' ''The German Ideology'', by Marx and Engels
−	The strategic purpose and content of deep ecology is most significant to our study, and what I shall therefore look at here. Rothenberg argues that it is a term “meant to gather activists around a common cause” and that it “offers specific tactical advice” (1995:202-206). Others argue the opposite, that it “provides no guidance to activists” (Stark 1995:274).[56] Deep ecology has been claimed as a justification for two key strategic routes, so that in my view there are two developments of deep ecological politics: pragmatic and militant The first constitutes a pragmatic, gradualist approach, amenable to many different methods so long as they aim in the right direction. As Naess phrases it:	+	''•'' ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', by Marx and Engels
−	“We need not agree upon any definitive utopia, but should thrash out limited programs of political priorities within the framework of present political conflicts. Our questions are of the form ‘What should be a GREENER line in politics at the moment within issue X and how could it be realised?’ rather than of the form ‘What would be the deep green line of politics within issue X?* Green is dynamic and comparative, never absolute or idealistic” (1991:160- !)•	+	''•'' ''Karl Marx'', by Lenin
−	Naess’s mixed, multi-level approach to politics resembles the position of many other greens in their attitude to change. I will provide an anarchist critique of this approach in section 4.3.3. It is not only the anarchists that parted ways with Naess on grounds of political strategy, however, but also those amongst his own followers who sought to put the principles of deep ecology into practice. (U.S.) Earth First! made deep ecology politically relevant and politically radical by justifying a strategy of sabotage in deep ecological terms. This ‘no-compromise* strand, unlike the gradualist strand, has adapted its strategy according to key aspects of anarchist analysis (notably the critique of institutions and reformism, which I consider in section 5.2.1). Yet it is also this ‘extreme* strand that has been most critiqued by eco-anarchists. We shall look at the development and organisation of (U.S.) EF! in section 5.3.2, and the strategic implications of monkeywrenching in 6.3.5 and 6.5.2.	+	The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:
−	The success of Earth First! *s activism led commentators to note that “Deep ecology, in practice, has been transformed into a paramilitary, direct action ecology force” (Seager 1993: 225). Rothenberg suggests that deep ecology “has changed the way environmental protests are conducted: a nature with value in itself is worthy of preservation for itself, and this has led to the practice of eco-defence, in which trees may not be able to grow spikes to save themselves, but we can help them out a little” (1995:204).	+	“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking<ref>''Delegate document of the 9<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”<ref>''Delegate document of the 10<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
−	The political perspective of US EFlers like Foreman was grounded in their no-compromise belief that what was good for the environment was all that mattered: “In any decision, consideration for the health of the Earth must come first” (Foreman quoted in Bradford 1989:5). The perspective articulated by certain spokespeople for Earth First!, however, often revealed a misanthropic attitude, blaming humans for the present ecological situation and expressing little hope for a change in people’s interaction with nature. This was particularly true with the two ‘litmus’ issues of wilderness preservation and human population growth (Eckersley 1992: 157). A popular EF! bumper-sticker stated “Malthus was right”,	+	-----
−	while EF! gatherings witnessed the camp-fire chant, “Down with human beings!” Foreman himself stated that “The human race could go extinct, and I, for one, would not shed any tears” (Foreman quoted in Bradford 1989:1; cf Des Jardins 1997:216).[57]	+	==== Annotation 41 ====
−	Misanthropic, racist and right-wing statements were printed in the EF! <em>Journal</em> without serious contradiction from within the deep ecology fold. This provoked an attack on <em>Earth First!</em> and deep ecology by self-identified anarchists, feminists and anti-racists (Manes 1990:157). The ensuing exchange of polemics was part of an important process of self-reflection and refinement in political, ethical and philosophical ideas for the EF! deep ecologists (Eckersley 1992: 147).	+	Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.
−	Critics like Bradford demonstrated an anarchist political critique through attacking the foundations of deep ecology (Bookchin & Foreman 1991:125; Zegers 2002). Elements selected for specific criticism included the tendency to oppose humanity and nature (Biehl 1989a: 27; Bradford 1989: 50); the conception of ‘intrinsic value’; the failure to recognise humanity’s specific attributes (Manes 1990: 158-159); and, most significantly, an inadequate analysis of capitalism.	+	There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.
−	Anarchists found deep ecology so repugnant because of the notion that “All people, regardless of their position in society, are held equally responsible” (Zegers 2002; cf Des Jardins 1997: 217). Deep ecology’s social myopia blinds them to the role and power of capitalism (Bookchin 1991:19). There is thus a gaping hole in the middle of deep ecology’s ‘deeper questioning’; one that conceals the real sources of hunger, resource pressures, and environmental refugees (Bradford 1989:10; Bookchin 1990a: 9-10). To believe that mankind is pitted against nature is to accept as unchangeable a situation that is historically contingent and thus transformable.[58]	+	It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.
−	However, biocentric anarchists do undoubtedly exist (BGN 2002:13; Orton 1998,2001; Scarce 1990: 39), and Merchant suggests that “Deepest ecology is both feminist and egalitarian. It offers a vision of a society that is truly free” (1992:107). On this view, there is no essential opposition between anarchism and deep ecology, despite the controversies existing between them. This conciliatory position was exemplified by the meeting that took place in the summer of 1987. In a public debate Bookchin and Foreman, the most famous antagonists in the controversy, recognised three major points of agreement: awareness of urgency, opposition to hierarchy (Levine in Bookchin & Foreman 1991; 3) and opposition to capitalism (Foreman 1991b: 42). Both Bookchin and Foreman agreed that their two approaches should be seen as two aspects of “the same battle, regardless of what we emphasise” (Foreman 1991b: 42; cf Naess 1988:130; Rage 2002:1). Without wishing to imply that this stated agreement eliminated all the tensions and diversity amongst the two camps, their recognition of the need for action, and opposition to state and capital, leads us to consider how the anarchist critique of state and capital informs the strategies for green change. I shall therefore outline the key elements of the anarchist analyses of capitalism (in section 4.3.1), and the state (in section 4.3.2), in order to consider (in section 4.3.3), how these analyses may be used to critique the majority of strategies for green change. We may view this as the ecological use of anarchist analysis.	+	''The Renovation Era'' refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to ''the'' ''Path to Socialism Era'' which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.”
−	** 4.3 Anarchist Guides to Action	+	And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.”
−	*** 4.3.1 Eco-anarchist critique of capitalism	+	== II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism ==
−	First, anarchists of all stripes argue that environmentalism needs an analysis of capitalism to rescue it from reformist attempts at “rationalising and humanising” it (Bradford 1989: 20). In contrast to this	+	=== 1. Objects and Purposes of Study ===
−	reformist strategy, anarchists identify themselves in opposition to capitalism: “We anarchistcommunists see through the Green veneer, we see that capitalism is the enemy of our environment, our autonomy, our freedom. We work for its downfall” (ACF cl991:24; cf Bookchin 1988a; Gaynor quoted in Heller 2000: 83; McKay 2001a; IE 2005:15). The ecological critique employed by anarchists and other anticapitalists states that	+	The objects of study of this book, ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism,'' are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.
−	“since capitalism is based upon the principle of’growth or death’, a green capitalism is impossible. By its very nature capitalism must expand, creating new markets, increasing production and consumption, and so invading more ecosystems, using more resources, and upsetting the interrelations and delicate balances that exist with ecosystems” (<em>Anarchist Faq</em> 1; cf AF 1997a; Bookchin 1988a; Atkinson 1991: 5; <em>Schnews</em> 2002:5).	+	-----
−	The character of capitalism is therefore identified by a ‘grow-or-die’ logic (indeed as a ‘cancer’ (Reinsborough 2003: 7-10)); it destroys natural and social harmony (Reinsborough 2003: 5); and it is reliant upon over-consumption (Carter 1999:32). I will look at the anarchist hostility toward consumerism in 5.3.6.	+	==== Annotation 42 ====
−	‘Green greens’ and ‘red greens’ disagree whether it is ‘industrialism* or ‘capitalism’ that should be considered as the main opponent. While most traditional and self-identified ‘anarchists’ tend to emphasise capitalism (AF 2001c: 6; Bookchin 1995a: 33), the anarcho-primitivist school emphasise instead the defining role of technology and techno-centrism (BGN 2002: 14). This demonstrates one more area of diversity and dialogue within the anarchist tradition, but in strategic terms I concur with Atkinson’s comment that “In practice there is no fundamental contradiction between these views” (1991: 5). One reason why this difference is not strategically crucial, is because capitalism is often seen in an all-encompassing way. At the 2000 EF! Gathering, a well-attended discussion on ‘capitalism’ displayed a variety of views which were loosely divided into two conceptions: a limited economic system of capitalism and a meta-capitalism that permeated and defined all society. Others argued that patriarchy was prior, and the only points of consensus reached were (a) that capitalism was opposed in both forms; and (b) it did not solely define our activism. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, capitalism is regarded by the vast majority of anarchists “as but a subset of a more deep seated problem, namely, social hierarchy” (Eckersley 1992: 147; cf Bookchin 1982: 67; 1971:218).	+	Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:
−	It is worth assessing how anarchists may critique both the systemic conception of capitalism, and also its active agency. Two pamphlets by Watson distributed around EF! UK, ‘We All Live in Bhopal’ and ‘Stopping the Industrial Hydra’, emphasise that such disasters as the chemical spill at Bhopal and the Exxon valdez oil spill are “not a fluke” that exists somehow out of the ordinary (Bradford 1996). In both cases, the construction of these events as ‘disasters’ is condemned as “a deterrence machine to take our minds off the pervasive reality” of endemic poisoning (1996). As far as capitalism was concerned, these disasters constituted not an ecological crisis but “a public relations crisis” (Bradford 1996: 8). Bradford argues that	+	'''1. The Philosophy of Marxism:'''
−	“to focus on disasters as aberrations resulting from corporate greed is to mystify the real operational character of an entire social and technological system... The real spillage goes on every day, every minute, when capitalism and mass technics appear to be working more or less according to plan... As petro-chemicals are necessary to industrialism whatever the form of management, spills are also integral to petrochemicals” (1996:11).	+	Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
−	The AF define capitalism’s approach to the ecological crisis as ‘Survivalism’, prominent examples of which include Ophuls’ work and Hardin’s ‘lifeboat ethic’, but aspects of which may also be found in central green texts such as <em>Limits to Growth</em> and <em>Blueprint for Survival,</em> The AF state that, “Operating in a similar way to nationalism, survivalism masks social differences in an attempt to create a false social unity in the pursuit of shared interests” (ACF cl 991:4; cf DA 32 2004: 5). They argue, alongside the social ecologists, that to counter the radical potential of ecology “to undermine the acceptance of a society founded upon hierarchy and exploitation ... capitalism needs to be seen to be embracing ecological ideas. In doing so it is able to redefine the ecological problem in terms which pose no threat to its existence and actually increase its strength” (ACF cl991:4). SDEF! concur, and argue that	+	'''2. The Political Economy of Marxism:'''
−	“calls for environmental protection usually spring from a sense of revulsion (conscious or otherwise) at capitalism and its works. But this revulsion can be twisted against itself and to	+	A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
−	capital’s advantage ... the analysis that is eventually adopted gives rise to solutions that create enormous opportunities for expansion, creating new goods and services, new ‘needs*... many of the greatest polluters ... also snap up contracts to mitigate pollution. They are ‘market leaders’ in pollution, profiting at both ends of the chain ... environmentalists must beware of functioning as little more than company sales reps” (SDEF! 1996).	+	'''3. Scientific Socialism'''
−	We shall therefore see that the EDA activists of this thesis operate an anarchist refusal to be involved in ‘the system’, but rather stay outside, refusing the portals of access to institutional environmentalism and remaining antagonistic to ‘mediation’, ‘partnership’ or ‘compromise’ with institutions and corporations that they consider as the enemies of environmental survival (IE 2005: 15).	+	The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
−	*** 4.3.2 Eco-anarchist critique of the state	+	These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.
−	To eco-anarchists, not only capitalism but the state, and all state-like forms, are antithetical to environmental health. The systemic analysis of capitalism is allied to a recognition of the active role of the state (Carter 1999: 57-9; Knill 1991: 243), which Carter argues is integrated with capitalist logic in a “self-reinforcing” environmentally hazardous dynamic (1999). This is portrayed in Figure 4.5.	+	-----
−	][Figure 4.5 The Environmentally Hazardous Dynamic (Carter 1999:46; cf Clark 1981:22).	+	In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Philosophy''' [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:
−	Carter argues that “states have a very real interest in promoting attitudes and modes of behaviour that are likely to be environmentally disastrous in their effects” (1999:215). Examples include “states’ military requirements” (1999:202), the adoption of “damaging forms of technology, which serve the interests of the bureaucracy and dominant economic class” (1999:203; cf Heller 2000:142-3), and “the promotion of the ideology of consumerism ... which, through taxation, maximises state revenues” (1999:215). Dobson states that it is improbable that “a sustainable society can be brought about through the use of existing state institutions” because they “are always already tainted by precisely those strategies and practices that the green movement, in its radical pretensions, seeks to replace” (1990: 134-5; cf Begg 1991). The awkward task that reformist and electoralist Greens have set themselves is thus “to bring about a decolonised society through structures which are already colonised” (Knill 1991:243; cf Holloway 2002: 15-16).	+	* Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
		+	* Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
		+	* Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]
−	According to eco-anarchist analysis, as illustrated in 4.2.4, the fatal flaws of eco-reformism, ecoMarxism and eco-authoritarianism are equivalent: each approach focuses on only one element of the environmentally hazardous dynamic. As Carter explains, “The problem is, unfortunately, that if we are within an environmentally hazardous dynamic, then it is mutually reinforcing and self-sustaining” (1999: 298). If one element of the dynamic were reformed, perhaps through a radical destabilisation of the state, “the other elements would simply reconstitute it in a form which is appropriate for serving	+	-----
−	their purposes. Consequently ... every element of the environmentally hazardous dynamic has to be opposed if we are to reduce the risk of our societies being driven to inflict major harm on future generations” (1999:298). Carter’s analysis underscores why eco-anarchists oppose, not only all hierarchical political structures, but also the economic relations of capitalism, the dominant norms of technology, consumerism, centralism and top-down activity, and all forms of coercion. He identifies the radicality of green discourse in terms of its opposition to this ‘vicious circle’ (1993:48-53). The context, framework and aim of eco-anarchist practice is situated within Carter’s diagram of the environmentally benign dynamic, reproduced in Figure 4.6:	+	==== Annotation 43 ====
−	decentralized, participatory	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Remember that ''Scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that ''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.
−	sett- sufficient, egalitarian economic relations	+	Thus, a ''scientific worldview'' is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.
−	empower	+	In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics''' [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
−	enforce	+	* The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
		+	* Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
		+	* General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.
−	develop	+	-----
−	<right>	+	==== Annotation 44 ====
−	support
−	</right>
−	globally eware, non-violerit activists	+	Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
−	fjiipport	+	In the scope of '''Scientific Socialism''' [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
−	convivial, soft technologies	+	* The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.
		+	* Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
		+	* Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.
−	][Figure 4.6 The Environmentally Benign Dynamic (Carter 1999: 52).	+	''The purposes'' of studying ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'' are:'''' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.
−	The above analysis indicates why anarchists view that any strategy that seeks to use an aspect of the environmentally hazardous dynamic (such as green consumerism) is doomed to failure. The same applies to all simplistic, one-sided strategies such as the stereotypical anarchist call to ‘smash the state’, as Bookchin too recognises (1986b). In the next section I will make the anarchist critique of green strategies much more explicit, and I will follow this in 4.3.4 with an analysis of how anarchists view correct (revolutionary) action. This latter section will give us a strategic/empirical sensee of how anarchists do action, and how they make eco-anarchism work	+	-----
−	*** 4.3.3 Inadequate Green Strategies	+	==== Annotation 45 ====
−	I will now review in turn each of the green strategies that must be critiqued. This negative ‘ticking off* of strategies viewed as inadequate by anarchists will provide a bridge to the more positive content of anarchist strategies for change in 4.3.4, Anarchist Action. This is not intended to provide an in-depth analysis of the various strategies greens have sought to use to bring about green change, but rather a brief account of how such strategies are perceived by anarchists, and particularly the activist anarchists of EDA that I will introduce in the next chapter.	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Communist Manifesto:'' “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”
−	First, eco-anarchists criticise ‘pragmatic environmentalists* (or “would-be planet managers” (Andy C1995: 8)) who campaign for top-down reforms such as the control of toxic wastes or restrictions on urban growth, because they inadvertently strengthen the state, and thus encourage future environmental problems (Bookchin 1990a: 160). This recalls the anarchist argument against the discourse of’rights’ (Walter 2002:47; AF 1997b: 20; Bakunin 1990a: 17; Smith 1997:345-346). The notion of legalistic rights is ultimately connected to the power of the state, the ‘neutral arbiter’ with its legally enshrined right to kill (Hess 1989 :179). This argument which also applies to those who seek to extend the discourse of rights to include the natural world (Eckersley 1996; Eckersley 1995; Hayward 1998; Bell 2002 [DJ: 703; Dryzek 1987; Marshall 1992b: 434; Pepper 2005:15; Miller 1998).	+	=== 2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method ===
−	Second, those who struggle to inject other factors (of environmental wealth, of interdependence), into a narrow economist outlook (Callicott 1989; Hawken, Lovins & Lovins 1999; Nash 1989) are criticised for failing to recognise that reformist liberalism is based on private property and fails to	+	There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:
−	counter market logic (Carter 1999:32; Knill 1991:240; Chenevix-Trench 2004:39-43; Sagoff quoted in De Shalit 2000: 87-88; Laschefski & Freris 2001). From this perspective, such attempts as Dryzek’s	+	First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.
−	project of ecological modernisation (1996:108; Diyzek, Downes, Hunold & Schlosberg 2003) may be	+	-----
−	condemned as futile and even harmful in the long run (Pepper 2005). So might all attempts to institute	+	==== Annotation 46 ====
−	radical reforms through the existing state frameworks (Mol, Lauber & Liefferink 2000; Doherty 2002: 83; <em>Do or Die</em> 1996:276-277).	+	Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.”
−	The “eco-establishment” belief “in free enterprise and in enlisting business as partners in environmental protection” (Seager 1993:225) is clearly anathema to the anarchist perspective - not least because “A significant proportion of society... has a material interest in prolonging the environmental crisis because there is money to be made from administering it It is utopian to consider these people to be part of the engine for profound social change” (Dobson 1990:135; Heerings & Zeldenrust 1995). The institutionalisation thesis that I elaborate in section 5.2.1 will outline the anarchists* argument for why.	+	As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in ''The Proletariat and the Peasantry'':
−	Such liberal attempts to reform the crisis may be distinguished from anarchist or socialistic strategies by their failure to challenge fundamental property relations (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995:57). The anarchist critique of property can be traced back as far as Godwin (1986:134) and Winstanley (1973). Carter provides a contemporary environmental elaboration, which flies against Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons* thesis. Carter notes that “What appears to be individually rational is collectively catastrophic” (1999:34). As Hardin’s individualistic rationality is based on private property, the abolition of property would also end the problem.[59]	+	<blockquote>
		+	Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Third, the anarchist critique of electoral strategies is well known and, with regard to the Green Party’s radicalism we might note that no matter how radical the beliefs of the party members, their methods distinguish them as conventional (Pepper 1996:42-3) - at least in that role (in Newcastle, Green Party members also took action suitable to an anarchist perspective on other occasions, other days). Anarchists’ analysis of power leads them to argue (a) that voting in a government is dangerous, and (b) that it constitutes, not an act of power but of <em>disempowerment*.</em> “Apart from the fact that leaving the environment to governments and multinational corporations is ‘like leaving a child batterer to look after the nursery’, voting for Green policies to be carried out by the state is a thoroughly disempowering act which does a lot to bolster the strength of the state and little, if anything, to protect the environment” (ACF cl991: 5; cf Carter 1999: 132; Miller 1984: 87). Anarchists maintain that the state cannot be changed: it is “constrained by its own nature to behave in certain ways”, and this means that those elected to represent the people are unable to do what they promise (Miller 1984: 88 j.[60] Bookchin puts this argument neatly: “Between a person who humbly solicits from power and another who arrogantly exercises it, there exists a sinister and degenerative symbiosis. Both share the same mentality that change can be achieved only through the <em>exercise</em> of power, specifically, through the power of a self-corrupting professionalised corps of legislators, bureaucrats, and military forces called the State” (1990:160; cf Holloway 2002:15-16; Miller 1984:87).	+	Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.
−	Fourth, while the above condemnation of top-down strategies returns us to grassroots attempts at change, these also fail to escape from the anarchist critique if they do not challenge the systemic nature of the problem. Bradford states that “Boycotts, demonstrations and other forms of militant response focus on some of the real culprits who benefit from ecocide, yet fall short of an adequate challenge to the system as a whole” (1989:27). Zerzan condemns them as “the parade of partial (and for that reason false) oppositions” (1995; cf POO 1998:2). The AF argue that “Campaigning against ‘bad	+	As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.
−	companies; implies that there are good companies* The reality is that production for profit inevitably means the domination and exploitation of people, useless unhealthy production and the domination of	+	One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in ''Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party,'' written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:
−	nature and hence pollution and destruction. Big companies are only worse than small ones because they are biggef’ (ACF c 1991: 42).	+	<blockquote>
		+	On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Fifth, anarchists attack the notion of green consumerism. Green consumerists like the Bodyshop’s Anita Roddick argued that “As consumers we have real power to effect change” (quoted in Pepper 1993: 850). To anarcho-communists in the AF this is based on a false, because individualised, notion of power (ACF cl 991: 43; cf Pepper 1993: 86). Systemic capitalism and ever-present domination require a stronger opponent Pepper expresses the common objection when he states “The idea that, through the market, money can be a vote for desirable change is flawed from an ecocentric point of view” (1993: 85), because “consuming greener commodities ... would still entail far too much consumption: (Carter 1999:29). Most centrally, eco-anarchists argue that “Green consumerism, by its very nature, cannot challenge the ‘grow-or-die’ nature of capitalism” <em>(Anarchist Faq</em> 1; cfBGN 2002: 15). Bookchin states that “The absurdity that we can ... moralise’ greed and profit [ is a ] naivete which a thousand years of Catholicism failed to achieve” (1986b). Pepper even suggests that “green consumerism is reactionary... [in that ] it is politically anaesthetising” (1993: 70; cf Luke 1997). In the sections of 5.3.61 will nonetheless demonstrate that activists of this study successfully combine an attention to what they consume in their personal life (although this is anti-consumerist rather than green consumerist), with grander social strategies that are not inconsistent with the noblest sentiments of the anarchist tradition.	+	During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.
−	Sixth, the strategy of wilderness protection central to Earth First! in the US is viewed as flawed. This strategy ultimately comes down to the idea of’saving what we can’. Foreman’s aim, for example, is to save some bits of wilderness “So that there is something to come back after human beings, through whatever means, destroy their civilisation” (Tokar 1988:138; cf Naess 1988:130). In practice, the strategy of wilderness preservation has led the conservation movement “to set aside and protect nature preserves, while trying to institutionalise, within modem capitalism and through the state, various safeguards and an ethic of responsibility toward the land” (Bradford 1989:20). However, the key problem here is that, when it comes down to money, institutions “have always chosen to exploit such preserves when it was decided that the ‘benefits’ outweighed the ‘costs’” (1989:21).	+	By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:
−	Attempts at protecting isolated areas of’wilderness’, however militant and ‘no compromise’, are thus considered to be doomed due to the overarching power and systemic nature of the environmentally hazardous dynamic. Tokar argues that the lessons of ecology should teach us the same lesson: “everything in nature is far more thoroughly interconnected... [ so ] no partial solution can really sustain life” (1988: 139; cf Bradford 1989: 50). Thus the attempt to retrieve areas of intact wilderness will fail, unless the global system of human society is transformed. Primitivists might demur with this conclusion to the degree that they hold apocalyptic visions of industrial collapse, and argue that wild reserves will be needed to repopulate and rewild the post-industrial landscape.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Seventh, a debate has taken place over another green strategy in which “changes in lifestyle ... [ are ] held to be the future society in microcosm” (Begg 1991:6). This tendency, equally prevalent within anarchism, is condemned as ‘lifestylism’ by left and politically engaged anarchists. The AF define it as “an individualistic theory: society is made up of individuals who have real choices about how they live; for example whether they do waged work or not (and what job they do), whether they live communally, pay rent, squat etc. If enough people make the right moral or ethical choices and act upon them, reform or major social change will occur” (ACF cl991:41; cf AF <em>Organise!</em> 34 1994; Dolgoff n.d.; Walter 1980:171; Bookchin 1995a: 19; Neal 1997). In 5.3.6 and 5.3.71 shall, however, defend these practices as a part of a whole (holistic) strategy.	+	Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:
−	The AF comment that such currents are part of “the same moralism, liberalism, rebelliousness and individualism that plagues the anarchist scene everywhere” (ACF cl991:47), and provide extensive lists of’false anarchisms’.[61] For both ecologism and anarchism, the solution identified by left	+	<blockquote>
		+	After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.
		+	</blockquote>
−	anarchists like the AF and Bookchin is an organised and explicitly ideological mass movement. Bookchin thus states that “without a self-conscious and thoroughly schooled libertarian left in their midst, the new social movements ... will not remain libertarian on their own” (1989a: 273; Bookchin 1990a: 171). I myself do not agree with the ‘strong’ version of this argument presented here, but I do see the role of traditional anarchist organisations such as the AF as valuable in a ‘weak’ version of this point: it is not <em>essential,</em> but it is still <em>positive.</em>	+	As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled ''A Nationwide Call for Resistance'', Ho Chi Minh wrote:
−	Anarchist denigration of those who seek to ameliorate only <em>aspects</em> of the environmental crisis as ‘reformist’ (Carter 1999: 31) does not, however, mean that pragmatic campaigns go unrecognised as “necessary struggles”. Bookchin states that they “can never be disdained simply because they are limited and piecemeal” (1990: 160), and Bradford concurs that “it would be a grave error to simply give up such struggles on the basis of a more abstract image of a larger totality” (1989:27).	+	<blockquote>
		+	We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Anarchists have always been involved in limited, so-called ‘reformist’ or ‘single-issue’ campaigns, with the crucial factor that they have expansive, revolutionary aims. I will look at this further in the next section. One thing I must emphasise: the robust, perhaps overly ‘certain’ strategic views presented here, therefore, do not abolish the validity of EDA as a site of anarchist struggle	+	As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.
−	*** 4.3.4 Anarchist Action	+	-----
−	Thje strategic arguments raised in the previous sections against the majority of green strategies for change might lead us to view anarchists as speaking from a purist, revolutionary perspective. But if they are so doing, their arguments lose their value. Ehrlich warns that “‘reformist’ is an epithet that may be used in ways that are neither honest nor very useful - principally to demonstrate one’s ideological purity, or to say that concrete political work of any type is not worth doing because it is potentially co-optable” (1996: 169). Ward suggests, furthermore, that it is possible for the <em>right kinds</em> of reforms to eventually make up a revolution (1988:138; cf Walter 2002:34; Jordan 2002:149). This notion of’radical reformism* is also extant in radical green discourse, as Naess demonstrates with his project of deep ecology: “THE DIRECTION IS REVOLUTIONARY, THE STEPS ARE REFORMATORY” (1991: 156; cf Ruins 2003: 16; Ritter 1980; 154-8).	+	Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
−	There remains the critique of reformism in the negative sense: when “reforms disperse and weaken the pressure for change, without ever tackling the actual problem that gave rise to that pressure” (Begg 1991:4; cf Wall 1990; Zinn 1997: 376; Jordan 2002:37). Yet other reforms may serve “not only ameliorate effects but also increase the instability of the phenomenon that caused them” (Begg 1991: 5). Jordan sees examples of these in many green proposals because such demands “cannot be met within existing structures” (2002:34). I prefer Malatesta’s acceptance of the ‘reformist’ label, but only in the sense that “we shall never recognise the [existing] institutions. We shall carry out all possible reforms in the spirit in which an army advances ever forwards by snatching the enemy-occupied territoiy in its path” (1995: 81; cfDominick 1997: 8).	+	Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.
−	I agree with Ward that despite the ‘fetishism’ and ‘posturing’ of many anarchists (‘I’m more revolutionary than you are! ‘), the distinction between reform and revolution is not the key marker by which anarchists can be defined. Indeed, Ward talks disparagingly of “the two great irrelevancies of discussion about anarchism: the false antithesis between violence and non-violence”, which I assess in 6.3, “and between revolution and reform” (1988: 142). Rather it is authoritarians with whom anarchists are most fundamentally and consistently opposed, and ‘revolutionary’ authoritarians are perhaps the most despised of these (1988: 143).	+	Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.
−	Some anarchists lament the radical reformist position as the pessimistic notion of ‘permanent protest’), in which no large-scale positive change is expected (Stafford 1971; 90-101; Walter 1980: 171; Lerner 1971:52; Miller 1984:149-50). But when their activity is expressed through NVDA, such ‘permanent protesters* should not be dismissed as non-revolutionary. The strength and value of protest and direct	+	Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially<ref>See Annotation 6, p. 8.</ref> the product of that history.
−	action is that it may provide a concrete education in freedom (Wieck 1973: 97).[62] I shall elaborate upon this point now, and return to it in the context of EDA in 5.2.2 and in the anarcho-syndicalist format in 6.2.2.	+	These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.
−	The central theme of anarchism is that “Liberty can be created only by liberty” (Bakunin 1990a: 179; cf Wieck 1973:97; Bey 1991: 102). Ehrlich explains that “Liberation requires self-education and autonomy. Autonomous behavior and the regular practice of educating oneself are habits ... built up over years” (1996: 333; cf Ritter 1980: 104; Carter 1999:267). Berkman notes the salient permutations of this theme: “If your object is to secure liberty, you must learn to do without authority and compulsion. If you intend to live in peace and harmony with your fellow-men, you and they should cultivate brotherhood and respect for each other. If you want to work together with them for your mutual benefit, you must practice co-operation” (1964: 62). My argument is that the strength and value of the EDA movement may be viewed on these terms. It is not just a site of protest and conflict, but of cooperative and right relations between people: the ‘power-with’ that, in Heller’s view, might “fracture the structure of domination” (2000: 8).	+	==== Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism ====
−	The foundation of freedom that I introduced in 2.2.2 has developed into a distinctive bundle of ethics, strategy and principles within the anarchist tradition, and it is the guidance for action provided by these that I examine in this section. I argue that anarchists frame revolution in terms of freedom versus authority (Wieck 1973:96). This perspective allows for both macro-revolutionary and microreformatory approaches, indeed it supports any process “through which people enlarge their autonomy and reduce their subjection to external authority” (Ward 1988:143; cf Zinn 1997: 653; Rejai 1984: 7). Begg repeats this theme in the environmental field when he states that “the goal of Green politics is achieved every time autonomy and development are increased” (1991:15; cf Paul Goodman quoted in Clark 1981: backpage). This section is devoted to an examination and formulation of this ethic.	+	''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.
−	Anarchists put the individual squarely in the centre of any action: personal autonomy and participation are key. Green overstates this as a quasi-religious principle - “a moral imperative for anarchism”- in which “Action may not bring tangible results, but it does bring ‘personal redemption’” (1971:24; cf Horowitz 1964: 56). I will argue that anarchist direct action involves no necessary separation from practical efficacy, but it is true that “what unites and characterises all the various tactics advocated by the anarchists... is the fact that they are based on direct individual decisions... No coercion or delegation of responsibility occurs; the individual comes or goes, acts or declines, as he sees fit” (Woodcock 1980:29; cf <em>GA</em> 1999:3; Begg 1991: 8). It is on this ethical basis that direct action is “particularly attractive to anarchists ... it is consistent with libertarian principles and also with itself’ (Woodcock 1980: 169).	+	''Methodology'' is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with ''philosophical methodology'' being the most general scope of methodology.
−	The anarchism exposited in this thesis, however, urges not only that each revolutionary action <em>expresses</em> freedom, but also that it <em>supports</em> freedom. Reacting to the notorious association of Bakunin with Nechaev, who brutally applied a “systematic application of the principle that the end justifies the means” (Deutsch quoted in Avrich 1987:27; cf Camus 1971:128-131; Nechaev 1989:4-5), the anarchist movement came to emphasise the need for ethical and free means to achieve ethical and free ends. Kropotkin intones that “By proclaiming ourselves anarchists, we proclaim beforehand that we disavow any way of treating others in which we should not like them to treat us” (2001:99; cf Bakunin 1990a: 208; Brown 1989: 8).[63] Anarchist practices which, while displaying autonomy, actually serve to close down spaces of freedom, may therefore be condemned. In 7.51 shall consider whether this has become the case with the Mayday mobilisations of recent years.	+	-----
−	I concur with sasha k that ethics are “at the heart of anarchism” (2001; cf Bakunin quoted in Skirda 2002:17; Bufe 1998:24), so much so that anarchism has been termed a “conscience of the left” (Shatz in Bakunin 1990a: xxxvi). These ethics are commonly articulated in terms of means-ends congruity (Miller 1984:93; Pepper 1993:305). Thus Goldman writes that “No revolution can ever succeed as a factor of liberation unless the means used to further it be identical in spirit and tendency	+	-----
−	with the <em>purposes</em> to be achieved” (quoted in Zinn 1997:648; cf Goldman in Woodcock 1980: 162; Marshall 1992b: 461; Bookchin 1971:44’5). This may be linked to the ‘immediatism’ associated with direct action (<em>GA</em> 1999:4; Jordan 2002:9), and the theme in the anarchist/Situationist tradition that views the reinvention of everyday life as a revolutionary act (Roseneil 2000:136; Moore 1997:12; Vaneigem cl967; Clark 1981:8). Ben Franks has done most to analyse this “particular ethic” within anarchist direct action, which requires both “that the means be in accordance with the ends (prefiguration)”, and also that those who will benefit from the act are the subjects who participate in it (Franks 2003: 13-24; cf2006). By contrast, non-anarchist tactics such as “Constitutional methods do not practically resolve the social problem, nor are the agents of change - parliamentarians - the ones directly affected” (Franks 2003:167). We are considering the prefigured ve elements of this formula now. The issue of whether the participants are also the ones affected may be seen in the terms of ‘representation’ illustrated in figure F2.3.	+	==== Annotation 47 ====
−	The historical development of means-ends congruity as an ethical principle has now been brought into service in the green movement. Thus Eckersley records that eco-anarchism promotes a “consistency between ends and means in Green political praxis” (1992: 145), and terms this “the ultimate principle of ecopraxis” (1987:21; cf Begg 1991:15; Ritter 1980: vi; Martin 2001:175). However, if we take Frank’s view strictly, it follows that “those deep ecologists who seek to save nature by interfering with logging or dam construction, would not be involved in direct action, in a libertarian sense, as they are acting on behalf of others”: on behalf of ‘nature*. However, they may be re-included within the anarchist definition when they hold a wider, ecological sense of self: when “they see a connection between their well-being and the protection of nature” (Franks 2003:24; cf Moore: 10). Deep ecologists explicitly build this into their theorising, primitivists and others demonstrate it also when they equate wilderness to their own freedom (IE 2005:9; <em>GA</em> 1997a: 12). Beyond these particular articulations, however, I believe that it is more generally true that many if not most of those involved in EDA associated their own well-being with that of their beloved landscapes and, by embedding themselves in the wider systems of nature, expressed a wider, ecological self (Heller [C] 1999; Smith 1999).	+	Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:
−	There are different versions of the means-ends argument within the anarchist plurality. Members of the peace movement, for example, affirm an intimate link between direct action and non-violence. Thus, when CD theorist Per Hemgren argues that “Direct action means that the end becomes the means” (1993: ll;cfEEV 1997: l;Bufel988: 18; De Ligt 1937: 72; Martin 2001: 19) he means a very different thing from what the class-struggle anarchists mean by the exact same words. To Hemgren, direct action requires an additional injection of pacifist ethics before it can be either successful or coherent: “Neither the political <em>results</em> nor the use of the right <em>method</em> can justify an action’s negative consequences for people” (1993: 10; cf Baldelli 1971: 19). By contrast, class struggle anarchists view the means-ends principle of direct action in terms of workers’ self-organisation. I will look at the frameworks of CD theory in 6.3.2 and anarcho-syndicalism in 6.2.2 when I shall diversify our understanding of basic anarchist principle yet further. Here, however, I wish merely to emphasise that the inflections given to direct action by one tradition are not integral to the practice as a whole, nor binding on our understanding of the term.	+	'''1. Field Methodology'''
−	Pacifists or Anarcho-Syndicalists may give Direct Action a pertinent inflection by smuggling in values from their own discourses (see 6.3.4 and 6.2.2), but these do not define what direct action is (Carter 1973:22; cf Doherty, Plows & Wall 2003:670). However, my argument is that the means-ends directive, and the injunction to use methods compatible with and conducive to freedom, do create an ethical centre no matter which particular version of direct action is being used. Walter acknowledges this theme in his consideration of anarchists’ roles within wider movements, such as environmentalism:	+	The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.
−	“The particular anarchist contribution ... is twofold - to emphasise the goal of a libertarian society, and to insist on libertarian methods of achieving it. This is in fact a single contribution, for the most important point we can make is not just that the end does not justify the means, but that the means determines the end - that means are ends in most cases” (1980: 172).	+	'''2. General Methodology'''
−	What is especially significant about the understanding of revolutionary action which we have now outlined, is that the means of action are what define it (anarchism-through-practice). Thus it is that in the quiet times of history, when revolutions in the conventional sense are not a part of life, activists can	+	A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.
−	remain just as ‘revolutionary* if they employ direct action. It is on these grounds that I categorise EDA activists as anarchists in the truest sense.	+	'''3. Philosophical Methodology'''
−	Put at its most simple, direct action may be synonymous with revolution (Carter 1973:25; cf Grassby 2002:192). Bookchin states that “Revolution is the most advanced form of direct action. By the same token, direct action in ‘normal’ times is the indispensable preparation for revolutionary action” (1971: 253; cf Dominick 1997: 16; <em>CW</em> 1997:6).[64] Wieck suggests that “The habit of direct action is, perhaps, identical with the habit of being a free man, prepared to live responsibly in a free society” (in Ehrlich 1996: 376). The <em>AF</em> support this argument with the case of EDA: “Whatever the label... direct action against the means of environmental destruction and degradation is an act of resistance and ultimately one of the means by which revolution is realised” (AF 2001a: 9). I will consider various of the stresses and tensions that arise through the actual performance of direct action, particularly with regard to the issues of coercion, violence and elitism, in later sections of this thesis.	+	The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.
−	NVDA has been claimed as the method to pursue the anarchist revolution, free of the dangers inherent in violent revolutions. Whichever term we use here - civil disobedience, NVDA, satyagraha - the quality of the method lies in its ability to achieve change without flouting anarchist principles and ethics (Nettlau 1979:388). As Nettlau records, Gandhi	+	-----
−	“wanted resistance to evil and added to one method of resistance - that of active force - a second: resistance through disobedience ... do not what you are ordered to do, do not take the rifle which is given to you to kill your brothers” (Nettlau in Tolstoy 1990: 17).	+	''Worldview'' and ''philosophical methodology'' are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.
−	NVDA has been championed as a means “for the realisation of the fundamental objectives of anarchism” (Bondurant 1965:173) and “the most promising method for moving beyond capitalism” (Martin 2001: 8; cf Woodcock 1992:98). Woodcock argues that non-violent action “is not merely efficient as a social solvent, but it also avoids the loss of freedom which seems the inevitable consequence of civil war” (1992: 100). It enables both a method of struggle in keeping with anarchist ethics, and also suggests how order in an ideal society might be guaranteed - non-violent coercion (Martin 2001: 184; Sharp 1973:741-752; Purchase 1996: 86). It is to practical manifestations of NVDA that I will now turn.	+	==== Annotation 48 ====
−	** 4.4 Green Radicalism: Conclusion	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''lý'' ''luận'' is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, ''lý luận'' is a combination of the words ''lý'' ''lẽ,'' which means “argument,” and ''bàn'' ''luận,'' which means “to infer.”
−	In this chapter I began by emphasising the flexible and constested plurality of radical environmentalism, characterised by Benton and Short’s argument that “While ... radical environmentalists agree that reformist environmentalism will not solve the environmental crisis, the debate <em>‘within</em> radical environmental discourse demonstrates numerous ideological positions, a mosaic of contested positions” (1999:136). I looked at some of the contributory trends to this, particularly those relvevant to the anarchist tradition, and clarified significant lines of resemblance and of difference between the different green radicalisms. Recognising that active green “networks are much more likely to be divided over strategy and praxis than ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism” (Doherty 2002: 8), however, the second part of the chapter turned to the strategic advice advanced by anarchist writers and environmentalists-tumed-anarchists in EDA. Here there is a tension, in that the strong strategic arguments of Bookchin and Carter’s anarchism seem aimed at providing an overall direction to the movement (Torgerson 1999:29; Eckersley 1992:153; Bookchin 1994a), and insist on “theoretical and practical coherence” (1999:26; cf Carter 1999:252). This might raise a problem for a study that seeks to accept plurality and fluidity, if I were to accept either position as fixed and complete. In the next three chapters we shall look at many different viewpoints, and many strategic arguments that ground themselves in an anarchist ethics as they tell activists and environmentalists what to do, what to prioritise, and how to see their struggle. Yet these strategic arguments exist within a plurality, and they exist at the grassroots: they are not a vision presented from on-high, but an ongoing wrking-out and engagement with the dilemmas, the lessons and the ethical ideals of a living anarchist practice. So it is true that there is a tension between particular strategic viewpoints and a fluid, pluralistic acceptance of diversity: but this is not a tension that I need to resolve here in a rhetorical synthesis. Instead, it is a tension that is negotiated and solved, at the local, temporary level, every day by people ‘doing it’ on the ground. As Torgerson recognises, the paradoxes of practical life “cannot be logically reconciled but... can sometimes be resolved through inventive action that bypasses, transcends, or unexpectedly reconfigures the abstract terms of the opposition” (1999:103; Bakhtin 1993).	+	The full meaning of ''lý'' ''luận'' is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.
−	In this chapter I have explored the relationship between anarchism and ecological thought. It prepares the ground for an application of anarchist ideas to the practices of environmental protest, green networking and strategic discussion amongst the scenes of environmental direct action. I hope to have demonstrated that ecological (even ecocentric) thinking may be genuinely allied to the anarchist tradition, without us having to conceptualise this narrowly or proprietorially (anarchism does not own or define environmentalism, and ecology cannot be explained by anarchism alone). Many green and anarchist ideas are compatible (and have been demonstrated so by practice over many centuries), but this does not mean that they are blissfully harmonious. Rather, the diverse and fluid nature of environmentalism introduced in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 provides a range of positions that may confront, critique and amend anarchist ideas, just as the equally dynamic, varied and cuttingly critical discourse of anarchism provides a standard from which all green strategies and sentiments may be judged. Finally, I wish to emphasise that anarchism is not outside of the environmental movement, but rather eco-anarchists (and also critical anarchists, and many green activists who would not label themselves anarchist), have been a part of its lifeblood since it became a major force in the 1970s. As such, the subjects of this thesis do not become ‘cut out’ from the green movement when I label them anarchist and apply anarchist terms to their practices and discourse, but rather they may inhabit all these subject positions at the same time, shifting and re-forming all the time. The question of whether they are acting as a force for anarchist revolution, however, was the topic of 4.3.4. Here I placed the ethics of freedom at the heart of the anarchist project, and I argued that the twin principles of freedom and means-ends congruity may be applied to green practice. I placed freedom at the centre of the anarchist revolutionary project, and characterised direct action as ‘revolution in the quiet times’. I identified the perspectives from which action can be identified as beneficial to the anarchist project, and supported by anarchists. This strategic understanding will be brought to bear on the actual practices of EDA covered in the next three chapters.	+	<br />
−	<br>	+	==== The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism ====
−	* 5. Activist Anarchism: the case of Earth First!	+	Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.
−	** 5.1 Chapter Introduction	+	Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:
−	In 5.2.11 first develop the anarchist critique of institutionalised environmentalism that I introduced in 4.3.3 to identify the reasons why anarchists condemn such institutions as vehicles for change, and to set the scene for the emergence of a radically different, extra-institutional movement of confrontational direct action. In 5.2.2 Radicalisation I look at the motivations of eco-activism and then follow it as an experience: here I consider why anarchists support it, and why it’s important for anarchist hopes. I fill out my argument for an experiential anarchism, in which anarchism through practice is matched by psychological and social processes, both alienating and empowering, that support and encourage an anarchist mindset - at least temporarily and in that context, and with the possibility of extending beyond. In 5.2.3 I look at the immediate context of Earth First!, which arose as one of the ‘disorganisations’ of DIY culture. This milieu of counter-cultural and freedom-loving protest is significant as an example of informal anarchism in which diversity is not just tolerated, but celebrated.	+	''Dialectical Materialism'' is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.
−	Earth First! crystallised from the environmental wing of this movement, and in the sections of 5.3 I shall chart its arrival on the UK environmental scene, its anarchist tactics, aims and strategies, and I shall examine its organisational culture in order to draw out the diversity of anarchist arguments and identities that could co-exist therein. I will be considering the nature of an anarchist environmental network; the tension between individuality and collectivity; the transcendence of the old dualisms such as lifestyle versus materialism, micro versus macro, revolutionary versus reformist. I shall then look at the actual detail of how EF!ers articulated different negotiations of the issues of activism, in recognisably anarchist terms, within a broader consensus of anarchist theory. This will reveal the diversity of ideologies that can exist at the heart of activist anarchism.	+	''Historical Materialism'' is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.
−	** 5.2 Activist Anarchism	+	Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of ''Materialist Dialectics,'' which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref> Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
−	*** 5.2.1 An Institutionalised Environmental Movement	+	-----
−	“the campaign becomes an institution for the regulation and control of dissent” (Law 1991: 28).	+	==== Annotation 49 ====
−	Anarchists are greatly concerned by, and informed by, the historical tendency for once radical organisations to partake of a process toward institutionalisation and deradicalisation. As Walter states it, “Every group tends towards oligarchy, the rule of the few, and every organisation tends towards bureaucracy, the rule of the professionals; anarchists must always struggle against these tendencies, in the future as well as the present, and among themselves as well as among others” (Walter 2002: 39; cf Chan 2004: 119; Clark 1981: 18). This ‘institutionalisation thesis’ is significant for my thesis, both analytically for anarchism in justifying extra-institutional, anti-governmental action, and also empirically, in going part-way to explaining why the EDA of the 1990s took the form it did.	+	For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between ''Dialectical Materialism'' and ''Materialist Dialectics'' may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:
−	The tendency toward institutionalisation, codified into an ‘iron law’ by Michels (1959), was tracked in the examples of the trade unions (Woodcock 1992:87; Alinksy 1969:29; Polletta 2002:37) and the socialist parties who uniformly abandoned their radicalism once they achieved power (Boggs 1986; Michels 1959; Miller 1984: 89; Bookchin 1998b). More recently it has been cited with regard to the Green Party (Bahro 1978:40-41; <em>Schnews</em> 2002:23; Bookchin 1990a: 160; Jennings 2005:26; ACF cl 991: 53), and indeed anarchists have noted “the self-preservationist tendency of <em>all</em> organisations” (	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-5.png|''Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
−	Dowie 1995: 209 operating in their own networks (Young 2001: 5): <em>Class War</em> dissolved their own organisation specifically to combat this conservatising trend (<em>CW</em> 1997: 8-15). Contemporary SM theorists identify a continuing propensity for radical movements to ‘normalise’ to more institutional and conventional forms (Crook 1992:162, Scott 1990:11; Lovenduski & Randall 1993; Piven & Cloward 1977; Klandermans 1997:138-139; Tilly 1978; Della Porta & Diani 1999: 147). There are two main aspects of this process. First are organisational shifts (formalisation, professionalisation, internal differentiation) that change the social relations within an organisation away from the anarchist ideals of equal participation and exchange (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 131-143; McCarthy & Zaid 1973). Second, and concurrent with these structural changes are political shifts, in which once radical ideas and critiques lose their bite (Purkis 2001:49; Jamison 2001). In Chapter 3 we noted this with the case of feminism in the academy: here we shall examine the case of the environmental organisations, and so set the scene for the explicit radicalism and anti-institutionalism of Earth First!.	+	''Dialectical Materialism'' is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.
−	The ‘second wave’ of environmentalism that emerged in the seventies was informed by this tendency, as Jonathan Porrit demonstrated when he lamented “the tragedy... that almost all of so-called ‘dissent’ have gradually been sucked into this nexis of non-opposition. Academics, the media, even the established Church, they all bend the knee at the right time” (1986:118). The older ‘first wave* environmental organisations were accused of losing their radical, emancipatory spirit The National Trust for example, that had begun the 20<sup>th</sup> century campaigning for common land for the people to enjoy (Weideger 1994:21), was by the century’s end transformed into a bureaucratic landowner that excluded the common herd from encroaching on the land of the elite (1994: 86; Spokesperson for Friends and Families of Travellers quoted in <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No.27; Hetherington 2003: 11; Chevenix- Trench 2004: 39-43). The radical environmental protesters of my study therefore encountered the National Trust and similar institutions not as an ally but as a collaborator in environmental destruction and alienation from the land (RA! 1997; Cresswell 1996:78).	+	''Materialist Dialectics'' is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.
−	Environmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Porritt’s Friends of the Earth (FoE) were formed in the 1970s out of a perception that the existing environmental groups had become too tame: “In contrast to older groups such as the CPRE, these new environmental pressure groups... used high- profile symbolic direct action to create media attention, and so place issues on the policy agenda” (Wall 1999:25). Yet by the late 1980s, these organisations too were changing (Lamb 1996: 182; Tokar 1997; Manes 1990: 59). Weston could state that “Friends of the Earth has moved from being the amateur, evangelical, fundamentalist ecocentric pressure group of the 1970s to a professional pragmatist organisation which is run virtually like any other modem company” (quoted in Wall 1999: 37). Lamb related that “The momentum of FoE’s campaigns seemed to some onlookers to slacken in [ the ] unwonted atmosphere of official approval”, and disaffected activists “felt the organisation was becoming ineffective as an agent of change in relation to government and industry. Still others felt excluded from the campaign side of things” (1996:166). In 5.3.3 we shall see that this dampening of activism and radicalism influenced the creation of EF! in the UK. I will look at how the organisational side of the ENGOs* institutionalisation was mirrored by a decline in confrontational politics.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-6.png|''Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
−	As the membership of some ENGOs grew beyond even the membership of the main political parties (Coxall 2001:2), it meant “that much of their resources and energy must go into management, and in particular the maintenance of their memberships” (Tom Burke quoted in Rawcliffe 1992:3-4; cf Dowie 1995:42-47; Morris 1995: 55; Scarce 1990: 52-53). The relationship between organisation and membership shifted and business attitudes were embraced, through partnerships, fund-raising and in their organisational structure: “These resources have allowed the national groups to develop into more corporate organisations, with administration, marketing, fundraising, media, and legal departments” (Rawcliffe 1992; 3). In other words, the ENGOs came to resemble the institutions they work with, in both their structure and discourse. Earth First! writers criticised this on grounds familiar to an anarchist discourse concerned with co-option	+	And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.
−	“The personnel of NGOs and companies became ever more interchangeable - indeed, by virtue of their similar structures, they began to develop an affinity with one another, they began to understand each others’ needs - they recognised, as Thatcher said of Gorbachev, that these were people they could do ‘business’ with. Cooperation began to replace confrontation, and the euphemistically named ‘strategic alliances’ between NGOs and particular companies started to develop” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:22; cf Foreman 1991b: 38; Burbridge 1994: 8-9; Letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 1994: 53; Dowie 1995: 116; Rawcliffe 1995:29).	+	As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.
−	These organisational and discursive shifts were paralleled by a shift in political tactics, so that the 1980s saw a general move away from the original consciousness-raising and anti-establishment protest of the environmental movement, into organisations aiming to engage with - and develop solutions to the environmental crisis in alliance with - government and big business (Porritt 1997: 67; Dowie 1995: 106; Rose quoted in Bennie 1998:400; Richards & Heard 2005:23; Grant 2000: 19-20). Greenpeace, for example, argued that ‘Ambulance chasing environmentalism’ had lost its value (Taylor 1994; Melchett 1997) and its distinctive strategy of raising public consciousness through media ‘mindbombs* (Hunter 1979:67) had run its course: environmental concern between the sixties and nineties had moved from a marginal to a central concern of the majority, governments and business included (Dowie 1995:222; Rawcliffe 1995). The focus of Greenpeace attention therefore came to reside with “more enlightened companies”, who were identified as the most likely agents of positive environmental change, (Grove-White 1997: 18; cf Melchett quoted in Bennie 1998:403; Porritt 1997:67; Richards & Heard 2005:23). We shall see that the activists of EDA held a different view.	+	It is also important to understand the nature of ''dialectical relationships.''
−	In its deployment of this strategy, Greenpeace utilised consumer pressure (Dr. Jeremy Leggett in Greenpeace 1996:18; Melchett 1997), and worked with businesses to develop ‘green solutions’, such as new commodities like fridges: “Alternatives which, while radical, can still ‘work* within broadly the present structure” (Greenpeace 1996:22; cf Millais 1990: 55; Secrett quoted in Lamb 1996:191). Greenpeace now ran “campaigns that aim to ensure specific business sectors expand, gain new markets and become far more profitable” (Millais 1990:56). Millais noted that “Some see this ... as evidence that we have jumped from the protest boat to the boardroom. But... It is about defining ways forward” (in Greenpeace 1996: 22). He even made the claim that “solutions intervention are a new form of direct action” (Millais 1990:52), but however prefigurative this strategy may be, the world it prefigures is one of capitalism, of consumers and of continuing disempowerment: not a direct action legitimate to anarchism.	+	A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in ''motion'' [see ''Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter'', p. 59] and in a constant state of ''change'', and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.
−	EF! writers argued that the structure and strategy of Greenpeace had come to embody part of the problem many radical ecologists challenge: it engages in the conventional liberal politics of a pressure group; its hierarchical structure repeats unequal power-relations; and its ‘supporters* are told to stay passive, and watch their representatives on the telly (Eyerman & Jamison 1989; cf Wall 1997:26; Rtldig 1983; Corr 1999: 195; Steve 2001). Even the ‘Direct Action’ of Greenpeace represents publicity used to pressure the government and corporations according to its agenda, and to gain converts through the dramatic pictures produced by mass media: classically ‘liberal’ direct action carried out by an elite (Hunter 1979:251-2; Richards & Heard 2005:33-4; ACF c 1991: 53; letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 2000:215; McLeish 1996:40). I shall explore this distinction between anarchist and liberal direct action in section 6.2.1. ENGOs such as Greenpeace prioritised results - media exposure, increased membership, increased ‘power’ in the world of pressure politics., but EF! writers argued that “In the process, they disempower their staff and members and reduce the green movement’s potential effectiveness” (Burbridge 1994: 9; cf Letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 1994: 53; Foreman 1991b: 38; Jasper 1999:365). We shall see that EF!, by contrast, share anarchism’s concern for right process: of the equal importance of the <em>means</em> by which results are gained.	+	-----
−	After the ‘first wave’ of conservation groups such as the National Trust, and the ‘second wave* of populist environmentalism in the seventies, critical commentators characterised “free market ‘third wave* environmentalism” as “the institutionalisation of compromise” (Dowie 1995:106-107). It was charged that the British Government succeeded in neutralising protest by incorporating environmental groups into its own <em>modus operandi</em> (Richards & Heard 2005:26; Rtldig 1995:225): the ENGOs* “access to the policy making process” proved “sufficient for them to remain well-ordered and non- disruptive” (Jordan & Richardson quoted in Doherty & Rawcliffe 1995; cf Jordan & Maloney 1997: 175-186; Grant 2000: 101-7; Rootes 1999: 156; Rawcliffe 1992). Chatterjee & Finger phrase the critique sharply:	+	Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.
−	“NGOs are trapped in a farce: they have lent support to governments in return for some overall concessions on language and thus legitimised the process of increased industrial development. The impact of lobbying was minimal while that of compromise will be vast, as NGOs have come to legitimise a process that is in essence contrary to what many of them have been fighting for years” (Chatterjee & Finger 1994: 36; cf Burbridge 1994: 8-9).[65]	+	-----
−	The argument exists that if the ENGOs had lost control of the environmental agenda to the government and MNCs, then that might mean it was at last being taken seriously (James Thornton quoted in Dowie 1995:58; Scott 1990:151). By allying themselves with the establishment and the primary agents of environmental destruction, however, the big environmental organisations came under fire for themselves serving as the first line of defence against growing public consciousness of the ecological crisis. Thus contributors to <em>Do or</em> Die wrote that ENGOs “mediate and divert the environmental concern that can be so disturbing to the status quo, channelling it into less antagonistic, more manageable forms” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997; 22; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1995:63; <em>Do or</em> Die 1999: 13; Gamer 1996: 129; Law 1991: 19). Robin Grove-White (himself allied to Greenpeace) argues that the real importance of ENGOs is as catalysts to “deeper structural tensions in the industrial societies in which they came to prominence” (1992:11; cf Torgerson 1999:25; Hjelmar 1996 114). On this same basis, Welsh advances the anarchist perspective that movements must remain marginal to retain their vitality: “new social movements do not and cannot operate within state space ... They can only exist at the margins, as to come inside would effectively kill the impetus for innovation, and cultural critique of the established system” (Welsh 2000: 204-5; cf Jasper 1999:375; Carter 1999: 127). Many in EDA believe the only way to stay effective is therefore to stay outside the institutions (Mike Roselle quoted in <em>EFIJ</em> 24(6) 2004:48). By doing so, it is arguable that they have kept alive the radical challenge of environmentalism that I introduced in the previous chapter.	+	=== 3. Excerpt From ''Modifying the Working Style'' By Ho Chi Minh ===
−	There is a danger that the tone of inevitability in the ‘institutionalisation thesis’ might lead one to assume, like Michels, that the above organisational processes are inevitable and total. But this would be to ignore the power of human agency. Human potential is the central plank in anarchist hopes for change (Pouget 2003: 8). In this situation, with the institutionalisation and neutralisation of green radicalism, human agency was demonstrated by the emergence of new, militant and anarchistic groupings in the early nineties (Doherty 2005:131; Dynes & McCarthy 1992; Doherty 1999a; Lean 1994; Dowie 1995:207; cf Rootes 1999:173). In 1994, Taylor thus wrote that “the direct-action agenda has moved elsewhere, to the anarchic structures of Earth First!” (1994; cf Tokar 1988: 134; Gamer 1996: 145; Rawcliffe 1995; Roger Higman quoted in Lamb 1996:17; Scarce 1990:103). As <em>Green Anarchist</em> phrased it, “Greenies voted with their feet against reformism. Instead of paying FoE bureaucrats salaries, they’re spending their dosh on D-locks” (1993). Aims were broadened to “wider cultural change as well as piecemeal legislation” (Gamer 1996:145), and autonomous action was chosen above the deal-making and compromise of “conventional, hierarchical green organisations” (B 1998; cf Garland quoted in Dynes & McCarthy 1992).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-7.jpg|''Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.'']]
−	EF!ers, in defining the alternative to institutional environmentalism, expressed an anarchist logic which included the key components of anti-capitalism, the anarchist critique of organisations, and means-ends prefiguration. EF! voices charged that “you can’t fight business with business -regardless of the content, the form itself is barren” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:23; Letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 1994: 53); that “a movement, such as the green movement, which is essentially hierarchical, undemocratic and capitalist, will create a society which is hierarchical, undemocratic and capitalist”; and that the positive solution to this lies with the principle that “our means and ends must be consistent” (Burbridge 1994: 9). What I find most interesting, is that these essentially anarchist principles were not restated due to a commitment to traditional anarchist ideology, but were arrived at afresh, <em>again,</em> as conclusions drawn from experience (Beynon 1999:295; Donnelly 2004:48; St.Clair 2004). In the next section I will look at some of the processes by which those conclusions were arrived at.	+	Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”
−	*** 5.2.2 Radicalisation	+	Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?
−	“A Beginner* s Guide to Tree Protesting:	+	But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?
−	You will need;	+	If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.
−	- A desire to protect the environment	+	Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”
−	- An identified area of land that is about to be trashed	+	In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:
−	- Some other enthusiastic people	+	“From within the masses, back into the masses.”
−	Everything else just turns up. Honestly” (Evans 1998:154).	+	No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.
−	The converse to the institutionalisation thesis, and its antidote, is the process of radicalisation that anarchists and others identify with the experience of extra-institutional struggle, particularly by means of direct action. In this section, I will introduce both the negative and positive parts of the ‘radicalisation thesis’ (political alienation; individual and community empowerment), particularly as observed with the case of NVDA. In doing so, I am arguing for the value of experience in informing an anarchist sensibility, and so clarifying my notion of’activist anarchism’ in Chapter 2. The radicalisation thesis advances reasons explaining why positive impacts are produced through avoidance of, and opposition to, these institutional structures and processes. A crucial point for my thesis is that people <em>become</em> anarchist through a radicalisation process: they are not necessarily pre-formed anarchist identities (Cox & Barker 2002:13; Seel 1999:333). It is to this experiential anarchism that I consider the most point of non-ideological anarchism. I will then examine Earth First! as the clearest example of an ecological activist anarchist organisation. Its very existence throws up questions about ideology and identity: how do environmental direct activists express their ideology through action? How do they negotiate the tension between autonomy and collective identity? If they are not traditional or ideological anarchists, then what brand of anarchists are they? In the final part of this chapter I will assess these issues through an examination of the arguments, proposals and critiques that EF! activists put to paper at a gathering in 1998, called the ‘Winter Moot’. These reveal that EF! does not express just one form of anarchism, but many; and they demonstrate that the anarchism that can be gleaned from activist debate is as strong and healthy as any traditional or text-bound formulation.	+	Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.
−	I emphasised in section 4.2.3 that the environmental critique served as a social and political critique, but I wish to temper that point now by returning to the environmental impulses for activism. Beynon states that “most environmentalists are anarchists primarily by intuition and by practice, rather than by conscious decision or education” (1999:295; cf Chimpy 2 2002:10; Scarce 1990: 9; Eisenhower 2004:36; Seel 1997a: 111; IE 2005:18). Their primary motivation is environmental concern (Beynon 1999; Watson 1998; 59; Begg 1991: 1; Liz Galst in Roseneil 2000:60-61): environmental activism is a genuine response to assaults on the environment (Dowie 1995:206). Beynon argues that “Those activists that have come to anarchist ways of thinking, as well as working, have done so through a dwindling personal faith in the current status of environmental protection, the toothlessness of the mainstream reformist agencies and an awareness of the problem being greater than any of these or of one road destroying one hill or one woodland” (1999:295-296). Anarchism has not been imposed upon environmentalism by a few persuasive writers, therefore, but has been self-generated by the movement (Seager 1993:270-271). This is anarchism not as ideology but as practice.	+	Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.
−	The experience of environmental resistance is an educative process (Tandon in Taylor 1995:175; <em>Schnews</em> 2002:9), particularly when “Mediated by the various discourses ... of feminism, anarchism and, to a lesser extent, civil liberties” (Roseneil 1995:149; cf Burgmann 2000: 87). Pepper states that “political action always politicises those taking part” (1986:164) and Vester (1975) articulates a Marxist evaluation of the process in which social movements represent ‘collective learning processes’ (cited in Cox 1998; cf Barker 2001:187). An anarchist articulation of what I am here terming ‘the radicalisation thesis’ need not remain within the field of workers* struggle and organisation (although I do look at this in section 6.2.2), but can be applied to any movement of direct action, self-organisation and resistance. Woodcock gives the example of the Committee of One Hundred:	+	= Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism =
−	“as always happens when militant pacifism confronts a government irremediably set on warlike preparations, there was a spontaneous surge of anti-state feeling - i.e. anarchist feeling still unnamed - and of arguments for the direct action methods favoured by the anarchists” (1980:457; cf Grassby 2002:175).	+	Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the ''theoretical core of a scientific worldview.'' Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
−	The tone of inevitability in these pronouncements is interesting, suggesting a linkage to views on human nature, but to me they have an over-generalised air. I prefer to use the term ‘may’, not ‘will’: radicalisation is a tendency and a possibility that is dependent on the active agency of the people involved.	+	== I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism ==
−	In this section I will first discuss some of the elements which, when encountered by participants in a local and specific environmental campaign, encourage a transgressive, indeed anarchist sensibility. To begin with the negative, disillusioning elements, we may note the change in attitudes to the supposedly ‘neutral’ institutions of police, media and democratic process. A road protester thus writes that “For a long time the police were seen to be really ‘impartial keepers of the peace’. This is being replaced by open hostility and defiance of the law” (Andy 1996: 8; WPH 1998:1; Richards 1981: 125; <em>Schnews</em> 1997 Nos. 28/29; Roseneil 1995: 133-153; Roseneil 2000:253-263).[66] Protesters often find that violent and prejudiced experience at the hands of the police is also frequently matched by a vilification in the media (Welsh 2000: 195; Correspondence with Jacob, Third Battle of Newbury, 12.3.1996). ‘Positive’ coverage in the media can also be a soul-destroying thing, as individuals turned into the media creations of’Swampy’ and ‘Animal’ discovered in coverage of the anti-roads movement (<em>Do or Die</em> 1998:35-37; Paterson 2000:156; Animal quoted in Evans 1998:178; WWMM 1997;). As a ‘respectable’ protester is quoted by Welsh, the experience of trying to change things from below can cause severe political disillusionment: “It really shatters you when you think about democracy. You become ... anti-establishment, they force you that way” (2000:192; cf Chris Gilham quoted in Brass & Koziell 1997:37; Welsh 1996:31). Most interestingly, this disillusionment is often mirrored in the progression of tactics, from respectful lobbying, expressing faith in the institutional system, to militant, transgressive and state-defying repertoires (Roseneil 1995:99-100; Andy 1996: 8; Welsh 2000; 192).	+	=== 1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues ===
−	In addition to questioning the system of representative democracy and its supposedly ‘neutral’ institutions, opposition to particular developments and issues broadened into a wider and more general critique. Andy reports from the anti-roads movement, for example, that “With increasing arrests and prison sentences since the Criminal Justice Act was passed, eco-activists have been forced to question the whole system. There is a growing awareness that it is Capitalism’s nature to pollute and destroy the environment” (Andy 1996: 8; cf SPCA 1998).[67] Indeed, “activism often leads to a broader analysis of power and how it might be transformed” (Doherty 2002:15; cf Roseneil 2000:241; McKay 1996:135). Amongst the implications of this for campaigners on specific local issues, is that the breadth of their opposition and critique will spread (Doherty 2002:208). In the case of EDA, this proved true, indeed it was often a stated aim of protest organisers, as Seel reports at the Pollok Free State: through participation “the core group hoped that the wider Free State ‘citizenry’ and supporters would learn about power, structural links between state and capital, and how these impact upon their everyday lives and environment” (1997a: 122).	+	''Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.''
−	The most uncontroversial demonstration of radicalisation is provided by evidence from life histories (Jasper 1997; Newman 2001; Epstein 1991; McAdam 1988; Roseneil 2000:246), which reveal how “the experience of campaigning often leads to changes in identity towards a more radical perspective” (Doherty 2002: 6). We should not assume this change is shared equally across the community, but examples are manifest from EDA. After the Newbury anti-road protests receded, for example, Franks records that the radicalisation of some climbers and archaeologists remained (2003:31).	+	Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>.”
−	Beyond the individuals taking part, the case can also be made that the activism, protest and challenge of social movements politicises attitudes in wider society: in a manner conducive to anarchism. Corr writes that	+	So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.
−	“Campaigns educate society about hidden inequalities and the ways which they can be overcome. Campaigns erode the culture of subservience that afflicts society as a whole. Campaigns encourage people, both on a societal and individual level, to free themselves of what are ultimately self-imposed psychological strictures.... encourage other social movements to grow and expand movement goals” (1999:182-3; cf Richards 1981:125).	+	In philosophy, there are two main questions:
−	Anarchists do not consider this broadening critique to be a purely negative development, but it is also possible to identify more straightforwardly positive aspects, for as “these groups discover what they	+	'''Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?'''
−	considered primarily their individual problem is also a problem of the others”, they may come to realise they need each other (Alinksy 1969:156; cf Pepper 1986:164; Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 92; GA 1999: 3). The struggle thus builds solidarity and community (Welsh 2000: 191,193; Pepper 1986: 164; Osha Neumann quoted in Epstein 1991: 8).[68] As RTS agitprop declares,	+	In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: ''Materialism,'' and ''Idealism.''
−	“By taking direct action, people make connections, they talk and communicate with each other, they break down the isolation and fragmentation of this alienated society... people realise that their particular local struggles are part of a wider problem - the global economy” (RTS Flyer 1998; cf de Cleyre 1912: 1; Clark 1981: 16).	+	'''Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?'''
−	The building of community takes place not only between movements in struggle (Roseneil 2000:2), but within particular pre-existing communities also. Epstein reports that “In each of the issue-based movements in which it has appeared, nonviolent direct action has involved building community” (1991:1; cf Simone Wilkinson in Roseneil 2000:57; Heller 2000:124). This is especially true when a particular and well-loved local place is threatened and people rally together to defend it. We shall note in the next section that class was not a unifying thread in the DIY or EDA protests of the early nineties. Instead, the threat of losing a cherished local landscape or green space could provide a focus around which members of all classes could find common cause, at least temporarily (Featherstone 1998:24; cf Burgmann 2000: 87).	+	In answer to this second question, two schools: ''Intelligibility'' — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and ''unintelligibility'' — which denies that capacity.
−	The method of NVDA is often placed at the centre of the process of radicalisation. Welsh relates that “The assumption that citizens will abide by laws and accept the precepts of wider governance is radically overturned by certain forms of non-violent direct action” (2000:154), and for that reason, “No state would be prepared to risk training its populace in full nonviolence action techniques ... It would then be all too easy for them to ‘rout’ the police: civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by customary violent means” (Routley 1984:132). It is worth considering the terms in which Welsh puts the case:	+	Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.
−	“In organising and participating in large-scale non-violent interventions people are required to take responsibility for every aspect of the action from the most basic, e.g. latrines, to unforeseeable events - perhaps the last-minute appearance of a barbed wire fence or riot police. Exposure to such situations on numerous occasions suggests to this observer that the diversity of human cultural capital prevalent within such sites nearly always provides a workable solution to fill every need as it arises. The more people are exposed to this kind of experience the greater the collective capacity for autonomous action in seemingly unlikely areas of a society becomes” (2000: 155; cf Pouget 2003: 5).	+	Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.
−	Welsh here restates the anarchist valorisation of human agency, and it is revealing that this is displayed precisely in the location where the state is opposed — is temporarily absent — and a grassroots collective (but diverse) will is proved capable of self-organisation. In addition to the negative, but anarchist, development of anti-statist feeling, therefore, direct action can provide a positive realisation of confidence, both in one’s own autonomy and in collective strength (the twin poles of anarchism).	+	<br />
−	This empowerment can take a prosaic, practical form, as with the many practical skills and confidencebuilding learnt through anti-roads protest (Franks 2003:30; cf Corr 1999:23; Cockbum 1977:64; Roseneil 2000:93-109). But more crucial and central to the experience of direct action is the psychological involvement and expression that gives activists the bonding moments and peak memories that they hold onto afterwards. Merrick’s account of the ‘Reunion Rampage* in 1997 when a crowd of anti-roads activists trashed and burnt a security compound at Newbury, presents us with one such occasion:	+	Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.
−	“Anyone brought up in a regimented hierarchical society is conditioned to have respect for the Powers That Be. With a mixture of the idea that They Wouldn’t Make Laws For No Good Reason and a Fear Of Punishment, they give us a deference to authority, we are taught to obey the voice that wears a uniform.	+	-----
−	This Fear Of Authority is the greatest force holding us back from realising our true power, our <em>real</em> capability for making things change. When a crowd realises there’s a dozen of us for every one of them and decides to ignore the authority of the uniform, there’s NOTHING they can do to stop us. This is what happened yesterday. We went for the fence and they couldn’t stop us. We got to touch Middle Oak Two hundred of us surrounded the tree singing ‘Jerusalem’, then did a massive celebratory hokey-cokey.	+	==== Annotation 50 ====
−	It was the most focused and clear thinking crowd I’ve <em>ever</em> known. Nobody held back; of the 800 or so people there, only about 30 didn’t come in to the compound. We moved almost as one from area to area, unafraid of security guards, unafraid of damaging the machinery, but with respect for people. I have no right to risk anyone’s safety but my own. I have no interest in, desire for or tolerance of violence against people, and as far as I could see nor did the crowd. We went and sat on the diggers and tipper trucks. After a while we went for the giant crane. Security guards surrounded it, but there were so many of us, we just prised them off, explaining that we’d won today and they should give up. A security guard next to me got knocked over, and protestors immediately helped him to his feet...	+	''Cognitive origin'' refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.
−	...It wasn’t chaotic, there was a sense of purpose, of collective will, of carnival, celebration, strong magic, triumph of people power, of a small but very real piece of justice being done” (Merrick 1997:2; cf Roseneil 2000:195)	+	''Social origin'' refers to origination from social relations between human beings.
−	Many commentators and participants concur that the “inspiring, personally empowering side of activism is one of its key strengths” (Maxey 1999:200; cf Melucci, 1989; Starhawk 1989; Sian Edwards in Roseneil 2000:275). Lichterman notes that activists possess a ‘psychological developmental model’ of activism, in which they move from ‘denial’ to ‘empowerment’ (1996: 87) and Franks concurs that “Direct action... recognises that identities alter through the practice of such methods, in the most simplistic form - from passive victim to active resistor” (2003:22-3; cf Roseneil 2000:59). George Marshall, an organiser with Rising Tide, presents activism as the diametric opposite to the ‘Passive Bystander Effect’, arguing that once you know how to watch out for the effect, you never have to be victim of it again (Talk at Newcastle University 2001). Activism is a powerfill antidote to despair (Roseneil 2000:60).	+	So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.
−	I will conclude by returning to Beynon’s assertions that eco-anarchism is driven primarily by environmental commitment This is predicated on two significant issues: a sense of, or connection to nature (“intuitive ecological consciousness” in Scarce’s terms (1990: 9)), and an emotional, rather than a primarily ideological or rationally articulated beginning (IE 2005: 18; cf Jasper 1999: 113). This returns us to the point I made in 2.3.4 for an emotional as well as a rational basis for anarchism, and for the validity of an intuitive or experiential anarchism. Smith argues that, rather than theoretical argument or articulated ‘principles’, it is the experience and expression of a “practical ‘ecological’ sense” that is central to the possibility of a real, and radical, green future (Smith 2001:216; Osman quoted in Epstein 1991:9). For anarchism, also, Neal argues that “when you get a group of people working together, organising and engaging in direct action against illegitimate authority, you’re more likely to have folks sympathetic to anarchism than any other doctrine, which calls for obedience and passivity. The social struggle itself promulgates the anarchist idea, when waged anarchistically” (1997). The importance of actually doing things ourselves (DIY) cannot be overestimated: “successful attainment of objectives is much more meaningful to people who have achieved the objectives through their own efforts” (Alinksy 1969:174-5; cf Katrina Allen quoted in Roseneil 2000:107).	+	These origins are ''unilateral consideration'' and ''absolutization'' of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.
−	In friendly disagreement with local Trotskyists, it is this factor that I have used to justify ‘our’ methods rather than S WP-style party-building, in which thoughts and decisions come down from on-high. Activities from campaigns to co-operatives “provide people with experience of direct action and autonomy” (EFH 1998) Alan Carter emphasises the value of this practice in anarchist skills: “Just as any attempt to set up a participatory democracy seems to require of us that we learn democratic skills, <em>any</em> workable anarchy seems to require the acquisition of cooperative skills” (1999: 267). April Carter argues that “those forms of anarchism which seem to be least political often, in fact, promote a sense of individual social responsibility. Standing aside from conventionally conceived politics may paradoxically enable anarchists to realise certain values of citizenship, and an ideal of political community, almost lost within the present meaning of’politics’” (1971:105). Looking at this process optimistically, Alan Carter suggests that “self-organised environmentalist opposition to the state can, in the process, generate prefigurative anarchist forms capable of socialising individuals towards a cooperative autonomy” (1999:269).	+	-----
−	In this section, I have presented the counterweight to the gloomy institutionalisation thesis, in which anarchists and other radicals place their hope and delight in the processes of radicalisation. Elements included in this tendency are disillusionment with ‘democratic process’, police and media; a widening of political perspectives; greater confidence; stronger communities; and greater skills and skill-sharing* The power of direct action is predicated, in part, on this process, by which anarchists judge success (in often non-quantifiable terms). This marks out anarchist criteria of success from Trotskyite organisation-building or liberal policy-affecting. The power of EDA, inspired by ecological sentiment, thus stands at the heart of anarchist processes.	+	==== Annotation 51 ====
−	In Chapter 2,1 argued for the legitimacy and possible primacy of ‘informal’, non-explicit anarchism, and I placed EDA within this category. The radicalisation process lies at the heart of this claim: it explains why such movements become a hotbed of anarchist practice and sentiment, just as the institutionalisation thesis is offered as an explanation of why bureaucratic organisations become a hotbed of accommodation and hierarchisation. Ideological or explicit organisations might demur from the idea that informal, experiential anarchism is enough to sustain a movement, and advocate instead the formation of explicit anarchist organisations (AF 1996a: 20; <em>CW</em> 1997:15; Alinsky 1969:223-229; Epstein 1991:276). They also argue against the embracing of difference, with the AF taking the strongest line, that anarchist-communist analysis is required to transform “activists into fully-fledged revolutionaries” (1996a: 15; cf Young in 2001:5). In the next section, however, I will look at the counter-cultural milieu known as DIY Culture that remained fully informal and fully committed to difference, yet demonstrated numerous anarchist arguments, ideas and applications. It was out of this milieu - not the traditional anarchist movement - that EF! and the other manifestations of activist anarchism emerged.	+	''Unilateral consideration'' is the consideration of a subject from one side only.
−	*** 5.2.3 DIY Culture	+	''Absolutization'' occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as ''always'' true in ''all'' situations ''without'' exception.
−	“there’s no point sitting around complaining about things. If you want change, you’ve got to get off your arse and Do It Yourself’ (<em>Pod</em> 1994: 11).	+	Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.
−	The EDA of the early nineties was embedded in a wider, broader milieu of activism united by themes pertinent to our understanding of activist anarchism. This was contemporaneously termed ‘DIY Culture’, and it provided many noteworthy and substantial instances of anarchist discourse, practice and development I cannot provide a full narrative or summation of DIY: such attempts have been made by Stone (1994), McKay (1996a, 1998) and Brass & Koziell (1997), and the ‘flavour’ of the movement may also be found in movement publications such as <em>Schnews, Squall</em> and <em>Po</em> J, and contemporary newspaper reports such as Vidal (1994a & 1994b), Berens (1995a), Bellos (1995), Grant (1995), Mills (1994) and Malyon (C1994:2-5). Specifically anarchist (or libertarian communist) assessments of DIY Culture have in my view largely failed to grasp the anarchist qualities and possibilities of DIY, being overly concerned with applying a critical, class-and capital-centric analysis (and denigration) of the movement: I shall demonstrate this with the case of <em>Aufheben[69].</em> Other left-wing commentary was similarly coloured by its concern for a reinsertion of traditional left themes, but it also celebrated many aspects of DIY in markedly anarchist terms (notably <em>New Statesman and Society</em> and <em>Red Pepper</em> magazines). The most significant themes for our study - and amongst the most recorded - were the celebration of diversity, the defence of civil liberties, anti- electoralism, and a commitment to extra-institutional protest allied to practical attempts at ‘living the alternative’.	+	Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality ''only'' from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists ''absolutize'' human reasoning as the ''only'' source of truth and knowledge about our world ''without exception.''
−	DIY Culture reached its most visible flowering in opposition to the criminalisation of alternative lifestyles in the form of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (CJB). The CJB was announced by Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard to cheers at his party’s conference as “the most comprehensive package of action against crime”. It covered numerous different practices and lifestyles that were not “culturally acceptable to dominant groups” (Parker 1999: 76), including ‘New Age	+	As Lenin wrote in ''On the Question of Dialectics'': “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.”
−	Travellers’, hunt saboteurs, squatters and the followers of music “characterised by the emission of a succession of repetitive beats”. Yet instead of conveniently wiping out these practices, the many and diverse elements affected or outraged by the bill were politicised and allied together in “heterogeneous networks of diversity and plurality” (Bolton in Grant 1995:18; cf Brass & Koziell 1997: 8; Mills 1994: 5; Bellos 1995). <em>Schnews</em> were able to declare that “Your attempt to criminalise our culture has unified it like never before. Thanks to you we are now witnessing the largest grassroots movement of direct action in years” (1996: 1; cf Malyon 1994: 12; Moore 1994; Fairlie 1994:14). Again human agency was demonstrated in response to the attempted exercise of state control and cultural domination, and it took the form of grassroots alliances of great diversity and creativity.	+	Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.
−	Definitions of DIY state the anarchist basis of the movement’s character: “DO IT YOURSELF You are only accountable to yourself in this life, and all you have to believe is that you can make a difference” (Kate in <em>Schnews</em> 1996:3). With DIY, individual autonomy was made practical and collective (this is the anarchist ideal), and commentators recognised that “those involved in Do It Yourself Culture are taking responsibility and control over their own lives” (Brass & Koziell 1997:7). Doing it Yourself involved a dual political movement: both a withdrawal of support and involvement in established politics, and also a decision to act positively for oneself. This links DIY to the holistic and prefigurative power of direct action introduced in 43.4; to the processes of both negative and positive radicalisation outlined in 5.2.2; and also to the themes of civil disobedience discourse that I consider in section 6.3.4.	+	-----
−	DIY Culture was united not by ideology but by action: as <em>Schnews</em> stated, “A single action is worth a thousand words” (in McKay 1998: 12; cf Berens 1995a: 22-23). This prioritising of deeds over words allowed a diverse range of concerns, cultures and ideologies to co-exist (Grant 1995:18 ; cf Doherty 1999b) without divisive dogma or exclusive sectarianism (Puddephat quoted in Grant 1995:19). Commentators were temporarily fascinated by DIY as a ‘New Politics’ (Grant 1995:18; Vidal & Bellos 1996:5; Worpole 1999: xi; Hughes-Dennis 2001:7), but they commonly recognised the dominance of traditional anarchist ideals such as freedom (Campbell 1995; Bellos 1996; Doherty 1999b; McKay 1998), and also of environmentalism (Grant 1995; Shane Collins in Brass & Koziell 1997:36; Lean 1994). DIY Culture was defined as ‘anarchist’ as well as ‘anarchic*, and it demonstrated a profound preference for NVDA over constitutional politics. DIY should be seen as <em>both</em> a new self-generated culture, <em>and</em> a part of the age-old direct action tradition (Grant 1995:18; Styles 1994:24; Monbiot 1996:4; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998: 140; Ward C1994). As Porrit recognises in the environmental case, “the direct action campaigns are almost as established a part of the modem environmental movement... as the mainstream NGOs” (1997: 66; cf Mueller 2004:146). DIY and EDA activists saw themselves in a long lineage of, mostly pre-industrial, rebellion and alternative living: “our struggles are battles in an old war” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 70). This was made most clear with the conscious links made to the seventeenth century Diggers, both in words and in actions, for example with the Land is Ours re-enactment of the Diggers* land occupation near StGeorge’s Hill (<em>EFIA U</em> No.58 1999: 1; Heller 2000: 101; SDMT 1998; letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 90-91).	+	==== Annotation 52 ====
−	Emblematic of the embracing of many diverse viewpoints, struggles and lifestyles, the ‘Union Jill’ flag which flew at many road camps (Malyon 1994:13) was made, not out of the standard Red, White and Blue, but many different fabrics and coloured pink, green or any variety of colours: see figure F5.1.	+	Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.
−	<br>	+	This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.
−	][Figure 5.1 The Union Jill, at Rye Loaf Camp, December 1995.	+	Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in ''The German Ideology'':
−	Elements of particular note for an anarchist understanding of the anti-CJB movement were the sense of betrayal created by the Labour party’s lack of meaningful opposition, and the rejection of the processes of parliamentary democracy itself { Berens 1995a: 22), which encouraged less conventional and more anarchistic forms of opposition. The opposition to the bill featured direct action stunts, and mass rallies characterised by a party atmosphere, colour and music (<em>Pod</em> 1994: 10; Grundy 1994: 58-62). While anarchistic grouping such as <em>Schnews</em> sought to build on this disillusionment (“Leave Labour... Get Involved in Politics” (1996 No.43)), many others who joined the opposition had never been interested in any form of politics before. Ironically, therefore, a huge section of youth culture was politicised by its alienation from politics (Berens 1995; Brass & Koziel! 1997: 7). Instead of relying on the politicians who were criminalising their lifestyles, the people in these subcultures decided to look to themselves, and in so doing created their own solutions to the alienation they felt (John Bird in Brass & Koziell 1997). Colin Ward recognised that this was in keeping with the older anarchist tradition of self-help (Ward 1994).	+	<blockquote>
		+	The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.’
		+	</blockquote>
−	DIY activism was not premised on class (Puddephat quoted in Grant 1995: 18), and was therefore able to encompass an astonishingly diverse range of individuals, campaigns and issues. As one participant explains the absence of class barriers. “If people are going to get off their butts I don’t give a monkey’s if they’re upper-class, middle-class or working-class. It’s an open movement” (Benn quoted in Grant 1995: 18; cf McPhail <em>Time Out</em> No. 1393; Colin in Seel 1997a: 134). Commentators noted that the alliance between radicals and many ‘Middle Englanders’ vexed the establishment and it gave a particular strength to the anti-roads movement (Campbell 1995; Tilly Merrit in <em>New Statesman & Society</em> 1995: 5; Vidal 1993: 18; Vidal 1994a: 2; McNeish 1999: 75-79; Lamb 1996: 17), but others from a more left-wing frame warned that “The inclusiveness of DI Y’s call to resistance leads to an unwillingness to address divisions in society” (Edwards 1998: cf AF 1996b). The class perspective presented to the DIY subcultures, however, tended to offer little practical strategic advice, indeed at its worst it could be interpreted to suggest that the convivial, celebratory and freedom-loving protesters should give up all the partying to get a job, and then go on strike (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 78). Clearly, no	+	Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:
−	<br>	+	<blockquote>
		+	Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.
−	matter the salience of the tension between democracy and class, this discourse demonstrated its irrelevance to the participants on the ground: even to those with a class consciousness themselves.	+	-----
−	Class-struggle anarchists and libertarian Marxists applied a class critique to activism (<em>CW</em> 1997:12; AF 2000a: 9; Red Robbie 2001:28). The anarcho-syndicalist Red Robbie, for example, criticises the AF for finding “more in common with EF! because of the latter’s emphasis on its narrow definition of activism and direct action than it does with proletarian struggle” (2001:28). Instead of viewing the method — direct action —as the cornerstone of anarchism, Robbie insists on “the two main aspects of class struggle theory for anarchists:”	+	In history, there are two main forms of idealism: ''subjective'' and ''objective''.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“(1) that the major part of the working class has to be involved in any revolutionary activity; (2) that the struggle of the working class is sited in the social and economic domain...	+	''Subjective idealism'' asserts that ''consciousness'' is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.
−	The revolution must take the people (and specifically the working class) and not the Earth as subject and object” (2001:28).	+	''Objective idealism'' also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.
−	The AF replied to this by arguing that “For us the criteria is simply whether their actions lead to a greater sense of combativeness or lead to greater passivity” (2001b: 30): the radicalisation effect charted in 5.2.2, therefore, is recognised as a significant force for anarchism. AF and Aufheben anyway used their class analysis to argue that the integral place of roads within the capitalist system meant that “when roads campaigners were trying to fight motorway expansion they were in a very real sense fighting part of the class struggle against capitalism” (AF 2001a: 29; cf Aufheben 1994: 11; ACF 1991; GAy No.9 2002:13; Faslane Focus 2002: 11-24). I do not consider the application of class analysis here to be the most useful way to analyse the anarchist importance of EDA and DIY, however. Indeed from the same perspective, class-strugglists argued that DIY was not a fully-fledged anarchism but merely ‘militant liberalism’ <em>(Aufheben</em> 1995:22). This was due to DIY’s failure to see the “class meaning” of the CJB <em>(Aufheben</em> 1995: 8), and the ‘liberal* basis of alliance around notions of civil liberties and the Liberty slogan ‘Defend Diversity - Defend Dissent* (<em>Aufheben</em> 1995: 14). They condemn DIY for celebrating individuality and diversity, and condemn the anti-CJA alliances for CD assumptions of a ‘common humanity’ (1995:12) (I will clarify this CD theme and examine its relationship to anarchism in section 6.3.4).	+	-----
−	Yet the CJB demonstrated that from the perspective of the state, all this anti-establishment diversity did indeed count as a threat (Stone 1994:16-17), and the act may be seen as the reassertion of property rights and a clampdown on deviancy (Sibley 1997; Halfacree 1996). The CJB was passed and became the CJA. The new penalties were effectively used against hunt saboteurs (Parker 1999: 77), and traveller culture was further devastated (many travellers left the country for more tolerant climes) (“Assemblies of Celebration, Assemblies of Dissent” <em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2000: np). The DIY movement’s direct action, however, - particularly as it was expressed in environmental protest - did not cease. Indeed DIY crossovers benefited the anti-roads movement, both tactically and politically (EF/Jt/No.4 1993:2; No.5 1993:3; Vidal & Bellos 1996:5). Many of the original protesters at Twyford Down, for example, were New Age Travellers looking for a safe place to stay, and outdoor living skills were passed from traveller to direct action scenes (<em>Schnews</em> 2003:21; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998:51; <em>Do or Die 2003:</em>10; <em>Monolith News</em> Nos. 13 & 14 1993; <em>Tribal Messenger</em> 1993: 12-15; <em>Musicians Network News Notes</em> No.22 1993). The experience of the CJA politicised many, who came to view the police, the politicians and the law and political system behind them with suspicion if not outright contempt, in a demonstration of the radicalisation thesis elaborated in 5.2.2. This was expressed, for example, in the progression “from a position of just lobbying for legal rights to one of defying the law as well” <em>(Aufheben</em> 1995:19; cf Griffiths quoted in Grant 1995:18; McKay 1996:135). All this was grist to the anarchist mill, and aided the development of many anti-state, anti-police and other traditionally anarchist perspectives.	+	==== Annotation 53 ====
−	Even the most trenchant class-struggle critics of DIY recognise that it contained a revolutionary content “in the road protesters’ refusal of democracy, the squatters’ refusal of property rights, and the ravers’ pursuit of autonomy” (<em>Aufheben</em> 1995:22; cf Seel 1997a: 130). I myself view the anti-CJA alliances and the wider DIY movements as activist anarchism in its own right As Brass & Koziell argue, “so-called ‘single’ issues are just a focus and a starting point for debate and action on a wider scale. DIY Culture encompasses far more” (1997: 8). This embracement of diverse views and areas of engagement led to the ‘multi-issue’ protest culture that had revolutionary ramifications, which I shall explore in 5.3.7.	+	''Primary existence'' is existence which precedes and determines other existences.
−	To conclude with a consideration of the class critique, <em>Aufheben</em> cite a fundamental contradiction between class subversion and liberal lobbying (1995:13), but I do not accept that these are the only categories into which we may place activism. It may be true that DIY was not a perfect expression of Marxist notions of an upsurge in class struggle, but this does not mean that it did not express anarchism or did not have an anarchist worth. By failing to generalise all struggles under a common category of ‘anti-capitalism’, the diversity of DIY activism (and not just in its protest guise), did not lose its relevance to the anarchist project but rather demonstrated the strength of the anarchist project above and beyond narrow categories of class struggle. One can act like an anarchist, and be an anarchist, even when stark collective conflicts do not make one’s choices simple. Autonomy can be expressed, direct action can be enacted, common ground in freedom can be discovered, and the oppressive, violent impacts of state and capital can be identified in any age by any individual (whatever their class upbringing).	+	Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.
−	Earth First!	+	Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.
−	*** 5.3.1 Introduction	+	Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.
−	In the sections of 5.3 I will build on the understanding of activist anarchism to look at how activist anarchist organisation holds together. As the most explicitly anarchist network of ecological direct action, I chose to examine Earth First! UK for its expression of activist anarchism: in particular of organisation and identity, direct action tactics and revolutionary holism. First, I intend to demonstrate that EDA should be seen as a legitimate expression of anarchism. I use the practice and debate of EF! to develop our understanding of what this activist eco-anarchism actually <em>means.</em> In this chapter more than anywhere else that I have the eco-activists themselves demonstrating their anarchism, and applying their anarchist principles, attitudes and critical repertoires to the structure and identity of their own network This provides powerful support for my argument that anarchism may most strongly be found in the dialogue of activists talking to each other. I do draw upon textual sources in this chapter, but this is mainly for their value as a residual, public record of the much broader, contextually diverse and more participatory debates that have flowed through EDA (and to which I have in my own small way contributed). Although ideological views cannot be bracketed and kept outside these debates, it is their application to the practical experience and issues of eco-activism that constitutes the focus here. The different political traditions, and the radicality of green and/or anarchist thought, provide only a background and a reference point to the content of this case study. I do not seek to build a monolith of ‘Earth First!’ thought, therefore, but rather draw out some of the most striking and revealing facets (some ‘revolutionary’, some not) revealed by the broad, diverse and ever-moving EDA experience. In doing so, I hope to reveal certain truths about the nature of anarchism itself.	+	The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88.
−	In this chapter I do not present a complete history for EF!, simply because it is a too diverse and decentralised network to be ‘neatened* into any such story. My own perspective is limited to my own experience and that of my local group, but this has been quite extensive and I was able, over several years, to consciously adapt my experience in order to gain insights into areas of interest or relative ignorance. Derek Wall has provided an assessment of the conditions and milieus from which early EF! first emerged, using extensive interviews with key activists (1999a; 1997:13-15), and <em>Do or Die</em> present one long-term EF!er’s assessment of the gradual progression and development of the network (2003: 3 - 35). There is no need for me to repeat this work and, more fundamentally, any attempt at a comprehensive summary of EF!UK must fail because for each person the meaning and impact of an event (or non-event) is different Even within TAPP, our annual review of the year revealed as many different versions of what was significant and successful as there were participants: to undertake such a task on a national scale is beyond me (this is especially true as EF! has porous boundaries, and it is therefore not clear where EF! begins and ends).	+	Willful activity (''willpower'') is discussed in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
−	In 5.3.2,1 frame EF!US as a radical reaction to the institutionalisation thesis presented in 5.2.2, and a ‘radical flank’ to the tamed and timid ENGOs. In considering the location and character of anarchism in EF!US, I consider that it expressed both a practical anarchist critique and a positive anarchist desire. I identify EF!US as an activist anarchist organisation, bound not by dogma but by core commitments to	+	The key difference between ''subjective'' and ''objective'' idealists is this:
−	anarchist organisation and tactics; I note that radical ecological principles facilitated this development; and I adopt Daktari’s distinction between libertarian and communitarian anarchisms in order to indicate some of the diversity contained within EFJUK’s anarchism.	+	Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there ''is'' a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.
−	In 5.3.3,1 consider the factors that allowed EF!UK to form when it did, and the divergent impacts it had on British media, ENGOs and green radicals. I apply 5.3.2’s characterisation of EF!US, but introduce the specific elements of the UK context to introduce the more socially concerned and selfconsciously anarchist network that I shall interrogate in the next few sections.	+	In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.
−	With the next four sections I develop our understanding of the political and activist character of EF!UK, introduced in 5.3.3 with a presentation of the character and impact of its arrival. In 5.3.4,1 introduce and compare the chief political influences on EFIUK, which, in 5.3.5,1 will develop with a presentation of the broad and mixed repertoires employed, and the range of issues interrelated by activist critique. In 5.3.6,1 undertake a narrower and more holistic assessment of EF!UK’s nonprotest and ecological actions, and in 5.3.7,1 conclude by assessing the impact and revolutionary nature of EF! activism.	+	-----
−	With the next four sections, I build on the characterisation of EF! as an activist anarchist network with a closer and more complex assessment of its organisation. In 5.3.8,1 emphasise the priority and autonomy of the network’s decentralised groups, and assess the relations between them through an assessment of TAPP’s relationship and identification with the wider EF! network. In 5.3.9,1 use my experience editing the Earth First! Action Update (<em>EF!AU)</em> to place the newsletter in relation to the wider network, and in 5.3.10,1 use my experiences of the Summer Gatherings to draw out the communitarian impulses, and negotiations of tensions, most clearly demonstrated there. With the ‘trappings’ of the EF! network thus evaluated, in 5.3.11,1 focus on the dilemmas and debates that have been expressed in the EF! network, concerning issues of elitism, accidental cliques and informal hierarchies. These prompted the Moot debates of 1999, which I utilise in 5.3.12, to demonstrate the variety of opposing positions available within a broad common ground of activist anarchist values.	+	==== Annotation 54 ====
−	*** 5.3.2 Earth First! US	+	Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.
−	Earth First! formed in the USA as a radical reaction to the effect of environmental institutionalisation, such as I have detailed in relation to the UK case in 5.2.1. Its ‘No Compromise’ position stands as the reaction to perpetual compromise by the ‘Big Green’ institutions; the anarchistic organisation stands as an intuitive reaction to, and a safeguard against, the top-down form of organisation of institutionalised ENGOS; and the anarchist politics of many Earth First!ers represent the lessons learnt from the experience of conflict and communality. EF!US therefore supports my argument for the existence of an informal, intuitive anarchism bom of experience and expressed through practice, in addition to the explicitly titled anarchist movement	+	Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.
−	EF!US was founded in 1980 by ex-reformist environmentalists who had experienced the destruction of vast areas of wilderness after pragmatic trade-offs and deals between the ‘Big Green’ ENGOs and government. They stated, in a founding and definitive principle, that “We will not make political compromises. Let the other outfits do that EARTH FIRST will set forth the pure, hard-line, radical position of those who believe in the Earth first” (EF!US 1980: 1). No-compromise thus became definitive of EF!’s discourse, tactics and strategies, and this was later adopted by the UK group (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 5-6).	+	As Engels pointed out in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'': “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.”
−	EF!US also made the pragmatic argument that by creating a no-compromise group, they would aid the environmental movement by making mainstream environmental organisations look respectable:	+	=== 2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism ===
−	“we in Earth First! tried to create some space on the far end of the spectrum for a radical environmentalist perspective. And, as a result of our staking out the position of unapologetic, uncompromising wilderness lovers with a bent for monkeywrenching and direct action, I think we have allowed the Sierra Club and other groups to actually take stronger positions than they would have before and yet appear to be more moderate than ever” (Foreman 1991b: 39; cf Foreman & Haywood 1993: 16; Zisk quoted in Wall 1999: 155; Manes 1990: 18).	+	In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: ''Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism,'' and ''Dialectical Materialism.''
−	The notion that direct action groups aid more moderate organisations by acting as a ‘radical flank’(Epstein 1991: 14; Mueller 2004:146; Zinn 1997:125-129) is an instrumental notion that was also claimed for EF! in the UK context (WWF quoted in Lamb 1996; GA 1993; Purkis 1995: 8): see 5.3.5. In 5.3.7, we shall note that the strategic, practical rationale behind Earth First! is one that is only achieved through being uncompromising and ‘unreasonable* (EF1US 1980: 1).	+	''Primitive Materialism'' is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in ''Matter'', p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.
−	EFlUS’s repertoire grew to include stunts such as the symbolic ‘cracking’ of the Glen Canyon Dam with black material; covert acts of’monkeywrenching* such as sabotaging machinery or spiking trees to prevent their sale as timber; and blockades and mass campaigns of NVDA to obstruct wilderness destruction. EF! has also engaged in more conventional and legal campaigns, which gamer less anarchist praise but have sometimes proved as successful in preventing wilderness exploitation. There is no purism in the practical methods used by EF!: the purism lies in the ethics behind those methods. “We believe in using all the tools in the tool box - ranging from grassroots organising and involvement in the legal process to civil disobedience and monkeywrenching” (£F/J21(1) 2000: 4; cf Purkis 2001: 18).[70] The same is true in the UK case, with each group adapting the available methods to its own use.	+	''Metaphysical Materialism'' is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.
−	The main strategies behind these tactics have been (1) to mobilise large numbers of people into practical defence, (2) to raise publicity about the issue, and (3) to increase the economic costs of wilderness exploitation and thus render it less profitable. The end aim of EFUS! is to render large tracts of land inviolate from human exploitation and control (EF!US 1980: 1). Direct action is justified on ground of wilderness protection and biocentric values; instrumental success; and political pragmatism: these are ‘liberal’ justifications of direct action and the strategic thinking which I will criticise from the anarchist perspective in 6.2.1 and 6.5.3 respectively. None of these strategic aims have a good ‘fit’ with the strategic arguments of section 4.3.3 or the terms of anarchist direct action we shall establish in 6.2.1: indeed EF!US was explicitly non-revolutionary at its inception (Foreman & Hayward 1993:10; Purkis 2001: 132). However, the anarchist implications of EFIers’ practice and experience meant that over time, anarchist positions came increasingly to the fore (Daktari 2000: 66; Scarce 1990: 89). I will look at this through EFlUS’s organisational expression, before noting the role of radical green beliefs in stimulating the development of activist anarchism.	+	==== Annotation 55 ====
−	After the initial call for an Earth First! movement had been put out by the ‘founding fathers*, several other groups quickly appeared. Instead of then forming a bureaucratic organisation, the first national gathering of EF! activists in 1981 declared that “There are no members of EF!, there are only EF!ers. EF! is a movement, not an organisation” (quoted in Lee 1997: 122). This declaration was both a (negative) response to the institutionalisation of the ‘Big Ten* US ENGOs and their “statist, bureaucratic models of organisation”. It also (positively) “expressed EF!ers anarchist... desire for dynamic, activist modes of organising” (Daktari 2000:66; cf Lee 1997:122-3).	+	Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by ''mechanical philosophy'', a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.
−	The decentralised model of Earth First! organisation represents not only an expression of the anarchist critique (Foreman quoted in Lee 1997:123), therefore, but also a positive expression of the alternative (anarchist) organisational paradigm (Doherty 2002:188):	+	Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.
−	“The organisation managed to grow and perform an increasing number of well-publicised actions despite its lack of formal leaders, board of directors, permanent administrative staff, official headquarters, membership fees, or any formal code of conduct for its members. The local groups operated in fairly autonomous ways, invoking only the name of Earth First! in the planning and implementation of their actions” (Foreman 1981:42).	+	''Dialectical Materialism'' is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.
−	In terms of internal coordination, decisions which affect the whole movement can be made at the annual gatherings, known as Round River Rendezvous (RRR), but the only centralised institution the movement developed was its <em>Journal (EF!J),</em> Precisely because it was the only centralised institution, the <em>EF! J</em> attracted ideological disputes and power-struggles (Daktari 2000:67; Maenz 2000: 76;	+	By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.
−	Scarce 1990: 89).	+	-----
−	It is not these institutional mechanisms that tie Earth First! together as a movement, however: they are crucial for communication and for Earth First!’s identity, but they do not and cannot contain it The fluid, non-membership, autonomous nature of the organisation is instead unifled by the simple commitment to put the Earth First! (Flyer quoted in Foreman 1981:42). This was not an exclusive ideology in the sense I distinguished from EDA in section 2.3.5, but connected by action. This nondogmatism is displayed by the diversity within the movement:	+	==== Annotation 56 ====
−	“from animal rights vegetarians to wilderness hunting guides, from monkeywrenchers to careful followers of Gandhi, from rowdy backwoods buckaroos to thoughtful philosophers, from misanthropes to humanists - there is agreement on one thing, the need for action!” (EF!US 2000:1).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106.
−	It behoves us to consider what is the place of anarchism in EF!US? Daktari places EF!US squarely within the anarchist tradition and I agree. This does not mean it arose from within the old leftist tradition, however - far from it (Purkis 2001:18). Instead, the history of Earth First! represents another example of anarchism’s tendency to crop up in history whenever new fields of struggle are opened. This is the radicalisation thesis and the hope of anarchism.	+	== II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ==
−	In Chapter 4,1 argued that eco-radicalism was at odds with industrial society, and in the EF!US case it was the biocentric and ecological fundamentalism that gave anarchism a way in: “The EF! movement was bom with an avowed purpose of subverting the dominant anthropocentric paradigm, and promoting a new ecocentric worldview” (Daktari 2000:66; cf Plows 1995:). This made the movement not only oppositional, but radical in an all-encompassing way, providing challenges to the old movements for liberation as well as the conventional mores of society. It does not matter that EF! did not proclaim itself the “anarchist environmental movement” at its inception. Such a label would have been, not only off-putting to most of its potential recruits, but also self-limiting in that it would be accepting an already-established ideology instead of pursuing new avenues of thought.	+	=== 1. Matter ===
−	Anarchism as a theory was not unknown to Earth First!, even at the beginning (Tokar 1988: 134; Daktari 2000: 66), but I agree with Daktari that the anarchism of EF! arose over time through the attitudes and experience of its diverse proponents (2000: 6). Within this activist anarchism, Daktari usefully identifies two different and sometimes opposing strands which define the character of the Earth First! movement: libertarian and communitarian. They “are complexly interwoven in EF!, accounting for much of the movement’s creativity, diversity and dynamism.” The first, libertarian element is expressed through the autonomy of	+	==== a. Category of “Matter” ====
−	“activists taking direct action based on their own situations, issues, interests and desires without authorisation (or even approval) by other EF!ers. On the other hand, EF! is more than a random collage of individuals or actions - it is a collective movement emphasising egalitarian, direct, democratic decision-making and unity in its internal organisation. Communitarian anarchy is displayed in the mutual aid and voluntary cooperation exhibited by affinity groups using consensus process” (Daktari 2000: 68).	+	<br />
		+	''Matter'' is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.
−	In 5.3.8 I shall assess this same dynamic in the case of EF!UK. However, Ritter claims that “Anarchist individuality and community are patently discordant’ (1980:137), and in the case of EF!US, the tension contributed to the ‘great split* of 1990, when the old-guard of radical conservationists sought to re-establish control of the <em>EF!J</em> from a new, more left-leaning generation and ended up leaving the network for pastures new (Maenz 2000:76; Scarce 1990: 89). But the arguments arising from this split resulted in a greater political sophistication and a commitment to anti-capitalism within the Earth First! movement (Bookchin 1991:59), and once this had been achieved then the final obstacle to us seeing EF! as a fully anarchist ecological movement was removed. I will argue that a recognition of the tension or discordance between individuality and community need not lead one to assume that a stale antagonism or exclusion must result Instead, the sense of creative tension I established in Chapters 2 and 4 may lead to many negotiations of the issue, as the practical examples of 5.3.12 will demonstrate.	+	Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were ''metal — wood — water — fire — earth;'' in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were ''Pradhana'' or ''Prakriti''<ref>According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; ''Prakriti'' is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.</ref>'';'' in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were ''water'' (Thales’s<ref>Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.</ref> conception) or ''air'' (Anaximene’s<ref>Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.</ref> conception); Heraclitus<ref>Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.</ref> believed the ultimate element was ''fire;'' Democritus<ref>Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.</ref> asserted that it was something called an “atom,”'''' etc. Even as recently as the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon<ref>Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.</ref>, Renes Descartes<ref>Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.</ref>, Thomas Hobbes<ref>Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.</ref>, Denis Diderot<ref>Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.</ref>, etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.
−	I will now look at how the EF!US model was transplanted to the UK context, and identify similarities and shared characteristics between the US and UK movements. The later sections will work to nuance this comparison, and draw out the particular, unique identity of EF!UK. Here, however, it is helpful to my overall argument to show how the EFIUK network served as a radical (anarchist) reaction to institutionalisation, informed both by critical frustration and positive passion. Themes of politicisation	+	These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.
−	and activist anarchism from 5.2.2 are made concrete, and the hopes of green radicalism from Chapter 4 are given a living form.	+	-----
−	*** 5.3.3 Earth Firstl’s Arrival in the UK Environmental Movement	+	==== Annotation 57 ====
−	“Green bureaucrats move over! The real green movement is on its way!” (Burbridge quoted in Torrance 1999:25).	+	Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:
−	In 5.2.1, we noted that, in the years preceding Earth Firstl’s appearance in the UK, the radical edge of the green movement had evaporated and confrontation seemed a thing of the past (Wall 1999a: 37). Earth First! UK may, like its US cousin, be viewed as a radical reaction to this ENGO institutionalisation (Seel & Plows 2000:117), its creation similarly linked to a frustration with “the unemotional and compromised activities of established green groups” (Burbridge 1994:8; cf Seel & Plows 2000: 117). Earth First! ‘s passionate activism and anti-authoritarian attitude, and its emphasis on autonomous action and participatory non-hierarchical organisation, was fresh and appealing to many environmentalists (Marshall quoted in Wall 1999a: 106; cf Chris Laughton in Wall 1999a: 45). It was thus not a solely instrumental ‘radical flank’ manoeuvre, but was intended to encourage “grassroots direct action” (Seel 1997b: 172) and have a powerful, empowering impact on the personal experiences of environmental activists (Wall 1999a: 107; cf Wood 2001:268; Scarce 1990:55): the theme of 5.2.2. Earth First! UK was formed not only as a negative expression of the anarchist critique of institutionalisation, therefore, but also as a passionate striving for positive anarchist ideals.[71]	+	'''Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”'''
−	Wall uses a critical realist approach to examine which structural influences enabled EF! to form at the time it did, including perceptions of political closure (as embodied by the CJB, see 5.2.3), and such economic factors as an accelerated road building programme and a pool of youth unemployment (1997:17-18). But he recognises that “structural influences ‘do not march in the streets’ or determine the nature of collective action: instead, they provide opportunities that must be consciously exploited” (1999b: 81; cf 1997: 19). Wall uses SM approaches to present useful findings such as that, in the early years, EF!’s ‘No Compromise’ standpoint and militant NVDA tactics were encouraged by both lack of government responsiveness, and also lack of severe state repression” (1999b: 93; cf 1999a: 125-9; 1997: 24). I feel that this language - even though Wall strives to avoid its deterministic implications, is nonetheless inappropriate to the spontaneous, passionate spirit of EF! and fails to capture its anarchistic and anti-authoritarian ethos (Goaman 2002; Purkis 2001: 373). The slogans on the first <em>EFlAUs</em> may supply a corrective by conveying the urgency of the new EF!: ‘No compromise!’ (Nos. 4-6 1993:1); ‘Just do it!’ (No.7 1993:1); ‘Resist much, obey little’ (No.8 1993:1); and ‘Never submit!’ (No.10 1994:3). Although the next decade would see die character of the network - its repertoires and rhetoric - change somewhat, this passionate impetus would not be lost.	+	Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.
−	The aspect of early nineties militant EDA that was most immediately novel and exciting for press commentators, was the use of the name ‘Earth First!’ (Shane Collins in Wall 1999a: 107). EF!US had gained a reputation that not only provided a dramatic story for the papers, but also carried with it the ingredients for alarmist scare-mongering (Dynes & McCarthy 1992). In the early days of Earth First!, it was the name that allowed the scattered radicals in the green diaspora to come together under a common identity (Wall 1997:19). The idea of a definable ‘Earth First!’ organisation, movement or network is problematic, however. Although the label ‘Earth First!’ seems, superficially, to give us a concrete specimen to analyse, it actually stands a critical distance apart from the activities to which it is applied. Issues and queries with the name came up at EF! Gathering after Gathering, and by the time of my involvement, very few groups in the network still used it. Each local group is very different, and the	+	'''Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness'''
−	diversity of the network is demonstrated by the <em>EF!A U</em> including reports and advertisements for a much wider range of groups than the self-proclaimed EFlers: from Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) to ‘Women Speak Out’ and McLibel. In 5.3.9,1 will indicate the breadth of actions and issues supported by the <em>EF!AU<sub>y</sub></em> in 5.3.101 will note the range of networks and workshops at EF! gatherings, and in 5.3.81 will use my experience of EF! to reject notions of a cohesive and bounded EF! identity.	+	Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined ''by'' the material world.
−	The companion point to make about the enthusiasm of disaffected radicals for EF!’s arrival, is the hostility with which the dominant ENGOs reacted: EF! “was regarded... as having the potential to discredit the whole green movement” (Doherty 1998:376). Antagonism from FoE and the established environmental movement was a part of the Earth First! story from the very beginning (Burbridge quoted in Wall 1999a: 51; Vidal 1994b), with FoE expressly forbidding its local groups from working with EF! (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 9; Marshall quoted in Wall 1999a: 122; Snorky the Elf <em>GA</em> 39; Lamb 1996: 9).	+	As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is ''created by'' matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can ''influence'' the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.
−	When FoE bowed down to legal threats at the Twyford Down roads protest, EF!ers and other EDA radicals (with no assets to threaten) stepped in. While they did not ultimately stop the road being built, their struggle changed the UK’s environmental scene. <em>Do or Die</em> proclaimed that “Twyford Down has become a symbol of resistance, a training ground, a life changer and a kick up the arse to the British green movement!” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 17; cf £FMC/No.l3 1995:1), and John Vidal reported that “By not admitting defeat, even when the road was being carved through what Judge Alliot..described as ‘one of Britain’s loveliest places’, the Dongas, groups like Earth First! and others have managed to radicalise many thousands of people into openly defying government” (Vidal 1993).[72] The experience left many EFlers feeling that FoE, which had condemned their actions in the media and to their local groups, had betrayed them (Notts efl 1998; Schnews 1998: No.103; GA 1993[73]). Even when relations became more cordial, some EFlers remained hostile, seeing it as a change in FoE’s strategy “from one of strength to one of weakness” and an attempt “to capitalise on direct action” equivalent to the later ‘vampirism’ of the SWP in the anti-globalisation protests (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 134-135; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 9). The uneasy relationship between Earth First! and FoE is significant in that it draws the line between two different types of organisation, and between two distinct political attitudes (RA! 1998; cf Ream 2004: 6-7).[74] It was not only the organisation and methods of’FoE Ltd’ (B 1998; cf GA 1993:) that received the institutionalisation critique (see 5.2.1), but also the media-centric and non- participatory (elitist) direct action of Greenpeace (Seel 1999:310-311; Seel 1997a: 121-122; Ream 2004:6-7; Steve 2001).	+	As Lenin explains in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'': “Consciousness in general ''reflects'' being—that is a general principle of ''all'' materialism... social consciousness ''reflects'' social being.”
−	SDEFl’s public message to Greenpeace spells out the difference between ‘revolutionary’ and ‘reformist’ EDA most clearly from an anarchist perspective: see Figure 5.2	+	Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the ''nature'' of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of ''Dialectics of Nature'':
−	“At Gorleben today, over three thousand unarmed people faced fifteen thousand heavily armed riot police, tear gas and water cannons. They were trying to stop a radioactive waste shipment being delivered...	+	<blockquote>
		+	That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Today three thousand people resisted. Three thousand people stood up and attempted to stop the invasion of the radioactive state machine. They came from different backgrounds, local farmers, eco-anarchist revolutionaries, green party activists, old ladies with handbags, doctors, teachers, whole flocks of schoolkids. What united this disparate crowd?... their desire for a viable future...	+	Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.
−	These people were not looking for a fight: people whose prime motive is fighting will pick on groups smaller than themselves, and avoid situations where they are heavily outnumbered or outgunned. These people were there to save the earth.	+	-----
−	We saw on the TV...men and women savagely beaten... Then as the death convoy rolled past we saw one of the women leaning against a tree, her body racked with sobs. We have been in similar situations, we have a good idea of what was in her mind. It’s the emotional devastation caused by overwhelming mindless brute force. Immediately after this a spokeswoman for Greenpeace appeared and stated that you ‘condemn the violence of the protestors*.	+	As Marx explains in ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
−	What makes you think that you have the right to pass judgement on these people?... The nearest the vast majority of your workers get to a real ecological struggle is their fax machine...Even the minute proportion of your employees who are allowed to take direct action (i.e. your Direct Action Unit and your ships crews) have been subjected to near tyrannical control -we know this from personal communication.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Unfortunately, many millions of people set great store by what you say. Stop abusing your position and start supporting the very few people who are making a genuine effort to stop the destruction of our planet”	+	Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
−	][Figure 5.2 SDEF! open letter to Greenpeace UK 8.5.96 (<em>EF!AUNq.ZI</em> 1996:3).	+	<blockquote>
		+	Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis
		+	</blockquote>
−	Here we are provided with EF! use of the traditional anarchist revolutionary themes of mass, participatory, unincorporated grassroots action, engaged in direct struggle with the state. Yet to only contrast EFIUK to its NGO equivalents runs the risk of drawing a too simplistic anarchist identity for the network. By contrast, as an activist rather than an ideological anarchist network, EFIUK is a site of many influences, where many traditions meet, merge and conflict. It is to this mix of political influences that I will turn in 5.3.4, and I will relate them to the broad and mixed strategies, repertoires and issues engaged by EFIUK in 5.3.5.1 will then return to the ecological identity of EFIUK in 5.3.6 by emphasising the holistic practices of its activists, and conclude in 5.3.7, by interrogating more directly the notion of revolution in EFIUK.	+	Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as ''social being'', which stood in contrast with human society’s ''social consciousness.'' Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.
−	*** 5.3.4 Political Influences	+	As Lenin wrote in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'':
−	In the early years, EF1US was the key influence on EFIUK (Seel & Plows 2000: 127; cf Purkis 1996: 199).[75] It is for this reason that I have presented its keynote themes in 5.3.2, and matched them with the UK context in 5.3.3. EF1US was not the only influence, however, and in this section, I shall introduce the contributions of peace, animal rights and anarchist traditions. Furthermore, although EFIUK adopted much of the rhetoric and form of the EF1US movement, it was always more socially- oriented: “Whereas early Earth First! activists in the USA emphasised their non-revolutionary positions, their direct action campaign focusing on simply preserving the American wilderness, in Britain, Earth First! is fundamentally more radical, more located in a wider context of social criticism” (McKay 1996a: 200; cf Purkis 2001:299; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000:46-7). Purkis, Plows and Seel agree that EFIUK’s worldview relates better with the social ecology viewpoint of Murray Bookchin than with the deep ecology associated with EFlUS’s founders (Purkis 1996:205; 1995: 12-13; Plows 1998: 154; Seel 1997b: 173; Seel & Plows 2000: 114; Goaman 2002: 226), although deep ecological statements may still occasionally be found within the EFIUK network (My notes, EF! Moot debate 2003; Purkis 2001:237; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000:46-47).[76] One reason for this is the lack of any real ‘wilderness’ in the UK (Purkis 1995: 6), but another reason comes from the background of many UK EFIers in the peace movement and other socially-concerned causes. Wall traces some of these influences: “Feminists who brought with them the experience of Greenham sought to introduce social goals to EF! (UK)’s diagnostic frame, as did militants influenced by anarchism” (Wall 1999a: 145; cf ACF cl991:38).	+	<blockquote>
		+	Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.
		+	</blockquote>
−	I will leave until 5.3.8, a consideration of EFlUK’s engagement with “the lessons and legacy of the womens liberation movement”, which Purkis states are “internalised if not always openly acknowledged” (2001:317). I will also leave untouched the ‘ lesser claims’ for influences from indigenous (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:2), or indeed situationist legacies (Purkis 2001: 150; ‘68RPM* <em>Schnews</em> 1999: np). To focus on the anarchist, however, Purkis emphasises that “EF!’s way of organising itself	+	Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between ''social being'' and ''social consciousness''. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.
−	&&&and its non-hierarchical and non-violent ethos owes much to the co-operative tradition within the anarchist movement” (2001:154; cf Seel & Plows 2000: 116).[77] Explicit anarchist links are evident in the <em>EF!AU</em>from 1994, when issue 12 advertised the ‘Anarchy in the UK’ festival (No. 12 1994:3), and from issue 37*s announcement of an EF! stall at the Anarchist Bookfair (No.32 1996:2)[78]: the links are manifest in <em>Do or Die</em> from 1992 (No.l 1992: 9). We can note with Seel and Plows note that “an increasingly articulated form of anarchism has emerged alongside an anarchism of the deed” (Seel & Plows 2000: 130). There are also, however, variations within this articulated anarchism, with primitivist notions particularly advertised by the Leeds collective who edited the <em>EF!A U</em> before we in Newcastle did (1999-2000[79]), and more traditional class-struggle themes expressed by the Norwich collective who followed us (2001-2002). With their first edition the Norwich collective identified EF! as anticapitalist and wished a “Happy New Year to all those involved in workers* struggle” (<em>EF!AU</em> No.73 2001:1-2).	+	-----
−	Doherty records that “Ecological direct action groups such as Earth First! often work with anarchist groups that are not necessarily committed to ecological goals” (2002: 9; Plows 2006:464-465). These groups criticise EF! for not putting class at the forefront of their critique (ACF c 1991: 38; AF 1996a: 15; Young 2001: 5), but nonetheless “suggest that readers get in contact with their local Earth First! group ... and get involved with what is already going on” (AF 1999a: 9). This demonstrates a practical tie of solidarity and sympathy based on action, more significant than the ideological differences and debates which, given the strong hostility to ecological currents on the part of classstruggle anarchists (as evidenced in webforums such as urban75 and enrager.net) prove much less fruitful and, I would argue, partake less of the spirit of anarchism.	+	These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.
−	Despite strong (and somewhat unrepresentative) voices of ideological anarchist and revolutionary rhetoric, EF! remains most anarchist in the little ways: in the methods, relationships and experiences of an activism that does not ask permission or follow a well-marked path, but follows its own impulses and gives practical outcome to its ideals. At Twyford, for example, the protesters learnt their methods of protest as they went along, in “equal measures of impulsiveness, innocence and action” (McKay 1996:134). It is the methods brought to the environmental cause that are definitive of EF!UK, and which are the central focus of my study, and so it is to these that I turn in the next section.	+	-----
−	It is arguable that, when it comes to EF!UK’s tactics and strategy, more influential than either EF!US or traditional anarchist groups were the peace movement (Seel 1997b: 174; cf ACF cl991: 38; Purkis 2001:258), and the animal liberation movement (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 13). The first action under the Earth First! banner, for example, drew on the peace and anti-nuclear tradition for its target; its participants; and its NVDA tactics (Jason Torrance, quoted in Wall 1999:46). Non-violence (the key discourse for the peace movement, as I shall discuss in 6.3.4) is included in the definition of the network presented by many EF!ers (<em>EF!AUNo.3</em> 1992:5; Purkis 2001: 57; SDEF! 1994), and the <em>EFIA U</em> features repeated advertisements for NVDA training, commonly led by peace movement activists (No.5 1993: 2; No.13 1995:2; No.43 1997:2; No.69 2000). Yet the range of repertoires I list in 5.3.5 includes many drawn from the animal rights tradition.	+	==== Annotation 58 ====
−	I concluded the previous chapter by noting that most tensions in direct action movement rotate around strategy rather than ideology. For example, while the EF!US and animal liberation movements supported covert sabotage (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:2), “activists drawn from peace networks were uneasy about the use of covert repertoires” (Seel & Plows 2000:127). As Wall notes, “Ideological disputes, where they have occurred [ in EF!UK ]... have focussed on the nature of direct action and organisational questions” (1997:21). The tension between NVDA and ‘physically effective’ repertoires of animal rights activism will later come to the fore in the debates which we shall assess in 5.3.7 and 6.5.3.1 will now present a survey of EF!UK’s repertoires, and in doing so will develop our understanding of how different traditions of activism inform different repertoire styles. The activist	+	Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:'' “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”
−	anarchism of my thesis is not a textbook model, but is a product of these tensions, cross-fertilisations and experimentations.	+	''Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.''
−	*** 5.3.5 Strategy, Protest Repertoires and Issue Range	+	In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:
−	In 1994, Jake Burbridge defined the objectives of EF! as (1) to halt destruction, (2) to attack bad companies, and (3) to educate people (EFlers included) (1994; <em>EF!AUNo3</em> 1992:5). The strategic message of EF1UK was the same as its American predecessor: “no compromise, no argument, just stop” (TMEF! 1998; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1993a: inside cover). Earth First! would use all the tools in the toolbox, but most significantly NVDA, to defend the environment from a position of no compromise: “For example, when other green groups respond to a new road project by coming up with an alternative route or tunnel, we campaign for no road at all. When other groups have backed down to court injunctions or police threats, we refuse to be intimidated into inaction” (SDEF! 1994). As in the US, Earth First! intended to provide a radical flank for the British environmental scene: both to counter the prevailing institutionalisation and deradicalisation of ENGOs, and to make their reforming efforts more effective (Seel & Plows 2000:117-119; Purkis 1995: 8; GA 1993:). In 5.3.3, however, I emphasised that EF!UK also wanted to provide a participatory and non-institutional network for activists (Wall 1999a: 107), and Seel & Plows accept that “Since the early 1990s, EF! activists have become much more concerned with the development of their own movement rather than being primarily concerned with how their activities influence EMOs” (2000:118). My own experience supports this view, and the assessment of organisational debates in 5.3.12 will chart the development and articulation of this concern.	+	<blockquote>
		+	We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.
		+	</blockquote>
−	In the previous section we noted that different milieus, traditions and historical movements informed the EF! repertoire (Carter 1973:24; cf Zinn 1997:622; Jasper 1999:245). The womens peace camp at Greenham in the 1980s, for example, extended these repertoires with camps, blockades and sabotage (Roseneil 1995: 172): all tactics which were utilised and adapted by the EDA of the nineties. Amongst the numerous tactical innovations developed during the anti-roads movement, we can track the development of tree-sitting tactics from the Cradlewell protest in Newcastle in 1993 (Little Weed 1994:5); to a habitable treehouse at Georges Green in the No Ml 1 campaign; to an entire tree village at Stanworth Valley (Evans 1998:50-65); and then taken below the ground with tunnels at Ashton Court and the A30 camps (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 15). As a participant at the Cradle well wrote:	+	Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:
−	“Lots of people got together at the Dene, from Newcastle to Twyford to London, as far as Finland and New Zealand. We’ve learned a lot of useful lessons in fighting the likes of the DoT and the security firms and the local council bureaucrats. And what we’ve learnt will spread out to other road and environmental protests: from direct action, to legal stuff to hammock building, to face-painting, it just gets bigger and bigger” (Little Weed 1994:9).	+	<blockquote>
		+	To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Many different repertoires of action have been used and promoted within Earth First!, from disruptive action aimed at increasing the economic costs of projects, to more symbolic acts of NVDA.[80] There is a general pragmatism about using whatever tactic appears most suitable to the given situation (although each local group tends toward its own preferred methods and styles). Good assessments of the repertoires of EF!UK are provided by Purkis (1996:202; 2001:299-307), Seel (1997b: 174) and Plows (1998: 154; cf Seel and Plows 2000: 114-127). Seel, for example, argues that EF!UK deploys confrontational, obstructive showdowns “which try to show where power lies, whose interests it is being used in, and what is passing for ‘progress’ or ‘development’” (Seel 1997b: 174; cf Plows 1997: 4; Chesters 2000b: 7). Purkis focuses on the manner in which EF! temporarily colonises “private or capitalist space” (2001:299), reaching the public in “the veiy places that are normally conceived of as safe from political agitation. The superstore, the hypermarket, banks, indeed the very places ... designed to put people at ease for the purposes of spending more money - become sites ripe for symbolic attention” (2001: 302). I accept and appreciate this evaluation, yet it is difficult to convey the sheer diversity of the methods and styles of EDA in such a short academic summation: indeed there is a tendency to ‘overcharacterise’ and neaten a more messy reality. Instead of repeating such an approach I will here present some of the repertoires featured in the <em>EF!AU</em> in order to (1) express something of the range of methods and issues used and approved by EF1UK, and (2) to collapse any notions of boundaries between the different labels we apply to such repertoires: I shall argue that all tactics are interchangeable and can merge into each other.[81] It is the ethics and the energy that count.	+	A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,” a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.
−	The most common and proudly reported repertoires are (1) blockades and acts of stopping work; (2) occupations and camps; (3) critical masses and street parties; (4) disruptions of AGMs, corporate recruitment fairs and official ceremonies, and (5) acts of sabotage, particularly with the trashing of GM plants which I assess in section 6.4. Yet the diversity within these broad labels is astonishing, and each method can be utilised in a different style, according to a different strategy and political discourse (as I considered in 5.5). Sometimes, for example, lock-ons are done to get the attention of top management (£F/J£7No.l0 1994:7), or to make information public (<em>EFlAU’HoA</em> 1 1994:3), thus representing liberal rather than anarchist action (cf Seel & Plows 2000:119; Purkis 1996:199) in the distinction which I shall establish in section 6.2.	+	<blockquote>
		+	It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.
		+	</blockquote>
−	We should not confuse the radicalism of EF! with a purist approach to methods.[82] Conventional campaigning methods such as letter writing and seeking to afreet parliamentary and other governmental decisions are also employed (£F7/lt/No.2 1992:7; No.58 1999: 7): indeed an early <em>EF!AU</em>report describes complaining to the advertising standards agency as ‘paper monkeywrenching’ (No.5 1993; 2; cf No.65 2000:2). Yet the lobbying involved need not be respectful or take place through the expected channels. When the <em>EF!AU</em> provides the details of how to ‘Fax your MP’ (No.77 2001:2), for example, it could equally be interpreted in terms of the pestering tactics more usually associated with the animal rights movement These can include pestering by phone (No. 15 1995: 3); mounting electronic blockades (No.68 2000:2); ordering unwanted junk and generating other nuisances, such as placing the offender’s name on mock prostitute calling cards (No.29 1996: 2; cf <em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2001:220).[83]	+	In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).
−	Applying divisions and categories to EF! repertoires misses the fluidity, diversity and spontaneity involved. Walks along proposed road routes (<em>EF!AU</em>No. 16 1995:3) can serve to encourage an attachment to the area, or to develop a practical knowledge of the geography to aid future actions; processions through towns can sometimes develop into road blockading (No. 17 1995: 3); mass trespasses can feature both picnics (No.l 1 1994: 6; No. 15 1995:2) and sabotage. Occupations can be temporary takeovers of corporate offices to send a message of outrage or solidarity, but they can also be used for practical information-gathering or feature additional forms of obstruction or sabotage - billed as “fim with computers” in one <em>EF!AU</em>guide (No.57 1999:5). Other occupations stand as attempts at community take-overs of disused buildings (No.57 1999:7), and these merge into proactive attempts at realising ecological and communal habitations (see 5.3.6). Seel and Plows note that EF!UK uses both material and consciousness-changing strategies (2000:115), but sometimes the tactics most clearly aimed at ‘consciousness-changing* involve the most physically destructive actions, for example with the ‘subvertising* of billboards (No.59 1999:2; No.68 2000:2; No.87 2002: 3; cf <em>Do</em> <em>or Die</em> 1992: 13), the stickering of polluting cars (No.70 2000:2), sabotage and graffiti (No.59 1999: <em>4;</em> No.78 2001:2; No.79 2001: 7). I consider the issues that arise for anarchists with regard to physically destructive repertoires in Chapter 6.	+	Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “''modern materialism'', which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible ''middle party'' in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”
−	One of the great energies of EF1UK was provided by the cross-fertilisation of tactics and repertoires from one issue to another, and the linking of issues into an inter-related and ‘multi-issue* form of protest culture (Plows 1997:4-5; Seel & Plows 2000:114; <em>Schnews</em> 1997 No. 100). Of the issues most regularly covered in the <em>EF!AU</em>[84] reports of roads and other anti-development actions (against houses, quarries, pylons, out of town shopping centres etc) are, as might be expected, the most common and consistent. More surprisingly, perhaps, the next most regularly featured issue is anti-nuclear protest, reported in almost two thirds of the editions from No.5 in 1993 to No.83 in 2002. In descending order, the next most regular issues for which actions and advertisements are covered, were oil; animal rights including hunts, live exports and circus demos, but most commonly HLS and ALF actions; the arms trade; McDonalds; and asylum seekers and refugees (from 1995 onwards). Solidarity with other communities across the globe extended from the Phillippines to Colombia, demonstrating a marked consciousness of the global south.	+	Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.”
−	Of particular interest to our consideration of the social concerns of EF1UK, we find reports of anti- discriminatory direct action on all conceivable areas. There are reports of women’s only camps and actions (notably in the peace movement) and the inclusion of declaredly feminist networks such as CAAT Womens Network, Women Speak Out and Womens Global Strike (Nos. 66,75,76, 77,78). There are anti-racist and anti-fascist reports (Nos. 6,55,74,75,78,79), actions by Direct Action Network (DAN) and others on disabled rights (Nos. 8,74,75); lesbian and gay actions (Nos. 66,67, 71; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 1994:4), with the formation of the ‘!eco-faeries! Network’ “to directly challenge homophobia and also to target queer capitalists” (No.62 1999:2); Mad Pride is reported in issues 68 and 70 in 2000; a pensioners blockade in No.76 (2001); and solidarity with asylum seekers and refugees is reported in 16 issues from 1995 (when Group 4, of Twyford fame, were awarded the contract for guarding asylum seekers (No.20 1995:5)) to 2002. In <em>TGAL,</em> the concern for non- environmental focuses was even more manifest over 90% of issues featured a report, article or action point on asylum seekers or human rights. <em>TGAL</em> also paid greater attention to other ‘social* issues such as empty homes (No.26 1999: 8), school meals (No.32 2000: 1), child poverty (No.60 2003: 8) and social exclusion (No.51 2002:6); as well as support for any strike or workers* dispute in the North East, and opposition to many profit-driven developments involving destruction of green space or existing communities/ community resources. In this <em>TGAL</em> is similar to other regional newsletters such as Oxyacetalene (Oxford), Loombreaker (Manchester) and Porkbolter (Worthing) in coveraging a broad range of local issues and social discontent	+	In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.
−	Returning to the <em>EFIA</em>IZ: reports of actions on some campaigns are not even over the period. The first few issues are dominated by actions on rainforest timber (Nos. 1-17 1991-1995): this was the first issue focus for EFIUK as Wall has documented (1999:51-53; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2003:7), but it did not persist as the main focus. There were ten reports of Lamb - the Lloyds and Midland banks Boycott - from 1994 to 1996, and it is listed as a local contact (£FL4l/No.8 1993:4; £FML/No.35 1997: 8), but there is nothing after 1997. Similarly, the peat campaign that I assess in section 6.5 garnered many reports in 2001, anti-GM actions dominated from 1999 until 2003, and antiwar protests dominated during the early months of the second gulf war. Other topics only make a brief or even single appearance, such as solidarity with skateboarders (£F/Jt/No.75 2001: 8) or the right to be naked (<em>EF!AU</em>No.66 2000: 8). Some developments signal responses to new technology: GM crops from 1995, human genetics from 1999, and more recently nanotechnology. Some indicate responses to state developments, such as new legislation, environmental policies and involvement in international warfare. Other changes signal developments from within protest culture itself, from innovations in camp defence to shifts in political colour: at the 2000 Summer Gathering, for example, several EFlers pledged to make anti-racism and anti-fascism a higher priority (<em>EF!AU</em>No.70 2000: 3).	+	The development of natural sciences in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen<ref>Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.</ref>, Becquerel<ref>Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.</ref>, Thomson<ref>Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.</ref> etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.
−	There is a definite shift around 1995 and 1996 towards a broader, more socially concerned outlook, demonstrated by the introduction of reports on toxics and anti-pollution; the benefits system and Poll Tax; and, most clearly, solidarity with workers’ struggles. The first factory strike report is included in the ‘News in Brief column in issue 23 (1995-1996:2),the same issue as the Liverpool dockers’ strike is supported, with a note of the dockers’ “long history of supporting other campaigns” (1995-1996:4). The next issue follows up the story with a ‘support strike’ (No.24 1996:3) and in 7.2, we shall see the ongoing links that developed between London RTS and the dockers?[85] EF! “articulated an increasingly systemic critique”, identifying “capitalism itself where, in the early 1990s, they were more likely to communicate about particular issues” (Seel & Plows 2000: 127; cf Kingsnorth 2001: 46; <em>Freedom</em> 19.10.2002:6). This was particularly evident at the 1998 Summer Gathering, with discussions on whether the various EF! targets could “be united under the banner of capitalism, patriarchy, civilisation, the State or some other definition?” (Summer Gathering Programme 1998:8). The 1999 gathering continued this discussion with a total of eight debriefs on the JI 8 ‘carnival against capitalism’, including the question “Is capitalism really the heart of the beast? Does focussing on it simplify our analysis of what it is that is really oppressing us”? (Summer Gathering Programme 1999: 5). I myself will argue that it does indeed mark a simplification in 7.5, and the 2003 Summer Gathering saw some EFlers launch a concerted appeal to “return to an ecological perspective” (sg2003 list 16.1.2003, 16.2.2003, 13.3.2003; Plows 2006:463), evidenced by the <em>EF!AU</em>from 2003 onwards. From this point, however, I consider the <em>EFlAUto</em> have lost the representative and movement- grounded character that I advocate for it in 5.3.9. Here, I wish to focus on the ecological roots that have always underlain EF1UK, to distinguish it from other narrowly ‘political’ networks by reinserting its protest direct action into a more holistic frame.	+	-----
−	*** 5.3.6 Anticonsumerism and Positive Action	+	==== Annotation 59 ====
−	In this section I will look at the holistic and lifestyle aspect of EF! and EDA, and I will follow this in the next section by arguing that a revolutionary characterisation still applies to EF! activism. The pursuit of more positive and non-protest forms of action is one broad area of Earth First! activism, often neglected because it is conducted not in the EF! name (Seel 1997b: 176-7; £F/JC/No.l6 1995:2).[86] One outgrowth from the protest camps of the anti-roads movement is the development of ecological settlements (Seel & Plows 2000: 120; Summer Gathering Programme 1999: 8), and this is a route that one of the founding TAPPers took, along with two Newbury veterans who had previously been the Newcastle EF! contacts. EF!ers also encourage each other to take a break from the strain of campaigning and take part in positive solutions: “We need to recognise that we can help to actively heal the earth, as well as carrying out the essential work of stopping business and governments from wounding it further” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993a: 2). Non-protest ecological direct action deployed by EF! activists (and consistently advertised within EF! circles) includes reforestation projects, community gardens, festivals (green and/or free), environmental education and permaculture. Articles on ecological restoration and guerrilla gardening, for example, are featured in 7 out of the 10 issues of Do <em>or Die.</em> Figure 5.3 illustrates this facet of EF! activism:	+	Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:
−	][Figure 5.3 ‘Even if... I would plant a tree today’ i <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 153).
−	EDA activists provide a living critique of contemporary norms o’consumerism, rejecting much of what most citizens consider essential for life as ‘tat*[87] (Keith Johnson in <em>EF!AU</em> No.3 1992: 4). DIY culture’s “disdain for consumerism” was claimed as one of its most politically radical and effective dimensions (Jay Griffiths quoted in Grant 1995: PAGE; <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No.45), especially as it was undertaken in a celebratory rather than a moralistic way (IE 2005: 18; cf Heller iC] 1999: 23; Epstein 1991: 210 !. The anti-roads protest camps displayed public and collective challenges to consumerism and demonstrated, in Seel’s phrase, the “positive abolition of private property” (Seel 1997a: 115). Seel notes that “EF! activists’ personal and community-based attempts to realise a sustainable and ethical lifestyle are based around anti-consumerism rather than just green or ethical consumption” (1997b; 172; Scarce 1990: 6; Marshall 1992b: 347). Anti-consumerism asks much bigger questions than green or ethical consumerism, and represents a radical politics, certainly on the micro-level i <em>Do or Die</em> 1998: 17; London Greenpeace c!999d). As anti-political anarchists refuse to vote, so radical ecologists refuse to consume. In both cases, this refusal represents an assertion of autonomy and a refusal to accept either the limits imposed i vote for choice A or choice B i, or the work-consume-die ethic.[88] It is sometimes augmented by practices of ‘self-actualisation’, such as learning new skills, to reduce EF!ers “amount of dependency on the formal economy” (Purkis 2001: 249) (foraging skills, for example, have been taught at successive summer gatherings).	+	<blockquote>
		+	We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Purkis notes that anti-consumerists, by “challenging contemporary consumer society” (2001: 294), are attacking “capitalism’s alter ego ... as a means to try to create a better society” (2000: 100-104 ».	+	Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:
−	Commentators who criticise such ‘lifestyle commitments’ as a “distraction from green political activity” misunderstand the nature o: holistic ecological politics (Wall 1997: 25; cf Purkis 2001: 294). As Plows argues, “Individual actions - boycotting products, living on the land, growing organic vegetables, cycling, recycling - are seen as complementary direct action, and ... interdependent strategies” (1998: 164; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1998: 158).	+	<blockquote>
		+	The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Plows argues that EF! transcends the redundant dualisms of red versus green, individual versus collective strategies, and values versus stmcture. I he material and the ideological, physical and	+	With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:
−	<br>	+	''“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”''
−	consciousness-raising are interrelated (1997:3-6). Purkis thus urges that when the holistic, anticonsumerist “sensibility is linked to direct action, it is possible to see a dual type of resistance - both symbolic and economic — to the prevailing economic and political culture” (1996:204; 1995:11). Plows also argues, and I concur, that EDA, like all anarchist movements, transcends the old Marxist collective-individual “dualism: the emphasis is on individual responsibility (‘Do it Yourself!... If not you, who?’) within a framework of collective direct action” (1997:6). This is a central reason why we should view EDA as an expression of anarchism. Anarchist advocates of direct action have always emphasised that one’s self should lie at the centre of collective processes (Pouget 2003: 3), and indeed that direct action should be prompted by self-interest (Franks 2001:24; Heller 1999 [C]: 100; IE 2005: 16; Ruins 2003:16; Maybe 2000:20).	+	Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:
−	As I emphasised in 2.2.2 that anarchists are both self-centred and fully social, and that there is no contradiction in anarchist action between self-centredness and practical social change, so I argue here that the environmental direct action movement is a form of both ‘life politics’ and ‘emancipatoiy politics’ (Giddens 1991). It is self-reflective and concerned with lifestyle, but it also seeks to produce a liberatory politics that overturns the exploitation and oppression ingrained in existing society (<em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003:29; Whitworth 1999: 9; Bookchin 1971:218; Heller 1999 [C]: 1; Szerszynski 1998; Plows 1998b: 32; Seel 1997a; Heller [C] 1999:2). The practice and analysis of TAPP support the conclusion that contemporary EDA constitutes both nonmaterial and material strategies (Thornton 1999:6). This is a more crucial re-evaluation than just ‘adding’ material and moral rationales: it must be recognised that the two are intimately interlinked and this is the ‘special power’ of direct action, and of anarchism.	+	''First,'' we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).
−	In the next section we will see that EF! activist anarchism successfully and routinely contradicts and collapses another similar, but slightly different dualism. Direct action transcends the “dichotomy between instrumental and expressive orientations” (Roseneil 1995:98), and activists may view self- actualisation and empowerment as part of the same struggle. As McCalla phrases it, “the goal of the process of discovery is transformation (self and societal) as much as understanding” (1989:47). Unfortunately, where this theme of self-transformation is covered in SM literature, it is often reduced to a ‘moralism’ far divorced from the anarchist project of revolutionary social change (Epstein; Shephard?) and strongly critiqued within the anarchist tradition (<em>CW</em> 1997: 12; Jonathan X 2000: 163; IE 2005: 8; <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 155; Begg 1991:6). EF! has contributed through its anarchist qualities, to the dissolution of false dualities such as those between instrumental and expressive action, idealism and realism, and reform and revolution. In the next section I will interrogate this hypothesis further, and assess EFIUK’s ‘success’ in the anarchist, revolutionary terms established in Chapter 5.	+	''Second,'' the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is ''objective existence,'' meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.
−	*** 5.3.7 Success and Revolution	+	''Third,'' matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.
−	This section will build on the sense of’radical reformism’ I established in 4.3.4, and the radicalisation outlined in 5.2.2, to assess how EF! combines pragmatisim with revolutionary aims. We shall see that the direct action idealism explored in this chapter achieved some remarkable successes, but that revolutionary ideals require revolutionary measure of successs, so the easy gauges of success, such as media reflection or economic costs, are insufficient	+	Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.
−	Purkis argues that Earth First! successfully combines reformist and revolutionary impulses: “although EF! are being idealistic in their long term vision of a society adhering to some of the principles of Social Ecology, in their day to day activism they show a pragmatism and a reflexivity of purpose as to what is feasible” (1996: 212; cf 1995: 10; Plows 1998:157-158). The strategy of not playing the game acts as both an indicator for the vision of a society which EF!-ers actually want, and also as a position from which to argue and negotiate. By avoiding negotiation and compromise EF! managed to act as a competent pressure group without backing down on their revolutionary principles (Wall 1997:22;	+	''First,'' by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.
−	Purkis 1995: 7).[89] This is the attitude that EF! feel has gained, not just their own limited successes, but	+	''Second,'' by asserting that matter was ''“objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,”'' and “''copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,”'' Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88''] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].
−	also all the achievements of the past, from the provision of allotments to the right to form trade unions; “So you fight for revolution, and if you lose you get reforms, if you win you get revolution. Revolution is extremely unlikely but it is the only thing that is realistic” (My notes, GVGS 1998, also Jeff 1998; cf Plows 1998: 172; Seel 1997a: 128). This fits the characterisation of anarchist revolution presented in 4.3.4, and allows us to view the revolutionary intent present in the eminently <em>practical</em> character of contemporary EDA.	+	==== b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter ====
−	What EF!UK contributed to the traditional anarchist intention of rousing the masses into direct action, was the replacement of class solidarity as the mobilising chord, with “‘militant particularisms’ based on cherished landscapes” (Wall 1997:25; cf Featherstone 1998:24; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:66). EF! UK “succeeded in working with very diverse groups including hedonistic dance cultures, middle-class conservationists and radical trade unionists (Wall 1999a: 8), and thousands of’ordinary’ people took to direct action as their preferred method of campaigning in the nineties. There are signs that Earth First! gained a greater legitimacy for direct action (Wall 1997:23; 1999b: 9), and in the early nineties the NVDA tactics pursued by EF! proved an inspiration, allowing a militant green rhetoric to be heard and encouraging greater involvement and support for NVDA, particularly from Greenpeace, the Green Party and Friends of the Earth (Marshall quoted in Wall 1999: 156; <em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 50; Welsh 1996: 28). Many of the anarchist criteria for success were thus achieved by EF!UK, demonstrated both in the number of people for whom the tactics gained a resonance, and in the way in which these tactics were used to raise fundamental issues about the status quo (Purkis 2000: 94).	+	According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''motion'' is the mode of existence of matter; ''space'' and ''time'' are the forms of existence of matter.
−	A contributor to <em>Do or Die</em> proclaims their success in anarchist terms:	+	-----
−	“A great saying runs: Mankind marches to annihilation under the banner of realism’ - we must resist the weasel words of’realism’ at all costs- after all, it was a ‘realistic’ attitude... that led FoE to abandon Twyford Down, and that leads people into passivity and defeatism on nearly every occasion. Some pride in our achievement is warranted here - we have given many people in the UK — and especially within the environmental movement - a concrete illustration that direct action works and produces results. This is an antidote to the prevailing attitude of powerlessness and hopelessness that keeps people down and the planet under attack” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995:94).	+	==== Annotation 60 ====
−	This was the success of passion over dry strategising, of confrontation over negotiation, of grassroots agitation over elite negotiation, of direct action over following ‘the accepted channels’, and of’having a go’ over everyday disempowerment.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the ''mode'' of circulation refers to ''how'' commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; ''mode'' of production refers to ''how'' commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to ''how'' matter exists in our universe.
−	EF!’s success should not just be measured in liberal, instrumental or single issue terms, but according to its broader, anarchist aims. EF!UK is not just a militant pressure group for wilderness, but committed to “radical social change to reverse, stop and ultimately overthrow the forces that are destroying the planet and its inhabitants” (EFWP 1998; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2003: 38). Indeed Ben Seel argues that Earth First! represents an “embryonic counter-hegemony”, and is “perhaps the only part of the wider green movement today which asks questions of systemic rather than just reform-oriented scope” (1997b: 178; cf Purkis 1996:203; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:37; Plows & Seel 2000:127). <em>Do or Die</em> recalls that “A consensus in plenary at the 1997 EF! Gathering was that we saw ourselves as an ecological revolutionary network” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:38) and, whether or not this was true before, my experience confirms that it has remained so since.	+	Form comes from the category pair [see ''Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Jasper has noted “how tricky definitions of success are” (Jasper 1999:295), and this is especially true in the case of anarchism. By looking at the meaning of success for EF!, we can gain a greater understanding of what makes anarchist standards and guides for action distinct (Welsh 2000: 180; Bonanno 1998: 5). This builds on the difference between a conventional top-down (liberal) approach and the alternative anarchist approach laid out in Chapter 3. Anarchists are opposed to conventional notions of’success’, such as gaining government ‘protection’. Environmentalists have also recognised that such ‘protection’ proves not a permanent but a very temporary victory that can be overturned at any time (Dix 2004:22-23; Lutzenberger quoted in Dowie 1995: 174). Indeed some state-centric terms of success may be viewed by anarchists as the opposite: as signs of failure, of cooption and the loss of revolutionary opposition (Adilkno 1994: 83): we introduced this theme in section 4.3.3 and developed it in the presentation of the institutionalisation thesis in 5.2.2.	+	''- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter''
−	Anarchists suspect easy measures of’success’. For instance, “In authoritarian groups like the SWP success is measured almost purely on recruitment to the party or paper-sales. For the rest of us, the effects of our efforts are more hidden”, and Class War warn against the consequent “temptation to see our reflection in the media as a guide to our success” (<em>CW</em> 1997:9; cf Franks 2003:30; WWMM 1997). The easiest means of gauging EF! success, such as media reportage (“Today’s 18 year olds were 12 when Twyford burst onto the screens. Almost their entire understanding of resistance and social conflict comes from watching us and our mates on telly” (WPH 1998:2)), or economic costs, (Twyford was “so successful that Tarmac construction spends just under a quarter of a million a week on security to combat it, and the DoT employs a private detective firm to find out who activists are” (Eldrum 1993: 15; cf Roseneil 1995:170; <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No.23)), are therefore insufficient from an anarchist perspective. This is because the anarchist standard of success is much higher: indeed from the revolutionary perspective there is no ‘success’ until the war is won and the whole world changed (<em>CW</em> 1997:9; McCalla 1989: 53; Grassby 2002:144). One EFIer uses this lofty perspective to lament that EDA is “marginalised, ghettoised, stuck in a rut and no more than a minor irritant to global capitalism” (B 1999).[90]	+	As Friedrich Engels explained: ''“Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”''
−	The counterbalance to these faulty notions of success (and a negative, ‘purist’ repudiation of them), may be found in the consistent ability of direct action to produce unintended and important consequences (Welsh 2000:153). Various of the facets of’radicalisation’ that I detailed in section 5.2.2 may be seen in this manner, including the development and legitimation of alternative critiques of power and organisation. ‘Success’ on anarchist terms may thus include the symbolic undermining of the authority of state- and science-backed ‘expert’ discourses (Welsh 2000: 202; Epstein 1991:10-15), changing “public perceptions about risks, encouraging further challenges to authority and scepticism about the interests of government and business” (Doherty 2002:207; cf Wall, Doherty & Plows 2002: 2). This relates to the wider purpose of such movements to challenge the way people view the existing way of life (Doherty 1998:73; Grove-White 1992:10-11). Discussion documents thus state that between 1992-6, EF! achieved phenomenal success in this way, “in politicising ecology, in politicising others into direct action and in politicising itself away from its biocentric macho wilderness US history” (BAT 1998; cf EEV 1997: 1). This was achieved by staying outside the institutions and using grassroots direct action.	+	According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.
−	As I argued in section 4.3.4, in my study of anarchist action I have found it useful to drop the revolutionary rhetoric and focus instead on the smaller scale angle of direct action. Amongst the latent effects of direct action identified by Welsh, for example, was the adoption of direct action as “a form of intervention used by wider and wider constituencies” (2000: 180; cf Welsh & Purkis 2003:11; Epstein 1991:10-15; Roseneil 2000:224). The diffusion of direct action strategies throughout broader social networks marks another case for anarchist approval. I considered this in 5.2.2 from an anarchist perspective, but it has also gained an echo in academic SM appraisal in terms of the development of ‘repertoires of action’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999: 167-184; cf Waddington 2000), and “capacity building” (Welsh 2000; Wall, Doherty & Plows 2002; Plows 2006:468). In the terms of repertoires of action, for example, diversity and flexibility is recognised as a positive: “Any movement can be located on a continuum according to the degree of flexibility or rigidity of its repertoire” (Roseneil 1995:99), and anarchists too urge that activists must “avoid universalising any single method” (Franks 2003:31). EDA groups demonstrate a very high rating in this regard (Heller 2000: 81). TAPP, for example, staged actions that varied from banner-drops to street stalls, letter-campaigns to ‘die-ins’, and street parties to squats, all within a time-span of four years.	+	-----
−	<em>Tod</em> <em>Ten examples of EFL</em>repertoire NVDA, lock-ons, tunnelling, tactical frivolity, office occupations, sabotage, samba, protest camps, street parties, blockades, pitched battles, tripods, squatting, indymedia, spoof newspapers,	+	==== Annotation 61 ====
−	<em>Top Ten examples of the SWP repertoire</em>	+	In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).
−	1. Newspaper selling and petitions	+	Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the ''mode'' of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the ''mode'' of motion. Over time, motion leads to ''development'' as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
−	2. Meetings	+	Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion<ref>In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word ''self-motion'' throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”</ref>.
−	3. Building the vanguard party	+	-----
−	4. Marching from A to B	+	==== Annotation 62 ====
−	5. Whining about betrayal by trade union leadership	+	It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.
−	web sites, pie-ing, digging up Michael 6. Entryism	+	In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:
−	Heseltine’s garden, crop decontamination, 7. erm, that’s it	+	<blockquote>
		+	The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.
		+	</blockquote>
−	critical mass, working with groups without trying to convert them, <em>not</em> forcing ancient turgid crap down each other’s throats, selfreflexivity, prisoner support, global coalitionbuilding, skills share, non-hierarchical meetings, cool posters, billboard liberation, self-catering etc.	+	In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:
−	<strong>Figure 5.4 Contrast between EF! and SWP repertoires (</strong> Cattleprod & Friend c2001:<strong>1).</strong>	+	<blockquote>
		+	To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.
		+	</blockquote>
−	The ‘repertoires of action’ angle is more compatible with anarchist frame than other views on strategy because it avoids built-in assumptions of state-centrism, Marxism or particular views of what counts as success.	+	So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.
−	It is not just with tactical repertoires that EF! demonstrated its radicality, but also with the political analysis and aims which, notwithstanding its activist (not ideological) basis, demonstrated a complex multi-issue consciousness and critique. To set aside the textual and ideological pronouncements to be found in such organs as <em>Do or Die</em> (cf2003:37), we may identify EFS’s revolutionary character in the form of its activism, as I sought to characterise in 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. Plows argues that the “conclusively ‘multi-issue’” nature of EF! protest “challenges society’s isolationist cost-benefit evaluation of’single issues’ and by pulling one thread, as it were, exposes die ‘rug’ of interrelated issues/effects” (1997:3- 5; cf Heller 2000:4; Chesters 2000b: 7; Seel 1997:123): see Figure 5.5. She maintains that EF! stays true to the intention to subvert the dominant paradigm (cf Purkis 1995: 7): to question, challenge and eventually overturn the destructive “structure/values/structure spiral which promotes and perpetuates exploitative unsustainability, and terms it ‘progress’, ‘development’ “ (Plows 1998:164). Purkis concurs that EF! “undermines the dualistic notion - progress/stagnation or even civilisation/nature” (2000: 107-8), and both Plows and Purkis valorise the “alternative, holistic ethic” with which EF! wishes to replace it (Plows 1998: 164): see 5.3.6.[91] As I have endeavoured to demonstrate, EF! is difficult to pigeonhole as “Reformist or Revolutionary in classical political terms” (Purkis 1995:13). But I would argue it is precisely this difficulty which indicates the true revolutionary/anarchist challenge of EF! and the green radicalism to which they have given teeth.	+	To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'':
−	][Figure 5.5 ‘Shoreham ... Why We Hate it AU’ (Leaflet, 1997; cf <em>EF!AU No.39</em> 1997: 3).	+	<blockquote>
		+	The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Purkis suggests that “It is possible that the new political aesthetic evident in groups like EF! is evidence that the old structures are not only antiquated but also incapable of dealing with new cultural and ethical agendas” (1995: 13-14). It is unlikely, therefore, that EF1UK will become institutionalised and ‘slotted in’ to existing power structures in the manner of FoE and Greenpeace (Doherty 1998:379). One sign of the vitality of Earth First!’s radicalism is the consistent expression of concern that the network might be losing its vitality: “EF! stands for no compromise. Other groups have been swamped by well-meaning but naive recruits and lost their original radicalism. In fact there is a general process by which radical groups get recuperated into the mainstream. If we don’t want this to happen to us we’re going to have to work hard” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1994: inside cover; cf Davey in <em>Do or Die</em> 1993a: 17; Cattleprod c2001a: 1). This expression of alertness demonstrates a hostility to conventional notions of ‘success’: the kind of success that kills the radicalism of grassroots movements: success as betrayal (Noddy in <em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 51). EF!ers thus determined to stay on the outside, holding fast to the position of ‘no compromise’ (Stauber in <em>Do or Die</em> 1995:98; Purkis 2001:51). In the next four sections it is to the organisational expression of this that I turn. We shall see that concerns over the radical ‘outsider* identity and the grander revolutionary aims of activists came to be expressed through dispute, critique and reassessment directed at the network’s limited institutional trappings. Through this process the identities of EF! were reaffirmed.
−	*** 5.3.8 EF! Organisation and Identity	+	-----
−	In this section, I provide a characterisation of EF! as a paradigmatic activist anarchist network, identifying elements and tensions that will give rise to the debates that I will look at in 5.3.11 and 5.3.12. As Becca Lush puts it, EF! “doesn’t have one big belief system... people congregate under the EF! banner rather than an FoE banner because they believe in NVDA, they are revolutionary rather than reformist, they are anarchic and don’t believe in government” (quoted in Wall 1999:150). The self-definition carried on the front page of each Action Update proclaims the extent of EF!’s ideology:	+	Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: ''mechanical motion'' (changes in positions of objects in space); ''physical motion'' (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); ''chemical motion'' (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); ''biological motion'' (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); ''social motion'' (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).
−	a commitment to defend the earth from its destroyers and to employ direct action and non-hierarchical organisation to do so:	+	These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.
−	“Earth First! is not a cohesive group or campaign, but a convenient banner for people who share similar philosophies to work under. The general principles behind the name are non- hierarchical organisation and the use of direct action to confront, stop and eventually reverse the forces that are responsible for the destruction of the Earth and its inhabitants” (<em>EFIA U</em> banner).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png]]
−	This definition is very open-ended, and in some ways expresses more what EF! isn’t (a controlled organisation tied to a party line) than what it is. Plows puts it in a pithy phrase: “ideology is autonomous, autonomy is the ideology” (1995; cf Seel & Plows 2000:113), and Derek Wall emphasises that “EF! (UK) activists reject the need for formal adherence to a fixed and detailed ideological programme. Instead, they emphasise the pursuit of green political goals via direct action and a loose participatory organisational form” (1997:20; cf Doherty 1998:377; Seel 1997a). Wall also provides a useful comparison with those groups who come closest to Earth First!’s political perspective:	+	The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]
−	“Even the green political organisations which refer to decentralisation as a key element of their ideology seem highly formal in comparison. For example, [ <em>Green Anarchist</em> ] and [ <em>London Greenpeace</em> ] articulate distinctive political programmes which they promote to would-be supporters” (1999: 154).	+	Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]
−	Earth First! thus stands as an activist anarchist network rather than an ideological anarchist group (or anarcho-syndicalist union), although those elements of a political ideology which it <em>does</em> hold (the shared perspectives that bind EF! into an identifiable entity) become all the more interesting for that reason. In this section I wish to examine the intersection of these beliefs with the organisational structure and process of EF!, as this is the place where they have been most clearly and practically articulated.	+	By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.
−	EF!’s critique and confrontation of “social hierarchies” is clear from the range of issues and repertoires I examined in 5.3.5, wherein “means and ends are merged into prefigurative strategies” (Seel 1997b: 173; cf What is EF!* MEF! 2001: 1; Seel and Plows 2000: 116). This prefigurative concern is recognised by Purkis, Seel & Plows as a demonstration of anarchist analysis and allegiance (Purkis 2001:345; cf Seel & Plows 2000: 116). Activist anarchism is an anarchism of methods and relationships - not a pledge of policy to sign up to and follow. As Manchester EF! put it, there is an “underlying principle ... that how far people go is entirely a matter for their personal choice, commitment and responsibility” (MEF 1994: 1).[92] In terms of EF! organisation this translates into a participatory, diverse and porous association of individually committed, multiply-concerned and strong-willed individuals (Purkis 1996:207) - and their friends who get dragged along! This organisational basis supports spontaneous creativity, and works against “unified, homogenous, fixed or clear” strategy (Seel & Plows 2000:130).	+	-----
−	Seel notes that “in the last instance local groups are responsible for their own actions and tactics” (1997b: 173). Just as EF!’s direct action expresses “individual self-determination; and the consistency between one’s behaviour and one’s ideals” (Purkis 2001:345), so EF!’s organisation embodies the anarchist ideal of decentralisation. The local groups are the real hubs of EF! activity (Summer Gathering Programme 1999: 8).[93] The anti-roads movement provides a perhaps even more illustrative example of this model. Anti-roads direct action was supported by two limited networks - Alarm UK for information (McNeish 1999: 70; cf <em>EFlAUHoA</em> 1993:2) and Road Alert! for direct action support (RA! 1998; EF!AU No.9 1994:7). But the movement was led from the bottom up with local alliances, and repertoires of action were developed and passed on by the participants themselves.[94] RA!	+	==== Annotation 63 ====
−	consciously limited its role (Doherty 1998; cf Ward 1973:387) and eventually folded on the anarchist basis, familiar from our discussion of institutionalisation, that “we started to become too indispensable and any movement with indispensable parts is not going to be strong enough to continue” (RA! 1998).	+	In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.
−	I should also note the relations between EF! and the road camps. Some camps did have a strong connection with and identification with the Earth First! network (Seel 1997a: 120; Routledge 1997: 360; cf £F/Jt/No.l3 1995:5; No.15 1995:2), but this was never an exclusive relationship (Seel 1997a: 117). In Newcastle, for the protests against the Cradle well Bypass, the textual evidence would indicate that EF! played a very strong role, as figure F5.6 indicates. EF! was named in both the movement literature (Little Weed 1994:1; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2003:12) and in the legal proceedings (Affidavit of Frank Malcolm ORR, made on behalf of Newcastle City Council against ‘Persons Unknown* 14.7.1993). Yet local campaigners downplay EF!’s role, emphasising instead that of the veterans of Twyford Down, the hunt saboteurs network and ordinary people from Newcastle.	+	When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become ''frozen;'' however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium'' and ''freezing is relative and temporary.''
−	<strong>Bypass protesters take to the trees</strong>	+	''Motion in equilibrium'' is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.
−	<strong>By MIKI KELLY</strong>	+	Freezing is a ''relative'' phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.
−	<strong>Tm£Z protwtore wore omnad Md mmr mt«d • M«tMC id a tree ai crouolt flared tod.r it ±1 uw ofN«wMafo’a Cndi«w«U Bypui</strong>	+	-----
−	<strong>AiMMfnu *m eomod off tb« nu after lit Um Moral</strong> <em>at</em> <strong>1 JOdlSVK</strong>	+	==== Annotation 64 ====
−	<strong>Ou«f buy Jo ha Grabs*. ia tbarte of 10 officer? M Uto Jeamood Dene «lt« eoeflrmed Uim two neo aod a worm wore »rr« M for oiietod paOUe order</strong>	+	Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed ''equilibrium'' as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, ''An Equilibrium of Forces:''
−	He MlA “Odo of the tiofl *M tyrni down to float <em>at</em> Reciueery. He **t ukod to Iwra. tfaea. »W4 bailtflk med io «)oet Bia. ho nepoodod pivRcaUa	+	<blockquote>
		+	1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.
−	4n officer irrttud bis for eauuad a breach of Um poaeo.”	+	2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.
−	Chief Ian Grabs* Mid the other am. *oo aad to be bfted out of the diptea vao lot off with o wanuot	+	3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.
−	<strong>YumrtiHe work m the Clint b*P0M was beiM hampered with two icttvtm n>f!n< • proto* ia a trie which woo due to be foiled.</strong>	+	4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.
−	<strong>OeertM weekend oetMaa trots the eeaipairo froup Barth Fira eiuaboe eoft tip a tree la the uMd« dioofibeutfi</strong>	+	The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.
−	<strong>Spokewan Virk Robson cold’ “Thieve foi luppiiM up there sad ore prepared to stay up there for a fonpuaM.</strong>	+	The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.
−	<strong>“There are will o mmhar of pen- Aim m lilt- aopeeceopl M Ml I IM)««*</strong>	+	For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.
−	][Figure 5.6 EF! at the Cradlewell (<em>Newcastle Evening Chronicle</em> 5.7.1993).	+	5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.
−	Earth First!’s involvement in the Cradlewell protest was not central or directing: they were one network of people, and one pool of activists, who could be drawn upon to join in the protest, but the protest itself was run by the people who lived on site. Earth First!’s link to the Cradlewell was provided by individuals at the camp: if there were not camp members who identified with Earth First!, then its role disappeared.	+	This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.
−	EFl’s predominantly urban groups represent the complementary part to the typically rural protest camps (Eldrum 1993: 15; Plows 1998:153; Purkis 1995:12; 1996:205; 2000: 95; Seel 1997b: 175).[95] It must be emphasised that Earth First! is NOT based in London, with a head office nestling amongst those of other ENGOs. Indeed in much of my experience of EF! networking there has been a sense in which London is effectively bypassed by the EF! network (cf sg2003 list 16.2.2003), while communication between the provinces is much more energetic. EF! is based directly on the local affinity groups or radical networks, and around the most active of eco-activists. Each local group is autonomous and chooses its own concerns and methods of acting. These groups are fluid, disappearing and appearing all the time (Wall 1999a: 60), which Seel notes “makes it difficult to quote figures” (	+	Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?
−	1997b: 173). However, certain strong and enduring groups have played a large role in keeping the network active, through hosting network gatherings and providing ongoing points of contact (1999: 88). Different local groups developed quite varied and specific characteristics and different abilities and histories. This has contributed a source of both tension and capability.	+	-----
−	Purkis provides an analysis of Manchester EF! as a group of individuals seeking to organise direct action campaigns in an anarchist manner (2001). My own local group, TAPP, differed from the Manchester group in having less of a defining relationship to the EF! network, being instead more of a Tyneside network in itself, of peace, anarchist and animal rights activists amongst others (<em>Do or</em> Die 1999: 108; cf Purkis 2001:331*341; Wall 1999a: 60).[96] TAPP began as an autonomous group and remained one throughout its involvement with EF!UK (<em>Do or Die</em> 1999:105-108; Duckett 1999a): the relationship it had with the Earth First! network should not be overplayed. Nevertheless, EF! was the national network that I personally had most connection with, which I considered our group to share most affinity with, and to which we demonstrated most practical attachment	+	''- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter''
		+	</blockquote>
−	TAPP’s place in the EF! network was recognised through inclusion in the groups listing in the <em>EF!AU(I</em> originally wrote to request our inclusion), and participation in Earth First! gatherings and other events. It is a convention at Earth First! Summer Gatherings for a go-round of groups to be made, in which a spokesperson for each group lists what activities and issues their local group has been involved with since the last gathering. By taking part in this go-round, TAPP was accepted as an equal part of the Earth First! network, its actions and concerns part of EF!’s actions and concerns, even while TAPP’s avowed differences were accepted. The most important manner in which TAPP was linked into the Earth First! network, however, was through individual friendships with others involved in the network, (although relatively few of those would see EF! as their own primary identity either).	+	Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call ''space.'' [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]
−	There are no rules that groups must abide by, or directives which they follow, but local groups collaborate nonetheless. SDEF! report that “If one group needs a helping hand, we all try and help out ‘Family outings’ to other groups’ campaigns happen regularly. Groups also carry out solidarity actions for each other” (1994). This is true, but informal and therefore ‘patchy’. Members of TAPP did regularly travel away to join and support other peoples’ protests. Groups of five or more of us attended, for example, a Reclaim the Streets party in Hull; Hillgrove & Huntingdon Life Sciences demonstrations; a route walk at Bingley Relief Road; and the ‘Doing it up North’ EF! actions in Sheffield (£F//4C/No.59 1999: 7) and Halifax (£F/JC/No.64 1999: 1). On such occasions, members of TAPP met new or old acquaintances, and shared in the experience of direct action. My own emotional connection to Earth First! was first most strongly made by risking arrest with, and in spending time in cells with, other Earth First! activists. As a slightly peripheral group, we in Newcastle found we did more travelling to support other groups* actions than we received in return. Partly this was because we did not provide the most inspiring and thought-through actions, but this in itself is a revealing indication of our relatively ‘junior* role in the network. There was a sense that the ideas for grand actions (which in my experience included JI 8, the ‘Smash Genetix’ mass trashing of a GM site in Lincolnshire (see 6.4.2), and a co-ordinated shut-down of Sainsburys distribution centres), always came from ‘somewhere other than us*: we did not feel it was likely that we ourselves would be able to gain the support for such grand actions.	+	On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call ''time.'' As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.
−	As the Twyford injunctions demonstrated, the fluid, decentralised and informal structure gives EF! certain advantages, making it hard for hostile agents to infiltrate or paralyse it, and giving it a flexibility and quickness of response (Plows 1997:2; Seel & Plows 2000:118; Lee 1997:127) that anarchists commonly claim for affinity groups. Wall states that “At times it seems almost invisible. Yet EF! has been able to kick off what has seemed like a tidal wave of action” (2000:23). Earth First! is perceived by many to have played a central co-ordinating role in environmental protest during the nineties.	+	-----
−	Before EF!, the UK environmental movement had “never had a mass grassroots wing which uses civil disobedience tactics unlike ... the Peace Movement and the Animal Rights/Liberation movements during the 1980s” (Purkis 1996; cf SDEF! 1994).	+	==== Annotation 65 ====
−	However, even if all Earth First!ers are involved in ecological direct action, the reverse is not necessarily the case. With no membership or real organisation, Earth First! is best understood as a (limited) network of contacts and organisers of action (Seel 1997b: 177). Indeed Wall notes by 1996,	+	Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.
−	EF! had ‘biodegraded’ into specific anti-roads campaigns (Wall 1997:19; Seel & Plows 2000:112), although it soon re-emerged from these. Compared with EF!US, less emphasis is made on EF!UK as a specific identity: activists can, if they so choose, give that identity to their activism, but the information and co-ordination activities of Earth First! provide just one among several available networks.[97] Individuals identify with EF!UK because they share its vision of action “rather than a wish to perpetuate EF! as an organisation” (Seel & Plows 2000: 112). EF!ers spent much (too much) time musing over their role within the environmental movement, and they recognised that they were just one network within the wider movement “not the environment movement, but a part of it... not even the ‘direct action environment movement’” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 50; Seel & Plows 2000:113). This organisational humility can be rooted in the anarchist tradition (Ward 1973:387).	+	Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,
−	Other EDA networks tend to be issue-specific, such as Roads Alert! & Alarm UK for roads protests, the Genetic Engineering Network (GEN) for genetics (see 6.4.2), Peat Alert! for stopping peat extraction (see 6.5.4) and Rising Tide for climate issues. These may be viewed as the ‘biodegradable’ networks that appear when they are needed and disappear when their usefulness is ended. EF! is not issue-specific and is perhaps les biodegradable, but the two types are fundamentally akin in their radicality and action-focus (Plows 1998:153): all four of these other networks made regular appearances in the <em>EFIAIL</em> Earth First!’s difference lies in its attempt to encompass many different campaigns and merge all the ‘single issues’ into a broader community pushing for radical change. EF! is thus one step removed from particular campaigns its activists pursue, and one step towards being an ideologically-bound anarchist organisation. Both EF! and the issue-specific networks contrast with the mainstream ENGOs whose concerns they share and with whom they sometimes co-operate.	+	p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.
−	A story in the 51st issue of the <em>EF!AU</em> tells of two EF!ers hitching a lift to the Summer Gathering with a Greenpeace worker who could not quite comprehend what exactly Earth First! was. In trying to explain, the EF! hitchers found themselves stating that “Earth First! doesn’t actually exist” (1998: 3). If we push our organisational analysis too far then we must encounter this rebuff. “Welcome! Toxic Mutants Earth First! does not exist It is a figment of the imagination of its members. To join, all you need to do is imagine that you have joined, and go out and shut down a chemical plant” (TMEF! 1998). One consequence of this is that EF!’s relative decline need not in itself concern the longevity of EDA: if the organisation disappears, the underlying milieu and movement remain.	+	==== c. The Material Unity of the World ====
−	As I write this section, I am conscious how false and formal all this description sounds; the Earth First! network is far too fluid, diverse and context-specific to sum up in the abstract. I must, however, use rather abstract language, and this abstraction remains even if we accept that EF! cannot be adequately described by conventional organisational terms. To seek to remedy this, I would like to emphasise that Earth First! is a real-world phenomenon with actual people in it who form close friendships and community feelings as well as ‘political’ factions and co-ordinated campaigns. Involvement within Earth First! means meeting people and working with them, and it is the very absence of political programmes that makes this inter-personal aspect all the stronger. In 5.3.11, we shall note that some perceived this as a problem.	+	Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]
−	To conclude, EF! organisation is “designed for doing radical activities as opposed to lobbying” (Manchester EF!er quoted in Purkis 2001:161; cf Seel & Plows 2000:116), but in 5.3.11 and 5.3.12, we shall see how the tension between action and organisation (and between individualism and community) flowered into an elaborate anarchist debate. “Beyond being a banner, Earth First! exists as a network” with “geographic groupings”, “publications and events”, and the “constituent parts and trappings of a non-hierarchical network” (Eldrum 1993:15). But a discussion document warns that “There is a danger in these trappings when they do not remain consistent with the essential philosophy of non-hierarchy and direct action”; for example if they become “afflicted by informal hierarchy and non-action” (EFWP 1998). It is to these “trappings” that I shall now turn.	+	The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:
−	<br>	+	''First,'' there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.
−	*** 5.3.9 The Action Update	+	''Second,'' the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.
−	“you can’t join [ Earth First! ], you ust get on with it. But it has its manifestations - the Gathering, <em>Do or Die,</em> numerous actions - and the Action Update” (<em>EF1AU</em> No.51 1998: 3; cf MEF! 2001: 1).	+	''Third,'' all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.
−	The Earth First! Action Update i <em>EF’AU)</em> was begun in 1991, and became a regu ar publication in 1993, produced quarterly and then monthly.[98] It is designed to provide an outlet for 8F! and other activists, to let people know of their actions and to provide inspiration and some sense of common identity for the EF! network (<em>EF!AU</em> No.51 1998: 3 .in figure F5.7, the Norwich editorial group provide a useful summary of the roles performed by the <em>EF!AU</em> and its importance to the network. Other consistent roles emphasised in discussions, and in the guidance notes passed on :rom previous editorial groups, include prisoner support, with a list of prisoners to write to (No.35 997: 7 ; technical information provided in the ‘inserts’, on every imaginable topic from email encryption to Compulsory Purchase law (No.32 1998: 3); and the contacts list of EF! groups and other organisations or campaigns. Some people consider the contacts list to be the most important part of the <em>EF!AU</em> (a way in to the network . while others consider it a waste of paper.	+	-----
−	THE ROLE OF THE EF!AU AND ITS RELATION TO THE EF! NETWORK	+	==== Annotation 66 ====
−	The EF!AU j« ito< the only publication to come from the Earth i irstl network, however it i* the only cue wliich tan lx- kom] tn hr the mouthpiece of EF! at much m of the collective producing it. The rule of the AU w widely seen *s being » networking tool for acuviiu <em>m</em> well aa being t point of contact and an inLr<xlucn<in to the network for thoic wishing to get in\ olved. When I became inwlved in EE utyle direct action if was the AU from which I got the de<em>tail</em>s of where and when action was hjjij>oung, I’m sure this was the same for many of us.	+	The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.
−	The AU is ultimately under the control of it* editoiui cullet uve However, every EH gathering sees a discussion on the role of the AU and we have acted on the teconiiiiciidnuii’i: and t nrn i tms arsing from these discustions almost without exception. We also held u ‘AU to the network* weekend, when discussion was held and acted upon. The suggdMKm of one editor that the gathering should mandate the editorial collective and make decision!* hy which they woud hr hound, wss derisively rejected. It is dear that the maturity <>f jieuple want the Al J edirnnsl rnllcTtive to main tun iu near total autonomy. There is some coutiudicuuu between rhe editors* mle as autonomous collective, and their rule as representatives uf the network. If the AU is the project of mir rnllrrtive then we are free to put our own spin on things and to exdudc omclrs about nenuns/groups that wc’rc not into. If however it is the project uf tlie network ihai it our duty to not do this On balance wc have tried to act a« the Utter, wtiUng tepuru ul tiny British, rroingiral direct action wc arc seal, which means that the content is decided by what hjppen ., nm whai we hke. Since the AU discuiHion weekend we have edited <ndy foi length, ilamv ami factual accuracy, upon rhr wishes of all those present.	+	=== 2. Consciousness ===
−	][Figure 5.7 The Role of the <em>EF’AU</em> and its Relation to the EF! Network (EF.C4l7No.73 2001: 5).	+	==== a. The Source of Consciousness ====
−	The role of editing the <em>EF1AU</em> is rotated between different EF! groups each year, although this has rarely been a smooth process: “It’s meant to change editorial group each year, thus sharing responsibility and avoiding institutionalising power and skills in one place. This helps avoid centralisation, and of course puts a huge strain on tine poor activists who take it on’ <em>EF!AU</em> No.51 1998: 3; cf Wall 1999a: 153). Wall and Doherty both emphasise that it is the larger, well-resourced groups that produce the <em>EF!AU(</em> Wall 1999a: 153; Doherty 1998: 377). I was part of the Newcastle editorial group that produced the <em>EF!AU</em> between October 1999 and February 2001, however, and we did not fit this profile. We should have handed it on in October 2000 but no one came forward to take it on until January. The Action Update represents a responsibility and potential source of debt that not all are eager to embrace[99], and it is my experience that it struggles to find a sense of relevance to the wider movement. The number of individual subscribers has never reached 200, and stories are rarely sent in by either groups or individuals unless specifically requested, and e-reques eu. 1 is tor 1.11is reason that a group with close ties and friendships within the EF! network is better placed to produce the AU effectively.	+	According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.
−	The Action Update is currently on issue 95 (seemingly stalled since Summer 2005), which is an impressive life-span for a radical newsletter, it has been recognised, furthermore, that the <em>EF1AU</em> is the only publication of its type that actually tries to be accountable to a wider movement (No.73 2001: 5; cf No.62 1999: 5).[100] Wall emphasises the influence that the editorial collective can exercise (Wall; cf <em>EF!AU</em> No.62 1999: 5), and of course this is true, but my subjective experience was one where the constraints and pressures on what we could include were most strongly felt. Editors are discouraged from including personal opinions or critical articles in what is, after all, the ‘Action Update’. A narrow role is prescribed for the <em>EFIA</em> L7, which means that the areas for free creative expression on the part of the editors are limited to peripheral (yet traditional) items such as the choice of cartoon on the backpage or the quote on the front cover. Of course, there are many ways that the editors can emphasise or downplay stories (by placing some on the front page, for example), and even groups (we were twice accused of deliberately excluding Green Anarchist from the contacts list[101]). What is perhaps more revealing are the mechanisms by which the wider network can bring pressure to bear on the Action Update[102]. When we included inappropriate humour or played around with the format of the<em>EF!AU,</em> then individuals from several EF! groups were quick to complain, and this has been the case with other editorial collectives also. On more than one occasion, local groups have refused to distribute particular editions of the <em>EFIA U</em> because of what has been expressed therein. This is a sanction, available to the decentralised network, that highlights the unique position of the <em>EF!AU.[103]</em>	+	-----
−	A few further points may be made about the <em>EF!A U.</em> To the extent that its producers, and the EF! network, consider the <em>EFIA</em> 17 to be a form of propaganda, then only positive, inspiring reports are to be included (My notes, 2001 Summer Gathering <em>EFIA U</em> workshop). What is reported in the pages of the <em>EF!AU</em>cannot, therefore, be assumed to tell the truth, even while its editors must seek to relate the simplest, least subjective account As one EF!er noted, “some stories have been blatantly not true, as we all know - we’ve reported lots of ‘great actions’ that have been shite” (My notes, 2001 Summer Gathering <em>EF!A U</em> workshop). On these same grounds (of propaganda, public consumption and potential recruitment), it is maintained that criticism and disagreements should be made within the movement, with discussion documents, and not displayed to the outside world. We did once receive correspondence from an individual who claimed to have found the <em>EF!A U</em> by chance, on the seat of a train, but in general I believe the existence of the Action Update is more significant for providing support to already-existing activists, than in recruiting new ones (which tends to happen on the local level, or regarding a particular issue). The limitations and tensions in the <em>EFIA U</em> reflect those of the wider network, as we shall discuss in 5.3.12.	+	==== Annotation 67 ====
−	*** 5.3.10 The Summer Gathering	+	Consciousness arises from ''nature'', and from ''social'' activities and relations.
−	“the Earth First! Summer Gathering is when people involved in radical ecological direct action - and those who want to be involved - get together for five days to talk, share skills, learn, play, rant, find out what’s going on and plan what’s next, live outside, strategise, hang out, incite, laugh and conspire” (Summer Gathering Flyer 2001: 1).	+	''Natural'' refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.
−	EF! Summer Gatherings are organised by a collective which is set up (usually at the previous gathering), exclusively for that purpose, and which draws on the resources of the stronger EF! groups and other useful collectives (for catering, tents, vehicles etc). They occur annually in various rural locations and are places of discussion, communication and training. I participated in the Gatherings in 1998, 1999,2000,2001,2003 and 2005, and was part of the work camps that prepared the site for the 2003 gathering. My involvement means that to me, gatherings are as much about learning how to build compost toilets, reading in the library tent and exploring the countryside as they are about the ‘politics’ of a network. Earth First! has organised other get-togethers, like the Winter Moot and regional meetings, but it is the Summer Gatherings that draw in most people under the ‘Earth First!’ banner.	+	''Social'' activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.
−	EF! UK’s national gatherings and local meetings provide arenas of consensus decision-making expressive of the communitarian, collective impulse in EF! (Wall 1999: 152; cf Purkis 1995: 5; Purkis 2001:318-319; IE 2005:16). Although consensus techniques (such as facilitation and go-rounds) are used, critical voices are raised whenever actual attempts at large-scale collective consensus have been attempted (these would have the gathered group make decisions that are - not <em>binding</em> as such, for that would be an impossibility - but <em>definitive</em> of EF! nationally). A contributor to <em>Do or Die</em> argues that such an attempt “totally goes against the whole principle of decentralisation and local group independence” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 53), and in 5.3.12 we shall note the concerted hostility of <em>Green Anarchist,</em> for example, to any national decision-making. This is an expression of the tension between national co-ordination and the autonomy of local groups that, I argue, is integral to the Earth First! network (Daktari 2000:68; cf FR 2000; Purkis 2001:265; Heller 2000:49-51; Seel 1999:315).	+	''- Natural Source of Consciousness''
−	In a reversal of the EF!US case, where it is the <em>Journal</em> that became the focus for disagreements and power struggles, in the UK the <em>EF!AU</em>is relatively marginalised and it is the Summer Gatherings that constitute the most important institutional space of EF! UK. One participant opines that “the EF! Gathering happens just once a year... and is a unique and valuable time ... the best opportunity that we have for getting our shit together and moving forward” (B 1999). <em>Green Anarchist</em> respond by suggesting “discussion at Gatherings is just a lot of studenty yatter that can happen anytime, whereas popular direct action is what distinguishes EF! from other eco currents” (GA 1999: 1; cf Anti-mass 1988:4; Letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 53). They denigrate the significance of the gathering and collective discussion in favour of the method of direct action, as that which comprises EF!’s identity. We shall address this further in 5.3.12: suffice it to note now that it is the Summer Gathering that draws out these conflicts most clearly.	+	There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are ''human brains'' and ''the relationship between humans and'' ''the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.''
−	After the first Summer Gathering I went to in 1998, when I had little idea of what to expect and before I became too familiar with EF!, I wrote down my initial impressions:	+	''About human brains:'' consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.
−	there were certain set rules given in advance, such as the banning of alcohol until the evening, of offensive behaviour and, more controversially, of dogs. “If approved by the Gathering they will then be enforced and anybody that breaks them may be asked to leave.” Although there is a tone of normative morality here that some participants disliked, the organisers did their best to explain their decisions as necessary, made themselves accountable and challengeable, and policed their decisions through dialogue which was dependent on the majority backing of participants. A decision which enough people disagreed with would be unenforceable. The style of regulating behaviour embodied, to some degree, the anarchist answer to the question *How do you deal with troublemakers or dissenters in a non-authoritarian way?’: Education, dialogue, social pressure and, if all this fails, exclusion from the community. All decisions and rules were justified with reference to freedom: for example, “please try to balance your freedom to drink against the freedom of others to an alcohol and aggression-free area” (My notes, September 1998, quotes from Summer Gathering Programme 1998: 2).	+	''About the relationship between humans'' and ''the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection:'' The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.
−	The tensions and negotiations I recorded in 1998 relate to the libertarian and communitarian aspects of EF! anarchism identified by Daktari (2000). My discussion of repertoires and local group autonomy in section 5.3.8 focussed on the libertarian and autonomous aspects of EFiUK. In order to balance this, I chose to participate in the 2001 Summer Gathering with an eye to the communitarian elements,[104] and also to note how the ideology of EF! is expressed through the organisation of such a gathering.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-9.png|''Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.'']]
−	As our starting point for this I would like to consider the salient points made in the Programme for the Gathering in 2001: see Figure 5.8	+	''Reflection'' is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.
−	Welcome to the	+	There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.
−	Earth First!	+	-----
−	Summer Gathering 2001	+	==== Annotation 68 ====
−	Gathering by * hill’lort m Kuma m IV92. anti mot ttesr it beer, pUur people invoked. « warning to be in nUKul gcolvgJOL dircvi ocix® to itenc tffll A ocher i ar the	+	Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, ''traces'' of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called ''reflection''.
−	rtm frw vein, about Tti people came twwe a year and tou tei turn to around It araund the cou rfn oadt j car jlo that more propie £<•< tte dunce to cam !nwn diffrrrrn ref him Ln rrvetr yewK there tbrtc <Miteun*et Hw (taidtar) Winter Mixn*, whwh came out uf ® dorr to liarc a ir. a building in a town which an donirc	+	The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.
−	nurc to talking than dotoi A	+	Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.
−	Pi Ite g^itenng hope* to be a place ior	+	The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:
−	- MtWptidn^ learning and tkih ahiutofc, bi Hl* formal ajhJ informal	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-10.png|''This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.'']]
−	- <strong>FCii. tolauiiivn aid</strong>	+	Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.
−	- rrurxm for thendu	+	-----
−	- oflfcring *ocwcT info, A wkmIi. in a tuppuTrc	+	''Physical and chemical reflection'' is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.
−	- acting out < In lie <H our vvuon • uqpnrMti m w uh Hii hierarchy. Jnmrh widiitt c ‘i?muntn. DIV culture	+	-----
−	- combining mpctf fw diflerrni item with the uppurumity fur teuton debate	+	==== Annotation 69 ====
−	- briny n v uiblc I H Lkxtg	+	Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.
−	<strong>No ^tecwfon* k< l-aflh Firo*” oon entire <*4 of dm gutbcrtrtf t >* b mate Up of *”[J] todi* dnalt</strong>	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png]]
−	uki inata tte dk un that are 1 rir*mu nd right for them t ar ite tot y<MM ii« >our <mn gjvip’i)	+	'''Reflection as Change in Position:'''
−	texiiKXw, learning, pUiutoig, tetaux docujaiofu, rvtki^MWi^ and rvUxalkWs akt.in^ id- t» ui«h viter* vum meet terr	+	1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.
−	fterc arc lau <it getting tte moM out uf tta g^ttervn* and anon hn^ w<wfcVuipt t* m<.rh oor of thro So n akepmg. ciaang, making tnu»K, pluyuy with kite. wixking hanging uol wub uto arul ih-w Lrazute and vumg m tte *urt I (Wpoi puik You arr terr to do wtai pw need to jo Ir spr U ing up m w<wt<te«f« iim’t >tome that* line • hare >uur tfacuuiom - umkr uae ul die graHdi ^all urte a leaflet of an ‘! F’ AcCtoh mhsmaiMiu inter!	+	2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
−	aAcr ite gaihaing - * hauler wurki hx yiNL	+	3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.
−	Whh I >r| F 1 I * » IM h	+	4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position ''reflects'' the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.
−	A to< ol diPt-ratt peppto w rth a winy id wka* nod ♦ tpmrnto c*i*nc to Ite gMtenni Ih * moan* rtifwxl and awamefct art rcaJh unp^ruru If hr Ip* io te careful .U maWl aawnipimi about ^tut utter pu»p< ikx m . or think, nr ahi	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png]]
−	If you have o problem uifh ^xnctJung, kel fjoe to My m a iwr w&* and <em>d a pit*hkr»</em> u hn^iM	+	'''Reflection as Change in Structure:'''
−	up with you, tiMcn »rth rmpoct	+	1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.
−	If you led like y<nu ideal «r m ihe muKfity. then y^it icvdribution * li te a u ctol oce. and be rxprtjacd and Miiucd People get mvufvcd with Earth Frat’ bocauac they dool want to te part of a frnup ® «b a party Hoc*. Earth Finl! ta ikH an ivganiWJUfk but a ihi ctk uumnuriity <em>of</em> poupk with d+ffrmo td<^% TW* a dialling, hut if* what makr* u* to ahvr	+	2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
−	On the otter hand, if your idea* arc cteiienred. Iba Ite opportunity k> rr-exatnuw item if tiko - this n hnpcfalty nor a •pace where ynu need te dderwive	+	3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.
−	Tte one n might te w<rih uanmg with H that wc dr cm ahmt cadi we U» rrs^t •*.!*	+	4. These changes constitute structural, physical ''reflection''.
−	utter, and we’re all domg the hew we can in a damn erwy wurkl	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png]]
−	][Figure 5.8 Summer Gathering 2001 Map and Programme.	+	'''Chemical Reflection:'''
−	The programme consisted of eight A4 pages (more than other years), in addition to the map and the lists of workshops; it therefore represented a strong attempt to impose a character on the gathering. Particular themes that we can take from the front page include the diversity of means of discussion ‘What unites us is our diversity’); the requirement of respect as a basis for honest discussion; and the avowed intent of providing challenges to participants’ ideas (cf B, sg2003 list 2003). I wish to associate this characterisation with the form of anarchist discourse whose existence I am arguing for in this thesis. We should especially note the imperative that ‘‘No decisions !br Earth First!’ can come out of this gathering. EF! is made up of autonomous groups and individuals who make choices that are relevant and right for them” (Summer Gathering Programme 2001: 1). This comment is a legacy of past worries and disputes (it was also asserted for the Moot which I assess in 5.3.12 (Winter Gathering Flyer 1998: 1; cf Winter Moot Programme 2000: 3)), assuring participants that the communitarian anarchism of the gathering cannot be translated into any form of legislative power.	+	1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.
−	I would like to focus in particular on the proposed ‘Purpose’ of the gathering:	+	2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.
−	(1) Networking, learning and skill-sharing, both formal and informal	+	3. This is a process of ''chemical reflection'', in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A <sub>C</sub>B a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).
−	(2) rest, relaxation and inspiration	+	As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.
−	(3) reunion for friends	+	-----
−	(4) offering ‘newer’ people info, support, and contacts, in a supportive atmosphere	+	''Biological reflection'' is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.
−	(5) acting out a little of our vision - organisation without hierarchy, diversity within community, Dh culture	+	Biological reflection is expressed through ''excitation, induction,'' and ''reflexes.''
−	(6) combining respect for different ideas with the opportunity for healthy debate	+	''Excitation'' is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].
−	(7) being a visible EF! thang (Summer Gathering Programme 2001: 1).	+	''Induction'' is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.
−	<br>	+	-----
−	Of these points, we have already mentioned (6) the emphasis on respect and healthy debate; (2) the importance of the informal side (cf sg2003 email list 16.12.2002), also demonstrated by scheduled workshops on reflexology and reiki, hot tubs and games of football, but tempered by the annual insistence that “this is not a festival”; and I shall consider (7) in 5.3.12. The rest I will now address in turn.	+	==== Annotation 70 ====
−	(1) We can note the diversity of both formal and informal types of meeting and discussion. Other networks riddled the Gathering site (including TLIO, regional networks, Green Party members, co-ops and ex-road protesters etc.[105]), and many issue-specific or unannounced meetings took place in addition to the open programme. The programmed meetings may be divided into the following types[106]:	+	''Unconditioned reflexes'' are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply ''induced'' physiologically.
−	- practical workshops, from tool care to earth education,	+	''Mental reflections'' are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.
−	- international workshops, including Peoples Global Action, Narmada dam and international conferences/days of action,	+	-----
−	- workshops centred on particular environmental or social issues,	+	==== Annotation 71 ====
−	- testimonials and videos,	+	''Conditioned reflexes'' are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.
−	- strategic discussions and planning,	+	''Dynamic and creative reflection'' is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.
−	- discussion of more abstract ideology, such as perspectives on violence, on red-green links and divergences, on spirituality and on academia,	+	-----
−	- consideration of new and old tactics, such as ‘tactical frivolity’ (see section 6.3.2).	+	==== Annotation 72 ====
−	Certain meetings had a more ‘structural’ importance, such as the daily morning meeting, at which announcements ranging from lost property to new workshops were announced. This, following close on from breakfast, was the first event to be shouted across the site. Amongst its other roles, “the various roles (toilet cleaners, people for the front gate, etc..) are announced and recruited for” (My notes, 2001). There were also networking sessions, both international, national and for the regions. In 2001 it was in the international round-up that the anarchist identity of Earth First! was made most clear, in that participants appeared to make no distinction, in their own countries, between anarchist activity and that of Earth First! in the UK.	+	Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'': “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”
−	(3) The third ‘purpose’, of reunion for friends, provides us with a connection to the clique issue of 5.3.11.A TAPPer new to the festival in 2001 commented to me that it was easy to see who the key Earth First! people are and I agree that being an apparent member of the ‘clique’, or the inner network of Earth First!, was indicated in many ways: “Certain people will consistently stand up and talk, know everyone by name, be louder and more confident in their pronouncements, show themselves familiar with all the jargon and the latest debates. Everyone seems to know them, and they talk to each other in workshops, which can mean that they exclude others by their over-participation” (My notes 2001). The 2001 programme recognises this apparent cliquey-ness for the first time. It states “Please have patience with the ‘old friends catching up’ thing, which is an important part of the gathering for many, and also with people assuming you know things” (Summer Gathering Programme 2001).[107]	+	An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, ''reflected'' in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.
−	The programme’s recognition of these social groups represented an attempt to overcome their exclusive (cliquey) aspects to them, and was linked with the fourth expressed purpose; (4) the welcome and support of new people. The programme offered the possibility of’shadowing’ members of the site crew or experienced hands, and also announced the existence of’welfare monitors’, to act as peace-makers or as emotional support, should they be needed. There was also a so-called ‘Black Route’ marked on the workshop timetable: “workshops on the timetable that are or will try to be particularly accessible to	+	Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in ''Capital Volume I'':
−	new folks, are marked in black Can people attending them be aware of this, and be extra aware of avoiding jargon, slang, obscure references, and the phrase ‘well I’ve been doing this for ten years and...* or the sentence beginning with ‘Obviously’!” (Summer Gathering Programme 2001). This relates to the tendency, criticised in a workshop on ‘EF! Culture’ at the 2001 gathering, that “Taking the position that ‘we have dealt with this and now it is resolved’ forgets that ‘WE’ changes all the time” (EF’JUNo.812002:4).	+	<blockquote>
		+	My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
		+	</blockquote>
−	My feeling was that such attempts at aiding newcomers run the risk of patronising their intended recipients: the very fact of being branded a ‘newcomer’ may be perceived negatively (as unequal, as labelled ‘outside’ or ‘naive’). I perceived a tendency in some Earth First! circles to assume that people not inside those circles are somehow missing out, or need support, when in actual fact they may be happily embedded in other networks. What does come clearly across in this concern to integrate newcomers into the fold, however, is the extent of the communitarian ethos in Earth First!’s anarchism.	+	In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in ''The German Ideology'', all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:
−	This brings us to (5), ‘acting out a little of our vision’, noted earlier in this section in terms of dealing with dissent (My notes, 1998), and the terms of debate, and most clearly demonstrated by the genuine sense of collective responsibility (<em>EF!AU</em> No.89 2003:5). As the programme puts it, “Eveiyone is Crew:... To ensure the smooth running of the site, work teams need to form for different tasks; for example, toilets, helping with cooking, driving, general welfare, being with the kids, etc... If eveiyone does a wee bit of work everything should be sorted. If you see something that needs doing, then do it” (Summer Gathering Programme 2001; cf Summer Gathering Flyer 2001). This mirrors the general philosophy of Earth First!: if you see a planet that needs saving, then do it!	+	<blockquote>
		+	Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Other aspects of Earth First! ideology manifested at the 2001 Summer Gathering included an awareness of gender issues, through a women-only camping space, and women-only workshops (for example on “Women’s fertility awareness for natural birth control”). There was a well-attended men- only workshop on ‘men and masculinity’ which was then converted into one including women’s points of view. Lots of men walked round the site wearing dresses, and there was an ‘Eco-faeries! ‘ Workshop. There was also a strong emphasis made on adopting the ‘social model of disability’, expressed through a concern for site accessibility that, through the participation of disabled individuals, was improved upon at the next gathering.[108]	+	Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the ''life-processes'' of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain<ref>Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, ''Scientific American'', February 26, 2018.</ref> (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine ''how'' consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].
−	There was an antifascist workshop, and one on the history of black radicalism. There are also annual workshops for “Working people - for those trying to balance jobs and activism”, and for parents balancing activism and children. There was a marked concern about the insularity of’EF! Culture’, expressed in this and the previous year through an emphasis on community activism (Summer Gathering Programme 2001; cf Summer Gathering Programme 1998: 8; EF!ROR2001: l;Seel 1997b: 176). Very cheap vegan food was laid on for everyone by not-for-profit collectives, and there was alternative technology powering some of the tents. I was pleasantly surprised by the many links between EF! protest activities and more long-term, sustainable projects and lifestyles. This was also evidenced by, for example, the number of children at the site (and the provision laid on for them), with both young babies and groups of middle-school age children running around, stealing footballs off the grown ups and putting on puppet shows. There were also displays for Permaculture, participants from organic smallholdings, community allotments and low impact communities. In 2001, environmental awareness was most clearly evidenced by an emphasis on water conservation: “Only use what you really need, and use fresh water only when there is no alternative. Think about your water use, could waste water be used instead? Think seriously about whether you can go without water using activities, for instance, showering twice a day will not be a option. Unless it rains” (Summer Gathering Programme 2001). In other years, site-specific issues varied from the design of compost toilets to the protection of ecologically sensitive areas. I consider it a strength of Earth First! that the truly	+	Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not ''determine'' the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in ''The German Ideology:''
−	environmental and sustainable is integrated with the political edge of the movement, as my arguments of 5.3.6 and 5.3.7 indicate.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.
		+	</blockquote>
−	*** 5.3.11 Cliques	+	In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,” and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:
−	Informal hierarchies are commonly identified in informal activism (<em>CW</em> 1997: 8; Roseneil 2000:175). Purkis refers to a hierarchy (or tyranny) of the most committed in EF! (2001: 168; cf Jonathan X 2000:163; Dolly quoted in Heller 2000:129), and an EF! document states that “Power exists. It’s held by the loudest people, or the most informed, or the funniest, or the most confident, or the men, or given to those perceived as having important views, or whoever” (EREE 1999; cf RA! 1996: 6). Freeman warned that friendship groups can create power inequalities when there are no formal structures to bypass them (1984: 8; Polletta 2002:164). My experience of the Earth First! network includes many examples of such friendship groups. One EF!er said that she rarely read the <em>Action Update</em> but was kept in touch by gossiping on the phone with friends elsewhere in the country. Tellingly, that method of communication was often more accurate, more speedy and more direct than the ‘official* EF! organ. The implications of this informal communication through friends are many. Inviting everyone to come to an action in the <em>EF!AU,</em> for example, would be a very unreliable way of gaining numbers. If well- connected, well-liked activists were involved in organising it, however, then bodies would be far more likely to turn up. The method by which they would hear of the action, and be spurred to join, would be informal, word-of-mouth, and mainly reliant on the good reputation of the activist/s concerned.	+	<blockquote>
		+	In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Freeman argued that ‘“Structurelessness’ is organisationally impossible” and “a way of masking power” (1984: 6; cf Bookchin 1995b: 58), and that the only way to avoid hidden cliques, is to adopt a formal structure (1984:14; cf Epstein 1991:272). The Land is Ours landrights group did just this, adopting a constitution “in order to prevent the emergence of hierarchy” (Monbiot 1998: 176). In contrast to Freeman’s thesis, however, the cliques of EF!UK came to be most vociferously criticised and identified precisely when EF! organisation was taken onto an institutional, democratic, open and participatory form, at the summer gathering. GA also claim that “Those who don’t attend [the gathering] tend to be the most militant EF!ers or those with the strongest local connections” (1999: 1). I would dispute this assertion to some degree, as it is often ‘big talkers* that state the most radical views, be that in textual form (such as GA), or at large gatherings. Yet, as I noted in 5.3.10, certain types of activist do dominate at gatherings, are more confident speaking in front of many others, and more comfortable with the idea of collective decision-making. It is also true that many EDA types (including those of a practical bent who are more interested in constructing camp defences than discussing other people) are not represented at gatherings.	+	So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).
−	It is claimed that those who are willing and able to organise such Gatherings “usually end up being the same people each year” (FR 2000), so that a situation arises where “we have a small number of highly motivated activists doing the main organising... working in small friendship groups” (EFH 1998). It is these (inadvertent) cliques that are identified as one of the biggest problems in informal, structureless organisation[109]. But as in EF!US, the <em>Journal</em> became the focus, so in EF!UK the national gatherings served to bring out the debate. It was alleged that the same circles chose the topics each year for the ‘gathering wide discussions’ (My notes, Summer Gathering 2003), and while it is a fair response to point out that the programme of the gathering is ‘chosen’ by anyone saying to the organising collective ‘I want to do a workshop on...* (J in Steve 2003:4), the social dynamics involved make the situation less simple than that[110]	+	Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.
−	One discussion document (DD) argues that	+	As Marx wrote in ''The German Ideology:'' “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:
−	“People outside the friendship cliques, firstly, can’t see how the organisation is being done so don’t know how to join in organising. Secondly, it appears that someone else is doing it so people don’t bother doing it themselves. The pattern becomes self-perpetuating” (EFH 1998).[111]	+	<blockquote>
		+	The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.
		+	</blockquote>
−	There is thus the danger of “a bureaucracy about to be bom” (EFH 1998), even though ‘bad’ bureaucrats are not initiating it. Invisible hierarchies or cliques develop through sustained participation. These, if they lose their receptiveness to new members, can act to the detriment of a camp or activist group (Freeman 1984: 14).	+	Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:
−	Another DD reports that “The damage caused by our very real informal hierarchy is disturbing ... holding us back from being more inclusive and effective, and we are wasting a lot of good energy and good people by not sorting it” (FR 2000). The perception of this led to the ‘clique discussions’ at 1997’s EF! Gathering (AOH 1998), and the situation is framed by Notts EF!:	+	<blockquote>
		+	Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“There is an unofficial hierarchy forming in Earth First! due to its structurelessness. Because of this lack of structure people are following action trends directed by a relatively small group of highly motivated activists. People are not educating and involving each other. This is not deliberate but it must be addressed. Direct Democracy does not just happen, it must be nurtured and guarded as a precious thing...Most of us in the U.K. come from an industrial society which does not encourage participation or taking control of your own life. It encourages domination, such as that of women by men or amateurs by experts. It also encourages the passivity of those not in the controlling elite. We need to be vigilant to avoid falling into these patterns. How many shy individuals’ participation do we lose, by not having a clear way they can join in without feeling that they are questioning the dominant clique” (Notts EF! 1998).	+	What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.
−	However, in Purkis’ study of a local EF! group, he notes that the ‘core group’ was “More of an accidental clique than an executive body, not as closed as a cell or a cadre, it often seemed to want to dissolve itself through extending the number of people responsible for particular tasks” (2001: 167). He notes that “there is a strong commitment to processes of self and group monitoring” (1996:207), and MEF! proved “as reflexive about themselves as a group as they are as individuals”, taking nonhierarchy very seriously (1996: 208; 2001:347-8). Purkis also notes that “The level of accountability of these people was quite high given the extremely long and participatory nature of the ‘EF! Gathering’s’” (2001:168).	+	Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a ''reflection'' of material reality which developed and results from ''life-processes'' of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.
−	It is my view, therefore, that the discussions which follow in 5.3.12 should be seen in a similar light to that which Roseneil claimed for the Greenham campers, where “Conflict and tension ... arose in situations where hierarchy and inequality were minimal in comparison with conventional political organisations and living arrangements” (2000:164). It is EF!ers’ (anarchist) hyper-sensitivity to issues of hierarchy, elitism and inequality (Purkis 2001:348-351) that provoked so much discussion, accusation and hand-wringing in the movement: issues of informal hierarchies and friendship cliques that had long existed on road camps, and indeed in all radical activism, were thrown into the spotlight. The results of this controversy, which I chart in 5.3.12, are useful to both our understanding of EDA and our understanding of anarchism, by displaying the variety of conflicting positions available within a broadly shared basis of activist anarchism. This variety exemplifies the spirit of exploratory dialogue that I identified in Chapter 2, and adds a critical bite to the characterisation of mutually respectful open debate which I applied to EF! in 5.3.10.	+	This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his ''Philosophical Notebooks,'' Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.”
−	*** 5.3.12 The 1999 Winter Moot	+	In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.
−	It was at the 1999 Winter Moot that discussions over the nature of EF! organisation were made most clear and explicit. EF! participants had long been raising criticisms and suggestions, highlighting the gulf between <em>Earth First!’s</em> ideal and its actual organisation. Here this debate became crystallised into formal proposals for network-wide debate. Through the articulation of these positions, we may view the EFlers as both utilising arguments and themes from the anarchist tradition, and also utilising their experience in practical activism, its successes, needs and limitations. Theory was drawn upon to (guide and) judge practice, and practice drawn upon to (reformulate and) judge theory. I have simplified the range of positions expressed at the Moot into four proposals, and drawn out what I consider the most valuable criticisms of these. The discussion at the Moot was, as usual, more wide-ranging than I can restate here.[112] My experience of the spoken debates indicated that the arguments put on to paper were generally taken less seriously in practice. Some EFlers did have strong views about what EF! should do, but a widespread sentiment was that the textual arguments I draw on here were ‘over the top*. The Moot did not, therefore, conclusively adopt one or other of the proposals (and not only for the ‘informalist’ reasons of proposal 4), but carried on in much the same format as EF! had before the Moot. Nevertheless, the value of the Moot lies in revealing the tensions and possibilities residing in the recognition of EF! as an activist anarchist network.	+	'''LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION'''
−	The issues that prompted the Moot were identified long before. Thus a <em>Do or Die</em> article reported in 1996 that	+	In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,'' Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.
−	“Two basic problems have to be addressed; firstly to define the major changes to society that we seek and secondly, do we want to build a mass movement or are we content to remain a small band of young, noisy, white, middle-class, unemployed, physically able ‘extremists’?” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1996:18).	+	<blockquote>
		+	1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Wony about becoming a closed, activist ghetto was one of EF!’s most consistent topics (EF.M UNo.29 1996: 6), with repeated calls for “more inclusive forms of direct action ... to prevent exclusion of less physically able, more elderly or less radicalised people” (Seel 1997b: 176; cf EF.MC7No.52 1998:4-5; Summer Gathering Programme 1998: 8).[113]	+	Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.
−	One Discussion Document at the Moot suggested that “EF! is full of well-meaning people who are scared to admit they’ve lost their way, who psychologically huddle together, hanging onto familiar old banners...People who forged important friendships in intense moments, and weeks and months of out- on-the-edge activism. And who don’t know how to stay at such intensity, without burning out, but neither can walk away from it and move onto other things” (EGOD 1999). Another DD noted that “There are splits and disagreements as we realise that perhaps we are not; after all; all moving in the same direction” (BAT 1998).	+	<blockquote>
		+	2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.
		+	</blockquote>
−	The Winter Moot of 1999 thus arrived at a moment of identity crisis for Earth First! UK, and was designed as “a space to discuss ourselves” (SI 1999). The organisers recognised that “All movements should change and evolve, and there’s currently a very strong general feeling that we all need to get together and discuss what we’re in it for” (S6 1999). They therefore intended the Moot to provide “a chance to chat with people new & energetic, and old & cynical, at more length than usual, in an atmosphere of constructive criticism and mutual interest & support I hope that we will be able to feel what binds us together, and be able to explore and respect our differences, without feeling the need to all agree” (S8 1999). This is the positive sense of debate which I claimed for the Summer Gatherings in 5.3.10. One of the contributors thus emphasises that the Moot should be a “safe space for <em>everybody *s</em> ideas” (FR 2000), and another valorises dialogue over agreement so that “new and old activist dynamics can cross-fertilise, instead of disappearing up our own arses” (AOH 1998).	+	Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive ''phenomena'' of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?
−	The ground rules of the Moot were laid out by the collective who organised it. It was an alcohol-free space and all discussion was to be based on <em>“Respect</em> - One of our challenges as a movement is working out how to work co-operatively together - in a sense policing ourselves. If you have a problem with someone’s behaviour but don’t want to discuss it with everyone please don’t hesitate to talk to one of the organising collective”. Discussion Documents (DDs) were invited in advance from participants, and these were distributed at the Moot, with copies arranged in different orders to avoid one person’s argument being given priority.[114]	+	Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that ''practice'' allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”
−	In activist anarchism, these problems are crucial because, lacking a fixed ideology, it is through this informal organisation that anarchism is expressed. As one contributor puts it, using the prefigurative language introduced in 4.3.4, “What you do is what you become. The way we organise will shape EFIs future” (EFH 1998). For clarity, I am structuring the arguments from the DDs into four proposals put to Earth First!: (1) to form an explicit anarchist federation, (2) to develop a recognised EF! power structure, (3) to form a tighter network of collectives and (4) to keep everything informal. I conclude with an assessment of the actual impact of these proposals on EF!, and consider the criticisms (also from within EF!) of the social dynamics revealed by this Moot process itself.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Proposal 1: An explicit anarchist federation	+	Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses ''do'' accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in ''Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:''
−	Some suggested that, like the Anarchist Federation, “EF! should be explicitly anarchist and revolutionary” (B 1999; cf S5 1999), and proposed “A national federation of local groups which ‘directly confront, and work towards the overthrow of the capitalist system, and its replacement with a free, egalitarian and ecologically sustainable alternative’” (BAT 1998). Such a proposal is supported by the strand of anarchism that suggests that equal power can be instituted by the creation of a horizontal federation which would liaise through delegates (<em>A T</em>1999), and which seeks the ‘leadership’ of anarchist ideas through making them explicit rallying points.	+	<blockquote>
		+	3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.
		+	</blockquote>
−	This proposal characterises the formal and not the informal strand of anarchism, and it is therefore liable to the critiques of ideological organisations that we introduced in Chapter 2. Thus GA criticise formal anarchists for “petty sectarian sniping over their barricades of ideology” (GA 1999:3), arguing that <em>that</em> is the real ‘ghetto’, not the activist scene: “EF!’s ‘activist ghetto’ is mercifully free of such ideological retardation, activists have no inhibitions about taking action themselves and setting their own agendas” and EF!’s informal anarchism is “freer of patronising, elitist attitudes than the old class strugglists” (GA 1999:4).	+	Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:
−	Green Anarchist states its opposition to ideology because, instead of facilitating revolution, it “creates a barrier” to it (“Organisational / ideological bullshit was just another layer of oppression” (GA 1999:2)); and its opposition to ideological organisation on the basis that “politicos form mini-States around themselves functioning much as all others, teaching those within to think and act in a certain way to distinguish themselves from outsiders and enforcing this with the threat of expulsions” (GA 1999:2). Others, however, accuse GA of possessing, and pushing, a very strong ideology themselves, and I consider that they fail to apply all their critical points to their own external image and impact.	+	<blockquote>
		+	That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.
		+	</blockquote>
−	One DD makes the more valuable point that “If EF! were to label itself’anarchist’... it would not only be inaccurate (I know many people who use the name [ Earth First! ] aren’t, don’t they count?) but it would look like a piece of ideology you had to subscribe to in order to ‘belong’.” Instead, with informal organisation “those of us who are anarchists can discuss anarchist ideas as much as we want, push ‘em as our personal idea of the way to go, make loads of links with anarchist movements, etc etc, and maybe we will get to a point where EF! is not simply in name but in reality synonymous with anarchism, which would be much better than officially labelling it so because a few people like the idea” (FR 2000). Introducing a stated ideology would also mean that EF!ers would have to constantly argue and battle over what brand of anarchism they possessed, and how it was defined. AOH instead wants to organise and settle issues “without the need for ideology or mission statements” (1999), and this is a position I tend toward myself, having as yet found no inspiration for my activism from ideological disputation.	+	Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in ''practice'' [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Proposal 2: A Formal Structure	+	<blockquote>
		+	The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
		+	</blockquote>
−	We noted that the Moot was called because of “unhappiness about cliques and power struggles” (BAT 1998), and the second proposal rests on the recognition of the problems within an informal, structureless organisation: “The current chaotic and individualistic nature of the EF! network” with its “unacknowledged and unaccountable hierarchies” (BAT 1998).[115] To counter the tyranny of structurelessness, some advocated (Zapatista-influenced) “direct democracy... instead of leaving decision making to individuals and cliques”. This would mean that “decisions concerning all groups would be made at national conferences (collective assemblies)” (1998): the Summer Gathering would thus get decision-making power (cited in FR 1999). BAT argued that “This is not a move away from anarchy ... [ but ] toward it, toward direct democracy instead of informal hierarchy” (BAT 1998).	+	Notice that Engels is careful to use the words ''so far'': “its qualities, ''so far'', agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:
−	Advocates of a formal structure support their case with the argument that a revolution needs to involve the mass of people: “The task of creating such a change ... requires the active involvement of millions of people - people taking back control of their lives and their communities through direct action” (ATW 1998). They perceive that elements at least of a national structure are necessary to make EF! accessible to such numbers (<em>Do or Die</em> 1996:20). EDA “was intended to be a mass movement. The movement’s there, but not the mass. How do you get more people involved?” (Paul, ex-EF!er quoted in Berens 1995; cf <em>Schnews</em> 2001:3). The strengths of wider movements were recognised from the anti-roads experience: “campaigns such as Newbury, and Live Exports can be seen as mass movements unified around ‘single issues’... they get the job done with a lower level of risk for individuals, and they plant the seeds of empowerment in many peoples minds” (EFH 1998). EFH notes that the EF! network was itself “beginning to act as if we were a mass movement” (EFH 1998), and that entailed the assumption that it needs to broaden its support base, or else implode.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.
		+	</blockquote>
−	This ‘mass movement logic’ is shared by traditional class-struggle anarchists, and also recalls the notion of ‘movement development’ assumed by most Marxist commentators. Hanisch, for example, states that without a structure, movements are “unable to speak with an organised, powerful voice” (2001: 88), and are unable to “deal with the very real power of the ruling classes” (2001:92). Such commentators advocate “the development of groups into organisations” (2001:92) in order “to assure the development of the organised strength needed to accumulate and eventually take power” (2001: 93; cf Freeman 1984: 14).[116] GA, by contrast, associate formal structures with compromise, reform (1999: 2) and hierarchy (S 1998), and argue that they “alienate rather than build support and revolutionary consciousness” (GA 1999: 1). This was the situation, in opposition to which, EF! originally formed.	+	Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
−	Most advocates of the second proposal did not want a formal, socialist-style organisation along Freeman’s lines, but rather a softer and more limited development of certain limited aspects of structure, such as:	+	<blockquote>
		+	The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“a national contact point that’s easily accessible, to sort stuff out that’s not getting sorted out, like new people, and media. Then we could efficiently have a national campaign. We want more people to know what EF! is, and how to become part of the movement. We want to have a voice and have people identifiable and accountable as speakers for us. Then we can get bigger and stronger” (FR 1999).	+	So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through ''practice'' in the material world.
−	While some EFIers agreed with GA that “Facilities, offices, fax machines, media spokesmen/spokeswomen, are all hostages to compromise” (S 1998[117]), many others persistently felt that EF! was suffering from its loss of a national, unifying campaign (earlier provided by the antiroads movement) (<em>EF!AU</em> No.43 1997:6).	+	-----
−	The idea of a national campaign on the format developed by HLS represented a less ‘structural’ but equally ‘co-ordinating’ proposal for EF! (WWB 1999). Like the successful animal rights campaigns against Hillgrove cat-breeders and Consort dog-breeders, such a campaign would consist of a monthly action, undertaken by different (regional) groups, with momentum for the campaign building with	+	''- Social Sources of Consciousness''
−	each action: “the difference from other campaigns is that it’s not a continual thing, i.e. sitting	+	There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are ''labor'' and ''language.''
−	trees/camps every day, but is a regular action, probably, but not necessarily, at the same place” (WWB 1999; cf <em>GA</em> 1997b: 13). The risk of burn-out and the burden of trying to get more people involved would be much lessened. In 6.4.3 we shall see that the campaign against Bayer took on some of these	+	''Labor'' is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].
−	qualities.	+	-----
−	Here we have entered into a polarisation within activist anarchism between mass movement logic and the ‘anti-mass’ positions that underlay the final two proposals (Levine 1984:4-21; Anti-Mass 1988:3; Notts EF! 1998:4; GA 1999:1; IE 2005: 11). I see merits in both positions, but on this occasion I agreed with those who argued it was “not realistic to expect to build a mass movement” (S 1998), that “By putting our energies into becoming a mass movement we are becoming ineffective” (EFH 1998), and I was also persuaded that, at the time, “building a large mass movement... [is] a flawed aim ... [ and ] impossible in this country” (EFH 1998). GA and EFH agree that “the principle under discussion is <em>organisation</em> not numbers” (GA 1999; 1).[118]	+	==== Annotation 73 ====
−	“Mass is not about numbers ... it’s about structure. A mass movement mirrors the structure of mass society, a superficially unified mass of alienated individuals.... mass movements are controlled by cliques, committees, and ideologies. Opposed to this is face to face full participation and communication of self managed small groups, or collectives” (EFH 1998; Levine 1984:19).	+	In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:
−	GA argue that “mass movements are all about manipulation - a small minority controlling the mass as its ‘representatives* - it’s unsurprising they’ve achieved so very little in revolutionary terms” (GA 1999:2; cf Anti-Mass 1988:3). Thus EFH restate the institutionalisation thesis: “in all large organisations democracy starts to warp when it moves above the level of the face to face conversation” (EFH 1998). This was the criticism of FoE and Greenpeace in 5.2.1.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.
−	The argument against the ‘mass’ in ‘mass movement’ is connected to the anarchist critique of power and is also deployed against mass actions. GA state that “Massification has been sold” to <em>Earth First!</em> on the basis that “more people means more power” (for example with the masses who turned up to the Birmingham RTS in 1998) and thus ultimately to revolution. “The trouble is that these mass events exemplify the cliquey manipulation at work, with a small, sussed group secretively laying on the event and a mass of ‘bodies* then turning up to it with little control and even little idea why they’re there” (GA 1999: 2). EFH joins in the critique of’mass’ actions: “For a lot of people in mass action the realisation of what’s going on isn’t complete. Only a small proportion of the people involved continue to act in a sustained way, others don’t because their involvement was only on certain levels” (EFH 1998; cf <em>GA</em> 1997b: 13). I will return to this critique with the study of RTS in 7.2.	+	Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.
−	A final objection to the proposal for a ‘national structure* reintroduces the bottom-up, ground-level theme of anarchism: in contrast to the attempts at ‘changing’ the structure of EF! at a national gathering, many participants urged instead that the real decisions and activity take place at the <em>bottom,</em> out of the limelight. Thus one contributor urged EFlers to “build working and communication relationships ... at a <em>local</em> level where those relationships really mean something.” That way, “change may happen from the grass roots” as opposed to by a ‘politburo’ decision (FR 2000). “Whatever this ‘new thing’ is, it must be created by everyone at a grass roots level” (BAT 1998).	+	Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.
−	Proposal 3: A Network of Collectives	+	But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.
		+	</blockquote>
−	A third proposal preferred the model of a network of small collectives to the idea of a mass movement (EFH 1998): “people want a network of collectives with representatives meeting together every few months” and are “pushing it onto everyone else” (AOH 1998). There are two elements to this proposal. First, that EFlers form themselves into small collective groups - “a small self-defined group of individuals that have a common analysis and agreement on a strategy” (EFH 1998): this was even encouraged within pre-existing but ‘unwieldy’ EF! groups. Second (and in common with Proposal 1), that these operate as a network with other such groups using delegates (EFH 1998; cf <em>AT</em> 1999).	+	-----
−	I had previously attended a workshop on collectives at the 1998 EF! Summer Gathering, in which we discussed the <em>Notts EF!</em> DD which proclaimed the strengths of collectives and advocated the “case for a network within the Earth First! family” (Notts EF! 1998:3). Different forms of collectives suggested included workers co-ops, housing co-ops, and collectives bound by common identity, locality or ideology.[119] Collectives, it was argued, form along natural lines and cannot be imposed from above, but rather form out of natural ties or ‘affinity*, from below. The aim is not to gain a ‘mass’ of people as in Proposal 2. Instead, “As the group grows it should look for natural lines along which it can divide into new ‘crews’” (Notts EF! 1998). When I suggested in the 1998 workshop that this kind of group was divisive and exclusive, the advocates replied that activists are elitist anyway, and to structure a clique into an affinity group actually made it less divisive.[120] I considered this an inadequate response.	+	Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.
−	Practical strengths claimed for affinity groups (as I shall here term this model of a fixed, closed collective) were that they make activism sustainable, supporting “campaigners in the long-run ... as well as for just effectively getting things done.” It is for these (social, psychological) reasons that some within EF! argue they should be actively trying to build them: “Affinity groups recognise the importance of community as a foundation for our resistance and offer us a chance to enact a vision now - that of supportive, non-hierarchical, participatory, flexible and friendly groups of people taking action” (EF/Jt/No.42 1997:3, redistributed with Notts EF! 1998). Some within Earth First! therefore pushed the idea of affinity groups beyond loose units to ‘get things done’, and into the ideal social unit for activists:
−	“Whilst affinity groups take forward some elements of Earth First! attempts already (avoidance of hierarchies; participation in decision-making), adopting affinity groups recognises that ‘structure’ is different to ‘authoritarianism’ and enables us to challenge the confusion between the two” (£F.44C/No.42 1997:3).[121]	+	-----
−	Affinity groups avoid the problems of mass ‘representation’ in proposal 2: “Being part of an affinity group strengthens our ability to take direct action - to act directly on a situation without recourse to a	+	==== Annotation 74 ====
−	representative” (£F/JC/No.421997:3). It is also claimed that they act as a positive force in the individuality - collectivity relationship:	+	We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical ''practice'' in the material world. See the discussion of ''practice'' in Annotation 211, p. 205.
−	“By working in consensus-based small groups, all members are able to participate in planning, decision-making and carrying out decisions, avoiding relying on strong, charismatic leaders and making people less prone to being manipulated by self-styled leaders” (<em>EF!AU</em>No.42 1997:3).	+	All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.
−	For reasons such as these, some anarchists claim that “the affinity group does well at providing a revolutionary context” (Ruins 2003:16).	+	''Language'' is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.
−	However, others within EF! responded with alarm to the notion of tightly-bound, closed affinity groups for abandoning the principles of participation, accessibility and openness to change (Seel & Plows 2000:130). They characterised affinity groups as “a permanent structure that functions as a fixed community ... a small institution of sorts” with “no specific function outside of its own existence” (EREE 1999). Barriers are created to new individuals and it is suggested that affinity groups “can isolate activists from the wider society” (EFH 1998). Group loyalty can blunt their receptiveness to critique and change (EREE 1999), and their sense of accountability to other members of their group does not extend to ‘outsiders*, which could cause problems on mass actions, for example (Seel & Plows 2000: 129).	+	The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.
−	At the same time as ‘outsiders’ are excluded, the ‘insiders’ may also suffer to the degree that they “use the Affinity Group as a shortcut to having needs met, or a way round personal growth* Close supportive relationships have to be developed - but if you have access to a structure that offers something like them to you, ‘ready-made’ upon joining, might you skip the developing?” (EREE 1999). This critic compares affinity groups to a traditional family, in which “the roles and the relationships of the members inevitably become fixed, and your own role becomes a familiar and comfortable one • but it is not the place where most of your personal growth, let alone your impact on society, occurs.” The author argues that “We don’t need to create artificial ‘families’. Real communities are all around us - home, EF!... neighbours or friends... These are alive, constantly changing, and constantly challenging, and all the goals that we have can be worked on in these contexts, without building walls for ourselves which we then only have to knock down” (EREE 1999).	+	-----
−	Further drawbacks are cited, such as an imbalance in the individual-collective relationship: “the group holds all the power and the individual holds very little.” An intimate, small-scale form of bureaucracy also represents a danger: “Affinity Groups make their own work -create their own problems which then clearly require time and effort to solve... all that internal work drains away time and effort from the real work”. Finally, it is argued that affinity groups, while introducing the additional negative dangers of factionalism, separation and elitism, have also not succeeded in escaping the negative dynamics of power-over and informal hierarchies: “In a fixed group, power relationships and roles tend to form, and be repeatedly reinforced, as the same individuals work to communicate or pursue projects together” (EREE 1999; cf IE 2005:13). A small, fixed affinity group would thus create a pintsize version of the negative power structures its advocates sought to avoid.	+	==== Annotation 75 ====
−	The alternative to this model was conceived as “a task-oriented, temporary structure” (EREE 1999) more in keeping with the principles of anarchism and the needs of activism. Thus one DD proposed its alternative notion of a collective as a loose, permeable and non-exclusive grouping:	+	From ''Dialectics of Nature'':
−	“the collective is a time-honoured structure that allows people to come together freely when needed for a temporary period for a specific focus, task, or action... With various levels of investment, you can be part of several different ones, and have access to the variety and freedom of ideas, the ebb and flow of energy, and the endless permutations and combinations of relationships with different people at different intensity in different contexts, that goes with the diversity of a live community” (EREE 1999).	+	<blockquote>
		+	It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.
−	In my experience, this is what does happen with the better (and more open) aspects of EF! and EDA, such as the Gathering collective, local groups and networks that form on specific campaigns or actions.	+	Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.
−	Before leaving this proposal for a network of collectives, we should note that the ‘network’ part was also attacked. For example, the call for delegates signifies “an acceptance of anti-democratic,	+	First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.
		+	</blockquote>
−	representational principles” for Green Anarchist (GA 1999:1). Others condemned the notion of a ‘network’ itself: “Hitherto, the in-word was ‘movement’ - looser, less exclusive, and importantly, a fluid rather than fixed ‘community’.” AOH noted, furthermore, that “A network or federate structure is something wide open to be defined, and thus controlled, however supposedly democratic the means are” (AOH 1998). Yet note that the notion of an identified and labelled ‘movement’ has itself been criticised as a limiting idea that places the phenomenon into the realm of media and state categorisation: a construct that appears ‘other’ and off-putting to those not yet involved (and, indeed, even to those who already are) (Adilkno 1994: 10-25). I personally dislike the oft-heard talk of ‘movement’ for its connotations of’mass’; for the sense that the ‘movement’ must be going ‘somewhere’ in particular; and for the tendency of’movement’ talkers to impose their own definitions of’what the movement is’ and thus ‘where the movement <em>should</em> go’. In the final part of this section we shall note that this charge was made against the Moot proposals themselves.	+	So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.
−	Proposal 4: Keep EF! Informal	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-14.png|''This diagram is based on work from an article titled'' “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation<ref>Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in ''The Royal Society''.</ref>.”''Modern research has discovered strong evidence<ref>''Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands'' by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.</ref> that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in'' Dialectics of Nature.]]
−	“There are (at least) two different models for building a movement...: a mass organisation with strong, centralised control, such as a Party. The other model, which consolidates mass support only as a coup de grace necessity, is based on small groups in voluntary association” (Levine 1984: 17).	+	-----
−	The proposal to ‘keep EF! informal’ has already been introduced through the hostility and criticism directed against the first three proposals. Advocates are in the privileged position of being able to marshal anti-ideological and anti-sectarian arguments against proposal one; anti-mass arguments against proposal two; and anti-rigid or anti-closure arguments against proposal three. Arguments against bureaucracy, for personal autonomy and for ‘revolutionary’ openness can be launched against all three. The arsenal can be applied to any defined organisational method, and to tendencies in any social movement	+	==== Annotation 76 ====
−	Green Anarchist argue that “EF! should be as free-form and accessible as possible” (GA 1999:2), and urge EF! to “Keep it informal” (S 1998; cf GA 1997c: 14; IE 2005; 14). They suggest that “We can network between separate groups and campaigns as we have been doing already, on an ad-hoc basis” (S 1998). Yet there is a danger that this proposal would leave EF! in exactly the same position as had earlier been recognised as a problem: stagnating, inaccessible and riddled with informal hierarchies.	+	It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language ''and'' social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
−	The informalists present an alternative approach to combat these problems: to “demystify what is happening ... empower others to form and use their own collectives and participate in the organisation of the movement” (EFH 1998).[122] Thus one DD states “There are many problems with an apparent lack of structure, but they can and must be faced up to, if there’s the will” (AOH 1998). The terms of debate are thus shifted away from making a grand collective decision, towards long-term small-scale effort (IE 2005:16). This fits the characterisation, which I have supported, of EF!UK as “a fluid community” (AOH 1998), and “a dynamic non-hierarchical organic thing not an organisation” (EFWP 1998). It is my belief that this approach is more in keeping with the ethos of EF!’s activist anarchism, and when it is displayed it would clearly have my support However, there is also the danger that such sentiments could be merely spoken, and then not acted upon, and that the informal cliques, exclusive behaviour and domineering behaviour would continue unchecked.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Some viewed the 1999 Moot itself as a veiy microcosm of the clique problem: “Different organisational concepts are being bandied about by a small number of activists in the movement, and they <em>seem</em> to have a disproportionately loud voice, which can dominate if allowed to” (AOH 1998). This author relates it to the individuals who grew up with EF! (such ‘old hacks’ were not in existence in the early years), who “got emotionally battered ... ask of themselves many questions” and, having come to “depend on the movement”, were “looking for a more stable or secure structure within which they can continue their campaigning lives” (AOH 1998; cf EGOD 1998; <em>EF!AU No.25:</em> 6). AOH records that “With this come two major problems, that of making structures more permanent, and of	+	In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
−	pushing a model of organising or campaigning on the many” (AOH 1998). The first of these issues related to proposal 2, die second is a case of unequal social dynamics and organisational processes, which I will look at now.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-15.png|''Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.'']]
−	AOH states that he previously became involved <em>defensively</em> in ‘national EF! politics’, when one person “had a strong idea of how EF! groups could be networked and organised, and wanted to stamp this idea nationally”, and the same process was taking place at the Moot (AOH 1998). GA added that “Good though it was to see the quantity and quality of opposition to EFlUK’s massification in discussion papers circulated before the 1999 Winter Moot, it was disappointing that none noted that the discussion papers themselves are part of the massification process ... potential policy papers”, and they argue that the whole debate “smells of representation” (GA 1999:1-3).	+	Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
−	The Moot proposals were thus seen as an attempt at defining, and thereby controlling the Earth First! network/movement/community. The informalists present ‘diversity’ as the preferred alternative to this: “If people don’t understand EF! supports a diversity of opinions - even the odd ideology - then that’s their problem” (GA 1999:2). AOH proclaims diversity a strength: “We do not need to all move in the same (defined) direction” (AOH 1998). The EF! network / movement / milieu is too diverse for decisions to be made: “there’s no way a group of delegates could be truly representative of the full diversity of the EF! community” (FR 2000).	+	-----
−	EFH notes that “our natural tendencies towards autonomy always gets in the way of mass direct democracy within our movement” (EFH 1998). The Moot ‘putsch attempt’ was framed as an expression of the tension between autonomy and democracy;	+	==== b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness ====
−	“people who want to make network-wide changes to EF! as it now exists are expressing frustration at the lack of means for democratically doing so. I would suggest this is still in fact a positive rather than a negative about the network... none of us can be told what to do by any of the rest of us” (FR 2000).	+	''- Nature of Consciousness''
−	AOH celebrates this opposition to the control paradigm:	+	''Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world.'' [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]
−	When “people complained ... that Earth First! hardly existed ... I said to myself, that’s the whole point, it’s not an organisation, and that makes our task difficult, but more worthwhile. It’s great that I don’t properly know about individuals or groups somewhere in the country doing fantastic stuff, but that means too that I can’t tell them or anyone else how it is or should be. It’s a radical message that says you are part of something which you can’t define beyond your own locality, that links you up with people you’ve never met who share a similar spirit, and that you can’t speak on behalf of, or represent the views or ideology - a strange kind of belonging without possessing” (AOH 1998).	+	''The dynamic and creative nature'' of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.
−	This theme was most clearly played out, before and after the Moot, at successive EF! gatherings, through discussion of the <em>naming</em> of EF![123]	+	The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:
−	AOH records that EF! has a tradition of not pushing the name (“as it would be corporate behaviour etc etc” (AOH 1998)), and it has never been central to EF! activity or strategy. He suggests it should be “a hat that we put on... rather than a barrier” (AOH 1998), not laden with content like ideological groups such as the Anarchist Federation. GA state that “we might as well use whatever labels we feel happiest with. Just as long as it’s done without consistency or the sombre reverence you’d expect from boring Lefties” (GA 1999:3). FR proposes that “people who don’t feel comfortable about using the name Earth First! simply exercise their autonomy and stop using it Its only a handy way to identify a loose community. Campaigns have their own identity and so do ideas” (FR 2000). They suggest it may even be good having an inadequate, disliked name, because then participants do not get hung up on how cool their identity is. GA link this namelessness to radically and EF!’s ‘no compromise’ identity: “the principle that no one in EF! can speak for anyone else” means that “negotiation is precluded” (GA 1999:4).	+	* The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
		+	* The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
		+	* The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.
−	Although Green Anarchist state that they don’t “give a damn what EF! calls itself’ (1999:3), their extensive contributions to the debate presented a very strong notion of what constituted the identity of EF!. GA state that “EF! is the sum total of the activity of those involved” (GA 1993). It is thus action which defines EF!, and this fits the definition on the <em>Action Update,</em> quoted in 5.3.9. One DD thus argues that “the most fundamental incidence of what Earth First! is ... is expressed through peaceful ecological direct action”, and “without these actions there would be no Earth First!” (EFWP 1998; cf GA 1999; 1).	+	''Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world.'' Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”<ref>''The German Ideology'', Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.</ref>
−	As I argued in 5.3.3, furthermore, this EDA is seen as only one part of a wider strategy of radical social change, and EF! is viewed as only a <em>part</em> of the environmental movement, not the whole of it:	+	-----
−	“there exists a peaceful ecological movement for radical social change; it is a dynamic, organic entity with many elements, many ways of operating and no clear boundaries. However, while Earth First! can be said to represent some of the parts of this movement, most importantly that part of the movement that organises itself non-hierarchically to take direct action ... Earth First! is not this movement, nor can it be, nor should it be” (EFWP 1998).[124]	+	==== Annotation 77 ====
−	The Moot debates are therefore presented as somewhat misguided, because EF! only “represents a grouping that has come together around a particular method of effecting a particular type of change” (EFWP 1998). To try to solidify EF! into something more definite, would mean attempting to somehow separate it from the wider movement, and weaken it through isolation.	+	In ''The German Ideology'', Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' that consciousness is not a ''mirror image'', or ''exact'' reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:
−	In the years following the 1999 Winter Moot, there is a sense in which all of the four proposals were adopted by EF!UK - presumably in large part due to the efforts of those who advocated them. First, EF!UK became a much more explicitly and identifiable anarchist organisation, and has been reported as such with, for example, coverage of the Mayday events of2000 and 2001:1 consider this more in 7.5. No strong national structure was created (indeed the name EF! is even less commonly used), yet the national ‘outreach project’ BLINC (Blatant Incitement Collective) made itself available to any ‘new people’ who want it, and conducted training days (£F.Ml/Nos. 57,59,77, 87). The Summer Gathering continued under the EF! name and continues to annually discuss EF!’s direction and identity. Also national actions (£FZJ t/No.87 2002: 8) and a national campaign (against Bayer, see 6.4) have been launched along the lines suggested in Proposal 2. Reflecting their allegiance to Proposal 3, several EF! groups have developed into what are effectively closed affinity groups (Purkis 2001:339). At least one of these requested to be removed from the <em>EF!AU</em> contacts list, but advised us they would be continuing their activism as an affinity group. In addition to this, various sub-groups, issue-specific campaigns and new projects have continued to pod off from EF!, including <em>Solidarity South Pacific,</em> CAGE, Social Centres and the <em>Dissent!</em> network: a practical attempt to create a libertarian anticapitalist network unburdened by EF! baggage while carrying forward its strengths of tactics and organising. These alternative projects and networks may be seen as practical attempts to create the alternative EF!’s that some participants desire. At the same time, many remain committed to EF!, at least as <em>one</em> of the networks they are affiliated to. This diversity exemplifies activist anarchism.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.
		+	</blockquote>
−	** 5.4 Chapter Summary
−	In this chapter I examined the nature of activist anarchism, and I detailed the concrete expressions of anarchist ideology in direct action communities. I examined the nature of revolutionary and anarchist action in practical, non-purist forms, and I used the Moot debates to identify the diversity inherent in the organisational nature of the EF! network. In this case study, therefore, I have presented EF!UK as a paradigmatic activist anarchist network. I have grounded it in the radical reaction to ENGO institutionalisation, and identified the existence of two parallel streams of anarchism, individualist and communitarian, that are expressed through its action, organisation and debates. The tension between these two streams has added to the conflict between EDA’s different political traditions, such as animal	+	-----
−	rights and peace movement repertoires, to constitute a major exemplar of both EDA vitality and to the problems in activist anarchism. It is this diverse, complex and ultimately quite hard-to-define milieu of action, intuition and experience that I have found so fascinating in my research.	+	Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:
−	In an effort to provide some glimpse of its reality - as opposed to resting content with a purely formal or abstract recognition of the diversity and fluidity of activist, deeds-based anarchism -1 have brought a spotlight to rest on the debates between activists concerning their organisation, aims and identity. The Earth First! Winter Moot provided the most accessible place to demonstrate this, as a location where many long-term, passionate activists drew on their experience and inspirations to articulate their views in hard, lasting, textual form, and were forced to precisely frame their positions in opposition to each other. This stands as a contrast to the usual robust, fragmented and often-confused arguments of a live discussion round campfire, pub table or living room. As such, the Moot debates were not inconsistent with the sentiments expressed ‘in action’, but they do represent a more crafted, static, and one might even say ‘academic*, crystallisation of such debates. I do not claim that they encapsulate for all time the debates of EDA in the 1990s, but they are perhaps the most direct, accurate and thorough record available. The various negotiations of practical necessity and anarchist ethics contained in the Moot debates demonstrate that anarchism is alive and well and living in the real-life needs of EDA activists. Similar demonstrations could be found through examination of the direct action elements of the antiwar, anti-nuclear or anti-globalisation movements.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4<sup>th</sup> Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].
		+	</blockquote>
−	By focussing on these debates, and demonstrating that they reveal the possibility for a whole <em>range</em> of positions consistent with an overarching framework of activist eco-anarchism, I hope to have developed a clearer recognition of the anarchism that exists within activism: an anarchism that is expressed through passionate unincorporated activism (as a response to institutionalisation); that engenders anarchist beliefs (through processes of radicalisation); and that is demonstrated through action (such as the expression of freedom and resistance in DIY, or the coherent forms of practical, non-compromising direct action in Earth First!). Anarchism, I insist, is not a dry or static theory. It is a set of ideals, ethics and critiques that, in the settings of DIY Culture, Earth First! and other scenes of grassroots direct action, is demonstrated, is tested and explored, and is constantly recreated in new patterns and new applications through practical action. Amongst the strengths of this activist direct action which I identified in this chapter, are the capacity for great flexibility in repertoires; the fluid creative crossovers between tactics and targets; the compatibility between political demands and lifestyle practices; the incorporation of multiple belief systems into a shared anarchist ethic of deeds- not-words; and the expression of revolution through everyday, situated struggle.	+	Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.
−	If, as I argued in 4.2.3 and 5.2.1, the strength of the environmental challenge is one that lies at the heart of our society’s anxieties and fault-lines, then the place where this challenge is being articulated and activated (as opposed to being smothered over or fudged), is precisely in the milieus of counter- institutional eco-activism exemplified by Earth First! The fact that anarchist ideas and anarchist arguments have resonated with the ecologically-motivated activists of this field is no accident, furthermore, for the lessons of anarchist history, its strategic arguments, and most importantly the ethical content of anarchism, have provided the best guide and support for those activists engaged in full-scale social change. EDA activists have voiced this anarchism through their debates, they have enacted this anarchism through their organisation and practical actions, and they have validated this anarchism by translating it, not into a dogmatic or unreal abstraction, but into an ethical, effective and impassioned collective life.	+	See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.
−	Having established the diversity, the roundedness and the articulate expression of ecological activist anarchism in this chapter, I shall turn in the next to the tensions that run through it. Indeed, I argue, these tensions and the conflict of strategic intentions and assumptions, is as much a defining part of activist anarchism as is its celebratory, consensual or holistic, lifestyle-matching practice. The ethics and arguments of anarchism, furthermore, may be articulated just as clearly in the form of critique and strategic intention, as they may be in the living-out of activist ecologism.	+	-----
−	* 6. Conflictual Strategies of Action: Violence, GM Crops, and Peat	+	''Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature.'' Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.
−	** 6.1 Chapter Introduction	+	-----
−	I have already introduced the ethics and critical content of anarchist direct action in section 4.3.4, and I considered the power it can bring through processes of radicalisation and empowerment in 5.2.2. In the sections of 5.3, furthermore, I detailed the complex and constantly changing uses to which direct action can be put, and the different strategic aims it can be used for (from economic pressure to triggering a public debate). I looked at the diversity of EFl’s strategy, repertoires and criteria of success, and argued that, in true anarchist fashion, the use of direct action confounds all the usual distinctions made between lifestyle and social change; micro and macro effects; single issues versus systemic analysis; and so on. In die first section of this chapter, 6.2.1 Defining Anarchist Direct Action, I will cement this understanding of what <em>anarchist</em> direct action is, by contrasting it to ‘pseudo-forms’ which I title ‘liberal’ direct action, and in 6.2.2, Syndicalist Direct Action, through a comparison with syndicalist direct action in which I uncover the underlying similarities and shared ethos that cut across the widely differing contexts but still provide a recognisable ethos to be found in <em>all</em> anarchist direct action. These comparisons provide us with a guide with which we may assess the many and varied forms of diverse EDA: how we may judge them as anarchist, despite their manifold diversity. They also add to the critical toolkit of ways in which anarchist ethics, principles and understandings can be applied to any form of activism.	+	==== Annotation 78 ====
−	Once the sections of 6.2 have established the shared anarchist basis of direct action (direct not indirect action; resistance not mere protest; ‘effective opposition* not formulaic demonstrations; and anarchist not ‘liberal direct action’), then we are in a position to nuance our understanding by identifying the different and competing strategic reasonings that are buried within the activist anarchist tradition. The bulk of this chapter will therefore be dedicated to the tensions, contentions and disputations that range between proponents of a non-violent civil disobedience discourse of accountability; proponents of traditional insurrectionary anarchism; and proponents of other strategic repertoires including those acquired via the animal rights movement These different sources of guidances, strategic frameworks, tactical reasoning and ethical justification, may be viewed as resources in competition - but all within the broadly shared anarchist ethos that the first section will clarify.	+	''Natural law'' includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.
−	In the sections of 6.3 I use the topic of violence as a prism through which we may identify the competing and conversing ideological and strategic frameworks. In 6.3.21 first present the opposition between principled non-violence and its critics as it came to be defined within EDA. In 6.3.3 I then turn to the anarchist tradition to glean a more nuanced approach amongst those who accept the potential need for violence, but regret it and warn against its effects. I consider the principle of self-defence by which violence can be judged, and consider the relationship of freedom to force. In 6.3.41 then look at the tradition of principled non-violence in the terms of CD theory and practice, and I consider the influence and interaction of this with EDA. Having identified sabotage as the most closely contested area for these divergent discourses, I look at this specifically in 6.3.5, considering its political defences, its strategic rationales, its flavours, and its flexibility.	+	''Social law'' includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.
−	The latter part of the chapter is dedicated to practical activist debate centred upon the above themes, and voiced in terms of the ‘covert-overt’ debate, within the issue field of anti-GM activism; and in terms of elitist or participatory sabotage, focussed upon the ELF and the UK peat campaign. Themes that will arise in the various sections of this chapter, which have a bearing on our understanding of activist anarchism, include representation and elitism; participation; violence and non-violence; sabotage; and terrorism.	+	''Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.''
−	** 6.2 Defining Anarchist Direct Action	+	In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:
−	*** 6.2.1 Anarchist Direct Action	+	<blockquote>
		+	In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
		+	</blockquote>
−	In this first section I will reinforce and clarity our understanding of anarchist direct action thorugh a contrast with non-anarchist, indirect or ‘liberal* forms of action. In doing so I will be presenting the understanding of ‘direct action’ that I consider to be the legitimate and coherent anarchist understanding. Later in this chapter I will be distinguishing DA from Civil Disobedience (CD) and Propaganda of the Deed, although all these forms may coincide and collide. Anarchist direct action is therefore not an exclusive doctrine or possession of a special ‘church’, but a tendency, an ideal and an approach that can be identified in many different contexts, and expressed in many different styles.
−	There are two initial confusions in relation to the term ‘direct action’. First, Franks reports that “the term is so widely applied by certain groups, such as journalists, that it appears to exclude nothing”. Second, it is commonly used as “a pejorative phrase expressing little but disapproval” and thus mistaken, particularly within a courtroom, “for criminal activity” (2003:14-15).[125] This second confusion is related to the unfortunate equation of anarchism with criminality (Nomad 1968:20-28; Woodcock 1980:24), and of direct action with bombs (Suskind 1971). These are two misconceptions that I cheerfully ignore in favour of more fruitful investigation.	+	-----
−	Originally, anarcho-syndicalists defined the phrase ‘direct action’ in contrast to Propaganda of the Deed, meaning the dull but effective work amongst trade unions. “But as the syndicalist movement grew and came into conflict with the system... the high points of direct action began to take on the same function as acts of propaganda of the deed” (Walter 1980:169). As well as being confused with Propaganda of the Deed, direct action also came to be applied to Gandhi’s Non-Violent Civil Disobedience, and nineties EDA activists often equated the two: NVDA is the preferred term for Genetix Snowball, for example. Walter notes that “all three phrases were confused and came to mean much the same” (1980: 169). In this thesis I am using the term ‘civil disobedience’ when speaking of a particular approach, discourse and strategy, defined in 6.3.4. On syndicalist terms, furthermore (as we shall see in 6.2.2), activities do not count as direct action if they do not involve class solidarity and practical aspirations to free collective organisation. I will modify and soften this perspective, abstracting it from the industrial context and seeking to identify the key anarchist facets that ‘carry over’ into EDA.	+	Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.
−	Perhaps the most interesting aspect of direct action is the sheer variety of forms it can take (Carter 1973:3). Forms of NVDA or civil disobedience, for example, may include blockades, occupations, camps, conscientious objection and sabotage (Hemgren 1993: 52-85). Sharp provides a list of 198 forms (1973; cf Ackerman & Kruegler 1994:6), to which may be added the treehouses, tunnels, tripods and other innovations of EDA. Yet the inclusion of sabotage and such economic disincentives as ‘consumer boycott* (Dowie 1995:114) within some of these lists may lead us to consider the range of repertoires as more harmonious than they actually are. In this section I am interested in the tensions between different strategic rationales. In later sections I will present the arguments advanced for civil disobedience and ‘physically effective’ rationales, including economic strategies, to demonstrate the tension between them. First, I will establish basic definitional points for anarchist direct action and contrast it to non-anarchist versions, in a manner similar to that in which I distinguished radical environmentalism from its pale imitators in section 4.2.1.	+	-----
−	Carter argues that essential ingredients of direct action include “organisation and a conscious will to resist or to affect policy”, and that it “implies group, if not mass, action” (Carter 1973; cf DeCieyre 1912:1). Distinctions can be made between direct action and <em>non-violent</em> direct action (NVDA); between legal and illegal forms; and between protest and non-protest action?[126] Forms of non-violent protest direct action are the focus of my study. Amongst the most common prefixes for direct action used in the DIY and eco-activist literature of the 1990s were ‘non-violent’, ‘creative* and ‘ecological*. Forms of ecological direct action that I have been involved in include street parties, anti-road camps, crop-trashing, blockades of roads and supermarkets, noise protests, sabotage of equipment, return of waste to the companies responsible, and occupations of offices and factory floors. More detail on certain of these repertoires is provided in this chapter.	+	==== Annotation 79 ====
−	We can establish a clearer understanding of direct action by contrasting it to its opposite: indirect action. Wieck defines direct action as that “which, in respect to a situation, realises the end desired, so far as this lies within one’s power or the power of one’s group” (1996:375). Indirect action, by contrast, is that action which achieves an irrelevant or even contradictory end (as the means to a good end, of course), such as voting for somebody else to do the job for you, or paying an ENGO to prevent environmental destruction on your behalf (Ward 1988:23; Franks 2003:19; Guillaume 1990: 7; <em>GA</em> 1999:4). This is what Greenpeace direct action was criticised as in section 5.3.3 (letter, <em>Do or Die</em> 2000:215).	+	The term ''material conditions'' refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base<ref>See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.</ref> of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”
−	I would like to add to this clarification a distinction that is commonly made in the field of peace and environmental activism, between resistance and protest (<em>GAy</em> 15 2004:9). Hart provides one elaboration of this distinction:	+	Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.
−	“Protest is mostly a specific act of dissent directed at a specific issue and contains an implicit acknowledgement of an external authority to which the protest is made. Resistance, however, is a more inclusive concept that entails a broad-based opposition to established authority” (1997:51-2; cf Bums 1992).	+	-----
−	<em>The Evading Standards,</em> a free newspaper produced for the 1997 March for Social Justice (see 7.4), provides an example from my subjects which illustrates these points. It provides us with one of the many instances in which movement discourse provides analytic tools equal to, if not sharper than, academic tools.	+	==== Annotation 80 ====
−	“Defining what protest is, is less important than discussing its content and direction... Its value comes from the issues it tackles and the methods and tactics it uses. Protest if it is not to merely recreate prevalent forms of power, must have means equal to its ends... You might want to stop your local hospital being closed down. Do you contact your M.P. and write to the minister of state for health or, do you organise a mass public meeting, link up with staff at the hospital and occupy the wards? One method legitimises the status quo and even if successful leaves power unchanged. The second involves a community in shaping its own destiny, it prioritises morality and action above the law” (<em>The Evading Standards</em> 1997).	+	Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.
−	Anarchists are in favour of the latter, autonomous approach, whether or not the methods involved appear ‘revolutionary’ or ‘reformist’ in the stereotypical terms I dismissed in section 4.3.4. Here it is important to distinguish between (what anarchists, at least, view as) genuine resistance and mere public displays of such, performed for an audience.	+	As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'':
−	Waddington argues that demonstrations by such ‘professional protesters’ as CND, NUS and trade unions are not feared but welcomed by police. The reason for this, is that “These are organisations that play within the ‘rules of the game” (1995:9). In contrast to these are those “who show scant respect for the ‘rules of the game’ and, thereby, threaten trouble” (1995: 9). Jordan suggests that we may use this “refusal to stay within known rules of the political game” to identify movements which are transgressive from those which are not (2002:34; cf Roseneil 2000:253-4).	+	<blockquote>
		+	At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“For example, it has become commonplace for groups planning public demonstrations to agree a route and timing with the police. Marches can then be carried off peacefully and within police definitions of public order. However, some groups have little interest in allowing the police to define what public order might or might not be. Such groups define demonstrations that are, as much as possible, kept secret from the police and around which police have to improvise” (Jordan 2002:37).	+	In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:
−	RTS street parties count as an exemplar of the refusal to cooperate with the authorities’ policing of a protest. In both of Newcastle’s street parties, police officers insistently (and unsuccessfully) tried to	+	<blockquote>
		+	At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.
		+	</blockquote>
−	find individuals amongst the crowd to identify themselves as ‘leaders’ with whom to make agreements. In 2000, this became comedic with a certain TAPPer in a rickshaw (who had been singled out as the most likely ringleader) calling out on behalf of the police ‘whose in charge? Is anyone in charge here?’: see section 7.3.	+	As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:
−	It is the contrast to this anti-authoritarian approach that I wish to assess, in order to clarify the anarchist critique. Franks uses his conceptualisation of direct action to argue that “the highly structured and passive marches through indifferent streets symbolise less resistance to oppressive power than the passivity of the crowd. The demonstration does not resolve the problem it sought to highlight, but accents the political power of those who manage the march, and the liberality of the state which allows opposition (albeit toothless) onto the streets” (2003:17). Law argues that “Far from damaging the system”, such manifestations of protest “legitimise if’ (1991: 20). The argument of the ineffectiveness of rule-obeying methods of demonstration is best displayed by movement satire, as displayed by the examples in Figure 6.1:	+	<blockquote>
		+	No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
		+	</blockquote>
−	(a)
−	“Let us march to show our governments how cross we are about the state of the world.	+	-----
−	But for this demonstration to be effective, we must march with dignity and unity. Comrades, a disciplined march is essential, if we are to avoid losing the support of the media, the international press and the police. So please remember to follow the rules of the demonstration... And please obey all commands given by the stewards and police, who will be working together throughout the afternoon to ensure peace.	+	''- Structure of Consciousness''
−	At the end of the march, there will be a long rally, with speeches by several very important people. After the rally, please disperse as quickly as possible and make your way home peacefully...	+	Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are ''knowledge, sentiment'' and ''willpower.''
−	With your co-operation, we can make today a massive success, and start building for a repeat performance next year”	+	-----
−	(‘March Against Anything’ <em>Attack International*</em> reproduced in Franks 2003:16-17).	+	==== Annotation 81 ====
−	][Figure 6.1 Critiques of Demonstrations	+	As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to ''Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky?'' by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.
−	(b)	+	''Knowledge'' constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.
−	“Don’t go on this action	+	-----
−	You never know when the GENERAL ELECTION might be.	+	==== Annotation 82 ====
−	Best stay at home in case you miss your lovely	+	Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in ''The German Ideology'', explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:
−	VOTE and watching it on TV.”	+	<blockquote>
		+	From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:
−	(‘Maysquaf flyer 2001).	+	Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.
		+	</blockquote>
−	(c)	+	The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.
−	Following an explanation of sabotage:	+	-----
−	“Obviously, don’t do this. You might enjoy it, plus you would be doing something worthwhile, so best not to - maybe organise a walk from a to b instead, perhaps with a placard, the government will shit themselves”	+	<blockquote>
		+	Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.
		+	</blockquote>
−	<em>(Faslane Focus</em> 2002:12).	+	And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:
−	<br>	+	<blockquote>
		+	This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…
		+	</blockquote>
−	Thus it is that subversive activists, from animal rights, anti-nuclear, anarchist and EDA movements, extend the “anarchist saying - ‘If voting changed anything they’d make it illegal*” to formulaic demonstrations held on the authorities’ terms (Curtin c2001:9; cf’Mayday Greetings’ Flyer 2003; Welsh 2000:166-7; <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003: 69). In contrast to this model of “ineffective opposition (voting for ‘left-wing’ MPs, marching from A to B, listening passively to public speakers at rallies, signing petitions...)” (<em>Faslane Focus</em> 2002:16), anarchists urge “more revolutionary alternatives of resistance” (Editorial <em>GAy</em> 7 2001:2). I must emphasise, however, that these need not all be dramatic or confrontational, indeed often the most subversive activities are informal and not intended as protests (Heller 2000:20).
−	For the purposes of this thesis I would like to synthesise these distinctions between protest and resistance, and between indirect and direct action, into an opposition between anarchist and liberal forms of direct action (Crouch 1970:52). Monbiot expresses the liberal view: “Direct action is not the whole answer, nor is it an end in itself’ (1998:185), and his EDA critics state the anarchist alternative when they argue that “Monbiot fails to appreciate that our direct actions are not intended to pressure politicians like Blair to change things for us. To act directly is to address the actual problem.... Direct action is also a model for how people will run the future society” (Witcop 2000:31). Three elements mark the difference here in that liberal direct action is perceived as: (1) a last resort; (2) a form of lobbying only; and (3) requiring infusion of’democratic’ ethics from wider society.	+	-----
−	(1) The first aspect of liberal direct action - direct action as last resort - is commonly expressed in SM approaches. It matches the many cases where direct action is taken because media and authorities are ignoring the cause (Margery Lewis in Roseneil 2000:46-7), and where “Direct Action Grows from Frustrated Legal Challenge” (Corr 1999:79; cf Burgmann 2000:187). Anarchist direct action may sometimes share the same methods and have reform as a subsidiary aim, but it is not apologetically explained away as solely due to a blockage in the official channels: it is considered legitimate, and prefigurative, in its own right	+	Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.
−	(2) Liberal direct action is often viewed and reported as a form of lobbying: “gaining influence over the political process that is not mediated by parliament, pressure groups or the mass media” (Wall 1999: 154; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998: 143). Elements of this pressure politics include “drawing attention to issues” (Monbiot 1998: 185; cf Melchett 1999; Thilo Bode in Greenpeace cl996: 3; Manes 1990: 170), and increasing the voice of a marginalised group (Corr 1999: 172). Greenpeace, for example, state “We lobby and cajole those who can take the decisions to change things for the better. And when the most effective course is intervening with non-violent, direct action, we take it” (“How far should we go to protect the planet?” Greenpeace leaflet cl 999; cf Richards & Heard 2005:34; Wilson 1984:23). Many if not most of TAPP’s direct action stunts counted as liberal in this sense- publicity stunts evaluated by the amount of attention gained from the media, city council, passing public or opponents. This was a source of self-criticism for the group. This approach worked especially well when the issue was new (notably with GM crops and human genetics), and when they were embarrassing to the company or council’s public image. Even radical economic strategies including sabotage, when they are conceived as a form of militant lobbying, can be viewed in this frame.	+	-----
−	(3) Actors such as the Green Party wish direct action to operate in tandem with ‘democratic’ processes[127]: “Change happens when you’ve got a parliamentary process but also an extra-parliamentary process... the whole principle of direct action is a key part of democracy” (Lucas c2001; cf Corr 1999:195-6; Lamb 1996:196). ENGOs like FoE wish to set ‘democratic’ limits on when the use of direct action is legitimate: “Direct action ‘should only be used when... the authorities are acting irresponsibly” (Welsh 2000:162; McLaren 2001: 19; cf Gamer 1996: 149). Direct Action is thus framed according to the ‘democratic system’ in which it takes place (Hoad 1998; Carter 1973:146-147; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998:135; Doherty, Plows & Wall 2003:685), its value is understood within the terms of that system, and it is defined according to its contribution to that system. From an anarchist point of view, this is regarded as ‘indirect’ because it is	+	==== Annotation 83 ====
−	reliant on, and supportive of, •representative’ structures that remove power from the people directly concerned. This is particularly true when the direct action aims for legal successes. It is best demonstrated to be the case with non-anarchist revolutionary groups like the SWP: “although the SWP is one of the leading advocates of rank and file action, it does not call for rank and file workers to control their own struggles. For the SWP, rank and file action has the limited aim of’forcing the officials to act’” (Wildcat 1985:7). Yet to judge direct action only in terms of whether there are ‘democratic’ ways to have their voices heard is a liberal-democratic assumption rejected by anarchists.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-16.png|''Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.'']]
−	The contrasting anarchist view advocates political activism that “goes beyond the instrumentalism of the State”. Hart claims that “An anarchist perspective of civil disobedience goes further than one which merely calls for the powers that be to respond to direct action in a positive way, so that direct action can ultimately cease” (1997: 52). Roseneil reports that at Greenham Common, for example, actions had ‘integrity’ for the actors, and were not just performed for the media (2000: 189). Frequently, commentators on social movements report that She central satisfactions of protest” (Jasper 1999:15) are not the instrumental or declared aims but the expression and experience of collective action. The same was the case in EDA, as I argues in 5.2.2. Walter states that “Anarchists are in favour of direct action at all times; they see it as normal action, as action which can be used to create and also sustain a free society” (1980:169; cf Welsh & Purkis 2003: 8; Martin 2001:34). Bookchin states that direct action is “a sensibility” which “should imbue every aspect of our lives and behaviour and outlook” (1980:48). For anarchists, therefore, direct action is not just a last resort, as sympathetic liberal commentators often assume, but the correct way of behaving at all times: taking responsibility for your actions, obeying only your own authority, and cooperating on an egalitarian, free and voluntary basis to work for positive change (Baugh 1990; 100; Beynon 1999: 305). In the context of a world of domination and exploitation, anarchists and activists find that obeying only their own authority leads them into direct confrontation with the state and other powerful bodies: this returns us to the principle of anarchism as rebellion which I established in section 2.2.3. Before looking at these issues, however, I wish to look at the topic of violence which often pervades media and government considerations of direct action.	+	It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.
−	*** 6.2.2 Syndicalism and EDA	+	-----
−	In this section, I bring anarchist arguments from one context to another, and in so doing I address the specific question of whether syndicalist direct action is essentially the same as ecological direct action. In	+	Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.
−	6.3.5 I develop this comparison of anarchist tactics between contexts with the case of sabotage. Here, I utilise three key hallmarks of syndicalist direct action: (1) organisation as the revolutionary project, and the seed of the future; (2) conceptions of (economic) direct action; and (3) the notion of educative empowerment This builds on the negative distancingyJww liberal direct action, with a recognition of the <em>positive</em> content of anarchist direct action. In so doing, I reaffirm the points advanced for anarchist direct action in the previous chapter.	+	-----
−	In Chapter 2,1 emphasised the central place of organisation in anarchism, but several of its less-	+	==== Annotation 84 ====
−	sympathetic commentators have argued	+	The following information is from the ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'', released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:
−	that anarchists are baffled both by “the problem of how to organise internally and how, united with the masses, to proceed from old to new” (Miller 1980:110). There is a perceived tension between high utopian aims on the one hand, and being effective in the here-and-now, on the other (Breines quoted in Della Porta & Diani 1999:161). As we saw in 4.3.4, the proposed solution in direct action and anarchism, “was the congruence of means and ends. But it was still necessary to find a	+	'''Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge'''
−	form of organisation and a strategy for revolution that was both consistent with these principles and practically effective” (Miller 1984:94). As Begg explains: “The task is to find organisational means that retain the values of autonomy and participation within the most effective and empowering structures” (1991: 7; <em>cf Organise! 27</em> 1992:12; Della Porta & Diani 1999:161). Historically, Anarcho-syndicalism is the form of organisation which gave anarchism its greatest success in this regard, building a revolutionary movement and society which, at its peak in Spain, operated efficiently at a close-to national level (De	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png]]
−	Santillan 1996; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000 44-45; Brenan 1950; Woodcock 1980:375; Andres Oltmares quoted in Rocker 1986:25).	+	''Daily Life Knowledge'' is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.
−	The anarcho-syndicalist project centred on the notion of solidarity as an active project. Tom Brown, for example, a British agitator and organiser, noted that “each industrial union is dependent on the others, as a man is dependent on his fellows” (1994: 6). At a time when craft unions pitted skilled workers against the semi- or unskilled, and there existed hundreds of unions within a single industry, the syndicalists sought to amalgamate all the petty unions into one big one, based on solidarity amongst the workers: “to make unionism... into a movement that will take in every worker” (Mann quoted in Pataud & Pouget 1990: x; cf SolFed 1998; DA 32 2004:2; IWW 2001). It was hoped that a peaceful path to revolution might thus be found through workers* control. Active organisation became the method of revolution (Brown 1994:6).	+	''Scientific Knowledge'' arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.
−	Yet even at their peak, anarcho-syndicalists recognised that their own conceptions of anarchism were nowhere near complete, but merely “the germ” of an anarchist organisation (Goldman 1969:37; cf Woodcock 1992: 85; Rocker cl938:21).[128] This is one of the ways that make anarcho-syndicalist conceptions of organisation relevant to contemporary EDA. Although the context is no longer that of industrial struggle, Jordan echoes the traditional argument that EDA’s “Dis/organisation is a hidden future inside the present” (2002: 74), and Beynon suggests that direct action harbours the seeds of the alternative future within its protest form (1999:304). NVDA’s “prefigurative, utopian approach to politics” (Epstein 1991:16) may therefore be seen in connection to the desired, although unwritten future (Bonanno 1998: 8-10; Jordan 2002:138; Franks 2003:28-9; Pepper 1993:305; Heller [C] 1999:156). I note some EDA examples of this in 6.4.3.	+	'''Experience and Theory Knowledge:'''
−	From their earliest history, anarchists rejected conventional ‘political’ struggle (through parliament or other ‘representatives*) in favour of a direct struggle by the workers themselves, on their own terms, against the state (Voline quoted in Carter 1973:4). While this ‘direct action* could refer to terrorism, riots or other agitation, it normally meant struggle in the workplace (Walter 1980: 168; <em>Voice of Labour</em> quoted in Quail 1989:241). This was economic struggle instead of political struggle, with ‘the strike of the folded arms’ as the key weapon.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png]]
−	The context for the success of syndicalism included a growing ‘class consciousness* amongst workers, and a recognition that the urban proletariat stood, more than ever, at the centre of industrial society (Rocker cl 938:51-2). The economic arena was viewed as the real, economic site of battle between workers and bosses (in contrast to reformist or ‘political* terrain). The trump card which the workers could play was the strike, which demonstrated their power in solidarity, hit their bosses where it hurt and, particularly with ‘sympathetic strikes’, drew the lines of battle in the class struggle. Much of this framework has now been lost with the withering of the working class and the unions, but Rocker provides a direct line in to the contemporary forms of environmental direct action when he extends the definition of’strike’ beyond the economic field and into the idea of the ‘social strike* (1973:151; cf Everett in Rocker cl 938: 10; Shantz 2002). The occupations, blockades, street parties and other EDA of this thesis may be included within Rocker’s definition, as contemporary anarcho-syndicalists have made clear by supporting and celebrating DIY and EDA (<em>Direct Action</em> 2002:9).	+	''Experience Knowledge'' is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.
−	I wish to emphasise that direct action is still direct action even when utilised by very different traditions (Woodcock 1980:165). As Carter noted:	+	''Theory Knowledge'' arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.
−	“The ethos of Gandhian non-violence is far removed from the class struggle of syndicalism, but when translated into more secularised and militant modes ‘non-violent action* is not necessarily very different from the syndicalist concept of direct action” (1973:4).	+	'''Emotional and Rational Knowledge:'''
−	Bookchin identifies the four key themes of anarcho-syndicalist direct action discourse as (1) empowerment; (2) opting out of negative power structures; (3) increasing political consciousness; and (4) demonstrating the economic strength of the workers (1977:135). Although (4) only fully comes into its own in the workplace arena (Ward 1988:24; <em>Anarchist Faq:</em> 1), the other three themes are still claimed as	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png]]
−	strengths by EDA groups, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter. <em>Schnews</em> provide a contemporary DIY	+	Less Developed More Developed
−	articulation of direct action as empowering, educative, flexible, authentic, and anarchist:	+	''Emotional Knowledge'' is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.
−	“DIRECT ACTION enables people to develop a new sense of self-confidence and an awareness of their individual and collective power	+	''Rational Knowledge'' arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.
−	DIRECT ACTION is founded on the idea that people can develop the ability for self-rule only through practice, and proposes that all persons directly decide the important issues facing them DIRECT ACTION is not just a tactic, it is individuals, asserting their ability to control their own lives, and to participate in social life without the need for mediation or control by bureaucrats or professional politicians	+	Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.
−	DIRECT ACTION encompasses a whole range of activities, from organising co-ops to engaging in resistance to authority.	+	''See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.''
−	DIRECT ACTION places moral commitment above blindly obeying laws	+	-----
−	DIRECT ACTION is not a last resort when other methods have failed, but the preferred way of doing things” (<em>Justice?</em> flyer for ‘direct action’ conference reproduced in <em>Schnews</em> 1996; cf RTS cl 995).	+	''Sentiment'' is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings ''sentiment.'' Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.
−	The ethos contained here remains in keeping with the syndicalist project, even once the industrial context is absent There are other principles, arguments and aspirations from the syndicalist project that can be transferred into the context of EDA. Perhaps the most useful part of the anarcho-syndicalist project for our study, for example, is the manner in which it defined its dual aspect:	+	-----
−	“(1). As the fighting organisation of the workers against the employers to enforce the demands of	+	==== Annotation 85 ====
−	the workers for the safeguarding and raising of their standard of living. (2). As the school for the	+	As Marx explains in ''Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:'' “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”
−	intellectual training of the workers to make them acquainted with the technical management of production and economic life in general so that when a revolutionary situation arises they will be capable of taking the socio-economic organism into their own hands and remaking it according to Socialist principle” (Rocker 1948: 252; cf Rocker C1938:54).	+	Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.
−	Syndicalism was viewed as eminently practical - achieving immediate victories - while simultaneously working with the long term plan of revolution (Pouget 2003:12-14). It was both defensive and preparatory, immediate and long-term, and it provided a training for the future both through the development of technical know-how, and through the development of revolutionary solidarity (Rocker cl938: 52-3; Clark 1981:13; Quail 1989: 87). Examples of radicalisation from EDA evoked a similar hope, and we saw how they combined revolutionary aims with secondary, reformist impacts.	+	-----
−	For the anarcho-syndicalists, notions of (and practices of) free association and direct control by the workers (Rocker cl 938: 53) were conceptualised and justified in terms of the anarchist emphasis on diversity, independent thought and practical experience: the expression of freedom, of self-organisation and direct action, was intended to nurture yet sophisticated and confident practices of freedom, selforganisation and direct action. In sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.31 noted that, from an anarchist perspective, the educative or empowering aspect of organisation and activity remains of central importance. It is recognised by Nottingham EF! as “The most important part of a revolutionary/ evolutionary movement, apart from its actions” (1998; cf Barker 2001:4; Clark 1981:13; Pouget 2003: 5).	+	==== Annotation 86 ====
−	While Rocker emphasised the liberating aspect of the syndicates (as a contrast to alienating, oppressive and inefficient <em>centralised</em> organisations (cl938: 53), others use this conception of formative, educative experience and pit it <em>against</em> the industrial logic of unions and syndicalism (Bonanno c2000; Jordan 2002:35): hence the informalist critique identified in 5.3.12. This opposition to unions is particularly the case for critics enunciating anti-civilisation views, who argue that not only capitalism, but mass, industrial society must be destroyed (GA 1999: 4). Syndicalists seek to remedy the institutionalisation thesis with radical decentralisation of power, but the history of syndicalist organisation itself provides examples to support the institutionalisation thesis (Woodcock 1980:369). We must, therefore, ask if decentralised federation does necessarily have the effect of educative empowerment that the syndicalists claim for it One of the traditional splits between anarchist schools is articulated by anarcho-communists arguing that the organisational project of anarcho-syndicalism (solidarity) was not enough — and that explicit anarchist ideas and ideology need to be placed at the forefront to actively combat authoritarian, reformist and parochial tendencies (Malatesta in Nomad 1968:28; Makhno et al 1989:5; ACF 1990). In sections 5.2.3 to 5.3.121 looked at the views on organisation held by activists in Earth First! and other DIY * disorganisations’, and I wish to emphasise that these are distinct again from both syndicalist and explicit anarchist (here, anarcho-communist) frameworks. Whereas syndicalists prioritise workplace organization and anarcho-communists emphasise the need for a mass organisation tied to an anarchist programme (such as I critiqued in 2.3.6), informality, fluidity and temporary, specific, task-focussed organisations are emphasised in EDA (Ward 1973:387).	+	''Moral Emotion'' is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. ''(Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)''
−	** 6.3 Violence and Direct Action	+	''Aesthetic Emotion'' refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. ''(Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of''
−	*** 6.3.1 Introduction	+	''Education and Training of Vietnam)''
−	Amongst the strategic frameworks and traditions that I have utilised so far, are syndicalism, peace movement direct action, feminism, ideological anarchism, wilderness defence and DIY activism. There are many differences and tensions between these different fields and traditions, even while they may all inhabit a broader anarchist universe. I will now turn my attention to the tensions and differences between such influences, and I will look at how different emphases on principles may translate into significant practical disagreements. Even when all direct action is undertaken in the non-liberal manner characterised as anarchist in 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, yet these strategic tensions may still arise.	+	''Religious Emotion'' is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. ''(Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)''
−	In particular, the next few sections will examine the place of violence in direct action, and the divergent strategic assessments of direct action made by those informed by civil disobedience discourse, and by the revolutionary anarchist tradition. I begin in 6.3.2 by presenting the ‘fluffy-spiky’ debate of 1990s EDA as an expression of this difference: but a crude and inadequate expression that is unhelpful to a rounded understanding of EDA positions.[129] I therefore turn to the anarchist tradition in 6.3.3 to draw out a more sophisticated and critical view of violence, and in 6.3.41 present the areas of significant disagreement to this that activists draw from CD discourse. In 6.3.5 I then focus on sabotage as the area in which the critical assessments of anarchist and CD discourses are most clearly demonstrated, in ways that inform the practices and debates of contemporary EDA. Presentation of these dialogues between different strategic frameworks and theorisations will then lead into an examination of specific practical examples from EDA where these tensions and strategic articulations were played out in practice, in the contexts of anti-GM direct action and peatland defence.	+	These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.
−	*** 6.3.2 Spikies versus Fluflies	+	''Willpower'' is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.
−	“The spirit of the direct action protest movement is ... half’spiky’, half’fluffy* - half politically hard, half warmly, humanly soft” (Jay Griffiths in Evans 1998: 9).	+	-----
−	Empirically, we may note that most radical green activists espouse a strategic non-violence in which nonviolence is justified on grounds of context: <em>“In this country, at this time,</em> there is NO NEED FOR VIOLENCE” (EEV 1997:1; cf Road Alert 1996:2; Roseneil 2000:129). Yet this contextual justification allows Greens to “support armed struggles of revolutionary people” in other contexts (Bari 1997a; Manes 1990:121;). Within file UK EDA network, this support has practical application, as demonstrated through exchanges and links of solidarity with such armed groups as the EZLN in Chiapas and the OPM in West Papua (BFM n.d.; <em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2001:199-200).	+	==== Annotation 87 ====
−	In the mid nineties, however, the debate around non-violence in EDA became stereotyped into a ‘spikies’ versus ‘fluffies’ opposition. ‘Fluffies* were those against the use of violence, usually for reasons of principle, while ‘Spikies’ were those willing to use or advocate violence[130]. Zoe Elford represents the ‘fluffy’ viewpoint when she urges a more binding allegiance to non-violence: “During actions, the differing definitions of non-violence often lead to confusions which endanger ourselves and others. The uncertainty about how far we are meant to go causes feelings of frustration, anger and runaway excitability. It is vital that we come to a consensus and stick to it” (quoted in Bellos 1997).[131] This introduces us to the ‘fluffy’ hallmarks of guidelines and formal NVDA training which I identify with CD discourse and evaluate in 6.3.4. Such CD groundrules sometimes exclude the use of sabotage (AF 1996b: 7-8), and as the area of most relevance for our study of EDA repertoires, I examine this particular area in 6.3.5.	+	An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:
−	The contrast to such positions comes from individuals and groups who were generally more influenced by anarchist history, including both class-strugglists and primitivists (Snorky 1995). In the case of the anti- M11 protests, anarchist commentators argued that “The tactics of non-violent Direct Action employed, the use of rooftops and towers, etc.,” are inadequate. Although they “proved successful in delaying the eviction, and piling up the costs for the state ... such tactics are incapable of actually preventing the state from recapturing the autonomous zones we create...We should learn the lessons from successful resistance on the continent and criticise the liberal dogma of non-violence which prevents us from making those connections” (Anonymous quote in <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No.3). I dislike such statements for the way they may prevent activists and anarchists from countenancing any criticism of violence (or sabotage). My own position lies somewhere between the CD viewpoint of principled non-violence and that which refuses to condemn any use of violence by protesters. Yet I am not willing to thereby abandon the anarchist moniker (to do so would be to accept the scurrilous equation of anarchism with violence). In 6.3.31 will therefore examine the range of perspectives within anarchist discourse and draw out the elements which are most appropriate for ethically informing and strategically assessing EDA practice.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Nothing in this world must be difficult
−	Often the ‘spiky’ arguments came from the class-struggle form of anarchism (<em>CW</em> 1997:4-5; Goaman 2002:38). One class warrior, for example, writes that “One problem was the fluffies, who demand that we fight with one arm behind our backs and hinder those getting stuck in. By their actions they risk getting us arrested and through isolating us they pinpoint us to the police. They are the enemy of our class” (<em>AF Resistance</em> 5, August 1999:1). One TAPP member suggested that views on violence were linked to a class basis (Thornton 1999: 8) and <em>Class War</em> even suggest the criteria of violence as the distinction between class-struggle and liberal forms of anarchism (<em>CW</em> 1997:2). This is a simplification I do not accept, as my comments on standpoint epistemology in Chapter 3 should make clear.	+	The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart
−	I consider the way the fluffy-spiky disagreements are framed to be a dead-end and it was often recognised within EDA as an “artificial dualism” (EEV 1997: 1; ‘Jo’ 2003). The simplification of differences into the spiky-fluffy antinomy encouraged divisiveness and name-calling, and tended to lower the level of real debate. Arguments against violence, for example, were quickly branded as ‘fluffy’, whatever the merit of	+	We can dig up mountains and fill the sea
−	their reasoning. The recognition that activist discussion constitutes a location of anarchism must be balanced, therefore, with the recognition that on-the-ground anarchist debate is not always of the highest quality.	+	Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision
		+	</blockquote>
−	I would like to illustrate these points with a text that was circulated in EF! and other EDA circuits in 1997, ‘Ego warriors and Energy vamps’ (EEV 1997). This was an edited record of discussions amongst several	+	Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).
−	different EDA activists (and therefore included a range of sometimes conflicting points). Some of the document’s arguments against violence draw upon civil disobedience discourse, or are made on grounds suitable for anarchist critique, such as media impact or of common humanity (a position which class-strugglists condemn as liberal). Yet other arguments for tactical non-violence were made on grounds of consequences: for the safety of protesters or for the sake of the success of the campaign (EEV 1997:3).[132] It was stated, for example, that violence had negative impacts on activism: that it was other protesters who suffered most from ‘intimidation’ by “Violent protesters”, who “wreck the energy and often the goals of the group” (EEV 1997: 1). It is unfortunate that these latter arguments should be dismissed so easily: in 4.3.4 and 6.3.31 argue for their relevance to anarchist practice.	+	-----
−	Most active anarchists avoided both ‘never-violent’ and ‘always violent’ positions (Wombles 2004a: 18). An insert in the <em>EF!AU \n</em> 1996 warned against getting side-tracked by the issue, or being divided into opposing camps:	+	Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.
−	“a long line of articles ... are trying to push green/direct action and animal liberation activities into the category of terrorism. One purpose of these articles is to try and disrupt our increasingly effective and popular movement by trying to split us into factions along lines that the state sets...and between activists that have differing views on violence as a tactic of resistance” (<em>EF!AU</em> No.26 1996:3).[133]	+	-----
−	The emphasis of this feature, and an argument repeated elsewhere, was that diversity in approaches should be encouraged, and not condemned: “there is room in this movement for all responses to ecological devastation and we must not divide ourselves on small issues when we agree on nearly everything else” (<em>EF!AU</em>26 1996:3; cf discussions at Bradford <em>Dissent!</em> Gathering, June 2004).[134] Unfortunately, while I agree with the sentiment of this argument and believe it expresses a truth about attitudes in the EDA movement, I also consider it to be a chiefly <em>rhetorical</em> solution that does not automatically translate into an enabling, inclusive practice. Activists (particularly those self-identified as anarchist) have also on occasion used the notion of’allowing diversity’ to effectively intimidate and silence those wishing to criticise tactics they perceive as ‘violent’. When EFlers hosted a meeting in advance of the anti-summit protests in Prague, for example, one participant felt that “There was no attempt in that meeting to rule out violence, and it created a very exclusive sort of environment I... felt alienated” (TTS/SW 2001: 8.40- 8.57).	+	==== Annotation 88 ====
−	While the different approaches to violence were never resolved in a conclusive way, activists on the ground, in small-scale arenas, nonetheless found many different ways of circumventing the issue (Roseneil 2000:177). Road camps established their own temporary agreements on what tactics were considered suitable, in relation to their own vulnerability to repercussions (<em>Do or Die</em> 1992:7). Temporary groundrules or limits, meanwhile, were formulated for office occupations or covert actions. On one occupation I participated in, we all agreed in advance that no-one would seriously damage computers, but that moving around the paperwork was fine and a bit of graffiti acceptable (Tarmac occupation, Nottinghamshire,	+	In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”
−	1.2.1999). For another occupation, people who did not want to risk arrest for such activities assigned themselves other roles (in other locations), and so removed themselves from the sphere of risk[135] (Nestld occupation, Halifax, 30.11.1999). Such negotiated compromises are only necessary, besides, when the individuals involved do not already know each other well. A small group planning an action, that is unencumbered by a ‘respectable* campaign (or a camp that might suffer die repercussion) will naturally form the plan most suited to their perspective. The sheer range and diversity of these negotiations of the issue are impossible to summarise in a thesis format: and I decline to attempt a neat resolution of the spiky- fluffy divide. Instead, I wish to emphasise the superiority of’real-world’ dialogue, agreement, and contextspecific resolutions. Any abstract textual conclusion would become dogmatic if imposed on those real- world situations. I will instead use the next three sections to inform our understanding of the debates, by explaining the historical background behind some of the thinking. These will enable us to understand the political differences and varied strategic theories behind a shared anarchist view of direct action.	+	In ''Capital Volume I'', Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:
−	I will conclude this section with one of the ways that TAPP dealt with the issue. It arose because the image which was standardly used on the newsletter ‘Think Globally Act Locally’ (<em>TGAL</em>) featured a crowd throwing rocks. Some TAPPers felt uneasy using this image, although others did not see a problem and many claimed the image did not show such a thing at all.[136] But as <em>TGAL</em> was a participatory newsletter, with a different person editing and printing it each time, these individuals were able to express their particular viewpoint by amending die image. Some tippexed out the rocks, some completely changed the title to change the activities of the people, and others deliberately kept with the original logo. Six examples featured in Figure 6.2 indicate the original logo; non-violent alternatives; and a feminist adaptation of the motif.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
		+	</blockquote>
−	][Figure 6.2 <em>TGAL</em> images (<em>TGAL</em> No. 7 (and most later issues); 62; 46; 31; 41; & 40).]]
−	*** 6.3.3 Anarchist Perspectives on Violence	+	-----
−	Here I will present a reading of anarchism that draws out the salient views on violence: this will be built on with the next section, and then followed by a discussion of sabotage: violence and sabotage are crucial strategic and ethical issues for us to understand from an anarchist perspective before we look at practical examples. We begin by noting that class-struggle anarchists consider all major achievements for the working class to have been achieved through struggle, and their reading of history indicates that violent struggle has been amongst the most effective means of doing so (Berkman quoted in Ruins 2003: 9; Most 1890; 1997:4; Churchill 1999; <em>Do or Die</em> 1999: 305). On strategic grounds, therefore, anarchists can	+	The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.
−	justify the use of violence, but there are some anarchists who turn that justification into a more general celebration (Joli 1971:215; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000:15). Some anarchists glory in the imagery and rhetoric of violence, and many consider the pinnacle of revolutionary activity to be street-fighting with the police (a mistake, in my view). <em>Class War</em> provide the clearest example of this position, which they repeatedly displayed in their populist newspaper:	+	-----
−	“Class War never apologised for our violence, Class War celebrated it Class War said that we should be fighting back as that is the way to win. Class War in its entire existence never had a single photo of a copper bashing up someone on a demonstration (unlike the rest of the left) - its photos always showed the other side, a copper getting bashed” (Norman 1998; cf Atton 2002: 119).	+	==== Annotation 89 ====
−	<em>Class War</em> justified the violence they supported in terms of “returning the aggression of the immediate enemy, the police” (<em>CW</em> 1997:4), but when the organisation split up in 1997, they admitted that “The glorification of violence ended up attracting people who were more interested in talking about violence than changing the world ... Class War’s macho approach has in turn alienated many people” (1997:5).	+	In “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'', Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:
−	The form of violence most consistently supported by (particularly class struggle and insurrectionary) anarchists is the popular, spontaneous street-fight or riot (AF 1996a: 21: Bookchin 1968: 3).[137] Riots are a starkly different form of revolt to NVDA, which is consciously chosen and considered before being pursued, “with careful limits self-imposed” (Cohen 1971:49; cf Adilkno 1994; Doherty, Plows & Wall 2003:685). Cohen considers riots revolutionary in intent, but partial and “doomed to accomplish little but destruction” (1971:49). While I would not dismiss the occasionally change-bringing power of mass, militant confrontation, I consider the way some anarchists view and speak of riots as an unbalanced ‘fetishisation*, in which a particular tool is mistaken for the revolutionary process (AEAG 2001:51). A self-knowing irony in this regard is indicated by videos of violent street confrontations (shown at EF! and Dissent! gatherings, and the Anarchist Bookfair), being commonly termed ‘riot pom’. In this fetishisation of a tool there is a parallel with the case of propaganda of the deed, which I shall now review.	+	<blockquote>
		+	History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.
		+	</blockquote>
−	‘Propaganda of the deed’ originally signified such action as strikes, demonstrations and local uprisings (Walter 2002: 85; Nomad 1968: 14; Kropotkin 1970: 35-43). Individual acts of assassination and other violence quickly came to take place under the anarchist banner, however, and by the 1890s the terms ‘direct action’ and ‘propaganda by the deed’ had become synonymous with individual acts of terrorism and murderous revenge (Joli 1971: 218). While the meaning of’direct action’ quickly moved on, I am using ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ in this same colloquial sense. When the 1881 London Congress of anarchists urged all those “affiliated to the Internationale to give first priority to the study of the chemical and technological sciences... as means of defence and attack” (quoted in Longoni 1970:15), it signified the ‘fetishisation’ of bombs, tools of conflict, into the act of liberation itself. Anarchist historican Alexandre Skirda considers the idea that explosives could “trace out a path for social revolution!” as “mind-boggling” (2002:47), and even at the time, many anarchists saw the limitations of individual acts of violence (Russell 1918: 67; Octave Mirbeau in Woodcock 1980:293). The ‘Sheffield Anarchist’ of 1894 stated
−	“DYNAMITE IS NOT ANARCHY.	+	-----
−	It is the weapon of men driven to desperation by intolerable suffering and oppression. Our ideal can be realised without it, if the rich will let us. Our work for the present lies in spreading our ideas among the workers in their clubs and organisations as well as in the open street So long as we can express our ideas freely we shall be content with advocating	+	All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.
−	_____________________________________________________________________________________	+	=== 3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ===
−	<em>PASSIVE RESISTANCE”</em> ________________________________________________________________________________	+	The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, ''matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.''
−	(Nicoll illustrated in Quail 1989: 195). This demonstrates the long heritage behind the anarchist link to NVDA, introduced in 4.3.4.	+	-----
−	The anarchist movement at large came to realise that propaganda of the deed had failed as a strategy (1996a: 12; Skirda 2002: 53-75; Walter 2002: 90: Kropotkin 1910: 916). Its practical results were the alienation of the public from anarchist ideals, and an invitation for governments to introduce further oppressive laws (Griffin 1997: 20: Davis & Wiener 2003: McElroy 2003: 7). When a more productive outlet for building the revolution presented itself in the syndicalist movement, terrorism quickly became eclipsed by the achievements of the latter: see 6.2.2.	+	==== Annotation 90 ====
−	1’errorism as an avowed method for bringing the anarchist revolution does not sit well with the anarchist conception of revolution. As Tolstoy put it. “Kings and Emperors have long ago arranged for themselves a system like that of a magazine-rifle: as soon as one bullet has been discharged, another takes its place. Le roi est mort. vive le roi! So what is the use of killing them?” (1990: 73). To assassinate a head of state is to reveal a misunderstanding of the nature of the state which, as we noted in 4.3.2, is not a neutral machine with some bad people in control, but possesses a force and logic of its own that is not decisively affected when its figure-heads are removed.	+	Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'' that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,” which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.
−	This evaluation is the positive legacy that the experience of ‘Propaganda of the 1 eed’ has left the anarchist movement. Since the terrorist ‘interlude’ (Woodcock 1980: 43), anarchists have demonstrated much more involvement in pacifist and nonviolent activity than in violent campaigns. We should note, however, that ‘antimilitarism’ rather than pacifism was the dominant ideal of anarchism AF <em>Organise!</em> 38 1995: 20; Walter 2002: 47; Martin 1965: 145).[138] The replacement of the state’s monopoly of violence with a popular militia was considered the only effective way of ridding the world of war and aggression, and so antimilitarism had as its emblem not the ‘broken rifle’ but ‘the people armed’ (Bookchin 1998c; cf Ruins 2003: 24). Both these motifs are still in circulation in EDA, as Figure 6.3 illustrates:	+	As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'', matter determines conscious activity:
−	][Figure 6.3 (a) The Broken Rifle on a flag I made for protests against the arms fair DSEI, September 2001. (b) ‘Veggies’ anniversary tour T-shirt, worn by an ex-TAPPer, March 2005.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
		+	</blockquote>
−	We should not, therefore, associate anarchism too closely with non-violence: even though many activists have adopted both sets of principles and professed a non-violent anarchism (Clark 1981; Chan 2004: 109110).[139] In my view, the anarchist perspective retains a critical distance from absolute pacifism (Richards 1993: 42). Camus noted that if one maintains a position of absolute non-violence, even when limited violence could prevent greater violence occur (1951:255). As the pacifist A.J.	+	However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is ''dialectical'', and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.
−	occurring, then one is complicit in enabling greater violence to Muste recognised, “the alternative of submission is by far the	+	==== a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness ====
−	greater evil” (1998: 13). Malatesta argues that	+	Dialectical Materialism affirms that:
−	“There can be cases where passive resistance is an effective weapon, and it would then obviously be the best of weapons, since it would be the most economic in human suffering. But more often than not, to profess passive resistance only serves to reassure the oppressors against their fear of rebellion, and thus it betrays the cause of the oppressed” (1993: 81).	+	'''• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.'''
−	To realistically prevent the state continuing to visit the world with its violence, therefore, Malatesta argues that a measure of violence on the part of the oppressed must be allowed (1993: 78). The limitation placed on the use of violence is already contained in the injunction that allows for it. As Malatesta writes, “it is necessary to defend oneself and others from violence. It is where necessity ceases that crime begins” (1993: 75; cf Christie & Meltzer quoted in Chan 2004: 119). From this theoretical basis, anarchists are able to mount a strong critique of violent methods, ‘revolutionary’ or otherwise, and also to critique the rigid pacifist position.	+	'''• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.'''
−	Self-defence is equated with the defence of freedom, and Malatesta extends this principle from the level of individuals to the struggle against the state: “The only limit to the oppression of government is the power with which the people show themselves capable of opposing it” (1993: 76). Eco-activists have since extended this conception from the defence of the workers to the defence of nature (Abbey in Foreman & Hayward 1993:2; Rage 2002: 1), which illustrates a problem with the principle that it seems capable of indefinite extension (Chan 2004: 115): to the 1992 Poll tax riot (Participant in Pickerill & Duckett, eds, 1999: 82; cf’The Battle of Hyde Park’ <em>Schnews</em> 1996), to CEOs of environmentally destructive companies (a friend 2002:3; RCAL 2003:21; Manes 1990:177), to all ‘counter-revolutionaries’?[140]	+	We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.
−	Ethical limits to the notion are provided by Malatesta’s statement that violence becomes “evil and ‘immoral’ if it serves to violate the freedom of others” (1993:79), and Goldman emphasises that “It is quite one thing to employ violence in combat, as a means of defence. It is quite another thing to make a principle of terrorism, to institutionalise it, to assign it the most vital place in the social struggle. Such terrorism begets counter-revolution and in turn itself becomes counter-revolutionary” (quoted in Carter 1971:106). It is the scale, and the coldly calculated disdain in state violence that anarchists find most objectionable (DeGrandpre 2004).	+	All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: ''matter comes first, consciousness comes after'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
−	In my view, the anarchist arguments <em>against</em> violence are given insufficient salience in the magazines and public arguments of the main ‘ideological’ anarchist groups (such as AF and CW), and are tragically downplayed in those anti-civilisation and insurrectionary currents articulated by <em>GA, GAy<sub>f</sub></em> and the pamphlets of Bonanno, Ruins, Churchill. A corrective is required to the over-emphasis on the violent moments of popular struggle, which in themselves show no sign of bringing a freer, more just world. The manifest examples of’manufactured vulnerability’ used by anti-roads protesters in the last decade may hold some promise for this reason (Doherty 1999a; Szerszynski 1999): I consider this in the next section.	+	We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:
−	The most important anarchist argument against violent means is indicated in the title of the pamphlet ‘You Can’t Blow Up a Social Relationship’. It argues against a ‘guerrillaist’ strategy (distinct from the strategy of individualist terrorism critiqued above (Law 1991; 50)), in terms which I shall apply to the ELF in 6.5. For now, we may summarise the injunctions against violence that are most central to the anarchist tradition (before introducing the distinct arguments from civil disobedience) by recognising Malatesta’s statement that “violence contains within itself the danger of transforming the revolution into a brutal struggle without	+	'''•''' Human brains
−	the light of an ideal and without possibilities of a beneficial outcome” (1993: 79; cf Muste 1998; Bakunin in Woodcock 1992: 93). Richards thus warns that “fighting tyranny by tyranny’s weapons will always lead one to becoming very like the thing one is fighting against” (1993:48; cf Woodcock 1992:98-102; Hill 1973: 39-40). Such aphorisms against violence are common in anarchist discourse, and Chan ties them to a not-quite-absolute pacifist position (Chan 2004: 111). Even when anarchists see violence as necessary, such aphorisms as “violence breeds violence” and “violence is the enemy of freedom” indicate that they should also see it as regrettable, dangerous, and to be avoided if possible (Cgan 2004:103).	+	'''•''' Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections
−	*** 6.3.4 Civil Disobedience Discourse	+	'''•''' Labor
−	For the purpose of this thesis, I am designating civil disobedience (CD) as the method and justificatory discourse utilised by the contemporary peace movement (at least its most radical and active parts). For this understanding, I am drawing on both the ‘traditional view’ of CD developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Welchman 2001:99), and the guidelines and strategic viewpoints from die ploughshares movement, as that is the wing committed to sabotage (see 6.3.5), and closest to anarchism and EDA. Both CD and revolutionary anarchism inform EDA, and often they merge and mingle when on the ground (nothing in life is as simple as political theory seeks to draw it). Here, however, I am contrasting the theoretical model of CD to positions established as distinctive of revolutionary anarchism, in order to throw a spotlight on the points of disagreement between the two approaches. These disagreements often percolate through to the ground, leading to tension and strategic disagreement between activists: I will demonstrate this with the case of Genetix Snowball in the sections of 6.4.	+	'''•''' Language
−	Cohen’s oft-quoted definition states that “Civil disobedience is an act of protest, deliberately unlawful, conscientiously and publicly performed” (1971:4). We will be looking at this definition’s various parts (unlawful, conscientious, public) in this section. We should also note what is absent here: ‘non-violence’ is not an essential part Yet in practice, CD is typically characterised by its emphasis on non-violence (Hemgren 1993: 8; Franks 2003: 15; Carter 1973: 65; Welsh 2000:175-6) and, as we shall see in this section, also by the themes of dialogue, accountability and democracy.	+	[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]
−	The most contentious part of CD discourse, from the anarchist point of view, is the <em>prima facie</em> duty of obedience for law (Cohen 1971:6; Gandhi in Bondurant 1965: 166). Martin Luther King is typical in insisting that civil disobedients* willingness to break unjust laws does not equate to a disrespect for law:[141]	+	All of these factors also assert that ''matter is the origin of consciousness.''
−	“I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law” (1963:21).	+	-----
−	Hemgren argues that “Civil disobedience is not putting oneself above the law... Civil disobedience is a political act that confronts the law and claims a higher perception and performance of justice” (1993:15). CD willingness, indeed keenness, to engage with the law and public notions of justice is thus significantly different from the anarchist conceptual break from the universe of laws and general, ‘neutral’, punitive justice (Van den Haag 1972:15; cf Walter 2002:33). Cohen spells out this difference in revolutionary- reformist terms:	+	==== Annotation 91 ====
−	“the civil disobedient does, while the revolutionary does not, accept the general legitimacy of the established authorities. While the civil disobedient may vigorously condemn some law or policy	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-20.png]]
−	those authorities institute, and may even refuse to comply with it, he does not by any means intend to reject the larger system of laws of which that one is a very small part” (1971:44; cf Welchman 2001:105).	+	The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:
−	We should remind ourselves that, as I elaborated in sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.7, the anarchist revolutionary outlook here opposed to the reformist civil disobedient is not equivalent to purism, but is an outlook, a sensibility and a body of strategic injunctions that has profound practical application.	+	<ul>
		+	<li><ol style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
		+	<li><p>The material structure of the human brain.</p></li></ol>
		+	</li>
		+	<li><ol start="2" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
		+	<li><p>Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.</p></li></ol>
		+	</li>
		+	<li><ol start="100" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
		+	<li><p>Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
		+	</li>
		+	<li><ol start="500" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
		+	<li><p>Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
		+	</li>
		+	<li><ol start="5" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
		+	<li><p>Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.</p></li></ol>
		+	</li></ul>
−	Perhaps the most interesting facet of civil disobedience theory is its conception of power and obedience. Thoreau makes the classic statement of this position: “When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has refused office, then the revolution is accomplished” (2003:275; cf Hemgren 1993:133). This engagement with the revolutionary idea gives the lie to a characterisation of CD as non-revolutionary: it should instead be viewed as merely non-insurrectionary. The civil disobedients possess a view of revolution based not on a struggle between different blocs of power, but on a recognition of the power we already possess as individuals.	+	For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.
−	“It is surprising that whether we call ourselves pacifists, revolutionaries, reformists, socialists, syndicalists, anarchists, Marxists, liberals, environmentalists, feminists, or non-violent activists - obedience still seems to be self-evident Choose any one of these groups. This group in itself would be enough to stop most environmental destruction or arms exports if its members used civil disobedience” (Hemgren 1993:26; cf De Ligt 1937:105).	+	-----
−	Although such a view may appear over-optimistic in today’s globalised society, Hemgren points out that “Not many disobedient telephone workers, postal workers, transport workers, or bankers are needed to stop a certain activity. The more complex our society becomes, the greater the dependence on co-operation at all possible levels” (1993:91). The CD perspectives have a good compatibility with the anarcho-syndicalist project of organisation: indeed the general strike was conceived as a possible alternative to violent revolution (Chan 2004: 107; Pataud & Pouget 1990; De Ligt 1937).	+	Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore ''the content of consciousness is decided by matter'' [see Annotation 68, p. 65]''.'' The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws<ref>For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref> as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.
−	CD theorists do recognise that a real attempt to challenge the system’s power will result in a violent assertion of its power (see 4.3.1), yet they emphasise that “if ordinary people - the lower levels of the pyramid — still refuse to obey orders, the disintegration of the power-system is inevitable” (Vinthagen 1999). Anticipation of resistance to revolution thus leads to a quite different conclusion for CD practitioners than insurrectionary anarchists (to passive resistance, empowerment and victory, not armed struggle). The emphasis on organisation and the constructive element of revolution is, however, not strange to traditional anarchism, which has long held that the significant part of revolution is “not armed confrontation with the state but the ... relationships and ideas amongst people in the groups, community councils, workers councils, etc. that emerge in the social conflict” (Bufe 1998: 8; cf Martin 2001: 34-5; Bookchin 1971:246; AF 1996a: 28). There is therefore a two-fold strategy to anarchist revolution: dismantling the top-down structures; and being more disobedient, thereby denying their power (Carter 1971:107; Carter 1993: 51).[142]	+	==== b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter ====
−	The conception of ‘the revolution’, ‘the enemy’, and thus the meaning of revolutionary activism in civil disobedience discourse nonetheless remains distinct from that in insurrectionary anarchism. According to this view, obedience cannot be destroyed through power struggle, but only by a change in our own way of thinking and acting (Hemgren 1993: 206; TTTS cl999; Clark 1998 [H]; Clark 1981:20).[143] The possibility for the link between the worlds of anarchism and civil disobedience discourse was established when anarchists emphasised the two-fold nature of revolution, in the external and the internal worlds, and thus placed one’s own thoughts and actions on an equal footing with the dynamics of mass struggle. The first anarchist periodical stated, in the tradition of Etienne de la Boetie: “Up to this very day, you thought that there were such things as tyrants! Well, you were mistaken; there are only slaves: where none obeys, none commands” (Bellegarrigue quoted in Skirda 2002:8).	+	In relation to matter, ''consciousness can impact matter through human activities.''
−	Anarchists might agree with CD discourse in so far as “Their greatest weapon is our Fear of Authority” (Merrick 1997:5; cf Oli quoted in Evans 1998:10; Carter 1971:102), but class struggle anarchists (amongst others) would be appalled at the ‘naive’ idea that “In civil disobedience, there are no enemies” (Hemgren 1993:104; cf <em>TCA</em> 7(1) 2005:7). Early in the history of anarchism, the peaceful, gradualist strand of anarchism exemplified by Godwin (1984:76; Ritter 1980:94) was criticised by those like Bakunin who insisted on the recognition that insurrectionary force would be needed to combat the enemies of freedom (Bakunin 1990a: 214; Wildcat 1985:9; Ritter 1980: 101). Class struggle groups like the AF prioritise the class enemies that oppress us, who can be identified as ‘external’ to ourselves (AF 1998a: 15; Churchill 1999:4). They identify two aspects to oppression: they may accept “that the State is a social relation, and that it depends on all of us upholding it to continue”, but emphasise that “at the same time it is a concrete thing that can be attacked and made not to work” Thus “Refusal is part of the strategy, but physically attacking it is the other part” (Ruins 2003:15). Although I, like most anarchists, accept the ultimate need for “paralysing the machinery of the State when we are strong enough to do so” (<em>Freedom</em> quoted in Apter & Joli 1971: 98), I have not become convinced by the insurrectionist strategy of attacking police stations as a model of social change.[144]	+	When we discuss consciousness we are discussing ''human'' consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.
−	Speaking from a standpoint miles removed from insurrectionary class struggle discourse, Martin Luther King announces to the oppressor that “We shall match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force with soul force” (1957: 11; cf Bondurant 1965:39; Ashe quoted in Chakrabarti 1995:157). To a Gandhian, self-suffering tests the truth that lies at the heart of the campaign. Whereas anarchists put up barricades to protect their squats, or “put on protective gear” in demonstrations (Hemgren 1993: 102; Wombles c2001:1), CD theorists like Hemgren state that “nonviolence is based on the power that is created by making yourself vulnerable and by taking the consequences of your actions. These modem suits of armour do not have any role in civil disobedience” (1993:102). Such is the gulf between the two discourses, although the practice is much more complex as was demonstrated by the many examples of defensive tunnelling, barricading, and physical obstructions that were used by roads protesters <em>in addition</em> to placing their bodies peacefully in the way. This has been termed ‘manufactured vulnerability’ (Doherty 1999a; Szerszynski 1999; Smith 2002:24), and it was amongst the most celebrated and media-friendly aspect of nineties EDA. As Jordan pictures it,	+	The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.
−	“The Campaign is a non-stop performance... Non-Violent Direct Action is performance where the poetic and pragmatic join hands. The sight of a fragile figure silhouetted against a blue sky, perched dangerously high, on a crane that has stopped work for the day, is both beautiful and functional. NVDA is deeply theatrical and fundamentally political” (John Jordan quoted in McKay 1996:139; cf Sam in Brass & Koziell 1997:42; Griffiths 1997:30).	+	-----
−	Manufactured vulnerability fits best the CD paradigm insofar as the protesters offer up their bodies, non- violently, displaying trust that they will not be killed outright.	+	==== Annotation 92 ====
−	Recalling the anarchist incorporation of NVDA in 6.3.3, Clarence Marsh Chase provides a useful elaboration of why manufactured vulnerability, civil disobedience, or ‘non-violent coercion’ in his terms, stands as a positive contrast to terrorist methods:	+	“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.
−	“True non-violent coercion is, and ought to be, a two-edged sword. In other words, it causes, and it is well that it should cause, inconvenience and suffering to those who wield it, as well as to those against whom it is invoked. In this it is exactly contrary to violent methods; for a principal reason accounting for the appalling growth of terrorism in modem times, is the unfortunate fact that the development of fire-arms and high explosives carries no automatic check and penalty for all who use them. As for the methods of non-violent coercion, particularly the strike and the boycott, the public usually stands more or less in position to determine which way the blow shall fall, that is, which party to the controversy shall suffer the greater loss. It is well that it is so, for it is not in the interest of the general good that any group of men should exert irresponsible power’’ (quoted in Bondurant 1965: 10).	+	From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
−	In contrast to the covert strategy of’physically effective action’ that I shall detail in 6.4 and 6.5, in this model of manufactured vulnerability ultimate decision-making power is given over to the public (the majority and the media), to determine the rightness of the cause and actions (Bondurant 1965: 16). Civil Disobedience is “a democratic means for minorities and other groups that are oppressed to obtain justice” (Hemgren 1993: 6; cf Stafford 1971:98). The civil disobedient appeals to society’s sense of justice, and demands consideration on those terms (Rawls 1971). Some anarchists argue that this is just a diluted ‘civil society* version of letting the law/govemment decide what is right Yet CD theorists insist that all profound positive changes must be made in the public sphere, and that principles of openness, dialogue and democracy are necessary for them to succeed (Welchman 2001: 100; Rawls 1971:365-6; Cohen 1971: 40). I will look at this now.	+	Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:
−	<em>Turning the Tide,</em> a Quaker group that trains activists in non-violence before demonstrations, are typical of Civil Disobedience theorists when they argue that “The aim is both dialogue and resistance -dialogue with the people to persuade them, and resistance to the structures to compel change” (TTTS cl999). Martin Luther King argued that “the purpose of the direct action is to ... open the door to negotiation” by bringing the hidden tension and injustice out into the open where it can be seen and dealt with (1963: 17:). In a similar sense, the primary objective of Gandhian civil disobedience is, not just to win the issue, but to <em>create:</em> “not to assert propositions, but to create possibilities”. The question constantly to be asked of satyagraha actions is therefore “In what way is the force generated through non-violent action directed into creative channels?” (Bondurant 1965: pvii)[145]. It does not promote confrontation for confrontation’s sake, but instead uses civil disobedience in order to get a dialogue based on truth going with the opponent	+	* We must perceive reality accurately.
		+	* We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.
		+	* We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.
−	CD theorists distinguish their own methods which operationalise the ‘principle of dialogue’ (Hemgren 1993: 99) from “methods that are directly effective, like boycott, strike, disobedience on a massive scale, or direct action” which “function above all as a means of creating political pressure” (1993: 7): these represent ‘duragraha* in the Gandhian framework, where they are condemned for ‘prejudgement’, ‘symbolic violence’, ‘arrogance’ and ‘self-righteousness* (Bondurant 1965: viii; cf Hemgren 1993:10-12). They are antithetical to the democratic basis of dialogue wherein CD theorists place their hopes for radical change (1965: ix; Martin 2001:137; Editorial, <em>Peace News</em> No.2421 1998). Such forms of physically effective action may not only be dissimilar to civil disobedience, therefore, but also counter to its ethics.[146]	+	Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the ''positive'' outcome of human consciousness.
−	In contrast to our theorisation of direct action in 6.2.1, the CD principle of dialogue makes the symbolism - the common language - of the action all important (Hemgren 1993:90). People sitting in the road, for example, may be seeking to disrupt the normal functioning of a nuclear base, yet this disruption is primarily conceived as a means of amplifying their message. Hemgren notes that	+	On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.
−	“The fact that Greenpeace often succeeds in stopping particular waste-dumpings and the Plowshares movement actually does disarm weapons does not make the actions less symbolic. Quite the opposite - the symbolic value increases when you show the possibility of stopping waste-dumping and that everybody can disarm weapons” (1993:93; cf Roseneil 2000: 202; J.W. in AEAG2001:6).	+	Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.
−	We might note that the contrasting examples here are both framed as liberal and not anarchist direct action. The important distinction for an anarchist understanding, however, is between actions that are <em>only</em> symbolic and those which <em>also</em> work as ‘direct action* (Franks 2003:15-16; cf Wombles 2004b: 4).[147]	+	By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:
−	These distinctions translate into practical differences. Most centrally, CD discourse, but not insurrectionary anarchism, also justifies the receipt of punishment (debilitating for the activist involved) on the basis that “The value of an action, together with the trial and the following punishment, is its message” (1993:92).	+	* Matter is the source of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 72, p. 68.</ref>.
		+	* Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 90, p. 88.</ref>.
		+	* Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness <ref>See: ''The Role of Matter in Consciousness,'' p. 89.</ref>.
		+	* Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
−	Ths is the focus of the disputations which we shall examine in the sections of 6.4.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-21.png|''Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.'']]
−	Gandhi and MLK proposed particular strategic plans for their campaigns of mass civil disobedience which instituted the principles of openness, self-suffering and, perhaps most importantly, dialogue (King 1963: 14-15; Ashe quoted in Chakrabati 1995:157). The guidelines imposed on action by the anti-nuclear weapons network Trident Ploughshares (formerly Trident Ploughshares 2000) highlight this theme: they are characteristic of the Ploughshares movement as a whole. First, “Everyone in Trident Ploughshares 2000 will have to take part in a formal two-day non-violence and safety workshop” (TP2000 1998:16), in order to become acquainted with, and accept, the ‘non-negotiable ground-rules*.	+	The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:
−	1) Every activist shall be a member of an affinity group, have signed the Pledges, be registered with the Core Group and have gone through the Non-violence and Safety Workshop.	+	* The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness <ref>See:Annotation 68, p. 65.</ref>.
		+	* Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity <ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
		+	* The degree of organization of social activity <ref>See: Annotation 93, below.</ref>.
		+	* Material conditions in which human activity occurs <ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>.
−	2) Our actions are built upon being open and public.	+	-----
−	3) Our attitude will be one of sincerity and respect toward the people we encounter.	+	==== Annotation 93 ====
−	4) We will not engage in physical violence or verbal abuse toward any individual.	+	The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in ''Capital Volume I'' [see Annotation 80, p. 81].
−	5) We will carry no weapons.	+	=== 4. Meaning of the methodology ===
−	6) We will not bring to any Trident Ploughshares 2000 action or use, any alcohol or drugs other than for medical purposes.	+	Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological<ref>For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see ''Methodology,'' p. 44.</ref> principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:
−	7) We will respect all the various agreements concerning the actions” (1998:18; cf TTTS cl999; Hemgren 1993).	+	* The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [''matter comes first, consciousness comes after''].
		+	* The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness <ref>See: ''Nature of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
		+	* The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
−	General and non-negotiable ground-rules are antithetical to anarchist recognition of fluidity that was articulated by the recognition in EF! (considered in 5.3.10) that “we” changes all the time (EF!AU No.81 2002; 4).	+	All cognitive and practical activities of humans ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws,'' however, our activities are capable of ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity''. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
−	Different conceptualisations of affinity groups also illustrate the difference between the revolutionary	+	-----
−	anarchist and CD traditions. Affinity	+	==== Annotation 94 ====
−	roups were used by both the Spanish anarchists of the 1930s, and the	+	The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.
−	peace movement of the 1970s. In both contexts they were (and are) celebrated for expressing congruity between means and ends (Bookchin 1977:197); for being participatory, democratic and human-scale (Hemgren 1993:28; Anti-mass 1988:3; AAG 2003:48); creative, diverse and adaptable (Ruins 2003:11; cf Hemgren 1993:29; EFH 1998; TP2000 1998:20; Polletta 2002:10); and for being harder to infiltrate and control (TP2000 1998:18; cf Bookchin 1977:174; Hemgren 1993; Anti-Mass 1988:3; EFH 1998) with no single leadership that “can be singled out for assassination or corruption” (<em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003:72). Yet there exist significant structural differences between the two models of affinity group. The peace movement, unlike the anarchist tradition, tends to make affinity groups compulsory, and to institute them into relatively rigid structures, complete with non-violent training, ground rules and pledges to swear (Epstein 1991:3). The justification for this is predicated on the themes of accountability and non-violence.	+	From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.
−	In the absence of fearless peace-warriors in the Gandhian style, affinity groups are viewed as providing a	+	-----
−	supportive unit ‘breaking political isolation’, making the stresses and fears of civil disobedience easier to	+	According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must ''simultaneously'' meet two criteria:
−	bear and, as a result, acting as a force against violence (Hemgren 1993:23; Clark 1981:10) and “a brake on disruptive impulses” (Epstein 1991: 3; cf EEV 1997; 3). I maintain that it is this theme that underlies the demand for participants in mass civil disobedience to be members of affinity groups. Herngren states that “This guideline provides a sense of security for everybody. If someone loses control, there is always a group that can help and provide support” (1993:103). The role of affinity groups in the Ploughshares Movement may be viewed as ensuring that participants obey the organisers’ rules: I consider them to be a decentralised mechanism of control. The argument from safety is also allied to the ‘democratic demand’ that “When you participate in an activity, you should be able to count on the fact that nothing is happening in secret” (Hemgren 1993:103). Such arguments, and their themes of democracy, openness and	+	1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.
−	accountability, make sense in the terms of Civil Disobedience discourse, but less so in the terms of the	+	2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.
−	revolutionary anarchist tradition.	+	When we say that human activities ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws'' we'''' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.
−	When I was invited to join a Trident Ploughshares affinity group, I chose not to, because of the guidelines	+	This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.
−	to which I had to agree. It was not so much that I intended to take drugs and run riot at future actions; it was	+	When we talk about ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity,'' we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.
−	more the feeling of being bound by pre-set rules and somebody else’s strategy. Other <em>Earth Firstlers</em> declined participation in TP for similar reasons, although they (and I) have joined in with the mass	+	Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice<ref>See: Annotation 211, p. 205.</ref> in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint<ref>See: Annotation 114, p. 116.</ref> and willpower<ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.</ref> in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.
−	actions. Heller notes that the perception of TP being “rule bound” “is perhaps the single greatest reason why the campaign has not grown to a larger size” (2000: 118). I would suggest that this rejection of preset rules reflects the anarchist critique of authority (Carmel Cadden in Roseneil 2000: 191). Anarchists do not necessarily mind being bound by rules of their own choosing, or moderating their behaviour to the desires of their companions. But the democratic, accountable and open format of the Ploughshares movement represents a different type of regulation and “pacifist discipline” (Polletta 2002: 51) from the self-imposed type most consistent with autonomy. The debaters in EF! whose views were aired in the	+	To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism<ref>See: Annotation 222, p. 218.</ref> and idealism<ref>See: ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48.</ref> through such errors as:
−	previous chapter would never have accepted the kind of control and fixity of a ploughshares campaign. The examples of EDA I focus on in this thesis are all stamped with the self-imposed ethics of autonomy, bar the case of Genetix Snowball in 6.4.4, which I use to underline the difference and present a case of EDA dialogue on the issue.	+	* Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
		+	* Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
		+	* Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
		+	* Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.
−	*** 6.3.5 Sabotage and Terrorism	+	On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism<ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>, which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.
−	Having considered the issue of violence, I will now bring our attention to bear on the issue of sabotage, as this is where the finest disagreement between CD and other anarchist strategic frameworks is expressed. In this section, I first argue for property destruction as the best point at which to draw a distinction between ENGOS and EDA, To illustrate this, I contrast the Sea Shepherd Society with Greenpeace. Note that this distinction is not equivalent to that betweeen anarchist and liberal direct action (see 6.2.1), although the consideration of institutionalisation in 5.2.1 will identify why there is a link. I then consider the origins of the term ‘sabotage’ in the context of industrial struggle, and assess its anarchist justification and its relationship to law in order to mark the difference from CD approaches. I then assess the relationship between sabotage and violence, before articulating the CD critique of sabotage implicit in the arguments of 6.3.4.1 compare conceptualisation of terrorism to demonstrate the differences.	+	-----
−	Gamer cites groups such as <em>Sea Shepherd,</em> the ALF and ELF as “The more extreme end of environmental activism” (1996: 146). ‘Extremism’, however, is a very limited and subjective term with which to understand radical action or thought (although there <em>is</em> something of a ‘logic of escalation’, similar to extremism, that I address in 6.5.4).[148] More accurately, it is the issue of property destruction, sometimes termed “violence against property” (Martin 2001: 135), that demarcates Gamer’s ‘extremists’ from more	+	==== Annotation 95 ====
−	moderate green groups: Manes terms it the “litmus test” (1990:170). This demarcation echoes the classstruggle opposition to non-violent principles cited in 6.3.2, by which they identify ‘reformist’ greens as non-radical. Again I maintain that the issue of property destruction provides us with a more accurate and fruitful demarcation line than subjective and often convoluted views on ‘violence’ (considered in the previous sections).	+	Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge
−	The EDA of my study contains support for and manifestations of property destruction in the form of ecological sabotage. We noted in 5.3.2 that monkey wrenching, or ecological sabotage (ecotage), quickly became the hallmark of Earth First! in the USA (Foreman & Hayward 1993). In the UK, ‘pixieing* quickly became the preferred term as we shall see in 6.5.2, with its own dedicated section in the newsletters <em>Do or Die</em> and <em>GA</em> (Atton 2002: 86). ENGOs, less questioning of the overall politico-economic system, and legally constituted within it so that their own bank balances become subject to penalties should they damage others* finances, must by their institutional nature condemn property destruction (Hunter 1979: 384). It is this issue that most clearly divides groups like Earth First! from Friends of the Earth (Lee 1997: 127), I will use the example of <em>Sea Shepherd</em> to mark the difference here: a constituted organisation more informed by CD theory than anarchism, but on the borderline of legality and sometimes termed ‘the Earth First! navy’ (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:67; Scarce 1990:105).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-22.png|''Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.'']]
−	As we saw in 5.2.1, Greenpeace utilises (liberal) direct action to trigger dialogue with companies, and “rejects violence against either persons or property” (cl 996: 13; cf Manes 1990:108). <em>Sea Shepherd</em> direct action, while resembling Greenpeace’s in many ways, differs in that <em>Sea Shepherd</em> places more emphasis on materially stopping ‘the enemy’, and they are enabled to do so more effectively by allowing the destruction of property. For example, in 1986 while Greenpeace led boycotts of Iceland’s fish products to protest its whaling policy, and some Greenpeace activists even stalled the off-loading of Icelandic fish from a freighter to publicise the issue, the <em>Sea Shepherds*</em> approach was to sink half of the Icelandic whaling fleet (Scarce 1990: 99).	+	In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:
−	The <em>Sea Shepherd Society</em> use their reputation for such acts of property destruction to intimidate whalers and other wildlife-decimating ships into stopping their activities. Watson’s own rules of non-violence allow for the destruction of property and also the use of fear: “Frighten the oppressors but do not harm them” (Watson quoted in Morris 1995:200; cf Watson 1993; DesJardins 1997:200; Scarce 1990:106).[149] We might mark the aspect of intimidation here by noting that the image of sabotage as both shadowy and threatening, is one that eco-saboteurs themselves have positively encouraged (Hopkins 1998:1), as illustrated in Figure 6.4.	+	<blockquote>
		+	To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth<ref>See: Annotation 232 and ''The Properties of Truth,'' on p. 228.</ref>, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.
		+	</blockquote>
−	][Figure 6.4 Shadowy Self-Images (EF! Gathering Flyer; <em>Do or Die</em> Flyer k
−	I consider the tense relationship between such threatening, covert strategies and the aim for positive change in 6.4, and critically assess the implications of this practice in 6.5 from the perspective of anarchist ethics. Now I look at the origins of sabotage in the context of industrial struggle, in order to examine the differences and similarities that have been carried from one context of anarchist struggle to another, very di fferent one. This provides another, less public, side of anarchist industrial struggle to add to that of organisation-building in 6.2.2.	+	-----
−	The term ‘sabotage’ comes from the French ‘sabot’ (a wooden shoe t and was originally used in the sense of “working clumsily, as if by sabot blows”. It is “a method of economic warfare that is as old as the system of exploitation and political oppression itself (Rocker c 1938: 71 h fhe principle behind the original use of sabotage as a political tactic was “for bad wages, bad work” (Flynn 1916: 5). E.G. Flynn, in her elaboration of sabotage for the IWW in 1916, terms it “an attempt on the part of the worker to limit his production in proportion to his remuneration i 1916: 5). Sabotage was thus conceptualised and justified within a framework of class struggle and economic direct action.	+	Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:
−	After the failure of a dock strike in 1889, a circular was sent round every docker in Scotland stating that “We will do the work just as clumsily, as slowly, as destructively, as the scabs did. And we will see how long our employers can stand that kind of work.” Within a few months, “through this system © sabotage they had won everything they had fought for and not been able to win through the strike” (Flynn 1916: 4). This episode stands as an emblematic example of the most important form of industrial sabotage. 1 Tie context is all important: it took place after strike action had failed, and scabs had been used to bypass the solidarity and strength of the union. It thus serves to illustrate the supportive role sabotage could play within a framework of class struggle: “one weapon in the arsenal of labor to fight its side of the class struggle” (1916: 2).	+	<blockquote>
		+	Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Ihe relationship of sabotage to the law is also interesting for our study of EDA. In 1920s USA, repressive new laws were brought in to reduce the chances of successful strikes. A member of the IWW presented sabotage as the obvious response:	+	In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become ''real'' (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis<ref>See: ''Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness,'' p. 204.</ref> in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'' [see Annotation 17, p. 18].
−	“Now that the bosses have succeeded in dealing an almost fatal blow to the boycott; now that picket duty is practically outlawed ... free speech throttled, free assemblage prohibited and injunctions against labor are becoming epidemic - now sabotage, this dark, invincible terrible Damocles’ sword that hangs over the head of the master class, will replace all the confiscated weapons and ammunition of the workers in their war for economic justice... In vain will they invoke old laws and make new ones against it - they will never discover sabotage, never track it to its lair, never run it down... There can be no injunction against sabotage. No policeman’s club. No rifle diet. No prison bars” (<em>Resistance 6,</em> September 1999:4; cf Flynn 1916: 15).	+	In ''Critique of the Gotha Program'', Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:
−	The celebration of sabotage in this account is overblown, the tool ‘fetishised’ as a miracle-doer (like the bomb in Propaganda of the Deed and the General Strike at the height of syndicalism). Such eulogies may still occasionally be found (The Havoc Mass 2004:18) but I have already used the legacy of anarchist bombs to warn against such tendencies. The anarcho-syndicalist Pouget thus writes that window smashing “which brings joy to the hearts of the glaziers” is a “narrow view of this exercise of proletarian might” (Pouget 2003: 15). The IWW account is accurate, however, in highlighting the characteristics of sabotage as by its nature covert and unaccountable. Being hard to call to account makes it impervious to the kind of state response used, above, against other strike tactics. It is for these reasons that the AF considered it relevant to the present day, as successive waves of state legislation have been employed to suppress more open forms of protest and make them ineffective.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.
		+	</blockquote>
−	In the context of anti-roads protests, just as in the context of industrial strikes, sabotage was employed from a position of weakness. A correspondent reports in <em>Do or Die</em> after the Twyford protests had subsided:	+	Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of ''labor'' and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.
−	“there just aren’t enough of us around at the moment... And anyhow, the damage has been done. All that’s left to do can be done by the fairy folk”[150] (1994:4).	+	We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text ''Anti-Dühring''. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:
−	Sabotage becomes relevant, as the above passages make clear, during those phases of struggle when other tactics are unavailable. It is best understood as a weapon of war, which is	+	<blockquote>
		+	Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“not going to be necessary, once a free society has been established ... it will with the war, just as the strike, the lockout, the policeman, the machine gun, the judge with his	+	Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:
−	o out of existence	+	<blockquote>
		+	What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?
−	injunction, and all the various weapons in the arsenals of capital and labor will go out of existence with the advent of a free society” (1916: 15; cf Martin 2001: 137; Martell 1994: 191).	+	No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Unlike direct action, which is fundamentally <em>prefigurative<sub>9</sub></em> sabotage is only a <em>defensive</em> tool (Manes 1990: 186). This is not to forget that the same act may stand as both direct action and sabotage: pulling up GM crops, for example, both sabotages the crop and directly acts to create a GM-free world. Yet the two conceptions, of direct action and of sabotage, are distinct and have distinctive justificatory discourses. The justification of sabotage is distinct from CD, as I shall now review, first with the case of law, and then with violence.	+	Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.
−	Anarchism provides a defence and justification of sabotage framed according to the wider context of struggle in a fundamentally unjust world (although syndicalists criticise the sole use of sabotage divorced from a wider struggle as “nothing more than a cry in the wind” DA 32 2004:7). It makes no attempt to engage with the discourse of law on its own terms, as civil disobedience discourse does. The justification given by Flynn in 1916 retains a resonance for those who employ the tactic today in a different field:	+	= Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics =
−	“If sabotage is to be thrown aside because it is construed as against the law, how do we know that next year free speech may not be thrown aside? Or free assembly or free press? That a thing is against the law, does not necessarily mean that the thing is not good. Sometimes it means just the contrary: a mighty good thing for the working class to use against the capitalists... Everything is ‘against the law’ once it becomes large enough for the law to take cognisance that it is in the best interests of the working class” (1916: 14).	+	Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
−	The same argument was made for the DIY alliances that I introduced in 5.2.3, which united diverse networks and subcultures in oppositioi to new legislation. One of the most widely used slogans stated “When freedom is outlawed, only outlaws will be free.” This was the postcard that I had on my bedroom wal 1 as a teenager.	+	[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
−	The final issue by which to assess sabotage is that of violence. In 6.3.2 we noted that some ‘fluffies’ condemned sabotage as a form of violence, while in this section 1 have articulated the anarchist support for using it as a means of struggle. As I have also identified property destruction as a key marker by which to define the EDA of my thesis, the relationship of sabotage to violence requires a closer investigation: in doing so, 1 will draw out further evidence of EDA’s affinity to anarchism.	+	== I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics ==
−	Cui wound the cin; Ie bciuu ,<sub>in</sub>d sik k n h* i ptfir ul cHrdtxwd. 4fineh j sif L’iy pin to flw hntk (ask an ad nil fur	+	=== 1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics ===
−	<center>	+	==== a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic ====
−	help if wrur I P
−	</center>
−	FUdge with pride Yiw too could mkmi labelled u terrorist	+	In Marxism-Leninism, the term ''dialectic'' refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.<ref>See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>
−	<center>	+	There are two forms of dialectic: the ''objective dialectic'' and the ''subjective dialectic.'' The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].
−	nupdate [
−	</center>
−	][Figure 6.5 The EF! Monkeywrench and I omahawk (£FA4t/Nos. 27; 72; 66; & 1997 Summer Gathering Flyer)	+	According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called ''objective'' dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
−	One of the main Earth First! symbols is a tomahawk crossed with a monkeywrench (see figure F6.5). Morris argues this symbol has	+	-----
−	“a more complex meaning than, say, an anarchist’s bomb. Any fool can destroy things or kill people. The monkeywrench and tomahawk - handheld, low-tech instruments borrowed from two quite different traditions - suggest that we already possess what we need to oppose the continuing rape o the planet. All we need is a will to use the tools at hand’’ (1995: 08).	+	==== Annotation 96 ====
−	Some commentators argue that practitioners of ecological sabotage are equivalent to terrorists (John Harlow quoted in Hart 1997: 47), but this is strongly denied. American Earth Firstler Mike Rose;le, for example, argues that “To use the word ‘terrorism’ for monkey wrenching is to total y cheapen the real meaning of what terrorism is all about and what people do when they are really desperate” (quoted in Manes 1990: 177; cf Watson quoted in Scarce 1990: 112 I. Hart notes that “Any reasonable critical analysis of the concept of terrorism indicates its essential aspect is that it aims to engender fear through the intentional killing, maiming or serious injury of people. Such actions are therefore obviously distinct from the activities of eco-saboteurs who merely damage property” (1997: 44-45; cf Martin 2001: 143). Ecoactivists standardly turn the charge of ‘eco-terrorism’ around i Watson in Scarce 998: 11) to state apparatuses (‘Why George Bush is an ecoterrorisf £F/J22(4) 2002: 6) and ecologically destructive companies (‘Most wanted Eco-Terrorists* <em>EF!J</em>22(3) 2002: 28). Gargan from ‘Genetic Concern’ thus states	+	''Dialectics'' is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: ''subjective'' and ''objective'' dialectics.
−	“Monsanto has coined the term *eco-terrorist’ to describe the people w ho destroy trial sites. A terrorist is a person who puts somebody in fear of their lives, which patently is not the case here. The multinationals are not in a good position from which to throw stones, considering that they are foisting this technology and its potential dangers on people who clearly do not want if (WRGO 1998).	+	''Objective dialectics'' are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.
−	The role of the state is here clearly identified, supporting the ‘eco-terrorist* organisations by prosecuting protesters and eco-saboteurs who see themselves, in contrast, as eco-defenders (Vaughan 2002:21; Luers 2002). This bolsters the anarchist definition of the state as violence (Tolstoy 1990: 90; Faslane Focus 2002:2; Martin 2001: 8,60; <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No.24), which is expressed in the much-repeated axiom that ‘war is the health of the state’ (Bourne in Woodcock 1980:98; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 141; <em>Hate Mail</em> 2002:2).	+	''Subjective dialectics'', or ''dialectical thought'', is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].
−	The interpretation of non-violence varies amongst environmental protesters, but most consider damage to property as non-violent (Participant in Pickerill & Duckett 1999: 81). On invasions of office firms, environmental activists have damaged computers, and in site invasions they have disabled machinery, A sharp distinction is drawn between such actions, however, and violence against people and living things. Thus “Non-violent direct action can include economic sabotage” (Kate 1997:20). In common with the anarchist view, EDA practitioners justified sabotage by attacking the notion of private property: “There’s nothing sacred about property - property used to destroy the Earth has no right to exist” (GA 1993). Faslane Peace Camp “contend that property destruction is not a violent activity unless it destroys lives or causes pain in the process. By this definition, private property - especially corporate private property - is itself infinitely more violent than any action taken against it” (Faslane Focus 2002?: 2; cf Hart 1997:54). Even those from the peace movement’s tradition of civil disobedience discourse - the very ‘fluffies’ condemned in 6.3.2 - justify damage to property if it is done in the right manner (TP2000 1998:18; vf Martin Shaw in TT/SW 2001: 3.52-4.02).[151]	+	-----
−	We will see in 6.4.3 that from the CD perspective, the economic rationale behind strategic sabotage “causes	+	''Subjective dialectics'' is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to ''metaphysics'' — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].
−	an essential flaw in the method” (Hemgren 1993: 85). The implications of sabotage and other ‘physically effective* action are worrying from a CD / non-violent perspective (Martin 2001:138). Martin states that	+	==== b. Basic Forms of Dialectics ====
−	“From a nonviolence point of view, sabotage falls into a borderline category” (2001:134; cf Carter 1973: 20), and Hemgren maintains that “The principles of sabotage and civil disobedience are in opposition to each other” (1993: 83; cf Scarce 1990: 70). Martell warns that	+	Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.
−	“It can start a spiral of destruction and reaction on the borderlines of violence which once established is mutually reinforcing and difficult to break out of* (1994:191; cf Hemgren 1993: 13; Martin 2001: 138; Carol Harwood in Roseneil 2000: 213).	+	''Ancient primitive dialectics'' is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.
−	It is for this reason that those who justify sabotage pay so much attention to the context in which it is deployed: “The damage of equipment and machinery is part of our action but it must not be done in a way that could endanger anyone” (TP2000 1998:17; cf Peg Millett quoted in Manes 1990:190), or indeed cause harm “to the Earth that you are trying to protect” (Ozymandias c2002: 1). Particularly for those informed by CD discourse, “The way an action is done is as important as what is actually done; a fence can be cut violently if the people doing it are oppressing members of their group or dealing with the police aggressively” (Kate 1997:20). Helen Backzowska from EF! Norwich emphasises “it shouldn’t be something that’s random. It should be targeted and specific” (in TT/SW 2001:12.59-13.03; cf Foreman & Haywood 1985:10-17).	+	Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:
−	Martin notes that, because the meaning of sabotage is contextual, there is no generalised justification for all cases (2001: 135-6). Rocker and Flynn recognised this, and it is for this reason that neither attempted a conclusive typology of sabotage, instead emphasising its adaptability: “Sabotage is as broad and changing as industry, as flexible as the imaginations and passions of humanity. Every day workingmen and women are discovering new forms” (Flynn 1916:14; cf Rocker cl938:150). The responsibility and the justification of sabotage is handed back to the individual practitioner. In 6.4 we shall assess the debate between some of these practitioners.	+	* “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
		+	* The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]
−	In section 6.3.2 I introduced the contested use and disavowal of violence in EDA. Then I considered the divergent theoretical perspectives on violence from within the anarchist tradition (section 6.3.3) and CD discourse (section 6.3.4). There are activists within EDA who position themselves according to both revolutionary anarchist and CD (particularly ploughshares) traditions, and the difference between these two positions will therefore keep recurring each time a new context presents itself. An understanding of the conflictual dialogue between CD frameworks and those of insurrectionary and class struggle anarchists is therefore essential to a finer understanding of EDA anarchism. Temporary resolutions and contextual choices are made, but it would be inaccurate and wrong to extend any of these resolutions into a fixed general guideline. In this thesis I demonstrate instead how relevant issues were expressed, guidebooks produced and specific repertoires advanced, for the different fields of EDA.	+	In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,” and “predestination.”
−	Anarchist celebrations of violence considered in 6.3.3 should be rejected, whether on grounds of anarchist revolutionary ethics, or merely in terms of immediate strategic consequences. This is not the same as condemning all violence (or taking a pacifist position, as I distinguished this from anarchism), but in my view a greater receptiveness to non-violent tactics needs to be taken by the anarchist movement, even as EDA has demonstrated many fruitful examples. CD advocates would agree with this, but I would not join them in some of the techniques by which they seek to guarantee non-violence, such as codes of policy; bureaucratic rigidification of affinity group networking; or submission to law. In 6.4 I will provide more critical perspectives on such strategies. We may note that Ploughshares CD activists do support sabotage, however, and so I introduced other discursive justifications of sabotage in 6.3.5: these mark a distance from the liberal direct action considered in 6.2.1, and shall be considered further in 6.4 and 6.5.	+	An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.
−	** 6.4 Anti-GM Direct Action	+	Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
−	*** 6.4.1 Introduction	+	Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	GM food rose from being a mere cloud on the horizon at the start of the nineties (<em>Do or Die</em> 1992:11), to being <em>the</em> “environmental issue of the late 1990s” (Wall 2000: 82). It dominated discussion at EF! gatherings and triggered the biggest wave of ecological direct action seen in the latter part of the decade. In these sections I will briefly note the salient qualities of anti-GM activism for our understanding of activist anarchism, but I will quickly then move onto a specific debate that took place within EF!: I do not, therefore, offer this section as a comprehensive history. The anti-GM movement carried forward many of the characteristics and activist-anarchist qualities identified with the anti-roads movement, such as crossclass alliances, a distrust of official democracy and testimonies of the empowering effect of direct action. In 6.4.2, Anti-GM Networks, I recognise the similarities and practical links with the anti-roads movement, particularly with the advice passed on to the GEN office from Road Alert!, which develops the anarchist concerns of activist organisation (such as relations of equality and empowerment, and a desire to avoid institutionalisation and hierarchisation).	+	-----
−	1 pay less attention to topics already assessed in Chapter 5, such as (a) criteria of success, because the anti- GM activists gained so much instrumental success, those articulations were less needed (<em>EF!AU</em>No.62 1999:2; GU No.15 2000:3; GU No.28 2004: 9); and (b) the tension with FoE and Greenpeace, because with the GM issue they joined in the direct actions and Greenpeace in particular was on the same wavelength as the EF!ers. In 6.4.3, Forms of Anti-GM Direct Action, the liberal rationale of Greenpeace direct action does however contribute to an anarchist consideration of the liberal justifications and conceptualisations of anti-GM direct action. I look at the most promising forms of this direct action for an anarchist perspective - blockades, mass public decontaminations, cropsquats, the Bayer campaign, and	+	==== Annotation 97 ====
−	crop decontamination in both its covert and open forms. In 6.4.4, Genetics Snowball and the Covert-Overt Debate, I follow much more closely the dialogue that took place within EDA regarding the strategic rationale of Genetix Snowball. This was a conscious introduction of a peace movement form of direct action into the GM field, and it provoked an articulate debate upon anarchist terms, from which we may learn much about the identity of activist anarchism.	+	Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.
−	I do not consider here the relationship of GM technology to anarchist ideology, which was controversial to some in the more traditional anarchist movement (Rooum 1999; 2002), although ecological anarchists were generally united in seeing GM in the terms of a “commodification of life’ (EF.Mt/No.29 1996:3; <em>Do or</em> Die 1999: 91; Do <em>or Die</em> 2003: 97), or at least as a “bad science ... led by profit” (Beynon 1999:307; cf Gene-no! 2000; <em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2000 No.225). Salient anarchist attitudes to ‘feeding the world’ were also brought into play against those who presented GM as a quick-fix solution to third world poverty (EF.M[/No.59 1999:2; No.70 2000: 8; No.79 2001:4-5; GU No.19 2001:4-5). The concern of this chapter lies more finely with the relationship of anti-GM activism and anarchism, and the circled A symbolism in Figure 6.6 provides one indication that many in the movement consciously recognised the affinity:	+	Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.
−	<right>	+	Jumping forward to the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.
−	<em>For more info chock out</em> www <em>boyemozorO com</em> [[http://www.0tyn0tw0rk.Ofp][www.0tyn0tw0rk.Ofp]] <em>anti the Bayor briefing from Corporate</em>
−	</right>
−	<strong>BAYER B10CKADED</strong>	+	''The classical German idealist dialectics'' were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: ''“The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”''<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring,'' Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	On 23rd January the German multinational chemicals company Bayer launched a share Issue on the New York Stock Exchange. On the same day. around forty people blockaded their UK headquarters to highlight ‘ Bayer’s acquisition of Aventis’s GM research Interests.	+	-----
−	The acquisition makes Bayer the biggest GM company In Europe, and the majonty of crop trials In the UK this year WIN be run by them.	+	==== Annotation 98 ====
−	Arriving at Bayer House in Newbury shortly after dawn, protesters used scaffold tripods and a human chain with metal arm tubes to block access to Bayer’s car parks.	+	Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in ''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring.'' First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:
−	A few of the protesters managed to enter the building but did not remain	+	<blockquote>
		+	Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.
		+	</blockquote>
−	found	+	Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:
−	unable to offices. The	+	<blockquote>
		+	It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.
		+	</blockquote>
−	<center>	+	Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”
−	revolving doors together by
−	</center>
−	staff	+	Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in ''On Dialectics'' and ''Dialectics of Nature,'' metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.
−	Bayer’s themselves reach their	+	Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in ''On Dialectics:''
−	In addition to Its Interests In genetic research, Bayer ia responsible for a number of other dubious activities In its pharmaceutical and chemical activities.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.
		+	</blockquote>
−	activists left peacefully of their own accord, after completing the planned three hour blockade.	+	The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from ''On Dialectics:''
−	There were no arrests.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.
		+	</blockquote>
−	pairs within the bicycle D-locked their necks.	+	Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:
−	<em>Soo also issue 20 of the Genehx Update</em>	+	<blockquote>
		+	What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.
		+	</blockquote>
−	][Figure 6.6 Tripod in form of Anarchy Sign (GI/No.21 2002:1).	+	Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:
−	*** 6.4.2 Anti-GM Networks	+	<blockquote>
		+	One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.
		+	</blockquote>
−	“Their weapons are the scythe, the billhook, the sickle, and their own boot-clad feet. They attack in large groups by night, trampling, cutting and destroying the carefully nurtured experimental strains of wheat, and other crops, which the groups have nicknamed Frankenstein Food...	+	After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:
−	The eco warriors pose in capes, wearing masks and goggles and carrying their slashing implements, for pictures on the Internet which celebrate the perpetrators as ‘superheroes’.	+	<blockquote>
		+	Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”
		+	</blockquote>
−	Evidence suggests their supporters are an ill-matched alliance of green activists, protest veterans and young idealistic recruits, many of them on Government-funded education grants” (Paterson &	+	In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:
−	Lewis 1998).	+	<blockquote>
		+	It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.
		+	</blockquote>
−	An impressively heterogeneous mixture of people took up anti-GM direct action (Vidal 1999:2). Newspapers identified the main components (accurately, in my view): “Some are former road protestors.
−	Others are drawn from the wider peace and environmental movements, or are first-time activists who fear that the new foods will cross-poll inate conventional and organic crops and contaminate the food chain” (Farrell 1998): organic fanners and bee-keepers were amongst the latter group (GU No.25 2003/2004:4-5; No.28 2004:1-2). The anti-GM direct action took place against a backdrop of massive public concern with GMOs and genetic engineering, and there were powerful points of connection, psychological as well as material, between the direct activists and mainstream ‘civil society* organisations such as the Womens Institute and the RSPB. Vidal thus reported that, in a more generalised and across-the-board way than with roads, “A stunning array of middle England is now roughly united in disapproval or fear of the implications and is not impressed by corporate claims that GM is totally safe, healthy and will benefit the world” (1998). GM was not, like roads, an environmentalism based around cherished local landscapes, but was a more generalised, technological risk for which local sites were ‘protected’ in a more destructive manner! Activists mobilised a discourse of risk and the ‘precautionary principle* (Melchett 1998; Helen Mordan quoted in Hopkins 1998), and sought to shine a spotlight on the disparity between corporate and popular influence on government	+	-----
−	The crossover from roads protest was particularly noted by the press: “The roads issue is fizzling out now and, every time there’s a GM story in the papers, more roads people will get involved” (Jerry Middleton quoted in Farrell 1998), Although it is a distortion to paint a picture of rent-a-mob protestors as bored and needing an issue to fight for (“roads are out genes are in” (Farrell 1998)), cross-over between the antiroads and anti-GM movements was certainly significant.[152] I shall look at this with a consideration of the sharing of practical experience gained by Road Alert! and passed onto the anti-GM networks.	+	These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.<ref>Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].
−	Anti-GM direct action was undertaken across the country by decentralised and autonomous groups, including ENGOs such as Greenpeace and FoE, organic fanners, and the counter-cultural activists introduced in Chapter 5, including those organised around the EF! network (Hopkins 1998).[153] Compared with roads, there was much less of an expressive celebration of alternative, counter-cultural lifestyles, and activists showed a greater concern to present themselves as ‘ordinaiy people*. Public co-ordination for the direct action elements of these dispersed and diverse groups was chiefly provided by the GEN office in London and the Genetix Update newsletter which it produced in the first few years (it was taken on by Totnes Genetics Group from No. 14 in 1999).	+	Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that ''dialectical thought'' served as the ''objective dialectics'' of the material world.]
−	The purpose of the GEN network was defined as	+	According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.
−	“an information sharing network for anyone actively campaigning against genetic engineering. GEN also helps us to focus our strategies and facilitates exchange between ‘big’ and ‘small’ groups, organisations and individuals. A forum for this is... [ the Genetix Update ] newsletter.	+	Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”<ref>''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	GEN is a decentralised network, with no central office or budget...this is the forum to inspire and inform each othef* (GenetiX Update 1998: 1).	+	-----
−	At the inception of GEN its organisers (whose experience included backgrounds in Reclaim the Streets and Earth First!) received advice on how to set up their network from those who had co-ordinated ‘Road Alert!’ The advice provided gives us a useful articulation of activist anarchist approaches to organisation, and develops our understanding of non-hi erarchi cal, leaderless co-ordination by defining and limiting the	+	==== Annotation 99 ====
−	“Roles the office should take on within a network: keep info flowing freely - write a weekly bulletin of latest developments & actions & contact points - help organise actions - write & distribute free info & news & briefing sheets on topics of interest, these help when answering inquiries” (RA! 1998; cf GU No.23 2003:7)	+	In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:
−	The experience gained in the anti-roads movement informed a particularly anarchist concern for the potential of unwitting hierarchisation: “The office will be looked to by people...this gives those staffing it a lot of power/influence. They need to decide whether they want to steer...or watch and spread info. It is better that this done clearly and openly” (RA! 1998). The GEN office, partly due to its location in London, had been criticised for encouraging a geographical centralisation of the movement, and RA! advised it to avoid taking on all the responsibilities and roles of a network upon itself: “If a movement is strong, it will soon stand on its own two legs, without the need for a networking centre. A genetix office should exist to make itself defunct” (RA! 1998). This sentiment echoes the traditional anarchist slogan ‘a strong people needs no leaders*, and reinforces our understanding of the temporary, limited and role-specific forms of DIY ‘disorganisations’.	+	<blockquote>
		+	First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
−	To avoid acquiring disempowering monopolies of information, Road Alert! made practical suggestions: “Set up a plan for getting people involved in the office...maybe identifying bite-sized roles and writing briefing sheets and organising training.” The GEN office followed much of the Road Alert! advice, for example in encouraging the decentralisation of the network (GU No.23 2003: 7): “Put press onto local campaigns” and “Always make sure that consultation with grassroots groups is complete and remember that you do not have to play the media game all the time” (RA! 1998). I consider this advice, passed from the atni-roads to anti-GM scenes of action, to be highly noteworthy for expressing the anarchist ethics and principles embedded in EDA.	+	-----
−	Most anti-GM direct action (and all crop sabotage) took place outside the capital, and the pages of GenetiX Update are filled with reports from many, often temporary local groups such as Newcastle’s Gene- No! (GU No.13 1998; No.52 2002:<em>4).</em> The GEN office fulfilled a supporting role to these agricultural sites of direct action by providing “those in the trenches with essential background information and it acts as their publicist” (Hopkins 1998; GU No.23 2003:7).	+	The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.
		+	</blockquote>
−	The different context of the GM issue required a different interplay of networks. The organisational role of GEN was not identical to that of Road Alert!, but rather by its separation from the organisation of action, it	+	Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly ''divined'' the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, ''nature'') in the dialectics of concepts.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s'' ''Science of Logic'', Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.</ref>
−	equally resembled the information-distributing role of Alarm UK. It is tempting to suggest that the maturing of the Earth First! network enabled it to play the role that Road Alert! fulfilled during the early anti-roads movement, although being not so singly-focussed it could not fulfil exactly the same functions.	+	-----
−	When it came to discussing action and co-ordinating local groups, this was not done via the GEN office or newsletter, but through discussions at gatherings such as the Big Gene Gathering or the Earth First! Summer Gathering. Often the dynamic would be that a few keen individuals would have done a lot of preparation and research in readiness for these gatherings, where the different local groups could decide how, if at all, they wished to co-ordinate. Other national co-ordination took place ‘on the quiet’ between already-existing groups, effectively selected for inclusion in the plan by a small number of committed activists, as for example with the national blockades of Sainsburys (see Figure 6.7, below). I shall discuss these and other forms of direct action in the next section.	+	==== Annotation 100 ====
−	*** 6.4.3 Forms of Anti-GM Direct Action	+	What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I,'' it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:
−	I am continuing to use <em>EF!A U</em> references in this case study, but a much more complete record of anti-GM direct action may be found in the Genetix Update, which for our purposes may be considered as an offshoot of the <em>EF!AU.</em>[154] While less ideological, its tone partook of EDA militancy and it featured a contacts page akin to that in the <em>EFIA U.</em> Here, the GU advised that “If there isn’t a listing for a group in your area, Earth First!, Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace may have a local group working on GM” (No.28 2004: 8). Although other editions of the GU had slight changes of wording, and the ordering of FoE and Greenpeace swapped around, it is significant that EF! was always given the priority.	+	<blockquote>
		+	My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
−	In this section I shall consider the repertoires of anti-GM direct action most promising to an anarchist framework: the public rallies, often allied to mass sabotage conducted in a spontaneous, camivalesque manner; occupations of GM fields by temporary camps known as cropsquats; and the application of animal rights pressure tactics on one GM company. I shall also introduce the practicalities of both covert and accountable methods of crop sabotage in preparation for the more discursive assessment in 6.4.4. This direct action took place against a background of more conventional ENGO campaigning, which involved churches, scientists, MPs and bee-keepers amongst others. The first guides to action that were produced, for example, (by and for activists) included many less militant repertoires that anyone could do in a supermarket or from the comfort of their home (SYWS 1998: 1).	+	-----
−	Anti-GM campaigning has included AGM protests (<em>EF-AU</em> No.59 1999: 1), office occupations (No.69 2000: 1; No.37 1997: 5) and the targeting of research establishments (<em>EF!AU</em> No.53 1998: 1; <em>EF1AU</em> No.75 2001: 4) and regulatory agencies (<em>EF!AU</em> No.75 2001: 4). It has featured numerous stunts and banner-drops by protesters dressed as superheroes (No.64 1999: 2), as GM turkeys and eco-chickens (No.72 2000: 2), or naked (E/TAUNo.43 1997: 2; No. 2005: 3 . The GU comments that “Taking your clothes off really does always make the papers” (GU No.24 2003: 6). There were explicitly reformist lobbying efforts, such as the ‘Five Year Freeze’ campaign, aided by tactics such as a community garden outside the Welsh assembly (<em>EF!AU</em> No.68 2000: 3), a GM picnic outside DEFRA (<em>EF!AU</em> No.83 2002: 7), and the ‘pilgrimage’ of tractors and trolleys to London in 2003 (<em>EF!AU</em> No.89 2003: 9; [[http://www.tractorandtrolley.com][www.tractorandtrolley.com]]). While prefigurative elements might be included in these demonstrations, chiefly through the substitution of GM with organic food (<em>EF!AU</em> No.69 2000: 2; No.89 2003: 11), these were often primarily symbolic and remained within the realm of reformist, non-anarchist action insofar as they sought to ‘represent’ the opposition to GM, and deliver it to the centres of power. Crop-trashing was the clearest case of physically-effective direct action, but even here, it was often designed to get mediacoverage of the issue. This was the case w’ith Gene-no!’s first attempted decontamination at Hutton Magna in June 1998, for which the press release stated the decontamination “has been spurred on by [the]... recent statement that the government has no power to close down these test sites” (Gene-no! 1998a).	+	Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring'', citing another quote of Marx from the ''Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I,'' further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”<ref>Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I'', Karl Marx, 1873.</ref>
		+	</blockquote>
−	Direct action was frequently justified according to the terms of liberal democracy, for example with the ‘Green gloves pledge’:
−	“a pledge to take, or support others who take, non-violent action to prevent genetic pollution and its damage to life and livelihoods. You will be acting in the public interest with the support of many others. The number of people signing the pledge will indicate to the government how many people are willing to actively defend nature and democracy. It will remind Tony Blair where real power finally lies: with the will of the people” (<em>EF!AU</em> No.89 2003: 4; [[http://www.greengloves.org][www.greengloves.org]]).	+	-----
−	Similarly, it may be argued that the use of trolley blockades in supermarkets (<em>EF!AU</em> No.57 1999: 2; No.59 1999: 7; cf GU No.28 2004: 1-3)(a repertoire already reported in use tor other issues in the <em>EF!AU</em> (No.4 1993: 2)), were non-anarchist insofar as they operated as a form of consumer pressure (No.71 2000: 2 i: the same applies to the stickering of GM rood i <em>Express</em> 1998: 7; <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 54-55). Figure 6.7 illustrates a blockade which Gene-no! organised as part of a campaign intended to ‘send a message’ up the management chain to the supermarket head office, while also serving as an attention-grabbing stunt from which to leaflet and discuss the issue with customers.	+	==== Annotation 101 ====
−	][Figure 6.7 Gene-no! Trolley Blockade June 1998, stills from camcorder footage.	+	In ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring,'' Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.
−	With the GM issue, direct action was frequently justified on grounds of’failed democracy’, as a last-resort tactic that ‘ordinary’ people felt compelled, reluctantly, to undertake (Goldsmith <em>[Z]</em> 1998; Melchett 1999; Monbiot in GU No. 14 1999: 1).[155] The sense of majority ‘public opinion’ affected the choices of repertoires used (MFLB 2001: 1) - media-friendly, not too alienating, justified according to the moral high ground (and framed according to the terms of liberal democracy), and ideally something that would encourage others to take direct action for the first time. Genetix Snowball was the pinnacle of this thinking, and we shall assess its relationship to more militant and devil-may-care discourse in 6.4.4.	+	Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.
−	I will now look at the anti-GM repertoires most promising to an anarchist perspective: mass rallies, often incorporating sabotage; cropsquats; and the Bayer campaign. First, participation of’ordinary’ or ‘new’ people was most clearly encouraged for public rallies (EF.MU No. 70 2000:1; No.74 2001:3; No.84 2002: 2), which often involved a camivalesque atmosphere and an attempt by (some of) the crowd to destroy the crop (No.77 2001:2; No.83 2002:2; Wall 2000: 80). This repertoire (in which I participated at the Fife EF! ‘stop the crop’ rally of 1999 (<em>EF1A</em>l/No.57 1999:2; GU No.13 1999:1)) may be seen as truly anarchist in organisation and procedure, and as spontaneous direct action as opposed to carefully planned group direct action in the style of Greenpeace: “the ‘organisers* provide little more than the site and a few props and use the net to advise people of the issues. The rest is left to the crowd” (Vidal 1999:2).[156] Such an application of anarchist organisation succeeded in involving people who followed a ‘militant lobbying’ approach, seeing their acts of sabotage in terms of “saying to government: ‘Listen to us’” (Pat quoted in Vidal 1999: 2). Rallies such as those at Watlington in 1999 were viewed as phenomenal triumphs on all fronts: effectivness, publicity, participation, and spreading the message (<em>Do or</em> Die 1999:99; Heller 2000: 122). The one concern expressed with this repertoire was that some would get ‘carried away* by the spontaneity and then regret getting themselves arrested: as antidote to this, peace-influenced activists recommended preparation (Tilley 1998b).	+	The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.
−	At the Fife EF! Stop the Crop rally, we had discussed some of the expectations of the rally with the people we were staying with on the night before. Knowing that some Scottish activists would begin uprooting plants, the three of us from Newcastle made up (so we thought) our own minds, with one deciding to trash until arrested, one deciding definitely not to trash, and myself deciding to see how I felt at the time and maybe trash a bit but avoid arrest if possible. On the day, all three of us found ourselves on our knees digging up the fodder beet till the very end, with just two Scottish activists. This was because the ‘known faces* of Fife EF! were arrested as soon as they entered the field, and we responded to the situation with a feeling that we should not let the police think that by targeting a few ‘ringleaders’ they could stop the decontamination. This kind of spontaneous and emnotional strategising is what much SM analysis fails to recognise, but it is central to an anarchist recognition of the power of direct action (Roseneil 1995:51; Roseneil 2000: 192; Heller 2000: 64).	+	Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in ''Capital'' to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.
−	The repertoire of cropsquats was imported from the continent (£F.44C/No.58 1999: 7; No.59 1999:1; No.83 2002:2; Farrell 1998; ‘Crop Squat!’ email 1998). The flyer for the first of these presents a case for direct action motivated by ‘risk’:	+	The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed ''materialist dialectics.'' This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.
−	“We all know genetic engineering is risky - for health, the environment and food production. We know our bodies and planet are being used for a huge experiment in which the only winners will be the multinationals. So what to do about it? Write to your MP? Lobby your local supermarket?	+	Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	NO! OCCUPY A GENETIX TEST SITE Challenge Industrial Agriculture and help create something better” (1998).	+	=== 2. Materialist Dialectics ===
−	These occupations act as a form of propaganda, temporarily demonstrating an alternative way of living on the earth. Like the anti-road camps, they may act as a challenge to conventional norms of development and modes of living, and also to the notion of private property and exclusive ownership of land (Nick Harris in Koziell & Brass 1997: 56), by seeking to demonstrate the germ of the alternative future in practical ways (Walter 2000b). Hopkins argued that the crop squat was a distinctive new use of the campsite tactic: not “strongholds to defend but... festivals with workshops and organised talks” (1998).[157] They functioned not only as an effective barrier to sowing GM seeds (and were often preceded by covert trashings of the same site), but also as publicity tools (Colin McLeod quoted in Seela 1997:115). For this reason efforts were made to present an attractive and “positive image which will not alienate people but make them say ‘oh, isn’t that a good idea’” (‘Occupy a Genetix Test Site May 23/24* flyer 1998?). Walter records that “for local residents who dropped by to visit, it was a compelling advertisement for the activists’ ideas, as they looked at the open squatters’ garden with its wooden boards explaining sustainable agriculture, and compared it to the Model Farm across the road, with its fields of GM rape and burly guards to keep them out” (2000b; cf GU No. 14 1999: 1). The discourse of public approval and participation was here playing a role in activist discourse and strategy. Although I do not disagree with the above points, and I recall how inspirational the cropsquats were for EDA activists, their actual impact was perhaps less than that suggested by the reports.	+	==== a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics ====
−	From 2000, with most experimental crops finished and many proposed commercial applications withdrawn, anti-GM activists adapted their tactics to targeting the only large commercial sector, GM animal feed. Anti- GM activists had already emphasised that their enemies were not the farmers who grew GM but the big corporations (Paul quoted in Farrell 1998; cf Tilley 2001). This facilitated efforts to ally with small farmers, and the two lobby groups cooperated on national blockades of distribution companies and supermarkets (£FMUNo.70 2000: 8; No.73 2001: 8; No.74 2001: 1-5; No.75 2001:1; No.76 2001: 7; No.81 2002:2).[158] Figure 6.8 illustrates my own participation in these.	+	Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.
−	<br>	+	Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	][Figure 6.8 (a) BOCM Pauls Cow Banner (Gene-No! 14.12.1999, reproduced in <em>Schnews</em> 2000);	+	Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.<ref>See p. 107.</ref> As John Burdon
−	(b) National Sainsbury’s Shutdown, East Kilbride, 2001	+	Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to ''Dialectics of Nature'': “In dialectics they
−	One specific company, Bayer, was targeted, particularly after the 2003 EF! Summer Gathering, with a strategy consciously adapted from the animal rights movement, of targeting all areas of a company (not just the crops) with persistent, obstructive and pestering tactics (<em>EF!A U</em> No.89 2003: 6-7).[159] The “continuous actions against Bayer Cropscience” (No.91 2003: 8-9) included the blockading and occupation of Bayer’s HQ, offices and factories, disruption of its AGM, presentations, promotional stalls and conferences, flyposted information and graffiti, home visits, hoax security alerts and ‘pieing’, the jamming of locks and damage of computers, leafleting, noise demos, GM free picnics, and ‘armchair activism’ including ordering Bayer junk and false subscriptions, making false phone calls and placing free ads with their phone number attached (EF/AJ/Nos. 89-92, 2003-2004).	+	[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
−	Those of the above tactics which do not stand as direct action in its prefigurative sense, may be viewed within the frame of a typically animal rights strategy of corporate intimidation, lor which the essential ingredients were identified as “A committed, diverse and at times militant approach” intensively focussed on Bayer. The <em>EF!AU</em> note that “The demoralisation of a company through the creation of an ‘unpleasant working environment’ is not to be underestimated” (No.92 2004: 4). I did not take part in this campaign (for contingent, not ideological reasons). but it is perhaps indicative of the animal rights influence to note that the attempt at imposing a permanent injunction on the activists was responded to in a significantly different manner than that of Genetix Snowball: “you have to be served with the injunction for it to have an effect, so this just led to more hit and run actions” (<em>EF!AU</em> No.92 2004: 4).	+	Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development<ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref> (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.
−	Now that I have considered repertoires influenced by animal rights endurance campaigns, and by public participation at crop squats and celebratory rallies, I will turn to the most direct of anti-(JM direct action - crop decontamination - whose popularity increased to such an extent that one <em>EF!AU</em>could report ‘Nine trashed in one night No.59 1999: 1). Wall reports that “an individual may enter a field and pull up genetically modified crops as part of a Snowball group, an Earth Liberation Front (ELF cell or within a festive situation resembling a skimmington” (Wall 2000: 80 J. The distinction between these forms of sabotage were recorded in both the mainstream (Vidal 1999: 3 and activist press, as demonstrated in Figure 6.9.	+	Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was ''dialectics'', i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref>
−	Eventually the owners, North Surrey Water, obtained an eviction «»nh’r J he dvtiUmg	+	==== b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics ====
−	that a defended eviction was not part of the aims, left the hill an 16th Apnl TUO 01 #W5 722016	+	There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:
−	Inspections A number of local campaigns Imve sprung up against specific test sites. In	+	''First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.''
−	TEST SITES START TUMBLING	+	-----
−	April has been another busy month m the Struggle to keep thr mutants at hay.	+	==== Annotation 102 ====
−	Covertly. Another five she- were d^trnyed in the dark this month. I wu of Ihe sites were m Norfolk and three on the same farm in TadcashT, Yorkshire. Don’t forget to jet GEN know if you hear of any more 0181 374 9516	+	Remember that ''scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that ''materialism'' in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see ''Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism'', p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that ''viewpoint'' is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].
−	Lothians during a public mto visit Despite the; pleadings of Ilie Green Par ty members that they did not enter the GM Held, many people took action and cbm bed die burbvd wire fence protecting the mutant crops. About 30 people were ripping thi plants from the ground, and six people were arrested. All were released the	+	Thus, a ''scientific materialist viewpoint'' is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.
−	vandalisnvone for obstruction, and one was even charged with the theft <*f a CM plant!	+	''Note:'' Materialist Dialectics contains ''Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories'', ''Two Basic Principles'' and ''Three Universal Laws''. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.
−	Contact Fife EH	+	In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics<ref>See Annotation 98, p. 100.</ref> (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).
−	local test site at Ruddington took place, A group in the Borders is meanwhile rallying against a trial of oilseed rape m llwn area. Find out more in the Green Shop in Berwick-on- Tweed, ar ring 01289 330 879 or UI 11 946 2257	+	Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.
−	Preventvd A Urmer in Suffolk has withdrawn from GMO testing, due to ‘‘protester risk’. Mr Reeve nf Riding farm, Walsham le Willows Near Bury- St. Edmonds, had a Hcmro tn grow GM crops the year, but decided against it because “...1 am sure they would have been pulled up?	+	''Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.''
−	Up and coming: The first farm size GM trial of oilseed rape has been approved now, on the land of Captain Barker, chum of Prince Charles. The man owns 3000 news near 1 kiruungton, Wiltshire, of which he is offering 100 to the experiment. 23 acres in the centre ■ will be the GM crop- [n]l don’t want to destroy anything, but if I can grow food half price 1 ;	+	Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:
−	must look at it* is Mr Barkers justification. . Well of course nobody wants to destroy anything, but.. .ran anybody look nt it please?	+	1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.
−	Accountably. Gunetix Snowball campaigners targeted 3 sites for their Silent Spring weekend on April 16/17. However, the weekend was 6uiiwwhat ‘.denier than hoped. AgrLvo Was successful in gaining an injunction against six named snowball activists the dav before the Jr . ■	+	2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.
−	planned actions. Two of the three targeted sites were heavily guarded by polin’, the third one hud already been covertly decun Laminated a few days before by persons unknown. Mon? successfully, an ethical shoplift wascarriixi out in Mane heater	+	By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.
−	AVON RING ROAD CONTRACT INFO	+	This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.
−	The Contrail fur building Uw Avon King Road has been awarded to Christian!	+	With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.
−	Nielsen. 1 heir head office is in Leamington ■ ?p«t and they also have a subsidiary in Cardiff. Research shows they are quite a small company fur a cun trail of this size, so solidarity actions and hitting them hard will he rrally worthwhile Tills company is hah-d in the West Country. They gut the job of Ui«	+	== II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics ==
−	][Figure 6.9 Formats of Crop Decontamination “covertly ... in the open ... accountably ... inspections ... prevented ... up and coming” (<em>EF!AUNo.58</em> 1999: 1).	+	-----
−	I hae introduced the carnival esq ue approach above, but the vast majority ofcrop decontaminations were undertaken covertly, in small groups, under the cover of night. There was minimal co-ordination between the different groups, although we in Newcastle were contacted on two occasions to check if we had our eyes on particular sites in North Yorkshire: when we replied in the negative, one of these sites was then sabotaged by an EF!-affiliated group from elsewhere in the country. On another occasion, however, a crop near Sunderland was sabotaged by individuals : rom Manchester with whom we had no communication, or knowledge of, before or after. Despite the necessary anonymity, several revealing and evocative accounts of covert trashings were publicised (Hopkins 1998; EF.MC7No.89 2003: 4; Lynas 2004: 26-30; <em>Do or Die</em> 1996: 59; <em>Do or Die</em> 1999: 101; Szerszynski 2005) and there is no need for me to add my own experience	+	==== Annotation 103 ====
−	Several guides for covert sabotage were produced and distributed around EDA circles, such as ‘A Gardener’s Guide to Survival in the Modern World’, cheekily attributed to HRH Prince of Wales (<em>EF1AU</em> No.53 1998: 4-5) and adapted for the US context in 1999. One of these guides, ‘My first little book of GM crop decontamination’, consciously echoing the roads-protest-oriented ‘My first little booi< of peaceful direct action’ (1996), and it referred readers to the Genetix Snowball handbook as the companion guide for open decontaminations (MFLB 2001: 2). These guides are interesting in themselves in demonstrating the active sharing of experiences amongst activists i MFLB 2001: 1), according to an anarchist conceptualisation of knowledge: autonomous, decentralised, collective, non-expert, as 1 introduced in	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-23.png|''The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.'']]
−	<br>	+	The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:
−	Chapter 3. They also demonstrate an increase in sophistication from the basic starting points listed in ‘Got a test site near you’ (GTSNY 1998) and ‘So you wanna stop the genetics experiment’ (SYWS 1998) to the experiences gained and shared from the repeated decontaminations of’Weymouth’s farm-scale trials’ (WFSL 2001), documented with detailed assessments of, for example, the level of plant recovery following different trashing techniques (2001:4). The different emphases in the different guides demonstrates the	+	-----
−	diversity available at the	+	=== 1. The Principle of General Relationships ===
−	rassroots level of direct action.	+	''a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship''
−	The ‘how-to’ guides emphasise that decontamination was accessible for “all sorts of people, with all levels of fitness” (MFLB 2001:13), and that there was not one prescriptive manner in which it has to be done: “Are night-time actions the only option? Absolutely not, after all there is beauty in diversity” (WRGO 1998:2). MFLB details the advantages and disadvantages of open and covert repertoires in a neutral tone that belies the impassioned debate assessed in 6.4.4, and it also notes that there are ‘middle ways’, such as “the covert-to-overt action, begun quietly in the dark and completed openly after dawn” (MFLB 2001:2; £F/^t/No.772001:2).	+	-----
−	*** 6.4.4 Genetics Snowball and the Covert-Overt Debate Genetics Snowball and the Covert-Overt Debate	+	==== Annotation 104 ====
−	Genetix Snowball (GS) represent a conscious and explicit translation of civil disobedience and ploughshares discourse from the peace movement into the field of environmental direct action.[160] For this reason, it is a valuable case through which to consider the relations, conversations and disagreements that took place between this discourse and that of other EDA strategies. In order to make direct action against GMOs more accessible to the wider public, GS explained in depth exactly how it organised and what it did (1998: 1.4). Finding evidence for a CD methodology of EDA is thus made simple. By contrast, one might at first expect those who prefer covert night-time anonymity to be more tight-lipped about their activities, but when it comes to talking politics, this tendency has proved equally loquacious, albeit with pseudonyms. I will first introduce the GS format of EDA, and then set the context for the resulting critique and dialogue from those pursuing a covert repertoire.	+	The ''Principle of General Relationships'' describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships
−	The Genetix Snowball Campaign was inspired by the Snowball campaign of the eighties against Cruise,	+	The ''Principle of Development'' relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.
−	which introduced property damage to the UK peace movement (Snowball 1986; Heller 2000:72). The tactic was for people, who often labelled themselves “simply ordinary residents of this area” (Penrose 1986: 6), to cut a single strand of perimeter wire at nuclear bases. Although causing minimal damage, the vandalism led to hundreds of arrests and court appearances which were followed avidly by the media:	+	These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.
−	Snowball was a PR triumph. We could do the same thing in fields of GM crops. Individuals digging up	+	Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by
−	one plant at a time” (Jacklyn Sheedy quoted in Hopkins 1998:2). The Snowball repertoire of sabotage was purely symbolic, and of a lobbying intent (Snowball 1986:1). The GS handbook states that “Hopefully we are combining the best of the original Snowball and the best of Ploughshares with our experience and understanding of environmental actions to produce an action that is appropriate for the	+	Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Engels began working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on ''Anti-Dühring''. He then restarted work on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, ''Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4'', and so stopped working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.
−	particular circumstances of genetically modified crops” (1998:1.2)	+	What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'' and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.
−	In Figure 6.101 utilise the GS’ own account of their action to highlight the elements of CD discourse (established in 6.3.4), but it is also evident and explicit in all of their many public testimonials, and in the GS aims and principles. GS account is on the left, my notes are on the right	+	Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: ''innern'' ''Zusammenhang'', literally: “inner connections”) in ''Dialectics of Nature'', but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: ''Bewegung'') modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.
−	“The first snowball action was carried out by a group of people who knew each other very well;... Before doing the action, we’d distributed several hundred leaflets giving information about the campaign at public events and through publications. We’d also written to farmers hosting the GM release sites, all the companies releasing GM crops, the Thames Valley Police to let them know about the genetiX snowball campaign and the Environment Agency specifically to let them know that there would be bags of biohazard which needed their attention. The letter to the farmer invites them to join the campaign. The letter to the companies asks them to remove the crops themselves” (GS 1998:2.1).	+	In materialist dialectics, the word ''relationship'' refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	“We walked to the site carrying a banner, brightly coloured flags, tape to cordon off the area and heavy duty plastic bags marked with the biohazard symbol for the GM plants. As an example of a more sustainable way of producing our food we also took an apple tree to plant at the site, Five people took the decontaminating role and four others did support work: liaising with and explaining the action to press, farmer and police and recording what was happening. We took known and trusted press with us whilst Andrew (press liaison) met other press at a point nearby. The police had decided to meet there too and took advantage of a guide to the action. The ‘decontaminators’ used ordinary gardening tools and wore protective suits which we decorated with messages. Each puller chose a number of plants significant to them; Jo chose to pull up 25 as she is 25 years old, Kathryn pulled 64 for the number of experimental trials currently in progress, [etc..]	+	-----
−	We arrived about five minutes before the police and just about had time to put on our protective clothing and begin digging up the plants. The police were met by Jane and Phil (farmer and police liaison). We felt a man and a woman together would be safe and not intimidating. They introduced themselves and explained who we were and what we were doing. An agent for Monsanto then arrived and gave us a warning to leave the site.	+	==== Annotation 105 ====
−	When the police tried to stop us digging one of us explained that we couldn’t as we had work to do. A sergeant asked if there was anything they could say that would persuade us to leave the site. Rowan said ‘Yes, arrest Monsanto! They’re causing criminal damage to other farmer’s crops through genetic pollution and we are preventing this by removing Monsanto’s GM crops’. The police officer went off to speak to his superior. We continued digging up, snapping in half and bagging up the plants. We were asked again to leave, we continued decontaminating.	+	Throughout this book, ''phenomenon/phenomena'' simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.
−	The police began to arrest us for criminal damage after about twenty minutes. Our action/legal observer busily noted down significant events, the time that they happened and names, numbers or descriptions of people being involved. At this point more press arrived and Zoe and Mel both managed interviews with them before being arrested... The decontaminators left their signed statements for the farmer and the company... The arrested decontaminators were taken a few miles from the site and released without charge. The police confiscated our tools and the banner.	+	Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an ''external relationship''. A relationship which occurs ''within'' a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an ''internal relationship''.
−	Twelve days later and just two days before the second snowball round the five decontaminators were served injunctions by Monsanto”	+	These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:
−	Affinity Group formed before action.	+	When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.
−	Information provided to the public and concerned bodies.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png]]
−	Dialogue with other bodies.	+	The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:
−	Participation / a response is encouraged.	+	Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.
−	Visible and public.	+	This ''system of relationships'' (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).
−	The alternative demonstrated.	+	-----
−	Division of roles.	+	Relationships have a quality of ''generality'', which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to ''general relationships'', we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, ''between'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Media strategy.	+	The most general relationships are ''universal relationships'': these are relationships that exist between and within ''everything'' and ''all phenomena'', and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the ''Principle of Development''; see page 119.]
−	Tools and techniques accessible and everyday.	+	-----
−	Symbolic.	+	==== Annotation 106 ====
−	Planning for the most peaceful outcome / response.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png]]
−	The opponent is involved in the action.	+	The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'', which only occur between two ''specific'' things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (''universal relationships'', which occur between or within ''all'' things/phenomena/ideas).
−	The police are involved in the action.	+	Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are ''universal'' relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].
−	The ‘turn around*, pinning the moral blame on the opponent, challenging the police to question their role.	+	''Translation Note'': In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.
−	Process of dialogue/interplay between opponents.	+	-----
−	Legal aspect planned and prepared for.	+	The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):
−	Media.	+	* Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). <ref>See ''Private and Common'', p. 128; ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156.</ref>
		+	* Relationships between quantity and quality. <ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref>
		+	* Relationships between opposites. <ref>See Annotation 190, p. 181.</ref>
−	Accountability made explicit.	+	Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.
−	No immediate punishment	+	-----
−	The opponent forced to respond.	+	==== Annotation 107 ====
−	][Figure 6.10 Account of the First Genetix Snowball Action (GS 1998: 5.2).	+	==== Principle of General Relationships ====
−	<br>	+	According to ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “''Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the ''Principle of General Relationships''.”
−	This account demonstrates how Genetix Snowball acted and argued according to principles of accountability, nonviolence, democracy, openness and responsibility (1998:1.1; cf Snowball 1986: 17). These CD principles were of central rather than tactical importance, indeed GS expressed the “hope that groups will experiment with pushing the frontiers of openness out much further than our minimum ground rule” (1998: 6.7.1). Like the original Snowball, GS sits firmly on the side of a ‘principled’ or absolute view of non-violence as opposed to the tactical view more common in EDA (Tilley 1998a).	+	From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
−	Genetix Snowball declared various aims, beginning with the demand that the government impose a five year moratorium on the deliberate release of GM plants in Britain, except for government sponsored ecological health and safety tests (in enclosed systems), and the removal of all GM crops already existing.[161] There were also additional aims and principles, that express the key themes of CD strategy, including the urge for a mass, participatory movement; for a dialogue in society and a workable, peaceful solution; and the urge to disobedience: “To encourage people to question mindless obedience and to move through their fears into a position of shared power balanced with a strong sense of responsibility (1998:2.1)	+	==== Diversity in Unity ====
−	In keeping with the CD discourse elaborated in 6.3.4, the role of direct action is articulated by GS as democratic and reasonable (as well as a liberating break from convention). In the handbook for action they are upfront about “inviting people to join together to take nonviolent action by safely pulling up genetically engineered crops: to cany out their action openly”, and “In the spirit of democracy we are asking people who take part in the genetiX snowball to be prepared to take the consequences of their nonviolent action” (1998: Acclaimer). Using the wordplay characteristic of the handbook, GS term their acts of direct action ‘civil responsibility’ (rather than civil disobedience).	+	There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
−	In the critiques I present below, we may witness the dialogue initiated when one particular method of activism was launched onto the EDA milieu. Representing a (CD) strategic rationale generally critiqued within anarchism, the ensuing dialogue brought to the surface many of the activist-anarchist arguments that, I maintain, are implicit behind much EDA. Although I frame this as an anarchistic EDA critique of ploughshares activism, the criticism was equally, if not more so, directed the other way (Vinthagen 1999; Tilley 2001).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-26.png|''An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.'']]
−	Many in EDA were shocked that GS should advocate “that we should do our illegal actions (criminal damage for example) in a totally open way, providing our names and addresses to the authorities, submitting to arrest and justifying our acts in court” (Bob 1998: 1). This reaction of outrage was unsurprising insofar as tactics of sabotage are more at home within a covert campaign: the Ploughshares tradition proves the exception to this rule, yet even there sabotage usually needs to be covert at least until the deed is done (Tilley 1998b). When the GS activists held a discussion at the 1998 EF! gathering, therefore, they had to begin by recognising that their tactics were a departure from the usual form activists in EF! used.[162] They nonetheless emphasised the worth of open CD tactics on the basis that they would (might) draw non-activists into taking direct action for the first time (cf Wall 2000: 84). Ultimately, it was this mobilisation of ‘normal’ people that legitimised the snowballers within an anarchist discourse.	+	The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.
−	The role of this workshop in enabling this critical dialogue amongst activists to take place should be emphasised: in my mind it validates the very existence of events such as the EF! Summer Gathering: see 5.3.10. This was the event for which activists critical of CD methods prepared the discussion documents ‘accountable to who?’ (Bob 1998) and ‘Fuck the disobedient, let’s get civil’ (Black Bat 1998).[163] The discussion documents were later reprinted in Peace News, entering a debate already	+	-----
−	underway between covert (EDA) and overt (ploughshares) positions, and later perpetuated in the letters pages: I draw on these as additional sources. The EF! critiques targeted: reformism; reliance on the State; delegitimation of other ‘non-accountable* actions; hostaging activists to (non-anarchist) public opinion[164]; and the ineffectiveness of a method of action that gets participants arrested without causing significant harm to the crops. The alternative proposed included widespread covert destruction, alongside more crop squats and public actions against test sites, laboratories and offices (Black Bat 1998:4).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-27.png|''Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.'']]
−	In the workshop many activists made criticisms face-to-face with two of those engaged in the Genetix Snowball campaign. The two GS spokespeople had expected criticism, but afterwards commented that they had not expected so much: one said he felt activists were seeing GS as an attack on their own (covert) methods of activism, whereas their strategy was not meant to replace, but to add to and increase activism. Criticism chiefly addressed two GS principles: making a ‘reasonable’ demand of the government, and accepting punishment I will deal with these two elements in turn, then move onto the debate over mass movements, elitism and empowerment that resulted.	+	'''Unity in Diversity'''
−	The GS call for a moratorium (above) was condemned as reformist (“dead end single issue reformism” in Black Bat’s words (1998:2)): it allowed corporations and governments to set the agenda - and also negated the challenge of more fundamentalist direct action. The GS handbook’s discussion on democracy, furthermore, implies that if the powers that be acted ‘morally* and ‘accountably*, there would be no problem (1998: Acclaimer; Black Bat 1998:2). The ‘democratic direct action’ of GS resembles the ‘liberal directaction* critiqued in 6.2.1, and this is underlined by a government-dependency in (some of) their thinking: “taking direct action... was necessary because the Government wasn’t listening to what people were saying and had waived its responsibility” (Tulip in Rowell 1998:). This is amongst the least anarchist of the themes that were commonly articulated around anti-GM direct action, and Black Bat argue “it blurs the lines between lobbying and direct action, a blurring which comes dangerously near in its effect to that of recuperation” (1998:3).	+	When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
−	The appeal to the authorities for reforms contradicts the Earth First! no-compromise principle, a principle interpreted to mean here that GM crops must be abolished full stop: “Direct action is making our individual and collective desires into reality, regardless of the laws that try and control us. It’s taking, occupying, destroying or building - it can’t be asking or demanding” (Bob 1998: 1). In the EF! workshop, the GS activists defended these aims as tactical, not ultimate: from a sabotage perspective, for example, all GM sites being contained indoors would make them a much easier target to find. Yet this was not convincing.	+	''Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
−	Even more than this issue, EF! critics focussed on the arrestable consequences of accountability versus the practical effectiveness of the anti-GM movement. In the workshop, accepting punishment was generally seen as plain stupidity, and not an option for most. It was also pointed out that it implicitly condemns those who act covertly as ‘non-accountable’ and ‘non-democratic’ (Black Bat 1998: 3). Most in EF!, and most in EDA, were unwilling to get arrested for something so ineffective as uprooting a handful of plants. Genetix Snowball declined in part because of the lack of active support from other activists.	+	-----
−	Hancock justifies the accountable position on the basis that only those claiming responsibility endure the immediate legal repercussions, and that it is easier to talk about such actions afterwards. From a CD perspective, with the goal of dialogue in mind, the potential for communication is thus enhanced: accountability makes it more possible for the opponent to trust you. It is also “easier to ensure and claim that the action is non-violent”, particularly as “the wider public often associate covert action with violence” (cf WRGO 1998:2). Hancock argues, furthermore, that “Democracy needs names and faces - it cannot function with anonymity” (Hancock 1997: 14).[165]	+	==== b. Characteristics of Relationships ====
−	Hancock argues that open actions are more disobedient and undermining, that they undermine the power of prison and that the trial increases the symbolic impact of the action. Anonymous Bob disagrees, stating that “The idea of giving yourself to the police, of arguing your position in court, legitimises their power and the system that power protects. It respects their ‘right’ to judge you and your actions. This is fine if you basically agree with that system” (Bob 1998: 1).[166] The revolutionary position, however, is clearly in opposition to this. Hancock demurs, using the CD conceptualisation of power (cited in sections 2.2.4 and 6.3.4) to suggest that open strategies can be more of a challenge to state authority:	+	Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.
−	“Covert actions might in some way challenge the validity of the state to punish us, but they also uphold the state’s power by somehow making us ashamed of our actions. To openly accept the consequences of one’s actions, indeed to use these consequences as an important part of the power of your action, can undermine and confuse the state no end, and opens up an arena in which vital debate can take place” (1997:14).	+	''-'' ''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships''
−	The strongest plank with which the GS activists constructed their defence, was the possibility of greater mobilisation and radicalisation of people ‘new to NVDA’ (see 5.13). They never designed their method for the already-active, already-radicalised saboteurs in EF!, but envisaged it as a device for making sabotage accessible. The anarchist reading of the purpose of GS was thus to involve masses of otherwise passive people in direct action, in opposition to the state, and in doing so to regain individual autonomy and build a collective resistance. As well as the obvious tactical (media-friendly) benefits of the Snowball organisation, the opening up of organising direct action neatly subverted the paranoi- ising and marginalising of activists by the state, and a successful GS would create a support base for the small number of covert saboteurs criticising it	+	According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.
−	It is on the (anarchist) logic of mass participation that Hancock thus stakes his defence of open campaigns: “Any action which alienates or limits participation must be keenly questioned - this is as true of ploughshares-type actions as it is of non-violent covert property damage” (1997: 13; cf Black Bat 1998: 3). He concludes his argument with the theme we have already encountered in 6.2.2, and which we shall return to in 6.5: “if it creates cultural and organisational forms incapable of wider, radical change, then it’s a reformist strategy, rather than a revolutionary one” (1997: 14; Black Bat 1998:4).	+	-----
−	It is therefore apt that it is on this very same ground that the advocates of covert action <em>opposed</em> the open strategy and its acceptance of punishment. Anonymous Bob states that suggesting activists go to prison is “hardly the best way to help our movement grow” (1998). Hancock accepts this point: “we cannot sustain large numbers of activists being imprisoned, in terms of our numbers or our energy.” Thus covert forms of action are potentially more effective because they offer the possibility “of repeating our resistance again and again” (Bombadill 1997: 14). Tilley questions the understanding of the word ‘effective*, considering the GS manner more likely to be effective in the long run. She insists that GS is “radical and revolutionary”, on the basis that for radical social change to happen “everyone will need to be involved” (1998).	+	==== Annotation 108 ====
−	I would suggest that covert actions are a very hard way to get more people involved in an issue, because it is so hard to talk about it Hence one of the guides states “do not talk about the action with anyone other than those directly involved in it” (MFLB 2001:10). The one attempt at a participatory, EF!-organised covert decontamination, ‘Smash Genetix’ (<em>EF1AU</em>No.59 1999:1), did not go to plan, and amongst the ‘lessons’ to be learnt was the exclusion of the less physically able (“people with kids, those unable to run etc.” (LSGA 1999:1; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2000: 67)) from future decontaminations. This action was considerably less empowering than participants found the more open and festive Watlington rally of two weeks before.	+	In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects
−	Bob nonetheless argues that taking responsibility for illegal actions makes us <em>less</em> accessible, the heavy sentences and financial penalties meaning “the only people prepared to break them will be the young unemployed with less to lose” (Bob 1998). Ploughshares actions require too much time and bravery, leading to a high level of burn-out, experienced particularly by those who’ve endured prison terms.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-28.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.'']]
−	Critics thus argue that this is a form of elitism, incapable of building a mass movement (TANL quoted in Welsh 2000: 175; cf Black 2004:7; Cunliffe 2002: 10). In the ploughshares case, the anarchist attention to elitism is seen through the lens of’martyrdom*.	+	All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have ''objective characteristics.''
−	Hancock records that “A major criticism of ploughshares is that martyrdom appears to be an essential component” (1998). Critics like Jonathan X argue it is disempowering and alienating (2000: 164). Although ploughshares activists seek to distance themselves from martyrdom, the theme of public, exemplary suffering and other motifs rooted in religious traditions remain. Hemgren argues that	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-29.png|''Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.'']]
−	“Civil disobedience does not... mean martyrdom... The strength of civil disobedience lies in overcoming the fear of suffering. The whole challenge is in overcoming fear. It forces us to realise what our possibilities are. Martyrs do exactly the opposite. They take opportunities away from others. We love them because they offer themselves for us. They are our proxies. But nobody else can free us. Freedom can be won only be overcoming fear and taking the consequences” (1993:136).	+	Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.
−	Hancock, however, accepts that there does exist an issue of martyrdom in the ploughshares movement, stating that “there is no doubt that such actions are playing around with dramatic and heroic ‘energy’, however humble the activists themselves feel” (1998).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-30.png|''The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.'']]
−	Anonymous Bob warns that the GS strategy “seems likely to reproduce the spectacle of the few committed activists being cheered on by their totally passive supporters” (Bob 1998:1). Even successful ploughshares actions like the ‘Seeds of Hope’ disempower others, making them feel they can only support those who did it (Bob 1998:). The Genetix snowballers thus admitted they were uncomfortable at how they were put on a pedestal as martyrs by some locals at Totnes for their arrest, when their aim was to make direct action a mass-accessible technique (My notes, EF! Gathering 1998). The GS style of direct action may therefore encourage a similar process of separation and elitism to the ELF strategy critiqued in 6.5.3.	+	As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.
−	One way ploughshares activists have responded is to state that “what is required is neither bravery nor purity, but good support and thorough preparation” (Hancock 1998). Much of the ground-rules and procedure of ploughshares activism, such as that of Trident Ploughshares, are rooted in this perceived need for support and preparation. Others in EDA prefer spontaneity, and associate the structured, controlled form of action in CD to be antithetical to the nature of revolution: “the assumption that training is needed before such actions, and the symbolic nature of many accountable actions... shows a pretty strange idea of direct action” (Bob 1998:1). Indeed, the critics suggested that having stated ‘principles’ equated to limiting ground-rules, which act as a constraint on freedom of action.	+	-----
−	Bombadill argues that covert action is the most effective form of NVDA because it is empowering to the participants, and thus has a healthy impact on them: “A group of people overcoming the roaddiggers and stopping them from working not only generates healthy disrespect for the machinery but also demonstrates how these weapons of destruction are merely machines which we can defeat when we come together” (Bombadill 1997:14; cf Merrick 1997:4). However, it is actually very hard to engineer these situations, as my experience of Smash Genetix indicates.	+	Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are ''inherent'' and ''objective'' properties of the pair.
−	Bombadill also presents an alternative argument for accessibility to activism. He accepts that “The realisation of our strength as a movement comes from the understanding that our actions are accessible” but notes that “To many people with families, jobs, and priorities other than campaigning, increasing the risk of imprisonment through greater openness would mean a corresponding decrease in their readiness to get involved.” By way of example, he cites the locals who, during the M65 campaign in 1995 would slip onto the worksite at night to sabotage the machinery. This was “what they felt was their most effective contribution to the campaign, as they were not able to commit themselves to live on site full-time or to write letter after letter to some faceless bureaucrat” (Bombadill 1997: 14).	+	-----
−	Anonymous Bob, several participants in the EF! workshop, and previous writers of EF! discussion documents have also made the link between ‘accountable’ actions and the middle class. The converse to this is that sabotage is considered more accessible to the working class (WPH 1998:2). I consider this a lazy argument, although not necessarily without some truth in terms of the culture of morally articulate, ‘worthy* and ‘reasonable* peace movement activism.	+	==== Annotation 109 Translation note: ====
−	The accountable Snowball campaign received a major blow when its opponent, Monsanto, succeeded in getting severe injunctions passed against the first Snowball participants. This represented a significant deterrent to the virgin activists that Genetix Snowball hoped to involve. These “SLAPPs, or Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, are designed to chill people into silence, by suing them for defamation, injury or conspiracy, not necessarily to win the case, but to bring victims to the point where financially or emotionally they cannot continue their defence” (Rowell 1998; cf Manes 1990: 204-205). The second Genetix Snowball action still occurred two days after the injunctions were served, but ultimately GS became stalled in the very legal process it had hoped to exploit. This is evident in the chronology of events on the GS website ([[http://www.fraw.org.uk/gs/chronol.htm][http://www.fraw.org.uk/gs/chronol.htm]]), and conversations with two of the activists involved have also confirmed that their own campaigning energy got sucked into fighting the legal battles. A snowball effect, therefore, did not happen (certainly not on the scale of the original), and GS wound down in 1999.	+	In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is ''“khách quan.”'' This is a compound word in which ''“khách”'' means “guest,” and ''“quan”'' means “point of view.” Therefore, ''“khách quan”'' literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”
−	The snowbailers emphasised that GS was only one technique amongst many which they personally supported, including the covert effective trashings advocated by Black Bat As we have seen, however, their proposed strategy was viewed with hostility by others within EDA. This is interesting, because the GS activists sought to add something new and supportive to the movement, not to convert the whole EDA milieu into CD Methodists. The common argument launched against those who wish to impose non-violent principles on a campaign, furthermore, is that we should allow a diversity of actions: “I believe that covert protest can share the vision of a more just and sustainable society while admitting the need to embrace a diverse strategy to achieve this” (Bombadill 1997:14). In later sections I will assess this argument for diversity and consider whether its effects are actually such as they are framed.	+	Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,” the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.
−	*** 6.4.5 Anti-GM Direct Action: Conclusion	+	The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is ''“vốn có.”'' This is another compound word: ''“vốn”'' is a shortened form of the word ''“vốn dĩ,”'' which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” ''“Có”'' means “to have” or “to exist.” '''''“Vốn có”''''' thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.”
−	This chapter has continued our assessment of EDA’s demonstration of an anarchist practice, sensibility and discourse, with an examination of anti-GM direct action and the most significant strategic debate that grew out of it. 6.4.2, Anti-GM Networks, noted the extension of the cross-class alliances noted in the anti-roads movement, and the deployment of mass EDA against a new environmental threat, this time characterised by the discourse of risk, corporate power versus democracy, and the commodification (enclosure) of life. I paid particular attention to the crossover of anti-roads experience in organisational form. This builds upon the previous assessments of DIY networks, and other forms of activist-anarchist organisation, to demonstrate the continued strength and applicability of anarchist organisational tenets to different environmental contexts.	+	So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.”
−	In 6.4.3, Forms of Anti-GM Direct Action, I assessed the place of anti-GM direct action within frames of ‘failing democracy’, and found much activism constituted only ‘liberal’ direct action (or ‘militant lobbying*), framed as a ‘last resort’ intended to inform the decisions made in higher spheres. I noted some genuinely anarchist elements in the spontaneous decontaminations, crop squats, covert and overt decontaminations, but also noted that each of these repertoires had limitations. The crucial point is that the activists themselves recognised this, and put their concerns into words: it is here that the anarchism of EDA is most clearly demonstrated.	+	-----
−	In 6.4.4, Genetix Snowball and the Overt-Covert Debate, I assessed these concerns by framing a dialogue between CD/Ploughshares discourse from the peace movement, and a covert approach more redolent of the animal rights movement (note that both have a place within EDA: I wish to exclude neither). This is the strategic debate that I consider most fully, and as such balances the focus on questions of organisation and identity in Chapter 5.1 consider it to be amongst the most important of the strategic debates that grew out of EDA, and certainly the one most clearly articulated in the language of political theory. It does not matter that agreement was not reached: it is the expression of anarchist sentiments, and the experimentation with positions available within a broad anarchist valuesystem, that makes the debate of importance to my study. Nor was this debate the end of the matter: in the next case study I shall take our examination of ecological sabotage into a new context, and consider the issues of exclusivity, elitism, divisions between passive and active campaigners, and unequal	+	Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.
−	relations of power that may all arise within a militant, anarchistically-informed campaign of (non- accountable) sabotage.	+	''-'' ''The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships''
−	** 6.5 Peat and the ELF	+	According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.
−	*** 6.5.1 Introduction	+	-----
−	In these sections I continue the study of ecological sabotage that I began in 6.3.5 in relation to previous, workplace frameworks of sabotage, and which I developed in sections 6.4.3 & 6.4.4 by presenting the range of sabotage forms deployed on the GM issue, and the resulting covert-overt debate. This field of inquiry explores further the place of sabotage within EDA, and presents additional vectors of anarchist critique. I am paying particular attention to the interface between unapologetically ‘militant* and ‘effective’ tactics, and the ethical views at the core of anarchism. I do not, however, dwell on the theoretical issues of violence and non-violence (this is covered in 6.3), but rather seek to reinsert the strategic debates considered in Chapters 4 and 5, into the actual practice of UK EDA.	+	==== Annotation 110 ====
−	In 6.5.21 resituate sabotage within EDA, and consider the ‘split’ declared between EF!UK and the ELF. I frame the economic strategy that lies behind ecological sabotage (and on which basis it has been claimed as a success), and consider its twin characterisation as, on the one hand, an application of cold, strategic thinking and, on the other, as light-hearted, passionate, and embedded in the wider EDA community. These characteristics stand in some contradiction.	+	Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of ''externality'' and ''objectiveness'' to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in ''isolation''. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the ''Principle of General Relationships'' [see p. 107], ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with ''all other'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	In 6.5.3 I pursue the first of these characterisations by considering the escalation of ELF ambitions and organisational form in the USA, and I present something of the critical dialogue that resulted from anarchists (of various ‘brands’), uneasy about the relationship of a quasi-militaristic (or ‘guerrillaistic*) organisation, to broader, more fundamental and long-term anarchist ethics. Elements of anarchist critique that come into play include: the critique of elite or vanguardist models of change (introduced in 5.2); the critique of organisational models that predicate a division between active participants and passive ‘supporters’, or which act as barriers between a mutual interchange; and the anarchist celebration of grassroots, passionate spontaneity against top-down militaristic strategising.	+	Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an ''open'' system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.
−	In 6.5.41 return from these grand and earnest discussions to a more down-to-earth, action-focussed and participatory context, which I consider to be a more positive, and perhaps more ‘real’, site of ecological direct action. This is the campaign of obstruction, trespass and sabotage against peat milling which reached a particular peak of activity between 2000 and 2003, under the co-ordinating efforts of the EF! offshoot ‘Peat Alert!*. With this case-study I will re-establish the grounded, fluid and diverse character of UK EDA.	+	-----
−	*** 6.5.2 Sabotage in EDA	+	==== Annotation 111 ====
−	“Don’t remain a machine hater—become a machine trasher. If a development is decimating your local ecology or your work is shit — you need sabotage” (TLWI: 18)	+	As explained above, a ''systematic structure'' is a structure which includes within itself a system of ''component'' parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).
−	I will begin this section by returning to Earth First! In 6.3 we noted that the primary repertoires of EF! were variations on blockades, occupations and other civil disobedience methods. <em>Do or Die</em> and <em>Green Anarchist</em> argued for the central importance of sabotage, however, and in a survey of EF! repertoires, Rootes found that attacks on property came second to ‘confrontational’ actions, ahead of ‘conventional’ or ‘demonstrative’ forms (2000:42). Although covert sabotage is integrally difficult to quantify, and suffers from an under-reporting (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004:203), its prevalence is easily established through participation in EDA camps and gatherings, and textual evidence is provided by guidebooks such as ‘Practical Monkey Wrenching’ (1993) or the Ozymandias Handbook (2002). In 6.4, furthermore, we noted that certain forms and fields of sabotage are actually quite fully documented and discussed: the case of peat shall provide another example of this in 6.5.4. One point to note is that these handbooks for covert sabotage consider blockading, civil disobedience and manufactured vulnerability repertoires to exist within essentially the same framework: they are termed ‘noble sabotage’ (Ozymandias 2002:1; PMW 1993: 1-2). As with the handbooks considered in 6.4.3, wherein the accountable approach of the Genetix Snowball handbook was referred to in those focussing on covert action, a diversity in methods and proclivities is recognised as the outset.	+	''- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships''
−	The range of forms of ecological sabotage has been indicated in the previous parts of this thesis, including peace-movement fence-cutting or warcraft-smashing, and supergluing locks and disabling computers during office occupations. Three forms are of particular note. First, the famed EF1US repertoire of ‘spiking’ trees to hinder their cutting and prevent their profitable sale was utilised at several anti-roads sites, including Newcastle (Little Weed 1994:2-3; Seel 1997a: 119; Do <em>or</em> Die 1998:22; Wall 2000: 85; Welchman 2001:97), but it was used comparatively less than in the US, and it was not <em>relied upon</em> as a central tactic. Second, arson was used, particularly for strategically crucial machinery, at road sites such as Twyford, Newbury, Pollok and the M65, sometimes by a joyous crowd <em>(Do or Die</em> 2003: 10; Merrick 1996; <em>Do or Die</em> 1994: 23; £F.Mt/No,12 1994: 2).[167] Third, and most interestingly for me, there was recurrent sabotage at sites of environmental destruction that worked with the elements, and with the surrounding environment, to seek to undo the destruction of ‘development’: for example, restoring the watercourse at Twyford (<em>EFIA</em>C/No.3 1992:2) or pumping water back into a reservoir at Buiy (<em>EFIA U</em> No.62 1999: 8; cf Booth 1997:25). The sabotage considered in 6.5.4 represents an extension, and the most popular form, of this latter, remedial and nature-allied sabotage, for which economic strategising is only a secondary consideration. Ecological sabotage should also not be seen as a discrete repertoire separate from other EDA, but instead as just one fluid ingredient which may be combined with, or spontaneously emerge out of, other repertoires such as blockading, street parties and mass trespasses <em>(Aufheben</em> 1995:15).	+	In addition to affirming the objectiveness<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> and generality<ref>See p. 108.</ref> of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the ''diversity'' of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:
−	Notwithstanding its widespread use, disagreement over the use of sabotage was common at anti-road sites (EEV 1997; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003; AF 1996b). Within the broader arena of EDA, EF! provided a slightly more formal space in which discussions concerning sabotage left a clearer paper trail, which facilitates assessment (<em>EF!AUNg3</em> 1992:5; No. 16 1995:2). At the Brighton gathering of 1992 (see 6.3.2) the issue was brought to a head when sabotage at Hatfield peat works costing £100,000 (see 6.5.4) was attributed to EF!, and the press carried a quote from an “EF!(UK) activist that argued that radical greens might carry out bomb attacks (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004: 202). It was felt that the sabotage at Hatfield “was an individual act and ... claiming it as the responsibility of EF! was unfair to those in the movement who disagreed with it” (£FA4UNo.3 1992:2). The decision was made that “Earth First! would be split into two. On the one hand there would be an underground group, the Earth Liberation Front, which would do ecotage and all the embarrassing naughtiness stuff and, on the other hand, all the open civil disobedience kind of thing would retain the name Earth First!” (‘Edgar’, quoted in Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004:202; cf Snorky the Elf <em>GA</em> 39). The EFI-ELF split was not competitive but intended to be mutually supportive, and it was ultimately more apparent than real: a convenient separation for purely strategic purposes.[168] Plows, Wall & Doherty note that “Ultimately no durable ELF network developed as a consequence of this gathering” but “ecotage diffused amongst the growing numbers and networks of direct action environmentalists” (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004: 202-203). The ELF name resurfaced later in the 1990s in the USA, however, associated with much grander, pro-active and spectacular acts of property destruction. It was also given a more concretely defined organisation and identity: I shall present the anarchist critique of this in 6.4.3.	+	* All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.
		+	* Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.
−	In the UK, the original choice of the ELF name identified the network as a companion to the ALF (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004: 202), although it was socially as well as ecologically concerned (Tara 2000; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1994:16). The name recalled legends of pixies (elves), hence the UK term of ‘pixieing’ for the US ‘monkeywrenching’ (<em>Do or Die</em> 1994: 16). The destruction of road-building equipment was often reported in terms of’mother nature’s revenge’: it was “a humorous thing with a serious nature to it that just took off’ (Tara 2003:46). Although the name was “consciously lighthearted” (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004: 214), the ELF initials themselves came to provide anarchists with a focus for criticism, as I shall consider in 6.5.3	+	-----
−	In a style that should be becoming familiar from our previous considerations of other DI Y EDA networks, the ELF was presented in organisational terms as a fluid, non-existing network:	+	==== Annotation 112 ====
−	“ELF had no command structure or solid network, each group being independent. There was no press officer or office, so the authorities had nowhere to focus their eyes and ears. ELF units would attack, cause damage and then let either the company or press know that it was ELF who did it” (Tara 2003:46; cf Foreman & Hayward 1993: 9).[169]	+	One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in ''Theses on Feuerbach,'' Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].
−	At the <em>EF!AU</em> we occasionally received typed ‘communiques’ reporting damage to car showrooms or peat-digging material, and would publicise them (£FL4C/No.63 1998:2; cf EF.Mt/No.62 1999: 8).	+	Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.
−	The economic rationale of much anti-roads direct action was noted in 6.2. On the basis that “the only thing likely to stop these roads being built is the escalating cost of the projects” (PMW 1993: 1; cf Merrick 1996:66; Little Weed: 2), destruction of property was advocated as “the most effective way” to cost them money (‘Andrew* quoted in Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004: 208). In Halloween of 1992, the first ‘Earth Night’ was declared and machines at Twyford Down and elsewhere were destroyed. Tarmac were forced to spend thousands on security, and the actions were proclaimed a success on economic terms. This economic rationale (Foreman & Hayward 1993: 8), forms the basis for strategic arguments over how to increase the effectiveness and impact of such tactics. It is these I wish to look at now. To take Earth Nights as an example, “A national Earth Night gives the opportunity for all groups to hit on the same night and so make the amount of damage more apparent Instead of having 2 machines and a battery hen unit being hit in one night[we] have 100 machines and 50 battery units being trashed. In this way we can capture the media and so make our arguments ram home” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993a: 7; cf £FA4t/No.8 1993:2; No.29 1996: 6; No.30 1996: 6). Yet focussing acts of sabotage on one publicly advertised night would clearly become ineffective if all a controversial company needed to do was to increase security on one day of the year. Thus it is that most strategic arguments are made running: they do not hold firm for all time, and they only make sense when understood as part of an ongoing dialogue.	+	''Characteristics'' refer to the features and attributes that exist ''internally'' within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.
−	In an appraisal of the tactic, CM writes that “if the sole purpose of ecotage is to make an adverse financial impact... it must be judged a success” (2003: 85; cf The Havoc Mass 2004:18). In the UK this was most notably the case with anti-GM direct action, prompting repeated withdrawals, cancellations and expressions of dismay from GM advocates, such as Professor Michael Wilson who stated “I am afraid that the Luddites have effectively won” (quoted in <em>The Independent,</em> 4.7.2004:). Although corporations may seek to neutralise the impact of sabotage by passing on the cost to customers, CM asserts that in the case of timber felling, for example, “a higher cost for wood products will inevitably mean that fewer wood products are bought” (2003: 84), furthermore, and we shall see that in the case of peat it was not separated off from other forms of activism. We shall also, however, note that much sabotage was motivated by the urgent need for ecological defence or restoration, not just economics.	+	''Manifestation'' refers to ''how'' a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed ''externally'' in the material world.
−	In 6.4 we explored criticisms of covert sabotage from the perspectives of non-violent and mass movement discourses of change, but CM also claims it as a success in terms of public impact and consciousness changing: “The radical environmental message, whether concerning old growth or dolphins, would not be receiving the widespread coverage it is today were it not for the ‘publicity value’ of monkeywrenching” (2003: 85). Similar claims have been made for animal rights militancy (Gamer 1998). Plows, Wall & Doherty argue that the effect of economic sabotage “is greater when combined with public campaigns against the same targets” (2004:209-210), and Carter returns us to the themes of Chapters <em>4</em> and 5, when he argues that ecotage has a significant role to play in the longterm progression to a ecological society:	+	For example, a ball may have the ''characteristics'' of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may ''manifest'' by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.
−	“Given a mounting concern for the condition of the environment in response to increasing ecological destruction, polluting industries could expect to suffer more and more from a growing willingness by activists to engage in ecologically-motivated sabotage ... This could easily reach a stage where pollution would no longer pay” (1999:241; cf Carter 1998:29-47).	+	If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.
−	Ecotage has thus a legitimate place within both the radical green project considered in Chapter 4, and the process of getting ‘from here to there’ considered in Chapter 5. In the US, ELF actions escalated into spectacular arsons such as that at Vail in 1998: the FBI have recorded 600 ELF and ALF actions since 1996, causing damage worth more than $40,000,000 US dollars (FBI 12.2.2002). The incident at Vail encouraged a split between EF1US and the ELF similar to that in the UK, and the ELF became more concrete and organised, with a ‘Press Office’ and self-appointed publicity officer. In the next section I shall present anarchist critical appraisals of this ELF model, but in the UK “the ELF failed to establish itself because activists rejected the idea of a specific group which would base its strategy on ecotage as its principal form of action” (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2004:207), and UK EDA has by contrast demonstrated “a pattern of many small acts of sabotage” (2004:205), which <em>Do or Die</em> emphasise was mostly embedded in, and undertaken by “by those campaigners onsite” (2003:16-17). I argue that this format escapes the chief anarchist criticisms, and provides a much healthier movement milieu for anarchist themes and empowering practices: the assessment of peat direct action in 6.5.4 shall support this view.	+	Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.
−	*** 6.5.3 Anarchism and the Earth Liberation Front	+	''Characteristics'' and ''Manifestation'' correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of ''Content'' and ''Form,'' which is discussed in section page 147.
−	In 6.21 distinguished attitudes to sabotage as the defining difference between radical groups such as EF! and Sea Shepherd, and liberal groups such as FoE and Greenpeace: this was given practical demonstration in episodes such as the Foe-EF! rupture at Twyford. In this section, however, I will present a form of sabotage that is clearly not liberal, but which still failed to escape the other negative dynamics that, in 5,2.1 and 5.3.3, Greenpeace was accused. I shall therefore be bringing the ethics of the anarchist revolutionary tradition to bear on forms of militant ecological direct action, in order to explore tensions and orient our understanding toward ‘best practice’.	+	Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.
−	Arguing from a materialist and militaristic framework, green anarchists in the US have argued that activists should see the enemy as a configuration with strategic pressure points (BGN 2002:15). UK adherents to this line have argued that a “strategic review is needed to tell us where best to hit the System” (GA 1999:4). An early contributor to <em>Do or Die,</em> for example, argued that “It is very hard to unbuild a freeway, dam, clearcut, or other such atrocity”, but “there are ‘bottlenecks’ where a small effort on the part of the activist can have an enormous effect in hindering or stopping that process (environmental jujitsu). Your job is to find and exploit those pressure points” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993a: 12; cf Reinsborough 2003). On this occasion, heavy machinery was identified as the crux: on certain road camps one specific, even unique piece of equipment was essential for the eviction and was therefore carefully targeted by sabotage. Indeed, it lies in no contradiction to the passionate and spontaneous ethos argued for Earth First! in 5.3, to recognise the strategic thinking that also lay behind its tactics: “standing back, viewing the whole operation, identifying a weak point, and going for it mercilessly. The perennial spanner in the works - using the element of surprise and doing the unexpected” (<em>Do or Die 2000:</em> 176; Scarce 1990: 5).	+	It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.
−	Such ‘strategic thinking’, however, has been given a heavier tone by Ted Kaczynski, the ‘Unabomber’ whose views have been publicised in the US anti-civilisation press (notably <em>Green Anarchy</em> whose editorial staff includes the leading primitivist theorist John Zerzan) (Eggen and Gates <em>Washington Post</em> 27.7.2002). He writes that activists should adopt “The principle ... that in any form of conflict, if you want to win, you must hit your adversary where it hints”: not the fist but the sensitive and vulnerable parts (Kaczynski 2002:1). He argues, for example, that “Smashing up McDonald’s or Starbuck’s is pointless” and “is not a revolutionary activity. Even if every fast-food chain in the world were wiped out the techno-industrial system would suffer only minimal harm as a result” (2002: 1). The same goes for raiding fur farms (“As a means of weakening the techno-industrial system this activity is utterly useless”) and the timber industry: another ‘fist’. The ‘vital organs* in the view of Kaczynski and others are communications, computers, propaganda, biotechnology and the electricpower industry (Kaczynski 2002: 18). Note that it is not the militancy of the tactic, but the strategic thinking behind it, that marks the distinction and which is the topic of concern here.	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	The edition of <em>Green Anarchy</em> which followed demurred from “the authoritarian and limited advice” Kaczynski offered, instead celebrating the spirit of spontaneous revolt[170] Grounded in the anarchist ideals of mass participation and empowerment (which Kaczynski is not), the anarchist editors celebrated acts of revolt not as “some massified, preplanned action, but the outcome of spontaneous rage” (Rage 2002 : 1). In contrast to Kaczynski’s presentation of cold, tactically perfect revolts, they argue that “It is in this rage and spontaneity that we find the spirit of resistance” (2002: 1). The sabotage guides of the UK offer cool and careful security advice, insisting that ecosabotage is “not about love and rage” or vandalism, but sensible, targeted and strategic (Ozymandias: 1,3.1; cf Foreman & Hayward 1993:9), but I concur with Plows, Wall & Doherty that, certainly in the UK, “Anger, frustration, love - passionate emotions fuel the fire of ecotage” (2004:208).	+	Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a ''comprehensive viewpoint''.
−	The difference between the <em>GAy</em> editors and Kaczynski is worth noting, as it provides a marker between anarchist and authoritarian forms of violence.[171] Although the anti-civilisation current of anarchism is held at arms-length from mainstream British anarchism, it is a body of theory that can nonetheless support many of the same tactics: those “which allow the dispossessed to seize direct control of their lives — strikes, riots, squatting and occupations of streets and neighbourhoods” (Rage 2002:8). This perspective supports an analysis of ELF activity as merely one organised manifestation of a much wider (and not necessarily green) tendency to sabotage: “the dispossessed will always be resisting work and commodity relations by slacking off on the job, shop-lifting, dodging fares and many other tactics” (ASAN 2002: 8). This fits the view of everyday sabotage contained within the mainstream anarchist tradition (Sprouse 1992), as I considered in 6.3.5.	+	Having a ''comprehensive viewpoint'' requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.
−	Primal Rage note that “not all revolt is equitable with the fight scenario that Ted uses as his analogy” (2002: 1). This is the most important point of their argument for me, one which tends to be lost amongst the US anti-civilisation journals and their UK following, such as <em>Green Anarchist.</em> They commonly utilise war metaphors not just in their theory but also in the general format of their papers, such as the “prisoners of war” listing. Often these listings (similar versions of which are also features of <em>GAy</em> and ALFSG), give inordinate attention to examples of violence, particularly bombs, arson and shootings. <em>Green Anarchist</em> became reviled amongst mainstream UK anarchists when it opined that the poison gas attacks of the Aum cult, IRA bombs and the Oklahoma bombing were tactically ‘inspirational* (AF 1998d; cf Booth in GA No.51 1998). Watson points out that such ‘revolt’ is not anarchist because it is indiscriminate in its victims, and because it “wilfully disregards the intimate connection between means and ends” (1998:61), and Atton comments that “it is difficult to see how such random acts of extreme violence and cruelty could be fitted into any anarchist philosophy” (1999: 29).[172]	+	Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
−	I also share grave doubts about the relation between the ‘spectacular* acts beloved of some anti- civilisationists, and the social, organisational and political process that might lead to an anarchist world (cf Heller [C] 1999:33). There has been a class-struggle, anarcho-syndicalist articulation of this	+	-----
−	concern. A correspondent to <em>Green Anarchy,</em> for example, writes: “The primitivists try to seize on acts of revolutionary violence and focus on them, rather than constructively assess the movement-building that takes place. Why? Because they aren’t anarchists, and aren’t interested in the construction of anarchist federations” (‘Bakunin’ 2002:3). Although this was part of an unnecessarily sectarian exchange of generalisations, the argument is given weight by the Italian insurrectionist Alfredo Bonanno’s suggestion that “In the past hypothesis where a strong working class existed, one could fool oneself about this passage and organise accordingly” (1998:23). With the absence of this ‘fulcrum of change’, it is feared that only violence fills the gap (Richard Livermore in <em>Freedom</em> 24.1.2004:6). As I argued in Chapter 2, however, I consider a mechanistic view of class struggle as limited an analogy for social change as a militaristic conception of’the system’ as an organism that can be killed through destruction of its physical components. My own view is that the diverse, grassroots and often small- scale EDA covered in this thesis has an equal validity and potential to the struggles of the industrial workforce.	+	==== Annotation 113 ====
−	An angle from which we can more usefully address this issue is with the anarchist organisational critique. The ELF, underground, anonymous and decentralised as it is, might appear to share affinity with the disorganisations of practical, activist anarchism. Yet a useful critique has emerged of the actual form in which ELF activity has become ordered in the USA. ASAN argues that “As a ‘front’, the ELF takes a bit of the Che Guevara image of third-world ‘national liberation’ movements such as the Algerian ‘National Liberation Front’” (2002 : 8), and a letter in <em>Do or Die</em> similarly stated that “Abbreviations such as the ALF, IRA, EDR, EDF, RAF, PLO and even ELF simply instil fear. They put a negative image across. Lets leave our actions to be the message. By turning monkeywrenching into the act of some shady sounding organisation, rather than the emotional reaction of people against the machine, we alienate a lot of potential activists and give the capitalist propagandists a handy label which they can use” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1993b: 53; cf IE 2005:21; TTHH 2000:1).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-31.png|''The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.'']]
−	There are various anarchist points brought into service in this critique. First, there is the critique of authoritarian revolutionaries, who perpetuated authoritarian power-relations even as they struggled against the dominant power of the time (Holloway 2002). Pointing out that the real-life ‘fronts’ ended up imposing gulags, ASAN condemn “the organisational setup of the ELF as reinforcing many of this society’s relations of representation, specialisation and authority at the same time it challenges the immediate power of the system” (2002: 8).	+	Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.
−	Second, and related to this point, ASAN argue that “The underground cells of the ELF windup as essentially specialists in destruction, intentionally cut-off from the entire milieu by the necessary security culture” (2002: 8). With the case of the anti-GM movement, TTHH state that the “gulf between the ‘elite cadre* of activists and the majority whose (even largely passive) support is so crucial, is big and problematic enough already. There is a danger of becoming isolated” (TTHH 2000: 1). The anarchist conception of revolution is one that must involve everybody and affect everybody: it cannot be won by an elite using force of arms or expertise on some distant battlefield.	+	-----
−	Third, ASAN argue on lines familiar from the critique of Genetix Snowball in 6.4.4, that ELF activism is disempowering, indeed “the more elaborate the vandalism pulled-off by ELF cells, the more... most people feel like they could never join such an effort” (2002: 8). This line of critique has an additional support from the condemnation of the division between ‘action teams’ and ‘supporters’ in Greenpeace’s model of activism (see 5.2.1 and 5.3.3). The danger is that “‘ELF supporters’ windup as followers, viewing their activity as just an adjunct to the ‘real work’ of the ELF’ (ASAN 2002: 8; cf McAllister Groves 2001:213).	+	The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.
−	Fourth, the ELF model can be condemned under the terms of the ‘Social Relationship’ critique of attentats, propaganda of the deed and ‘guerrillaism’ considered in 6.3.3. TTHH thus warn against falling into the trap of “those who wish to conceal the exploitative and destructive nature of capitalism to seek out individuals to blame and punish, rather than addressing the system” (TTHH 2000:1). As I have insisted throughout the thesis, anarchists conceptualise the problem as a ‘system’, and as this section makes clear, this simple notion translates into a sensitive analysis and practice of models and processes of change.	+	Having a ''historical viewpoint'' requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.
−	Fifth, the ELF are criticised for being “dependent on the mainstream media to report their actions, which otherwise do not touch the lives of the mass of dispossessed people” (ASAN 2002: 8; cf Ruins 2003:).[173] This not only gives power away to the media conglomerates, preventing the action from being insufficiently ‘direct*, but it also indicates the action is ‘spectacular’ or merely political, as opposed to a fully social and embedded action that takes place amongst “the day-to-day lives of ordinary people” (Bufe 1998).	+	-----
−	ELF activists in the US have responded to this critique by, for example, denying “the myth that we who feel strongly enough to take action are not part of the ‘mass of dispossessed people*. It is precisely because we are part of the dispossessed masses that we feel the loss caused by society’s destruction of, and alienation from nature, enough to be driven to act Those who sit on their asses and write about inspiring the masses fail to realise that the greatest inspiration is action” (Critter 2002:9; cf AEAG 2001:22).[174] Yet looked at from an organisational point of view, the form of ELF activism does imply a division between the actors and the masses, mediated through communiques and interviews by the press office. As another critic suggests, “Communiques/Press Releases are a broken model”, and “Media Obsession Reinforces Apathy” (TEP 2003:12; cf TTHH 2000:1). Although the press release is only one small part of ELF activity, it is a useful handle for this critique, as revealing of the pernicious social relations whose demise is the aim of anarchism.	+	==== Annotation 114 ====
−	Guerrillaism, even when undertaken collectively and with the intent of being ‘of the people’ as well as ‘for the people’, is condemned as a variant of vanguardism (Skirda 2002:54; AF 2001c: 7). Bufe argues that “guerrillas attempt to act for the people — attempting to substitute individual acts for mass actions - thus perpetuating die division between leaders and followers (in this case, spectators)” (1998). Doherty notes that greens argue “any turn to violent strategies would lead to a more elitist underground organisation” (2002:6). The anarchist critique of those who advocate ‘extreme’ methods abstracted from social context is not the same as a condemnation of violence, however, as demonstrated by class war’s celebration of “mass working class violence, out in the open’ not created or led by Class War or others, but developing according to its own dynamic, as a means of selfempowerment” (<em>CW</em> 1997:5).	+	While the ''comprehensive viewpoint'' focuses on internal and external ''relationships'' of subjects, the ''historical viewpoint'' focuses on the specific ''properties'' of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.
−	The ‘black bloc’ which came to the fore in the anti-globalisation protests of 1999 onwards, triggered another anarchist elaboration of many of the same themes. The black block, which began as a tactic of dressing the same when engaged in property destruction or street fighting, in order to hinder easy identification by the police, was quickly mistranslated into an organisation: as a club with a name and identity, and to which you had to belong, or admire from afar (Grosscup & Doyle 2002:1; Dixon 2001:23). It was criticised by anarchists for its uniform and militaristic model (AF 200Id: 9), and for mistaking the militancy of a tactic - economic damage - for a revolutionary quality: “property destruction, spray paints and looking menacing on television is clearly not enough to bring on a revolution” (AF 200 Id: 14; cf Grosscup & Doyle 2002:2). In a discourse of revolutionary ethics equally similar to that applied to the ELF, the black bloc was accused of being “substitutionalist” (AF 200 Id: 10) (instead of being ‘of the people, by the people’), and it was challenged to provide in its actions and organisation a “model for an anarchist and free society” (AF 200Id: 11). Here, the textual output of black bloc participants, which had chiefly focussed on condemning ‘fluffies’; defending economic sabotage (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000:125); and seeking to find a more strategically effective method of continuing their style of activism (which tended to increase “centralisation and militarisation” (AEAG 2001:51)), was challenged to move from a strategic mindset to an ethical one: “Rather than examining our practice first and foremost on the level of tactics and strategies, of effectiveness in battle, our first priority should rather be to examine them in terms of whether they indeed reflect and are therefore capable of creating - not just in the future, but also here and now - our aims. Do they reflect in practice the principle of individuals self-determination and the collective struggle of individual realization?” (AEAG 2001:52). In all these criticisms and clashes of themes, the case of the Black Bloc reinforced all the points made with regard to the ELF in this section.	+	So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.
−	A final warning made regarding ELF or guerrilla-style activism is that, as with propaganda of the deed, ‘spectacular* acts may give “the state extra leverage in using political repression against individuals and the left in general” (Bufe 1998). We noted in 5.5.2 that anarchists anticipate repression of successful resistance movements anyway (£F/JUNo.26 1996: 3; cf Corr 1999: 131), but there is a difference in that “A developing mass movement... will also produce numbers of people with clear aims and the organised means of reaching them” (Bufe 1998:6; cf Carter 1971:106), whereas “When by their own actions terrorists serve such ends, they are contributing to the ... closing of various options for the spreading of ideas before they have been fully utilised” (Bufe 1998: 5; cf Tolstoy 1990: 15; Burch 2002:54). It was on these grounds (of building a mass movement) that Northern California Earth First! famously renounced tree-spiking as a tactic and issued a ‘code of non-violence’ in 198?: “Now the workers [ and ]... the peace movement could ally with us.” (Bari 1997a). In the US context, this declaration thus made tactical sense,[175] yet the same extremes of repression and escalation have not forced the issue in the UK.	+	For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the ''exact same'' methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to ''adapt'' some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — ''exactly'' as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.
−	Corresponding to increased state repression, several commentators have warned that environmental direct action was becoming more and more covert, mirroring in many ways the development of the animal liberation movement (£FL4t/No.26 1996:3; Goodwin 1996a: 18-19). This is a concern because of the apparent logic of escalation in the animal liberation movement (Durham 1995:), such that Dominick states from an anarchist viewpoint that “the tactics of the animal lib movement are in dire need of critique. From pointless protests to violent attacks, the movement has become increasingly angry and decreasingly grounded” (1996:18). The development of bombs recalls the same development in anarchist propaganda of the deed years, from small, jokish gadgets, to “serious, lethal devices” (Skirda 2002: 54; cf McAllister Groves 2001:213). In 3.3.51 noted the concern that sabotage would lead to violence, and in 6.4.3 1 noted that in the field of anti-GM campaigning more intimidatory tactics had been used (WRGO 1998:2; TTHH 2000:).	+	-----
−	This would seem to be supported by movement statements such as “If the government uses dirty tricks and violence to perpetrate gross acts of vandalism then why shouldn’t their opposition?” (PMW 1993: 1). Yet in the UK die ELF has stayed largely low-key, restraint has been shown in the forms of sabotage used, and a media mechanism has not developed in the US form. Plows, Wall & Doherty suggest that eco-saboteurs are “not isolated from ties with a wider activist community and therefore unlikely to undergo the kind of psychological transformation noted in leftist terrorist groups of the 1970s” (2004: 217). I will detail how sabotage remained embedded in a broader, more participatory campaign in 6.5.4.	+	In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.
−	*** 6.5.4 Peat Alert!	+	-----
−	“Restoration management in its simplest form involves ... blocking of ditches in order to raise the water table” (‘The Cumbria Biodiversity Action Plan’ 2001:257).	+	==== Annotation 115 ====
−	Stopping peat extraction from habitats such as lowland raised mires is an environmental struggle characterised by (a) defending specific sites, as with the anti-roads movement and (b) justification on the conventional conservationist grounds of biodiversity, wildlife and ecological stability (RSPB & YWT 1998). It also links with both the wider ecological themes of climate change and of protecting ‘wilderness’, and it fits <em>Do or Die’s</em> strategic identification of “Land deemed ecologically or strategically of prime national importance, which the movement as a whole can recognise and act on” (2003:62). Chiefly, the repertoires of the peat campaign were justified on grounds of ecological urgency: “It may not be possible to restore the site as a peatland if Scotts manage to cut as much as they want THIS SEASON” (PA! ‘Mass Trespass on Hatfield Moor’ 2001; cf PA! ‘Jim Thackerey* 16.7.2001). Peat direct action saw a deployment and cross-fertilisation of blockading, anti-enclosure mass trespassing, and street partying repertoires from different fields of EDA, all within a general umbrella of sabotage. I will argue that this particular field of EDA made sabotage accessible,	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-32.png|''A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.'']]
−	participatory and grounded in a broader movement, in a way that the notions of an organised and distinct ‘ELF’ are not.	+	The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.
−	I noted in 6.5.2 that peat was a decisive issue at the beginning of Earth First! ‘s (and the ELF’s) history when on 13<sup>th</sup> April 1992, “a young Earth First! caused £100,000 damage to machinery that was digging up peat on Thome and Hatfield Moors” (RTP 2002). The saboteurs’ communique placed them squarely within the no-compromise heart of EF!:	+	Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.
−	“All our peat bogs must be preserved in their entirety, for the sake of the plants, animals and our national heritage. Cynically donating small amounts will do no good. The water table will drop, and the bog will dry out and die, unless it is preserved fully. FISONS MUST LEAVE ALL OF IT ALONE - NOW!” (<em>GA</em> No.30 1992:6).	+	The factory is also ''positioned'' among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.
−	This sentiment of no compromise was previously declared by William Bunting, a local anarchist, ecological saboteur and anti-enclosure activist active in the 1970s: “the essence of conservation lies	+	These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.
−	with one simple word, NO! Don’t become like those prostitutes in the Nature Conservancy. Say no, mean no, fight to retain the places we have” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:246-257; cf Caufield 1991:45).	+	In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a ''comprehensive and historical viewpoint'' — we must consider subjects both ''comprehensively'' in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as ''historically'' in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.
−	Informed by the institutionalisation thesis of 5.2.1, it was this recurrent tradition of noninstitutionalised direct action (romantically linked to the pre-industrial ‘bog people’ of the area, famous for their ungovernability (‘Mass Trespass on Hatfield Moor’ 2002; <em>DA</em> No.23 2002 :9; cf	+	So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.
−	Booth 1997:24)), that was contrasted to the compromised approach of conventional groups such as	+	-----
−	FoE (GA No.30 1992: 6). As with other issues, the direct action element was only one, wave-like component and it existed alongside liberal campaigning by local conservationists and ENGOs, which included writing to MPs and calling for stronger legislation (WT n.d.). As “75% of the peat sold goes	+	==== Annotation 116 ====
−	to domestic gardeners” (£FL4[/No.80 2001/2002:4), the solution to the problem was also brought home in the holistic, lifestyle approach considered in 5.3.6: in this case, chiefly gardening without peat This was supported by tactics similar to those used in the GM issue: boycotting and pressuring retailers and large users (such as councils) to adopt stronger policies on peat (EF.MC/No.80 2001/2002:5;	+	''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
−	PA! June Newsletter 2002).	+	''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
−	The most popular and ecological form of direct action against peat extraction was a form of sabotage not primarily viewed as an economic strategy but in terms of ecological defence and restoration. William Bunting’s group of self-styled ‘Beavers’ had previously used dam-building at Thome moors to prevent ecological devastation (Caufield 1991), and EF! activists brought the repertoire brought back into use from 2001 to 2003. EF! trespasses onto the site also acted as sabotage (a) by preventing work for the day and (b) by filling in drainage ditches. These forms of sabotage worked <em>with</em> the seasons and the site: the trespasses were chosen for dates between Easter and October, on the basis that “Peat milling can only be done when the peat is dry enough to support heavy machinery” (PA! 30.9.2001; PA £F/JC7No.80 2001-2002:5). Much of the sabotage was intended to prevent the ground drying out, or obstruct the machinery used to strip the peat from the dried-out surface, layer by layer: see Figure 6.ll.	+	=== 2. Principle of Development ===
−	‘Peat Alert’, a temporary, issue-specific network, was set up by EF! groups, and co-ordinated a ‘National Day of Action* on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2002, which saw Scotts Head Office occupied in Surrey, its Fertiliser plants blockaded in Suffolk and disrupted in East Yorkshire, a ‘home and garden plant’ occupied in North Wales, trespasses and ditch-filling on Hatfield Moor and a Newcastle group’s trespass on Wedholme Flow (<em>TGAL</em> No.53 2002: 11; £F.U(7No.81 2002:3; No.82 2002: ‘Day of Action Against Scotts* PA! website).	+	==== a. Definition of Development ====
−	<br>	+	According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a ''quantitative'' increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for ''qualitative'' changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.
−	][Figure 6.ll Wedholme Flow, by author.	+	-----
−	At other trespasses the sabotage element was openly talked about: “Lots of drainage ditches were blocked, various big bits of machinery were disabled and one peat train derailed itself’ (PA! 30.9.2001 i, and on occasion night-time sabotage followed on from day-time mass trespasses (power cables at Hatfield were sabotaged on Mayday 2002, for example, soon after the peat camp, below). Some sabotage is referred to as the act of’pixies’, and “peat pixies” feature in <em>TGAL (</em> No.51 2002: 4). The merging of trespass and sabotage repertoires demonstrates the fluidity EDA tactics that I characterised in 5.3.5. At one trespass, conversations overheard between police and manager, that “disrupting the factory works would cause them massive problems” (PA! 30.9.2001 , encouraged a shift of focus and in November 2001 around 30 people tried to shut down machinery, occupy ot Ices and block the bridge to the works: additional acts of sabotage, such as “missing keys’*, accompanied the action t PA! 2.12.2001). Acts of sabotage were not here isolated from the flexible dynamics of grassroots EDA.	+	==== Annotation 117 ====
−	The economic logic considered in previous sections was deployed, with economically vulnerable companies targeted at economical!} significant times of the year: “We want to target the Scotts Company in the run up to the Easter bank holiday weekend. This is the busiest time of year for the peat industry, and we hope that strong action at this time will severely affect their operations’ (RTP 2002; cf My notes 3.9.2002[176]). The PA! website lists holdings and addresses, including “People to bother: some key personnel, their telephone number, e-mail addresses and so on” (PA website; cf Corporate Watch 2003). The economic and pestering strategies utilised in the anti-roads and other environmental campaigns, and particularly animal rights campaigns, were thus given another airing.	+	In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between ''quantity'' and ''quality''.
−	Elements of secrecy came into some of Peat Alertf ‘s plans, such as those codenamed ‘Project Y’ and ‘Project Likely Lads’: “Sorry to be so vague, I don’t know who reads your post, but I know who reads mine sometimes!” (PA! ‘Feedback from meeting’ 26.7.2002). Overall, however, the sabotage was notable for the unusual openness and accessibility. This was not done in a rigid, Genetix Snowball format, furthermore but in a messy, mixed form that included both covert night-time action by small experienced affinity groups, and open daytime action involving a whole mixture of people. The sabotage was both ecological and economic, and could be both friendly (I recall smiles and waves from the local police as we left Hatfield Moor after a full day’s trespass), and more militant (notably when directed at the works, including the ‘reclaim the peat’ blockade in Figure 6.12).	+	''Quantity'' describes the total ''amount'' of component parts that compose a subject.
−	The chief alliance, as with the roads campaigns, was between EDA activists and local conservationists who had become embittered by the destruction ongoing despite years of campaigning. PA also cooperated with certain FoE groups, attempting to co-ordinate consumer pressure with local groups leafleting at peat outlets (‘Feedback from meeting* 26.7.2002). FoE’s name featured on a flyer for one mass trespass (‘Mass Trespass on Hatfield Moor’ 2001), and they organised a symbolic action during the PA action camp (£FMC7No.82 2002), but EF! activists did not see them as likeminded campaigners. Discussing on email whether FoE should be allowed to join in the week of action, one PA participant noted that “They seem to have missed the point of the Blockade, its not to do actions symbolic or otherwise around the moor/works it is to prevent peat from leaving the area in the run up to the easter bank holiday.” It was also pointed out, however, that “the more people that come then the more cover there is for stuff’, and “potentially some of them may want to be involved in other things if they’re at the site.” FoE’s symbolic action was ultimately welcomed, on the basis that “it shouldn’t limit anyone else’s actions, and it would be a good opportunity to get more people involved in direct action stuff, even if its just ditch filling. Celebrate diversity (even if they are a bit soft)” (PA! emails February 2002). FoE was thus included in the campaign, yet recognised as very ‘other’ to EDA. The difference was further illustrated by the divergent reactions to government intervention.	+	''Quality'' describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.
−	Under the European Habitats Directive, the UK government at this time had to nominate sites for Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). The extracting companies argued that the ecological significance of the sites was long passed (<em>EF!AU</em> No.80 2001-2002: 5), and so local conservationists had to demonstrate the continuing ecological richness and possibility of regeneration (THMC n.d.; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:246-257). This grassroots ecologism had to battle against government unconcern and ‘betrayal* for many years before the government fulfilled its EU requirement by arranging a deal with Scotts in 2002, paying them for stopping peat extraction from Wedholme Flow and Thome Moor immediately, and Hatfield Moor after a delay of two years (<em>Environment News Service</em> 27.3.2002; Harper 2002: 76-78). This does fit the demands of the RSPB, PCC and Thome & Hatfield Moors Conservation Forum - “the Government must act now” (RSPB & YWT 1998) and it was welcomed by groups such as FoE (PA! 27.2.2002). PA!, however, gave it only a grudging welcome, objecting to the continued digging at Hatfield and at other peatland sites, and worrying that “the problem may well be shifted overseas” with imported peat destroying bogs in, for example, the Baltic states (PA! 27.2.2002). This demonstrates the global analysis that EDA incorporated into its stuggles over local sites: see 5.3.5.	+	Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.
−	Where ENGOs saw this as a victory and scaled down their campaigning on the issue, therefore, the groups connected to Peat Alert! kept up their activities: indeed escalated them with an action camp in April 2002. This included an impressive squatted camp (see Figure 6.12) and an attempt to introduce ‘Reclaim the Streets’ repertoires to the peat issue (see 7.2) (<em>Schnews</em> 2002:253:	+	'''''Example 1:'''''
−	<br>	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-33.png|''In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change'']]
−	Welcome to the first	+	A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of ''a football player''. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of ''a football team''. This subject, ''football'' ''team'', is composed of the same component parts as the subject ''football player'', but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a ''football team''.
−	“Reclaim The Peat	+	The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:
−	][Figure 6.12 “Reclaim the Peat’ flyer, Blockade and Squatted camp from the 2002 action week	+	If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of ''football team'', but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a ''team''. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full ''team'' and thus won’t be allowed to play.
−	This week of action was followed by “a mass trespass on Hatfield Moor in memory of Benny Rothman, leader of the original Kinder Scout Mass Trespass, who died on January 23rd” (‘mass trespass 11.05.02’ PA website). Rothman had also spoken “at the mass injunction-breaking trespass at Twyford Down in 1993” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 246-257), and the linkage between the discourse of ecological restoration (sabotage). and that of anti-enclosure (and ‘reclaiming’), was consciously made: “This trespass is also to protest against the enclosure and subsequent destruction of this ecologically important site. This event combines access to the moor to many people who will never have seen the devastation first hand. Whilst there we will be stopping peat extraction and undertaking ecological restoration” (‘mass trespass 11.05.02’ PA! website; cf <em>DA</em> No.23 2002: 9).	+	Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a ''football team'' (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being ''on the same team).''
−	As a non-NIMBY manifestation of EDA, peat direct action did not solely confine itself to Hatfield, or end when the destruction there ceased. Rather, additional targets were identified, such as the William Sinclair company, who extracted at Solway Moss in Cumbria and were threatening to take the SAC decision to judicial review: “time to let them feel a bit of heat I think!” (<em>Peat Alert! News</em> June 2002). A second action camp from 28<sup>th</sup> August to 1<sup>st</sup> September 2002 launched a week of daily actions (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:), in which I participated at Solway Moss, where my notes record the experience:	+	'''''Example 2:'''''
−	“I hadn’t known which was the target until I turned up in Carlisle on the day. But luckily I’d done a summary recce of the site on the Monday, and as no-one else had this made me a relative expert: I told people the snippets that I knew, in the van. One group occupied the office in Carlisle, not expecting arrest but receiving it until released without charge. ‘1 ne larger group - about 15 of us - invaded the works: our first look at it (the lairy workers meant that most of didn’t wanna hang around). We trapped in 9 lorries - very good timing on our part, but then we wandered and ended up away from the important work going on, by a shitty little digger that people wanted to trash - and then the police came round the corner.	+	Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water
−	I’d reckoned that we could easily escape to the road but when 1 went ahead to check, I found the small beck was flooded and impassable. I crossed it once, fast water up to my knees and a	+	DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE
−	<br>	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-34.png|''All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.'']]
−	little scary, but on the way back it had risen up to my balls and I got dead scared holding fast to the taut barbed wire that crossed the stream. Feet getting pulled away by water. I felt really shit and guilty for leading people into a dead-end, and contemplated making a run for it alone if everyone was getting nicked for trashing the digger. But luckily the police had turned up just before serious damage was done, and we could leisurely leave via a farm. I still feel guilty though. Everyone was soaked from the rain and we sped away to get charity-shop dry clothes. Compared to the other action camp days, this was less effective - largely because it hadn’t been properly recced” (My Notes 3.9.2002).	+	The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
−	The messy, exciting and disorganised experience of peat direct action recorded in my notes, is evocative of many of the mass action days at Hatfield, and stands at a far remove from the representations of ELF in the USA.	+	A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the ''quantities'' of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the ''quality'' of water.
−	The Peat Alert network is currently dormant, as are the peatworks of Thome, Hatfield and Wedholme Flow. Echoes of direct action continue to be heard, however, such as the blockade of Scott’s factory and distribution centre in Januaiy 2003 (‘Scotts shut down in Ipswich’ 16.1.2003), and the significant property destruction reported at the end of2004 at a peat processing site in Somerset. The plant involved used peat from or near five SSSIs, all within an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty: it was an act of destruction motivated by ecological restoration (Jane 2005). It is my view that this ecological motivation is sufficiently strong that, even if EF!, PA! and the ELF completely disappeared, another grouping or mobilisation would be likely to emerge and apply similar repertoires of direct restoration, just as Bunting’s Beavers did in the 1970s.	+	A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.”
−	*** 6.5.5 Conclusion	+	When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.
−	Where the anti-GM sabotage of 6.4 was considered in terms of the critical dialogue between an open, rigid, ploughshares-style method, and a covert, anonymous style more redolent of the animal liberation movement and EF!US, in the sections of 6.5 it is another tension which I explore. This is the tension between two different attitudes to sabotage: calculated economic strategy predicated on ‘effectiveness’ that is in danger of separation and elitism and liable to a logic of escalation, and a more spontaneous, passionate and participatory ecologism, grounded in community settings of EDA such as road sites or EF!.	+	In terms of ''temperature'' and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become ''steam''. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”
−	In 6.5.2, Sabotage in EDA, I reconsidered the locations of sabotage in EDA and I considered how the tensions within the EDA movement over sabotage led to the split between EF! and the ELF in 1992.1 introduced the salient characteristics of the latter ‘organisation’, particularly in terms of the economic strategy on which its strategies of sabotage are justified, and claimed as a success.	+	'''''Example 3:'''''
−	In 6.5.3, Anarchism and the Earth Liberation Front, I followed the development and escalation of the ‘strategic thinking’ behind ecologically-motivated, economically-targeted sabotage. I noted that strands of anarchism that have no qualms about advocating other forms of violence, nonetheless expressed concern at some expressions of quasi-militaristic anti-civilisation sabotage. It is my view that in confronting the outgrowth of an escalated strategic thinking, and articulating their concerns with reference to anarchist first principles (and ‘first emotions’), the critiques of’spectacular actions’, communiques and the ELF name which were launched within and around US primitivist circles demonstrate the ongoing relevance of anarchism in EDA. I therefore delineate the different aspects of anarchist discourse that are employed in this critique. They spell out a direction that some of the dynamics of ecological sabotage might have led UK EDA towards, were its embedded culture and circumstances different	+	AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES
−	The spectacular sabotage at Hatfield peat works in 1992 was a landmark event for UK EDA and prompted the creation of the ELF, which escalated that form of activism in the US. In the UK, however, sabotage remained embedded within a broader grassroots activism, and in 6.5.41 returned to Hatfield and peat direct action to demonstrate how this has operated. I describe a field of EDA in which economic strategising, covert property destruction and a desire to effectively and efficiently cripple an	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-35.png|''The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.'']]
−	industry were all in place, yet which retained an openness in sabotage, a desire for mass participation and local involvement, a tolerance of reformist fellow-travellers, and a fluid, adaptable and open-ended cross-fertilisation of repertoires. Peat provided a field of action in which EDA could express its radical, anti-institutional and fully anarchist desires, yet remain grounded in a communitarian, participatory and diverse counter-culture. It provided an issue of profound ecological importance, in which the EF!	+	As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.
−	network found its core identity enjoying a second blossoming. The strengths of the network were played to, with direct action taken to the sites of destruction and many of the most popular EDA repertoires adapted and reapplied. Let it serve as a contrast to the development of urban and generalised activism that I shall chart in chapter 7.	+	'''Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change'''
−	** 6.6 Chapter Summary	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-36.png|''Metaphysics only consider linear properties of'' quantity''change; Materialist Dialectics takes'' quantity changes ''and'' quality shifts ''into consideration when considering change over time.'']]
−	This chapter has been concerned with violence, sabotage, and the tensions between strategy and ethics. It has provided an examination of the anarchist ethics of action (which were established in 4.3.4, and then described with the example of Earth First! in 5.3), and it has brought these ethics to bear against the most militant and strategically contested forms of ecological direct action. In doing so it has highlighted the tensions, contradictions and incompatibilities that lie between different strategic frameworks of direct action. This has aided an understanding of anarchism as a contested terrain that may contain and be run through with different frameworks and emphases; in which CD discourse merges with the anti-guerrillaist arguments of anarchism, and the project of educative empowerment is lifted from the heart of the anarcho-syndicalists’ industrial struggle, and transplanted into the classcrossing project of environmental defence. At the same time as I am arguing for the essential diversity that exists (and moves, and talks) within anarchism, I am also arguing for the essential sameness of the ethics and effects that bind it	+	Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only ''quantity'' is considered and ''quality shifts'' are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.
−	By looking at the specific cases of anti-GM direct action and peatlands defence, I have brought the ethical and strategic issues to bear against real terrains of struggle. In the first of these, I have drawn on debates within Earth First! that challenged the discourse of open, accountable and respectful direct action that was brought in from the peace movement tradition by Genetix Snowball. These debates were articulate and thorough, referring to anarchist principles of participation and anti-elitism; autonomy; and the refusal of authority. Most interestingly, these were not purely theoretical debates, but were enacted in practice. The EDA activists explored with their own bodies and their own efforts how to bring an anarchist approach to bear on opposing GM. How to make sabotage participatory? How to challenge the foundations of the legal system most effectively, without hampering the immediate struggle? By doing so the activists on both sides of the debate brought anarchism back into the real world, made it relevant, and made it effective. By referring their actions to ethical principle they also made their anarchism conscious and intelligent Crucially, in my view, both sides of the covert-overt debate achieved this, to a significant degree, by pursuing divergent strategies with different strengths. The anarchism they made real, therefore, was not only an anarchism of practicality and of experience, but it was one that they demonstrated to be characterised by diversity and flexibility also.	+	-----
−	In the second case of applied anarchism and ecological sabotage, I looked at the origins of the property-destroying wing of Earth First! - the ELF - noting its impish origins and seeing past its grand talk to recognise its grounding in broader, and messier, EDA milieus. I then charted the US development of the ELF idea into an impressive, but worryingly separate and distinct seeming organisation. Where UK activists had borrowed the Earth First! idea and manifested it in a socially engaged and mass participatory way, US activists had seemingly borrowed the ELF idea back and turned it into a ‘front* complete with press officers and stockpiles of incendiary devices. This went counter to the historical anarchist critique of guerrillaism and the separation of elites from spectators, and I noted the consequent articulation of these points in this new setting. I concluded the chapter, however, by returning to the grassroots movement of UK EDA and demonstrating, with the case of peat, that sabotage need not be elitist or regimented, given a peace movement structure or a narrow, economistic strategy. Rather it could be used by ordinary environmental activists to work with the seasons and aid the natural processes of peat ecosystems. In this, I do not wish to appear to synthesise and resolve all the apparent tensions and strategic contradictions surrounding sabotage and the other practices of EDA, such as manufactured vulnerability. Rather I wish to emphasise the astounding capacity that activists - active human beings - demonstrate when they apply themselves to the diverse needs and contexts of the environmental struggle. The issues of violence charted in 6.3 will always be there, but given the setting, given the freedom, and given the right attitude and common purpose in any group of people, then a solution will be found. If it is temporary, specific and incomplete, then that is most likely a good thing because it will be apt to the context, and also because it leaves the future open for the next group of people to come along and work out the next solution. In this way the intelligence of activist anarchism will continue to manifest itself in dialogical debate and practical application.	+	In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, ''development'' refers to the ''motion'' of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.
−	<br>	+	-----
−	* 7. Reclaim the Streets and the Limits of Activist Anarchism	+	==== Annotation 118 ====
−	** 7.1 Introduction	+	In materialist dialectics, ''motion (also known as change)'' is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given ''motion/change'' leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.
−	In this chapter I consider Reclaim the Streets (RTS) both as the particular London group (London RTS) which made the name, and the tactics of street parties popular, and also as the broader tendency itself, including self-organised street parties in other cities: specifically Newcastle. RTS in both these senses was the form of EDA most celebrated by anarchists and most successful at expanding its repertoire into a major challenge to the authorities. Yet overall I argue that despite RTS’s impressive development into confrontational, challenging and thought-provoking manifestations, its very size and strength has revealed the limitations and tensions embedded in the relationship between anarchism and EDA.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-37.png|''The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.'']]
−	In 7,2, Reclaim the Streets in London, I situate the origins of RTS within EDA, introduce the development of the street party form, and establish the anarchist identity of the London RTS group. In 7.3, Reclaim the Streets in Newcastle, I use my own experience to provide an example of the diffusion of the street party repertoire across the country. In 7.4, Anarchist Dimensions of RTS, I highlight the anarchism expressed in the practice of Critical Mass and Reclaim the Streets events. I also look at the ideological articulations of the London RTS group, and analyse these, particularly by considering the relationship of carnival to anarchist revolution. In 7.5, Mayday, I follow the trajectory of London RTS to more traditionally ideological anarchist city centre mobilisations. Here I assess the interaction (both practical and discursive) between EDA and more traditional, ideological anarchism at the Mayday 2000 event I conclude with a consideration of whether the emotional, experiential and strategic power of place that marked the upsurge in EDA was lost in the move to city-centre confrontations, and I consider the limitations of an abstract ‘anti-capitalism’ as a unifying and sustaining theme.	+	This process, taken in total, is referred to as ''development''. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a ''tendency'' to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word ''tendency'' is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”
−	** 7.2 Reclaim the Streets in London	+	For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of ''recession'' — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.
−	Reclaim the Streets formed in London in 1991, out of the Road Alert! and EF! networks (<em>EF!AU’NoZ</em> 1992:2; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:7), indeed it was the London contact for EF! in the early nineties (<em>Do or Die</em> 1995:23). As a history of RTS in <em>Do or Die</em> states, “With the battle for Twyford Down rumbling along in die background, a small group of individuals got together to take action against the motor car. They were campaigning ‘FOR walking, cycling and cheap, or free, public transport, and AGAINST cars, roads and the system that pushes them”* (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:1). The fight in the countryside was thus brought back to the city. Szerszynski states that	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-38.png|''Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.'']]
−	“From the beginning RTS also focused on the motor car, but less as a destroyer of rural habitats and more as a ‘condensing symbol’ for the general inhuman priorities of consumer capitalism” (1999:214-215).	+	The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].
−	RTS expressed a form of EDA that was attractive to ideological anarchists due to its London location, its social concerns and explicit anticapitalism, and its defiantly anti-authority attitude. In this chapter I am viewing RTS as the furthest EDA went in expressing anticapitalism.	+	Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.
−	London RTS at this time was “drawing on protest repertoires not dissimilar to those employed by older organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth” (Szerszynski 1999:215; cf Wall 1999:2931). There were hints of future tactics, but on a smaller scale: “the trashed car on Park Lane symbolising the arrival of Car-mageddon, DIY cycle lanes painted overnight on London streets, disruption of the 1993 Earls Court Motor Show and subvertising actions on car adverts around the city”	+	-----
−	<em>(Do or Die</em> 1997: 1). Most of these cheeky repertoires were not new, and they were simple enough to be reproduced and adaptated by other groups, such as TAPP in Newcastle: see Figure 7.1.	+	It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of ''qualitative'' changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram ''Relationship Between Motion,''
−	| uen to irw*t you* ow* irtMrw mo*#	+	''Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development'', Annotation 119, below]
−	Motor Vehicle Immobilisation Notice	+	Development is also the process of creating and solving objective ''contradictions'' within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.
−	<right>	+	-----
−	1 ■ DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ■ MOVE THIS VEHICLE! ■
−	</right>
−	m Th# wrvsc hit 1 tmad 5ut jwc	+	==== Annotation 119 ====
−	(a) (b) (c)	+	A ''contradiction'' is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in ''equilibrium'' for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of ''quality''. This process of overcoming is called ''negation''. In short, ''development'' is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.
−	<br>	+	==== b. Characteristics of Development ====
−	][Figure 7.1 (a) Anti-traffic sculpture, May 1999; (b) spoof ‘Immobilisation’ warning used September 1999; (c) spoof ‘Travel for Free* poster, February 2003; (d) Street theatre 1997; (e) subvertisement, September 2000; (f) banner drop, September 2000.	+	Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,<ref>See: Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> generality,<ref>See: Annotation 106, p. 109.</ref> and diversity.<ref>See: Annotation 107, p. 110.</ref>''The characteristic of objectiveness of development'' stems from the origin of motion.
−	In 1993, London RTS became absorbed into the No Ml 1 Campaign, acquiring many ideas and practical skills from the experience of the anti-roads movement and anti-CJA raves (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:). In comparison to Twyford (which “was nice fluffy landscapes and not about houses and people and their communities” (No Ml 1 Link protester, quoted in McKay 1996: 148: cf <em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 7) •, the No Ml 1 was a fully urban campaign involving impressive mass collective confrontations, from which many ideological anarchists (and others) drew inspiration.	+	-----
−	As the No-Ml 1 campaign ended. RTS had a second beginning which saw a swift development from small to large, both in the scale of the events organised, and in the scope of the organisers’ ambitions. Most notably,	+	==== Annotation 120 ====
−	“1995 saw the birth of the RTS ‘Street Party’, where motorised traffic in urban streets is halted, and the resultant spaces ‘reclaimed’ temporarily by crowds enjoying sound systems, jugglers, street theatre and a general air of festivity and pleasure. Two such Street Parties took place in that year, followed by the extraordinary Street Party of July 1996, involving 8,000 people, sound systems and food stalls, which stopped motorway traffic for eight hours” (Szerszynski 1999: 215).	+	Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
−	At this latter ‘extraordinary Street Party*, trees saved from the Ml 1 destruction were planted in the motorway, symbolising the continuity of their actions and the interconnectedness of the issues (similar demonstrations of continuity were demonstrated at. for example, the ‘Pure Genius’ occupation of land	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-39.png|''Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.'']]
−	<br>	+	Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.
−	at Wandsworth, where timber from Newbury was used to construct the meeting hall (Goodwin 1996b: 6; Smart 1996). The ambitious scope of the M41 event far surpassed anything displayed before by transport protesters (<em>Squall</em> No. 14 1996:26; Wall 1999: 88; £F.Mt/No.30 1996:1)[177].	+	The ''Principle of Development'' states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.
−	In 7.4 we shall note the engagement of London RTS with striking dockworkers, and its explicit anti* electoralism with the 1997 ‘Never Mind the Ballots* actions. On May 16th 1998, organisers under the RTS banner embarked upon an even bigger action: a global street party in Birmingham, where the G8 were due to meet (<em>Schnews</em> 1999:168). It was networked across the globe by the decentralised activist anarchist network, People’s Global Action, in order to coincide with other street parties all over the world (£F.MC7No.49 1998:2). This was the first UK anti-summit action in which EDA repertoires were used to mobilise masses of people into a confrontational urban event (the UK’s previous G7 summit was opposed with direct action by a small group of EFlers (£FL4t/No.2 1993: 1)). My notes from Birmingham record typical scenes and feelings from a street party, albeit on a larger than usual scale:	+	-----
−	“whistles and gazoos and leaflets etc., given out, people getting changed into costumes in the photo booth, an old woman giving out midget gems on a tray, before we moved off a horn blew a duh-durr! a few times, like ewoks on ‘Return of the Jedi*... nice symbolic dancers and fire-jugglers and prams on one side, in no formation, opposed by three-deep line of shiny yellow helmet-headed cops in a strict boundary-line, as if they were symbolically representing order... as the day wore on the riot helmets came on and then shields and clubs ... You’d get all tense (and there were the drunk-punks staggering about... shouting at the hippies) and then someone else would daub you with blue paint and you’d be forced to lighten up - the happier you were, the more we’d won” (My Notes, May 1998).	+	==== Annotation 121 ====
−	The organisers of the Birmingham global street party, separate from London RTS, stated that “Our aims included increasing people’s understanding of the role of the G8 states and raising awareness of the insidious way trans-national corporations are implicated in every detail of our lives” (GSP 1998: 9). This broader horizon indicates the manner in which the growth of RTS’s ambitions was mirrored by a closer identification with more traditional left-revolutionary discourse (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:1; <em>Schnews</em> 2002: 5). The street party succeeded in occupying the city centre road system and the summit leaders abandoned the city for an alternative venue in the countryside.	+	The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.
−	The street party tactic spread to cities around the country (reported in every <em>EF!AU</em>from No. 18 in 1995 to No.33/34 in 1996), an example of which is considered in 7.3, and also around the world, beginning with a 1997 party in Amsterdam (No.37 1997: 3). The London RTS group, meanwhile, became more and more associated with the largest anti-globalisation actions, such as the June 18<sup>th</sup> Carnival against Capitalism in 1999 and the MayDay 2000 demonstration that I consider in 7.5, and it became the European convener for the PGA. It is, however, the character and tactics of RTS <em>before</em> it became so closely associated with the big London anti-capitalist events that I wish to establish first, in this and the next two sections.	+	Development has the ''characteristic of generality'' because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].
−	As RTS’s scale and effectiveness grew, so they became more of a threat to the powers that be (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997; 3). Police forces were angered by their repeated success at causing disruption to the capital. London RTS meetings were therefore infiltrated, computer files and publications seized and individuals were harassed at home, vilified in the media and on one occasion accused of attempted manslaughter (Chesworth & Johnson 1996: 16; Paton Walsh 2000; <em>TGAL</em> No.20 1999:3; <em>Schnews</em> 2000b: 113). Despite this attention, London RTS kept up weekly open meetings (by all accounts terrible (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000:73; RTS Minutes 31.10.2000:1; RTS 2000d: 18)) and for several years managed, just, to cope with the notoriety and this “war of attrition” (RTS 2000d: 1). It was unavoidable, however, that the desired anarchist paradigm of open, inclusive, horizontal organising was affected by this attention and took on aspects of secrecy and elitism (RTS activist quoted in McNeish 1997; Vidal 1999:2; Vidal 2000; OSPAD 2000; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 75). Even as they proclaimed their openness and denied the media image of “a virtual world of shadowy activists communicating in ‘cells’ over the internet and using mobile phones” (RTS 2000d: 18; cf Mark quoted in Wells 2000), RTS had to accept it was	+	-----
−	“mobile and furtive” (‘Maybe’ 2000:20). London RTS became concerned about the issue of’herding’ people (RTS 2000d; 21), and we will see that their organisation of Guerrilla Gardening at Mayday 2000 was “motivated by a wish not to replicate the spectator/participant dynamic from previous street parties and to break down the distinction between the ‘leaders’ and the ‘led’” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 74). Their mass actions were also condemned by GA on the basis that “the majority of participants in <em>any</em> big event are largely passive, voiceless and directed” (2000; cf Adilkno 1994: 107). I shall address this issue further in 7.5.	+	==== Annotation 122 ====
−	As their successful activities led the relevant authorities to view RTS as anarchist troublemakers, so fellow anarchists also identified with them A list of events in the AF’s ‘anarchist marching season’ of 1997, for example, is dominated by three Street Parties and the ‘March for Social Justice’ (AF <em>Organise!</em> No.47 1997). Even as RTS suffering under pressure, they were celebrataed by others for “making anarchism groovy again” (PGA 2002). In 7.41 shall argue that such identification by others, and indeed self-identification by RTS organisers, stands as only a secondary ‘revelation’ of RTS’s anarchism. More centrally, the anarchism of RTS was expressed in their events, their practice and ‘disorganisation’. The spread of RTS Street Parties across the globe, for example, demonstrates a method of anarchist proliferation in which there is no ‘ownership’ of the tactic, or necessary ideological baggage. Rather, street parties presented a model that expressed anarchist ideas and practices, which could be utilised in diverse contexts, by diverse actors, for diverse reasons, in diverse ways. In 7.3 I shall use my experience in Newcastle to illustrate one example of this adaptability. Other records of organising autonomous street parties are provided by Chesters & Clarke (1998), Marman (C1997), RTS in McPhail (1997: 11) and RTS (n.d.).	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.
−	** 7.3 Reclaim the Streets in Newcastle	+	---------
−	In Newcastle, recent veterans of Newbury and the No Ml 1 roads protests tried to mobilise friends and students like myself for an attempted Street Party on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1996. Despite a practice run, however, on the day itself we were too slow at getting the tripod up and police had their hands on us and the scaffold poles while we were still figuring out how to arrange them. We ended up dancing with a small sound-system on the church grounds next to, but not on, the road. ‘Failed’ actions such as these are as much a part of EDA as the famous ones (Ferrell 2001: 122), and often provide the background experience that enables successful ones to work.	+	Development has the ''characteristic of diversity'' because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.
−	On June 12<sup>th</sup> 1999, the one year-old TAPP group made a second attempt at a street party in Newcastle, this time building on a larger group experienced in blockades and other direct action. It was prepared for with extensive publicity (flyering nightclubs, fly-posting the university), and preparation (practising tripod assembly, and holding elaborate meetings in which we split into different groups to work out routes, communication and responsibilities). In one of those unpredictable elements of direct action, the volunteer tripod-climber damaged his hand on the night before, and so I was thrust into the central role as replacement The organising group shared a profound sense of trepidation and tension (I had a nightmare involving deaths at the hands of police and cars), no-one knowing who would turn up or how events would transpire on the day. To keep one step ahead of the police, two separate gathering-points were advertised and were led by TAPPers in masks through Newcastle city centre, to a point where, just before the two groups converged, a third group carried the scaffolding poles out of hiding and quickly set the tripod up in the road (Roads & Moor 1999): see Figure 7.2.	+	-----
−	(a)	+	==== Annotation 123 ====
−	][Figure 7.2 Newcastle RTS 12.6.1999 (a) photograph (b) cartoon in <em>TGAL</em> < No.25 1999: 1).	+	Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].
−	This was possibly the most successful action TAPP conducted, with the most participants, the best feedback from them, and the most positive memories from TAPPers in later interviews.[178] This was true despite the early confiscation of the soundsystem and the arrest of six individuals, most of whom had only a marginal connection to the event (Kennedy 1999; Sunday Sun 1999; Hughes-Dennis 2001: 54-70). For Newcastle, this street party was an unusually ambitious and high-profile event. We might note the interesting assumption of the police, who did not believe we could have autonomously organised such an event and that we must have been led by individuals from London (<em>TGAL</em> No.25 1999: 2). Although this was not true (no such individuals were involved), it may be noted that we did follow London RTS in our adoption of more explicitly anti-capitalist statements (‘Bea Green’ quoted in Kennedy 1999; cf TAPP 1999: 7; TAPP 2002: 2). With the propaganda build-up for June 18<sup>th</sup> at its peak,[179] this was an example of our ‘provincial* group being influenced, at least in our textual expressions, by ‘national’ trends that were generally initiated by certain ‘leading’ groups. Nonetheless, the street party was entirely our own creation, and it gave us pride and confidence that we had joined the groups around the world that were able to put on such an event.	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	TAPP attempted a third Newcastle street party on ‘car-free day’ 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2000, although this involved fewer organisers (and was largely initiated by one individual who failed to keep the group communicating together) and also failed to completely block the road. There were also technical errors, with the tripod so short so that its sitter had to perch on the apex to avoid being pulled down. Although it was not a complete failure, and added to the impact of the other car-free day events, its perceived lack of success was a factor in the group not feeling confident enough to put the effort into the tactic again. TAPP’S debrief reflected this negativity with comments such as “planning was rushed ... no/poor communication with the person who initiated the action and “the event needs a proper process to build a proper event” (TAPP SWOT analysis[180] September 2000). These factors are of crucial importance to ‘successful’ actions: a bonded group, confident in each other and popular with a wider circle of people was what made the 1999 street party successful. After 2000, the anticipated gains of using the tactic (pleasure, political impact, meeting new potential activists), were not again sufficient to outweigh the anticipated costs, including arrests, and most significantly the time needed to organise and publicise the event, to the occlusion of other activity. Note that TAPP was never solely transport (or capitalism) oriented, indeed its activism tended to follow the interests of the most active members of the group - from Zapatistas to incinerators.	+	Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a ''development viewpoint''.
−	These three local examples of the street party embodied in a small way the aspects of anarchism that I will draw out in 7.4, and then use to lead into London RTS’s stated ideology. To use the most successful 1999 event as the example it was, first, characterised by an elaborate preparation, in which the organisation relied upon a mixture of open advertisement (to get the crowd) and secret knowledge, known only to a few (PGA 2002). The police were unable to find an ‘organiser* or ‘leader’ with whom to negotiate a closure of the event Second, the events were premised on the active power of a crowd defying the police and the accepted uses of the city centre, and connected to this, efforts were made to create a festive, carnival atmosphere with costumes, banners and several forms of music (sound-system, drums, home-made shakers), which served to keep the crowd together. Third, the police responded to the event with violence and, with those arrested kept in cells for two nights (at the command of someone ‘higher up’ than the officers on duty), demonstrated a certain paranoia or fear regarding the potential of street parties (this being the week before June 18<sup>th</sup>). Fourth, the propaganda distributed condemned cars and capitalism together, moving away from the ‘safer city’ discourse that had characterised the previous critical mass events (considered below) (Starforth 1998:17) into a more utopian or ‘revolutionary’ rhetoric[181]: this was made even more clear with the propaganda produced for the 2000 street party (NRTS 2000). It is this combination of a distinctive RTS discourse, and the practical anarchism of an authority-defying crowd, that I shall critically assess in 7.4.	+	According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: ''Mode and Forms of Matter'', p. 59.</ref>
−	** 7.4 Anarchist Dimensions of RTS	+	This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation<ref>See Annotation 62, p. 59.</ref>, and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.
−	“Freedom is there for the taking - so let’s take it!” (Leaflet for 6.6.98 Street Party).	+	-----
−	In this section, I shall build on the points with which I concluded 7.3, to clarify the various and diverse ways that RTS has expressed, and consciously engaged with, anarchist discourse and practice. I begin by considering the collective power enacted by a street party or ‘critical mass* crowd, and highlight the antiauthoritarian spirit embodied therein. I then introduce some of the critiques expressed by London RTS, which may be used as indicative of the anarchist ideology that forms their basis, before focussing on the key elements of the distinctive rhetoric that London RTS utilised and made real. These include notions of imagination and possibility; the subversive power of festivity and the revolutionaiy potential of carnival; and the uneasy attempts to ally RTS’s utopian and temporary manifestations with more substantial, traditional left projects such as solidarity with striking workers and the formation of a more long-lasting public sphere.	+	==== Annotation 124 ====
−	The partner to street parties were critical masses (Carlsson, ed, 2002; Seaton 1999:33-35; <em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 65-7), first begun in San Francisco in 1992 but adapted by diverse UK groups including EF! groups (<em>EF!AU No.7</em> 1993:2), anti-road groups (No.20 1995:2), the ‘London Psychogeographical Association’ (No.12 1994: 6), London Greenpeace (No.62 1999: 8) and ourselves in Newcastle, under the issue-specific label ‘Tyneside Action on Transport’ (TAT). The link between critical masses and street parties was demonstrated by Newcastle organisers using critical masses to build up enough confidence and collective experience to attempt a street party: this was true for both the first run of events from 1995-1996, and for the TAT events of 1998-1999; indeed the advertising of several bike rides as street parties blurred the distinction.[182] In 1995 monthly critical masses were held in 15 UK cities (<em>EF!AU</em> No. 14 1995: 3; cf Social Control 1996: 7), but this was the peak of their popularity: notwithstanding the continued listing of rides on the RTS website, the Newcastle events, for example, were still listed five years after they ceased, in 2000, after a rather limited run (<em>Do or Die</em> 1999: 107): see Figure 7.3. Furthermore, more rides were advertised than actually took place: this was true both in Newcastle (in leaflets and <em>TGAL)</em> and nationally (RTS website), underlining the problems of using solely textual sources to record a history of EDA.	+	Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.
−	][Figure 7.3 Newcastle Critical Masses (a) 16.3.1996 (b) 8.10.1998 (c) 3.11.1998 (d) 5.12.1998	+	According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.
−	In Critical Mass bike rides, collective action is celebrated or bringing collective power, and for bringing normally atomised individuals into right relations with each other. “An active crowd celebrates its own strength and enacts an unmediated diversity; and we all experience, albeit briefly, moments of collective control” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 10; cf Carlsson, ed, 2()02). This is built in to the very structure of the bike-ride:	+	-----
−	“These are gatherings of cyclists who ride together, en masse, taking control of the road space. Critical mass is pure inspiration, for those who ride and have seen their streets temporarily transformed from a transport sewer into a peaceful space for living... It is not just a demonstration, but people riding their bikes together, each with their own motivation. Making it happen doesn’t require centralised organisation or leaders. Just talk to likely people... On the day, anybody can suggest a route. Be ready to adapt and keep together, even if that involves those at the back going through a red light” (RA! 1996: 102).	+	==== Annotation 125 ====
−	Critical mass cycle rides, like street parties, make manifest the notion of the solidarity of free and equal individuals, who take control in opposition to ‘the system*. A temporary anarchist body-politic is thus	+	Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.
−	formed: a living example of anarchist organisation, ethos and strategic thinking (Ferrell 2001: 94). The attitude that participants share in a street party demonstrates the anti-authoritarian element of anarchism most successfully and definitively. As the ‘how-to’ guides put it, “The police may ask who’s in charge. The correct answer is - NOBODY” (RA! 1996: 102).	+	In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:
−	This oppositional, ‘we’re in control, not the authorities’ attitude is also fundamental to the Street Party: “We are not going to demand anything. We are not going to ask for anything. We are going to take. We are going to occupy” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:6). This is not just a purely rhetorical or sloganeering attitude, but is carried through into the practice and experience of the event: the Street Party in its very essence opposes the autonomy of the reclaimed space to the police who enclose it “Tell the police (don’t ask them, tell them) that the party will end at a certain time” (RA! 1996:108; cf Ferrell 2001:127; <em>EF1AU</em> No.30 1996:1). The dynamics of a street party see protesters seeking to outwit police tactics using innovation and the spontaneous ability of a crowd (EF! AU No.25 1996:5; No.58 1999: 8; PPC 1996: 7), and when the street reclaimers gain the upper hand, their success is seen on the anarchist terms of human capability: “faced with an active crowd, the authority of the police dissolved” (EF!AU No.30 1996:1).	+	“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.”
−	This genuinely radical dynamism of contention and outwitting was added to by the powerful and influential ideological rhetoric of London RTS. This employed elements from several varieties of anarchistic ideology, including anti-capitalism and anti-hierarchy; the social critique of liberal individualism; the opposition of enclosure to reclaiming; and the empowerment that comes from direct action. I will now look at how they pitted carnival, play and imagination against the deadening system of work-consume-conform. Their textual manifestations (which had the highest profile of all EDA texts) made it clear how far removed EDA was from single issue campaigns, such as traffic reduction.	+	Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
−	The RTS critique of car-culture provides an entryway to the rest of their critiques and serves to link cars to capitalism, and consumerism to direct action. A version of this is reproduced in Figure 7.4:	+	== III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics ==
−	“Cars dominate our cities, polluting, congesting and dividing communities. They have isolated people from one another, and our streets have become mere conduits for motor vehicles to hurtle through, oblivious of the neighbourhoods they are disrupting. Cars have created social voids; allowing people to move further and further away from their homes, dispersing and fragmenting daily activities and lives and increasing social anonymity. RTS believe that ridding society of the car would allow us to re-create a safer, more attractive living environment, to return streets to the people that live on them and perhaps to rediscover a sense of’social solidarity’.	+	''Category*'' is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.
−	But cars are just one piece of the jigsaw and RTS is also about raising the wider questions I behind the transport issue - about the political and economic forces which drive ‘car culture’. Governments claim that ‘roads are good for the economy’. More goods travelling on longer journeys, more petrol being burnt, more customers at out-of-town supermarkets - it is all about increasing ‘consumption’, because that is an indicator of’economic growth*. The greedy, short-term exploitation of dwindling resources regardless of the immediate or long-term costs...	+	-----
−	More importantly, RTS is about encouraging more people to take part in direct action. Everyone knows the destruction which roads and cars are causing, yet the politicians still take no notice. Hardly surprising-they only care about staying in power and maintaining I their ‘authority* over the majority of people. Direct action is about destroying that power and authority, and people taking responsibility for themselves. Direct action is not just a tactic; it is an end in itself. It is about enabling people to unite as individuals with a common aim, to change things directly by their own actions. I	+	==== Annotation 126 ====
−	Street Parties...embodied the above messages in an inspired formula: cunning direct I action, crowd enjoyment, fun, humour and raving...festivals open to all who feel exasperated by conventional society”I	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> ''Translation note:'' In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.
−	][Figure 7.4 Critiques Employed by London RTS (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 2; cf Gorz 1973; Social Control 1996).	+	Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,” and “profit” categories.
−	As well as grounding their activism in a discourse of empowerment (see 5.2.2), these paragraphs demonstrate RTS’s allegiance to 3 distinct critiques and, most significantly, to making the links between them. These are (1) an anarchist critique of politics, noted as central to the anarchist tradition in Chapter 2 and frequently reinforced with slogans such as ‘The only party worth having is a street party” (<em>EF!A U</em> No.30 1996: 1; cf No.37 1997: 2). Other publicity condemned politicians (RTS 1999) and the “increasingly meaningless ritual of the general election” (RTS 1997), and insisted that workers could run things much better on their own (RTS 1999). (2) an environmental critique of capitalism, which in Chapter 4 I argued was essential for green ideas to become fully radical and compatible with anarchism, and (3) A social critique of car-culture, premised on the anarchist conceptualisation of social-individual interdependence established in section 2.2.2. The car is identified as a source and symbol of ‘bourgeois* individualist freedom, which “serves to reduce the freedom of everyone else” (<em>Aufheben</em> 1994: 8; Phil quoted in Brass & Koziell 1997: 42; Merrick 1996: 67). These three elements (anarchist critique of democracy, green critique of capitalism, social critique of capitalist individualism) are translated into the red. green and black of the RTS flag, one hundred of which were produced for the 1997 march for social justice (My Notes, RTS talk at Mayday 2000): see Figure 7.5.	+	Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.
−	Figure 1’7.5 RTS flag, still from de Quijano (1998).[183]	+	''Categories of materialist dialectics'', on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.
−	The car represents a microcosm of capitalism (McLeish 1996: 41), and while RTS attack the building of new <em>roads,</em> they seek to reintroduce the <em>street</em> i <em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 4 ; cf ‘Maybe* 1.5.2i MO: 12-13; Social Control 1996: 6). This opposition is framed as one of community against consumerism: “Ideally, street parties can temporarily recreate a sense of community that has been all but lost to the pollution and danger of cars” (RA! 1996: 102). Later in this section I shall query whether this ‘sense* can translate into something more tangible, but I wish now to emphasise that anarchists consider that “Any liberated areas, however limited, are a challenge to the capitalist order” (Porter quoted in Downing 2001: 72; cf Heller 2000: 23).	+	Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see ''Private and Common,'' p. 128].
−	In contrast to the “mechanical, linear movement epitomised by the car” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 4), RTS state that they seek to express the possibilities that our imagination could unleash, beyond the everyday routine we all get stuck in: “We are trying to show people that the way things are now aren’t the way they have to be” (activist quoted in Field 1996). “Placing ‘what could be* in the path of ‘what is’“ (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5), Reclaim the Streets events are more than a negative act of obstruction: they are a positive and a constructive event in that they are demonstrating a potential alternative to the status quo.	+	-----
−	In unashamedly “utopian and romantic” (Chesters 2000c: 12) terms, the Street Party represents a world turned upside down: “There are transvestites snogging in the fast lane, stilt-walkers partying in the slow lane, and Parents encouraging their children to play in the overtaking lane. By a sound system on the hard shoulder, a 24-foot Pantomime dame sways to music, skirts billowing yards of pink fluffiness. Welcome to a typical street. Not” (<em>Guardian</em> 17.7.96). The effect on participants is immediate and vivid, if a little confusing to the newcomer (Participant quoted in <em>Guardian</em> 8.6.1998).	+	==== Annotation 127 ====
−	“Wow! Where can I get red streamers that float in the air? Spectacular ribbons tangling up maybe 100m!...	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-40.png|''The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.'']]
−	There is, still, a woman in baggy leopardskin shorts and a three-foot pink-spotted tail dancing on a ledge 1 Om off the ground...	+	Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].
−	Banner check: ‘Protest is hope’. ‘Misbehave for the planet’. ‘Under the road, the dancefloor’” (NNR1998: 1).	+	-----
−	The Street Party is notable for its high level of festivity, as the ‘business-as-usual’ of consumer capitalism gives way to a convivial, celebratory anarchy.[184] This is one of the immediate impacts of a street party, and also “One of our most powerful tools ... We’re not interested in politics that doesn’t include an element of fun” (RTS activist quoted in <em>Guardian</em> 15.6.98; cf Goaman 2002:229-238; Marman cl997:3). The opposition between police and partiers at a Street Party was vastly different to the grim ritual of tree camp evictions (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:12), and expresses better a microcosm of the anarchist worldview, of free collective pleasure against violent ‘control’ (My Notes, Birmingham street party 1998; cf <em>Aufheben</em> 1995:16). Ferrell writes that	+	As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: ''Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.''
−	“For those fighting the closure of public space, playful pleasure constitutes both the terms of engagement on which they are willing to fight, and also the sense of possibility, the imagination of an open city, for which they fight. Unfettered festivals in the streets, moments of spontaneous dancing and free-form music serves as sensual subversions, undermining the taken-for-granted order of everyday life and inviting passersby into the pleasures of playful insubordination” (2001:235; cf Thrift 1992: 149; Goaman 2002:229).	+	-----
−	Aside from the ideological aspects, this ‘festive mood’ also serves to make the event attractive to a broad range of participants: “Our role is to inspire people ... The creativity, craziness and cheek helps” (RTS activist in Vidal 2000; cf <em>EFIA U</em> No.31 1996: 8). It attracts those who enjoy a party, those interested in defying the law, and also those wishing to avoid getting trapped in a violent situation (Adilkno 1994:105). Although heavy-handed police attacks on Street Parties sometimes destroyed this mood (<em>EF!AUNo.3</em>1 1996:7; No.52 1998: 8; No.59 1999:2; Heller 2000: 145[185]), the success of festivity as a protest tactic is demonstrated by its extension to anti-summit events, as RTS gave birth to the pink and silver blocs (and most recently the clowns) that have become a prominent feature of antisummit protests (<em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003:20; Farrer 2002; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 9): see Figure 7.6. At the Prague anti-IMF protests this tactic was not only more accessible than outright confrontation, but also proved the most effective in terms of penetrating the conference zone.	+	==== Annotation 128 ====
−	][Figure 7.6 The ‘festive’ theme displayed for the Global Street Party (1998).	+	Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as ''category pairs.'' So, a ''category pair'' is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.
−	RTS took up the idea of a camivalesque theorisation of revolution, as demonstrated by the title chosen for the June 18<sup>th</sup> protests: the ‘Carnival Against Capitalism’. They argued that “The great revolutionary moments have all been enormous popular festivals - the storming of the Bastille, the Paris commune and the uprisings in 1968 to name a few” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:3; cf Chesters 2000b: 4; Grindon 2004: 148).[186] Employing rhetoric that speaks of “a gigantic fiesta, a revelatory and sensuous explosion outside the ‘normal* pattern of politics’* (Leble quoted in <em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 12 ; cf Adilkno 1994: 15; ‘Maybe’ 2(>(0: 9; <em>Schnews</em> 2000: 63). RTS present street parties as an ‘‘attempt to make Carnival the revolutionary moment” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5; cf Jordan 1998: 5).	+	Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.
−	Situationist influences are often explicit in RTS discourse, slogans and tactics (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5; Goaman 2002: 234-235). McKay notes that “in 1995 Reclaim the Streets spread sand on the tarmac outside Goodge Street underground station in London, set up deckchairs and held a beach party in the middle of a central London road. This was a terrific literalisation of that Situ slogan, slightly inverted: sur not sous le pave, la plage” (1996a: 202). At the global Street Party in Birmingham a banner read “Beneath the Tarmac, the Earth”, making a link between situ-provocation and ecologism, and we in Newcastle made a similar point, illustrated in Figure 7.7.	+	=== 1. Private and Common ===
−	][Figure 7.7 Newcastle ‘beneath the tarmac’ banner, 12.7.1999	+	==== a. Categories of Private and Common ====
−	Linkages were also made with the convention-defying carnivals of the early middle ages (cf Bakhtin quoted in <em>TCA</em> 5(1) 2002: 4), which celebrate “temporary liberation from the established order ... the suspension of all hierarchy, rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 3). However, some commentators have noted that this Carnival served ultimately as a cathartic ‘safety valve* measure (Kershaw 1997: 266; Szerszynski 1999: 219) - a tool of social control, and GA warn RTS of having the same effect (<em>GA</em> 1999: 4; cf Grindon 2004: 151-152; Cresswel 1996: 128-130).	+	The ''Private Category'' encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the ''Common Category'' defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.
−	Like Hakim Bey*s theorisation of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (1991; <em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 51; <em>Schnews</em> 2002: 159; Heller 2000: 45), a Street Party is fundamentally temporary: it does not strive to build on one spot, as earlier anarchist initiatives have done. Rather, it is “an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it” (Bey 1991)[187] This has been claimed as in keeping with a postmodern ethos; it is certainly a strategy designed to avoid being destroyed by the police. Bookchin and others, however, critique this from the perspective of anarchist revolution: “The ‘temporary autonomous zone* is a pipe dream, as it leaves the prime source of oppression — the State - untouched, unchallenged, and intact” t Neal 1997; cf Bookchin 1995b; Pepper 1993: 319; Grindon 2004).	+	Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.
−	Echoing the situationist identification with workers’ councils, despite the wide gulf between that organisational form and the situationists* own tactics of’constructing situations’ (Barrot 1996), London RTS strove to build practical links with striking workers. They joined the pre-election ‘March for Social Justice’ of 12th April 1997 with their own tactics and anti-election agenda: ‘Never Mind the Ballots...Reclaim the Streets* (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 7). They allied with striking tubeworkers in London (EF/JC7No.31 1996:2; No.55 1999:2; No.58 1999: 7), and with the sacked Liverpool dockers (<em>EF!AUNo3\</em> 1996: 3; No.32 1996:1; No.36 1997:2; No.43 1997: 5; No.52 1998:1; AF 1998b; Fogg 1997:9; Shelton 1997:22-23). These were alliances not of the word but of the deed, characterised by occupations, joint actions and a blending of EDA repertoires with more traditional pickets.	+	-----
−	Traditional anarchists celebrated these links (‘Conference Programme* Mayday 2000:24; <em>EF!AU</em> No.31 1996:4), which operated on the terms of the anarchist ideal of alliance. Solidarity was actively expressed at the grassroots level, cutting out the hierarchical leadership, and encouraged a broadening out of the issues (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:9-10; £FMt/No.31 1996:4). Vidal argued that	+	==== Annotation 129 ====
−	“Their alliance with the dockers makes emotional and some intellectual sense. Almost uniquely the activists loudly and wonderfully articulate...the blindingly obvious - that the environmental and the social are indivisible. Moreover both groups are deeply principled and are being kept at arms* length by their peers - the union will not fiilly recognise the dockers; most Green groups are unsure what to make of the activists” (1996: 5).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png]]
−	Although RTS argued that “we recognised the common social forces against which we are fighting in order to combine our strengths” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 9), Vidal and Bellos warned that the alliance was dangerous for the direct activists in that it “makes it look like it is fighting battles of the old left” (Bellos 1997). RTS, after all, did not have a narrowly workplace-centred philosophy, but “an expansive desire; for freedom, for creativity; to truly live” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 6): this could be lost in the specific and limited struggle of striking workers. GA also criticised the alliance as an attempt by narrowly ideological (and unpopular) anarchists to exploit the “Greenies ... numbers, enthusiasm and activity” (2000; cf <em>GA</em> 1999:4). I will consider the development of these critiques in 7.5. Yet these attempts at alliance represent a key part of London RTS’s wish for the Street Party to create something more than a festival. Aware that “the street party risks becoming a caricature of itself if it becomes too focused on the spectacular and its participant - the mass”, RTS responded to the dangers of deradicalisation (of a purely spectacular, rather than real radicalism), with the hope that, “inherent within its praxis - its mix of desire, spontaneity and organisation - lie some of the foundations on which to build a participatory politics for a liberated, ecological society” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:4).	+	The ''Private'' category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.
−	RTS aimed “For the recreation of a public arena where empowered individuals can join together to collectively manage social affairs.” They suggest that “The street party, in theory, suggests a dissolution of centralised power structures in favour of a network of self-controlled localities” and advocate its extension into “a public meeting or community assembly that works in opposition to the state” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:5; cf Social Control 1996:6). The organisers of the Global Street Party of 1998 similarly reflected that “It is hugely empowering for someone who always walks on the pavement to step into the road, but for most people that is where it ends. To achieve lasting change we must keep that person in the road, keep them dancing, and start them thinking... Maybe the next street party you go to will have workshops instead of a sound system?” (GSP 1998:9). In 7.51 consider how this was manifested, to some degree, at the Guerrilla Gardening element that RTS contributed to the Mayday 2000 events.	+	The ''Common'' category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are ''private'' apples, and fall within the ''Private'' category.
−	In conclusion, I would suggest that the tension between the temporary, celebratoiy, and pleasure-based (often drunken) space of a street party, while radical and even revolutionaiy in part, is not equivalent to the basis for a ‘commune of communes’ that some RTS literature spoke of.[188] The street party does, however, open up possibilities in participants’ minds, and the most significant political impact of RTS could be just this: to provide glimpses of freedom and collective power that undermine the normally accepted oppressions of everyday life (‘Maybe’ 2000: 8). Where the organisers of the anti-G8 global street party in Birmingham answered their critics (who argued it wasn’t ‘political’ enough) that “It was a practical demonstration of our political message” (GSP 1998: 8), a distinction nonetheless needs to be drawn between the sensibility-awakening effect of a Street Party, and the grandiose plans for revolution expressed in the literature of London RTS. The ‘imagination’ rhetoric of RTS, by 2000 familiar to the point of clichd to many activists (‘Maybe’ 2000:23)[189], came to be attacked as “Grandiose simplistic and unrealistic demands” (Stone 2000). As an EF!er drily comments, “I have no doubt that our tactics are weak. After all, what we need is more samba in order to rid ourselves of the plague of capitalism” (K, sg2003 list 2003; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:42). It was Mayday that pressed this point home for many activists, and so it is Mayday that I shall look at now.	+	However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are ''common'' attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the ''common'' category, based on these common attributes.
−	** 7.5 Mayday	+	Apple A and Apple B will also have ''unique'' attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has ''unique'' properties.
−	“Let red & black fly from the green Maypole heights Let riots of wild flowers spread like wildcat strikes	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-42.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
−	Yes, come all ye Wiccan-syndicalists & eco-agitators	+	The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Ye anti-fascist faeries & allotments propagators Plant those Beltane barricades of hawthorn & yew & in the seasoned pagan cauldron cook an anarchist stew” (Hancock 2001).	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-43.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
−	I will here use the Mayday 2000 protests to consider problems inherent in allying EDA and traditional ideological anarchism. Mayday is especially useful for my thesis in consciously allying EDA with traditional anarchists, both through self-identification (see below), and in press reports (Harris, Walsh & Thompson 2001). The Sun, for example, listed the “extremist groups” that organised Mayday 2000 as “RECLAIM THE STREETS, which ran the Twyford Down and Newbury By-Pass protests... EARTH FIRST, an ecology turned anti-capitalist faction, BLACK DOG, an anarchist magazine, CLASS WAR, which has a long history of stirring up rioting, ANARCHIST FEDERATION and ANIMAL ACTION” (‘Riot Demo’s extremists* <em>The Sun</em> 2.5.2000).[190] The experience of the Mayday protests has also been of defining import for UK groups where other anti-summit actions (bar JI 8 and the rural 2005 G8 protests) were not (TGAL No.32 2000:2).[191].	+	It is also true that every private subject contains within itself ''Unique'' attributes which it does ''not'' share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.
−	An equal part to the actions was the plan for a conference (‘Mayday 2000: Mini-Planning Conference’ Flyer Mayday 2000; £F.Mt/No.63 1999; No.65 2000:1), billed as “the most exciting and far-reaching attempt to spread our ideas EVER” (‘Mayday 2000 A festival of anarchist ideas and action’ Flyer Mayday2000). Unlike previous dates, chosen because they coincided with summits, “Mayday is different because it is a date chosen by us, because it is symbolic for us.... Mayday gives us a chance to correct the one-sidedness of J18 and N30, in concentrating only on finance and business ... International Workers Day, it provides an ideal opportunity for us to show the foundation of the riches traded in the city” (Brighton Mayday 2000). The ‘us’ of this statement, however, related to the classical anarchist movement much more than to the EFlers. The Mayday notion of’spreading ideas’ is	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-44.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.'']]
−	also distinct from the active solidarity and demonstration by example which marked most of the activist anarchism in this thesis.	+	Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a ''unique relationship'' in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the ''principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity'' [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common ''and'' the Unique and has unique ''and'' common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Several EDA voices warned that the event was “poorly conceived” and organised “ad hoc” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 79), and they resented the date both because it left insufficient time to prepare, and because it provided a way in for authoritarian left groups like the SWP (and some anarchists) who had up till that point failed to get a foothold in activist events. Furthermore, “AUTONOMOUS organisation has not been stressed from the start... the ‘event’ already seems to have been planned right from the outset ... we now have a form of’central committee’ of our own, with people bickering about who can or who can’t attend” (Mayday 2000 2000e).	+	This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of ''private'' information sources or data points to look for ''commonalities'' between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many ''private'' data points and pieces of evidence as possible.
−	The 1999 EF! Summer Gathering did support the idea for an action on Mayday, but at the following Winter Moot in 2000 it was agreed that the RTS action on Mayday would not be a national EFI action as it had been for J18. RTS therefore planned their event as one action amongst many, but encountered the “problem of being a London group, i.e. working in the capital. Inevitably any action we do tends to have national significance even if we try to localise it!” (RTS 2000d: 6). Mark Brown also cites the “unrealistic expectation of RTS’s organisational capabilities”, whose active membership started to decline around 1998 (Jim Paton 1.12.1999) at the same time as, “Conversely, RTS actions have grown in popularity” (Mark Brown 17.5.2000; cf RTS 2000d: 4).	+	For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the ''Common'' without examining enough ''Privates''. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the ''Private'' for the ''Common'' which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.
−	There was an uneasy relationship between the organisers of MayDay, and the Earth First! ers who they sought to mobilise (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000:72). Some EF!ers felt they were approached with a “fait d’accompli” and expected to join in without any real control over events. GA translated the resentment evident at the 2000 EF! Moot into an ideological critique:	+	Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY
−	“MayDay 2000 doesn’t come out of Reclaim the Streets (RTS), Earth First! or anywhere else in the direct action / DiY milieu. It’s prime movers are the Anarchist (Communist) Federation, old guard anarcho-Lefties more into promoting themselves and their ideology than revolution” (2000).[192]	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png]]
−	GA argued the conference represented an attempt to push ideology, and the actions on May 1st are “just used as a come-on to sell the conference and up their ideological cred” (2000; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 72). We may view this hostility to Mayday as an expression of activist anarchist critique of ideological anarchism, although GA’s crystallisation of this (while useful for my thesis in being ‘spelled out’ so clearly), is itself marked by an ideological emphasis. The practical points made by GA were nonetheless representative of other views mooted around EF! circles. For example,	+	''“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).''
−	“Although International Workers Day is an attractive enough date for people from their ideological tradition and would boost their conference internationally, it was a significant departure from previous world days of action inasmuch as they’d been selected to coincide with dates the WTO were actually meeting. Even this practice had been criticised as giving those outside the country concerned no opportunity to act directly against the WTO meeting, but the choice of May Day eliminated even this direct action component, reducing the whole to empty protest” (2000).	+	In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.
−	<em>GA</em> also criticised the date because it sat on a bank holiday, which meant there was no practical (as opposed to symbolic) focus for the action, and they note that “N30 Euston shows the cops know how to contain and control this stuff even if there were” (2000; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2000: 71). This indicates a critique of the city as a place for meaningful, effective protests, that I shall consider at the end of this section.	+	At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously ''Unique'', ''Private'', and ''Common.''
−	First, however, I wish to record the meaning given to the history of Mayday by the literature advertising the event: it is particularly useful for my thesis in articulating different ideological facets of	+	It was ''Unique'' because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was ''Private'' because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was ''Common'' — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.
−	the anarchisms[193] involved. Some, for example, saw Mayday primarily in terms of the anarchist movement’s identity (McKay 2001b), or as a solely workers-based, anticapitalist event (Mayday2000 2000b). Most of the plethora of literature produced, however, placed great emphasis on joining the different meanings of Mayday into a shared celebration:	+	Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously ''Unique, Private,'' and ''Common,'' with some slight developments:
−	“MAYDAY is RED for international workers day, GREEN for Beltane - the ancient fire and fertility festival that signals transformation and rebirth, and BLACK for the anarchists executed for their part in trying to bring about a shorter working day with enormous strikes on Mayday 1886. MAYDAY is a time when RED, GREEN and BLACK converge - a catalyst for hope and possibility...” (RTS 2000a; ‘Maybe* 2000:7; ‘Brighton & Hove No Leaders’ 1.5.2000:2).[194]	+	It remains ''Private'' because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains ''Unique'' because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains ''Common'' because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares ''commonality'' with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer ''Unique'' for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.
−	The symbolic emphasis was thus on the alliance of “the red and black and green” (Brighton Mayday 2000; cf EGGE 2000; Hancock 1.5.2001), illustrated in F7.5 on the RTS flag.	+	If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the ''Private'' of that ''object'' would no longer exist — it would remain only as an ''idea'', and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The ''Unique'' would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.
−	Other themes given to the day were that of reclaiming, in opposition to “Our rulers [ who ] responded by first trying to control and then banning the May fairs” (Mayday Monopoly 2001b: 4), and continued to make efforts to stop the 21* century version (<em>Hate Mail</em> 1.5.2002:4). This echoes the discourse of enclosure made popular in nineties EDA by TLIO and others (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997:40-53; Monbiot 1994; <em>Schnews</em> 1996 No. 19). In keeping with the themes identified in 7.4, Mayday was billed as a day of Carnival (2002:12), a festival of diversity to celebrate strength (<em>ASW 2000),</em> and a device to continue to build the anticapitalist network (Thomas Johansson email on allsorts list 10.1.2000): both fun and political. The press, on the other hand, came to term it “International Riot Day” (<em>Scotsman</em> 2001:1), and it was the theme of violence and property destruction that dominated all media coverage before and after the events. I shall consider these issues of violence after I have assessed the RTS Guerrilla Gardening event	+	''Translator’s Note:'' The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.
−	RTS took on the ‘Guerrilla Gardening* component of Mayday 2000 (<em>EF!AU</em> No.67 2000:4-5; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 69-81). Their intriguingly mysterious literature stated that Guerrilla Gardening was intended “to transform a symbol of capitalism” (RTS 2000a), utilising green themes of’compost not commerce* (‘Maybe* 2000: 10-15). The organisers felt this event “fitted the spirit of Mayday perfectly” as it melded social and ecological issues, required no ‘target* that the police could protect, and was proactive, positive and creative (RTS 2000d: 7). The proclaimed strengths of this event are interesting, as they were viewed in terms of responding to the concerns and overcoming the limitations previously identified with street parties, namely (1) herding (the problem of secret leadership and an open crowd), and (2) participation (as opposed to spectatorship, which Street Parties had been criticised for by, for example, <em>Organise! (</em> AF 2001a: 30) and <em>Aufheben (1995: 167).</em> The RTS plan for Mayday organisation was thus “motivated by a wish not to replicate the spectator/participant dynamic from previous street parties and to break down the distinction between the ‘leaders’ and the ‘led’” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 74).	+	Example (from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks''): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is ''Common'' in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the ''Private — s''pecific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their ''Unique'' properties.
−	(1) The logistics of London demo’s are complex: on J18, for example, “approximately 150 people were needed to split the crowd into four and have them regroup at the final location” (RTS 2000d: 11). Those of us from outside the city and the preparation, found following one of these groups disorienting and confusing (which added to the experience). In Mayday 2000, RTS used three colours of flag to signify ‘follow*, ‘converge to garden* and ‘gather to decide’ (RTS 2000b; RTS 2000e: 17). On the day, however, a large part of the crowd followed the “restless* samba band up Whitehall. This was not part of the plan, indeed on this occasion the action was to take place at the same place as the meeting point, but “Such is the nature of autonomy, and the unpredictability and spontaneity of mass actions” (RTS 2000e: 18)	+	Here are excerpts from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks'' discussing these concepts:
−	The focus of street parties was typically the sound system (‘Mayday 2001: Overview’ Metropolitan Police), harking back to the ‘repetitive beats’ outlawed by the CJA. Police reaction to street parties therefore commonly took the form of confiscating the sound system (as at Newcastle in 1999 and 2000). Guerrilla Gardening, however, successfully managed “An RTS action without a soundsystem: who’d have believed it!” (RTS 2000e:17), signifying that the more mobile samba band had taken on the unifying, celebratory focus of the more static, centralised, vulnerable sound system (PGA 2002; <em>Schnews</em> 2002:26. Police also recognised the ‘leadership’ role of the samba band and musicians by focussing their attention on them, with arrests and heavy surveillance (£F.UC7No.31 1996: 8). In 2002, a group of less than 30 samba players demonstrating outside the Argentinean embassy found themselves monitored by their very own police helicopter, and at other unconnected events, individuals from samba groups have been addressed by police by name, in a communication that they are being watched.	+	<blockquote>
		+	(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.
−	(2) Literature repeatedly stated that “Guerrilla Gardening is <em>not</em> a street party. It is an action demanding everyones participation and preparation. An adventure beyond spectating!” (RTS 2000a; cf EGGE 2000; ‘Maybe’ 2000: 8; <em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5). The event was designed to “demand participation”, with people encouraged to bring seedlings and trowels (RTS 2000e: 8), and “public assemblies on the day” to “allow people on the action to decide what they wanted to see happen” (RTS 2000d: 8). It was considered a qualified success in that regard, gaining “A higher level of participation” than street parties (2000a: 16). This is illustrated in the flyer reproduced in Figure 7.8:	+	Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’
−	][Figure 7.8 ‘Calling All Cyclists and Cycle Trailers’ (Flyer RTS 2000).	+	Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...
−	Where supporters claimed the event as direct action in opposition to ‘spectacularisation* (‘CopWatch’ 5.2000), however, I must side with critics of the action who stated “If this was not a protest, how come it was taking place in Parliament Fields, across from the Houses of Parliament. Wasn’t this a statement of public intent, a declaration, a protest in fact?” (Stone 2000; cf Monbiot 2000b; TWNP 1999). RTS did indeed choose the site for its symbolism (RTS 2000e: 11-12), and other protesters at Mayday also targeted “Establishment’ symbols” (Baldwin, Eden & Pook 2000). The trashing of McDonalds, for example, was by now a ritualistic event (its symbolic significance is demonstrated by the use of its famous ‘golden arches’ symbol on a later year’s Mayday Monopoly Guide to denote all “corporate scum” (OurMayday 2003)). The property damage on the day may therefore be viewed as liberal as much as it may be seen as anarchist direct action.	+	Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.
−	I would now like to consider the issue of violence and property destruction at the event, illustrated in Figure 7.9, in order to draw out the difference between liberal and radical/anarchist approaches to protest. I will situate the problems involved in these tactics in terms of the city location.	+	Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.
		+	</blockquote>
−	[Newspaper: How the laughter turned to terror	+	Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in ''Capital'':
−	drugged along with them.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.
		+	</blockquote>
−	All around me broken bottles fell bending shards of glass flying.	+	Here, “general form” refers to the ''commonalities'' of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in ''common'' with every other commodity.
−	\s the lines of riot police pt is I nil forwards, Lacticiilly closing in on us, there was nowhere to hide.	+	The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the ''Private, Common,'' and ''Unique'' features and aspects of commodities:
−	li was a bizarre acene and lor^ni objcetiw observer impossible to futlmni whut tlir protesters hojasl to achieve by this mindless vloleacv.	+	<blockquote>
		+	The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.
		+	</blockquote>
−	<strong><em>Bizarre</em></strong>	+	We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying ''concepts'' which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.
−	One ininntc they wi-rc singing and laughing, strumming guitars and play ing drums. Next they <strong>hxtv</strong> hurling missiles at police - which htndril imlisi riininaiely.	+	==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common ====
−	Alongside the mi lit ants I saw smartly dressed, middle-aged people handing out leaflets for more mot I crate causes anti groups like I hr Green Party and genetically nwdlflMl foods. .	+	According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.
−	“We arc here to highlight the fact tliat we can’t go on abusing <nir plam-L,” said Toriya Arnold. VVe don’t condone violence hut people feel strongly.* ■ <strong>j ;</strong>	+	-----
−	I watched sickened as Trafalgar Square, usually bustling with lourist.s, buses anil taxis, his’uinr a forum for destruction.	+	==== Annotation 130 ====
−	Uttered with beer cans, smashed bottles and paint and covered dli graffiti. VVoinert squatted in the streets io riJiew themselves while men lumcd doorways Into urinals.	+	The ''Common'' can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a ''private'' subject which has various features in ''common'' with other ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the ''Common'' through observation and study of various ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the ''Common'' of apples. Only by observing many ''private'' apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all ''private'' apples have in ''common''.
−	I had been in the riots last Ntncmbi i and 1 knew what these people were capable of.	+	The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.
−	I he v ioh’iH’c of mob rule is unlike anything I have experienced.	+	-----
−	While the young and the old, (he skinheads, the. smartly drt*ssed and Ilie sliideiiLs inultrrvd about (heir beliefs, (heir causes seemed to disappear in the nio<xi of hatred w Inch descended across the crowil. j	+	==== Annotation 131 ====
−	Uy the time the Square had Ijttiiime ciiihroikd in (hr* tiglntcss of violence, the only thing they hud in common wo their determination Co damage the great landmark an<l hurl the police.	+	No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist ''absolutely without'' commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares ''absolutely no features'' with ''any other'' thing, phenomenon, or idea.
−	- Those of us caught hel.uinui the mob and the riot squad were at the iiieixy ol them both. ‘ I	+	The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.
−	Wo were pushed back by the of 1 kws to find a similar solid black line behind lis. I	+	-----
−	It wus a terrifying experience. I	+	==== Annotation 132 ====
−	But Trafalgar Square yesterday r forwieiuMi	+	The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.
−	lircsMst myscli against the wall thcl buddm^® lirullv thFkqii	+	Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see ''Essence and Phenomenon,'' p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the ''relationships'' between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.
−	i desperately hoping I wouldn’t bv | | drugged^along withThem. ;MHH	+	Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].
−	shouldn’t I? She’s got every right to Im* here, we all nave. It’s Uinsc !>***■ ♦«•*» who shouldn’t be here.*	+	The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:
−	idleriiiMHi was no p	+	“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other '''kinds''' of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”<ref>''On the Question of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref> [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].
−	Or any other |x-ai*e-ubiillng viIIzihl	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Each time the no	+	We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.
−	Iir< mutinied a	+	-----
−	By BARBARA	+	==== Annotation 133 ====
−	mtim (he sunpng rnnvd 1 fc	+	Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].
−	run through me like electricity.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-46.png|''Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.'']]
−	They charged, and caught in the heaving mass I was forced with them, (tcs|»enitrh trying l*< b» bill under their stampeding feet.	+	It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.
−	Yet minutes earlier I had stood next to a young women bolding a	+	-----
−	Tattooed and d rend locked, and dicsscd in tie-dyed clothes, she was swallowed up in the charge hut afterwards I saw her laughing.	+	In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.
−	She looked furious when 1 asked her why die had brought hefbi	+	-----
−	<em>6 ...................................................... ‘</em>	+	==== Annotation 134 ====
−	<br>	+	==== Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common ====
−	][Figure 7.9 A Typical Press Account of Mayday (Davies 2000: 4).	+	''Dogmatism'' is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.
−	Typical newspaper narratives stated “Carnival fun then the mobs took over” (<em>Metro</em> 2.5.2000; <em>Sun</em> 2.5.2000; Lee & Peachey 2000: 3; Woodward, Kelso & Vidal 2000: 1; Harris 2000: 4-5), and the common press story stated that the soft ‘non-confrontationaL police response had failed (Hall 2000), that the demonstrators had stepped over the line and the police had to be given extra support so it could never happen again (White & Woodward 2000). The government and police used the propen \ damage and scenes of street fighting to depict the activists as terrorists in the media (<em>Schnews</em> 2001: 43; cf Cohen 2000). This was ironic when the day was preceded by the anti-terrorism ‘A3O’ photo shoot, and may be seen to reinforce the dilemma noted by several commentators on protest: “Be violent, and you get noticed. Be peaceful, and be patronised or ignored” (Young 2000; cf <em>Guardian</em> 2001b; <em>Nonviolent Action</em> No.l 1 2000: 1). Comments on the Mayday 2000 email list cited the McDonalds episode as a case of police entrapment, considered the problem with conveying substantive messages at such an event, and held a tactical (not moral) debate over property damage and lighting police. Overall, it was perceived to have failed as an effective and inspirational piece of EDA.	+	Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.
−	rhe (actually limited) violence was said to have alienated middle England (<em>Sunday Herald</em> 7.5.2000), although the newsletter <em>Nonviolent Action</em> recorded the day as mostly peaceful (No. 12 2000 ». Commentators argued that the Mayday protests failed to convey any message: “If their purpose was to highlight any issues at all, they failed” and that the protest backfired: “the only winner was the very	+	Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing
−	<br>	+	Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.
−	system that they purported to oppose” (Goldsmith 2000; cf <em>Times</em> 2000; Young 2000). It served to close off “avenues for political dissent, as the police and government clamp down on mass action and peaceful people keep away” (Monbiot 2000b; cf <em>GA</em> 2000; Hall 2000). Commentators attacked “their hopeless way of taking on the system” (Hall 2000; cf Monbiot 2000b) and used the event to valorise democratic process above extra-parliamentary protest (Toynbee 2000; cf Ridley 2000; Freedland 2001:15; McNeil 2001:3; Monbiot 2001a).	+	According to Vietnam’s ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought,'' the opposite of Dogmatism is ''Revisionism''. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.
−	Ken Livingstone, facing a negative ‘cenotaph effect’ on his electoral bid to become Mayor of London (Travis 2000; Steven Norris quoted in Baldwin, Eden & Pook 2000: 1), followed Tony Blair (White & Woodward 2000) in expressing “contempt for those who defiled the monument to those who gave their lives for our liberty” (Livingstone 2000; cf Livingstone 2001a; Jasper 2001). He was even led to praise Winston Churchill (White & Woodward 2000), a position blasted by protesters such as James Matthews (prosecuted for painting blood on the mouth of Churchill’s statue), who distinguished ordinary soldiers from Churchill, “an exponent of capitalism and imperialism and anti-semitism. A Tory reactionary vehemently opposed to the emancipation of women and to independence in India” (quoted in Gillan 2000; cf MayDay email list). The RTS press statement refused to celebrate the generals and ruling classes who ran the war (RTS 2000d: 23; cf White & Woodward 2000), and repeated the anti-militarist opposition to all war (RTS 2000d: 32-3; cf OOW 2000). We are returned to the anarchist view of violence established in section 6.3.3, and many anarchists responded to the media condemnations of violence by simply condemning the media in return (Bradley 2001b; <em>Schnews</em> 2001 No.303; Revolt 2001): “They talk about violence when they have blood on their hands” (AAWR 2000).	+	For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.
−	I am not, however, going to leave our consideration of this event at this point, with an articulation of anarchist arguments in response to press and political criticism. The issue is more significant, in that even sympathisers with EDA and the aims of Mayday, and many participants, were somewhat dismayed by the result. My own notes lament that “There didn’t seem to be any particular point to it... and no-one - not even the organisers - seemed convinced that it would achieve anything.... There didn’t seem to be much happening,... When the open mics came out I realised that this was probably where the guerrilla gardening event was going to take place after all. I felt disappointed : we’d all expected the flags to appear, and then move off to some great spot chosen by the geniuses in RTS London. This was not to be” (My notes, May 2001). Albert Beale, one of the editors of <em>Nonviolent Action,</em> bemoaned the violence and media portrayal of what started out as a peaceful, positive action, and concludes that “This movement is not as well-organised as it ought to be” (2000; cf Brown 2000: 1; <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 75-76; Young 2000). Even amongst anarchists with no objections to street-fighting or property damage (see 6.3.3), Mayday was criticised as a strategically faulty model (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 75-6;).	+	==== Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common ====
−	Newspapers suggested that “The violent nature of the protests has sparked infighting among rival groups. RTS is furious that anarchists disrupted a peaceful day of action by attacking the Cenotaph and vandalising a statue of Winston Churchill” (Thompson & Aldridge 2000). When it quotes John Jordan (who had appeared as the public face of RTS) to thus state that “It was an act of stupidity which damaged our image”, and “We want to stop the nutters from taking over”, we may note that the journalists effortlessly translated ‘nutters’ into ‘anarchists* (Thompson & Aldridge 2000). RTS’s antiauthoritarian refusal to negotiate with police and media was translated into anarchism’s traditional association with violence (Peter Mandelson quoted in <em>Guardian</em> 2001a: 4; Taylor 2001: 6; Rosser & Davenport 2001:10). The blame for the violence was laid on anarchist organisational weakness: “The price of eschewing hierarchy is to make violence more likely” (Waddington 2000; cf Goldsmith 2000; Monbiot 2000b; Alex Robertson, letter <em>Guardian</em> 3.5.2000; Milne 2001). I do not accept these criticisms of anarchism in the general terms by which they are advanced. Instead, I will look at the problems of Mayday from the perspective of those EDA activists who are opposed to democratic process and authority, in order to find a more revealing understanding of Mayday’s limitations. It is the location and the form of protest that many in EDA identified as being the main flaws in the plan.	+	The ''metaphysical'' position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,
−	EF!ers had previously worried that the place would “would turn into some sort of street confrontation” and <em>Do or Die</em> suggest that “An important lesson to learn from this is that you have to be prepared for big actions in London to kick off’ (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000:72-79). The inherent trickiness of making big events work (PSMB 2000: 2) was allied to the choice of location, in a place where no lasting EDA contribution could be made (no destruction stopped, no homes built), and in which the opponents of the event had clear advantages of resources and preparation.	+	p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private ''and'' the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Of equal significance for EDA, wounding attacks came from prominent commentators on EDA using their outlets in the mainstream media to condemn RTS as “a threat to the environment and social justice movements” (Monbiot 2000b). Zac Goldsmith, editor of the Ecologist, and George Monbiot, until that point perhaps EDA’s most visible advocate, both argued that the environmental movement and the anarchists involved in it were incompatible (Goldsmith 2000).[195] In opposition to the Mayday protests, Monbiot presents a quintessentially liberal conception of direct action, “not a direct attempt to change the world through physical action, but a graphic and symbolic means of drawing attention to neglected issues, capturing hearts and minds through political theatre.” He argues that such direct action must be peaceful, have clear, achievable aims, and that this can only succeed as part of a wider democratic process (2000b).	+	<blockquote>
		+	The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.”
		+	</blockquote>
−	While Monbiot’s specific criticisms of the event were also freely expressed within the movement, his liberal perspective was rejected, and he provoked a fierce backlash for his rhetoric of condemnation, explicitly intended to cause a rift between RTS and ‘acceptable’ environmentalism’.[196] When he responded to these attacks under the title ‘Does RTS believe in Free Speech?’ (Monbiot 2000c) he drew yet more criticism, which attacked the notion of abstract ‘free speech’ as “a classic liberal fiction that serves to hide massive inequalities in wealth and power, and thus access to communication”, which “consistently ignores, marginalises and censors certain groups and their speech while privileging others” (RTS 2000e). Monbiot staked his claim for being able to speak on the recognition of a ‘diversity of opinions’, yet it was pointed out that those opinions followed remarkably closely the same line as the rest of media.[197]	+	In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas ''in relation to one another'', which must include the analysis of Commonalities.
−	“RTS and the wider direct action movement have been on the receiving end of much of what you call ‘political process’ over the years, from ‘babies thrown under diggers’, to ‘stockpiling stun guns’ and ‘riot scum’. So your continual equation of the daily bile of the corporate mass media with ‘public debate’ or ‘opinion’, with you as the public’s voice of criticism, is selfserving and ultimately hollow” (RTS 2000d).	+	Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.
−	With Livingstone and Blair both making statements to distinguish legitimate, acceptable protest from the ‘criminal violence’ of Mayday (Livingstone 2001a: 6; Livingstone 2001b; Blair quoted in Vidal 2001:1; White 2000b; Heffer 2000:6). Monbiot was accused of confusing media representations with the event itself, and for recognising only liberal and not anarchist dimensions of direct action. More pertinently, he was accused of attempting to divide the movement: “To split the spikies from the fluffies, the NGOs from the direct action groups, middle England from street folk... so that disunited, we affect nothing” (<em>Schnews & Squall</em> 2001: 50-51; cf <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 79). One response lauded RTS’s “unity in diversity” as “one of its strengths”, but stated that “Our emphasis on direct action is even more crucial. So is criticism: but the moment anyone joins with the establishment in condemning one group, they weaken this diversity” (Witcop in RTS 2000d: 30). Where Monbiot condemned RTS for endangering Ken Livingstone’s election chances, RTS responded that they did not buy into the ‘political process’ but opposed it both in its media and parliamentary democracy forms (RTS 2000e). In contrast, Monbiot criticises the direct action movement’s ‘myth of consensus’ as an alternative and improved method of democracy, and he argues that the non-hierarchical structures of the direct action movement are illusory: “Reclaim the Streets is less accountable than many of the institutions it seeks to overthrow” (2000b; cf Secrett 2000; Livingstone 200 la). RTS of course never sought to be ‘accountable’ in the style of Genetix Snowball, but instead gave as much of the responsibility for decisions and leadership on the day, onto the crowd who turned up.	+	In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.
−	The issue of Mayday violence not only revealed the gulf between the anarchist views of RTS and those of liberal commentators otherwise sympathetic to EDA, but was also extended into an anarchist critique of media, including the unquestioned assumptions of’acceptable* militaristic violence, and the dangerous and powerful role of commentators. However, I feel it is too simplistic to view this as a correct drawing of’sides’ (anarchist versus liberal), partly perhaps because I share the view that, tactically, most of the property damage on Mayday was counterproductive. Instead, I wish to refer back to the point in 6.3.5 that it is the contextual basis rather than set principle which can justify sabotage: this was demonstrated with the study, in 6.4, of anti-GM direct action. In this context, there were no clear gains from property damage and graffiti, either direct or symbolic (<em>Guardian</em> 2000b). I argue that the city location was the reason that the tactic was at fault In doing so I hope to indicate how it is possible to remain an anarchist yet oppose the use of sabotage or street-fighting on occasion. I might even suggest that the difference between an activist and an ideological anarchism is that the former is able to make practical judgements with less clumsiness.	+	-----
−	There is one last point to make before I look at the context and place of Mayday. Some used the events of Mayday to condemn the abstraction of the ideological anarchists. EDA activists charged that in contradiction to the symbolism of the combined colours, the event was not green (<em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 77), and that “black-flag anarchism took priority” (Brown 2000: 1). Self-declared Twyford veteran Jem Bendell, for example, attacked the “Anarchist and Revolutionary Marxist... tendency to argue for all- or-nothing solutions encourage either apathy, on the one hand, or aggression, on the other” (2000; Chris Turnbull quoted in Vidal & Hopkins 2001), and Chris Stone suggested that RTS had been “taken over by some out-of-touch anarchist faction more intent upon self-promotion than in actually dealing with the very real issues that face us” (2000; cf Brown 2000).[198] It is possible that the move by London RTS (and other sections of EDA) toward an ever more abstract ‘anticapitalism’, encouraged the abstraction of their Guerrilla Gardening event: a lack of feel for context and situation that has negative effects on the impact and experience of the action.	+	==== Annotation 135 ====
−	My view is that this sense of ‘generalisin’ did contribute to the problems of Mayday and the Guerrilla Gardening action, and that abstraction stands in opposition to the emotional, intuitive and grounded impulse to eco-activism. Activist anarchism is by its nature connected, intimately, to the lives and surroundings of the people engaged with it: when this connection is severed, when the practice does not speak to the theory, or when experience does not inform an anarchist sensibility, then the foundations of activist anarchism are eroded. The innovation and contextual sensitivity displayed in EDA, whether through the architecture and landscape-specific layout of anti-road camps (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 15), or through the use of sabotage in co-operation with the seasons and the elements, is lost when a formula gets repeated too many times. As <em>Do or Die</em> put it, “RTS quickly became victims of their own success. They became trapped into repeating this formula indefinitely, and any attempts to break from this merely ended up in not-quite-so-good street parties (2000:74; cf IE 2005: 12). While the idea of street parties spread successfully around the world, therefore, London RTS were left in a corrosive war of attrition with the London authorities, and with the architecture of the city working against their desires to create participatory and inspirational moments out of mass action. Once they had successfully reclaimed the M41 motorway, where else could they go?	+	In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be ''unique'' to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into ''common knowledge''.
−	The chief problem with the Mayday protests was not the abstract or utopian rhetoric but the place: the city of London is not a good venue for empowering and effective EDA, as my notes indicate at the time:	+	Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.
−	“I hate London, I hate the size of it, the smell, the black snot you get, the way that if you disappeared, no-one would notice, the way that no matter how powerful, heroic or amazing the tilings you might do there, next day the crowds will come, swarm over the remains and obliterate your memory: the city forgets, you don’t matter there. And I don’t belong there” (My Notes, May 2000).	+	=== 2. Reason and Result ===
−	I would like to develop this point by returning to the origins and characteristics of the earlier wave of nineties EDA, and emphasising the ecological centrality of’place*. It is perhaps ironic that early RTS	+	==== a. Categories of Reason and Result ====
−	propaganda suggested it was dedicated, in opposition to the fragmentation caused by car use, to “rediscovering place” (RTS cl997).	+	The ''Reason'' category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.
−	I believe the connection to place is one of the core strengths of EDA, whether that means EF! and CAAT taking the struggle to the offices of quarry companies and arms manufacturers, or the attempts to build a little piece of ecotopia in a communal back garden or action camp. By re-centring action in the centre of London - a tactic that with JI 8 had worked to some degree (<em>Do or Die</em> 1999: 1-34) - the Mayday protests lost the specific significance of landscape and community. They also took the protests onto the ‘home ground’ of the Metropolitan police, and with a limited repertoire they were relatively easily outflanked by those with greater resources and the experience of containing countless demonstrations there. The Mayday organisers banked on a centralised gathering, to get a mass of anarchists together, but this proved a tactic of diminishing returns, and the location of the city served to make small-scale actions (such as were encouraged at each Mayday protest) ineffectual.	+	The ''Result'' category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or ''externally'' between different things, phenomena, or ideas.
−	Franks notes (in line with a common anarchist criticism of the anti-globalisation movement) that “The move away from multiple sites of struggle towards a strategy aimed at global meetings of the IMF and so on acts as a constraint on the wider disruptive possibilities of direct action based on local protests” (2003:31). I concur, and every group seeking to mobilise ‘effective’ mass protest at such events must grapple with the knowledge of superior police numbers, weaponry and other resources: it can be very hard to take advantage of surprise, small group flexibility and the unpredictable development of direct action (hard to be spontaneous when the adversary operates with a fixed, intelligent strategy to contain all space for experimentation). There are those who seek to advance autonomous small-group action at anticapitalist events, arguing “It can be more efficient for small groups of individuals to pick their own targets and act with surprise on their side than to protest in areas already entirely controlled by security forces”(AntiG8 2004:3; cf SRA 2001:15). At June 18<sup>th</sup> and DSEi 2003, for example, it was felt that dispersed small groups acting autonomously worked successfully (<em>Do or Die</em> 1999 1-24; <em>EF!AU</em> No.90 2003:3).	+	-----
−	In 2001, the Mayday organisers responded to the results of Mayday 2000 with the theme of Mayday Monopoly (EF.MC7 No. 75 2001:2-3), presented not as one mass event but as “lots of autonomous actions, separate yet interconnected, which express our opposition to the monopoly that capitalism has over our lives”(Mayday Monopoly 2001a). The condemnations from police, press and politicians again came early, with alleged bomb threats, rubber bullets and a ‘mass looting’ scare (Rosser 2001; Jeffreys 2001: 8; Taylor & Atik 2001:9; Clark 2001), and Tony Blair, George Monbiot and Ken Livingstone all made statements condemning the oncoming violence (Vidal 2001: 1; Monbiot 2001b; Livingstone 2001a; Livingstone 2001b; Jasper 2001[199]). Yet the riot never came (Apple & Rai 2001), attendance was down, the crowd was effectively contained in a pen (Hopkins, Dodd & Allison 2001; Hopkins 2001), and the event was considered a damp squib: even a “McProtest” (Klein 2001). The only successes that protesters claimed for the event were giving the lie to the press and politicians, and costing businesses some money, because they closed for the day, expecting trouble (Sheffield Mayday 2001).	+	==== Annotation 136 ====
−	The sense of diminishing returns from mass London protest encouraged 2002’s ‘Mayday Festival of Alternatives’ (<em>Hate Mail</em> 1.5.2002) to focus on the ideas of anarchism more than the action (<em>EF!AU</em> No.81 2002:3; No.82 2002:1; <em>Schnews</em> 2003:15-16). In 2003 the war theme dominated, with a map targeting “companies that feed the war machine” (OurMayday 2003). The day was also quiet, and effectively reverted to the traditional trade union march (Vidal & Allison 2003). As the title of one report phrases it, ‘Let’s face it it was a bit crap really wasn’t it’ (PLH 2003). Most significantly, in 2004 an open invitation was put out to organise Mayday events, but lack of response meant that Mayday was effectively ‘cancelled’ in London, with even the Wombles (who had been central to the 2001 events (<em>EF!AU</em> No.75 2001:2-3)) leaving to take part in antiwar protests in Dublin (Wombles 2004a). 2005 had limited protests against Tesco, but their location was forced to remain secret, revealed only at the last minute by mobile text-messaging, “because of police tactics on previous Maydays” (Euromayday 2005: 1). When planning for the 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles, one comment made several times in <em>Dissent!</em> meetings was that “we don’t want another Mayday”.	+	''Translation note:'' the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.
−	This case study therefore concludes with a stigma attached to the Mayday events that had, at least in some anarchists’ eyes, initially held out such promise of extending the best parts of EDA.	+	In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given ''effect'' is seen to have a single ''cause''. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the ''mutual impacts'' which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.
−	** 7.6 Reclaim the Streets: Conclusion	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-47.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.'']]
−	In this chapter, I have focussed on the EDA form most avowedly anarchist, and considered by both activist- and traditional ideological anarchists to hold most promise in taking environmental protest into a truly anti-authoritarian challenge to the powers that be. Some ambitious RTS literature even sought to map the street party tactic onto traditional anarchist conceptualisations of full-scale revolution, experienced as carnivals and organised into a commune of communes (street party of street parties). It was therefore no surprise that street parties were extended into explicitly anticapitalist mobilisations that were not merely symbolic and identity-affirming, but also physically attacked summits or sought to shut down ‘centres’ of capitalism.	+	In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of ''development'' (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:
−	However, while I found the anarchism of practice truly embedded in the street party form (and also in the lesser critical mass cycle rides), and I noted that the ideological expressions of London RTS had a thought-provoking and inspirational effect within EDA networks and beyond, I found that both the grander claims of London RTS, and also the larger ambitions of anticapitalist demonstrations, encountered problems which, perhaps, remain irresolvable. A sense of festivity is hard to sustain against violent responses, a sense of the camivalesque does not in itself constitute revolution, and attempts to ally with more substantive struggles or co-operative experiments are awkward and of limited success. London RTS’s dedication to the Guerrilla Gardening aspect of Mayday 2000 was an interesting and logical outgrowth of their identification with workers’ struggles and traditional leftanarchist concerns, but it reached a dead end in terms of expressing green practice and extending the project of radical green change. Although I do not wish to dismiss all contributions of London RTS, I did conclude negatively by raising the possibility that the problems of London Maydays might indicate fundamental tensions between the anarchist project of total change, and the actual, small-scale, empowering practice of EDA.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-48.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.'']]
−	My own view is that EDA has proved most inspirational and effective when it has taken place in unexpected places, by individuals bound not by ideology but by immediate practical concerns and an urge to action. However, I am aware that on occasions it has been my distance from the originating sources of these inspirational and influential moments that has led me to consider them as such ‘successful’ actions. It is hard for those outside the originating group to judge ‘success* fairly, and nobody knows what is possible to achieve with EDA until it is attempted. But it is possible to compare the impact of the Mayday event with the impacts of previous EDA mobilisations, such as the No Ml 1 campaign in which RTS organisers had earlier cut their teeth. There, although the protesters squatting in the way of the road were eventually evicted, “It was an experience that changed hundreds of people” <em>(Do or Die</em> 2003:19; cfDo <em>or Die</em> 1994:22; <em>EF!AU No A0</em> 1994:3; McLeish 1996:40). It was such experiences of collective, autonomous direct action, usually on a much smaller and more personal scale, contributed to the radicalisation of so many people. The second factor missing from the Mayday events is the inestimable importance of “Belonging/connection... love of the land” (EEV 1997; Jasper 1999:12; Heller 1999 [C]: 142-143; Eldrum 1993:15). In abandoning the connection to specific, loved sites, Mayday lost much of what tied EDA protesters together.	+	In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.
−	In conclusion, the loss of ‘place’, the generalisation of opposition away from specific targets, and the substitution of ideological rather than deeds-based ties, undermined the foundations of (anarchist) success that EDA built on. Mayday confrontations were not offering an empowering, or even a ‘real’ experience. They could not therefore sustain the infusion of activists that had come into the city for J18 and Mayday 2000. These activists (and passionate ‘ordinary people* who did not see themselves primarily as activists) had arrived at anarchist sentiments through their experience of struggles over particular places, often beloved to them and frequently becoming, through the experience of struggle, a site of strong emotional and collective ties. Such people came to recognise state and capital as their enemy: they recognised all issues were multiply linked and they followed the trail of money and corporate power to the city. But once they were there, they did not discover a site where they could bring their activism effectively to bear on the problem at hand, and they were not persuaded of the	+	This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.
−	benefits of gathering annually in London on Mayday. The anarchist criteria for success were not achieved, and the anarchist ethics of direct action were not fulfilled.	+	In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these ''relations'' will become new reasons for new results through ''mutual impact''.
−	<br>	+	In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).
−	* 8. Overall Conclusion	+	So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.
−	In this concluding chapter, I summarise the core arguments made in each chapter, and highlight the most significant parts of those for our understanding of an anarchism that lives: an anarchism, that is, which does not sit still and static in a book, but which is practised, talked, tested and reflected upon in the actual context of struggle. I shall begin with my main premise and aim for this research project, and then move through the chapters in turn.	+	==== b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result ====
−	In this thesis I have used several sites of environmental protest, organisation and dialogue, to explore the interrelationship between anarchism (as theory) and ecological direct action (as a site of struggle and experience). I have pursued the argument that EDA is anarchist, and that anarchism is constituted by activist debate, and then, pursuing a reflexive, grounded and open-ended methodology, I have sought out specific manifestations of this activist anarchist discourse. During my thesis research, the debate undertaken between activists proved most important and influential on my own understanding of the anarchism of EDA. It demonstrated the vitality of anarchism in non-traditional settings, underlined the primacy of grounded discourse over purely theoretical reflection, and revealed to me the sheer range and acuity of collective activist intelligence.	+	The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.
−	In Chapter 1,1 introduce my research project into the notion that environmental direct action is anarchist, and that anarchism may be located in the dialogue of activists talking to each other. I argue that many efforts at allying anarchism and environmentalism have tended to abstraction, reductionism and bowdlerisation. These unfortunate limitations have had more to do with the format and approach used to discuss the relationship, than with the authors’ grasp of the subject, which is often more nuanced than is expressed. Some, including sympathetic green commentators, have presented an inadequately in-depth or critical analysis of the anarchism of green activists, while others from the eco- anarchist and activist milieus have committed the opposite error of over-criticality, losing what is most valuable in the anarchist tradition even as they harness anarchist tools to critique the forms handed down to them. I present my own attempt to explore the links between anarchism and environmentalism in the light of the faults identified in these limited approaches, and I characterise the anarchism of this thesis as one composed of the diverse and contested interplay of positions that arise from, and are grounded in, specific contexts. The elaboration of eco-anarchism in this thesis, therefore, is not a static mapping or structure-building, and it is not a neat, all-encompassing synthesis, because eco-anarchism is fundamentally diverse, many-voiced and dynamic. In keeping with this view, I chose to look, not solely at the works of green ‘experts’ or thought-specialists, but at the practices of activists on the ground, and to learn from the way that they, the living breathing eco-anarchists, reflect upon and manifest their beliefs.	+	Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.
−	In Chapter 2,1 argue that an anarchism that avoids being confused with specific historical or codified	+	A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.
−	manifestations - one that is recognised as fluid, fractured, contextual and <em>lived</em> is one that can legitimately be applied to EDA. This anarchism can be found, not in a ‘canon’ that is untouchable and dusty, but in sites of communal practice; of confrontational struggle; of extra-institutional community; of horizontal, non-hierarchical and non-domineering practice; and of free individuality and creativity. It is crucial for our understanding of, and the continued vibrancy of, anarchism, that we recognise that anarchism is not only the historical movement, nor is it the ‘coherent’ or explicit anarchist movement (which is often miniscule and rarely the site of the most exciting and progressive activism). I maintain that real anarchism is found in practice as much as it is in text, and in the interplay of partial dialogues as well as in a beautifully constructed, intricate and harmonious (but dead) model. By demonstrating this, we can look at anarchism anew.	+	When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.
−	To facilitate the study of this grassroots, practised, activist anarchism, I examine key tenets from the realm of anarchist ‘theory’, in order to then apply them and re-ground them in the situations of activist eco-anarchism. First, I record the key, defining tenets of anarchism as (1) opposition to authority (in all its forms, and in all its practices); (2) a commitment to a real, social freedom (not the individualism of a few ‘over-empowered’ personalities); (3) rebellion, as a commitment to higher ideals than are possible within the current systems of exploitation, domination and; (4) a faith in our collective ability, and a refusal to accept a world that constrains and corrupts human potential; (5) a	+	-----
−	recognition that power corrupts us, and a consequent commitment to developing only non-dominating and non-acquiescing forms of collective practice. The critiques that, later in the section I apply to ENGOs, Green Parties, Leninist-Trotskyists and ‘elitist’ forms of practice are all rooted in these base principles, and the experiments with free, radically challenging forms of lifestyle and politics practised at anti-road camps, EF! gatherings and street parties may all be grounded in, and critically examined on these grounds. Does one form of activism rely upon state support? Does another express a freedom that actually diminishes others’? If so, it is subject to anarchist critique.	+	==== Annotation 137 ====
−	I have probably said enough about the nature and existence of anarchism as I see it, but the core arguments advanced in the second part of Chapter 2 were for anarchism’s flexibility (not rigidity); its existence as an ideal beyond and behind each historical manifestation; its continuity, supported by a conception of history as a neverending struggle between liberation and domination; its diversity - but a conflictual diversity of many robust and mutually critical strands; its commitment to reason but its refutation of dogma; its passion, its generous feelings of love and its carefully-remembered rage; diversity, and the growing that arises from the mutual exchange of ideas, criticism, and experimentation; and its commitment to practice. Most of all, I see anarchism as an ideology that supports action! All the principles listed above only come into their own, and become relevant, through their application to practice. Only then can we see what they actually <em>mean.</em>	+	As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.
−	I argue that the practice of environmental direct action not only fits the requirements of my reading of anarchism, but also that it demonstrates the continued vitality and relevance of anarchism as a living, breathing current of life. Anarchism is lived in the practices of horizontal exchange and communal endeavour created at Earth First! gatherings and anti-road camps; it is expressed in coherent and symbolically powerful challenges to the dominant norms of society, and in physical attempts to shut down the most environmentally destructive arms of capital; it is spoken by activists discussing strategy in the anti-genetics movement; and it is recorded in the rants, newsletters and discussion documents self-produced for activist debate. This thesis, therefore, has not only adopted anarchism as its framework for analysis of EDA, but has also endeavoured to ‘rediscover* and ‘recreate’ anarchism through an examination of the ideas and practices of EDA. I believe that it is in this constant process of rediscovery and recreation that the life of anarchism is to be found.	+	Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):
−	In Chapter 3,1 apply elements of anarchist critique and of anarchist ethics to my own practice of research. I do not stand outside the process of research as some distant observer, but as an active, enquiring agent on the same footing as the activists with whom I am engaged. I use anarchist, activist and feminist understandings to reject orthodox academic notions of objectivity, neutrality and the researcher-subject relationship on the grounds that these are bound up in state-centrism, and that they reproduce a hierarchical paradigm of power. My examination of the notion of ‘activism* utilised in this thesis brings me to focus on the specific, local example of Tyneside Action for People and Planet (TAPP). Specifically, I consider the impact of ‘being researched’ on this group, and use this experience to clarify the perspectives on ‘researching activism’ which I advocate and have sought to employ. As eco-anarchism is grounded in local, particular sites, so in this thesis I have utilised examples from TAPP to support my more general arguments.	+	'''Types of Reasons and Results'''
−	A key part of what I consider to be an anarchist approach to researching activists is to recognise them as autonomous and able individuals - not treating them as mere passive research ‘subjects’ - and I seek to include their voices in a critical dialogue with this thesis, for example by the inclusion of movement texts, newsletters and debate. These are not presented statically, as if they were stamps in a stamp album, but are situated within the dynamic debates and specific contexts that I explore. Never do I present the anarchist views recorded in this thesis as a monolithic truth - as ‘this is the way it is’ - but always as a part of a broader scene, in an often conflictual dialogue with other voices. It is a regrettable necessity that, due to size and the constraints of a thesis format, I must cut most divergent voices short. The voices, debates and sites of struggle considered in this thesis have all been selected for inclusion at the expense of a myriad others, and the simplifying effect this has, in enabling our understanding of the relevant arguments and our pursuit of selected ideas, should not lead the reader to conclude that ‘this is all there is’ - that this is the conclusive, authoritative story. Rather, activism and activist debate is still ongoing, and this thesis presents no ‘synthesis’ that puts a lid on the perspectives cited. At the local level, for example, the TAPP group may have ended, but most of the individuals involved are still committed to the practical contestation of power and an engagement with higher, more anarchist ideals. The details of this current practice have been deliberately left absent from the thesis, in order to avoid an intrusion of academia into the present Perhaps the most significant of my applications of anarchist	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-49.png|''Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.'']]
−	critique to the practice of research, I would conclude, is that academic enquiry, while not without worth, is a <em>limited</em> form of investigation, and should not exercise a tyrannical hold over its subject. In order to avoid the worst impacts of this I have sought to utilise ethics from anarchist tradition, to act as check and defence.	+	'''Direct Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.
−	In Chapter 41 interrogate the place of anarchism within the green movement, asking what eco- anarchism was constituted from and exploring the interface of green with anarchist ideas. I begin with Andrew Dobson’s definition of ecologism as a radical, political, all-or-nothing challenge to the status quo, in comparison to which any non-radical presentations of environmentalism stand revealed as nothing at all but evasions and prevarications. In comparison to Dobson’s definition, other permutations on the definition of green radicality vary according to the emphasis given to ‘pure’ green outgrowths of eco-centrism, and toward radical (left) politics. Anarchism and the EDA activists of my thesis count as fully radical in all these definitions.	+	For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.
−	Green anarchism - most clearly in the form of EDA - is not a logical working out of political radicalism from ecological principles but rather an active, contested part of green thought - and of green practice also - some of whose practical manifestations have constituted the body of this thesis. This makes the influence of anarchists in the green field all the more impressive - things that have been <em>achieved, demonstrated) agreed</em> to be so, are much more valid than things that have dribbled down from on high, been forced on us, or exist as automatic, unexamined assumptions.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-50.png|''Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.'']]
−	The exploration of’essential’ (contested) or theoretical (idle) compatibilities of anarchism and ecologism is not the topic of my study, but I do conside anarchism’s place within the field of green politics. This is marked (as in other fields) by its committed opposition to authority: not just antagonistic to right-wing greens but also to left-wing authoritarians or to any of the myriad middle ways that fail to adequately challenge the institutions of state and capital (and all the proto-states and other forms of social domination that may arise). In healthy contradiction to the case made in the first part of the chapter for green plurality and heterogeneity, in the later part of this chapter I launch uncompromising strategic arguments from the anarchist heritage of critique, revolutionary endeavour and ethical practice. Most simply viewed as opposition to state and capital, I apply these strategic injunctions to the majority of green strategies for change: from state-dependent projects of reform, to militant but doomed attempts at wilderness defence. I emphasise the systematic approach that anarchists insist must be made against the sources of environmental destruction: against militarism as well as against ‘bad’ corporations, and against capital as well as against unethical consumerism. This leads me to consider what anarchists consider to be the <em>right</em> ingredients for meaningful change and for anarchist revolutionary practice, which I characterise according to the terms of non-reformist (but also non-purist) direct action. Direct action may be viewed by anarchists as ‘revolution in the quiet times’, and on this basis I consider that the traditional anarchist attention paid to revolutionary ethics can legitimately be brought to bear against the use of direct action in the here-and-now. The central anarchist concepts here are means-ends congruity, and the necessity for action to both express and support freedom.	+	'''Indirect Reasons''' are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.
−	I argue that the anarchist approach to our understanding of direct action is not only accurate and useful, but also that it resembles the view of EDA practitioners themselves. In Chapter 51 turn to the actual practice of UK environmentalists, and I reveal the anarchism manifested and articulated in the nineties eco-activist scene. First, I characterise the institutionalisation of the conventional environmentalist opposition, noting the anarchist conceptualisation of the processes by which state-dependent or bureaucratic organisations ultimately neutralise the radical challenge. In contrast to this realm of pacification and state-like specialisation, in which ‘supporters’ are encouraged to remain passive and governments and corporations are viewed as partners in the management of environmental problems, I characterise extra-institutional protest in the anarchist terms of active human agency and the will to struggle. Most importantly, the experience of this form of protest can develop processes of radicalisation (exactly contrary to the institutionalisation thesis), in which an experiential anarchism can develop. Through the experience of ecological struggle, individuals and communities in the 1990s became alienated from authority and the conventional processes of liberal democracy, and they developed broader critiques of power - of causal forces of domination in society. In compensation for this alienation, extra-institutional protest and mobilisation can also generate a power and a sense of empowerment that impacts not just on individuals but on communities and wider society also.	+	For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.
−	Anarchists recognised the merit of these radicalising tendencies in the movements of environmental defence, and the defence of civil liberties (diverse freedoms), which arose in the early nineties. But these were not traditional arenas of workplace struggle and some anarchists fretted that they did not have class or the traditional anarchist badges of identity at their centre. I argue, however, that the party- and-protest culture of DIY, and the cross-class defensive mobilisations that snowballed around the UK state’s road-building programme, were just as significant for anarchism as conventional labour disputes or historical insurrections. Theorists of anarchism, and its advocates, should take on board from these movements that anarchism can exist in a form that genuinely embraces diversity and difference at its heart: it can do this when the anarchism of practice, rather than one set ideological dogma, is placed at its centre. Of course this will not be a purist or strictly orthodox expression of anarchism, but it may nonetheless engender strong expressions of anarchism, in ways that reach beyond the narrow ideological anarchist scene and into unexpectedly broad and energetic communities. I examine what the actual articulation of this activist anarchism looks like in the main part of Chapter 5, by examining the practices, debates and expressions of organisational identity in Earth First!, the most explicit and perhaps the most articulate of the UK’s eco-anarchist networks.	+	In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.
−	Earth First! played a frontline role not just in the anti-roads movement, but also in the other sites of radical EDA looked at in this thesis, such as genetics, peat, traffic and transport, and anti-globalisation. EF! is the closest thing there has been to a central coordinating network for anarchistic EDA. I frame its organisational formation (in both the US and UK) in terms of an anarchist reaction to institutionalised, inadequate ENGOS. I trace the anarchist characteristics, both individual and communitarian, of EF! ‘s organisation - particularly through my experience of the Action Update, the Summer Gathering and the Winter Moot, 1999.1 use the latter event to crystallise the streams of anarchism present and at work within EF! activism, as they were forced into some polarisation and competition, in the form of articulated proposals for how EF! should develop and how it should be identified. Yet I do not champion one successful proposal or version of eco-anarchism here, as the ‘most coherent’ or winning formulation. Rather, I emphasise that all these different forms and flows of anarchism coexist within EF!, and other eco-anarchist groupings, and that it is the interplay of these that demonstrate the particular powers of activist anarchism. By considering the radical power contained in EF!*s multi-issue (but not over-generalised) approach to politics; its ecological holism; its negation of the institutionalisation thesis through no-compromise principles; its innovative geographical use of direct action; and in its incorporation of many different tactics and strategies, we also discover the character and power of an eco-anarchism applicable to current times.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-51.png|''Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.'']]
−	Through my examination of EF! practice and debate, Chapter 5 re-embeds anarchism into a particular place and time, in a particular milieu, in a way that gives anarchism a reality missing from the theoretical discussion of the earlier chapters. In Chapter 6,1 do the same with two new contexts - the anti-GM movement and peatlands defence - but I also introduce new theoretical issues of importance to any understanding of anarchism. These are the issues of what constitutes genuine, non-elitist and non-reformist direct action, and what is the impact and importance of violence within militant strategies for change.	+	'''Internal Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a subject.
−	I begin in 6.2 by distinguishing anarchist direct action from state-dependent or reformist versions of direct action, and tracing the common qualities that tie the EDA extant at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century together with syndicalist forms of direct action more common at the century’s beginning. In 6.3, by contrast, I emphasise that within the anarchist field there are many, often conflicting, formats, traditions and potentialities. For example, civil disobedience discourse conflicts with the method of insurrectionary anarchism, and syndicalists operate under a vastly different justificatory framework from eco-saboteurs, yet all of these tendencies and traditions may accurately be viewed as a part of the diverse and dynamic field of anarchist direct action. The EDA of this thesis may take elements from each of these traditions, and reject elements from each, without causing a serious rupture to our understanding of anarchist direct action. This is because the value of anarchism lies in the applicability of its arguments and the coherence of its ethical, attitudinal approach to practice: I seek to demonstrate this by applying the ethics of participation, mean-ends congruity and freedom-based/freedom- expressing practice to the tactics of militant, effective direct action in these two settings.	+	For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure ''within'' the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an ''internal Reason'' for the collapse.
−	In the sections of 6.4,1 consider the anti-GM movement, which followed the decline of the anti-roads movement as the most widespread and effective focus of EDA. I also move from the identification of anarchism in practice and organisation, and the debates over identity (considered in Chapter 5), to consider how the breadth and acuity of eco-anarchism can also be expressed through <em>strategic</em> debate.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-52.png|''External Reasons stem from external relations.'']]
−	Here, the covert-overt debate serves as the point of polarisation, in which the differing strategic and ethical frameworks of CD discourse, animal rights strategy and others, are thrown into contrast in a series of disagreements that nonetheless serve to demonstrate the overall strength and validation of anarchism. They do this by grounding the divergent views in shared anarchist themes of empowerment, autonomy, anti-authoritarianism and accessibility. Antagonism revealed common values, and diversity demonstrated an underlying unity, and I argue that the only viewpoints at fault in such a debate are those which take their own position too literally, too rigidly, and too tyrannically.	+	'''External Reasons''' are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	I continue this examination of the interactions of anarchism’s ethical and strategic discourses within the context of ecological activism in 6.5, Peat and the ELF. Here, I consider how the use of sabotage, elaborated in theoretical terms in 6.3.5, became subject to anarchist critique when it advanced into a vanguardist and quasi-militaristic discourse of’effectiveness’, and was embodied by the organisational form of the ‘Earth Liberation Front’. As a corrective to this tendency, I consider the UK campaign against peat milling and highlight the coexistence and fluid interaction between sabotage and other repertoires, presenting this recent form of UK EDA as a more grounded and sustainable model for future environmental practice. The case of peat provides a useful example because, coming later than the anti-roads battles I consider, and intimately connected to the history and narrative of EF!, it allowed a re-expression of EF! activists’ commitment to ecological principles, and provided a re-flowering of geographically-mobile and inclusive direct action, targeted at the source of production/destruction and operating not only on economic, but also on ecological and on political levels. Many of the strengths that I, and many participants, found in nineties EDA may be identified in the post-millennium peat campaign. These include a sound ecological motivation combined with persuasive, seemingly achievable aims (and these were not requests for government action, but no-compromise efforts to close one particular site of destruction down); a sensitivity to place and a connection both to the seasons and to past histories of rebellion; a decentralised and dispersed dynamic of activism, combined with moments of collective confrontation that created a sense of purpose and of strength; a grounded use of tactics, that were accessible, uncompromising and direct (sabotage included), and which could be varied and adapted loosely and at will; a specific and non-grandiose network of organisation, that supported but did not lead the campaign; a timeline, a sense of urgency and purpose, and a satisfying end result. These perceived strengths were notable by their absence from the final case considered in this thesis.	+	For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an ''external Reason'' for the collapse.
−	In Chapter 7, Reclaim the Streets and the Limits of Activist Anarchism, I consider Reclaim the Streets as the furthest point EDA went in expressing a generalised anticapitalism. I look at its origins, its organisation, the anarchism of its practice and the diverse elements in its anarchist ideology. I then look at the protests on Mayday 2000 as a crossover between ideological and activist anarchism that was not ultimately considered to be successful.	+	All of these roles and positions can be viewed ''relatively''. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to ''the couple'' (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.
−	I begin by noting the origins of RTS in EF! and the anti-roads movement, and charting the successful expansion of the urban ‘street party’ tactic. Here I provide examples of Newcastle’s street parties and critical masses to support an assessment of the anarchist character embodied by a street party event, as premised upon crowd solidarity, free festivity, and the autonomous ‘we’re in control, not the authorities’ attitude. A resonance with the original key tenets of anarchism made in Chapter 2 should be clear. The fact that the anarchism of critical masses and street parties was demonstrated in practice, as well as in rhetoric, demonstrates that a solely textual analysis of the history and impact of street parties would, furthermore, have created an inaccurate account: as with the other case studies, I maintain that an approach in which participation is triangulated by accounts from others or from movement texts, and in which experience and feelings are valued as a source of judgement, is much better able to reveal the essence of activist anarchism. For example, in this case it revealed the nature of the relationship between local autonomy and ‘national’ influence in the organisation and diffusion of street parties, and it provides the only route to understanding how the quasi-situationist and celebratory rhetoric of RTS translates into reality.	+	From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see ''Reason and Result'', p. 138).
−	In addition to its practice, RTS used (recontextualised and revitalised) different elements from anarchist ideology, including a social critique of individualism, an ecological critique of capitalism, and an anarchist critique of politics, to create a distinctive ‘brand’ of rhetoric that laid emphasis on individual empowerment, the opposition of festivity to authoritarian control, and a homage to the camivalesque history of revolution (albeit in temporary form). The case of RTS thus demonstrates the heterogeneity of anarchist influence, which includes situationist, feminist, non-violent, insurrectionary, communal and individual streams, capable of innumerable combinations and hybridisations. In	+	Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.
−	comparison to the other EDA of this thesis, however, RTS’s articulate rhetoric was perhaps over-done: it was easily abstracted from reality, quickly became repetitive, and was so idealistic that it couldn’t help but be used against RTS, to criticise the gulf between their rhetoric and the reality. With Mayday 2000, some in EDA used this abstract rhetoric as part of an attack on ideological anarchism.	+	-----
−	There was a tension in RTS between organisational openness (according with the anarchist ideal), and the pressure to become secretive and closed (due to conflict with the authorities). At times this tension could be expressed creatively, positively, by tactics that subverted expectations or responded to criticism. Thus the attempt at assembly-style organisation at Guerrilla Gardening, for example, responded to critique of’spectators* at street parties. The alliance with striking dockers and tubeworkers also answered accusations of hedonism, shallowness or inadequacy in political depth. The street party tactic could, furthermore, be taken on by any organising group, which is what happened against the G8 in Birmingham, in Newcastle, and in London against the DSEI arms fair. Tensions also had negative impacts, however, with individuals targeted for punishment by the authorities, the fracturing of open meeting processes, and the festivity, considered essential to a successful party, corroded by both authorities and by some participants.	+	==== Annotation 138 ====
−	RTS was the highest-profile carrier of generalised anticapitalism and ideological anarchism into the EDA milieu. I use the case of Mayday 2000 to indicate both the integration of, and tensions between, ecological and ideological anarchist themes on the field of activism. This may be viewed in terms of the problem of how to fit direct action into a ‘general issue’, and I consider, as its constituent parts, problems encountered in RTS in extending their ideals of diverse participation into a central London setting; tensions between egalitarian relations and the security and ‘herding’ necessitated by large-scale urban street parties; and the friction generated between different ‘radical’ tactics. In this case, the property damage and unproductive street fighting of Mayday encouraged non-anarchist sympathisers of EDA to mount condemnations of anarchistic direct action and celebrations of liberal direct action as the preferred alternative (triggering further articulations of anarchist refutation and argument). I argue that the abstract generalisation of struggle under an ‘anticapitalist’ umbrella provides only half of the necessary equation for activist anarchist success: strong local sites are needed too, no matter how small they may appear beside the national spectaculars. Most significantly, I argue that connection to place - ecologically and emotionally - is one of the strengths of EDA and the city of London proved a hindering rather than a facilitating venue for radical EDA: particularly when allied to a sense of repetitiveness in the tactic, and an unsympathetic political climate.	+	'''Primary''' Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.
−	I will not now present a list of suggested avenues for further research, or predictions of the future of EDA and anarchism. Instead I will simply urge that future research, especially, but not solely, when dealing with an anarchistic movement such as EDA, takes on board a more anarchist approach to research, in terms of both ethics and criticality, and also in terms of practice. I hope to have demonstrated the critical strength and contextualised relevance of practised anarchism. I have argued that anarchist lessons should be learnt by the green movement, and that an anarchism of plural diversity and open-ended, fractured dialogue is stronger and more accurate than any reductivist narrowing-down of what constitutes ‘legitimate* anarchism. I have presented an understanding of direct action not just as the moment of conflict, but as the whole ethos and defining nature of the movement: as expressed in organisation, in strategy, in tactics and in ideological statements. The power of environmental direct action, furthermore, is something beyond what can be expressed in theory or in ideological rhetoric. The clearest way to understand the anarchism of ecological direct action is to experience it.	+	'''Secondary''' Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.
−	* Bibliography	+	For example, an earthquake may have ''primary'' Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. ''Secondary'' Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.
−	An unavoidable problem with the ephemeral literature I have drawn upon is its difficulty to date, to place, and to accredit I make no apology for using this ephemeral literature, indeed I have taken pains to place it on an equal footing with the more authoritative and library-held texts (I often provide a reference from one source of each type). It has necessitated certain omissions and adaptations to this bibliography, however.	+	In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.”
−	I have placed a ‘c* for those items whose date I have had to estimate. When the text has been reprinted, I date the version I have used, i.e. the reprint, as it may have been edited and repaginated during its journey from the original source. None of the dates for ephemeral and re-distributed texts are fully ‘authoritative* - they represent the point that I became aware of the pamphlet, often at a gathering, meeting, bookfair, or by email. Where possible, I updated internet references for September 2005. These are provided only when a print version is hard to trace, or when my own reading of the text has been via the internet: many of the other texts are also quickly found by an internet search. For unpaginated texts my own system of pagination has taken the first number from the first page with substantial text - often the front page of newsletters such as the EFJAU or TGAL. Internet-only or single page texts have not been paginated.	+	-----
−	In order to avoid having an unfeasibly long list of ‘Anons’, I have listed anonymous discussion documents by a sequence of letters from the title, so for example, “Earth First! What Are Our Philosophies?” becomes EFWP (1998). Dates for these are taken from the time of my reading of them, and I have overridden the date-of-writing in favour of the date-of-printing and circulation at, for example, the 1999 Earth First! Winter Moot This is also the case for the Schnews newsletters, which may have been distributed in one year, but collated in a book format the year following: in the case of Schnews, when the book is unpaginated I have combined the book’s date with the newsletter number. If the title is in quotation marks instead of being underlined, it is not a published book, magazine, or substantial pamphlet but a more ephemeral piece such as a leaflet or discussion document For a few edited collections (see Freedom Press) I have used the publishing name as the author, because that name constituted the group that initiated the project	+	==== Annotation 139 ====
−	Most articles in <em>Do or Die, Schnews, EFIA U, TGAL</em> etc are not accredited to individual authors, so I have included authors’ names in the bibliography only when they were clearly attributed. I have not been able to include page numbers for all newspaper reports and articles: this is partly due to my ‘inheritance’ of collections of clippings from other TAPP members, which did not feature all the publishing information. Places of publication are not always obvious. I have been unable to provide dates and issue numbers for the (now-defunct) Greenline magazine, for example, as my collection of clippings was not adequately labelled. There are occasional other instances where this has been the case (eg. Subversion, French cl993). Other idiosyncracies in the referencing may be explained by referring to the title in the bibliography: Calendar (c2002:8<sup>th</sup> November), for example, is an anonymously produced diary, not specific to any year, with no page numbers but with dates instead. Much of this ephemeral literature will pass away with the relevance of the context that triggered it, but new and equally incisive examples will replace it	+	With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?
−	A (cl998) “Mayday Mayday” Subversion <em>Best of Subversion</em> Manchester, 30-31	+	As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.
−	AAWR (2000) “Anarchist Age Weekly Review” 398,1	+	Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
−	Abbey, E. (1975) <em>The Monkey Wrench Gang</em> London: Robin Clark	+	-----
−	Acab Press (1990) <em>Poll Tax Riot: Ten Hours That Shook Trafalgar Square</em> London: Acab Press	+	==== Annotation 140 ====
−	ACF (n.d.) <em>The Revolutionary Organisation: How We See It</em> London: Anarchist Communist Editions	+	In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.
−	ACF (1990) “Anarchism As We See It” Revised edition available at [[http://libcom.org/library/as-we-see-it-solidarity-group][http://libcom.org/library/as-we-see-it- solidarity-group]]	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	ACF (cl991) <em>Where There’s Brass There’s Muck: Ecology and Anarchism</em> London: Anarchist Communist Editions	+	Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.
−	ACF (1996-1997) <em>Newcastle Resistance</em> Newsletter, ACF: Newcastle	+	-----
−	ACF: see AF, where I have placed all <em>Organise!</em> articles	+	==== Annotation 141 ====
−	Ackerman, P. & Kruegler, C. (1994) <em>Strategic Nonviolent Conflict</em> Westport, CT: Praeger	+	In political activity, it is important to remember that ''every'' interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.
−	ACME Collective (1999) <em>N30 Black Bloc Communique</em> Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/octo/wto_blackbloc.html][www.infoshop.org/octo/wto_blackbloc.html]]	+	Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.
−	Adams, I. (1993) <em>Political Ideology Today</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	-----
−	Adams, J. (c2002) <em>Non western Anarchisms: Rethinking the Global Context</em> Available at [[http://www.geocities.com/ringfingers/nonwestemweb.html][http://www.geocities.com/ringfingers/nonwestemweb.html]]	+	==== Annotation 142 ====
−	Adamson, W.L. (1980) <em>Hegemony & Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci *s Political and Cultural Theory</em>	+	It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).
−	Berkeley: UCL Press	+	For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.
−	Adilkno (1994) <em>Cracking the Movement: Squatting Beyond the Media</em> New York: Autonomedia	+	However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.
−	Adorno, T. (1990) <em>Negative Dialectics</em> Routledge: London	+	Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the ''actual'' Reasons and Results which drive development.
−	Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (1979) <em>The Dialectic of Environment</em> London: Verso	+	=== 3. Obviousness and Randomness ===
−	AEAG (2001) <em>The Anarchist Ethic in the Age of the Anti-Globalization Movement</em> Available at www. geocities. com/kk_abacus/kka/ethic. html	+	==== a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness ====
−	AF <em>Organise!</em> Articles available at [[http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af/org/index.html][http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af/org/index.html]]	+	-----
−	AF (1996a) “Anarchist Communism in Britain” <em>Organise!</em> 42,12-28	+	==== Annotation 143 ====
−	AF (1996b) “Roads Out Ahead, Interview with an Anti-Roads Protester, and Essex Anarchist” <em>Organise!</em> 43	+	In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.
−	Available at [[http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af7org/issue43/roa.html][http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af7org/issue43/roa.html]]	+	The ''Obviousness'' category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious ''has'' to happen in a certain way, it ''can’t'' happen any other way.
−	AF (1996c) “Review: Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience” <em>Organise!</em> 44,15-17	+	-----
−	AF (1997a) “Ecology and Industry: Friends or Foes?” and “Capitalism Eats Greens” <em>Organise</em> 45,11-14	+	==== Annotation 144 ====
−	AF (1997b) “Rights” <em>Organise</em> 45,20	+	''Obviousness'' can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper ''will'' burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper ''will'' catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will ''obviously'' burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.
−	AF (1997c) “Gandhi” <em>Organise!</em> 46.20	+	The ''Randomness'' category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome ''may'' occur or it ''may not'' occur; a Random outcome could happen ''this'' way or it could happen ''that'' way.
−	AF (1998a) “No War But the Class War” <em>Organise!</em> 48,1	+	-----
−	AF (1998b) “The End of the Liverpool Dockers Strike” Or<em>ganise!</em> 48	+	==== Annotation 145 ====
−	AF (1998c) “Bradford Mayday98” <em>Organise!</em> 49, 7-8	+	As we discussed above, paper ''will'' burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is ''obvious''. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper ''will'' burn — that’s ''obvious''. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates ''Randomness''. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.
−	AF (1998d) “Green Anarchist — Bombs Away? Or Away with the Fairies?” <em>Organise!</em> 49,15	+	==== b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness ====
−	AF (1998-1999) “Whose Land is it Anyway” Or<em>ganise!</em> 50, 9-11 F—	+	Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.
−	AF (1999a) “Genetix Can Really Spoil Your Day” <em>Organise!</em> 51. 8-9	+	-----
−	AF (1999b) “Get Off My Land ... The Struggle for the Land” <em>Organise!</em> 51.10-14	+	==== Annotation 146 ====
−	AF (1999c) <em>Resistance</em> 5	+	Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.
−	AF (1999/2000) “JI8” <em>Organise!</em> 52 Available at [[http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af7org/issue52/jl8.html][http://www.libcom.org/hosted/af7org/issue52/jl8.html]]	+	Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.
−	AF (2000a) “Conclusions by the AF” <em>Organise!</em> 53,9	+	-----
−	AF (2000b) “Conservation: Anti-People or Anti-Capitalist?” Or<em>ganise!</em> 53,14-16	+	==== Annotation 147 ====
−	AF (2000c) <em>Resistance</em> 14	+	Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.
−	AF (2001a) “Land and Ecology” <em>Organise!</em> 55,2-9	+	In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.”
−	AF (2001b) “Reply to Young” <em>Organise!</em> 55.30	+	In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.
−	AF (2001c) “Can ‘Anti-capitalism* Overthrow Capitalism? A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Globalisation Movement” <em>Organise!</em> 56,3-8	+	As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [''obvious''] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [''random''] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>
−	AF (2001d) “The black bloc: Fighting back” Or<em>ganise!</em> 56,9-14	+	Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.
−	AF (2002a) “Class War in Argentina” <em>Organise!</em> 57,6-10	+	-----
−	AF (2002b) “What’s Wrong With Civilisation? Primitivism and Deep Ecology” <em>Organise!</em> 57,14-17	+	==== Annotation 148 ====
−	AF (2005) “The International of Anarchist Federations: striving for a global anarchist movement in thought and action” <em>Organise!</em> 65,3-4	+	Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.
−	A friend (2004) “Impassioned Violence, Justified Violence” <em>Green Anarchy</em> 15,11	+	Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.
−	Agit-Wank (1998): See Black Bat	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Aldridge, J. & Wazir, B. (2000) “Eco-Warriors Vow to Mix Flower Power and Violence” <em>Observer</em> 30<sup>th</sup> April, 5	+	Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.
−	Alinksy, S. (1969) <em>Reveille for Radicals</em> New York: Vintage Books	+	-----
−	Allsorts (cl998-2002) “Allsorts” Email information service. London: Allsorts	+	==== Annotation 149 ====
−	Amster, R. (1998) “Anarchism As Moral Theoiy: Praxis, Property and the Postmodern” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 6(2), 97-112	+	We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.
−	Amster, R. (2002) “Globalisation and its Discontents” <em>New Formulation</em> 1(2), 2<sup>nd</sup> June	+	A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically ''confirm'' that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.
−	Amusing Pseudonym (1999) “Keep it up, don’t let violence divide us” in RTS <em>Reflections on June 18<sup>th</sup></em> UK: RTS.	+	Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.
−	Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/octoZj][http://www.infoshop.org/octoZj]] 18_rts3.html	+	=== 4. Content and Form ===
−	Anarchist Faq 1 (accessed 2005) “What Do Anarchists Think Causes Ecological Problems: Introduction”	+	==== a. Categories of Content and Form ====
−	<em>Anarchist Faq</em> Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/faq/secEinthtml][http://www.infoshop.org/faq/secEinthtml]]	+	The ''Content'' category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.
−	Anarchist Faq 2 (accessed 2005) “Appendix - The Symbols of Anarchy” <em>Anarchist Faq</em> Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/faq/append2.html][http://www.infoshop.org/faq/append2.html]]	+	The ''Form'' category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. ''Form'' thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Anarchist Federation: see AF	+	-----
−	Anarchist Information Network (1998-2001) “Quarterly Newsletter” Derby: AIN	+	==== Annotation 150 ====
−	Anarchist Lancashire Bomber (1999) “Bookfair” London: Anarchist Lancashire Bomber	+	Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.
−	Anarchist Teapot (c2000a) “The Anarchist Teapot Mobile Kitchen” Brighton: Anarchist Teapot	+	<blockquote>
		+	Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.
−	Anarchist Teapot (c2000b) “Your Anarchist Teapot Souvenir Introduction to Anarchy” Brighton: Anarchist Teapot	+	Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Anarchist Teapot (c2000c) “The Anarchist Teapot’s Recommended Reading List” Brighton: Anarchist Teapot	+	Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are ''relatively'' stable, then it has a Form.
−	Anarchist Trade Union Network (1999) <em>Bread and Roses</em> 5, Derby: Anarchist Trade Union Network	+	We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.
−	Anarchy (2002) <em>Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed</em> 53,20-21	+	Stability itself is also ''relative'': a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.
−	Anderson, B. (1991) <em>Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin an</em>d Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso,	+	We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.
−	Andy (cl995) “New — Age Nonsense” <em>Greenline.</em> 8-9	+	''Inner form'' refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.
−	Andy (1996) “Militant Eco-Action” <em>Organise!</em> 42, 8	+	''Outer form'' is how an object “appears” to human senses.
−	Anon (cl993) <em>Asterix and the Road Monster</em> No publication details	+	In this book, we are primarily concerned with the ''inner Form'' of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the ''outer Form'' plays a more prominent role.
−	Anon (1989) <em>The Situationist International: Its Art. Its Theory. Its Practice</em> Edinburgh: AK Distribution	+	Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.
−	AntiG8 (2004) “This is Autonomous Action” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 24(6), 3	+	'''Material vs. Ideal'''
−	Anti-Mass (1988) <em>Anti-Mass Methods of Organisation for Collectives</em>	+	When discussing the ''material'' — i.e., ''objective'' systems and objects<ref>See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.
−	AOH (1998) An Old Hack “Old hacks (it) Apart”, Earth First! Discussion Document	+	'''Material'''
−	Apple, E. & Rai, M. (2001) “Nonviolence and mass protest: reflections on May Day” <em>Nonviolent Action</em> 22,1-2	+	With material things and phenomena, the ''Content'' is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.
−	Apter, D. (1971) “The Old Anarchism and the New - Some Comments” in D. Apter & J. Joli, eds, <em>Anarchism Today</em> London: Macmillan	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-53.png|''A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.'']]
−	Apter, D. & Joli, J. eds, (1971) <em>Anarchism Today</em> London: Macmillan	+	The ''inner Form'' of a material object refers to ''stable internal relations'' which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. ''Stability'' is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.
−	Area (1999) “Research, Action and ‘Critical* Geography” <em>Area</em> Special Issue 31(3), 195-246.	+	The ''outer Form'' of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.
−	Arendt, H. (1958) <em>TheJHuman Condition</em> London: University of Chicago Press	+	==== Ideal ====
−	Arendt, H. (1961) <em>Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought</em> London: Faber & Faber	+	With the ideal — i.e., ''abstract'' ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'' explains:
−	Arkangel (cl997) <em>Arkangel</em> 18 London: Arkangel	+	<blockquote>
		+	Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.”
−	Arkangel (c2001) <em>Arkangel</em> 25 London: Arkangel	+	With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].
		+	</blockquote>
−	Armstrong, K. ed, (2000) <em>Bless*d Millennium: The Life and Work of Thomas Spence (1750-1814)</em> Whitley Bay:
−	Northern Voices	+	-----
−	Arshinov, P. (1987) <em>History of the Makhnovist Movement</em> London: Freedom Press	+	The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in ''Private'' as the ''Unique'' is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it ''that'' chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The ''outer Form'' of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the ''inner Form'' is what distinguishes one chair from the other.
−	ASAN (2002) Against Sleep And Nightmare “The ELF and the Spectacle” in <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,8	+	<blockquote>
		+	However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.”
−	ASEED (1999) <em>Europe*s Forests: A Campaign Guide</em> Findhom: Posthouse	+	When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”
		+	</blockquote>
−	Ashbrook, K. & Aslet, C. (1999) “Should We Have the Right to Roam?” <em>Observer.</em> 3<sup>rd</sup> January	+	This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of ''freedom'' we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of ''freedom''? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.
−	Askwith, R. (1998) “Showdown on the Farm” <em>Independent</em> 5<sup>th</sup> September, 1-2	+	<blockquote>
		+	But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.
		+	</blockquote>
−	ASW (2000) “Why Mayday” <em>Action South West</em> Bristol: ASW	+	This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.
−	AT (1999) “What is Anarchism” <em>Active Transformation</em> 2(4) ELansing, MI: Active Transformation	+	==== Content and Form in Art ====
−	Atkinson, A. (1991) <em>Principles of Political Ecology</em> London: Bellhaven Press	+	Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.
−	Atkinson, I. (2001) “May Day 2001 in the UK, the New Media and Public Order” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 10(3), 145-150	+	This is because art concerns itself with ''abstract ideas'' expressed through various Forms of ''physical representations.''
−	Atkinson, P. & Hammersley, M. (1994) “Ethnography and Participant Observation” in N.K.Denzin & Y.S.Lincoln, eds, <em>Handbook of Qualitative Research</em> London: Sage	+	These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).
−	Atton, C. (1999) “Green Anarchist: A Case Study of Collective Action in the Radical Media” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 7(1), 25-50	+	Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the ''stable inner relations'' of the ''ideas'' which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.
−	Atton, C. (2002) <em>Alternative Media</em> London: Sage	+	According to the Vietnamese art textbook ''Curriculum of General Aesthetics'':
−	ATR (2005) “Activist Trauma and Recovery” Oxford: Activist Trauma	+	<blockquote>
		+	What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:
−	ATW (1998) “Accountable To Who?” EF! Discussion Document	+	First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?
−	Aufheben (1994) “Auto-Struggles: The Developing War Against the Road Monster” <em>Aufheben</em> 3. All articles	+	Second: how is it expressed?
−	available at [[http://www.geocities.com/aufheben2/][http://www.geocities.com/aufheben2/]]	+	Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Aufheben (1995) “Kill or Chill? Analysis of the Opposition to the Criminal Justice Bill Part One” All	+	So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the ''physical content'' of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the ''abstract content'' of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).
−	Aufheben (1996) “Review: George McKay, Senseless Acts of Beauty” <em>Aufheben</em> 5	+	As for Form, the ''inner Form'' of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).
−	Aufheben (1997) “Death of a Paper Tiger... Reflections on Class War” <em>Aufheben</em> 6. Available at http ://www. geocities, co m/aufheben2/auf_6_c war. html	+	The ''outer Form'' of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.
−	Aufheben (1998) “The Politics of Anti-road Struggle and the Struggles of Anti-Road Politics: the Case of the No Ml 1	+	The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.
−	Link Road Campaign”, in G. McKay, ed, <em>DIY Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Britain</em> London: Verso	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png]]
−	Aufheben (2002) <em>“‘Anti-Capitalism* as Ideology... and as Movement?</em>“ <em>Aufheben</em> 10	+	==== Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media ====
−	Avrich, P. (1987) <em>Bakunin and Nechaev</em> London: Freedom Press	+	Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:
−	B (1999) Tm Fed Up of Using A Minor Irritant” EF! Discussion Document	+	'''Literature''' is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.
−	Bad Press (2002) “Anarchism Without Hyphens” <em>Total Liberty</em> 3(3), 13	+	'''Painting''' is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).
−	Baggott, R. (1998) “Nuclear Power at Druridge Bay” <em>Parliamentary Affairs</em> 51(3), 384-396	+	'''Theater''' is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.
−	Bagguley, P. (1995) ‘Middle Class Radicalism Revisited* in T.Butler and M.Savage, eds, <em>Social Change and the Middle Classes</em> London: UCL	+	These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.
−	Bagguley, P, (1999) ‘Beyond Emancipation? The Reflexivity of Social Movements* in M.O*Brien, S.Penna & C.Hay, eds, <em>TheorisingJdodemity: Reflexivity. Environment and Identity in Giddens* Social Theory</em> Harlow: Longman	+	Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in ''Dialectics of Nature:''
−	Bagguley, P. & Hearn, 1 eds, (1999) <em>Transforming Politics: Power and Resistance</em> London: Macmillan	+	<blockquote>
		+	The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bahro, R. (1982) <em>Socialism and Survival</em> London: Heretic Books	+	Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.
−	Bahro, R. (1984) <em>From Red to Green</em> London: Verso	+	Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.”
−	Bahro, R (1986) <em>Building the Green Movement</em> London: Heretic Press	+	==== Other Viewpoints of Content and Form ====
−	Bahro, R. (1994) <em>Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster: The Politics of World Transformation</em> Bath: Gateway Books.	+	Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:
−	Bailey, C. White, C. & Pain, R. (1999) “Evaluating Qualitative Research: Dealing with the tension between ‘science’ and ‘creativity’” <em>Area</em> 31(2), 164-183	+	<blockquote>
		+	The law has internal and external forms:
−	Bakan, J. (2004) “The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power” <em>Ecologist</em> 34(9), 53-61	+	The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.
−	Bakunin, M. (1970) <em>God and the State</em> New York: Dover	+	The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.
−	Bakunin, M. (1972) “The International and Karl Marx” in S.Dolgoff, ed, <em>Bakunin on Anarchy</em> London: George Allen & Unwin	+	According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.
−	Bakunin, M. (1986) “Integral Education” <em>The Anarchist Encyclopaedia</em> Folio 2 Cambridge: Cambridge Free Press	+	If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bakunin, M. (1990a) <em>Marxism. Freedom and the State</em> London: Freedom Press	+	There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the ''inner Form'' of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.
−	Bakunin, M. (1990b) <em>Statism and Anarchy</em> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press	+	==== b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form ====
−	Bakunin, M. (1992) <em>The Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871</em> Buffalo NY: Prometheus Books	+	Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.
−	Bakunin, M. & Warren, R. (1981) <em>A Critique of State Socialism</em> Sanday, Orkney: Cienfuegos Press ‘Bakunin* (2002) letter in <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,3	+	The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.
−	Baldelli, G. (1971) <em>Social Anarchism</em> London: Penguin	+	-----
−	Baldwin, P. Eden, R. & Pook, S. (2000) “Rioters Dishonour War Heroes” <em>Daily_Telegraph</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 1-5	+	==== Annotation 151 ====
−	Ball, T. & Dagger, R. (1991) <em>Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal</em> New York: HarperCollins	+	For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.
−	Bann, C. (1996) “Natural Justice” <em>Red Pepper</em> November. 18-20	+	When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also ''influence'' the Content, but not nearly as much as Content ''determines'' Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.
−	Barclay, H. (1986) <em>People Without Government</em> London: Kahn & Averill	+	The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.
−	Bari, J. (1993) “The Feminisation of Earth First!” in <em>Do or Die</em> 2.4-5	+	-----
−	Bari, J. (1994) <em>Timber Wars</em> Maine: Common Courage Press	+	==== Annotation 152 ====
−	Bari, J. (1996) <em>The Bombing Storv and Community Under Siege</em> EF1 Reprint, Brighton: SDEF1	+	Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the ''internal relations'' of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
−	Bari, J. (1997a) “The Attempted Murder of Judi Bari” <em>Albion Monitor</em> 13 <sup>th</sup> January. Available at http://www. monitor.net/monitor/bari/jbint-14.html	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-55.png|''Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.'']]
−	Bari, J. (1997b) “Revolutionary Ecology: Biocentrism and Deep Ecology” Available at [[http://www.monitor.net/~-bari/RevolutinaiyEcology.html][http://www.monitor.net/~-bari/RevolutinaiyEcology.html]]	+	As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.
−	Barker, C. (2001) “Fear, Laughter, and Collective Power: The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980” in J.Goodwin, J Jasper & F.Polletta eds, <em>Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements</em> London: University of Chicago Press	+	Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.
−	Barrot, J. (1996) “Critique of the Situationist International”, in S.Home, ed, <em>What is Situationism? A Reader</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the ''change in Content'' which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.”
−	Barry, J. (1999) <em>Rethinking Green PoliticsiNature. Virtue and Progress</em> London: Sage	+	Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.
−	Barry, 1 (1994) “The Limits of the Shallow and the Deep: Green Politics, Philosophy, and Praxis” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 3(3), 369-394	+	Content determines Form, but Form is not ''fully'' decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.
−	Bartol£ C. ed, (2000) <em>The Breath_of My Life: the Correspondence of Mahatma Gandhi and Bart de Ligt</em> Berlin: Gandhi-Informations-Zentrum	+	-----
−	Bartunek, J.M. & Louis, M.R. (1996) <em>Insider / Outsider Team Research</em> London: Sage	+	==== Annotation 153 ====
−	Bash Street Kids (cl998) “Nostalgia in the UK” in <em>Smash Hits</em> London: Smash Hits, 2-4	+	The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see ''Matter and Consciousness'',
−	BAT (1998) “Mootiny” EFl Discussion Document	+	p. 88). Just as the material world ''determines'' consciousness while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world, the Content of a subject ''determines'' the Form while the Form ''impacts'' the Content.
−	Baugh, G. (1990) “The Politics of Social Ecology” in J.Clark, ed, <em>Renewing the Earth</em> Montreal: Black Rose	+	''Suitability'' describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).
−	Books	+	We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.
−	Bauman, Z. (1987) <em>Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity. Postmodemity. and the Intellectuals</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.
−	Bauman, Z. (1988) “Is There a Postmodern Sociology?” <em>Theory. Culture & Society</em> 5,217-37	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Bauman, Z. (1992a) <em>Intimations of Postmodemity</em> London: Routledge	+	Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.
−	Bauman, Z. (1992b) “The Fall of the Legislator” in T.Docherty, ed, <em>Postmodernism: A Reader</em> Colombia: Colombia University Press	+	Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.
−	Bauman, Z. (1993) <em>Postmodern Ethics</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.
−	Bauman, Z. (1995) <em>Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	-----
−	Bauman, Z. (1997) <em>Postmodemity and its Discontents</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	==== Annotation 154 ====
−	Baxter, B. (1999) <em>Ecologism: An Introduction</em> Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press	+	In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.
−	Beale, A. (2000) Letter, <em>Observer</em> 7<sup>th</sup> May	+	Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in ''Capital Volume 1'', as in this excerpt:
−	Beck, U. (1992) <em>Risk Society. Towards A New Modernity</em> London: Sage	+	<blockquote>
		+	The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Beck, U. (1995) <em>Ecological-Politics In An Age of Risk</em> Cambridge: Polity Press,	+	Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.
−	Beck, U. Giddens, A. & Lash, S. (1994) <em>Reflexive Modernization</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	<blockquote>
		+	But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Becker, H. (1974) “Whose Side Are We On?” in G.Riley, ed, <em>Values. Objectivity and the Social Sciences</em>	+	Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a ''commodity'' which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.
−	London: Routledge	+	Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.
−	Becker, H. (1997) <em>Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance</em> New York: Free Press	+	-----
−	Beckett, A. (1995) “Power to the (Young) People” <em>Guardian</em> 19<sup>th</sup> June	+	=== 5. Essence and Phenomenon ===
−	Beder, S. (1997) <em>Global Soin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism</em> Partington: Green Books	+	==== a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon ====
−	Begg, A. (1991) <em>From Dream to Transition: Green Political Strategy</em> Leeds: Self-produced	+	The ''Essence'' category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Bell, D. (2002) “How Can Political Liberals Be Environmentalists?” <em>Political Studies</em> 50.703-724	+	The ''Phenomenon'' category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.
−	Bell, D.S.A. (2002) “Anarchy, Power and Death: Contemporary Political Realism as Ideology” <em>Journal of Political Ideologies</em> 7(2), 221-239	+	-----
−	Bell, J. (2002) <em>The Last Wizards: Books of Green Shadows</em> Chicago: Out of Order Books	+	==== Annotation 155 ====
−	Bellos, A (1995) “Pieces of the Action”, <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> December	+	Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.
−	Bellos, A (1997) “Go Forth in Peace... and Multiply”, <em>Guardian</em> 9<sup>th</sup> April	+	Essence should not be confused with ''Form''. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the ''synthesis'' of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which ''define the existence, motion, and development'' of a subject.
−	Bellos, A & Vidal, J. (1996) “Protest Lobbies Unite to Guard Rights” <em>Guardian.</em> 27<sup>th</sup> August	+	Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur ''in specific conditions''.
−	Belsey, C. & Moore J. (1989) <em>The Feminist Reader</em> London: Macmillan	+	The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, ''essentially'', a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.
−	Bendell, J. (2000) Letter <em>Guardian</em> 3<sup>rd</sup> May, 21	+	The ''Phenomena'' of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.
−	Benford, R.D. & Hunt, S.A (1995) “Dramaturgy and Social Movements: The Social Construction and Communication of Power” in S.M. Lyman, ed, <em>Social Movements: Critiques. Concents. Case-Studies</em> London: Macmillan	+	The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.
−	Benhabib, S. (1992) <em>Situating the Self: Gender. Community and Post-Modernism in Contemporary Ethics</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.
−	Benn, T. (1996) “We Must Do It Ourselves” <em>Red Penner</em> November, 5	+	Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not ''essentially defined'' as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.
−	Bennie, L.G. (1998) “Brent Spar, Atlantic Oil and Greenpeace” <em>Parliamentary Affairs</em> 51(3). 397-410	+	==== b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon ====
−	Benston, M. (1989) ‘Feminism and the Critique of Scientific Method* in A.R.Miles & G.Finn, eds,	+	Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.
−	<em>Feminism: From Pressure to Politics</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	''The unity between Essence and Phenomenon:'' Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.
−	Benton, L.M. & Short, J.R. (1999) <em>Environmental Discourse and Practice</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref>
−	Berens, C. (1995a) “Generation X”, <em>New Statesmen & Society</em> 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 22-23	+	''The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon'': Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.
−	Berens, C. (1995b) “Earth Burst!” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> December, 5	+	-----
−	Berg, B.L. (1995) <em>Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences</em> London: Alyn & Bacon	+	==== Annotation 156 ====
−	Berkman, A. (n.d.) <em>The Anti-Climax</em> London: ACF	+	Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.
−	Berkman, A (1929) <em>What is Communist Anarchism</em> Available at	+	Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is ''essentially'' a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what ''essentially make it'' a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).
−	[[http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/berkman/comanarchism/whatis_toc.html][http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bright/berkman/comanarchism/whatis_toc.html]]	+	The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.
−	Berkman, A (1964) <em>ABC of Anarchism</em> London: Freedom Press	+	With ''ideas'' and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'', beginning with a quote from Hegel:
−	Berkman, A (1976) <em>The Russian Tragedy</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	<blockquote>
		+	Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Berlin, I. (1967) “Two Concepts of Liberty” in A Quinton, ed, <em>Political Philosophy</em> Oxford: OUP	+	Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:
−	Bermann, M. (1982) <em>All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: the Experience of Modernity</em> New York: Simon and Schuster	+	<blockquote>
		+	The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bemeri, M.L. (1950) <em>Journey Through Utopia</em> London: Freedom Press	+	This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.
−	Best, S. & Kellner, D. (1991) <em>Postmodern Theory</em> London: Macmillan	+	<blockquote>
		+	In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bey, H. (1991) <em>TAZ: the Temporary Autonomous Zone: Ontological Anarchy. Poetical-Terrorism</em> New York: Autonomedia	+	This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.
−	Bey, H. (1993) “PAZ: The Permanent Autonomous Zone” Available at [[http://www.tO.or.at/hakimbey/paz.htm][http://www.tO.or.at/hakimbey/paz.htm]]	+	Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.
−	Bey, H. (1995) “Primitives & Extropians” <em>Anarchy: Jouma! of Desire Armed_</em>42. Available at	+	In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.”
−	www. tO. or. at/hakimbey/pri miti v. htm	+	We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).
−	Bey, H. (cl 995) “Seduction of the Cyber Zombies” Available at [[http://www.tO.or.at/hakimbey/seducthtm][http://www.tO.or.at/hakimbey/seducthtm]]	+	Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.
−	Bey, H. (1994) <em>Immediatism</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	<blockquote>
		+	Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Beynon, H. (1999) “On taking action” <em>The Raven: Anarchist Quarterly</em> 10(4) London: Freedom Press	+	Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the ''Essence'' of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for ''contradictions'' within the subject (see ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.
−	BFM (n.d.) “Support the Ecological Revolution on Bougainville” Leaflet Brighton: SDEF!	+	-----
−	BGN (2002) Black and Green Network “What Is Green Anarchy Primer”, in <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,13-16	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Biehl, J. (1989a) “Ecofeminism and Ecology: Unresolvable Conflict” in D.Roussopoulos, ed, <em>The Anarchist Papers 2</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.
−	Biehl, J. (1989b) ‘Goddess Mythology in Ecological Politics* <em>New Politics</em> 2	+	-----
−	Biehl, J. (1998) <em>The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism</em> London: Black Rose Books	+	==== Annotation 157 ====
−	Biehl, J. & Staudenmeier, P. (1996) <em>Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.
−	Biehl, J. ed, (1997) <em>The Murray Bookchin Reader</em> London: Cassell	+	This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.
−	Bilsborough, S. (1995) “A Hidden Histoiy: Communal Land Ownership in Britain” <em>ECOS</em> 16(3/4), 51-58	+	According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, ''without end.''”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref> On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.
−	Black, B. (1996) “The Abolition of Work” in H.Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Again</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	-----
−	Black, B. (cl996) “Anarchism and Other Impediments to Anarchy” in <em>Green Anarchist</em> 45/46	+	==== Annotation 158 ====
−	Black, B. (1997) <em>Anarchy After Leftism</em> Colombia, Mo: CAL Press	+	For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.
−	Black, B. (2002) “Wooden Shoes or Platform Shoes” Available at [[http://www.inspiracy.com/black/wooden.html][http://www.inspiracy.com/black/wooden.html]]	+	It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.
−	Black, B. (2004) “Theses on Anarchism After Post-Modernism” <em>Green Anarchy</em> 16, 6	+	Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.
−	Black Bat (1998) “A Critique of GenetiX Snowball” Discussion Document, reprinted as “Agit-Wank” <em>Peace</em> News 2431, 10-13.	+	Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.
−	Black Flag (2001) “From Riot to Revolution?” <em>Black Flag</em> 221	+	=== 6. Possibility and Reality ===
−	Bleiker, R. (2000) <em>Popular Dissent Human Agency & Global Politics</em> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press	+	==== a. Categories of Possibility and Reality ====
−	Bliese, J.R.E. (1996) “Traditionalist Conservatism and Environmental Ethics” <em>Environmental Ethics</em> 19,135	+	The ''Possibility'' category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.
−	Blomley, N. (1994) “Editorial - Activism and the Academy” in <em>Environment and Planning PLSociety and Space</em> 12,380-385	+	The ''Reality'' category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.
−	Blomley, N. (1994) <em>Law. Space and the Geographies of Power</em> London: The Guilford Press	+	==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality ====
−	Blomley, N. (1998) “Landscapes of Property” <em>Law and Society Review</em> 32, 567-612	+	Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.
−	Bluhdom, I. (1995) “Environmental NGOs and ‘New Politics’” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 4(2), 328-332	+	Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.
−	BOB (1999) <em>Beasts of Burden: Capitalism - Animals - Communism</em> London: Antagonism Press	+	-----
−	Boggs, C. (1986) <em>Social Movements and Political Power</em> Philadelphia. PA: Temple University Press	+	==== Annotation 159 ====
−	Boggs, C. (1995) “Rethinking the Sixties Legacy: From New Left to New Social Movements” in S.M. Lyman, ed, <em>Social Movements: Critiques. Concepts. Case-Studies</em> London: Macmillan.	+	'''Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'''
−	Bombadill, S. (1997) “In Praise of Covert Action” <em>Peace News</em> 2404,12-14	+	''Editor’s notes in [brackets]''
−	Bonanno, A. (1990) <em>From Riot to Insurrection: Analysis for An Anarchist Perspectiv</em>e Against Post-Industrial <em>Capitalism</em> London: Elephant Editions	+	Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
−	Bonanno, A. (1998) <em>The Anarchist Tension</em> London: Elephant Editions	+	Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.
−	Bonanno, A. (c2000) “Beyond Workerism Beyond Syndicalism” Available at	+	[The categorization below draws a distinction between the ''obvious'' and the ''practical.''
−	http.7/www. geociti es. com/kk_abacus/insurr 1. html	+	The ''obvious'' is that which will ''certainly'' occur. If you drop an object, it will ''obviously'' fall. The ''practical'' is that which we ''certainly could make occur'' through human will. If you are holding an object, you could ''practically'' drop it.]
−	Bondurant (1965) <em>Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict</em> Berkeley: University of California Press	+	'''Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility''' [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].
−	Bookchin, M. (1968) “Revolution in America” <em>Anarchos</em> 1	+	''Obvious Possibility'' refers to Possibility that ''will'' happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.
−	Bookchin, M. (1971) <em>Post-Scarcity Anarchism</em> Berkeley: Ramparts Press	+	[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes ''obvious'' that a hurricane will form.]
−	Bookchin, M. (1974) “Introductory Essay” in S.Dolgoff, ed, <em>The Anarchist Collectives - Workers* SelfManagement in the Spanish Revolution 1936-1939</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	''Random Possibility'' is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, ''prepare'' for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]
−	Bookchin, M. (1977) <em>The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years 1868-1936</em> London: Harper & Row	+	Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:
−	Bookchin, M. (1980) <em>Towards an Ecological Society</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	'''Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:'''
−	Bookchin, M. (1982) <em>The Ecology of Freedom: the Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy</em> Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books.	+	''Practical Possibility'' means that conditions in Reality which ''could'' make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you ''could'' make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]
−	Bookchin, M. (1986a) <em>The Modem Crisis: Rethinking Ethics. Nature and Society</em> Philadelphia: New Society Publications	+	''Abstract Possibility'' is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.
−	Bookchin, M. (1986b) “The Greening of Politics: Towards a New Kind of Political Practice” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 1 Burlington VT: Green Program Project	+	[It is an abstract Possibility that you ''could'' make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. ''Near Possibility'' simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, ''far Possibility'' refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]
−	Bookchin, M. (1986c) “Municipalization: Community Ownership of the Economy” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 2	+	-----
−	Bookchin, M. (1988a) “The Crisis in the Ecology Movement” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 6	+	In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to ''subjectively'' change possibility into reality, but only when the ''objective'' circumstances exist in the external world.]
−	Bookchin, M. (1988b) “The Population Myth: 1” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 8	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Bookchin, M. (1988c) “Yes! - Whither Earth First!” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 10	+	We must base our perception and practice on Reality.
−	Bookchin, M. (1989a) “New Social Movements: The Anarchic Dimension” in D. Good way, ed, <em>For Anarchism:</em>	+	Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] ''only'' precisely and unquestionably demonstrated ''facts''.”<ref>''To N. D. Kiknadze'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.</ref>
−	<em>History. Theory and Practice</em> London: Routledge	+	However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.
−	Bookchin, M. (1989b) “The Population Myth: 2” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 15	+	-----
−	Bookchin, M. (1990a) <em>Remaking Society</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	==== Annotation 160 ====
−	Bookchin, M. (1990b) “The Meaning of Confederal ism” <em>Green Perspectives</em> 20	+	This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.
−	Bookchin, M. (1991) “Where I Stand Now” in M.Bookchin & D.Foreman, <em>Defendingthe Earth</em> New York: Oxford	+	== IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
−	University Press	+	''Laws'' are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.
−	Bookchin, M. (1992a) “The Ghost of Anarcho-Syndicalism” Available at	+	There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: ''Private and Common'', p. 128].
−	[[http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/ghost2.html][http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/ghost2.html]]	+	''Private laws'' are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.
−	Bookchin, M. (1994a) <em>Which Way for the Ecology Movement?</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	''Common laws'' are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws,'' and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.
−	Bookchin, M. (1994b) “Defending the Earth” in L.Gruen & D.Jamieson, eds, <em>Reflecting on Nature: Readings In</em>	+	''Universal laws'' are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.
−	<em>Environmental Philosophy</em> New York: Oxford University Press	+	If we classify laws based on the ''reach of impact'', we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.
−	Bookchin, M. (1995a) <em>Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: an Unbri</em>dgeable Chasm Edinburgh: AK Press	+	''Laws of nature'' are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.
−	Bookchin, M. (1995b) <em>Re-Enchanting Humanity: a Defence of the Human Spirit A</em>gainst Antihumanism.	+	''Laws of society'' are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.
−	<em>Misanthropy. Mysticism, and Primitivism</em> London: Cassell	+	-----
−	Bookchin, M. (1996a) <em>The Philosophy of Social Ecolog</em>y Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	==== Annotation 161 ====
−	Bookchin, M. (1996b) “Anarchism: Past and Present” in H.Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing:</em>Anarchism. Again Edinburgh: AK Press	+	We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.
−	Bookchin, M. (1996c) “Bookchin Replies” <em>Organise!</em> 44.17-18. Available at	+	Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an ''objective character'' — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.
−	[[http://www.libcom.org/hosted/aTorg/issue44/bookchin.html][http://www.libcom.org/hosted/aTorg/issue44/bookchin.html]]	+	''Laws of human thought'' are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.
−	Bookchin, M. (1997) “Deep Ecology, Anarchist Syndicalism and the Future of Anarchist Theory” in Freedom	+	As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the ''universal laws'' that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.
−	Press, ed, <em>Deep Ecology and Anarchism</em> London: Freedom Press	+	These universal laws are:
−	Bookchin, M. (1998a) “The Communist Manifesto: Insights and Problems” New Politics 6(4)	+	* The law of transformation between quantity and quality.
		+	* The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.
		+	* The law of negation of negation.
−	Bookchin, M. (1998b) “A Politics for the Twenty-First Century” Speech to the Lisbon Conference on Libertarian	+	-----
−	Municipalism, 26<sup>th</sup> August Previously available at http://www.social-	+	==== Annotation 162 ====
−	ecology.org/leam/library/bookchin/politics_21 century_5.html	+	Each of these laws is considered ''universal'' because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.
−	Bookchin, M. (cl998) “Turning Up the Stones: A Reply to Clark’s October 13<sup>th</sup> Message” Available at	+	=== 1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
−	dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/tuming.html	+	The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.
−	Bookchin, M. (1999) <em>Anarchism. Marxism and the Future of the Left</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	-----
−	Bookchin, M. & Foreman, D. (1991) <em>Defending the Earth</em> Boston: South End Press	+	==== Annotation 163 ====
−	Booth, S. (1997) “Fenland Rebels” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 45-6- 24-5	+	Remember that mode refers to ''how'' something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to ''how'' all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.
−	Booth, S. (1999) “The Irrationalists” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 51.11-12	+	Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
−	Booth, S. & Allen, R. (2002) “Green Anarchist” in <em>Blue</em> 2(21). Available at [[http://www.bluegreenearth.com][http://www.bluegreenearth.com]]	+	<blockquote>
		+	The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bourdieu, P. (1988) <em>Homo Academicus</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	In other words, ''quantitative'' changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to ''quality'' shifts.
−	Bourdieu, P. (1991) <em>Language and Symbolic Power</em> ed, J.B. Thompson, Oxford: Blackwell	+	-----
−	Bourdieu, P. & Wacquant, L.J.D. (1992) <em>An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology</em> Chicago: UCP	+	The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:
−	Bowen, J. (2005) “Moving Targets: Rethinking Anarchist Strategies” in J.Bowen & J.Purkis, eds, <em>Changing</em>	+	Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	<em>Anarchism</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	-----
−	Bowen, J. & Purkis, J. cds, (2005) <em>Changing Anarchism</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	==== Annotation 164 ====
−	Bowers, J. (2001) “Mugsborough Revisited” <em>Ecologist</em> 31(7). 26-28	+	Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.
−	Bowles, G. & Klein, R.D. cds, (1983) <em>Theories of Women’s Studies</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have ''1 dozen'' donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have ''2 dozen''.
−	Bradford, G. (1984) “A System of Domination: Technology” <em>Fifth Estate</em> 306. 11	+	Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.
−	Bradford, G. (1989) <em>How Deep is Deep Ecology? With An Essay-Review on Women’s Freedom</em> Ojai. CA: Times	+	Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.”
−	Change Press	+	The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.
−	Bradford, G. (1990) “Revolution Against the Megamachine” <em>Fifth Estate</em> 333,<em>32</em>	+	==== a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity ====
−	Bradford, G. (1996) <em>We All live in Bhopal</em> pamphlet SDEF! reprint (originally in <em>Fifth Estate</em> 1985)	+	''- Definition of Quality''
−	Bradford Mayday98 (1998) “Land, Ecology & Environment” in Conference Programme, Bradford Mayday98 Conference	+	''Quality'' refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Bradley, J. (2001a) <em>The Possibility of An Antihumanist Ecoanarchism</em> Available at [[http://melior.univ-montp3][http://melior.univ- montp3]]. fr/ra_forum/en/peopl e/jofV	+	-----
−	Bradley, J. (2001) “Mayday for Capitalism” 16<sup>th</sup> April. Available at	+	==== Annotation 165 ====
−	[[http://www.guardian.co.Uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4170884,00.html][http://www.guardian.co.Uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4170884,00.html]]	+	Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In ''Science of Logic'', Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.
−	Brand, K.W. (1990) “Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements” in RJ.Dalton & M.Kuechler, cds, <em>Challenging</em>	+	<blockquote>
		+	Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.
		+	</blockquote>
−	<em>the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Wcstei</em>	+	The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as ''differentiated''. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as ''quality''. For example, a human being’s ''quality'' refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) ''in unity''. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a ''reflection'' of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
−	<em>Democracies</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	-----
−	BRAS (c2003) “The Bourgeois Roots of Anarcho-Syndicalism” Leeds: Re-pressed	+	So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.
−	Brass, E. & Koziell, S.P. (1997) <em>Gathering Force: DIY Culture - Radical Action for Those Tired of Waiting</em> London: The Big Issue	+	-----
−	Bray, IS. & Must, E. (1995) <em>Roadblock</em> Berkshire: Alarm UK/Road Alert	+	==== Annotation 166 ====
−	Brenan, G. (1950) <em>The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the_So</em>cial and Political Background to the Spanish Civil <em>War</em> London: Cambridge University Press	+	Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).
−	Brewer, J.D. (2000) <em>Ethnography</em> Buckingham: Open University Press	+	If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the ''total number of students''.
−	Brighton & Hove No Leaders (2000) <em>Brighton & Hove No Leaders</em> Spoof Newspaper, 1* May	+	The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.
−	Brighton Mayday (2000) “Maypoles and Mayhem	+	-----
−	in the New Millennium!” Discussion document circulated in	+	==== Annotation 167 ====
−	EF!	+	Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.
−	Brown, L.S. (1989) “Anarchism, Existentialism, Feminism and Ambiguity” in D.Roussopoulos, ed, <em>The Anarchist Papers 2</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.
−	Brown, L.S. (1996a) “Beyond Feminism: Anarchism and Human Freedom” in H.Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Again</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	-----
−	Brown, L.S. (1996b) “The Politics of Indi vidualism: Liberalism, Liberal Feminism and Anarchism” <em>Social</em>	+	==== Annotation 168 ====
−	<em>Anarchism</em> 22. Available at [[http://www.nothingness.org/social/sa22/22revschleuning.html][http://www.nothingness.org/social/sa22/22revschleuning.html]]	+	It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.
−	Brown, M. (2000) “Mayday in London” <em>The Land is Ours News 18</em> Oxford: The Land is Ours	+	For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.
−	Brown, T. (1994) <em>British Syndicalism: Pages of Labour History</em> London: Kate Sharpley Library	+	Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.
−	Brighton Mayday (2000) “Maypoles and Mayhem in the New Millennium!” Brighton Mayday 2000 circulated at Winter Moot 2000	+	Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.
−	Bristol Mayday (2000) “Kill Capitalism” Leaflet	+	-----
−	Brough, G. & Bain, C. (2000) “Hurry Up and Die Queen Mum” <em>Daily Mirror</em> 17<sup>th</sup> July, 9	+	==== Annotation 169 ====
−	Brown, M. (2000) “RTS: Get-Up, Stand Up or Shut-Up!” Email circulated on Allsorts, 17<sup>th</sup> May	+	Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.
−	Buber, M. (1949) <em>Paths in Utopia</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.
−	Buber, M. (1959) <em>I and Thou</em> Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark	+	-----
−	Buckman, P. (1970) <em>The Limits of Protest</em> London: Panther Books	+	==== Annotation 170 ====
−	Bufe, C. (1992) <em>Listen Anarchist!</em> Tucson, AZ: See Sharp Press	+	Remember that ''quality'' is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.
−	Bufe, C. (1998) “Introduction” in C.Bufe, ed, <em>You Can’t Blow Up A Social Relationship: The Anarchist Case</em>	+	''- Definition of Quantity''
−	<em>Against Terrorism</em> Tucson, AZ: See Sharp Press	+	''Quantity'' refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:
−	Bufe, C. ed, (1998) <em>You Can’t Blow Up A Social Relationship: The Anarchist Case Against Terrorism</em> Tucson.	+	* The amount of component parts.
		+	* Scale or size.
		+	* Speed or rhythm of motion.
−	AZ: See Sharp Press	+	A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]
−	Bunting, M. (2004) “Beyond May Day” <em>Guardian</em> 26<sup>th</sup> April	+	Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.
−	Burbridge, J. (1994) “Radical Action and the Evolution of Consistency”, <em>ECOS</em> 15 (2), 7-11	+	-----
−	Burch, B. (2002) “Book Review: Memoirs of an Urban Guerrilla” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 22(3), 54	+	==== Annotation 171 ====
−	Burgmann, V. (2000) “The Social Responsibility of Labour Versus the Environmental Impact of Property Capital: The Australian Green Bans Movement” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 9(2), 87-101	+	If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12<sup>th</sup> donut, one “dozen” may represent the ''quality'' which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an ''order'' (quality) of ''three dozen donuts'' (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally ''twenty'' ''orders'' (quantity) as the day’s ''sales goal'' (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered ''relatively'', based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.
−	Burkett, P. (1999) <em>Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective</em> London: Macmillan Press	+	==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality ====
−	Burnett, G. (n.d.) <em>Permaculture: A Beginner’s Guide</em> Westcliff on Sea: Land and Liberty	+	Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.
−	Bums, D. (1992) <em>Poll Tax Rebellion</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	-----
−	Buttell, F. (2005) “The Environmental and Post-Environmental Politics of Genetically Modified Crops and Foods” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 14(3), 309-323	+	==== Annotation 172 ====
−	Cadogan, P. (1991) “Freedom to Vote? Or Freedom from Voting?” <em>Raven</em> 4(2), 101-113	+	In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.
−	Cahill, T. (1999) “Re: AFPP - exclusionary?” Comment on bulletin board available at http://ktru-	+	This amount is called the ''threshold'', which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).
−	main.lancs.ac.uk/CSEC/nscm.nsf7e5561718532911148025649100544826/6adafd 133192cd7f8025672b0060c4f8?	+	With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the ''quantity range''.
−	OpenDocument	+	''Quantity range'' is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.
−	Cahill, T. (2002) “Fw: Cox Barker Paper”, contribution to Social Movements Discussion List, 10<sup>th</sup> June, not archived on the internet	+	-----
−	Cahill, T. (2003) “Starhawk, Webs of Power: Notes from the Global Uprising - Review” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 11<sup>th</sup>	+	==== Annotation 173 ====
−	January, 92-94	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-56.png|''The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.'']]
−	Calendar Riots (c2002) <em>The Calendar Riots</em> Diary, Derbyshire	+	Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “''one donut''” and “''one dozen donuts'',” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “''one dozen donuts''.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the ''quantity range'' between the qualities of ''donut'' and ''one dozen donuts''. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.
−	Calhoun, C. (1993) ‘“New Social Movements’ of the Early Nineteenth Century” <em>Social Science History</em> 17,385428	+	Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the ''threshold.''
−	Calhoun, C. (1992) <em>Habermas and the Public Sphere</em> London: MIT Press	+	-----
−	Call, L. (1999a) “Anarchy in the Matrix: Postmodern Anarchism in the Novels of William Gibson and Bruce Sterling” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 7(2)	+	==== Annotation 174 ====
−	Call, L. (1999b) <em>Postmodern Anarchism</em> Pamphlet	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-57.png]]
−	Callicott, B. (1989) <em>In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy</em> Albany: SUNY Press.	+	Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.
−	Camatte, J. (1995) <em>This World We Must Leave and Other Essays</em> New York: Autonomedia	+	When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a ''quality shift''.
−	Camatte, J. (n.d.) <em>On Organisation</em> Detroit: Black and Red	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-58.png|''A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.'']]
−	CAMC (n.d.) “Campaign Against the Middle Class” Anonymous Pamphlet	+	''Quality shifts'' inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.
−	Campbell, B. (1995) “How Active Citizens Become Activists” <em>Independent</em> 10<sup>th</sup> February	+	-----
−	Campbell, D. (2001) “Anarchy in the USA” <em>Guardian</em> G2 18<sup>th</sup> April, 1 -4	+	==== Annotation 175 ====
−	Camus, A. (1971) <em>The Rebel</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	Quality shifts are ''inevitable'' because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.
−	Capra, F. & Spretnak, C. (1984) <em>Green Politics: The Global Promise</em> New York; E.P.Dutton	+	Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.
−	Carey, J. (1994) “Dissent”, letter to <em>Guardian</em> 31 * December	+	The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.
−	Carlsson, C. ed, (2002) <em>Critical Mass: Bicycling’s Defiant Celebration</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	''Quality shifts'' mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.
−	Carrell, S. (2003) “WWF in Row over Threat to Rare Birds” <em>Independent on Sunday</em> 16<sup>th</sup> February, 11	+	-----
−	Carroll, J. (1974) <em>Break Out from the Crystal Palace: Stimer. Nietzsche. Dostoyevsky</em> London: Routledge &	+	==== Annotation 176 ====
−	Kegan Paul	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-59.png|''The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.'']]
−	Carroll, R. & Staff, D. (1998) “Rescue Ban Urged for Eco-Warriors” <em>Guardian</em> 6<sup>th</sup> July, 5	+	''Period of motion'' refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.
−	Carter, A. (1971) <em>The Political Theory of Anarchism</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	''Period of motion'' differs from ''quantity range'' because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur ''between'' quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.
−	<em>Carter. A, (1973) Direct Action and Liberal Democracy</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	For example, a ''period of motion'' for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The ''quantity range'' of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.
−	Carter, A. (1983) <em>Direct Action</em> London: Housmans	+	Quality shift represents ''discontinuity'' within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].
−	Carter, A. (2005) <em>Direct Action and Democracy Today</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	Carter, A. (1989) “An Anarchist Theory of History” in D.Goodway, ed, <em>For Anarchism:History. Theory and</em>	+	==== Annotation 177 ====
−	<em>Practice</em> London: Routledge	+	Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief ''discontinuity'' in the sense that we perceive a definite and ''distinct'' transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can ''distinguish'' between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.
−	Carter, A. (1993) “Towards a Green Political Theory” in A.Dobson & P.Lucardi, eds, <em>The Politicsof Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory</em> London: Routledge	+	Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.
−	Carter, A. (1998) “In Defense of Radical Disobedience” <em>Journal of Applied Philosophy</em> 15(1), 29-47	+	This is related to the ''historic perspective'' of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].
−	Carter, A. (1999) <em>A Radical Green Political Theory</em> London: Routledge	+	When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:
−	Carter, J. & Morland, D. eds, (2004) <em>Anti-Capitalist Britain</em> Cheltenham: New Clarion	+	* Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.
		+	* Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.
−	Casebolt, C. ed, (1991) <em>Covenant for a New Creation</em> New York: Orbis Books	+	''In summary,'' dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the ''quantity range''] will eventually meet the ''threshold'', which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through ''quality shift''. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Cathies, G. (2000) “Friends and Allies: The Role of Local Campaign Groups” in B.Seel, M.Paterson & B.Doherty, eds,	+	==== Annotation 178 ====
−	<em>Direct Action in British Environmentalism</em> London: Routledge	+	Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.
−	Cattleprod (c2001a) <em>What We Talk About When We Talk About Power</em> Pamphlet distributed in EFI. Manchester:	+	So, it is important to understand that there is no ''material manifestation'' of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in ''stages of development''. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.
−	Cattleprod	+	There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.
−	Cattleprod (c2001b) <em>Repertoire Dogs</em> Pamphlet distributed in EF!. Manchester: Cattleprod	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-60.png|''Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.'']]
−	Cattleprod (c2001c) <em>My FIRST! little guide to Ecological Economics</em> Pamphlet distributed in EFI. Manchester: Cattleprod	+	There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.
−	Cattleprod & Friend (c2001) <em>Tools 4 Intellectual Self-Defence</em> Pamphlet distributed in EF!. Manchester: Cattleprod	+	We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from ''metaphysical'' categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).
−	Caudwell, C. (1977) <em>The Concept of Freedom</em> London: Lawrence & Wishart	+	Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.
−	Caufield, C. (1991) <em>Thome Moors</em> St Albans: The Sumach Press	+	-----
−	CCC (cl 998) “Castors, Cops and Chaos!” in Subversion <em>Best of Subversion.</em> 33-37	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Cervi, B. (1994) “Majority Back Right to Protest” <em>New Statesman & Society</em> 7<sup>th</sup> October, 7	+	Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
−	Chakrabati, M. (1995) <em>The Gandhian Philosophy of Man</em> New Delhi: Indus	+	Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.
−	Chan, A. (1995) “Anarchists, Violence and Social Change” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 3(1), 45-68	+	-----
−	Chan, A. (2004) “Violence, Nonviolence, and the Concept of Revolution in Anarchism” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 12(2), 103-123	+	==== Annotation 179 ====
−	Chandler, P. (2003) “At Ease With Radical Knowledge: The More We Know, the Less We Like GM” <em>ECOS</em> 24(3), 51-57	+	We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.
−	Chantal, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) <em>Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics</em> London: Verso	+	For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.
−	Charlesworth, J.J. (2000) “Mayday! May Day!” <em>Art Monthly</em> 236. 13-16	+	Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.”
−	Chatterton, P. (2002) “‘Squatting is Still Legal, Necessary and Free*: A Brief Intervention in the Corporate City” <em>Antipode</em> 34(1). 1-7	+	In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.
−	Chatterton, P. & Style, S. (2000) ‘<em>Be Realistic. Demand the Impossible? Moving Towards Sustainable Development in the North East?</em> Commissioned Report for Newcastle City Council. Newcastle: CURDS, University of Newcastle	+	Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.
−	Cheney, J. (1990) “Nature and the Theorizing of Difference” <em>Contemporary Philosophy.</em> 13(1), 1-14	+	On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is ''inevitable'' that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.
−	Cheney, J. (1987) “Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology” <em>Environmental Ethics</em> 9(2), 115-145	+	-----
−	Chester, G. (1979) “I Call Myself A Radical Feminist” in <em>Feminist Practice: Notes fromthe Tenth Year</em> London: Theory Press.	+	==== Annotation 180 ====
−	Chesters, G. (1998) “Bodies As Barricades, Bodies As Messages” Paper presented at The Body and Power: Regulation and Resistance, British Sociological Association Annual Conference 6-9 April 1998, University of Edinburgh	+	“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: ''Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder''. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can ''instantly'' transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.
−	Chesters, G. (1999) “Resist to Exist? Radical Environmentalism at the End of the Millenium” ECOS 20(2), 19-25	+	“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the ''Vietnam Encyclopedia'', published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:
−	Available at [[http://www.shiftingground.freeuk.com/ecosl.htm][http://www.shiftingground.freeuk.com/ecosl.htm]]	+	<blockquote>
		+	Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:
−	Chesters, G. (2000a) “Breathing Space” <em>Guardian</em> Society 7th June, 4-5	+	Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.
−	Chesters, G. (2000b) “The New Intemperance: Protest, Imagination and Carnival” ECQS 21(1), 2-9	+	Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.
−	Chesters, G. (2000c) “Guerrilla Gardening—The End of the World as We Know It?” ECOS 21(1), 10-13	+	Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Chesters, G. (2003) “Shape Shifting: Civil Society, Complexity and Social Movements” <em>Anarchist Studies,</em> 11(1), 42-65
−	Chesters, G. (2005) <em>Complexity. Multitudes and Movements: Acting on the Edge of Chaos</em> London: Routledge	+	-----
−	Chesters, G. & Clarke, N. (1998) “Reclaim Lancaster! - The Jericho Effect” Available at	+	Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.
−	http ://www. shiftingground, freeuk.com/rtslancs. htm	+	-----
−	Chesters, G. & Welsh, I. (2004) “Rebel Colours: ‘Framing’ in Global Social Movement”, Sociological Review, 52(3)314-335	+	==== Annotation 181 ====
−	Ches worth, S. & Johnson, A. (1996) “Police Clampdown on RTS” <em>Squall</em> 14,16	+	Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors<ref>See Annotation 207, p. 202.</ref> as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).
−	Chevenix-Trench, H. (2004) “Conservation Land Ownership in Scotland - Time to Pause for Thought?” <em>ECOS</em> 25(2), 37-43	+	=== 2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
−	Chimpy 2 (2002) “Why We Sit in Trees” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 22(7), 10	+	The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the ''Essence'' of dialectics [see: ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”<ref>''Summary of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Chittenden, M. & Rufford, N. (2000) “Anarchist Rioters Target the Queen” <em>Sunday Times</em> 7<sup>th</sup> May	+	-----
−	Chomsky, N. (1969) <em>American Power and the New Mandarins</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	==== Annotation 182 ====
−	Chomsky, N. (1970) “Notes on Anarchism” in D.Guerin <em>For Reasons of State</em> Available at [[http://www.tigerden.com/~berios/notes-on-anarchism.html][http://www.tigerden.com/~berios/notes-on-anarchism.html]]	+	In other words, ''contradiction'' (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Chomsky, N. (1996) <em>Powers and Prospects</em> London Pluto Press	+	Contradiction is a ''fundamental driving force'' because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.
−	Chomsky, N. (1999) <em>The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo</em> London: Pluto Press.	+	Contradiction is the ''originating driving force'' because all motion and development arises from contradiction.
−	Chomsky, N. & Foucault, M. (1971) “Human Nature: Justice versus Power: Noam Chomsky debates with Michel	+	Contradiction is the ''universal driving force'' because ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.
−	Foucault” Television debate. Transcript available at [[http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm][http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm]]	+	==== a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction ====
−	Chouinard, V. (1996) “Blomley, N.K. Law, Space and the Geographies of Power” <em>Antipode</em> 28,210-212	+	''- Definition of Contradiction''
−	Christiansen-Ruffman, L. (1989) “Inherited Biases Within Feminism: The ‘Patricentric Syndrome* and the *Either/Or Syndrome* in Sociology*” in A.R.Miles & G.Finn, eds, <em>Feminism: from pressure to politics</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place ''within'' all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as ''between'' all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.
−	Christie, S. (2002) <em>My Granny Made me an Anarchist: The Christie File part 1</em> Hastings: Arguments and Facts Media	+	-----
−	Churchill, W. (1999) <em>Pacifism As Pathology: Reflections on the Role of Armed Struggle In North America</em> EF!UK reprint	+	==== Annotation 183 ====
−	Churchill, W. (2001) “Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens” Available at http ://[[http://www.kerspl][www.kerspl]] e bedeb. com/my stuff’s 11 /churchi 1 l.html	+	A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual ''negation'' of one subject and the ''synthesis'' of the negator and the negated into some new form.
−	Cixous, H. (1981) “Sorties: Where Is She...” in I.de Courtivron & E.Marks, eds, <em>New French Feminisms</em> Brighton: Harvester	+	The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.
−	Clark, H. (1981) <em>Making Nonviolent Revolution</em> Peace News Pamphlet, Nottingham: Mushroom	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-61.png|''In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.'']]
−	Clark, H. (1998) “More Power Than We Know” <em>Peace News</em> 2422,10-11. A previous version appeared in J.	+	Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.
−	Brierley <em>et al<sub>t</sub></em> eds, <em>Gathering Visions. Gathering Strength</em> Bradford: GVGS organising group/Peace News	+	In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.
−	Clark, J. (1984) <em>The Anarchist Moment</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-62.png|''The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.'']]
−	Clark, J. (1990) “What is Social Ecology” in J.Clark, ed, <em>Renewing the Earth: The P</em>romise of Social Ecology Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see ''Negation of Negation'', p. 185].
−	Clark, J. ed, (1990) <em>Renewing the Earth: The Promise of Social Ecology</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).
−	Clark, J. (1998) “Municipal Dreams: A Social Ecological Critique of Bookchin’s Politics” Available at [[http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/municipaldreams.html][http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/bookchin/municipaldreams.html]]	+	Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:
−	Clark, J. (2001) “Anarchist plot London Mayday riot” <em>Sunday Times</em> 18<sup>th</sup> March, distributed on Allsorts email list	+	* Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
		+	* Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].
		+	* Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.
		+	* Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.
−	Class War (1997) <em>Class War</em> 73 Final issue of newspaper	+	==== Annotation 184 ====
−	Class War (1999) <em>21<sup>st</sup> Century Class War</em> London: Class War Federation	+	All of the above forms of contradiction ''drive motion and development''. These processes exist in ''unity and opposition''. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.
−	Class War (2001) “The Problem of Revolutionaiy Activity and Social Democracy - Or a Review of ‘Reflections on Mayday*” <em>Class War</em> 81 Previously available at [[http://www.tao.ca/-lemming/classwar/81/35.htm][http://www.tao.ca/-lemming/classwar/81/35.htm]]	+	''- The General Properties of Contradictions''
−	Cleaver, H. (1994) “Kropotkin, Self-Valorisation, and the Crisis of Marxism” Anarchist Studies 2(2), 119-135	+	Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1877.</ref>
−	Cleaver, H. (2000) <em>Reading Capital Politically</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	==== Annotation 185 ====
−	de Cleyre, V. (1912) <em>Direct Action</em> New York: Mother Earth Publishing	+	Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).
−	de Cleyre, V. (1980) <em>The First Mayday: the Haymarket Speeches 1895-1910</em> Orkney: Cienfuegos Press	+	Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.
−	Clifford, J. (1986) “Introduction: Partial Truths” in J.CIifford & G.E.Marcus, eds, <em>Writing Culture: The Poetics</em> and Politi<em>cs of Ethnography</em> Berkeley: University of California Press	+	Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:
−	Clifford, J. & Marcus, G.E. eds, (1986) <em>Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography</em> Berkeley: University of California Press	+	* Internal and external contradictions
		+	* Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
		+	* Primary and secondary contradictions
−	CM (2003) “Monkeywrenching: An Appraisal” in <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 23(1), 84-85	+	==== Annotation 186 ====
−	Cockbum, C (1977) “When Women Get Involved in Community Action” in M.Mayo, ed, <em>Women in the</em>	+	''Internal'' contradictions are contradictions which exist in the ''internal relations'' of a subject, while ''external'' contradictions exist ''between'' two or more subjects as external relations.
−	<em>Community</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	For example: a sports team might have ''internal contradictions'' between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.
−	Cohen, C. (1971) <em>Civil Disobedience: Compliance. Tactics and the Law</em> London: Columbia University Press	+	A ''fundamental'' contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A ''non-fundamental'' contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can ''impact'' a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.
−	Cohen, G.A. (1984) “Restricted and Inclusive Historical Materialism” <em>Irish Philosophical Journal</em> 1(1), 1-65	+	For example: the ''fundamental contradiction'' of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is ''non-fundamental'', as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).
−	Cohen, N. (2000) “Act of Desperation” <em>Observer</em> 30<sup>th</sup> April	+	In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the ''primary'' contradiction. ''Secondary'' contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.
−	Cohn, J. & Wilbur, S.P. (2003) “Whats Wrong with Postanarchism?” Available at [[http://www.anarchist-studies.org/article/articlereview/26Z2/lZ][http://www.anarchist- studies.org/article/articlereview/26Z2/lZ]]	+	For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the ''primary contradiction'' to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many ''secondary contradictions'' which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all ''secondary contradictions'' which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.
−	Cohn, N. (1970) <em>The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages</em> London: Pimlico	+	On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine ''except'' for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.
−	Cohn-Bendit, D. & Cohn-Bendit, G, (1969) <em>Obsolete Communism The Left-Wing Alternative</em> London: Penguin	+	Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.
−	Cole, G.D.H. (1954) <em>Socialist Thought: Marxism & Anarchism 1850-1890</em> London: Macmillan	+	==== Annotation 187 ====
−	Cole, H.S.D. ed, (1973) <em>Models of Doom: A Critique of the Limits to Growth</em> New York: Universe Books	+	Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.
−	Coleman, S. ed, (1996) <em>Reform and Revolution: Three Early Socialists On the Way Ahead</em> Bristol: Thoemmes	+	All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.
−	Colin (2001) “A Challenge to the Protest Movement” Speech at ‘How to Be An Obstacle: Direct Action, Politics and Anti-globalisation* event, ICA 10-11<sup>th</sup> November	+	==== b. Motion Process of Contradictions ====
−	collectableanorak (c2001) “Anarchy Peace & Liberty” Love&RageCommunique Sheffield: collectableanorak	+	In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.
−	Common Ground (1986) <em>Common Ground</em> Newsletter, Newcastle: Common Ground	+	-----
−	Communities Against Toxics (n.d.) “Landfill Studies Show Ill-Health” Ellesmere: CATS	+	==== Annotation 188 ====
−	Coo ver, V. Esser, Deacon, E. & Moore, C. (1981) <em>A ResourceManual ForA Living Revolution</em> Philadelphia: New Society Publishers	+	Contradictions are ''binding'' and ''inseparable'' because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply ''separate'', then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.
−	Coppe, A. (1987) <em>Selected Writings</em> London: Aporia Press	+	Contradictions are said to be ''mutually impacting'' because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.
−	Cop Watch (2000a) “Keep Your Class Collaborationist Opinions for Your Next Dinner Party” Email circulated on	+	Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).
−	Allsorts, 10<sup>th</sup> May	+	In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
−	CopWatch (2000b) “A Reply” in RTS <em>Mayday! Mayday! Visions. Collisions andJRealitv</em>	+	-----
−	Coronado, R. (2000) “An Eco-Saboteur*s Tale” in <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 21(1). 37-89	+	==== Annotation 189 ====
−	Coronado, R. (2003) “The Smog Monsters Versus the ELF: Burning for a Better World” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 24(1)	+	Here, Lenin is explaining that ''identity'' and ''unity'' are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we ''define it'' in terms of the opposition.
−	Corporate Watch (2003) <em>Turning Dirt into Dollars</em> Oxford: Corporate Watch	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-63.png|''War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.'']]
−	Corr, A. (1999) <em>No Trespassing - Squatting. Rent Strikes and Land Struggles Worldwide</em> Cambridge. MA: South End Press	+	When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist ''between'' the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces ''between'' the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption ''within'' the economy.
−	Cotgrove, S. (1982) <em>Catastrophe or Cornucopia: The Environment. Politics and the Future</em> Chichester: Wiley	+	In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is ''defined'' by the ''unity'' of the opposing sides with one another.
−	Cotgrove, S. & Duff, A. (1980) “Environmentalism, Middle-Class Radicalism and Politics” <em>Sociological Review</em> 28(2), 333-351	+	The concept ''struggle of opposites'' refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:
−	Cotgrove, S. & Duff, A. (1981) “Environmentalism, Value and Social Change” <em>British Journal of Sociology</em> 32(1), 92-110	+	* The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.
		+	* Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).
		+	* Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].
−	Coward, R. (2000) “Have plants and watering can; will protest” <em>Guardian</em> 30<sup>th</sup> April	+	The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a ''transformation between them''. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.
−	Cox, L. (1997) “Reflexivity, Social Transformation and Counter Culture” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 3 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	-----
−	Cox, L. (1998) “Gramsci, Movements and Method” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and</em>	+	==== Annotation 190 ====
−	<em>Popular Protest</em> 4 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	Opposing sides, by definition, ''oppose'' one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do ''not'' oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, ''opposites''. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to ''struggle against'' one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.
−	Cox, L. (1999) “Power, Politics and Everyday Life: The Local Rationales of Social Movement Milieux” in	+	Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as ''equilibrium'', but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article ''An Equilibrium of Forces.''
−	P.Bagguley & J.Hearn <em>Transforming Politics: Power & Resistance</em> London: Macmillan	+	[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]
−	Cox, L. (2002) “Alternative Futures and Alternative Practice” Contribution to Social Movements discussion list, 17<sup>th</sup> April, not archived on the internet	+	Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, ''no'' equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.
−	Cox, L. & Barker, C. (2002) “‘What Have the Romans Ever Done for Us?’ Academic and Activist Forms of	+	According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
−	Movement Theorizing” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 8 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	-----
−	Crang, M. & Thrift, N. (2000) <em>Thinking Space</em> London: Routledge	+	==== Annotation 191 ====
−	Cresswell, T. (1994) “Putting Women In Their Place: The Carnival at Greenham Common” <em>Antipode</em> 26,35-58.	+	“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.
−	Cresswell, T. (1996) <em>In Place/Out of Place: Geography. Ideology, and Transgression</em> London: University of Minnesota Press	+	So Lenin’s point is that ''unity'' exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, ''opposition'' is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.
−	Critter (2002) “Perpetuating the Spectacle: A Response to the ASAN Article” in <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,9	+	In the same text quoted in the passage above, ''On the Questions of Dialectics,'' Lenin notes:
−	Crossley, N. (2002) <em>Making Sense of Social Movements</em> London: Routledge	+	<blockquote>
		+	The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...
−	Crouch, C. (1970) <em>The Student Revolt</em> London: Bodley Head	+	Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.
−	Crown, S. (c!979) <em>Hell No We Won’t Glow: Seabrook 1977. Non violent Occupation of a Nuclear Power Site</em> Portsmouth, NH: Clamshell Alliance	+	The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Cumbria Biodiversity Action Plan (2001) Available at [[http://www.ukbap.org.uk/lbap.aspx?id=436][http://www.ukbap.org.uk/lbap.aspx?id=436]]	+	In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a ''dialectical relationship'' with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Cunliffe, D. (2002) “The Violence of Martyrdom” <em>The Cunningham Amendment</em> 5(2)	+	''Relative unity'' refers to the nature of ''unity'' between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are ''unified'' in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are ''unified'' in contradiction. However, this unity is ''relative'' in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).
−	Curtin, J. (c2001) “A question of tactics” <em>Arkangel</em> 25,8-9	+	''Absolute struggle'' refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are ''absolute'' because such struggle exists ''permanently;'' struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.
−	Cush, J. & McKeyens, A. (1998) “Nuclear Demo Sparks Chaos” Newcastle Journal 21 * October	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-64.png|''Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.'']]
−	CW See Class War	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-65.png|''The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.'']]
−	*cw(3po)’ (2002) Letter to <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,3	+	This applies to contradictions. The ''relative unity'' and the ''absolute struggle'' between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.
−	DA = Direct Action, Magazine of the Solidarity Federation	+	-----
−	Daily Star (2000) “Smack Donald’s” <em>Daily Star</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 1-5	+	The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
−	Daktari (2000) “Ecocentric Anarchism” in <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 21(1). 66-68	+	-----
−	Dale, S. (1996) <em>McLuhan’s Children: The Greenpeace Message and the Media</em> Toronto: Between the Lines	+	==== Annotation 192 ====
−	Dalrymple, J. (1992) “The Storming of Castlemorton” <em>Sunday Times</em> Review, 3 l[at] May, 1	+	Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.
−	Dalrymple, J. & Bradbury, H. (1992) “How Defiant Giro Hippies Milk System for Cash on the Hoof’ <em>Sunday</em>	+	For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.
−	<em>Times</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> August	+	An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).
−	Dalton, A.J.P. (2000) <em>Consensus Kills</em> London: AJP Dalton	+	Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.
−	Dalton, R.J. (1994) <em>The Green Rainbow</em> New Haven: Yale University Press	+	For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.
−	Davies, B. (2000) “How the Laughter Turned to Terror” <em>Daily Mirror</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Day, B. (2006) “Promoting Environmental Citizenship? A critique of the moral persuasiveness of direct action environmental protest” Presented to Environmental Justice and Global Citizenship 5<sup>th</sup> Global Conference, Mansfield College Oxford University 3-6 July	+	Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.
−	Daly, H. (1977) <em>Steady StateEconomics</em> San Francisco: W.H.Freeman	+	Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the ''essence…'' of dialectics.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
−	Daly, H, & Cobb, J. (1989) <em>For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future</em> Boston: Beacon Press	+	-----
−	Daly, M. (1973) <em>Beyond God the Father Toward A Philosophy of Women’s Liberation</em> Boston: Beacon Press	+	==== Annotation 193 ====
−	Daly, M. (1978) <em>Gyn/Ecologv: The Meta-Ethics of Radical Feminism</em> Boston: Beacon Press	+	In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	D’Anieri, P. Ernst, C. & Kier, E. (1990) “New Social Movements in Historical Perspective” <em>Comparative Politics</em> July, 445-458	+	Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.
−	Danny (1996) “F.L.F.” <em>Faslania</em> Winter Solstice, 13	+	-----
−	Davies, B. (2000) “How the laughter turned to terror” <em>Mirror</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 4	+	==== Annotation 194 ====
−	Davis, J. & Foreman, D. (1991) <em>The Earth First! Reader: Ten Years of Radical Environmentalism</em>	+	The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.
−	Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books	+	For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?
−	Davis, M. & Wiener, J. (2003) “The Heroes of Hell” <em>Radical History Review</em> 85.227-237	+	It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.
−	Debord, G. (1990) <em>Comments on the Society of the Spectacle</em> London: Verso	+	=== 3. Law of Negation of Negation ===
−	Debord, G. (1991) <em>Panegyric</em> London: Verso	+	The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through ''dialectical negation'', forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “''negation of negation''.”
−	Debord, G. (1994) <em>The Society of the Spectacle</em> New York: Zone Books	+	==== a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation ====
−	DeGrandpre, R. (2004) Untitled <em>Adbusters</em> 12(3)	+	The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called ''negation''.
−	Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1983) <em>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</em> Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press	+	All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called ''dialectical negation''.
−	Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (1999) <em>Social Movements: An Introduction</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	-----
−	De Ligt, B. (1937) <em>The Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution</em> London: Pluto Press	+	==== Annotation 195 ====
−	Denzin, N. (1999) “Interpretive Ethnography for the Next Century” <em>Journal of Contemporary Ethnography</em> 28(5), 510-519	+	''Negation'' refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.
−	Des Jardins, J.R. (1997) <em>Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy</em> London: Wadsworth Publishing Company	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-66.png|''An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.'']]
−	De-Shalit, A. (2000) <em>The Environment: Between Theory and Practice</em> Oxford: Oxford University Press	+	''Dialectical negation'' occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.
−	De-Shalit, A (2001) “Ten Commandments of How to Fail in An Environmental Campaign” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 10(1), 111-137	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-67.png|''Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.'']]
−	DEUS (2002) <em>Down With the Empire Uo With the Spring</em> EF! Pamphlet, Winter Moot 26<sup>th</sup> February	+	'''Translation Note:''' ''The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.''
−	Devall, B. (1992) “Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism” in R.Dunlap & AG.Mertig, eds, <em>American Environmentalism</em> New York: Taylor & Francis	+	''Replacement negation'' occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of ''replacement negation'' — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.
−	Devall, B. & Sessions, G. (1985) <em>Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered</em> Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-68.png|''Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.'']]
−	De Welde, K. (2003) “Review Essay: The Brouhaha of Ethnography: Not for the Fainthearted” <em>Journal of Contemporary Ethnography</em> 32(2), 233-244	+	''Terminal negation'' is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been ''terminally negated'' — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.
−	DFROIOW (1999) “Fences: The Definitive Illustrated Guide...” <em>Peace News</em> 2435,34-38.	+	Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the ''terminal negation'' of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have ''replaced'' swords as the primary battlefield weapon.
−	Diane (cl997) “Close Down Comyhaugh Fur Fann” <em>Fast Connection</em> 5 Newcastle: Fast Connection	+	Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a ''terminal negation'' — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.
−	Diani, M. (1992) “The Concept of Social Movement”, <em>Sociological Review</em> 40,1-25	+	-----
−	Diani, M. (1995) <em>Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement</em> Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press	+	Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development
−	Diani, M. & Della Porta, D. (1999) <em>Social Movements: An Introduction</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	-----
−	<em>Direct Action,</em> see DA	+	==== Annotation 196 ====
−	Disarm DSEI (2004) “Affinity Groups: A Guide” Leaflet, adapted from ‘Ploughshares and Anarchism in Action*, distributed in EF! & Dissent! networks	+	All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of ''dialectical'' negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.
−	Dix, L. (2004) “Roadless Rule Shredded” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 24(6), 22-23	+	Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is ''development'' which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].
−	Dixon, Cyril. (2001) “Militant mob plans for May Day mayhem” <em>Daily Express</em> 25<sup>th</sup> April, 23	+	From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.
−	DLDL (c2000) <em>Devastate to Liberate or Devastatingly Liberal</em> Pamphlet, Bristol: DS4@. Available at	+	This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.
−	[[http://www.anarchosyndicalism.net/analysis/animal-liberation.htm][http://www.anarchosyndicalism.net/analysis/animal-liberation.htm]]	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-69.png|''The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.'']]
−	Dobson, A. (1995) <em>Green Political Thought</em> London: Routledge	+	In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.
−	Dobson, A. ed, (1991) <em>The Green Reader</em> London: Andre Deutsch	+	'''''Excerpt From'' Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:'''
−	Dobson, A. & Bell, D. eds, (2005) <em>Environmental Citizenship: Getting From Here Jo There</em> Cambridge, MA: MIT Press	+	Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.
−	Doherty, B. (1996) “Paving the Way: The Rise of Direct Action Against Road Building and the Changing Character of British Environmentalism” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 2 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.
−	Doherty, B. (1996) “Green Parties, Nonviolence and Political Obligation” in B.Doherty & M.de Geus, eds, <em>Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability. Rights and Citizenship</em> London: Routledge	+	'''Comparison Examples:'''
−	Doherty, B. (1998) “Opposition to Road-Building” <em>Parliamentary Affairs.</em> 51(3), 170-183	+	{|
		+	| | '''Metaphysical Negation'''
		+	| '''Dialectical Negation'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | The earthquake destroyed the house.
		+	| The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | Water eroded the mountain.
		+	| The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail.
		+	| The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant.
		+	| The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Doherty, B. (1999a) “Manufactured Vulnerability: Eco-Activist Tactics in Britain” <em>Mobilization</em> 4(1). 75-89	+	As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).
−	Doherty, B. (1999b) “Paving the Way: the Rise of Direct Action Against Road-building and the Changing Character of British Environmentalism” <em>Political Studies</em> 47(2), 275-291	+	Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.
−	Doherty, B. (2002) <em>Ideas and Actions In the Green Movement</em> London: Routledge	+	Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: ''objectivity'' and ''inheritance''.
−	Doherty, B. & de Geus, M. eds, (1996) <em>Democracyland Green Political Thought: SustainabilityJRights. and Citizenship</em> London: Routledge	+	Dialectical negation is ''objective'' because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.
−	Doherty, B. Paterson, M. Plows, A. & Wall, D. (2002) “The Fuel Protests of2000: Implications for the Environmental Movement in Britain” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 11(2), 165-173	+	-----
−	Doherty, B. Paterson, M. Plows, A. & Wall, D. (2003) “Explaining the Fuel Protests” <em>British Journal of Politics and International Relations</em> 5(1), 1 -23	+	==== Annotation 197 ====
−	Doherty, B. Plows, A. & Wall, D. (2003) “The Preferred Way of Doing Things: The British Direct Action Movement” <em>Pari i amentary Affai rs</em> 56,669-686	+	Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
−	Doherty, B. & Rawcliffe, P. (1995) “British Exceptionalism? Comparing the Environmental Movement in Britain and Germany” in I.Blflhdom, F.Krause & T.Scharf, eds, <em>The Green agenda: Environmental Politics and Policy in Germany</em> Keele: Keele University Press	+	Therefore, every development is simultaneously an ''internal'' and an ''external process,'' depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place ''within'' a subject or ''between'' two subjects, but they are always ''external'' (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously ''internal'' to the relationship.
−	Dolgoff, S. ed, (1972) <em>Bakunin on Anarchy</em> London: George Allen & Unwin	+	For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an ''internal process of development'' of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.
−	Dolgoff, S. ed, (1977) <em>The Anarchist Collectives - Workers* Self-Management in the Spanish Revolution 1936- 1939</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.
−	Dolgoff, S. (n.d) “The Relevance of Anarchism to Modem Society” Available at [[http://fratemitelibertaire.free.fr/reserve/the_relevance__of_anarchism.rtf][http://fratemitelibertaire.free.fr/reserve/the_relevance__of_anarchism.rtf]]	+	This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.
−	Dominick, B. (1997) <em>Anima! Liberation and Social Revolution: A Vegan Perspective on Anarchism or an Anarchist Perspective on Veganism</em> Syracuse, NY: Critical Mess Media	+	Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.
−	Donnelly, M. (2004) “Been Brown So Long It Looked Like Green To Me” Review <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 24(6), 48	+	-----
−	Do or Die Collective (1992) <em>Do or Die 1: The Voice of the British Earth First! Movement</em> August, Brighton: Do or Die	+	==== Annotation 198 ====
−	Do or Die Collective (1993a) <em>Do or Die 2: A Voice of British Earth First</em>! April/May, Brighton: Do or Die	+	To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an ''external, objective'' process. From the perspective of the contradictory ''relationship'', processes of development are ''internal'' processes of ''self-negation''. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.
−	Do or Die Collective (1993b) <em>Do or Die 3: Earth First!</em> August, Brighton: Do or Die	+	If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.
−	Do or Die Collective (1994) <em>Do or Die 4: A Voice From Earth First!</em> Summer. Brighton: Do or Die	+	Dialectical negation also has an ''inheritance'' characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.
−	Do or Die Collective (1995) <em>Do or Die 5: Voices From Earth First!</em> Brighton: Do or Die	+	-----
−	Do or Die Collective (1996) <em>Do or Die 6: Voices From Earth First!</em> Brighton: Do or Die	+	==== Annotation 199 ====
−	Do or Die Collective (1998) <em>Do or Die 7: Voices from Earth First!</em> Brighton: Do or Die	+	Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow ''reflected'' in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.
−	Do or Die Collective (1999) <em>Do or Die 8</em> EF! Gathering, Brighton: Do or Die	+	Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.
−	Do or Die Collective (2000) <em>Do or Die 9: Voices from the Ecological Resistance</em> December, Brighton: Do or Die	+	The factors which are adopted will be ''suitable with the present conditions''. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.
−	Do or Die Collective (2003) <em>Do or Die 10: Voices from the Ecological Resistance</em> July, Brighton: Do or Die	+	As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].
−	Douglass, D. (1999) “Indiscipline and Rebellion in the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth century Coalfields” in D.Douglass <em>All Power to the Imagination! Revolutionary Class Struggle in Trade Unions and the Petty Bougeois Fetish of Organisational Purity</em> London: Class War Federation	+	Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:
−	Douglass, D. (2000) <em>Geordies - Wa Mental!</em> Newcastle: TUPS Books	+	“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
−	Dowie, M. (1995) <em>Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Centurv</em> London: MIT Press	+	-----
−	Downing, J.D.H. (2001) <em>Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements</em> London: Sage	+	==== Annotation 200 ====
−	Doyle, K. (1997) <em>Parliament or Democracy?</em> Dublin: Workers Solidarity Movement	+	The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:
−	Dryzek, J.S. (1987) <em>Rational Ecology: Environment and the Political Economy</em> New York: Basil Blackwell	+	<blockquote>
		+	Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Dryzek, J.S. (1988) <em>Discursive Democracy: Politics. Policy and Political Science</em> New York: Cambridge University Press	+	In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s ''Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]''. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.
−	Dryzek, J.S. (1996) “Strategies of Ecological Democratisation” in W.M.Laffert & J.Meadowcroft, eds, <em>Democracy and the Environment: Powers and Prospects</em> Cheltenham: Edward Elgar	+	''Skepticism'', here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.
−	Dryzek, J.S. (1997) <em>The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses</em> Oxford: Oxford University Press	+	Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
−	Dryzek, J.S. Downes, D. Hunold, C. & Schlosberg, D. (2003) <em>Green States and Social Movements:</em>	+	''Eclecticism'' refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]
−	<em>Environmentalism in the United States. United Kingdom. Germany and Norway</em> Oxford: Oxford University Press	+	With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be ''negative'' in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a ''totally negative process''.
−	DuBois, D. (1983) “Passionate Scholarship: Notes On Values, Knowing and Method In Feminist Social Science” in G.Bowles & R.D. Klein, eds, <em>Theories of Women’s Studies</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-71.png|''A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.'']]
−	DuBois, F. (1894) <em>The Anarchist Peril</em> London: T.Fisher Unwin	+	In the chapter from ''Science of Logic'' which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as ''only negative'' — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.
−	Duckett, M. (1999a) “Communication and Self-Analysis Within An Activist Group” in J.Pickerill & M.Duckett, eds, <em>Radical British Environmentalism: Theory Into Practice</em> Newcastle	+	The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.
−	Duckett, M. (1999b) Unattributed “It All Began on Mayday” in <em>Do or Die</em> 8, 105-108 (referenced under <em>Door Die)</em>.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-72.png|''In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis'']]
−	Duckett, M. (2000) “Stopping the Nuclear Convoys” Paper presented at ‘Between Nature’ Conference, Lancaster	+	We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).
−	University 27-30 July	+	A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) ''completely negates'' the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator ''always'' retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.
−	Duckett, M. (2001a) <em>“Micropolitics in TAPP”</em> Unpublished Discussion Document	+	This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.
−	Duckett, M. (2001b) <em>“Reflections on D S EI”</em> Unpublished Discussion Document	+	''Eclecticism'' is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.
−	Duckett, M. (2001c) <em>“Qi! Recuperator! An Anarchist Critique of Research”</em> Paper presented at ‘Beyond the	+	Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.
−	Academy* conference, Northumbria University 30<sup>th</sup> April	+	In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are ''inherited'' by the negating side.
−	Duckett, M. (2003) “The Proper Place(s) of Anarchism in Environmentalism” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, Alternati<em>ve Futures and Popular Protest</em> 9 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	''Note:'' For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from ''Science and Logic'' in the cited notes above:
−	Durham, M. (1995) “Animal Passions” <em>Observer</em> 12<sup>th</sup> November, 19	+	<blockquote>
		+	...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Dynes & McCarthy (1992) “Militant Activists Join in M3 Lobby” <em>Times</em> 28th February, 1
−	Eagleton, M. (1991<em>)_Feminist Literary Criticism</em> London: Longman	+	-----
−	Earle, F. et al (1994) <em>A Time to Travel? An Introduction to Britain’s Newer Travellers</em> Lyme Regis: Enabler Publications	+	Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Earth First! Action Update (1991 -2005) See EF’AU	+	==== b. Negation of Negation ====
−	Earth First! Journal (2000) “Earth First! An Introduction” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 21(1), 4	+	In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.”
−	Earth First! Journal (2002b) “Peat Alert! Scott’s Company is Devouring UK’s Peatbogs” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 22(4), 14-15	+	-----
−	Eckersley, R. (1988) “The Road to Ecotopia? Socialism Versus Environmentalism” <em>Ecologist</em> 18(4/5), 142-147	+	==== Annotation 201 ====
−	Eckersley, R. (1989) “Green Politics and the New Class: Selfishness or Virtue?” <em>Political Studies</em> 37(2). 205-223	+	The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.
−	Eckersley, R (1992) <em>Environmentalism and Political Theory</em> London: UCL Press	+	==== Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development ====
−	Eckersley, R. (1995) “Liberal Democracy and the Rights of Nature: The Struggle for Inclusion” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 4(4). 169-195	+	The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
−	Eckersley, R. (1996) “Greening Liberal Democracy: The Rights Discourse Revisited” in B.Doherty & M.De Geus, eds, <em>Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability. Rights, and Citizenship</em> London: Routledge	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-73.png|''The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.'']]
−	Ecologist (2005) “The Seductive Language of Development” <em>Ecologist</em> 35(5), 23	+	In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.
−	Eder, K. (1982) “A New Social Movement?” <em>Telos</em> 52, 5-20	+	This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
−	Eder, K (1985) “The ‘new social movements’: moral crusades, political pressure groups, or social movements?” <em>Social Research</em> 833,868-890	+	==== Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development ====
−	Eder, K. (1993) <em>The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies</em> London: Sage	+	The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:
−	Eder, K. (1996) <em>The Social Construction of Nature</em> London: Sage	+	1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.
−	Edgerton, W. ed, (1993) <em>Memoirs of Peasant Tolstoyans in Soviet Russia</em> Bloomington: Indiana University Press	+	2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., ''negation of the negation''), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.
−	Edwards, B. (1995) “With Liberty and Environmental Justice for All: The Emergence and Challenge of Grassroots Environmentalism in the United States” in B.Taylor, ed, <em>Ecological Resistance Movements</em> Albany. NY: State University of New York Press	+	3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.
−	Edwards, J. MacMahon, P. Turner, L. Brough, G. & Hughes, C. (2000) “They gave their lives so these fools could do THIS” <em>Mirror</em>2<sup>nd</sup> May, 2-3	+	Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.”
−	Edwards, P. (1998) “Direct Action at the Crossroads” <em>Independent</em> 7	+	In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.
−	EEV(1997) <em>“Egowarriors and Energy Vamps”</em> EF! Discussion Document	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-74.png|''The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.'']]
−	EFH(1998) <em>“Earth First! Ha! Ha! Ha!”</em> EF! Discussion Document	+	The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.
−	EFID (c2001) “Earth First! Is Dead - Long Live the Earth Liberation Front” <em>Collectable Anorak</em> Sheffield	+	The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.
−	EFWP (1998) <em>“Earth First! What are our philosophies?”</em> EF! Discussion Document	+	This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.
−	EF!AU (1992-2005) <em>Earth First! Action Update</em> Nos. 1-93 Partial archive at [[http://www.eco-action.org/efau/aulasthtml][http://www.eco- action.org/efau/aulasthtml]], near complete paper archive in collection of author	+	Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.
−	EF!J see Earth First! Journal	+	In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a ''forward tendency of motion''.
−	EFIUS (2000) 1<sup>st</sup> Earth First newsletter (1980), reproduced in <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 21(1). 1	+	-----
−	EGGE (2000) “Essential Information to Enhance your Guerrilla Gardening Experience” RTS leaflet	+	==== Annotation 202 ====
−	Eggen, D. & Gates, D. (2002) “From Jail Cell, Unabomber Finds a Forum, Essay in Newsletter Pits Prison Rules vs. First Amendment Claims” <em>Washington Post</em> 27<sup>th</sup> July. Available at [[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7705-2002Jul26.html][http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/articles/A7705-2002Jul26.html]]	+	The ''forward tendency of motion'' describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.
−	EGOD (cl999) “An Epitaph to the Good Old Days” EF! Discussion Document	+	As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.”
−	Ehrlich, C. (1996) “Socialism, Anarchism, and Feminism” in H. Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Again</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be ''more similar'' to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the ''exact characteristics'' of the Roman Empire ever again.
−	Ehrlich, H. (1985) “The University-Military Connection” <em>Social Anarchism</em> 8-9,3-21	+	Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.
−	Ehrlich, H. (1990-1991) “Notes from an Anarchist Sociologist” <em>Social Anarchism</em> 16,29-45	+	-----
−	Ehrlich, H. (1996) “How To Get From Here to There: Building a Revolutionary Transfer Culture” in H.Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Again</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	==== Annotation 203 ====
−	Ehrlich, H. (2002-2003) “Peace is the Way” <em>Social Anarchism</em> 33	+	Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:
−	Ehrlich, H. ed, (1996) <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Again</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-75.png|''The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.'']]
−	Ehrlich, P. & Ehrlich, A. (1990) <em>The Population Explosion</em> New York: Simon & Schuster	+	The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:
−	Elam, D. (1994) <em>Feminism and Deconstruction</em> London: Routledge	+	1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.
−	Eldrum (1993) “Earth First! and tribalism” in <em>Do or Die</em> 2.15	+	2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.
−	Eisenhower, J. (2004) “From Atheist to Treehuggef * <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 24(6), 36	+	3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.
−	Elderberry (2005) “Another Fifty Years to Go” Collection of articles distributed at EF!SG 2005	+	4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.
−	Elkins, S. (1989-1990) “The Politics of Mystical Ecology” <em>Telos</em> 82, 52-70	+	Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.
−	Elliott, L. (1998) <em>The Global Politics of the Environment</em> London: Macmillan	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-76.png|''In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).'']]
−	Emberley, J. & Landry, D. (1989) “Coverage Of Greenham and Greenham As Coverage” in <em>Feminist Studies</em> 15, 485-498	+	Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).
−	Emerson, R.H. ed, (2001) <em>Contemporary Field Research: Perspectives and Formulations</em> Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press	+	According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:
−	Engel, M. (1998) “The day the city became a shire” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> March	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-77.png|''The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.'']]
−	Englart, J. (1999) “Anarchism in Sydney 1975-1981” Available at [[http://www.takver.com/histoiy/sydney/syd7581][http://www.takver.com/histoiy/sydney/syd7581]] .htm	+	Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.
−	Enzensberger, H.N. (1974) “Critique of Political Ecology” <em>New Left Review</em> 84,3-31	+	Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.
−	Epstein, B. (1991) <em>Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Non viol entDirect Action in the U.S.</em> Tucson: Ned Ludd Books	+	Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
−	EREE (1999) <em>“Exist to Resist or Exist to Exist?”</em> EF! Discussion Document	+	-----
−	Escape (cl997) <em>“Beyond Kronstadt /Escaping the 20<sup>th</sup> Century</em>“ London: Escape	+	==== Annotation 204 ====
−	ESI (2001) “Eveiybody Stop it-EF! and Invisible Hierarchies” EF! Discussion Document	+	Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].
−	ESRC (2002) “Direct Action Protesters Move On Within Ten Years”, Press Release at [[http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/PO/releases/2002/november/DIRECTACTION.aspx][http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/PO/releases/2002/november/DIRECTACTION.aspx]]?	+	The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Evading Standards (1997) <em>Evading Standards</em> Spoof Newspaper, London. Available at	+	In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
−	[[http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/evading/][http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/evading/]]	+	-----
−	Evading Standards (2000) <em>Evading Standards</em> Spoof Newspaper, London	+	==== Annotation 205 ====
−	Evans, K. (1998) <em>Copse:. The cartoon book of tree protesting</em> Wiltshire: Orange Dog	+	In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”
−	Evans, P. (2000) “Drama Queens and Radical Greens: a Bit of a Performance” <em>ECOS</em> 21(1), 33-39	+	==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
−	Evemden, N. (1992) <em>The Social Creation of Nature</em> Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press	+	The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.
−	EWAW (1996) <em>Educating Who About What? The Circled A and Its Parasites.</em> Anonymous pamphlet available online at [[https://www2.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/10/298440.html][https://www2.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/10/298440.html]]	+	-----
−	Express (1998) “My Fight Goes on vows the Beanfeast one” <em>Express</em> 27<sup>th</sup> August 7	+	==== Annotation 206 ====
−	Eyerman, R. & Jamison, A. (1989) “Environmental Knowledge As An Organizational Weapon: the Case of	+	Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both ''scientific'' and ''revolutionary.'' Such a worldview is ''scientific'' because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a ''forward tendency'', meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.
−	Greenpeace” <em>Social Science Information</em> 28(1), 99-119	+	Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to ''impact'' motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a ''revolutionary'' worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.
−	Eyerman, R. and Jamison, A. (1991) <em>Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage ''subjective factors'' as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Fairlie, S. (1994) “On the March” <em>Guardian</em> 21* January, 14	+	-----
−	Fairlie, S. (1996) <em>Low Impact Development</em> Charlbury: Jon Carpenter	+	==== Annotation 207 ====
−	Farrell, S. (1998) “Crop Crusaders Are Latest in Protest Chic” <em>Times</em> 5<sup>th</sup> September	+	Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have ''objective'' relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is ''external'' to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.
−	Farrer, L. (2002) <em>Pink Silver. Pink, and Silver - Contested Identitites Against the G8</em> Available at	+	However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can ''impact''. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is ''objective'' to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can ''impact'' the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.
−	[[http://www.pcworks.demon.co.uk/magazine/campaign/pinksilver.htm][http://www.pcworks.demon.co.uk/magazine/campaign/pinksilver.htm]]	+	Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are ''subjective factors''. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on ''that which we are capable of changing'', since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what ''can be changed'' and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.
−	Farrow, H. Moss, P. & Shaw, B. (1995) “Symposium on Feminist Participatoiy? Research” in <em>Antipode</em> 27(1), 71- 100	+	As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.
−	Fas lane Focus (2000/2001) <em>Faslane Focus</em> Magazine, Falane: Faslane Peace Camp	+	-----
−	Faslane Focus (2002) <em>Faslane Focus</em> Magazine, Faslane: Faslane Peace Camp	+	==== Annotation 208 ====
−	Faslania (1997-2000) <em>Faslania.</em> Magazine. Faslane: Faslane Peace Camp	+	Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by ''impacting'' processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.
−	Featherstone, D. (1998) “Review Article: Some Versions of Militant Particularism” <em>Antipode</em> 30(1), 19-25	+	Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include ''rigidity'' (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and ''conservativism'' (see Annotation 236, p. 233).
−	Featherstone, M. (1989) “Postmodernism, Cultural Change, and Social Practice” in D.Kellner, ed, <em>Postmodernism.</em>	+	In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.
−	<em>Jameson. Critique</em> Washington: Maisonneuve Press	+	-----
−	Feldman, J. (1989) <em>Universities in the Business of Repression</em> Boston: South End Press	+	==== Annotation 209 ====
−	Fenn, S. (1998) “Torture Tactics” <em>Squall</em> 16,6	+	If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.
−	Ferguson, N. (1996) “Two Wheels Good, Four Wheels Bad” <em>Times</em> 8<sup>th</sup> August	+	In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.
−	Ferree, M.M. & Merrill, D. (2003) “Hot Movements, Cold Cognition: Thinking About Social Movements in	+	In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:
−	Gendered Frames” in J.Jasper & J.Goodwin <em>Rethinking Social Movements: Structure. Meaning. Emotion</em> Rowman & Littlefield	+	<blockquote>
		+	Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.
−	Ferrell, J. (1998) “Anarchist Criminology” <em>Social Anarchism</em> 25.5-15	+	... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Ferrell, J. (200D <em>Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy</em> New York: Palgrave	+	Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.
−	Festing, S. (1996) “The Third Battle of Newbuiy - War in the Trees” <em>ECOS</em> 17(2), 41-49	+	-----
−	Field, P. (1996) “Reclaim the Streets” <em>Evening Standard</em> 16th July	+	= Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism =
−	Financial Times (2001) “Violent scenes signal that the carnival is over” <em>Financial Times</em> 2 May, 3	+	In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.
−	Flood, A. (2001) Email on Allsorts list, 7<sup>th</sup> June	+	-----
−	Flynn, E.G. (n.d.119161) <em>Sabotage: The Conscious Withdrawal of the Workers* Industrial Efficiency</em> Sheffield; Pirate Press	+	==== Annotation 210 ====
−	Fogg, A. (1996) “A breath of fresh air”, <em>Guardian.</em> 8<sup>th</sup> May	+	Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”
−	Fogg, A. (1997) “Harbouring Dissent in Merseyside” <em>Squall</em> 15.9	+	Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.
−	Foley, C. (1994) “Under Siege With the Road Warriors” <em>New Statesman & Society</em> 25<sup>th</sup> February	+	Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material ''determines'' the ideal, while the ideal ''impacts'' the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
−	Foley, G. (1988) “Deep Ecology and Subjectivity” <em>Ecologist</em> 18(4/5), 119-123	+	However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:''
−	Fonow, M.M. & Cook, J.A eds, (1991) <em>Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research</em>	+	<blockquote>
		+	The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Bloomington: Indiana University Press	+	So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.
−	Foreman, D. (1991a) <em>Confessions of an Ecowarrior</em> New York: Harmony Books	+	-----
−	Foreman, D. (1991b) “Second Thoughts of an Ecowarrior” in M.Bookchin & D.Foreman <em>Defending the Earth</em>	+	== 1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness ==
−	Boston: South End Press	+	=== a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis ===
−	Foreman, D. (1993) “Putting the Earth First” in S./.Armstrong & R.G.Botzler, eds, <em>Environmental Ethics</em> New	+	''Praxis'' includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.
−	York: McGrawhill	+	<br />
−	Foreman, D. & Haywood, B. eds, (1993) <em>Ecodefence: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching</em> California: Abbzug Press	+	-----
−	Foster, J.B. (2000) <em>Marx’s Ecology</em> New York: Monthly Review Press	+	==== Annotation 211 ====
−	Foucault, M. (1977) <em>Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — ''Praxis'' — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — ''thực tiễn'' — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”
−	Foucault, M. (1980) <em>Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings</em> Harlow. Essex: Harvester Press	+	One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality ''and'' consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is ''intention''. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics'' might be considered praxis:
−	Foucault, M (1984) “Preface” in G.Deleuze & F.Guattari <em>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</em> London: Athlone Press	+	''Purpose'' simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with ''historical-social characteristics'' are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.
−	Foucault, M. (1986) <em>The History of Sexuality. Volume 3: The Care of the Self</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Foucault, M. (1990) <em>The Wil! to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Vol.l. An Introduction</em> London: Penguin	+	<blockquote>
		+	The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Foucault, M. & Rabinow, P. ed, (1986) <em>The Foucault Reader</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: ''revolutionäre Praxis''].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', writing:
−	Fox, N. (2005) “Efficiency be damned” <em>Ecologist</em> April, 23-24	+	<blockquote>
		+	The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Fox, W. (1989) “The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels” <em>Environmental Ethics</em> 11,5-25	+	Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is ''objective'' activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].
−	Fozoori, B. (2003) “May Day demonstrations inside Vygotsky’s ‘zone of proximal development*” Paper presented at <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> Manchester Metropolitan University	+	Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.
−	FR (1999) “Forget Redecorating, It’s the Reality We Have to Change, EF! Discussion Document	+	Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.
−	FR (2000) “Forget Redecorating, It’s the Reality We Have to Change, EF! Discussion Document, revised edition	+	''Material production activity'' is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.
−	Frankfort- Nachmia, C. & Nachmia, D. eds, (1992) <em>Research Methods in the Social Sciences</em> London: Edward Arnold	+	''Socio-political activity'' includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.
−	Franks, B. (2003) “The Direct Action Ethic” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 11(1), 13-41	+	''Scientific experimental activity'' is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.
−	Freeden, M. (1996) <em>Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach</em> Oxford: Oxford University Press	+	-----
−	Freeden, M. (2000) “Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices” <em>Political Studies</em> 48(2), 302-322	+	==== Annotation 212 ====
−	Freeden, M. (2000) “Editorial: Ideology at Century’s End” <em>Journal of Political Ideolog</em>ies 5,5-15	+	The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics''.
−	Freedland, J. (2001) “In place of violence” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 15	+	''Material production activity'' has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.
−	Freedom (2002) “Parliamentary Con” <em>Freedom</em> 63 (19), 5<sup>th</sup> October, 6	+	''Socio-political activity'' has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.
−	Freedom (2002) “Night of Mischief’ <em>Freedom</em> 63 (20), 19<sup>th</sup> October, 1	+	''Scientific experimental activity'' has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.
−	Freedom Press, eds, (1971) <em>Fighting the Revolution</em> London: Freedom Press	+	In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.
−	Freedom Press, eds, (1987) <em>The May Days Barcelona 1937</em> London: Freedom Press	+	Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.
−	Freedom Press, eds, (1997a) <em>Peen Ecology and Anarchism</em> London: Freedom Press	+	-----
−	Freedom Press, eds, (1997b) <em>Why Work? Arguments for the Leisure Society</em> London: Freedom Press	+	==== Annotation 213 ====
−	Freeman, J. (1984) “The Tyranny of Structurelessness” in <em>Untying the Knot: Feminism. Anarchism and Organisation</em> London: Dark Star/Rebel Press. Available at [[http://www.spunk.org/texts/consensu/sp000760.html][http://www.spunk.org/texts/consensu/sp000760.html]]	+	Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.
−	French, G. (cl993) “Monkeywrenching Drives Me Nuts” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 14-15	+	Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc
−	Frost, D. (2002) “Ubiquity, Utility and Morality” <em>Total Liberty</em> 3(2), 4	+	Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.
−	Fuller, D. (1999) “Part of the action, or ‘going native’? Learning to cope with the ‘politics of integration’” <em>Area</em> 31(3), 221-227	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-78.png|''Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.'']]
−	Furbisher, J. (1993) “Swollen Hippie Army Steals A Hi-Tech March” <em>Sunday Times</em> 6<sup>th</sup> June	+	Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.
−	Fyke, K. & Sayegh, G. (2001) “Anarchism and the Struggle to Move Forward” <em>Perspectives on Anarchist Theory</em>	+	-----
−	5(2) Available at [[http://www.anarchist-studies.org/publications/perspectives][http://www.anarchist-studies.org/publications/perspectives]]	+	=== b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness ===
−	G (1999) “June 18th • If I Can Dance It’s Not My Revolution?” in <em>Reflections on June 18<sup>th</sup></em> London: Reclaim the	+	The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.
−	Streets. Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/octo)518_rtsl.html%23dance][http://www.infoshop.org/octo)518_rtsl.html#dance]]	+	This view stems from the following basic principles:
−	GA See Green Anarchist	+	* The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
		+	* The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
		+	** To perceive the objective world.
		+	** To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
		+	** To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48]
−	Gambone, L. (1999) <em>Towards Post-Modern Anarchism</em> Red Lion Press	+	The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.
−	Gamson, W. (1990) <em>The Strategy of Social Protest</em> (2nd edition) Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.	+	-----
−	Gamer, R. (n.d.) <em>If Hobbes is Right Then He Is Wrong: The Case Against the_State</em> Ipswich: Half-Assed-	+	==== Annotation 214 ====
−	Photocopy-Job Unlimited	+	The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:
−	Gamer, C. (1997) “The Gospel According to Swampy” <em>Independent</em> 6<sup>th</sup> February	+	Hegel’s ''Absolute Idealism'' upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in ''Anti-Dühring'':
−	Gamer, R. (1996) <em>Environmental Politics: Britain. Europe and the Global Environment</em> London: Macmillan	+	<blockquote>
		+	If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Gamer, R. (1998) “Defending Animal Rights” <em>Parliamentary Affairs</em> 51(3). 458-469	+	''Fideism'', which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.
−	Gathering Visions, Gathering Strength 2 (1998) <em>Gathering Visions. Gatheringstrength-2</em> Reports Manchester:	+	''Positivism, or empiricist materialism'', which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].
−	Manchester Metropolitan University	+	-----
−	GAY See Green Anarchy	+	The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216]
−	Geertz, C. (1993) <em>The Interpretation of Cultures</em> London: Fontana Press	+	-----
−	Gene-no! (1998a) “Bye Bye Blackbird, Locals Uproot Genetics Test Site” Press Release, 21[rt] July	+	==== Annotation 215 ====
−	Gene-no! (1998b) Notes of DANE-Gene-no! Meeting, 27th August	+	Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.
−	Gene-no! (2000) <em>International Centre for Lies</em> Newcastle: Gene-no!	+	Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.
−	Genetix Update (1998) “Introduction” <em>Genetix Update</em> 6,1	+	Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.
−	Genetix Update (1999-2004) <em>Genetix Update</em> 13-28 London & Totnes: Genetix Update	+	From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from ''empirical consciousness'' to ''theoretical consciousness''; and from ''ordinary consciousness'' to ''scientific consciousness''.
−	Gerlach, L. & Hine, V. (1970) <em>People. Power and Change</em> Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.	+	-----
−	Gerrard, N. (1999) “Treehouse Truants” <em>Observer</em> Review, 10<sup>th</sup> January, 2	+	==== Annotation 216 ====
−	GGFS (cl999) “A Gardener’s Guide for Survival In the Modem World”, activist handbook reproduced in	+	In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:
−	Schnews <em>Schnews Survival Handbook</em> London: Calverts Press	+	''•'' ''Sense experience'': observations of the external world detected by our senses.
−	Giddens, A. (1991) <em>Modernity and Self-Identity - Self and Society In the Late Modem Ag</em>e London: Polity Press	+	''•'' ''Knowledge'': information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.
−	Gillan, A. (2000) “Ex-Soldier Admits Defacing Statue of Churchill” <em>Guardian</em> 8 th May, 7	+	Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).
−	Gitlin, T. (1980) <em>The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and the Unmaking of the New Left</em> Berkeley: University of California Press	+	In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are ''abstractions'' of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.
−	Gitlin, A. ed, (1994) <em>Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research</em> New York: Routledge	+	Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''.
−	GLAS (2003) <em>Glaspaper</em> Production issue, Glasgow: Glasgow Letters on Architecture and Space	+	Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world ''empirical consciousness'', and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world ''theoretical consciousness''.
−	GLAS (2004) <em>Glaspaper</em> Learning and Education issue, Glasgow: Glasgow Letters on Architecture and Space	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-79.png]]
−	Glendinning, C. (2002) <em>Off The Man: An Expedition Deep into Empire and the Global Economy New Society Publishers</em> Boston: Shambhala	+	Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.
−	Goaman, K. (2002) <em>The Old World is Behind You: The Situationists and Beyond in Contemporary Anarchist Currents</em> Phd Thesis, University of London	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-80.png]]
−	Goaman, IC (2003) “Globalisation Versus Humanisation: Contemporary Anti-Capitalism and Anarchism” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 11(32). 150-171	+	Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.
−	Goaman, K. (2005) “The Anarchist Travelling Circus: Reflections On Contemporary Anarchism, Anti-Capitalism and the International Scene” in J.Bowen & LPurkis, eds, <em>Changing Anarchism</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	According to ''Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy,'' edited by T. J. Blakely:
−	Gombin. R. (1979) <em>The Radical Tradition: A Study in Modem Revolutionary Thought</em> London: Methuen	+	<blockquote>
		+	Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...
−	Godwin, W. (1796) <em>An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness</em> (2 Vols) London: G.G.J. & J. Robinson	+	The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.
−	Godwin, W. (1969) “Anarchy as Conversation” in W.Godwin <em>Thoughts on Man, his Nature. Productions, and Discoveries. Interspersed with some Particulars Respecting the Author London: E, Wilson</em>	+	An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Godwin, W. (1986) <em>The Anarchist Writings of William Godwin</em> London: Freedom Press	+	Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).
−	Goldman, E. (n.d. [ 1915]) <em>Preparedeness: the Road to Universal Slaughter and the Individual. Society and the State</em> New York: AJ.Muste Memorial Institute	+	Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.
−	Goldman, E. (1969) <em>Anarchism and Other Essays</em> New York: Dover Publications Inc.	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-81.png|''Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.'']]
−	Goldman, E, (2002) <em>Anarchy! An Anthology of Emma Goldman’s Mother Earth</em> ed, P.Glassgold, Washington: Counterpoint	+	Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).
−	Goldsmith, E. et al. (1972) <em>Blueprint for Survival</em> London: Tom Stacey	+	Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ''ordinary consciousness''. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as ''scientific consciousness''.
−	Goldsmith, E. (1988) “The Way: An Ecological World view” <em>Ecologist</em> 18(4/5), 160-185	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-82.png]]
−	Goldsmith, Z. (1998) “Who are the <em>Real</em> Terrorists?” <em>Ecologist</em> 28(5), 312-317	+	These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.
−	Goldsmith, Z. (2000) “The Planet Needs Saving - But So Does the Cenotaph” <em>Telegraph</em> 15<sup>th</sup> May, 18	+	-----
−	Gombin, R. (1979) <em>The Radical Tradition: A Study in Modem Revolutionary Thought</em> Available at	+	''Empirical consciousness'' is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in ''empirical knowledge''.
−	[[http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2379/gomb_rad.htm][http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2379/gomb_rad.htm]]	+	''Empirical knowledge'' has two types: ''ordinary empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and ''scientific empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.
−	Gonzales, S. (2002) “Social Innovation In Tyne and Wear” Undergraduate Dissertation, Northumbria University	+	''Theoretical consciousness'' is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.
−	Good, P. (2002) “The Time is Not Yet Ripe, But It’s Too Dangerous To Wait” <em>Total Liberty</em> 3(3), 3	+	Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.
−	Goodin, R. (1992) <em>Green Political Theory</em> Cambridge, MA: Polity Press	+	Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.
−	Goodman, P. (I960?) <em>Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organised Society</em> New York: Vintage Books	+	-----
−	Good way, D. (1989) “Marxism and Anarchism” in D.Goodway, ed, <em>For Anarchism: History. Theory and Practice</em> London: Routledge	+	==== Annotation 217 ====
−	Goodway, D. ed, (1989) <em>For Anarchism: History. Theory and Practice</em> London: Routledge	+	The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).
−	Goodway, D. (1999) “The Anarchism of Colin Ward” in K. Worpole, ed, <em>Richer Futures: Fashioning a New Politics</em> London: Earthscan	+	Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.
−	Goodwin, J. (1999) ‘Size Does Matter...And Nine Other Tips for Effective Protest* <em>Mother Jones</em> March/April	+	''Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.''
−	Goodwin, J. Jasper, J. & Polletta, F. eds, (2001) <em>Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements</em> London: University of Chicago Press	+	For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that ''more'' manure will help plants grow ''even more'' — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.
−	Goodwin, J. & Jasper, J. eds, (2004) <em>Rethinking Social Movements: Structure. Meaning, and Emotion</em> Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers	+	This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.
−	Goodwin, N. (1996a) “Disarming Women” <em>Squall</em> 14,20-21	+	Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call ''theoretical knowledge''].
−	Goodwin, N. (1996b) “Pure Genius: the land is ours” <em>Peace News</em> June, 6	+	-----
−	Gordon, G. (2000) <em>Horizons of Change: Deconstruction and the Evanescence of Authority</em> Available at [[http://mel][http://mel]] ior. uni v-montp3 .fr/ra_forum/en/gordon_gareth/theses_OO.html	+	==== Annotation 218 ====
−	Gordon, U. (2003) “Consensus Games: Towards a Democratic Theory of Consensus Decision-Making” in C.Barker & M.TyldesIey, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 9 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is ''empirical knowledge.'' ''Theoretical knowledge'' is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call ''theoretical knowledge''.
−	Gorz, A. (1980) <em>Ecology as Politics</em> Boston: South End Press	+	Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ''ordinary'' or ''scientific'' in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.
−	Gorz, A. (1993) “Political Ecology: Expertocracy Versus Self-Limitation” <em>New Left Review</em> 203,55-67	+	''Ordinary consciousness'' refers to perception that is formed ''passively'' and ''directly'' from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.
−	Gorz, A. (1994) <em>Capitalism. Socialism. Ecology</em> London: Verso	+	''Scientific consciousness'' refers to perception formed ''actively'' and ''indirectly'' from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.
−	Gott, R. (1995) “The Hit and Run Left” <em>Red Pepper</em> 15-18	+	Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.
−	Gould, D. (2003) “Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back Into the Study of Social Movements? in J.Goodwin & J.Jasper, eds, <em>Rethinking Social Movements: Structure. Meaning, and Emotion</em> Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield	+	-----
−	Gould, N. (1974a) “William Morris” <em>Ecologist</em> 4(6), 210-212	+	==== Annotation 219 ====
−	Gould, N. (1974b) “Peter Kropotkin: The Anarchist Prince” <em>Ecolog</em>ist 4(7). 261-264	+	Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is ''scientific consciousness''.
−	Gouldner, A.W. (1973) “The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State” in A.W.Gouldner, ed, <em>For</em>	+	Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.
−	<em>Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today</em> London: Allen Lane	+	Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.
−	Gouldner, A.W. (1979) <em>The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Classj_a Frame of Reference. Theses. Conjectures. Arguments, and An Historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest of the Modem Era</em> London: Macmillan	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-83.png|''Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.'']]
−	Graeber, D. (2002) “The New Anarchists” <em>New Left Review</em> 13,61-73	+	-----
−	Gramsci, A. (1971) <em>Selections from the prison notebooks</em> London: Lawrence & Wishart	+	==== Annotation 220 ====
−	Grant, L. (1995) “Just Say No”, <em>Guardian.</em> 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 15-22	+	For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.
−	Grassby, J. (2001) <em>A Socialist’s Guide for the 21” Century</em> Washington: TUPS Books	+	In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.
−	Grassby, J. (2002) <em>Revolution in the 21st century: a Rough Guide to Revolution for Academics and Activists</em> Washington: TUPS Books	+	=== c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness ===
−	Green Action Network (n.d.) “Green & Brown Anarchist” 1, Spoof Paper, Oxford: Green Action Network	+	Praxis serves as the ''basis, driving force,'' and ''purpose'' of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]
−	Green Anarchist (1991) <em>“Gormless Greens</em>“ 27,7-9	+	Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.
−	Green Anarchist (1993) <em>“Refuse Reformism</em>“ Discussion Document circulated in EF!	+	-----
−	Green Anarchist (cl996) “Against Ideology” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 45-46,9	+	==== Annotation 221 ====
−	Green Anarchist (1996) “Greens, Get Real” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 40-41,27-28	+	Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see ''The Source of Consciousness'', p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.
−	Green Anarchist (1997a) “Earth First! A Movement Under Threat: Which Way Forward for Direct Action” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 49-50. 12-13	+	Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.
−	Green Anarchist (1997b) “Dis/Organisation: Are Mass Campaigns Really the Way Forward?” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 49- 50,13	+	Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.
−	Green Anarchist (1997c) “The Importance of the Local Over the National” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 49-50,14	+	Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.
−	Green Anarchist (1997d) “Earth First! and Ecofascism” <em>Green Anarchist</em> 49-50,15-16	+	Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].
−	Green Anarchist (1999) “Reformism or Revolution” Discussion Document circulated in EF!	+	Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the ''standard of truth.'' Reality also serves as the basis for ''examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process'' [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”<ref>''Theses On Feuerbach'', Karl Marx, 1845.</ref>
−	Green Anarchist (2000) “MayDay, MayDay!” Pre-Mayday discussion document	+	Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
−	Green Anarchy (2001) “Editorial” 5,2	+	The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.
−	Green Anarchy (2002) “Anarchism: The New Identity Politics” <em>Green Anarchy</em> 9,2	+	-----
−	Green, G. (1971) <em>The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?</em> New York: International Publishers	+	==== Annotation 222 ====
−	Green Party (1996) “Local Elections: Direct Action that Hits the Spot” <em>Green World</em> Spring, 18	+	''Subjectivism'' occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is ''solipsism'', a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
−	Greenpeace (cl996) “25 Years as a Catalyst for Change” Report, London: Greenpeace	+	''Idealism'' has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.
−	Greenway, 1 (1997) “Twenty First Century Sex” in J.Purkis & J.Bowen, eds, <em>Twenty-First Century Anarchism:</em>	+	''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.
−	<em>Unorthodox Ideas for a New Millennium</em> London: Cassell	+	''Rigidity'' is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
−	Gridley, K. (1999) <em>Tyneside Action for People and Planet: A Study of Participation in Direct Action</em>	+	''Bureaucracy'' arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.
−	Undergraduate Dissertation, Sociology Department, University of Newcastle	+	On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.
−	Griffin, R. (1997) “Direct Action - Means & Ends” <em>Greenline</em> July, 20	+	-----
−	Griffin, R. (1999) “Post Modernist Anarchism: A Response to John Griffin” <em>Total Liberty</em> 1(4)	+	==== Annotation 223 ====
−	Griffin, R. (2002) “Reality and Ideology” <em>Total Liberty</em> 3(3), 6	+	In this context, ''pragmatism'' refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.
−	Griffiths, J. (cl 998) “Art as a Weapon of Protest” <em>Resurgence</em> 180,30	+	''Empiricism'' is a faulty form of materialism in which ''only'' sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material ''determines'' consciousness, while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world through conscious labor activity. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]
−	Griggs, S. Howarth, D. & Jacobs, B. (1998) “Second Runway at Manchester” <em>Parliamentary Affairs</em> 51(3), 358- 369	+	Thus, the principle of the ''unification'' of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]
−	Griggs, S. & Howarth, D. (2002) “An Alliance of Interest and Identity? Explaining the Campaign Against	+	== 2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ==
−	Manchester Airport’s Second Runway” <em>Mobilization</em> 7(1)	+	=== a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ===
−	Grindon, G. (2004) “Carnival Against Capital: A Comparison of Bakhtin, Vaneigem and Bey” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 12(2), 147-161	+	==== Annotation 224 ====
−	Grosscup, B. & Doyle (2002) “An Open Letter to the Anti-Authoritarian Movement” Available at	+	The section below outlines and explains ''the Universal Law of Consciousness'', which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.
−	http.’Z/www. zmag.org/content/Vi sionStrategy/open_l etter_. cfm	+	In his ''Philosophical Notebook'', Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.
−	Grove-White, R. (1991) “The UK’s Environmental Movement and UK Political Culture” Report to EURES, November	+	According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).
−	Grove-White, R (1992) “Environmental Debate and Society - The Role of NGOs” <em>ECOS</em> 13(1), 10-14	+	-----
−	Grove-White, R. (1995) “Environment and Society - Some Reflections” <em>Environmental Politics</em> 4(4). 265-275	+	==== Annotation 225 ====
−	Grove-White, R. (1997) “Brent Spar Rewrote the Rules” <em>New Statesman</em> 20<sup>th</sup> June, 17-19	+	Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.
−	Gruen, L. & Jamieson, D, eds, (1994) <em>Reflecting On Nature :_Rcadings In Environmental Philosophy</em> New York: Oxford University Press	+	For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.
−	GSP (1998) “Global Street Party” Organisers* Report, distributed in EF!	+	Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.
−	GTB (2001) “Getting the Bastards: I studied the Birmingham G8” Distributed on Allsorts Email List	+	By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.
−	GTSNY (1998) <em>“Got a test site near you?”</em> Activist handbook	+	When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.
−	GU - Genetix Update, newsletter	+	For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.
−	Guardian (2000a) “Secretaries with Skills in Sabotage” <em>Guardian</em> 17<sup>th</sup> April, 2	+	This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.
−	Guardian (2000b) “Making the garden	+	Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.
−	row” Editorial <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May	+	This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.
−	Guardian (2001a) “Confusion reigns as police brace for mayhem” <em>Guardian</em> l[rt] May, 4	+	-----
−	Guardian (2001b) “Taking to the streets - protesters gained little except air time” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May	+	==== Annotation 226 ====
−	Guerin, D. (1973) <em>Anarchism: From Theory to Practice</em> Accessed at http ://www. geocities. com/nestor_mcnab/guerin/contents. html	+	Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).
−	Guerin, D. ed, (1998) <em>No Gods No Masters - Book 2</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.
−	Guillaume, D. (1990) “Introduction” in M.Bakunin <em>Marxism. Freedom and the State</em> London: Freedom Press	+	We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.
−	Gutting, G, ed, (1994) <em>Cambridge Companion to Foucault</em> New York: Cambridge University Press	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-84.png|''The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.'']]
−	GVGS (1999) “Gathering Visions Gathering Strength 17-19* October 1999 Report” Sheffield: GVGS III	+	The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.
−	Habermas, J. (1971<em>) Toward a Rational Society Student Protest Science, and Politics</em> London: Heinemann	+	-----
−	Habermas, J. (1984) <em>The Theory of Communicative Action</em> London: Heinemann	+	'''- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness'''
−	Hajer, M. (1995) <em>The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization a</em>nd the Policy Process Oxford: Clarendon Press	+	''Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process.'' In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, ''phenomena'', as opposed to ''essence'' — see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the ''essence'' — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: ''sensation'', ''conception'', and ''symbolization''.
−	Halfacree, K. (1996) “Out of Place In the Country: Travellers and the ‘Rural Idyll’” <em>Antipode</em> 28,42-73	+	Human ''sensation'' of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — ''conception'' — is formed.
−	Halfacree, K. (1999) “‘Anarchy Doesn’t Work Unless You Think About It*: Intellectual Interpretation and DIY Culture” <em>Area</em> 31(3), 209-220.	+	''Conception'' is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., ''sensation'']. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.
−	Hall, S. (2000) “Softly, Softly Approach Falls Sown as McDonald’s is Wrecked by Anarchists” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 3	+	''Symbolization'' is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.
−	Hall, S. (1996) “Who Needs Identity?” in S.Hall & P. du Gay, eds, <em>Questions of Cultural Identity</em> London: Sage	+	-----
−	Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (1989) <em>New Times The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s</em> London: Lawrence & Wishart/Marxism Today	+	==== Annotation 227 ====
−	Hamilton, M. (2002) “Putting Food First” <em>Freedom</em> 65(20), 2	+	Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:
−	Hammersley, M. ed, (1993) <em>Social Research: Philosophy. Politics and Practise</em> London: Sage	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-85.png]]
−	Hammersley, M. (1995) <em>The Politics of Social Research</em> London: Sage	+	''1.'' ''Sensation'': Jessica ''senses'' a cake in the window of a bakery. She ''sees'' the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She ''smells'' the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.
−	Hammersley, M. & Atkinson, P. (1993) <em>Ethnography: Principles in Practise</em> London & New York: Routledge	+	''2.'' ''Conception'': Jessica begins to ''conceive'' of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.
−	Hancock, S. (1997) “In Praise of Openness” <em>Peace News</em> 2415.13-14	+	''3.'' ''Symbolization'': The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.
−	Hancock, S. (1998) “Hammering the Message Home” <em>Peace News</em> 2423	+	Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the ''rational consciousness'' stage of the cognitive process'','' which is explained in more detail below.
−	Hancock, S. (2001) “Greasing the Maypole” 1<sup>st</sup> May, distributed on Allsorts	+	-----
−	Hansen, A. (2001) <em>Direct Action: Memoirs of An Urban Guerrilla</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly ''interpret'' the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into ''rational consciousness''.
−	Haraway, D. (1988) “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of the Partial Perspective” <em>Feminist Studies</em> 14,575-599	+	''Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process.'' It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the ''essence'' of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: ''definition'', ''judgment'', and ''reasoning''.
−	Haraway, D. (1991) <em>Simians. Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature</em> London: Free Association Books	+	''Definition'' is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.
−	Haraway, D. (1992) “The Promise of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others” in	+	''Judgment'' is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.
−	L.Grossberg, C.Nelson & P.A.Treichler, eds, <em>Cultural Studies</em> New York: Routledge	+	According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.
−	Hardin, G.J. (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons” <em>Science</em> 162,1243-48.	+	''Reasoning'' is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).
−	Harding, L. (1998) “Rural Lobby Raises Its Angry Voice” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> March	+	-----
−	Harding, S. (1991) “Who Knows? Identities and Feminist Epistemology” in J.E.Hartman & E.Messer-Davidow, eds, <em>(En)Gendering Knowledge: Feminists in Academia</em> Knoxville: University of Tennessee	+	==== Annotation 228 ====
−	Harding, S. & Hintikka, M.B. eds, (1983) <em>Discovering Reality - Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology.</em>	+	Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].
−	<em>Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science</em> London: D.Reidel Publishing Co	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-86.png]]
−	Harding, S. ed, (1987) <em>Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues</em> Milton Keynes: Open University Press	+	''1.'' ''Definition'': Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of ''definition''. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.
−	Harford, B. & Hopkins, S. (1984) <em>Greenham Common: Women at the Wire</em> London: Women’s Press Ltd.	+	''2.'' ''Judgment'': Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”
−	Harris, N. Paton Walsh, N. & Thompson, T. (2001) “Met tactics raising May Day riot threat” <em>Guardian</em> Accessed	+	''3.'' ''Reasoning'': Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”
−	May 200Ion [[http://www.indymedia.org.uk][http://www.indymedia.org.uk]]	+	Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the ''sensation'' phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final ''reasoning'' phase of the rational stage, and so on.
−	Harper, C. (1987) <em>Anarchy: a Graphic Guide</em> London: Camden Press	+	It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.
−	Harper, C. ed, (1994) <em>Proleeoma to a Study of the Return of the Repressed in History</em> London: Freedom Press	+	Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.
−	Harper, M. (2002) “2002 - A monthly guide to nature conservation” <em>ECOS</em> 23(1), 72-79	+	''- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality''
−	Harper, V. (1970) “Russell and the Anarchists” <em>Anarchy</em> 109,68-77	+	Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If ''emotional consciousness'' is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then ''rational consciousness'', based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.
−	Harrd, R. Brockmeier, J. & MUhlhauser, P. (1999) <em>Grecnspeak: A Study of Environmental Discourse</em> London: Sage	+	-----
−	Harrington, B. (2003) “The Social Psychology of Access in Ethnographic Research” <em>Journal of Contemporary Ethnography</em> 32(5), 592-625	+	==== Annotation 229 ====
−	Harris, J. (1998) “Liberating Human and Non-Human Animals: Ethical Bodily Regimes Amongst Women Animal Rights Activists” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 4 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.
−	Harris, P. (2000) “Thent he thugs came out to play” <em>Daily Mail</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 4-5	+	For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.
−	Harrison, J. (1993) <em>Travellers of the New Age. Trying to Go For It</em> Syston. Leicestershire: Monolith Publications	+	However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is ''truth'' [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.
−	Hart, L. (1997) “In Defence of Radical Direct Action, Reflections on Civil Disobedience, Sabotage and Nonviolence” in J.Purkis & J.Bowen, eds, <em>Twenty-First Century Anarchism: Unorthodox Ideas for a New Millennium</em> London: Cassell	+	-----
−	Hartman, IE. & Messer-Davidow, E. eds, (1991) <em>(En)Gendering Knowledge: F</em>eminists in Academia Knoxville: University of Tennessee	+	==== Annotation 230 ====
−	Hartsock, N. (1983) ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism* in S.Harding & M.B.Hintikka, eds, <em>Discovering Reality - Feminist Perspective</em>s on Epist<em>emology.</em>	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-87.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.'']]
−	<em>Metaphysics. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science</em> London: D.Reidel Publishing Co	+	One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].
−	Hate Mail (2002) <em>Hate Mail</em> Spoof Newspaper, 1* April	+	The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.
−	The Havoc Mass (2004) “The Havoc Mass” <em>Green Anarchy</em> 15,18	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-88.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.'']]
−	Hawkens, P. Lovins, L. & Lovins, H. (1999) <em>Natural Capitalism: the Next Indust</em>rial Revolution London: Earthscan	+	This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.
−	Hawkins, C. (1999) “Assassination, Self-Expression and Social Change: Emma Goldman and Political Violence” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 7.3	+	-----
−	Hawthorne, A. eds, (1993-1996) <em>On The Fiddle</em> 4-9 Newsletter, Brighton: Levellers	+	Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.
−	Hay, P.R. (1988) “Ecological Values and Western Political Traditions: From Anarchism to Fascism” <em>Politics</em> 8(2), 22-29	+	The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].
−	Hayward, T. (1994) <em>Ecological Thought: An Introduction</em> Cambridge: Polity Press	+	-----
−	Hayward, T. (1998) <em>Political Theory and Ecological Values</em> Oxford: Polity Press	+	==== Annotation 231 ====
−	Hebdige, D. (1987) <em>Subculture: The Meaning of Style</em> London: Routledge	+	The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:
−	Heckert, J. (2005) “Sexual ity/Identity/Politics” in IPurkis & J.Bowen, eds, <em>Changing Anarchism</em> London: Cassell	+	''The Law of Negation of Negation'' dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.
−	Heerings, H. & Zeldenrust, I. (1995) <em>Elusive Saviours: Transnational Corporations and Sustainable Development</em> Utrecht: International Books	+	''The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'' recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a ''quality shift'' in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”
−	Heffer, S. (2000) “This bestial behaviour is motivated by evil, not by nobler concerns” <em>Daily Mail</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 6	+	''The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites'' states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of ''truth -'' the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.
−	Heilbroner, R.J. (1974) <em>An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect</em> London: Calder & Boyars	+	=== b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality ===
−	Heller, C. (1999) <em>The Ecology of Everyday Life - Rethinking the Desire for Nature</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	''- Definition of Truth''
−	Heller, D. (1999) “Faslane Peace Camp: Power Within an Autonomous Zone”, in J.Pickerill & M.Duckett, eds, <em>Radical British Environmentalism: Theory Into Practice</em> Newcastle	+	All cognitive processes lead to the creation of ''knowledge'', which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.
−	Heller, D. (2000 [2001]) <em>The Practice. Power and Poetics of Direct Action</em> University of Hull. I used the internet- accessible version from 2000, formerly available at [[http://www.angelfire.com/au/davidheller/introduction.htm][http://www.angelfire.com/au/davidheller/introduction.htm]]	+	Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of ''truth'' is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a '''process''': thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
−	Hemlock, C. (2002) “I marched against the bill, jail me - thoughts on the UK’s new terror bill” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 22(3), 20-53	+	-----
−	Hemment, D. (1998) “The Northern Warehouse Parties - Dangerous Dancing and Disco Riots” Available at http://www. dre whemment co m/1998/dangerous_dancing_and_disco_riots. html	+	==== Annotation 232 ====
−	Henderson, IP. (1998) <em>The Co nstructionof Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Con</em>fucian. Islamic. Jewish and Early <em>Christian Patterns</em> Albany, NY: SUNY Press	+	Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”
−	Hemgren, P. (1993) <em>Path of Resistance: The Practice of Civil Disobedience</em> Philadelphia: New Society Publishers	+	Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.
−	Hess, K. (1989) “Rights and Reality” in D.Roussopoulos, ed, <em>The Anarchist Papers 2</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	''- The Properties of Truth''
−	Hetherington, K. (1998) <em>Expressions of Identity: Space, Performance. Politics</em> London: Sage	+	All truths are ''objective, relative, absolute,'' and ''concrete.''
−	Hetherington, K. (2000) <em>New Age Travellers: Vanloads of Uproarious Humanity</em> London: Cassell	+	The ''objectivity'' of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.
−	Hetherington, P. (2003) “Bourgeois Image Haunts National Trust” <em>Guardian</em> 6<sup>th</sup> September	+	-----
−	Heywood, A. (1994) <em>Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction</em> Basingstroke: Macmillan	+	==== Annotation 233 ====
−	Heider, U. (1994) <em>Anarchism: Left. Right and Green</em> San Francisco: City Lights	+	The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to ''idealism'', which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].
−	Hill, C. (1972) <em>The World Turned Upside Down: Radical ideas during the English Revolution</em> London: Temple Smith	+	This objectivity of truth also refutes ''skepticism'', which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].
−	Hill, C. (1973) Introduction, G. Winstanley <em>The Law of Freedom and other Writings</em> Harmondsworth: Penguin	+	Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).
−	Hill, C. (1986) “Winstanley and Freedom” in R.C.Richardson & G.M.Rider <em>Freedom and the English Revolution: Essays in History and Literature</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.
−	Hillgrove Campaign Newsletter (1999-2000) <em>Hillgrove CampaignNewsletter</em> 10-14 Oxford: SHAC	+	Truth is not only objective, but also ''absolute'' and ''relative''. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
−	Hindle, J. (2006) <em>Nine Miles: Two Winters of Anti-Road Protest</em> Phoenix Tree Books	+	-----
−	Hjelmar, U. (1996) <em>The Political Practice of Environmental Organisations</em> Aidershot: Avebury	+	==== Annotation 234 ====
−	Hoad, D. (1998) “Direct Action and the Environmental Movement” <em>Talking Politics</em> 10(3), 208-211	+	Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in ''Anti-Dühring'':
−	Hoagland, S.L. (1988) <em>Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value</em> Palo Alto: Institute for Lesbian Studies	+	<blockquote>
		+	If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
−	Hoffman, R. ed, (1973) <em>Anarchism</em> New York: Atherton Press	+	But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.
−	Holloway, J. (2002) <em>Change the World Without Taking Power</em> London: Pluto	+	Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Holm wood, J. (1999) “Radical Sociology: What’s Left?” in P.Bagguley & J.Heam, eds, <em>Transforming Politics: Rower and Resistance</em> London: MacMillan
−	hooks, B. (1984) <em>Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center</em> Boston: South End Press	+	-----
−	hooks, B. (1991) <em>Yearning: Race. Gender and Cultural Politics</em> London: Turnaround	+	Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
−	hooks, B. (1994) <em>Teaching to Transgress</em> New York: Routledge	+	-----
−	Hopkins, N. (1998) “Sowing New Seeds of Dissent” <em>Guardian</em> 13<sup>th</sup> June, 1-2	+	==== Annotation 235 ====
−	Hopkins, N. (2000) “Police braced for violence at ‘hard core’ protests” <em>Guardian</em> 19<sup>th</sup> April	+	''False consciousness'' is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:
−	Hopkins, N. (2001) “How ‘zero tolerance’ worked in practice” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 5	+	<blockquote>
		+	Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Hopkins, N. Dodd, V. & Allison, R. (2001) “Police set trap for protests” <em>Guardian</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 1-4	+	Although the ''term'' “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the ''concept'' underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in ''The Holy Family,'' Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:
−	Horowitz, I. (1964) <em>The Anarchists</em> New York: Dell Publishing	+	<blockquote>
		+	They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Hughes Dennis, C. (2001) <em>Reclaiming Space: DIY Culture in Newcastle</em> MA Urban and Regional Change in	+	This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.
−	Europr, University of Durham, Department of Geography	+	<nowiki>*</nowiki> Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are'':
−	Hunt, A. (1980) “The Radical Critique of Law: An Assessment”, <em>International Journal of the Sociology of Law</em> 8, 33-46	+	<blockquote>
		+	It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Hunt, E. (1999) <em>The Creation and Maintenance of Identity in the Context of Non-Violent Direct Action Groups</em> MA Dissertation, University of Durham	+	Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in ''Marx Myths and Legends'':
−	Hunter, R. (1979) <em>Warriors of the Rainbow</em> New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston	+	<blockquote>
		+	Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Hunt Saboteurs Association (cl997) <em>HSA Tactics Book - Hints and Tips</em> Accessed 1997 at http ://www,cn vi ro 1 ink.org/arrs/HRS A/tactics/tactbook/hi nts. html
−	Huston, S. (1997) “Kropotkin and Spatial Social Theory” <em>Anarchist Studies</em> 5(2). 109-130	+	-----
−	IE (2005) <em>Insurrectionary Ecology</em> Pamphlet distributed at EF! summer gathering	+	“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
−	Illich, I. (1971) <em>Deschooling Society</em> London: Calder & Boyars	+	Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
−	Illich, I. (1990) <em>Tools for Conviviality</em> London: Marion Boyers	+	Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.
−	<em>i Publics</em>	+	-----
−	Inglehart, R. (1977) <em>The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Weste</em>	+	==== Annotation 236 ====
−	Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press	+	Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:
−	Inglehart, R. (1981) “Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity” <em>American Political Science Review</em> 75, 880-990	+	''Metaphysics'' is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth ''at all''. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a ''process'', and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.
−	Inglehart, R. (1990) <em>Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society</em> Princeton: Princeton University Press	+	''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.
−	Irvine, S. & Ponton, A. (1998) <em>A Green Manifesto</em> London: Optima	+	''Conservativism'' includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.
−	IWW (c2000) “I WW: An Union For All” Poole: IWW	+	''Stagnation'' is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.
−	IWW (2001) “Every Worker Needs a Union” Poole: IWW	+	On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.
−	JI 8 (1999) <em>Squaring Up to the Square Mile: A Rough Guide to_the City of London</em> UK: June 18 Publications	+	-----
−	Jakobs, M. ed, (1997) <em>Greening the Millennium? The New Politics of the Environment</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	==== Annotation 237 ====
−	Jamison, A. Eyerman, R. & Cramer, J. (1990) <em>The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness</em> Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press	+	''Relativism'' is the belief that human consciousness can ''only'' achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:
−	Jamison, A. (2001) <em>The Making of Green Knowledge: Environmental Politi</em>cs and Cultural Transformation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press	+	''Subjectivism'': which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.
−	Jane (1997) “Anti-Nuclear Anarchy in Action” <em>Faslania.</em> Summer, 12.	+	''Revisionism'': a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see ''Private and Common'', p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
−	Jane (2005) “Peat processing plant sabotaged” Email distributed on PA! List 11.6.2005	+	''Sophistry:'' the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.
−	Jarach, L. (2004) “Leftism 101” <em>Green Anarchy</em> 15,34-36	+	''Skepticism:'' the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.
−	Jarman, M. & Torrance, J. (1999) “Ecology and Nonviolent Revolution” <em>Peace News</em> 2436. 15-16	+	-----
−	Jasper, J. M. (1998) “The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around Social Movements” in <em>Sociological Forum</em> 13(3). 397-424	+	In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has ''concreteness.'' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call ''concreteness''.
−	Jasper, J.M. (1999) <em>The Art of Moral Protest: Culture. Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements</em> University of Chicago Press	+	Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref> Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.
−	Jasper, J.M. & Poulsen, J.D. (1995) “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests, <em>Social Problem.</em> 42,493-512	+	-----
−	Jasper, L. (2001) “Stay away, says Ken” <em>Guardian</em> 1<sup>st</sup> May, 19	+	==== Annotation 238 ====
−	Javad, S. (2002) “Why Should We Bother With Anarchism in Relation to the ‘Classicality* and ‘Canonicity* in Contemporary Sociology” in C.Barker & M.Tyldesley, eds, <em>Alternative Futures and Popular Protest</em> 8 Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University	+	In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.
−	Jayaratne, T.E. (1983) “The Value of Qualitative Research for Feminist Research” in G.Bowles & R.Duelli Klein, eds, <em>Theories of Women’s Studies</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	''- The Role of Truth in Reality.''
−	Jeff (1998) “Anarchy and Realism” GVGS <em>Gathering Visions Gathering Strength 2</em> Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University, 12	+	In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.
−	Jefferies, J. (2000) “Land for Life and Livelihoods - A Campaign for Land Rights” <em>ECOS</em> 21(1), 45-48	+	The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.
−	Jeffreys, D. (2001) “In America... how I infiltrated the extremists who have been training London’s May Day riot	+	-----
−	<em>ily Mail</em> 30<sup>th</sup> April, 8	+	==== Annotation 239 ====
−	commandos”	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-89.png|''Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.'']]
−	Jennings, P. (2005) “New Ecology Party? That’s the Last Thing We Need” <em>Ecolog</em>ist 35(6), 26	+	Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.
−	JM (n.d.) “Green Communism” <em>Subversion</em> 22,2	+	A ''theory'' is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes ''false consciousness''. ''Practice'' (or ''praxis'') is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.
−	* Jo* (2004) TAPP Interviewee	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-90.png|''Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.'']]
−	‘Joe* (2000) TAPP Interviewee	+	This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.
−	Johnson, R. (1972) <em>The French Communist Party versus the Students Revolutionaiy Politics in Mav-June ‘68</em> London: Yale University Press	+	In ''Theses on Feuerbach'', Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:
−	Johnston, W. (1989) “Madelaine Gagnon: My Body in Writing” A.R.Miles & G.Finn, eds, <em>Feminism: from Pressure to Politics</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	<blockquote>
		+	The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.
		+	</blockquote>
−	‘Jolie* (2000) TAPP Interviewee	+	Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.
−	Joli, J. (1971) “Anarchism - A Living Tradition” in D.Apter & J.Joli, eds, <em>Anarchism Today</em> London: Macmillan	+	Marx also writes in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that:
−	Joli, J. (1979) <em>The Anarchists</em> London: Methuen	+	<blockquote>
		+	The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.
		+	</blockquote>
−	‘Jon* (2002) TAPP Interviewee	+	This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be ''proven through practice''. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.
−	Jonathan X (1999/2000) see X	+	Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	Jones, D.J. (1970) “Towards a Native Anthropology” <em>Human Organisation</em> 29(4), 251-259	+	<blockquote>
		+	Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Jones, A. (1987) “The Violence of Materialism in Advanced Industrial Society: An Ecological Approach
−	<em>Sociological Review</em> 35 (2), 29-33	+	-----
−	Jones, J. (1998) “Public Enemy 1-12” <em>Guardian</em> 25<sup>th</sup> Nov, 14	+	Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'' of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:
−	Jordan, J. (1995) Untitled in: C. Zine, ed, <em>The end of the beginning. Claremont Road Ell not Ml 1</em> London: C.Zine	+	<blockquote>
		+	There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Jordan, <em>J. (1998)</em> “The art of necessity: the subversive imagination of anti-road protest and Reclaim the Streets” in G.McKay, ed, <em>DIY Culture: Parties and Protest in Nineties Britain</em> London: Verso	+	It is ''practice'', according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.
−	Jordan, J. (2001) “Zapatismo and the Carnival: Direct Action In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” Talk at *<em>How to be an Obstacle:</em>	+	Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'':
−	<em>Direct Action. Politics and Anti-globalisation*</em> ICA 10-11<sup>th</sup> November	+	<blockquote>
		+	The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Jordan, T. (1994) <em>Reinventing Revolution</em> Aidershot Avebury	+	Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.
−	Jordan, T. (2002) <em>Activism!: Direct Action. Hacktivism and the Future of Society</em> London: Reaktion Books	+	This brings to mind another line from Marx’s ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
−	Jordan, T. & Lent, A. eds, (1999) <em>Storming the Millennium: The New Politics of Change</em> London: Lawrence &	+	<blockquote>
		+	The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Wishart	+	The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce ''action'' and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”
−	Joseph, S. (1992) “The Politics of Transport and the Environment” <em>ECOS</em> 13(4), 2-6	+	Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: ''Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:''
−	Juris, J. (2004) <em>“The Rise of Informational Utonics: Activist Networking and Digital Collaboration within Anti- Corporate Globalisation Movements”</em> Paper presented at ‘Imagining Social Movements’ Conference, Edge Hill College	+	<blockquote>
		+	Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Sasha, K. (c2000) “Activism and Anarcho-Purism” Available at [[http://www.infoshop.org/rants/kk__purism.html][http://www.infoshop.org/rants/kk__purism.html]]	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-91.png|''“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).'']]
−	Kaczynski, T. (2002) “Hit Them Where It Hurts” in <em>Green Anarchy</em> 8,1-18	+	= Afterword =
−	Kala (2001) “Earth First! Revolutionary or Racist?” EF! Discussion Document	+	If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!
−	Kasmann, K (1997) <em>Envisioning Ecotop i a: The U.S, Green Movement and the Politics of Radical Social Change</em> London: Praeger	+	The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:
−	Kate (1997) “Nonviolence” <em>Greenline</em> July, 20	+	=== Part 2: Historical Materialism ===
−	Katz, C. (1994) “Playing the Field: Questions of Fieldwork In Geography” <em>The Profess</em>ional Geographer 46(1), 67-72	+	This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an ''applied field'' of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.
−	KDIS (1998) “The Riot That Never Was” <em>Knee Deep in Shit</em> Bradford: KDIS	+	=== Part 3: Political Economy ===
−	Keith, M. (1992) “Angry writing: (Re)Presenting the Unethical World of the Ethnographer” <em>Environment and Planning D: Society & Space</em> 10,551-568.	+	This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of ''Capital'' by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:
−	Kellner, D. (1981) <em>Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory</em> London: Pluto Press	+	1. The doctrine of value.
−	Kellner, D. ed, (1989) <em>Postmodemis</em>	+	2. The doctrine of surplus value.
−	<em>/ Jameson / Critique</em> Washington:	+	3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
−	Maisonneuve Press	+	Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.
−	<br>	+	=== Part 4: Scientific Socialism ===
−	Kennedy, S. (1999) “Traffic Protesters in Road Chaos Pledge” <em>Evening Chronicle</em> 12<sup>th</sup> June	+	This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:
−	Kenny, M. (1996) “Paradoxes of Community” in B. Doherty & de Geus, eds, <em>Democracy and Green Political</em>	+	1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution
−	<em>Thought: Sustainability. Rights and Citizenship</em> London: Routledge	+	2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism
−	Key, A. (2003) “Libertarian Anti-Militarism Then and Now” London: Kate Sharpley Library	+	=== Moving Forward ===
−	Khayati, M. (1989) “Captive Words: Preface to a Situationist Dictionary” in KKnabb, ed, Situationist Anthology Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets	+	We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.
−	Killing King Abacus (2000 - present) <em>Killing King Abacus</em> Available at http ://www. geocities. co m/kk_abacus/i ndex. html	+	We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is ''alongside other socialists''.
−	Kincheloe, J.L. & McLaren, P.L. (1994) “Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research” in N.KDenzin & Y.S. Lincoln, eds, <em>Handbook of Qualitative Research</em> California: Sage	+	Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory ''must'' be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”
−	King, D. (2004) “A Passionate Metamorphosis: Continuity and Change in the Negotiation of Activists* Multiple Identities” <em>Mobilization</em> 9(1)	+	To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for ''application in the real world''. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”<ref>''Revolutionary Ethics,'' Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.</ref>
−	in<em>gham Jail.</em> Declaration of	+	As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical ''engagement''. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through ''praxis''. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Holy Family,'' such critical criticism is futile, as we will never ''think'' our way to revolution:
−	King, M.L. (n.d.[1957,1963,19671) <em>Loving Your Enemies, Letter from A Bi</em>	+	<blockquote>
		+	According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.
		+	</blockquote>
−	<em>Independence from the War In Vietnam</em> New York: A J. Muste Memorial Institute	+	Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
−	King, Y. (1989) “The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology” in J.Plant, ed, HealingJhe Wounds	+	<blockquote>
		+	Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Philadelphia: New Society Publishers	+	Engels concludes by punctuating ''why'' he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.
−	Kingsnorth, P. (2001) “If it’s Tuesday, it must be Seattle” <em>Ecolog</em>ist 31(2), 46	+	Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.
−	Kingsnorth, P. (2004) “Road Rage” <em>Ecologist</em> 34(3), 32-35	+	Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book ''People’s War, People’s Army'':
−	Kitchin, RM. & Hubbard, P.J. (1999)”Research, Action and ‘Critical* Geographies” <em>Area</em>31(3). 195-198	+	<blockquote>
		+	During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Kitschelt, H. (1990) “The Medium is the Message: Democracy and Oligarchy in Belgian Ecology Parties” in	+	Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like ''scientists'' to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to ''change the world.''
−	D.Rucht, ed, <em>Green Politics One</em> Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press	+	=== Advice on Further Study ===
−	Klandermans, B. (1997) <em>The Social Psychology of Protest</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:
−	Klandermans, B. & Staggenborg, S. eds, (2002) <em>Methods of Social Movement Research</em> Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press	+	First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the ''spirit'' of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”
−	Klein, N. (2001) “May Day’s lessons for the rootless” <em>Guardian</em> 3<sup>rd</sup> May	+	Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to ''The Communist Manifesto'':
−	Klein, N. (2002) <em>Fences and Windows - Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalisation Debate</em> New York: Picador	+	<blockquote>
		+	The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”
		+	</blockquote>
−	Klein, R.D. (1983) “Thoughts About Feminist Methodology” in G.Bowles & R.D.Klein, eds, <em>Theories of Women’s.Studies</em> London: Routledge & Kegan Paul	+	Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in ''What is to be Done'', Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:
−	Knabb, K. ed, (1989) <em>Situationist International Antholog</em>y Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets	+	<blockquote>
		+	In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”
		+	</blockquote>
−	Knabb, K. “How I Became an Anarchist” Available at [[http://www.slip.net/~knabb/autobio.anar.htm][http://www.slip.net/~knabb/autobio.anar.htm]]	+	Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:
−	Knill, M. (1991) “Green Thinking: Politics or Paradigm?” <em>Area 2</em>3(2). 238-244	+	<blockquote>
		+	Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!
		+	</blockquote>
−	Koedt, A. (1973) “Women in the Radical Movement” in Koedt, E.Levine, & A.Rapone, eds, <em>Radical Feminism</em> New York: NY Times Books Co	+	In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:
−	Komegger, P. (1996) “Anarchism: the Feminist Connection” in H.Ehrlich, ed, <em>Reinventing Anarchism. Ag</em>ain	+	<blockquote>
		+	Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.
		+	</blockquote>
−	Edinburgh: AK Press	+	As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through ''practice''.
−	Komegger, P. (1980) “Invisible Dictators - Social Science Research and Liberal Politics” <em>Social Anarchism</em> 1,1- 13	+	=== Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics ===
−	Krimmerman, I. & Peny, L. eds, (1966) <em>Patterns of Anarchy</em> New York: Prometheus Books	+	Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism ''creatively''. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the ''spirit'' of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then ''apply'' what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.
−	Kropotkin, P. (n.d.) <em>On Order</em> Sheffield: Pirate Press	+	We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.
−	Kropotkin, P. (cl890) “An Appeal to the Young” in <em>Socialism</em> London: William Reeves	+	=== In Closing ===
−	Kropotkin, P. (1910) “Anarchism” <em>Encyclopaedia Britannica</em> (11<sup>th</sup> edition) London: Encyclopaedia Britannica	+	One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:
−	Kropotkin, P. (1915) <em>Mutual Aid: A factor of evolution</em> London: William Heinemann.	+	IskraBooks.org
−	Kropotkin, P. (1946) <em>The State, its Historic Role</em> London: Freedom Press	+	InternationalMagz.com
−	Kropotkin, P. (1972) <em>The Conquest of Bread</em> London: Allen Lane	+	If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:
−	Kropotkin, P. (1974) <em>Fields. Factories and Workshops Tomorrow</em> London: Allen & Unwin	+	BanyanHouse.org
−	Kropotkin, P. (1989) <em>Memoirs of a Revolutionist</em> Montreal: Black Rose Books	+	We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:
−	Kropotkin, P. (1993) <em>Ethics: Origins and Development</em> London: George E.Harrap. Available at	+	'''Workers of the world, unite!'''
−	http ://d wardmac. pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/ kropotkin/ethics/preface.html	+	You have nothing to lose but your chains.
−	Kropotkin, P. (2001) <em>Revolutionary Pamphlets</em> North Stratford NH: Ayer Co.	+	=== In Solidarity, ===
−	Laclau, E. (1990) <em>New Reflections in the Revolution of Our Time</em> London: Verso	+	''-'' ''Luna Nguyen, Translator &amp; Annotations''
−	Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) <em>Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics</em> London:	+	''-'' ''Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, &amp; Annotations''
−	Verso	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-92.jpg|''“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.'']]
−	Lakey, G. (1973) <em>Strategy for a Living Revolution</em> New York: Grosman	+	<br />
−	Lamb, R. (1996) <em>Promising the Earth</em> London: Routledge	+	= [Appendices] =
−	Laschefski, K. & Freris, N. (2001) “Saving the Wood ... From the Trees” <em>Ecologist</em> 31 (6), 40-42	+	== Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics ==
−	Lash, S. Szerszynski, B. & Wynne, B. eds, (1996) <em>Risk Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology</em> London: Sage	+	This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.
−	Law, L. (n.d.) <em>The Spectacle: A Skeleton Key</em> London: Spectacular Times	+	{|
		+	| | '''Private'''
		+	| '''Common'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | A specific item, event, or process.
		+	| The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Law, L. (1991) Bi<em>gger Cages Longer Chains</em> London: Spectacular Times	+	''Private'' is commonly referred to in literature as ''Special/Specific'' while ''Common'' is commonly called ''General''. ''Note:'' When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered ''Unique''. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. ''See p. 128.''
−	Law, L. (1993) <em>Images and Everyday Life</em> London: Spectacular Times	+	{|
		+	| | '''Reason'''
		+	| '''Result'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change.
		+	| The change caused by a Reason.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Lean, G. (1994) “New Green Army Rises Up Against Roads” <em>Independent on Sunday</em> 20<sup>th</sup> February, 18	+	''Reason'' and ''Result'' may be referred to as ''Cause'' and ''Effect'', respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. ''Note:'' Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. ''See p. 138''
−	Lee, A. & Peachey, P. (2000) “ ‘Peaceful’ protest erupts in violence” <em>Times</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 3	+	{|
		+	| | '''Obviousness'''
		+	| '''Randomness'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure.
		+	| Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Lee, A. Peachey, P. Urquhart, C. & Tendler, S. (2000) “Anarchy Thugs in Central London” <em>Times</em> 2<sup>nd</sup> May, 1-3	+	''Obvious'' may be referred to as ''Necessary,'' while ''Randomness'' may be referred to as ''Accidental. See p. 145.''
−	Lee, M.F. (1997) “Environmental Apocalypse: the Millennarian Ideology of Earth First!” in T.Robbins &	+	{|
		+	| | '''Content'''
		+	| '''Form'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | What something is made of.
		+	| The shape that contains content.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	J.Palmer, eds, <em>Millennium. Messiahs and Mayhem. Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements</em> London: Routledge	+	Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. ''See p. 145.''
−	Leeds Class War (1994) <em>“Yorkshire Evening Pest</em>“ Newsletter, Leeds: Leeds Class War	+	{|
		+	| | '''Essence'''
		+	| '''Phenomena'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | Features that make something develop a certain way.
		+	| The expression of the essence in certain conditions.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Leeds May Day Group (c2003) “What is the Movement?” <em>Derive Aonrodi</em> Available at	+	''See p. 156.''
−	[[http://www.deriveapprodi.org/rivista/22/leeds.htm][http://www.deriveapprodi.org/rivista/22/leeds.htm]]	+	{|
		+	| | '''Possibility'''
		+	| '''Reality'''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place.
		+	| What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.
		+	|
		+	|}
−	Lefebvre, H. (1976) <em>The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production</em> London: Allison & Busby	+	''See p. 160.''
−	Lenin, V.I. (1970) “Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder” in <em>CollcctedJWorks</em> London: Lawrence & Wishart	+	== Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism ==
−	Lerner, M. (1971) “Anarchism and the American Counter-Culture” in D.Apter & J.Joli, eds, <em>Anarchism Today</em> London: Macmillan	+	'''The Principle of General Relationships''' This principle states that:
−	Leval, G. (1975) <em>Collectives in the Spanish Revolution</em> London: Freedom Press	+	“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”
−	Levine, C. (1984) “The Tyranny of Tyranny” in <em>Untying the Knot Feminism. Anarchism and Organisation</em> London: Dark Star/Rebel Press	+	From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
−	Lichterman, P. (1996) <em>The Search for Political CommunitykAmerican Activists Reinventing Commitment</em>	+	'''''The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity''''' is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
−	Cambridge: CUP	+	'''''The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity''''' is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
−	Lichtheim, G. (1967) <em>The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays</em> New York: Random House	+	'''The Principle of Development''' This principle states that:
−	Little Weed (1994) <em>For Flapjack and Mother Earth: Earth Warriors at Jesmond Dene</em> Available at [[http://www.eco-acti][http://www.eco- acti]] on. org/dt/j esmond. html	+	'''“'''Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”
−	Livingstone, K. (2000) “Londoners Calling the Shots” <em>Guardian</em> 6<sup>th</sup> May	+	'''''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development''''' stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
−	Livingstone, K. (2001a) “Don’t let the thugs hide behind the mask of protest” <em>Evening Standard</em> 24<sup>th</sup> April, 6	+	'''''The Characteristic of Generality of Development''''' stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.
−	Livingstone, K. (2001b) “A May Day message from the Mayor of London” Previously available at [[http://www.london.gov.uk][http://www.london.gov.uk]]	+	'''''The Characteristic of Diversity of Development''''' stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.
−	LJSC (n.d.) London Joint Sites Committee “Reclaim the Sites, Target Tarmac” Leaflet distributed in EF!	+	== Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
−	Lohman, L. (2001) “What Does Racism Have to Do With Us?” <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 22(1), 28-50	+	=== The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
−	London Anarchist Forum (2000) “Transcript of Foucault and Anarchy” Available at	+	The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'', and states that:
−	http ://w ww. angel fire, co m/ak4/Forum/28-7-00. html	+	“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” ''See more on p. 163.''
−	London Class War (1999) <em>London Calling</em> London: London Class War	+	=== The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
−	London Greenpeace (c1999a) “Reclaiming Our Lives and Our World - How People Can Make it Happen” London: London Greenpeace	+	The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in ''Summary of Dialectics'':
−	London Greenpeace (cl999b) “World Domination By Corporations...” London: London Greenpeace	+	“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” ''See more on p. 175.''
−	London Greenpeace (c1999c) “Doing It For Ourselves” London: London Greenpeace	+	=== The Law of Negation of Negation ===
−	London Greenpeace (cl999d) “What’s Wrong With the Body Shop - A Critique of’Green* Consumerism” London: London Greenpeace	+	The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Anti-Dühring,'' it states:
−	London Greenpeace (c2000) “The Vested Interest” London: London Greenpeace	+	“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” ''See more on p. 185.''
−	London MayDay Group (cl 999) “Conference Reports and Personal Accounts of Mayday ‘98” London: London	+	== Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge ==
−	Mayday Group	+	''Consciousness'' refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216.
−	Longoni, J.C. (1970) <em>Four Patients of Dr.Deibler</em> London: Lawrence & Wishart	+	''Knowledge'' is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
−	Loombreaker (1999) <em>Loombreaker</em> 3 Manchester: Loombreaker	+	Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.
−	Lorde, A. (1984) “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” in <em>Sister Outsider</em> New York: Crossing Press	+	Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.
−	LOS (1987) <em>The Future in the Present: Libertarian Organisation and Structure</em> Durham: LOS	+	=== Forms of Consciousness ===
−	Lovenduski, J. & Randall, V. (1993) <em>Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain</em> Oxford:	+	Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.
−	Oxford University Press	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-99.png]]
−	Lowe, P. & Goyder, J. (1983) <em>Environmental groups in politics</em> London: Allen & Unwin	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-100.png]]
−	Lowe, R. & Shaw, W, (1993) <em>Travellers: Voices of the New Age Nomads</em> London: Fourth Estate	+	=== The Cognitive Process ===
−	LSGA (1999) “Lessons from the Smash Genetix Action” Anonymous report	+	The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see ''Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth'' on page 219.
−	Luke, T. (1988) “The Dreams of Deep Ecology” <em>Telos 7</em>6.65-93	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-101.png]]
−	Luke, T. (1993) “The Leisure of the Theory Class: Political Correctness or Professional Correctness” <em>Telos</em> 97,97- 104	+	=== Forms of Knowledge ===
−	Luke, T. (1997) <em>Ecocritiaue: Contesting the Politics of Nature. Economy and Culture</em> Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press	+	''For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.''
−	Lynas, M. (2004) “If They Plant Them, We’ll Pull Them Up” <em>Ecologist</em> April, 26-30	+	[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-102.png]]
−	Lyotard, J. (1984) <em>The Postmodern Condition</em> Manchester: Manchester University Press	+	== Appendix E: Properties of Truth ==
−	M (cl 998) “A View From the Trees” Subversion <em>Best of Subversion.</em> 32-33	+	Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.
−	MacCallum Jnr, G. (1972) “Negative and Positive Freedom” in P.Laslett, W.G.Runciman & Q.Skinner, eds,	+	'''Objectivity:''' The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.
−	<em>Philosophy. Politics and Society: 4<sup>th</sup> series</em> Oxford: Blackwell	+	'''Absoluteness:''' Absolute truth<ref>Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.</ref> is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
−	MacKay, I. (2001) Unpublished letter to <em>Guardian,</em> distributed on Allsorts email list 25<sup>th</sup> July	+	'''Relativity:''' Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
−	Mac Laughlin, J. (1986) “State-Centered Social Science and the Anarchist Critique: Ideology in Political	+	'''Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth:''' Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
−	Geography” in <em>Antipode</em> 18(1). 11-35	+	'''Concreteness:''' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is ''concreteness''.
−	MacSimoin, A. (2004) TITLE <em>Freedom</em> 10<sup>th</sup> January, 5	+	'''Abstractness:''' Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in ''pure abstraction''. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.
−	Maenz, K. (2000) “Twenty Years of the Radical Environmental Journal” in <em>Earth First! Journal</em> 21(1). 12- 77	+	== Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism ==
−	Makepeace, W. (2001) “The Choice is Yours” Bi<em>g Issue</em> June 4 -10,10	+	Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.
−	Makhno, N. (1907) “Summons” Available at [[http://www.knooppunt.be/%7Eerikb/anarchie/thema/makhno01.html][http://www.knooppunt.be/%7Eerikb/anarchie/thema/makhno01.html]]	+	'''Bureaucracy:''' An expression of ''dogmatism'' which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.
−	Makhno, N. (1996) <em>The Struggle Against the State and other essays</em> Edinburgh: AK Press	+	'''Conservativism:''' A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
−	Makhno, N. Mett, I. Arshinov, P. Valevsky & Linsky (1989) <em>Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists</em> Dublin: Workers* Solidarity Movement	+	'''Dogmatism:''' A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.
−	Mail on Sunday (1997) “Don’t Vote, Make Trouble” <em>Mail on Sunday</em> 13<sup>th</sup> April, 1 -2	+	'''Eclecticism:''' An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.
−	Malatesta, E. (1974) <em>Anarchism</em> London: Freedom Press	+	'''Idealism:''' A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.
−	Malatesta, E. (cl981) <em>Fra Contadini: A Dialogue on Anarchy</em> London: Elephant Editions	+	'''Opportunism:''' A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.
−	Malatesta, E. (1993a) in V.Richards, ed. <em>Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas</em> London: Freedom Press	+	'''Revisionism:''' A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
−	Malatesta, E. (1993b) “Anarchism and Violence” in V.Richards, ed, <em>Violence and Anarchism: A Polemic</em> London:	+	'''Rigidity:''' An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
−	Freedom Press	+	'''Skepticism:''' The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
−	Malatesta, E. (1995) <em>The Anarchist Revolution: Polemical Articles 1924-1931</em> ed, V.Richards London: Freedom Press	+	'''Sophistry:''' The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
−	Malyon, T. (1994) “Killing the Bill” <em>New Statesman & Society</em> 8<sup>th</sup> July, 12-13	+	'''Subjectivism:''' The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.
−	Malyon, T. (cl994) “Protesting or Surviving: the State we’re in” in ‘DIY Politics’ supplement to <em>New Statesman & Society.</em> 2-5	+	'''Utilitarianism:''' An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:
−	Malyon, T. & Platt, S. (1994) “Riot Control” <em>New Statesman & Society</em> 14<sup>th</sup> October	+	<blockquote>
		+	“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”
		+	</blockquote>
−	Manchester Earth First! (1999) “Guide To Public Order Situations” Leaflet, Manchester: Manchester Earth First!
−	Manchester Earth First! (2000) “What is Earth First!” Leaflet, Manchester: Manchester Earth First!	+	= [Back Matter] =
−	Manes, C. (1990) <em>Green Rage</em> Boston: Little, Brown & co	+	== Glossary &amp; Index ==
−	Manuel, F.E. & Manuel, F.P. (1979) <em>Utopian Thought in the Western World</em> Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press	+	{|
		+	| | '''Absolute Truth'''
		+	| Absolute Truth can refer to:<br />
		+	<br />
		+	1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234.<br />
		+	<br />
		+	2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228.<br />
		+	<br />
		+	See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Absolutization'''
		+	| To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Abstract Labor'''
		+	| The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output ''is'' taken into consideration, it is referred to as ''concrete labor''. See p. 15, 17.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Adam Smith'''
		+	| (1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of ''political economy'', which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Ahistoric Perspective'''
		+	| A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Base'''
		+	| Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and ''superstructure'', the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Biological Motion'''
		+	| One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Biological Reflection'''
		+	| A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by ''excitation'', ''induction'', and ''reflexes''. See p. 65.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Bourgeoisie'''
		+	| The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also:<br />
		+	<br />
		+	Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Bureaucracy'''
		+	| An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218.<br />
		+	C→→M→→C C = A Commodity<br />
		+	M = The Money Commodity<br />
		+	The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’<br />
		+	Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Capitalism'''
		+	| The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. ''Referenced throughout.''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Capitalist Class'''
		+	| See: Bourgeoisie
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Capitalist Commodity Production'''
		+	| The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Category'''
		+	| The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Category Pair'''
		+	| A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on ''universal category pairs'' which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Characteristics'''
		+	| The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Chemical Motion'''
		+	| Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Chemical Reflection'''
		+	| The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Circulation'''
		+	| The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Commodity'''
		+	| In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Common'''
		+	| See: Private and Common
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Common Laws'''
		+	| Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws'', and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Comprehensive Viewpoint'''
		+	| A ''viewpoint'' which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Conception'''
		+	| A relatively complete ''reflection'' within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Concrete Labor'''
		+	| The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as ''abstract labor''. See p. 15, 17.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Conditioned Reflex'''
		+	| Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Consciousness'''
		+	| The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Content'''
		+	| See: Content and Form.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Content and Form (Category Pair)'''
		+	| Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.<br />
		+	<br />
		+	Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Contradiction'''
		+	| A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Consciousness'''
		+	| The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Conservativism'''
		+	| Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''David Hume'''
		+	| (1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''David Ricardo'''
		+	| (1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Deductive Inference'''
		+	| Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Definition'''
		+	| The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Development'''
		+	| The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Development Viewpoint'''
		+	| A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics'''
		+	| In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dialectical Materialism'''
		+	| A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dialectical Negation'''
		+	| A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dialectical Relationship'''
		+	| A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''(Characteristic of) Diversity'''
		+	| The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Diversity in Unity'''
		+	| The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dogmatism'''
		+	| An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Duality of Labor'''
		+	| The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Dynamic and Creative Reflection'''
		+	| The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Eclecticism'''
		+	| An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Economic Base'''
		+	| See: Base
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Economism'''
		+	| Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Eduard Bernstein'''
		+	| (1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Emotional Consciousness'''
		+	| The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Empirical Consciousness'''
		+	| Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Empirical Knowledge'''
		+	| Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Empiricism'''
		+	| A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Empirio-criticism'''
		+	| A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Epistemology'''
		+	| The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Ernst Mach'''
		+	| (1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Equilibrium'''
		+	| A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Essence'''
		+	| See: Essence and Phenomena
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair)'''
		+	| The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Exchange Value'''
		+	| A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Excitation'''
		+	| Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''External Contradictions'''
		+	| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''False consciousness'''
		+	| Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''First International'''
		+	| Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''(Basic) Forms of Motion'''
		+	| Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Form'''
		+	| See: Content and Form.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Form of existence of matter'''
		+	| The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Form of Value'''
		+	| See: Value-Form
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Forward Tendency of Motion'''
		+	| The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Friedrich Engels'''
		+	| (1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, &amp; co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. ''Referenced throughout.''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions'''
		+	| A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''(Characteristic of) Generality'''
		+	| A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''General Relationship'''
		+	| Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Generality (of relationships)'''
		+	| Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'' — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (''universal relationships'' — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''George Berkeley'''
		+	| (1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel'''
		+	| (1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor &amp; objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Historical Materialism'''
		+	| The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Historical Viewpoint'''
		+	| A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Idealism'''
		+	| A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Immanuel Kant'''
		+	| (1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Induction'''
		+	| The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Inductive Inference'''
		+	| Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Intelligibility'''
		+	| The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Internal Contradictions'''
		+	| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Internal and External Contradictions'''
		+	| Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Judgment'''
		+	| The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Karl Marx'''
		+	| (1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. ''Referenced throughout''.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Knowledge'''
		+	| The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Labor Value'''
		+	| The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Law of Negation of Negation'''
		+	| A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'''
		+	| The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites'''
		+	| and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Law of Development of Capitalism'''
		+	| Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Laws'''
		+	| In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Laws of Nature'''
		+	| Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Laws of Society'''
		+	| Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Laws of Human Thought'''
		+	| Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Life-Process'''
		+	| Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Ludwig Feuerbach'''
		+	| (1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''M→→C→→M’'''
		+	| The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for ''more money'' than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Machism'''
		+	| See: Empirio-Criticism.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Manifestation'''
		+	| How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Marxism-Leninism'''
		+	| A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Material Conditions'''
		+	| The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Material Production Activity'''
		+	| Material production activity is the first and most basic form of ''praxis''. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Materialism'''
		+	| A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Materialist Dialectics'''
		+	| A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Matter'''
		+	| A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Means of Production'''
		+	| Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Mechanical Motion'''
		+	| Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Mechanical Philosophy'''
		+	| A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Mental Reflection'''
		+	| Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Metaphysical Materialism'''
		+	| Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of ''mechanical philosophy'', which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Metaphysics'''
		+	| A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Methodology'''
		+	| A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Mode'''
		+	| The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Mode of Existence of Matter'''
		+	| Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of ''motion.'' See p. 59.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Motion'''
		+	| Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Motion in Equilibrium'''
		+	| Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will ''eventually'' lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Narodnik'''
		+	| Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Natural law'''
		+	| See: Laws of Nature.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Natural Science'''
		+	| Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Negation'''
		+	| The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of ''dialectical negation''. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''New Economic Policy'''
		+	| Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Objective Dialectics'''
		+	| The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Objective Existence'''
		+	| Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Objective Idealism'''
		+	| A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Objectiveness'''
		+	| An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Obviousness'''
		+	| See: Obviousness and Randomness
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair)'''
		+	| The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Opportunism'''
		+	| A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Opposites'''
		+	| Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Ordinary Consciousness'''
		+	| Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Period of Motion'''
		+	| Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Perspective'''
		+	| See: Viewpoint.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Petty Bourgeoisie'''
		+	| Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Petty Commodity Production'''
		+	| See: Simple Commodity Production.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Phenomena'''
		+	| Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Physical Motion'''
		+	| Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Physical Reflection'''
		+	| Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Point of View'''
		+	| See: Viewpoint.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Populism'''
		+	| The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Positivism'''
		+	| The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with ''empiricism'' in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Possibility'''
		+	| See: Possibility and Reality.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Possibility and Reality (Category Pair)'''
		+	| The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Practice'''
		+	| See: Praxis.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Pragmatism'''
		+	| Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Praxis'''
		+	| Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Prejudice'''
		+	| See: Conservatism.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Primary and Secondary Contradictions'''
		+	| In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Primary Existence'''
		+	| Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Primitive Materialism'''
		+	| An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Principle of General Relationships'''
		+	| A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Private'''
		+	| See: Private and Common
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Private and Common (Category Pair)'''
		+	| The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Private Laws'''
		+	| Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Production Force'''
		+	| The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Proletariat'''
		+	| The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Quality'''
		+	| The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Quality Shift'''
		+	| A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Quantity'''
		+	| The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Quantity range'''
		+	| The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Quintessence'''
		+	| Original Vietnamese word: ''tinh hoa''. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Randomness'''
		+	| See: Obviousness and Randomness.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Rational Consciousness'''
		+	| The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Reason'''
		+	| See: Reason and Result
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Reality'''
		+	| See: Possibility and Reality.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Reason and Result (Category Pair)'''
		+	| The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Reasoning'''
		+	| The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Reflection'''
		+	| The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Relative and Absolute'''
		+	| “Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Relative Truth'''
		+	| Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Relativism'''
		+	| A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''René Descartes'''
		+	| (1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Result'''
		+	| See: Reason and Result.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Richard Avenarius'''
		+	| (1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Rigidity'''
		+	| An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Robert Owen'''
		+	| (1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific'''
		+	| An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific Consciousness'''
		+	| Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered ''indirect'' because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific'''
		+	| Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Activity'''
		+	| in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific Materialist Viewpoint'''
		+	| A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific Socialism'''
		+	| A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Scientific Worldview'''
		+	| A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Second International'''
		+	| Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Self-motion'''
		+	| In the original Vietnamese, the word “''tự vận động''.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Sensation'''
		+	| The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity'''
		+	| A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously ''active'' in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as ''passive'' in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Simple Commodity Production'''
		+	| What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Simple Exchange'''
		+	| When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Social Being'''
		+	| The material existence of human society, as opposed to ''social consciousness''. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Social Consciousness'''
		+	| The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to ''social being''. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Social Motion'''
		+	| Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Socialization'''
		+	| The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Socialized Production Force'''
		+	| A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Socio-Political Activity'''
		+	| Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Solipsism'''
		+	| A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Sophistry'''
		+	| The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Stage of Development'''
		+	| The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Stagnation'''
		+	| An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Struggle of Opposites'''
		+	| The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Subjective Factors'''
		+	| Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought'''
		+	| A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Subjective Idealism'''
		+	| Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Subjectivism'''
		+	| A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Suitability'''
		+	| The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Superstructure'''
		+	| The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Surplus Value'''
		+	| The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Symbolization'''
		+	| The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Systematic Structure'''
		+	| A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Theoretical Consciousness'''
		+	| The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Theoretical Knowledge'''
		+	| Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Theory'''
		+	| An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value'''
		+	| See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Thing-in-Itself'''
		+	| The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, ''as it exists outside of our consciousness''. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Third International'''
		+	| Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Three Component Parts'''
		+	| The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism''. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Threshold'''
		+	| The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Truth'''
		+	| A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Unconditioned Reflex'''
		+	| Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Unilateral Consideration'''
		+	| The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Unintelligibility'''
		+	| A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Unique Relationship'''
		+	| The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Unity in Diversity'''
		+	| A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Universal Law of Consciousness'''
		+	| A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Universal Laws'''
		+	| Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Universal Relationship'''
		+	| The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with ''development'', universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Use Value'''
		+	| A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Utopianism'''
		+	| 1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Value-Form'''
		+	| Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Viewpoint'''
		+	| Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Viewpoint Crisis'''
		+	| A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Vladimir Ilyich Lenin'''
		+	| (1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. ''Referenced throughout.''
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Working Class'''
		+	| See: Proletariat
		+	|
		+	|-
		+	| | '''Worldview'''
		+	| The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.
		+	|
		+	|}
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−
−	<br>
−
−	* Appendix: TAPP: how we talked about what we did...
−
−	**What this is:**
−
−	This is not my analysis of TAPP, and it’s not a history of what TAPP did. It’s a kind of history of what TAPP has said about itself. It’s written from the various things that TAPP folk have written, and that TAPP people have said to me. Some things may be out of date or unrepresentative. Others are not dealt with much, simply because I haven’t found much written down about them. I’ve done it as a reminder of the group that has gone, and to provoke thought about what we want to come.
−
−	** 1. Basic Values
−
−	<strong>Deeds not Words</strong>
−
−	In Spring 2001, the North Guide reported that “Increasingly there is a culture of DIY protest in the UK as people decide that politicians cannot be relied upon to bring about change. As a result direct action is spreading”. It went on to advertise the existence of a group called TAPP that believed in doing something more radical than “sending off an annual membership fee to Friends of the Earth”.
−
−	“TAPP is a direct action group” (Act Locally, Issue 14, Summer 1993)
−
−	TAPP was thus promoted as a group that believes in ‘Deeds, not Words’. Taking action was prioritised over being just another ‘talk-shop’, and the group’s meetings were pretty much all focussed on thinking up, and then organising, various forms of political action. One ex-TAPPer even stated that “TAPP... have an obsessive direct action thing, and there’s a rejection of theory: let’s not talk about politics in meetings because we’ll just do if (Interview, February 2002). Compared to other political and campaigning groups in Tyneside, the list of TAPP’s activities was huge: a testament to its attitude of ‘deeds not words’.
−
−	<br>
−
−	*** The ‘Do - it - Yourself’ ethos
−
−	TAPP’s DIY spirit is shown in its attitude to media. Throughout its life, TAPP produced the monthly newsletter of actions and local issues, ‘Think Globally, Act Locally’. The editorship of this newsletter was passed around the different members of the group, so that most TAPPers took the editorial control for at least one issue. One down-side of this democratic DIY spirit is that the quality of the newsletter sometimes suffered: professional production this was not!
−
−	TAPP also researched and produced many fliers for particular events, like protests against Shell, or GM promotions. The most ambitious of these was the spoof newspaper ‘the Chronic’, produced for May-Day 2002 and handed out for free in its thousands. Backing up such publicity and propaganda have been fund-raising gigs, cakestalls, and cafe’s (although some no-strings funding was also accepted.
−
−	FREE Anti-copyright
−
−	FINAL EDITION EVER
−
−	*** Council to leave tells everyone for culture bid
−
−	NORTH UMBRIA P< XLlCE
−
−	Northumbria Police are aware of illigal activities taking place in area. .
−
−	Individuals should be aware that if complaints ,from the public are received this may result in the Police prosecuting offenders.
−
−	In a wider sense, too, TAPP ‘did it ourselves’ in the many actions and events we organised. There are few forms of DIY action that TAPP has not had a bash at doing: from supermarket blockades on the GM issue, to its very own Reclaim the Streets and, the following year, the first political squat to be seen on Tyneside for over a decade. Each of these events have involved the learning of new skills, and the sharing of those skills around the group: these range from putting up a tripod, using a camcorder, and editing the newsletter.
−
−	*** Co-operation and Diversity
−
−	The North Guide advertisement for TAPP went on to talk of the group’s ‘non-violent direct action’: (non) violence is one of the many issues that TAPP’s members never fully agreed on. TAPP members never had to sign up to a set of beliefs or norms: individuals’ different opinions didn’t matter so long as they could agree to work together (there’s that emphasis on ‘action’ again). I think this was one of TAPP’s main strengths, others may disagree...
−
−	In one of the group’s early statements, TAPP described its methods as “Peaceful demonstrations” and “Accountable non violent direct action”. It also set limits on the methods used, namely “Respect for individuals, No physical violence” and “No harm to people and planet ‘ (TAPP’s aims, methods and limits, produced for the meeting room’s managers, Autumn 1999). This s:atement had no real meaning for the group, however: in fact most participants seem to have forgotten its ever being drafted.
−
−	An interesting outward sign of the differences in outlook on the (non) violence issue can be seen with the banner for ‘think globally act locally’. The image that quickly became the standard logo features a crowd throwing rocks (although one TAPP-ista insists that he always thought they were cakes and buns!). These rocks were tippexed out by one of the newsletter s editors, and alternative logo’s used by others, partly in order to avoid the ‘violent* image.
−
−	In general, though, the image endured, and was even used as the TAPP logo on a leaflet coproduced with other environmental groups (even though TAPP never had an ‘official’ symbol).
−
−	[Illustration: think globally
−
−	ACT LOCALLY
−
−	FEBRUARY 2000 tswe 3t?
−
−	DANCE FOR PEACE and | SOLIDARITY
−
−	The mid-december Dance for Peace
−
−	€vent was a stomping Succ<em>es</em>s
−
−	Thanks to everyone who attended ;
−
−	and Jets look forward to the next -- I onel I]
−
−	** 2. Social Issues
−
−	*** Gender
−
−	The added skirts on the figures above brings us to the next subject. For most of its lifespan, TAPP had a roughly equal mix of male and female participants. In early 2001, when it found itself almost entirely male, the group panicked slightly and discussed why it had lost its female half. Amongst the potential reasons identified were a “bloke-ish atmosphere” in some meetings, lack of childcare facilities and the nature of ‘boring’ politics. The actual reasons for women withdrawing from TAPP, however, seemed to be more career- or outside-world related. When TAPP folded itself, the gender balance had become more healthy again.
−
−	In comparison with TAG (Tyneside Anarchist Group), which had existed before TAPP, I think TAPP fared well on the gender issue (ie. for a group of its type[200] i. A (male) ex-TAG member characterised TAG as “much more in your face. Very much more ideological, as well, although, some people weren’t particularly ideological and just liked fighting and drinking... Very male as well.” Another (female) TAPPer in the room then commented “That accounts for the fighting and drinking, then.” (Group interview, 1999).
−
−	It is interesting, however, that certain group roles were taken on more by the women in TAPP: sitting on stalls, making banners and, most noticeably, baking cakes as a fundraiser (the fairy cake collective’ was all female). Apart from one dominant woman in its first year, furthermore, I think it’s fair to say that the biggest and loudest talkers in meetings were all men.
−
−	I would like to think that TAPP had a healthy attitude to issues of homophobia, bisexuality etc.. but that was never expressed through its campaigns (unlike feminism, race and disability)
−
−	I walked back along Northumberland st about 2ish when I met 4 or 5 other folks giving out anti-mcdonalds leatlets. I explained about the free tatties earlier and they were chu fed but also thought it explained the hostile reaction from the med’s security guard that they’d got. [oct 2001]
−
−	*** Race / Class
−
−	The composition of TAPP itself was predominantly white, although its participants did work with nonwhite campaigners on such issues as anti-racism and asylum rights.
−
−	Class was an issue that was mentioned more than race (anti-racism tended to be taken for granted as a background assumption). One TAPPer wrote a university essay problematising class and DIY politics. The ex-TAG member above suggested that TAG was superior to TAPP in being “a lot more working class than TAPP is... most had left school at 16” and (related to this) “people were motivated more by, what I’d term sort of social issues” as opposed to such things as genetics.
−
−	Another ex-TAPPer phrased the problem in this way: “Lots of people have a lot of doors open to them in the future, and a lot of people (it’s myself I’m talking about) have a lot of doors shut... It’s not in the present, with money or whatever, it’s in the future. There are structured inequalities that are repeated in the group, and nothing can be done about them” (Interview, -eb 2002).
−
−	TAPP had a high degree of university-based or exuniversity members and this was commented upon as a problem by several people. The previous interviewee argued that “it can be a barrier for people coming in. It can feel like a university milieu, undergraduate, postgraduate or whatever, and I think that... can feel cliquey, or exclusive” (interview, Feb 2002). As one of the university-based TAPPers I also wrote in May 2001 that “Maybe the most defining point of the ‘group’ is that we’re overloaded with academics or pseudo-academics.”
−
−	Tension with the amount of research done by students on TAPP is also demonstrated, for example with a recent spoof Phd proposal:
−
−	<em>“Why is it that so many people think that a very small group of people organising things over such a small length of time warrant so much fucking attention?”</em>
−
−	*** Disability
−
−	Direct action groups have been criticised for privileging an elite of able-bodied, young activists. I would like to think that TAPP is not elitist in this way, but it is true that none of the group’s regular participants were ‘disabled’.
−
−	In choosing to campaign against the human genetics showcase, the International Centre for Life (ICFL), TAPP came onto common ground with local disability activists from the now-defunct DANE group, (Disability Action North East). In a TAPP-DANE meeting in August ‘98, the DANE activists contrasted the medical model of disability with the social model: “the medical model of disability ... atomizes the individual, homing in on one characteristic and reducing the human being to that. Hence the blindfold of ‘disability’ rather than seeing the social barriers... It is society which impairs us, through this individualization... disablement is socially constructed”. Without going into the detail of the discussion and the ICFL, I think it’s fair to say that TAPP accepted the point that “To escape the oppressive point of view, the medical viewpoint must be countered. By the social one, holistically. Disability is the experience of barriers in society that are caused by society, like negative cultural stereotypes.’’ This thinking was then reflected in TAPP’s campaign to expose and embarrass the ICFL and in its support of the ‘Freedom March’ of DAN (Direct Action Network) in May 2000.
−
−	*** Being Green
−
−	Many of TAPP’s campaigns were centred around environmental issues, and I just want to note here that this environmental consciousness was reflected in TAPPers’ own private lives. Members tended to be low-consumers and re-used materials such as placards: it was common to find that, when the slogan on your placard started to come off, you’d find the slogan from a previous, unrelated demo beginning to come through from underneath! Several TAPPers also took on allotments, composted, did courses on Permaculture, held a strictly ethical, organic or vegan diet, and undertook conservation or environmental education activities. Although some did own petrol-driven vehicles, these were outnumbered by the bikes.
−
−	** 3. Political positions
−
−	*** Differences and Common Ground
−
−	The individuals involved in TAPP came from different traditions. In the years before TAPP formed, they were variously involved in the Cradlewell bypass anti-road camp, Alleycat Radical Books Co-op, Tyneside Anarchist Group, Newcastle Animal Rights Coalition, Newcastle University’s Peace Action Society and Green Society, and North East Green Party. On the group’s first collective action, in solidarity with the Magnet strikers, ‘Think globally* reported that anarchists, socialists and greens took part.
−
−	In a “discussion of priorities” in June ‘98, a majority of people in the meeting said that genetics was a priority for them, but everyone had their own issues. While one person wanted to do solidarity actions with striking workers, and campaigning on the New Deal, another in the meeting said she was “Less concerned with working rights. Although I recognise they’re important, my heart’s not in it. Coz it’s part of the system I hate so much”. This launched the discussion onto a debate about our various attitudes to work (eg. “we should do [ a campaign ] on ‘the Right not to work’“). This was typical of the spectrum of opinions in the group on all kinds of political and social issues.
−
−	Despite these differences, however, the general basis of agreement in the group was stated by another person at this meeting:
−
−	<em>“Everyone’s up for supporting each other’s campaigns, but a long-term campaign is different”.</em>
−
−	The next 4 years proved this statement right: the group as a whole never took on a long-term campaign as its priority (genetics included). Instead, individuals in the group would make personal commitments to long-term campaigns and issues, like the Byker incinerator, Faslane nuclear sub base, anti-racist organising etc.. These individuals would keep the group informed of their issues, and the other members of the group would then get involved at times when they felt it useful. When they didn’t feel that campaign was a priority, then they simply wouldn’t get
−
−	involved. As one interviewee said in 1999, “I know well over half the people in TAPP think the critical masses are a stupid idea but... not one person in TAPP has said, ever to me, that they don’t think we should do it, but I know that most people think it’s not worth it coz they don’t turn up... I like that... coz it means you don’t feel embarrassed to suggest a really silly action. People don’t shout you down, they just don’t come”.
−
−	One implication of this is that TAPP, being a group involved in many issues, did not become fully involved in any. As one ex-TAPPer put it: “It’s either a long-term community campaign, or it’s free-floating, dipping in here, dipping in there, don’t have to be responsible to a local residents group or local community group” (interview, Feb 2002). Another TAPPer criticised that “Every week we touch upon numerous issues, we plan actions on numerous issues, seemingly moving every week from one thing to the next. This means there isn’t a focus... It would be wonderful to target something big and win.” (email, May 2002)
−
−	TAPP has made various group statements, of <em>‘who we are’</em>. The most representative of these was, I think, that in ‘the Agitator’ directory of “autonomous, non-hierarchical groups”, in 2000:
−
−	<em>“TAPP is really a forum allowing people with different political views but with a belief in direct action to come together over certain issues. Whilst there is no single ideology for the group there are socialists, anarchists and greens in it) it does operate in an anarchist way (no hierarchy, collective decision-making etc etc.)”</em>
−
−	Calling ourselves a ‘forum’ was also a common thing[201], but over time, TAPP members came to habitually refer to TAPP as an definite group, and others certainly saw it as such. For example, in October 1998 one member wrote to a fur shop “on behalf of TAPP a local group which campaigns on issues of environmental and social concern”.
−
−	Another member wrote on behalf of TAPP as an ‘anti-capitalist’ group, once the phrase became common currency after Seattle.
−
−	At a TAPP meeting in May 2001, one person argued (against me) that the people in TAPP “shared a lot of <em>common ground</em> and thought in a similar way... Direct action, libertarian, anticapitalist” (my notes). That this common ground does exist in the group is demonstrated by the ‘Think globally’ edition for MayDay 2001 (issue 44)
−
−	<em>“On this month’s front cover we have translated ‘think globally, act locally!’ into a number of languages to represent the international nature of struggles which May day represents.</em> We <em>have also coloured them red (for socialism), green (for ecologism and black (for anarchism) to represent what we are working towards - a unity of diverse struggles which connects a concern for the environment and the welfare of people with the need to organise our own lives, Be realistic.</em>
−
−	<em>Demand the impossible!”</em>
−
−	There was no criticism or controversy over this front page (incidentally, the sentiment was already familiar from national MayDay literature)
−
−	A sense of being part of a radical tradition was demonstrated with ‘Wor Story’, the pamphlet TAPP members produced on radical Tyneside history, and also with leaflets on North East volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, etc...
−
−	[[http://www.sandyford.techie.org.uk/][http://www.sandyford.techie.org.uk/]]
−
−	*** TAPP’s relationship to other Green and Left groups
−
−	We have already noted the North Guide positioning TAPP as “more effective” than such NGO’s as Friends of the Earth (FoE). Although TAPP did work with local branches of FoE on shared issues (eg. the proposed 2<sup>nd</sup> Tyne Tunnel), it distinguished itself as being both more radical (anarchistic), and more socially-committed: TAPP was never a solely environmental group, indeed for some of its members the environmental causes were the least important.
−
−	This helps to explain why TAPP did not call itself an <em>Earth First!</em> group, although I personally consider other EF! groups in the UK to be very similar to TAPP. For the EF! journal, Do or Die, I wrote in June 99 that we called ourselves TAPP as “a more inclusive name without the macho connotations... A hand ul of members had
−
−	previously done EF! stuff but others didn’t even know what EF! do and we basically formed outside that network.” (‘It All Began on May-Day, Do or Die 7). The majority of TAPP members did at some point take part in national Earth First! events and gatherings of one sort or another, but this was only one network that TAPP was hooked into (others included, for example, Trident Ploughshares, Green Party and Women Speak Out).
−
−	<em>“it is now a forlorn scene of ugly bamboo fences and dead native plants</em>
−
−	We are calling for you to Boycott ‘The Beach’
−
−	Stereotypes of what Earth First! represented were mentioned in a couple of interviews, but these were less strongly worded than the criticism directed at various Trotskyite groups. No member of TAPP was, during its existence, a member of a Trotskyite group, although some were members of the Green Party, and one briefly joined Labour to ‘subvert from within’? Several members of TAPP had several years <em>previously</em> been involved in Trotksyite groups like Militant and the SWP, however: they had taken from this experience a critical attitude to such organisations.
−
−	In a group interview, Militant were first criticised for
−
−	“talking as if they’d sort of, y’know, run the whole
−
−	campaign [ against the JSA ].” Later the conversation moved onto the SWP and I asked <em>“why do we have a problem with the SWP?”</em> The answers were:
−
−	<em>“Because they work in a hierarchical system, they don’t seem to think for themselves very much, and they’re always trying to sell papers and gain membership, but rather than provoke people to think, or provoke people to want to do something, they want people so they can think what they’re supposed to think and then do what they say.”</em>
−
−	<em>“Plus the fact that they don’t say what they think, they have these fucking ways of saying stuff... They think we have to lead, we have to encourage these people to go up the wrong path in order for them to turn round and turn to you when they’re disillusioned or whatever. It’s extremely patronising... If you believe something you say it, say it straight out, and, that’s what I hate about the whole Trotskyist - cos it’s obviously not just the SWP, of course the SWP happens to be the biggest one but they ‘re all pretty much about the same thing. “</em>
−
−	Their success at <em>recruitment</em> was noted, and then the previous interviewee summed up the issue:
−
−	<em>“It’s okay if you recruit people to actively partake and actively participate in something rather than sign petitions or trot out whatever they’re told to trot out. I know loads of people who were angry about issues and joined the SWP, experienced it fora few months and left, and haven’t gone back to anything, and the reason they haven’t gone back is cos they’ve found out that they’re just like the other bastards, y’know. If the British state or whatever wanted to have a good way of disillusioning angry people they couldn’t ha ve chosen one better. “</em>
−
−	TAPP members continued to work alongside Trotksyite groups such as the SWP despite their misgivings, but occasionally the tensions would come out. During the coalition work against the Afghan war in October 2001, for example, an internal memo from the SWP was leaked and
−
−	emailed around TAPP members. It commanded its members that “Every SWP member has to throw themselves whole-heartedly into opposing this war” and ‘Where we are building a Stop the War
−
−	group there should be a SWP group in the locality, the workplace, school or college organising [ paper ] sales.” The memo was thus all about recruitment and building their organisation, just as the Schnews critique of Globalise Resistance had recently exposed.
−
−	many points, and we didn’t have one clear issue, like animal welfare, from which to launch a recruitment drive). One member suggested that lack of attention to recruitment was one of the reasons that TAPP declined, and therefore folded (I disagreed).
−
−	<br>
−
−	The TAPPer who sent the memo echoed the sentiment of that critique, and repeated its concluding question: “ How easy is it for somebody new to your town to find out about your group?’” This TAPPer then continued: “The [ Radical ] Film Festival will be good for this, but we need to do other things that are public, so interested people don’t just get hoovered up by the SWP/Globalise Resistance/ANL.” (email, October 2001).
−
−	One of TAPP’s rare email flurries followed this, with one participant arguing that “The swappies aren’t taking over the anti-war movement in Newcastle, they are ‘creating’ it... I suggest getting involved in the anti-war movement before slagging off one of the major driving forces behind it.”
−
−	A reply to this, from a (quietly) Quaker member of TAPP, jokingly proposed “a minor correction, it was the Quakers that set up the first meeting... And after losing ground in the first week, we’ve reestablished our stamp on the coalition by enforcing silence on the Saturday afternoon vigils... Now what else shall we plan? A Quaker Film Festival, to recruit some more people into our own ideological little grouping, perhaps?”
−
−	The final comment came from another TAPPer: “anyway, more importantly, Harold on Neighbours is chained to a fence outside a vivisection lab, and the police are about to arrest him - what shall we do?” (emails, October 2001).
−
−	Recruitment, it is clear, was not always taken terribly seriously by TAPP (what were they being recruited to, after all? Individuals disagreed on
−
−	As for the <em>criticism</em> of the SWP and other Trotksyite groups, this was rarely made public. When one article in ‘Act Locally’ did criticise the group (amongst others), a letter of complaint stated that “One of the refreshing aspects of Act Locally has been the lack of stereo-typical infighting and back-stabbing which is common to the Left... people with different ideologies and from different backgrounds can and do work together around specific issues which unite them”. The article’s author responded by laying out the basis of his criticism: “individual SWP members were not attacked, the target was the politics of the organisation: a legitimate target.” (Letters to the Editor, ‘Act Locally’)
−
−	Most criticism was cheeky. When, for example, the poster for a combined TAPP/Leninist benefit gig was discovered by TAPPers to feature Lenin, it was amended so that Lenin was hanging from a noose, and the slogan read “Death to all dictators?” This poster was put up around the venue of the benefit gig but not otherwise commented on.
−
−	Again, when a contributor to ‘Act Locally’ asked for the ‘Living Marxism’ conference to be advertised, he commented that he hoped his advert wouldn’t be trimmed down into illegibility, as previous ones had been. The ‘Act Locally’ editor of that month edited the advert in the following way (adding no words, just splicing it together): “Marxism. Ring 020 7538 2707 to join this annual week with the SWP, 7-14 July. It promises to be... a week of left wing meetings but if past experience tells you not to hold your breath, then please don’t tell everyone Why” (Act Locally, Issue 35).
−
−	*** Differences that mattered
−
−	<strong>Election Special</strong>
−
−	Amongst the many things that TAPPers disagreed on are the following:
−
−	<em>free speech for all</em>
−
−	<em>close down lap-dancing</em>
−
−	<em>supporting Cuba</em>
−
−	<em>prioritising one issue more laws eg.</em>
−
−	<em>calls to regulate gm and ban hunting</em>
−
−	<em>don’t vote</em>
−
−	<em>vs no platform for fascists</em>
−
−	<em>vs do-as-thou-wilt</em>
−
−	<em>and anti-censorship vs anarchist critique of</em>
−
−	<em>cuba-as-state</em>
−
−	<em>vs all kinds of issues vs less laws,</em>
−
−	<em>vs desire to dismantle government</em>
−
−	<em>vs vote green / socialist</em>
−
−	This last contradiction was perhaps the strongest in the group, and was brought to a head in the runup to the May 2001 general election. Some people in TAPP wished to run a ‘Vote for Nobody’ campaign, in emulation of the campaign in Bristol at the time. Others, in the Green Party, were themselves standing for election and exhausted from their campaigning work. I produced an ‘Act Locally’ election supplement with an anti-electoral bias.
−
−	“If our own people are forming part of parliament, the instruments of the enemy, they are helping to make the very laws we will not obey. Where is the enemy then? What are we to do to attack him?*
−
−	William Morris, 1887
−
−	<strong>Excited by the Election? Want some more democracy?</strong>
−
−	Then why not enter our ‘What’s Your Favourite Anti-election Slogan’ Competition! Put Your Cross next to your favourite traditional saying and exercise your democratic right!
−
−	One (fair) criticism of this came from a TAPPer who stated that “I am somewhat at a loss to understand why the Socialist Alliance comes in for so much criticism and the SPGB, Green Party (of which I am a member) and Monster Raving Loony Party gets none” (email, May 2001).
−
−	Another possible problem was that the positive alternatives we pushed looked a bit weak compared to the things we were opposed to.
−
−	<center>
−	■HSe are not Y[a5J]Jsi r°u°n?«Lst 1 (]9 obediencd
−	</center>
−
−	** 4. Conclusion
−
−	It’s up to you to provide the conclusion.
−
−	<em>“Practical, everyday ways of working with each other to get things done... bring with them their own experience of making our own decisions...</em>
−
−	<em>Learning how to take charge of your own life, and helping others to do the same, is where the real power lies” (Election Special, may 2001),</em>
−
−	When TAPP was most together (when we had time, when we felt like a group, when we made ourselves busy) we got together to talk about our activities. The weekly meeting was one place to do this, but that was mainly about sharing information and planning future events. Our peak time of collective group-analysis therefore came with big events, like stories of June 18<sup>th</sup> or the booklet on human genetics, and also with occasional reviews like the Berwick away-day. Self-criticism was something we were honest and realistic about, even when we didn’t have perfect answers to the problems we came up with. The squat swot is one good example.
−
−	SQUAT SWOT
−
−	STRENGTHS
−
−	Brought lots of new people together
−
−	Enjoyable
−
−	Social, communal centre
−
−	Amazing free space
−
−	Fantastic events
−
−	Great building
−
−	Made new friends
−
−	Did what set out to do
−
−	Political building
−
−	Diversity of activities, energy
−
−	New opportunities for tapp, not just banners
−
−	People inspired by space, presenting alternatives
−
−	New people wanting to be involved
−
−	Support from people on street
−
−	WEAKNESSES
−
−	Not enough people, same few doing lot of work No effective means of communication Treatment & acceptance of new group
−
−	Dealing with press
−
−	People stuck with kitchen duties
−
−	Maintenance of day to day running, so many roles Sustainability of that sort of commitment Turning people away
−
−	HOMELESSNESS
−
−	*** Free travel was hoax
−
−	<br>
−
−	*** Debate and Reflection
−
−	M K’l’KO passengers
−
−	tricked by hoaxers into believing they could travel free were let off by inspectors.
−
−	Posters and flyers told travellers free transport was available on the train
−
−	system as part of ihiropean Car-Free Day.
−
−	A. Metro spokeswoman said: “We were tipped off that somebody had put up posters on Newcastle City Council headed paper saying Metro travel would be free/’ Inspectors were lenient — they just sold single tickets to people who had been tricked.
−
−	I hope that this piece about what TAPP said about what we did, will be useful in helping us remember what was valuable, and what was not ideal, about the group. Obviously it’s pretty biased to what I think is important - so have a think what’s missed out and what’s wrong. Write it down or talk about it, and let’s have some collective analysis.
−
−
−	Let’s be avenue, sir
−
−	- MAKE WAY. . . on anti-traffic protester is arrested by po/ice yesterday.
−
−	- <strong>I A MAN who hung 20ft (7 m) above a city centre street for three hours yesterday was arrested during a peaceful protest against core.</strong>
−
−	- <strong>ABOUT 200 protesters brought traffic to a holt In Newcastle yesterday as they danced In the street, blew whistles and banged drums.</strong>
−
−	- <strong>TROUBLE flared briefly os police dismantled a sound system pumping out music to the crowd. Two others were arrested for minor offences.</strong>
−
−	- <strong>THE demo was < _</strong>
−
−	<strong>highlight urban problems of traffic, | pollution and social decoy. Les Roods added: *This carnival Is free and for the people. They can have a good time rather than wonder around like rumble % |</strong>
−
−	after police blacked oH approach roods.
−
−	- THE strong police presence draw Criticism from one of the let the Reclaim the Streets demonstration
−
−	- THE womftrt, catling hereHf Les Roads. claimed: *lt woi totally unnecessary. That’s the lost thing we wanted
−
−	- THE man who dangled from a quickly erected scaffolding frame was believed to be called Mike Polals. He was arrested as the protestors dis-
−
−	<br>
−
−	[1] Of the books of this type, I consider Alan Carter’s to be the exception to the rule (1999), and I draw upon his work in Chapter 4.
−
−	[2] In organising the Projectile festival of anarchist film and ideas in Newcastle (11-13 February 2005), we provoked comments from both directions of this issue. Firstly, our inclusion of one speaker led to comments such as ‘he’s no anarchist He doesn’t deserve a platform, he deserves a good kicking’. From the other direction, a prominent member of the IWW speaking at our event was criticised by others in the IWW for identifying himself with an anarchist event along the lines of *1 thought we were avoiding being associated with narrow anarchism.’ I maintain that practical anarchist positions are <em>always</em> situated between such critical perspectives, and so they are always subject to critique from both sides.
−
−	[3] This point is contested by anarcho-capitalists and some other anarchist individualists, but in line with most anarchists I consider their doctrine as ‘beyond the pale’ (Meltzer 2000:50).
−
−	[4] A recent expression of this approach to ‘freedom* is given by Toma: “We are bom into company, the company of our mothers ... life offers no freedom in the sense modem civilisationaiy philosophy understands the term. The need to eat, excrete, hug, orgasm and all that’s naturally necessary to achieve them - these leave no room for freedom. Freedom exists only where it doesn’t exist” (2002: 2).
−
−	[5] Alternative meanings of the anarchist symbol include ‘The Alpha & the Omega”, wherein liberty is identified as the beginning and the end (Dubois 1894: 278).
−
−	[6] ‘Authoritative’ here indicates the widespread influence and respect which Kropotkin’s definition has accrued: it should of course not be viewed as some kind of Archimedean point, prior to all other expressions.
−
−	[7] “We associate and cooperate because that’s how we are” (Frost 2002:4). Begg notes that in the radical green analysis, too, “Human nature is seen as potentially cooperative and seeking autonomous development” (1991:2). Marshall writes that “Many base their optimism on the existence of self-regulation in nature, on the spontaneous harmony of interests in society, and on the potential goodwill of humanity” (1992a: 664). But such ideas of a ‘natural order’ or the fundamental goodness of humanity hold little respect in the world of theory today. Several anarchist writers have therefore made explicit attempts to re-ground anarchist ideas on a non-essentialist basis (Brown 1989; Woodcock 1992: 57; Marshall 1989:138; May 1994). I do not consider this necessary for my thesis, as EDA has not grounded itself in such questionable assumptions.
−
−	[8] This also applies to working class incumbents, which marks a key difference from Marx, for whom workers remained workers, even in parliament (Marx quoted in Miller 1984:197). For anarchists, strategies which involve ‘seizing power’, such as the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat* are doomed to fail, and not because of’betrayal* as in the typical Leninist-Trotskyist analysis (Wildcat 1985:2) but due to a systematic and “gradual assimilation to the modes and thoughts’* of power (Rocker 1948:251; Michels 1959:307; Holloway 2002:17).
−
−	[9] Ward defines the state as a <em>rigidification</em> of the fluid texture of life into a hierarchical, rule-based structure, which has domination as its aim and substance (1988:6; cf Bakunin 1990a: 36). This relates to Landauer’s definition of the state as a form of relationship: “a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour, we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently” (quoted in Ward 1988:19). This conceptualisation (which also applies to capitalism (Jonathan X 2000:163)), is important to understand, because a crude conception of the state, which indiscriminately equates it with the modem nation-state, loses the whole thrust of anarchism.
−
−	[10] This is evidenced, for example, in the extant anarchist magazines, in the bookstalls at Anarchist Bookfairs, and in the debates at explicitly-titled ‘anarchist’ events, such as the Bradford discussions of 1998, the Mayday 2000 conference and our own ‘Projectile Festival of Anarchist Film and Ideas’ in Newcastle, Februaiy 2005. It is also demonstrated by the attitude of other anarchist streams, such as the ‘evolutionary anarchists* of Total Liberty who self-consciously perceive themselves as a minority current valiantly braving the dominant class-struggle norms.
−
−	[11] There is also extant a three-phase period isation, with a ‘third wave’ of anarchism identified as appearing in the late nineties (Adams 2002). We might view this as equivalent to the contemporary anarchism in this thesis, but I have not adopted the term as
−	<br><br>I have not found it a particularly useful heuristic concept, unlike the distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘second-wave’ anarchisms. A more useful point is made by Adams when he argues that, in the global context, the western anarchism that I deal with in this thesis is only a minority current On this view the ‘classical anarchism’ of Bakunin and Kropotkin should not be viewed as representative of anarchism per se (although it shall remain the touchstone of my thesis). From this perspective, Adams argues that when we abolish the idea of a homogenous ‘classical anarchism’, we also do away with any attempt to dismiss anarchism as ‘outmoded* (2002; cf Mbah & Igariwey 2001).
−
−	[12] The black flag of anarchism symbolised the ‘dark* emotions of grief and anger (Ehrlich, ed, 1996:229; <em>Anarchist Faq 2</em> 2005), and in 5.2.3 and 7.41 shall note the more jolly symbolism employed by contemporary EDA, but we should not forget the importance of rage as a motivation for activism (Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta 2001:16).
−
−	[13] Within EDA, also, we might take on board the point made by Jasper and others that “most emotions are part of rational action, not opposed to it” (Jasper 1999:109), and “Emotions can be strategically used by activists and be the basis for strategic thought” (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001: 9).
−
−	[14] “Give the people a free hand, and in ten days the food service will be conducted with admirable regularity. Only those who have never seen the people hard at work... can doubt it Speak of the organising genius of the ‘Great Misunderstood*, the people, to those who have seen it in Paris in the days of the barricades, or in London during the great dockers* strike, when half a million of starving folk had to be fed, and they will tell you how superior it is to the official ineptness of Bumbledon” (Kropotkin 1990: 77; cf Carter 1971:108; <em>Notes from Nowhere</em> 2003: 73).
−
−	[15] “Ideologies such as Marxism, classical anarchism and feminism all oppose aspects of civilisation”, but ‘99% of life in civilisation remains unchanged in their future scenarios... The Western model of progress would merely be amended and would still act as an ideal Mass society would essentially continue, with most people working, living in artificial, technologised environments, and subject to forms of coercion and control”, Moore states that “only anarcho-primitivism opposes civilisation, the context within which the various forms of oppression proliferate and become pervasive -and, indeed, possible” (Moore cl”[7]:2).
−
−	[16] As debates raged over whether the ‘totality’, a metaphor ‘or civilisation as a unitary, monolithic grid or railroad’ (Bookchin 1998b) was an unhelpful worldview for activism (<em>EFtJ</em> June-July 2002: 53; Ruins 2003: 16), primitivist writers were reminded of the anarchist notion of history including the counter-balancing ‘legacy of freedom’ (Bookchin 1998b; c Bookchin 1995 b: 48; Bookchin 1989a; Bookchin 1991; Watson 1998: 59-60). This was termed “the perennial (counter-) tradition. (Watson 1997), from which primitivists seek to learn and draw inspiration from (<em>GAy</em> 15 2004: 1; Purkis 2001: 88; Ruins 2003: 2).
−
−	[17] Watson’s brackets.
−
−	[18] Anarchist history provides supportive examples of this: “ i he Slavic Section recognises neither an official truth nor a uniform political program prescribed by the General Council or by a general congress. It recognises only the full solidarity of individuals, sections, and federations in the economic struggle of the workers of all countries against their exploiters” (in Bakunin 1990: 220
−
−	[19] This line of critique is also extended into the realm of nature, for instance by eco-anarchist Peter Marshall who charges that “The ideal of science is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. But science is not value-free. Science treats nature in a particular way. Research is usually oriented towards a specific goal which leads to the exploitation of nature” (1992b: 454: cf Plumwood 1993: 110-111; Merchant 1980:290-292; Orton 2004).
−
−	[20] Colin Ward’s oeuvre provides many good examples of a practical application of this bottom-up perspective, looking at how the issue at hand (be it housing, education, or DIY culture) might allow ordinary people to live in a more cooperative, selfcontrolled society. In a different style, Jeff Ferrell situates himself amongst those marginal autonomous subcultures (2001: 87) who experience and view the view the mechanisms of state control and ‘aesthetic exclusion* by the middle class (2001:14) in a very different light (2001: 67).
−
−	[21] In January 2002, one disaffected participant in TAPP criticised the group for being all action and no theory. He argued that nothing could be done without a theoretical understanding of that action but, in my opinion, offered nothing by way of practical suggestions, merely repeating certain stock rhetorical positions. I have always been suspicious of people who offer their ‘theory’ as a clue to the mystery of the universe, when they are unable to ground it in real-life experience.
−
−	[22] In my case, an example of this was a TAPP meeting’s request for me to collate a folder of TAPP’s writings.
−
−	[23] Hermeneutic researchers argue that to explain and understand any human social behaviour, we need to understand the meaning attached to it by the participants themselves (it cannot be done by solely looking at observable human action). A full understanding of social action must therefore involve empathetic understanding, and it is this empathetic understanding which provides the underlying tone of this thesis, and constitutes my primary aim. My secondary aim, arising from this position, is that this thesis will attain a useful political and practical function by aiding the self-reflection and reflexivity of the movements that it considers.
−
−	[24] They are more deliberately and self-consciously engaging with(in) anarchist discourse than those who stay textually silent
−
−	[25] The inaccuracies of textual manifestations, such as newspaper reports and even internal activist reports, is made manifest to those involved in peripheral groups such as ours, each time actions are inadvertently misreported, particularly when our word is taken as fact when we <em>know</em> we are exaggerating (<em>Schnews</em> 2002:14).
−
−	[26] Schnews articulate one of many occasions for this lament “our refusal to talk to the press this time meant that academics and wannabe politicians whining * We voted for Labour and they let us down’ got airtime and are seen to represent us” (<em>Schnews</em> 2002:17).
−
−	[27] Amster summarises the difference between an anarchist, and an academic perspective on validation in a revealing comment on anarchist academic Jeff Ferrell: “Ferrell himself dabbles in many if not all of these anarchistic pursuits - a quality that lends integrity and credence to his work even as it undermines his stature in traditional academic circles” (2002: n.p.).
−
−	[28] I might add that I often found the *non-technical’ literature much more technically sophisticated, and 1 concur with Heller in finding activist handbooks, for example, of much more utility and insight than academic accounts of direct action (2000:62).
−
−	[29] It is perhaps an indication of this that I found sources from the geographical and anthropological wings of academia more fruitful for anarchist analysis than those from sociology or politics.
−
−	[30] The anarchist solution to this specialised a-politicism and obedience to capitalist logic might be found in Kropotkin’s call for a re-unification of manual and intellectual work, in such as way that intellectual work would inform manual work, not add to its exploitation” (Mac Laughlin 1986:28; cf Kropotkin 1972:105; Bakunin 1986:1-5). This resembles Okely’s valorisation of ‘embodied knowledge* (1992: 16-17; cf Barker & Cox 2002:24; Mehta & Bondi 1999:69).
−
−	[31] It is perhaps significant that of all the actions, updates and events reported in <em>TGAL,</em> the only ‘academic* paper advertised was one which critiqued the government’s white paper on education (<em>TGAL</em> No.61 2003: 6).
−
−	[32] Heller argues, against the optimism stated by Plows who viewed her academic work as a continuation of her activism (1998b: 5), that “When I started my research I had more illusions about the potential impact of academic work in general” (Heller 2000: 5; cf Schnurrer 1998: 1), but by the end of his research he felt “it is as an activist that I think I have the greatest potential effect in terms of bringing about potential social change*” (2000: 5). Since the demise of TAPP and my own reduced involvement in protest and confrontational activism, I have listened to other self-defined radicals critique ‘activism* as limited and ineffective (in comparison to cultural events, for example). My experience of these articulate radicals* actual practice, however, has only increased my respect and faith for the power and the rounded ethical holism of the forms of ‘traditional* activism covered in this thesis.
−
−	[33] Routledge makes the important point that activists* “voices are not necessarily an authentic articulation of a resister’s (individual or collective) inner subjectivity since each individual resister speaks with many voices, the articulation of resistance being only one of many” (1996b: 413). This is certainly true in the case of leaflets produced by TAPP for public consumption, as I reflected upon in Duckett (2001b).
−
−	[34] TAPP had already merited a small mention in an undergraduate essay on *DIY Culture*, but this was done by an ‘insider* without the need for sustained research.
−
−	[35] Although in general we remained candid, and always ‘honest* in our discussions, the informal ways in which some information was excluded or filtered before it reached him should not be underestimated.
−
−	[36] We may assume that the piece in <em>Do or Die</em> was more likely to be read by the intelligence agencies, due to its medium of publication.
−
−	[37] One participant in TAPP did raise this contradiction to me, when I presented my <em>Do or Die</em> piece to the group to be okayed: what was the point in Hunt making us anonymous if I then go and tell the world all about us? This unease was not, however, carried forward into an objection to my paper.
−
−	[38] The importance of this in gaining acceptance for new[r] members of APP should not be underestimated: it is only individuals who were <em>not</em> introduced in such a way who TAPP viewed as objects o’ suspicion.
−
−	[39] But see the final points of this section to see how my views on this situation were prompted to change.
−
−	[40] This situation, in which I face the possibility of quoting myself as quoted by another researcher, raises some interesting issues of multi-layering (including yourself as one of the research subjects), and accuracy. I could easily have engineered quotations for inclusion in the thesis, and indeed I produced a pamphlet for distribution in EFI in 2002 which would have supported many of my arguments: however I thought it better to exclude it from consideration!
−
−	[41] He also comments that “Their absence perhaps speaks more about the ethical implications of my research than any formal, angst ridden, reflexive methodology chapter ever could” (Heller 2000:4).
−
−	[42] In a previous draft I declared that “The subjects of study will thus be invited to conunent and their requests on security will be adopted. They will also get a chance to veto or edit out any parts of the thesis that disturb them. This is not to say that I will accept anything they say: I consider my own views to be just as valid as theirs, and I hold an author’s prerogative. It is therefore only on grounds of security (not representation), that I would accept their desire for omission. On questions of analysis or representation, then I will include their opinions in a footnote but not cancel out my own. I don’t imagine many will feel compelled to write these, but the opportunity will explicitly be made... comments would be relegated to footnotes and appendices” (2000 thesis draft). In the final event, ex-TAPPer comments were minimal, as most individuals had moved on to the next pressing issue.
−
−	[43] Two anarchist academics in the North East recently withdrew a proposed paper, prompted (but not decided), by my point that the subjects, whose opinions were stated on anarchist internet chatrooms, would probably condemn it and them.
−
−	[44] The alternative possibility for these raids is that the EU ministers’ visit had provided the police with so much manpower, money and resources that they were just looking for something to do with it, and the small demo was the closest trigger they could find for their activity.
−
−	[45] Participants at the first Eclectic City squat (largely the same people as TAPP) also took part in a group interview with students from the Newcastle University Politics Department in 2000. Not having taken part in this group interview, I found that I was desperately eager to hear exactly what was said and how the group presented itself. It appears that the group presented their beliefs and justified their practice in a more abstract and grand way than I was used to - they were described as ‘utopian’ by one of the interviewers.
−
−	[46] One participant in TAPP (a ‘doer’) suggested there was a general split in the left between groups who actually try and do something (such as the <em>Socialist Alliance)</em> and those who only engage in navel-gazing (such as the <em>Socialist Party of Great Britain</em> SPGB). As this comment was made in the context of TAPP, I took it to imply a criticism of us (myself) doing too much navel-gazing, and also to encourage us as a group to work with other groups like the <em>Socialist Alliance.</em> I should, however, also note that myself and another participant were identified on another occasion as being the ones who most often cut short debate in meetings (in order to arrange the practical side). There was not, therefore, a neat equivalence between ‘doers’ and ‘nonintellectuals’.
−
−	[47] Gridley sought to highlight factors which inhibited mobilisation (both in the sense of political action, and in involvement with TAPP). She notes, for example, that “limited time; limited energy; poor health; the desire to avoid possible risks; and the geographic isolation of TAPP, all contribute to the failure of ‘weak* ties to facilitate mobilisation” (1999:1). As potential solutions to these limitations, she proposed “Providing childcare, scheduling actions for more convenient times, making special arrangements for those with health problems and finding funding for transport to and from actions” (1999:10). These suggestions were not put into practice by the group, although the themes did crop up again after she raised them (she was not, however, the first to raise them). One TAPP member did undergo a course for creche workers and after TAPP finished, awareness of the problems faced by parents was heightened as several parents sought to become involved in activism. Of this post-TAPP period, this thesis remains silent
−
−	[48] We might also note that Hunt despite his sympathies for the group, did not feed back his own research except to provide the group with a paper copy. His language was highly technical and therefore not read by most of the group. Waters wrote that “I do not believe this reciprocation would occur if the researcher was not a member of TAPP as these ideas will not be put forward in a formal feedback meeting of some sort” (2001:15). I agree with her in this, and what I consider to be my <em>greater</em> involvement in TAPP will, hopefully, lead to a <em>greater</em> feedback.
−
−	[49] Compare this with Waters: “I questioned if I was a full enough member to legitimately use the group as a research base” (2001:9).
−
−	[50] One of these projects is to make a 2007 diary featuring dates and episodes from Newcastle’s radical past, largely utilising old issues of <em>TGAL</em> and acting as a kind of <em>TGAL</em> review. This will involve ex-TAPPers. Another intended project is to edit activist videos into short clips of’peoples history* that can be downloaded from the internet
−
−	[51] This anti-fascism can be given a rather uncompromising form by some anarchists who require an <em>explicit</em> commitment The Anarchist Federation thus state that “ecological themes require an explicit social context to have political relevance; the failure to provide this is the hallmark of reactionary ecology, under banners such as ‘beyond politics* or ‘apolitical”“ (AF 1996c: 15; cf Biehl & Staudenmeier 1996). I consider the difference between left and right wing environmentalism further in section 4.2.4.
−
−	[52] This, however, is only half of the stoiy of ecological radical isation - the abstract half. The other motivation comes from the actual experience of beloved local places destroyed by ‘progress’, as I shall emphasise in sections 5.2.2 and 7.6.
−
−	[53] Ecology, with its emphasis on interconnections and interrelationships (Evemdon quoted in Carter 1999: 82; Commoner 1971), has been labelled the ‘subversive science’ (Paul Sears quoted in Manes 1990: 225; cf Scarce 1990: 34; Athanasiou 1997). Radical green theorists have taken this focus on interrelationships to mean that ecological principles, such as diversity (Myers 1985: 254; King 1989; Bookchin 1971: 80; Carter 1999: 272), spontaneity (Bookchin 1982: 58; Carter 1999: 71; Purhase 1994: 29) and stability (Sale 2001: 41; Carter 1999: 303; Bookchin 1971: 80), lead “directly into anarchic areas of social thought” (1971: 58), and that they can be used critically to condemn authority (Bookchin 1971: 77-78; Marshall 1992b: 423) and the multiple forms of domination in human society (Boo^chin 1971: 63; 1980: 76; 1988a: 1990a: 33). I am not in this thesis looking at anarchist arguments for their alternative vision, however, but at the practices and processes by which they make eco-anarchism alive now, today.
−
−	[54] Post-left anarchists, like the editors of <em>Anarchy</em> magazine, make a similar claim to newness when they state their position as “Neither left nor right, we’re just uncompromisingly anti-authoritarian” (<em>Anarchy</em> 2002: 83). This brand of anarchism is not post-left in a right-wing sense, but has rather rejected certain of the trappings of * worker-ism* or outmoded organisation (Jarach 2004; Flaco in <em>Schnews</em> 2002:217-218).
−
−	[55] With the decline of the working class as the proposed revolutionary subject (Gorz 1994:68; X in <em>Do or Die</em> 2000: 170), those in the anarchist camp who argue that “Ecological analysis needs to be part of a wider class analysis” (ACF cl 991:2) arc, in my view, outdated. However, while some radical greens oppose any mention of class conflict ideology (Shadow Fox 1996: 27), others (including several primitivists) include class as one of many oppressions to oppose (GA 1996:28; GA 1997a: 12).
−
−	[56] The eco-anarchist Peter Marshall, although sympathetic to deep ecology, states that”Although deep ecologists are philosophically radical, they do not tty to transform existing society... As a strategy for change, deep ecology mainly recommends isolated acts of ecological vandalism, tampering with the legal system, changing personal lifestyle and increasing awareness through persuasion and example. It leaves however the main sources of human domination and hierarchy - private property and the state - intact” (1992b: 418-420). He even states that “deep ecology is little more than a tautology, like cold snow” (1992b: 423), and has thus added little to the arsenal of radical ecological ideas.
−
−	[57] Such views became so notorious that commentators like Cal li cot were led to declare that “The extent of misanthropy in modem environmentalism may be taken as a measure of the degree to which it has become biocentric” (quoted in Nash 1989: 154). I do not however share the view that eco-ccntrism need leed to anti-humanitarianism
−
−	[58] “While [ it is ] human beings and institutions that actively engage in the destruction of nature... it should not automatically be assumed that they are acting out the biological destiny of the species; that would be to take at face value the corporate and state rationalisations for exploitation (‘we do it all for you’)[M] (Bradford 1989:10; cf Bookchin 1990a: 9-10). Anarchists instead have a fundamental faith that an alternative world is possible, where the absence of capitalist drives to exploit and consume would allow humanity and nature to live in peace.
−
−	[59] The ASEED <em>Forest Campaigners Handbook</em> provides us with a practical example of this case, identifying property and profit as the underlying causes of forest destruction, and not in a generalised way but in rlation to specific forests, specific companies, and specific trade agreements (ASEED 1999:27; cf Manes 1990: 90). The agents of this might be the nation state, overconsumption in the West, particular companies, or such institutions of global capitalism as the IMF (<em>EF!J 22(5)</em> 2002; <em>EFU</em> 22(4) 2002). ASEED recognise that “ultimately we have to look to the basics of the system which has created these excesses of demand, and ask the question ‘is environmental sustainability really possible within a society geared towards the accumulation of capital?’” (1999:8).
−
−	[60] Bookchin emphasises that his aim is one of “creating dual power composed of directly democratic assemblies of the people in revolutionary <em>opposition</em> to the state” (letter in <em>Organise!</em> No.44 1996; cf Bookchin 1986c). Clark, however, argues that “the municipalist program and Bookchin’s new ‘revolutionary subject* cannot be deduced from the general premises of social ecological analysis, nor can they be shown to be the only plausible basis for an ecological politics” (1997).
−
−	[61] Many other versions (or corruptions) of anarchism arc identified by ‘serious’ anarchists. For example, in the pages of one edition of the AF’s theoretical magazine, <em>Organise!</em> (issue 42), the following tendencies arc all condemned: the abdication of critical judgement regarding overseas revolutions; the *unity-at-all-costs syndrome’ involving alliances with Trotskyite and other authoritarian groups; the problem of egotistic individuals; localism; factionalism; and also being too tolerant of incorrect views; running anti-election candidates in elections; hippies and the alternative scene ‘confusing the movement’; lacking a strong enough theoretical strength to turn activists into fully-fledged revolutionaries; and holding a pedantic obsession with philosophic principle rather than social practice. My own approach when examining informal, hybridised and loose forms of anarchism is to highlight positive anarchist elements rather than exclude on the basis of impurity, naivete or doctrinal irregularity.
−
−	[62] Kropotkin pushes us towards the logic of ‘propaganda of the deed* when he states that “By actions which compel general attraction, the new idea seeps into people’s minds and wins converts” (2001:40). Similar (if less grand) sentiments were expressed in TAPP: “it’s doing actions that makes more actions happen” (‘Josh’, my meeting notes 2001). This position is criticised as ‘actionism’ by some anarchists, however, and in 6.3.3 we shall note the anarchist critique of Propaganda of the Deed forms that fail to meet the ethical directive of anarchism.
−
−	[63] The lesson was expressed by Bakunin, shortly before his death: “Realise at length that nothing living and firm can be built upon Jesuitical trickery, that revolutionary activity aiming to succeed must not seek its support in base and petty passions, and that no revolution can achieve victory without lofty and conspicuously clear ideas” (quoted in Avrich 1987:30).
−
−	[64] The 1907 International Anarchist Congress urged its participants to “propagate and support only those forms and manifestations of direct action which cany, in themselves, a revolutionary character and lead to the transformation of society” (quoted in Russell 1918: 84).
−
−	[65] This is demonstrated by the co-opting of the environmental movement’s own language and internal discourse (Grove-White 1995:269-270), such as with the case of ‘sustainable development*, where the radical hopes applied to the phrase by ecologists were overridden by the sustained growth ideology of the government, which then “facilitated the hijacking and compromise of environmental goals” (Thomson & Robins 1994:10; DA 2004:18-20). In Rose’s term, the radical green ideas were ‘colonised’ (2004:3).
−
−	[66] As an EF!er puts it: “we have learned... from our struggles. We have surely seen enough loaded public inquiries, enough police and bailiff violence, enough beautiful places trashed and enough of our friends sent down to see the state as our enemy” (ATW1998).
−
−	[67] There was a consensus in certain discussions at the 1997 EFI Gathering that “people in the movement had become more politicised over the years”, as reflected in the move “away from single-issue politics” and “the growing willingness to identify capitalism as the root of the problem” (SPCA 1998). I consider this further in sections 5.3.7 and 7.5. Although I did not participate in all the same experiences as the people in those discussions, my own story too is one where experience has confirmed, hardened and sophisticated my anarchist views.
−
−	[68] Della Porta & Diani claim: “Through collective action, individuals rediscover their ‘natural’ affinity with each other, likeminded people, which had, for too long, been hidden” (1999:92; cf Jordan 2002: 12; Clark 1981:19). As Notes from Nowhere phrase it, “Resisting together, our hope is reignited” (2003:29; cf Camus 1971; 21). Solidarity, as the anarcho-syndicalists emphasise, is itself an entry-way into an anarchist world-view (see 6.2.2), and can throw up unexpected allies, as the RTS- dockers experience demonstrated (Franks 2003:30) (see 7.4).
−
−	[69] A libertarian communist theoretical magazine widely read by anarchists, pursuing a class- and capital-framed analysis of collective struggles, which effectively equates to a Marxist economics allied to an anarchist politics.
−
−	[70] <em>Do or Die</em> focus on the most radical repertoires: “Diggers trashed, forests occupied, billboards subverted, logging roads dug up, trees spiked, offices invaded, windows smashed, snares disabled, computers scrapped” (2003: 5).
−
−	[71] Instead of the supposedly ‘effective* but actually ‘bureaucratic* machine of Greenpeace, writers for Earth First! argued that it is another spirit of resistance that will be effective: “An unbridled, exultant, unapologetic and deeply ‘irrational* affirmation, both of your own life and of all that surrounds you, must be set against the nullifying language of death. That is why we have achieved so much with comparatively little • we have learned to give up trudging and to start dancing. This is the reason why, as Fourier says, it takes ‘workers several hours to put up a barricade that rioters can [erect] in a few minutes”* (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997; cf Wall 1997:26).
−
−	[72] Concomitant with this perceived success for extra-institutional protest went the perceived failure of the top-down, expert-led style that had dominated British environmentalism: “After Twyford, with its plethora of special status designations, it was acknowledged that no site in Britain could be deemed to be safe from road development” (Welsh 1996:31).
−
−	[73] GA phrase this hostility well: “They’re happy enough to use EFI as cannon-fodder - good dramatic stuff for catching the attention and bringing the subs in - but if there’s ‘uncontrollable’ direct action like ecotage, that’s going too far” (GA 1993:).
−
−	[74] Road Alert! (RA!) illustrate this difference in their account of the relationships RA! held with the organisations: “FOE and Greenpeace used RA! as their sole contact, acknowledging frankly that they wished to work hierarchically as this was what they were used to and it was less trouble. This extended even to funding - ‘group A has asked us for some money, does RA! think they are alright and deserve it?’ - something we were totally uncomfortable with.” In contrast to this attitude, RA! state their claim for in terms fitting for an anarchist attitude: “we never, ever lost sight of our perspective as radical ecologists and were not wooed into a careerist position by rubbing shoulders with FOE and Greenpeace, nor were we afraid to disagree with them” (RA! 1998).
−
−	[75] This remained true until ‘anti-capitalist’ events such as Mayday 2000, which demonstrated a greater attachment to traditional anarchist mores (<em>Independent</em> 22.4.2000): see section 7.5.
−
−	[76] EFlUK’s rhetoric has also been consistently much less ‘spiritual’ than that of either the Dongas or EF1US (expressed, for example, through placing parties or publication dates on the solstices and equinoxes) (Purkis 1995:12). Although the first few <em>EFlAUs</em> were published on solstices, and the very first <em>EF!AU*s</em> contained die EF1US slogan *no compromise in defence of mother earth* (£EMUNo.2 1992:8), neither of these persisted past 1993. The ‘mother’ was consciously dropped from the EFIUK slogan ‘no compromise in defence of the earth’ and only made one reappearance in 2000: but that was because I myself included it, and so I can state with certainty that it did not represent any shift back to EF1US or pagan inspiration (EFWUNo.72 2000: 1). Views harshly critical of’New Age’ ideas arc equally likely to be heard amongst EFIers as are openly voiced sentiment (Heller 2000:97).
−
−	[77] Note that Purkis associates anarchism with the prc-anarchist millenarian tradition. This is a link made by many anarchist writers, but while I consider there to be a broad truth to the association, I find it unhelpful to allow the religious terms of the earlier, pre-enlightenment movements to bear on post-industrial movements such as EFI
−
−	[78] This connection with the arenas of traditional and ideological anarchist gatherings has continued: I myself sat on the EF!AU stall at the Mayday 2000 ‘Festival of Alternatives’.
−
−	[79] Already in 1997 the EF!AU recommended the American journal <em>Fifth Estate</em> for its critique of technology and civilisation (<em>EF!AU</em> No.36 1997: 2). In EFIUK, the influence of primitivism is significant, but not dominant <em>Green Anarchist</em> has republished many primitivist articles; the Re: Pressed book service, has sold primitivist texts at Earth First! gatherings since 1999; and when I first attended EFI gatherings, significant primitivist essays had already been copied and distributed for free or for very low prices by Dead Trees EF!/ South Downs EF! (<em>EFLA</em>C/No.29 1996:2).
−
−	[80] “Seel suggests that EF1UK has emphasised NVDA rather than covert monkeywrenching and economic logic (1997b: 173), but I have found it difficult to support this finding. NVDA has a numerical advantage over ecotage in the <em>EF1AU</em> reports, (and in <em>Schnews, TGAL</em> and the mainstream media), but this is countered by the strong emphasis on sabotage in <em>Do or Die</em> and <em>Green Anarchist</em> reports. While I consider the latter two magazines to show a stronger editorial bias and selectivity than the former, there remains the additional point that sabotage, by its nature covert and unaccountable, makes less of a public ‘splash’ than public acts of NVDA, which often seek to amplify their impact in order to convey a message (Plows, Wall & Doherty 2001). I interrogate the apparent contradiction between the use of both civil disobedience and sabotage (Scarce 1990:11) in sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5
−
−	[81] Note, also, that while the <em>EF!AU</em> is the best source for EFI reports, it is by no means comprehensive. Wall, Doherty & Plows suggests it has a 60% coverage rate of local actions (2003), but this is perhaps over-generous. The <em>EF!AU</em>often featured only one or two instances of a repertoire when I have known many more to have been carried out - such as the production of spoof papers. As an editor of the EF!AU it was very difficult to decide what ‘counted’ as EFl and what was covered by other newsletters and publications: priorities of coverage varied between editorial collectives, between members of the editorial collective, and between individual issues. There was a tendency to report novel or ‘inspirational’ first-use of tactics, which may continue within their issue field (such as stopping nuclear convoys) but receive no more attention. A comparison of the <em>EF!All’s</em> coverage of blockades, stunts and other protest events conducted by TAPP (for which <em>TGAL</em> had a higher than 90% coverage rate, compared against my diaries) indicates little better than a 20% coverage for actions. Many of these actions did not have an ecological theme, and almost all partook more of a ‘liberal’ than ‘anarchist’ direct action character: this, combined with TAPP’s only partial identification with EF!, might explain the lower ratio for TAPP coverage in the <em>EF!AU</em> However, TAPP did regularly send in reports and <em>TGALs</em> to the <em>EFLAU*</em> and for groups which did not regularly send in reports, or were even more marginally EF!-like, the ratio would be much worse. When we in Newcastle edited the <em>EF!AU></em> we featured a greater proportion of our own actions, but our sense of the <em>EFIAlfs</em> editorial remit still encouraged us to exclude a majority of actions and events. From my reading of the <em>EF!AU</em> only cross-network ‘national* EFI actions received a 100% coverage.
−
−	[82] As a cartoon in the 2”* <em>EF!AU</em>declared, “you’ve got to get your hands dirty when your dealing with shit* (£7*7/1No. 2 1992: 6). See also my characterisation of revolutionary non-purism in 5.2.
−
−	[83] <em>Do or Die</em> make the pertinent point that EFIUK <em>chose</em> not to regularly utilise other animal rights tactics, such as home visits (2003:12; <em>Schnews</em> 1999 No.153/154; £FMUNo,89 2003: 7).
−
−	[84] Note I am missing 4 Most* issues and have not been able to factor these in.
−
−	[85] The Norwich group which took over after our editorship paid much more attention to workers issues, with 6 issues featuring reports on GAP and additional attention to construction safety (£FMt/No.73 2001:3), casualisation (<em>EF!AU</em> No.72 2000:5) and privatisation (<em>EF!AU</em>No.74 2001:2; £F7/fC/No.80 2001-2002:7). These are topics more characteristically covered by the anarcho-syndicalist paper <em>Direct Action:</em> conditions in the workplace and solidarity-based campaigns.
−
−	[86] I noted in 5.2.2 that preventing destruction should not be seen as a purely negative action: “if what those grey-suited masses in the city do is positive, then GET NEGATIVE! and if you can’t handle that remember, NO more roads is good for the earth and is therefore positive” (<em>Do or Die 4</em> 1995:35). The positive and negative aspects of ecological action have been combined most clearly (because most extravagantly), by anarcho-primitivists, who position themselves not only “For the destruction of civilisation” but also “for the reconnection to life!” (<em>GAy</em> 9 2002:16). Anarcho-primitivists often frame their project in terms of Reconnecting* with the roots of pre-domesticated society, to wildness (or ‘going feral*), and “to rediscover the primitive roots of anarchy”. They differ from class struggle anarchists in viewing hunter-gatherer tribes as “ecological anarchists” from whom we should learn (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003).
−
−	[87] A word used for belongings on road camps
−
−	[88] Anticonsumerism is also displayed through public events such as No shop day (<em>EF’AU</em> Nos. 7, 33/34, 43, 87; cf Purkis 2000:105); ‘Commonpoverty events (Nos. 81,83, 84); and a ‘money defacement league’ (Nos. 30, 31, 36).
−
−	[89] In campaigning to stop the big DIY companies stocking hardwood from indigenous forests, for example, tactical irritation was used to tty and play one company oft against the others rather than calling for an all-out government ban (<em>EFlAUNv.S</em> 1993:2; Purkis 1995:10).
−
−	[90] The contrast between instrumental and revolutionary success was displayed in the case of the anti-roads movement There, camping in the path of proposed roads worked as an economic tactic, intended to push the costs of building the road up so high that other roads could not be built “If we can stop the bastards totally we can COST them, show there’s no easy profit in earth rape” (Little Weed 1994; cf Merrick 1996; 66; <em>Do or Die</em> 2003:19). Vindication for the camps was therefore cited in the drastic cuts in the government’s roadbuilding budget (<em>EF!AU</em>No.23 1995-1996:2; <em>Do or Die</em> 1998:2). Thus [M]in 1992 we set ourselves the task of stopping 600 roads, which were ripping through a significant proportion of Britain’s most important habitats. Within five years 500 had been cancelled” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:61). But an activist then puts this evaluation of success in revolutionary perspective: “just a little bit of reform in a world full of shit” (Oli, quoted in Evans 1998:10; Do <em>or Die</em> 1996:19).
−
−	[91] In 5.3.4 I argued that the relative disregard for revolutionary rhetoric (most noticeable for its absence in the first five years, and fragmentary and non-synthesised from then on) is due to activists’ internalisation of the lessons of their radical ideology. Instead of expressing sweeping views of how society should be, they apply the radical critique and the ecological ethic to their own actions, choices and ways of being. I maintain that this holistic message may actually be more revolutionary than allegiance to an explicit revolutionary platform.
−
−	[92] This may lead to some ‘non-radical* actions, but if they are arrived at in a free, anarchist manner then in my view they may represent a more properly anarchist action than methods that are militant but obligatory.
−
−	[93] The first <em>EF!AU</em> contains nine contacts, including personal names (EFZXlf No. 1 1991:4), and the fourth <em>EF1AU</em> reveals an exciting spread of groups (£F.M4/No.4 1993:3). By the time we took on the EF1AU, several of the contact groups had started to go quiet, requiring periodic culls: the Norwich group which followed our editorship thus culled the action groups to 14 (m4C/No.74 2001: 6).
−
−	[94] It is with regret that the focus of this thesis leads me to downplay the role of the local (non-anarchist) campaigners. I do not wish to equate ‘grassroots’ only with those of radical beliefs, nor claim all the ‘success* of the movement for the radical contingent
−
−	[95] The rise of activist ‘social centres’ (as opposed to protest camps) was approved at the 2003 Summer Gathering as “more accurate cos we live in cities” (My Notes, Summer Gathering 2003).
−
−	[96] A note of warning regarding the accuracy of movement literature might be provided by the fact that although TAPP folded in 2002, the TAPP contact address was retained on the EF!AU contacts list until 2004 when, after our requests, it was finally removed.
−
−	[97] NSM organisation allows that “Individuals often take part in several of these groups while being tied to none” (Seel 1997), and Purkis emphasises that groups are embedded in local ‘radical miliues* (2001:65). With the case of TAPP, individuals were also active in the Green Party, Anarchist Federation, Trident Ploughshares and People & Planet; were connected to networks like TLIO, GEN, Peat Alert!, CND, PGA, Tyneside Stop the War Coalition; and received newsletters and information from innumerable others, including the anarchist press and the mailshots of other activist groups like Faslane Peace Camp, London RTS and SHAC.
−
−	[98] From 2003 the EF!AU has reverted to quarterly. <em>TGAL</em> has shown similar aspirations to being monthly, but is more commonly quarterly. <sub>#</sub>,
−
−	[99] We were warned that at least two EF! groups were effectively destroyed by their experience o editing the Action Update. One re-formed after a lull, while the other never re-appeared. Other groups reported that editing the <em>EE!AU</em> made it harder to do direct action (<em>EF!AU</em> No. 10 1994: 7), although this was not our own experience.
−
−	[100] These points were made in a small group discussion about the action update at the 2001 Summer Gathering. <em>Do or Die,</em> “EF! Action Update’s big sister publication” (EF.UU No. 19 1995:2), exercised much more editorial independence and as of 1999 (No.8), became independent of EF1UK (Seel & Plows 2000:131). We found it quite hard that what was billed as open to new collectives, and which we had been encouraged - even begged - to take on, turned out to have a lot of baggage from EF! history and expectations behind it Not being pre-stamped with the EF! identity, our Newcastle collective tended to offend the sacred cows, miss the requisite tone and, now I read through our editions with hindsight failed to stamp an effective, inspiring or distinctive identity on our reports. Atton conducted a survey of anarchist newsletters and analysed them according to how participatory and non-elitist they were (Atton 1999; 2002). According to his criteria, the <em>EF!AU</em> (and <em>TGAL</em> even more so) would come out very high: partly this is due to their lack of professionalism, which facilitates a rotating and accessible editorship. A letter of support we received stated that “the move in recent years towards more and more ‘professionalism* is not necessarily a good thing. Our network should be based on a DIY ethos” and presenting publications that appear professionally produced “doesn’t exactly inspire others to do it themselves” (letter, March 2000).
−
−	[101] GA in typically paranoid vein accused us of bowing to (non-existent) patronage and funding, when it was a case of technical incompetence rather than political malevolence. They made the useful remark that “the <em>EF!AU</em> is a forum for EF! as a whole, not a vehicle for the prejudices of its current editorial group” (GA, letter, 6.4.2000).
−
−	[102] The term ‘wider network* here is thought of in terms of the potential mass of people that could, should they so choose, respond to the Action Update. Thus the <em>EF!AU</em> workshop at the Summer Gathering was billed “The hour and a quarter where the Action Update is accountable to the network” (Summer Gathering Programme (2) 1999:7). In actual experience, it is only a few individuals - “the more mouthy elements” as one letter of support phrased it (letter, March 2000) - who reacted to the Action Update.
−
−	[103] Comparison with other anarchist publications might be fruitful. For the class-struggle anarchist networks, the group and the ‘official line* tends to revolve around their newsletter, while many of the non-mainstream anarchist papers are one-man affairs. An EF!er commented that, on attending a Northern Anarchist Network gathering in the late 1990s, it seemed most of the men there had their own paper in tow (<em>Total liberty. Green Anarchist, Cunningham Amendment, Northern Voices).</em>
−
−	[104] Gatherings also bring up collectivc/comniunal needs, such as childcare and kitchen work (Winter Moot ‘ Iyer 200C: 2; Tsolkas 2004; 27-8), in a way that affinity groups of like-minded agile twenty-somethings do not.
−
−	[105] A list of 35 networks with websites was listed on the 2003 Summer Gathering website, alongside 7 groups who contributed kitchen equipment, structures (tents), and other resources (accessed 27.8.2003).
−
−	[106] At the 1998 Summer Gathering, I distinguished formal campaign meetings from practical skill-sharing and experience-based workshops, noting “These workshops included how to: plan actions, deal with arrest, handle prison, facilitate meetings well, save lives with first aid, squat buildings, do co-counselling, build a bender, practice self-defence (some workshops women-only), learn to climb, practice a more ecological lifestyle, use lock ons, use radio scanners, put newsletters together, develop affinity groups, deal with problem-people, stay healthy on site, combine activism with children and/or jobs, set up pirate radio stations etc..” (My notes September 1998). Each Summer Gathering programme divides the sessions up in a slightly different way: these divisions are somewhat arbitrary and should serve only to indicate the range of workshop styles and issues.
−
−	[107] An EF!er from 2003 makes the valid point that “Sometimes it is very hard for individuals to express viewpoints, let alone have them taken on-board, when there are years of entrenched dogma and attitude amongst a core group” (Fred in Steve 2003:5). Yet I also side with the respondent who stated that this was not truly due to dogma and core groups, but more because of <em>perceptions</em> of these (‘the guru* in Steve 2003:6). I will consider these issues further in the next section.
−
−	[108] The programme stated that “This year’s collective has been looking at the issue of accessibility. The model of disability generally accepted in our society is known as the Medical Model - that a person is disabled because of their impairments (i.e. if s their problem). However, disabled people have challenged that with die Social Model - a person is disabled by society (i.e. if s our problem). If society met their needs, they would not be disabled. Accepting the Social Model, we have begun looking into how we can improve physical access at the Gathering, and make a start on some practical things* A lengthy email preceded the 2001 gathering announcing this attempt to construct the site according to the social model, and the onus was put on future gatherings to greatly increase accessibility. Some TAPPers felt Earth First! over-played its left-libertarian ideology, and can verge on arrogance, self-importance and being *up its own arse*. It is interesting that it is this sense of self-importance that provides much of the explicit and textual evidence that facilitates an analysis of EF! ideology. TAPP, for example was aware and utilised the social model since its involvement with disabled activists on the human genetics theme (Gene-No! 1998b; <em>Do or Die</em> No.8 1999:10), but had not written a manifesto to the movement about it
−
−	[109] Elites are not evil conspiracies out to grab power, but rather “nothing more and nothing less than a group of friends who also happen to participate in the same political activities” (Freeman 1984: 8; cf Roseneil 2000:167-169). That the EFI network is riddled with these networks is certain: indeed a case could be made for the ‘EF!’ network identity being held together primarily by these friendship ties (Purkis 2001:265-268; £774 £7 No. 25 :6). It was beneficial to me that our own group did not feel part of the ‘inner circles* and had not shared the same bonding experiences at Twyford Down, for example, as certain other activists: it is partly for this reason that I have focussed on the <em>EF!AU</em> and the Gathering to explore these dynamics, rather than on our own local group.
−
−	[110] It was partly in response to this relative isolation of the gathering-organisers that I joined in the organisation in 2003, preparing the site, organising logistics, and participating in the creation of the programme. I found it very easy to get involved, simply by joining an email list and then turning up when it was advertised to do so. The organising group was fluid, geographically dispersed, and showed no hallmarks of elitism or cliqueyness.
−
−	[111] Purkis emphasises the effort EF’ers make to avoid hierarchy and empower people (2001:347), but he also recognises there can be a “self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the older members became frustrated with the fact that nobody was actually volunteering to do these tasks, thus causing themselves to maintain ‘control* of these activities” (2001:333).
−
−	[112] At the third Winter Moot in 2002,1 made my strongest attempt to use my academic analysis to inform movement debate. The notes I took indicate how unsuccessful (and unnecessary) I felt my contribution to the debate was, but they also record my experience of feeling *put down* in debate: “Always more anarchist and more on the ball than I remember. I feel so less intelligent than them. Nothing new to say... Lots of effort was put into making the debate a safe space for discussion (this point especially urged on the points of racism and sexism, so that we could be honest and not feel scared to speak), but in the small group... and also in the big plenaries (folk’d huff and laugh/make jokes), there was an undertone... that might scare off real honesty. I certainly felt when I phrased a few things wrong that people leapt to disagree when they detected things they*ve decided they’re anti. This happened when I used the words ‘democracy* and ‘accountable’ to consider how ef! related to each other... those words have baggage and people leapt at the baggage ... So you have to mind your p’s and q’s, and if I didn’t already share so much of their anarchist ideology I would feel very ‘outside* I think” (My notes, Winter Moot 2002).
−
−	[113] A recognition of the exclusivity of EDA which I will criticise using formal anarchist arguments in 7.6, is also commonly recognised within EF! Some people are excluded by the “level of commitment” needed (ATW1998), others by the physical demands (<em>EF!AU</em> No.25:6; WPH 1998:2). One DD notes that “a movement whose whole strategy is based on risk, danger, transience and illegality; attracts only those too young to have obtained anything to lose” (WPH 1998:2), and others raise the fear that, rather than being a true revolutionary movement, “Ecological direct action could be just an exciting holiday of autonomy between leaving school and entering the world of work and parenting” (WPH 1998:1; cf Do <em>or Die</em> 2003:38). Ableist barriers are self-selecting (Roseneil 2000:49), and these factors mean that EF! is a “young persons movement, mostly white and well educated, but economically ‘decommodified’“ (Purkis 1996:200). EFH warn that “Actions can turn into another branch of the trend towards dangerous sports, privileged people looking for extreme experience in a dulled world, an outlet for angst driven rebellion, or a comforter to make you think you’re doing something” (EFH 1998).
−
−	[114] Although the effort to receive as many contributing DDs as possible was unprecedented, most DDs were nonetheless produced by long-term ‘clique* members (and their GA snipers), because they were the most attentive to the channels by which DDs were solicited, and most aware of the impetus behind the attempt Most authors remained anonymous, and so I have utilised either the initials of their pen names or, where that is lacking, the initials of their title.
−
−	[115] The issue of informal hierarchies had already been discussed at the 1996,1997 and 1998 gatherings (Summer Gathering Flyer 1996: 2-3; Summer Gathering Flyer 1997:2; Summer Gathering Programme 1998: 8), and would continue to make an appearance at future gatherings (Summer Gathering Programme (2) 1999:8; ‘Earth First! Culture* notes from the Summer Gathering 2001 discussion’: 1; ESI 2001:1).
−
−	[116] Others, within the anarchist camp, claim that though Freeman won the immediate debate, her adversary Levine’s “arguments against massification were borne out by history”, in that “the articulate middle-class Freemanoids used their precious mass movement structures ... to make careers for themselves within patriarchy, selling out all the women they claimed to represent in the name of’reform*” (GA 1999:1).
−
−	[117] Two years later at the third Moot, I noted that the idea of a “central office/web/point of contact was thoroughly rubbished in the small groups’* (My notes, Winter Moot 2002).
−
−	[118] “proposals about structure are about aping main-stream politics” (GA 1999:1). “A mass movement tends to have managers, directors, co-ordinators, whatever polite euphemism you use, people in control” (EFH 1998).
−
−	[119] Essentially the same arguments for small, affinity-based groups are made in all fields of anarchist activity, from the anarchosyndicalists of thirties Spain to the punk collectives of the present day: this represents another example of how the same anarchist discourse can settle upon many different contexts.
−
−	[120] Anti-Mass, an influential pamphlet referenced by Notts EF!, anticipate that their proposals would be criticised as exclusive and elitist (as they argue that the collective should only communicate with other collectives, not the ‘mass*), but state that “The collective has a right to exclude individuals because it offers them the alternative of starting a new collective, i.e. sharing the responsibility for organisation” (1988:3). I find this equally inadequate, because it avoids addressing the power disparity created between the gang and the outside individuals.
−
−	[121] The argument is that you don’t fight mass society with mass movements but form a collective to escape the powerlessness of atomisation and take a step towards change: “If a collective is organised in a way opposed to hierarchy and domination and if it balances individual autonomy with accountability (within and outside the collective), then its goals and tasks will almost inevitably work towards the creation of a free society” (<em>Profane Existence</em> reprinted in Notts EF! 1998:4).
−
−	[122] A discussion document from a later gathering advises activists to “acknowledge the existence of, and learn to recognise, invisible hierarchies ... [stop] accepting them, either by taking more power, or accepting less power... confront power inequalities when I see them” (ESI 2001:3; cf RA! 1996:6).
−
−	[123] This perennial theme, gloom-inducing to many EFIcrs who have faced it before, is encapsulated by FR: “Wc can’t continue to be EF! anymore. We want to work with other people and other struggles, and they can’t take us seriously as Earth First! It doesn’t represent what we want to be anymore, or the wide range of issues we recognise as important We need to disband ourselves, and become something different - with a groovier more inclusive name and a different description • and then we can work with others and they will want to work with us* (FR 1999).
−
−	[124] One implication of this is that EF! members “may each of us be pan of wider groupings ... may also use other networks, banners and methods to cany out complementary work” (EFWP 1998).
−
−	[125] In February 2003,1 attended the court case of a friend who had been involved in protesting against a local pro-war MP. In this case, the prosecutor attempted to get my friend to agree with him that he ‘believed in direct action’, in order to make the standard link with violence and criminality. My friend, stating he was unsure how the prosecutor meant the term, did not allow himself to be led in that direction, but it brought home to me how politically (and legally) loaded such terms are. Although I deem the anarchist conception of direct action to be positive and liberating, it may be used by those in authority to associate protestors with all the worst imagery of extremism, violence and criminality.
−
−	[126] Non-protest forms of direct action in my own case include conservation work, food growing, and participation in mutual aid, gift-giving and non-hierarchical modes of organisation.
−
−	[127] Certainly in Newcastle, direct action has often been supported (and initiated) by Green Party activists. Examples include Gene- Nol’s first attempted GM crop decontamination in May 1998, for which the North East Green Party arranged a bus, and the call to ‘blockade the blockaders* during the Fuel protests of2000. Certain North East green party members also regularly participated in direct action with TAPP without wearing their ‘official* hat
−
−	[128] It is claimed that “The influence of the Syndicalists has always been immensely greater than their numbers” (Brown 1994: 7). The same point has been made of the C.N.T. in Spain, the I.W.W. in the USA (Russell 1918: 86), the C.G.T. in France (Woodcock 1980: 278; Russell 1918:76), and also more recent populist anarchist organisations like Class War (<em>CW</em> 1997:2). The power of influence beyond their numbers is put down to anarchists’ ability to channel the sentiments of the working class, at least during times of crisis. Anarchist influence is demonstrated through practical mobilisation on the streets more than it is through formal membership. I suggest that the influence of the committed eco-activists has at times possessed a similar dynamic, albeit with a different constituency and a different mobilising chord. Earth First! and Reclaim the Streets only ever had a small number of individuals who identified closely with them, but on occasions they both proved able to mobilise thousands, and to inspire many, often unexpected sections of society.
−
−	[129] I came ‘late’ to this debate, and so I may have been influenced in my opinion of it by an air of staleness and stereotyping then surrounding it, and by missing out on the contexts in which the first, and perhaps most relevant arguments, took place.
−
−	[130] The original “Keep it Spikey” leaflet was produced by Class War for the 1996 CJA Hyde Park demo, outlining what to do if the event turned into a riot It was afterwards reproduced in the media, much to CW’s delight (<em>CW</em> 1997:9).
−
−	[131] There is a contingent link in anarchist groups between the use of consensus methods and non-violence, and between class analysis and acceptance of violence.
−
−	[132] Griffin argues that “When considering whether any [ method of direct action ] is justified, it is important to ask what effect an action has on all those involved, whether the outcome justifies the means, the reaction it creates, the outcome and its longer term implications” (1997: 20). Franks disagrees, arguing that “It is [the] rejection of consequential ism that particularly marks direct action out as especially anarchic” (2003:15 X but while I would readily defer to Frank’s clear theoretical definition of ‘coherent* anarchist direct action, I feel his definition is too rigid when it comes to actual application.
−
−	[133] <em>Road Alert!</em> provide a warning about the role of the State and the media, repeating the anarchist emphasis on the State’s double standards when it comes to violence: “The State has always depended absolutely on threatening and using violence, and will dig deeper into its huge arsenal given any excuses. It will nonetheless be quick to condemn any violence on your side - often including such actions as damage to property. The media will follow this line. It is important to expect this sort of thing and be ready to deal with it” (1996:2): see 7.5.
−
−	[134] The experience of being condemned by the mainstream environmental organisations (see 3.2.4 and 5.3.3) influenced such appeals.
−
−	[135] At the same time they removed themselves from the planning discussion for that part of the action, so they did not learn the things they did not need to know.
−
−	[136] The image was originally adapted from an anti- Jobseekers Allowance campaign, where the crowd emerged from the official Jobseekers Allowance logo, and were pictured escaping from the Jobcentre. In this context, the black dots could better be read as scrunched up benefit forms.
−
−	[137] In the view of the Anarchist Federation’s newsletter, for example, the violence that took place on June 18* was an achievement to be celebrated on the grounds that “While world leaders were plotting our fates they lost control of the city and some of London’s coppers got the kicking they deserve. Damage to the city was put at over 5,000,000 pounds - a good days work... It was class anger versus riot armour... This anti-capitalist demonstration showed us setting the agenda on their turf* (AF 1999c: 1). JI 8 is an interesting case, in that it may be seen as an event where the two modes - riot and NVDA - temporarily joined, but in 7.51 argue for their incompatibility.
−
−	[138] “Anarchists have always opposed war, but not all have opposed violence” (Walter 2002: 43). This position is clarified by the resolution passed at the anarchist congress in Amsterdam in 1907. stating “The anarchists urge their comrades and all men aspiring to liberty, to struggle according to circumstances and their own temperaments, and by all means - individual revolt, isolated or collective refusal of service, passive and active disobedience and the military strike - for the radical destruction of the instruments of domination. They express the hope that all the peoples concerned will reply to any declaration of war by insurrection and consider that anarchists should give the example” (quoted in Woodcock 1980: 250). However, although anarchist internationalism implied opposition to war, Kropotkin and twelve other prominent anarchists broke ranks with the more common revolutionary abstentionist anti-war position in World War I, and supported the Allies (AF 1996a: 13).
−
−	[139] George Woodcock is one of these, and his pacifism w as amongst the reasons that. I noted in Chapter 2 (some) class struggle anarchists dismissed his anarchism as ‘liberal’.
−
−	[140] By extending a simple model from one context to another, significantly more complex one, we add complications unforeseen in the original context, so that it is no longer self-evident, for example, on which occasion self-defence begins. Other complications occur with the logic of provocation intended to “force authority to tear off its mask” and create “A crisis of provoked authority” (Provo manifesto in Woodcock 1992: 48-49), which also destabilises the assumption that all anti-establishment violence is self-defence: El Paso, for example, state that “the responsibility is that of the State and its protectors, independent of provocateurs. Their very existence is a provocation” (quoted in AEAG 2001:48; Pouget 2003:16). Similarly, several movement theorists critique false and limiting assumptions such as that the police always provoke violence on demonstrations (a view that Merrick expresses (1997:5)), on the basis that we should allow the possibility that people are justified and able to use (class) violence - and police response - for their own purposes (Adilkno 1994: 107; Mueller 2004; AF 1996a: 21).
−
−	[141] King uses the religious perspective to distinguish between just and unjust laws: “An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law” (1963: 19). Compare this theme to the ecoteurs who contrast ‘natural laws* to human ones (Hart 1997: 153; <em>Do or Die</em> 1995: 89). All such comparison of laws with a different hierarchy of authority would seem to stand at a distance from normal anarchist discourse in which law, perse, is illegitimate and violent Yet they perform a rhetorical function, undermining the supposed legitimacy and normality of state law.
−
−	[142] “Our aim is not to overthrow the state but to undermine it to the point where it is irrelevant We want to decrease people’s dependence on it to the point where they don’t need it” (RTS activist quoted in Vidal 2000).
−
−	[143] Flaws have been identified with the CD theorisation of power as based on obedience (Sharp 1973: 16). The strategy works best for specific issues of injustice within a democratic framework, but becomes hander to apply when the aim is full-scale revolutionary social change (Bleiker 2000:105). Most significantly, it loses something of its power when there is no clear ‘ruler’ from whom the ‘subjects’ can withdraw their consent, or “opponents with whom activists can engage in dialogue”. Under capitalism, “These conditions no longer apply” (Martin 2001:14). The ‘truth’ demonstrated by satyagraha campaigns has no power to reach people in an age of information surfeit, and “Moral persuasion... has little chance when cause and effect are separated. Bomber pilots show little remorse for the agony caused by their weapons detonating far below, while managers of large international banks have little inkling of the suffering caused by their lending policies in foreign countries” (2001:35). Martin nonetheless notes that while consent theory has considerable theoretical shortcomings, it is remarkably well suited for activists. “It immediately implies that individuals can make a difference: all they need to do is withdraw consent and the power of rulers is undermined. This can actually be quite effective, because experienced and perceptive activists often have a remarkably good grasp of power structures, especially local ones. Through their own understanding of complexities of power, they essentially provide the structural analysis that is missing from consent theory. In turn, consent theory provides activists with an easy way to grasp that their own actions can have an impact” (2001:37). It is the practical use to which the theory is put which is significant, and which reveals the complexity involved in effecting social change.
−
−	[144] A simplification.
−
−	[145] At the first <em>Dissent!</em> gathering in Nottingham 2003, a group of around 50 Activists used consensus methods to decide the name and descriptive statement of the new network they had created. Here, the suggestion of applying the prefix ‘creative* to direct action was vociferously opposed, precisely because of the experience of peace movement activists using it in this sense (My Notes, 2003).
−
−	[146] Welchman seeks to reincorporate ecosabotage within the CD characterisation (2001:105 X but it is excluded by the conventional understanding of CD. She notes that “Environmental protesters turn out to be in good and numerous company, almost the norm rather than the exception in their departure from philosophically recognised forms of civil disobedience” (Welchman 2001: 99). It may be re-included through a renaming process, as “environmental disobedience” or “radical disobedience” (Carter 1998:29-47), but overall, I consider direct action to be the most suitable conceptual term.
−
−	[147] Against the argument that direct action too is symbolic, Franks dips into the terminology of semiotics to “provide a clearer basis for division”, terming anarchist direct action ‘synecdochic*, and solely symbolic action ‘metaphorical’: “A synecdoche is a symbol that contains a small part that represents a larger whole, For example, a half brick thrown during a riot is used to represent the whole insurrection. The term ‘symbolic action* is used for those events that are not in themselves attempts to resolve the problem at hand directly but are <em>metaphoricaT</em> (Franks 2003:15-16).
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−	[148] The notion of ‘extremism* tends to be linked to increasing militancy and violence, irrationality and the over-riding of both left- and right-wing values. It is a label that tends to get used against people, rather than by people to identify themselves.
−
−	[149] <em>Sea Shepherd</em> occupies a mid-ground between the imperatives of efficacy and non-violence, and it serves as a boundary post between the deployment of civil disobedience and ‘economic sabotage* discourses. Like EDA groupings such as EFI and Genetix Snowball, SS does not fit the narrow definition of CD (Welchman 2001:104). In sections 6.5.2 to 6.5.4 we shall see more anarchist versions of non-CD saboteurs with examples from UK EDA
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−	[150] A reference to ‘pixieing*: see 6.5.2.
−
−	[151] The peace movement hesitantly moved from symbolic protest to civil disobedience in the 1970s (Welsh 2000:153-161) and then, in the 1980s, sabotage in the form of fence-cutting at military establishments came to be included in the repertoire (Roseneil 1995: 107; Roseneil 2000:211). The hesitancy was due to concern that such extensions might lead to violence. Sabotage is notably used by the ploughshares wing of the peace movement, enacting the biblical injunction to ‘convert swords into ploughshares* by sabotaging nuclear and other weapons of war, for example with the ‘Seeds of Hope* ploughshares action (Goodwin 1996:20-21; Needham 1996: 34-5). The most serious actions, such as expensive theft and sabotage, that are reported in <em>TGAL,</em> were performed by the groups most committed to nonviolence, such as TP (No.26 1999: 2).
−
−	[152] Mel Jarman explains that “The Labour Government came in about the time that a lot of people involved in roads protests had reached burnout point anyway. With genetically modified crops, here was another technology that seemed to be unnecessary, ecologically unsafe and involved decisions made in the interests of a small group of unaccountable people. Practically speaking, the crops were all over the country and in place for criminal damage activities. Things fell into place in a way that they just do sometimes” (quoted in Farrell 1998).
−
−	[153] Some individuals within EFI would place their involvement much higher than this: they consider that despite the ‘public* declarations of all sorts getting involved, “we know it’s the same people really... the same old faces” (comment at EF! Summer Gathering 2001).
−
−	[154] Where there are duplicate references from the <em>EF!AU</em>and the GU I have used only the <em>EFLAU.</em>
−
−	[155] Useful examples of the liberal discourse of direct action are provided by Zac Goldsmith and Peter Melchett: “It is clear that democracy is failing us. Despite unambiguous resistance from the public at large, genetic engineering is being allowed to storm ahead - virtually unhindered. As a result, increasing numbers of people are deciding to take things into their own hands. Angry at the prospect of giving in to corporate bullying, they are setting out to accomplish by ‘direct action* what their political representatives have so lamentably failed to do on their behalf* (Goldsmith 1998:312).
−	<br><br>“Governments hate non-violent direct action because it makes clear when a democracy is failing. Astonishingly, the peaceful removal of GM crops before they flower is practically the only democratic veto UK citizens currently have to prevent genetic pollution... At no point have the people given their consent... The private interest of a small handful of chemical companies have been raised above the public’s right to an uncontaminated environment and access to organic and non-GM food”(Melchett 1999).
−
−	[156] “They had only got a short distance when individually and spontaneously they all headed straight to the test site and started trampling down the crop. It was extraordinary. There was no signal or word given” (Participant at Watlington ‘Stop the Crop* rally quoted in Vidal 1999:2).
−
−	[157] The effort that went into digging tunnels as defences for the ‘Pink Castle* occupation might belie this assumption (GU No.22 2002: 7).
−
−	[158] An ex-TAPPer strongly resisted our involvement in these blockades on the basis that the farmers would gain more from it than the anti-GM protesters: this individual had gained a profound resentment towards farmers through his experience in anti-snares and antihunting activism.
−
−	[159] Briefings by Corporate Watch showed how the different companies were interconnected and provided advice on how to affect them (EFMt/No.89 2003: 4; [[http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk][www.corporatewatch.org.uk]]).
−
−	[160] Green Anarchist define this when they criticise and oppose the influx of ‘peace movement ideas* into EFI, including “Gandhian preconceptions about openness, accommodation with our enemies, more than a whiff of careerism ... and seeing campaigning as a particularly vigorous form of lobbying to be done through the media” (<em>GA</em> 1999: 2; cf ACF cl991: 38).
−
−	[161] These resembled the three limited aims of the original Snowball campaign (Snowball 1986:1). The reasonableness and reformist (not revolutionary) character of the aims were emphasised by a Northumbrian snowbailer who states that “no-one can call them outrageous or unrealistic”, and that “Were any one of these met the whole campaign would stop, and gladly” (Penrose 1986: 7). This is liberal not anarchist direct action.
−
−	[162] Hancock recorded that, when in prison for accountably disarming a nuclear-capable warplane, his fellow-prisoners accepted his law-breaking and anti-militarism, but couldn’t understand his ‘hanging around to get caught*. He notes that “A similar headshaking has gone on in the anarchist and environmental movement”, despite “an emerging respect for open actions, especially in response to the Seeds of Hope ploughshares women” (1997). Seeds of Hope refers to four women who damaged a warplane bound for Indonesia where it would most likely be used against civilians in East Timor. They were acquitted of all charges by a jury in 1996 (find refs).
−
−	[163] This was a collective of individuals from Leeds EF!. The content was less offensively phrased than the title, and there was a disclaimer that stated ‘We hope to make constructive criticisms, not personal slaggings* (Black Bat 1998:1). Several correspondents to Peace News nonetheless took offence at the content of the critiques and the anonymity of the authors (Needham 1998)..
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−	[164] GS suggest that “Reaching into your community... is vital and is more democratic than a small isolated action which does not make reference to its locality” (GS 1998:6.10). These principles are applied to the Snowball methods of organisation (consensus decision making, transparency etc.) and action (openly writing to the police before the action, signing nonviolence pledges before the action and so on). Critical activists queried the idea that their actions had to be in line with public opinion, when the radical impulse could be on the extremes of accepted norms and cutting a path for society to follow (Black Bat 1998:3).
−
−	[165] In other ‘how to’ guides, dialogue was also suggested as a part of the campaign, both with the farmer and with the corporation, to be followed if necessary by direct action (GTSNY1997:2).
−
−	[166] Bombadill therefore argues that “Covert action not only allows for lesser commitment in terms of lifestyle but also does not demand that trust be put in institutions which are a core part of the concerns that activists are opposing. Covert action questions the legitimacy of the legal system’s handing out punishment” (Hancock 1997:14).
−
−	[167] It was noted in 6.4 that “For many ‘normal everyday people* covert sabotage was less risky than overt ‘civil disobedience”* (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:17), but on several occasions mass, and quite public expressions of sabotage were performed in a manner akin to the camivalesque celebrations or ‘skimmingtons’ noted in 6.4.3 (Wall 2000: 88).
−
−	[168] Considering EFI’s position on sabotage: “A line of’we neither condemn nor condone* was agreed upon” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003: 8; cf EF.MC/No.30 1996: 3). EFI continued to “tacitly but not officially” support sabotage (Purkis 2001:273), and the <em>EF!AU</em> periodically reported acts of sabotage, sometimes attributed to the ELF (No.53 1998:2; No.68 2000:2; No.75 2001:3; No.91 2003:7): indeed most of the news reported from the USA concerned major acts of ELF sabotage or arson (No.55 1999:2; No.57 1999:2; No.65 2000:2; No.74 2001:2; No.76 2001:2; No.77 2001:2; No.81 2002:2; No.87 2002:3). Notwithstanding Plows, Wall & Doherty’s suggestion that “virtually no actions have been claimed by the UK ELF since 1996” (2004:203), since 2000 this trend has been reversed. The most recent <em>EF1AU</em> has gone furthest in its support for aggressive sabotage, encouraging its readers to sabotage SUV cars: a repertoire already popular in the USA, though more a hallmark of the ELF than EF! (No.93 2005:1; cf Coronado 2003:14-15).
−
−	[169] Compare this with Curtin’s statement that “The ALF has never been an organisation - it has only ever been there in spirit It simply comes from the heart” (c2001: 8).
−
−	[170] Implying a contrast with Kaczynski, the authors state that “we have no notions of grandeur as to a vantage point of ours” and presented their ideas as a humble “offering*. This avowed distinction between anarchist and authoritarian primitivism maps onto the anarchist viewpoint of bottom-up revolution, and the assertion in Chapter 3 of an anarchist perspective that knowledge is not top-down but everyone*s.
−
−	[171] The recognition of anarchist themes is made especially clear because a different ‘brand’ of anarchism - primitivism or anticivilisation anarchism - is involved: one with which I do not identify and was not overly-familiar with. The articulation of recognisably anarchist arguments and principles therefore ‘stood out*.
−
−	[172] Atton charts the progression of GA’s editorial line from an inclusive, NVDA-supporting content in the mid-1980s to a “a blend of theoretical critique (Moore, Zerzan) and the (apparently indiscriminate) support of terroristic violence” by the late nineties (Atton 1999:31). Watson notes that “It is one thing to write critically about the dialectic of civilisation and empire, its origins and contradictions, and to challenge the assumptions embedded in the ideology of progress. It’s quite another to think you*re forging a political tendency to carry out civilisation’s destruction... this is a fantasy contaminated by today*s style of paranoid politics, an ugly and authoritarian fantasy” (1997). It should further be noted, however, that in 2001, GA split into rival editions, one of which returned to a markedly more inclusive, liberal and non-violent editorial line, although it failed to carry much of the previous readership with it.
−
−	[173] Note that precisely <em>because</em> the ELF is underground (and also draws on the romance of that), the communication with the ‘above ground world’ becomes all the more central, hence the form of the communique and the role of the press office. The tension within the ‘effectiveness’ of such covert actions is between the ability to escape undetected and strike again (the low arrest count is claimed as the ELF’s particular strength (MPCL 2002)), and the desire to publicise the efforts (to give the action impact). This tension between anonymity and notoriety cannot be easily dissolved.
−
−	[174] That may be so, but the textual output of that current tends to denigrate such social projects, and in romanticising street riots and arson attacks the anti-civilisation press are in danger or repeating all the dangers of the ‘Propaganda of the Deed’ years (see 6.3.3).
−
−	[175] Note that this episode should not be misconstrued as a principled rejection of sabotage as violent “Ecofeminists did not denounce monkeywrenching, but encouraged it by timber workers as a means to disrupt the labor process and slow the cutting of trees. Workers were no longer viewed as necessary targets of sabotage, they were viewed as potential eco-saboteurs” (Jeffrey Shantz cited in Bell 2003:9).
−
−	[176] Concerning the firm working Crowle Moor: “There’s a feeling that this small family firm could be put out oTbusiness’’ (3.9.2002).
−
−	[177] “A feature was the skirts wooden frames in which a person would stand on a platform, looking like a giant in Elizabethan costume. Most of the time they just wheeled up and down the motorway with the person on top scattering glitter like at a carnival. Then we stopped them near the sound system to hide the noise and someone got in the bottom of each and started digging holes in the tarmac with petrol-driven road hammers” (<em>Do or Die</em> 2003:). The use of sabotage serves to mark the difference between RTS and a liberal group such as FoE, as I established in 5.3.5.
−
−	[178] The first ‘Eclectic City’ squat of 2000 was the other event most favourably commented upon. The reason these two events got the ‘votes’ is because they were elaborate, invoked everybody, and could thus be looked back upon as impressive. Some individuals in the group preferred other, less elaborate actions, hut as these involved less people they could not gain the ‘votes’. It is harder to give due attention to small events in a thesis, or any report, but they should not be forgotten as they are the ongoing pulse of EDA out of which the high-profile events emerge.
−
−	[179] An indication of J18’s importance within the activist scene was that <em>TGAL</em> had been advertising it since 1998 (No. 18:6).
−
−	[180] SWOT analysis arranges comments under the headings Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats: it is a structure for discussion and note-taking that was utilised by T.APP on other occasions to review the Eclectic City squats, and to review the group’s annual activity.
−
−	[181] Some titles given to these protests, such as ‘Accessible City Events*, ‘Safer City Cycle Rides* and the 12.6.1999 ‘Safer City Street Party* presented a discourse of safety, accessibility and a communally shared city, and were supported by flyers which listed statistics of road deaths and the advocacy of practical alternatives such as public transport (indeed a specific leaflet was produced for bus drivers at the 2000 street party). I have not drawn on these more conventional discourses, but should note that they were allied to attempts at coalition with less radical groups such as Tynebikes and the Green Party. Several of these events were also allied to apparently instrumental or lobbying objectives, such as to show support for the Road Traffic Reduction Bill (27.1.1996), or to show disapproval of the building of the West Central Route (1998). I would maintain, however, that these were not the primary objectives of the events, but merely a convenient framing in which to place the activity of collective streetreclaiming, which was organised, and later celebrated in the pub, for its own sake. Of the ideological texts opposing cars and roads which were distributed around Newcastle (specifically, kept in the TAPP meeting room), some advocated changes in government policy and lobbying to that end, and some advocated more radical, non-state-centric attitudes (French 1996; CCC 1996; IDHW 1996).
−
−	[182] A further attempt to create monthly critical masses was made in September 2000. but after three attempts gained insufficient attendance these were called off. As the photos indicate many (sometimes most) of the participants did not have bicycles, which from a purist point of view, made the events more of a procession than a critical mass: this was not. however, how they were conceptualised by TAPP. Since late 2005. monthly critical mass rides have taken place in Newcastle, and these have been solely bicycle-based. This has been achieved in part by the addition of a bike-repair workshop recycling abandoned bikes: a good example of nonprolest ecological direct action.
−
−	[183] We should recall that tn addition to rationalist objections to the rituals of the state, law and church. “Revolutionaries have always felt the need of their own symbolism” (Carter 1971: 49). Hence the black and red flags of the anarchist tradition, and the red, green and black flags of RTS (Jordan 2002: 25).
−
−	[184] This is reinforced (a) by promotional material, encouraging participants to dress colourfully, bring instruments and get themselves in the mindset for fun, and (b) by banners, such as “They wanna fight we wanna dance” (‘Never Mind the Ballots* street party) and the phrase traditionally attributed to Emma Goldman, “If <em>I</em> can’t dance it’s not my revolution”.
−
−	[185] At DSEI2003, for example, where the street party tactic was incorporated into wider direct action targeting the arms fair, the festival atmosphere did not really work anymore, because experience told people to expect police strategies intent on removing the Tun*: crucial ingredients of which included mobility, autonomy, varied interaction, spontaneity, music, and the unexpected. The introduction of the ‘kettle* tactic, in which police pen a crowd into a small space for a long period of time to destroy their energy and enthusiasm, has proved an effective break on such ‘fun* when successfully applied (Raif 1.6.2000). London RTS had not organised a street party since 2000.
−
−	[186] Compare with RTS: “Crowds of people on the street seized by a sudden awareness of their power and unification through a celebration of their own ideas and creations. It follows then that carnivals and revolutions are not spectacles seen by other people, but the very opposite in that they involve the active participation of the crowd itself. Their very idea embraces all people, and the Street Party as an event has successfully harnessed the emotion” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5; cf RTS 20< iOa; Adilkno 1994: 9; ‘Maybe’ 2000: 8; Berman 1983: 82). “The liberated society that these carnivals envision is one based on diversity joy, passion, spontaneity and generosity. The rigid rules, the hateful hierarchies and the monotonous uniformity of capitalism all melt in its intense heat” (‘Maybe’ 2000: 9).
−
−	[187] Compare this with RTS: “before it can be recuperated, it disappears - only to spring up again in another place at another time” (‘Maybe’ 2000: 20). TAPPers also referenced the TAZ concept (TAPP 1999: 11).
−
−	[188] RTS suggest that the traditional anarchist notion of “the Commune of communes... translated into current terminology, gives us the Network of networks or, more appropriately: the Street Party of street parties. That such a ‘street party’ would tend to undermine centralised state and government structures, constituting a ‘dual power’ in direct opposition to them, is obvious” (<em>Do or Die</em> 1997: 5). I personally did not see this as a practical proposal but rather, at best, as a piece of artful rhetoric designed to raise ideas and a questioning of how radical activists’ methods related to their professed aims. A street party is not a good place to materially achieve a discursive body politic. The mass of participants in a Street Party do not develop any political participation deeper than opposition to the police: an identification of ‘them and us’. I speak from my limited experience of seven street parties, from which one slight exception might be made: at the 1999 Hull RTS, several people from Newcastle took the opportunity to sit in a circle in the middle of the street and discuss how to organise our own RTS in June. Even here, however, the sense of occasion and apt location was more poetic than useful: the vast majority of our collective planning and discussion took place in houses, meeting spaces and pubs.
−
−	[189] The flyer for the DS EI street party in 2003, which featured a typical image of festivity with a small number of key words such as ‘imagine* and ‘carnival’ was criticised by one EF!er for being a ‘parody of an RTS flyer’.
−
−	[190] This list by <em>The Sun</em> is full of mistakes (RTS did not run the Newbury or Twyford protests, and by ‘Black Dog* it must be assumed they mean ‘Black Flag*). It is largely copied from a similar list in the Sunday Times, which cites Reclaim the Streets as “central to recent protests, presenting an image of a group prepared to bend rather than break the law, although ‘members’ have been arrested for violent offences.” Earth First!, it considers a “Long-standing eco-group which has turned itself into a wider anti-capitalist organisation” (‘Who’s Who on the Streets*, <em>Sunday Times,</em> 30.4.2000).
−
−	[191] Mayday 2000 was, like the Birmingham Global Street Party and JI8, networked as a PGA call for action. The idea for an international Mayday action was initiated by the Canadian Postal Workers’ Union but, in the UK, it originated from the Bradford Mayday conference of 1998, at which EFlers and ideological anarchists had their first formal encounter (AF 1998c: 7-8).
−
−	[192] ATAPPer, connected by friendship to the Mayday organisers, saw this as a sign of the cliqueyness in EF!: the Mayday organisers sought to engage in the network on the basis that EF! presents to newcomers: that an idea can come from any point in the network and autonomous groups will choose whether or not to support it Yet the resentment arose because the Mayday organisers were not recognised as ‘one of us*, familiar from Twyford and all the other bonding experiences of the network. Although I am unable to dismiss this comment, I can note that the GA statement is (as usual) not entirely accurate: the Mayday organisers did include individuals engaged in DIY and direct action (anti-CJA activism in Newcastle, for example), but from milieus less familiar to ‘core* EFlers.
−
−	[193] I use the plural deliberately.
−
−	[194] Similar themes were produced for future Maydays, this continuation demonstrating a certain vitality and sense of[4]aptness’ to the rhetoric: “Mayday has been a celebration of life, renewal and pleasure since ancient times. More recently it was declared international Workers* Day to commemorate the execution of 4 anarchists in Chicago for their part in the struggle for an eighthour working day. Both these aspects of Mayday were intertwined - a festival against work, want and denial, and a vision of freedom and plenty throughout the world” (‘Mayday 2002’ Flyer; cf Fozoori 2003; Mayday Monopoly 2001b).
−
−	[195] Here we encounter the old equation used to dismiss anarchism: Mindless + Violence • Anarchists. Goldsmith’s article, earned by the right-wing Telegraph and sandwiched between a society column and an article praising zero tolerance policing in New York, was accompanied by a cartoon of an anarchist punk spray-painting and smashing up a globe. Goldsmith equated anarchism with Stalinism, and promoted instead the typically right-wing themes of “community, family, tradition” (2000).
−
−	[196] In TAPP the following comments were made: “Who the fuck does George Monbiot think he is? We don’t need him... We don’t need people like him speaking for the movement.. George Monbiot can fuck off.” “He’s made some alright points, but they way he did it is out of order... he could have written them to, y’know, the movement Not the fucking Guardian, and put like that” (My Notes, May 2000). As well as reaffirming the textual rebuttal s and condemnations of Monbiot, these comments underline the wounding reach of his comments.
−
−	[197] In contrast, it was stated that there was no ‘corporate* RTS response because “it contains such a huge diversity of views” (RTS hack 1.6.2000): the quote I here attribute as RTS thus represents one expression, but not a binding or necessarily representative one. RTS was invited to publish a response to Monbiot’s article in <em>The Guardian*</em> which as a diversity of individuals they felt unable to do. It is interesting that it was an academic - Graeme Chesters, connected to ‘Lancaster RTS’ - who ultimately produced the piece for this (2000a).
−
−	[198] Where Stone states that “RTS seems to have lost its roots” (2000), however, we might note that Dave Morris provides a response that is both fully ideologically anarchist, and also fully ‘rooted’: “each and all of us set up residents* mutual aid and solidarity groups/networks in every street/estate/locality, and also anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist activists’ groups/networks in every borough/village/town” (Mayday2000 egroup 2.5.2000). This suggestion is coherent and consistent with anarchist theory, but it was considered dull and not acted upon by the majority of Mayday participants.
−
−	[199] Livingstone’s condemnation is revealing: “on 1 May we are faced not with an attempt to exercise the peaceful right to protest but by a deliberate attempt by small groups of people to promote violence and destruction of property in London” (Livingstone 2001a).
−
−	[200] Politics generally is dominated by men, including left-wing and anarchist politics. Statistically, environmentalism has a majority of women involved, but in certain sectors, eg. high-paid jobs, and confrontational protest, men predominate.
−
−	[201] The website, for example, states that “TAPP is a forum for the various Direct Action and other campaigning groups in the North East.
−
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Latest revision as of 01:19, 4 August 2025

CURRICULUM OF
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM
PART 1

THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM

For University and College Students

Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought

FIRST ENGLISH EDITION

Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen

Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad

Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman

Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson

Proofread by David Peat

Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books

Published in association with The International Magazine

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“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.”

- Ho Chi Minh

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Dedication and Gratitude

This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three years of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.

Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.

Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!

Thanks also to The International Magazine, who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with The International Magazine on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.

We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.

March, 2023
Luna Nguyen

Foreword

In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7^th Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:

We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.

Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.

During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.

In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.

Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.

Dr. Vijay Prashad.
5 March 2023
Caracas, Venezuela.

Preface to the First English Edition

The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.

The entire curriculum consists of:

Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)

Part 2: Historical Materialism

Part 3: Political Economy

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.

However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.

As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.

It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are not present in the original Vietnamese work.

We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:

• As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
• As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
• As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.

This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.

This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.

...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin, who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20^th century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.

Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.

It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.

At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at BanyanHouse.org — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.

Introduction

Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20^th century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.

No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.

Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.

Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.

Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.

For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.

Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.

March, 2023

Dr. Taimur Rahman

Editor’s Note

Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.

Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.

In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.

I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.

As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.

March, 2023

Emerican Johnson

A Message From The International Magazine

The International Magazine began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.

Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.”

To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”

We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.

After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.

We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.

If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of The International Magazine online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!

In solidarity,

The Editorial Team of The International Magazine

Notes on Translation

Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.

One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.

I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).

As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.

March, 2023

Luna Nguyen

Guide to Annotations

This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.

These annotations will take the following forms:

• Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].

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Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.

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We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note

In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.

With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18^th, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought

Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.

We hope this book will be of use to you.

April, 2016

NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT

Original Vietnamese Preface

To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5^th

Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18^th, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:

Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,

Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang

Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate

Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,

Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.

After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Table of Contents

Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

3. Excerpt from Modifying the Working Style

Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

2. Consciousness

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

4. Meaning of the methodology

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

2. Materialist Dialectics

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics

1. The Principle of General Relationships

2. Principle of Development

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

1. Private and Common

2. Reason and Result

3. Obviousness and Randomness

4. Content and Form

5. Essence and Phenomenon

6. Possibility and Reality

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

3. Law of Negation of Negation

Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Afterword

Appendices

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism

Glossary and Index

“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”

Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx^[1] and Friedrich Engels^[2], and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin^[3]. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.

Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, and Scientific Socialism.

Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.

Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.

Scientific Socialism** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.

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Annotation 1

* A worldview encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.

** The word “science,” and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.

However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from

Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.”

“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.

In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.

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Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:

1. Stage of formation and development of Marxism, as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

2. Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism, as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism

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Annotation 2

The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18^th and 19^th century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.

- Social-Economical Conditions

Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18^th century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.

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Annotation 3

Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.

Means of production are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. Capitalism is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.

Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.

The proletariat are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production: the bourgeoisie. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.

According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the petty bourgeoisie and the lumpenproletariat. Marx defined the petty bourgeoisie as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:

... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:

The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.

The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.

However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.

Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.

In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.

Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (lumpenproletariat), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”

Political Theories, an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:

It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.

History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...

The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.

In the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.

The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.

During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word hiếu, which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.

During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as Bỉ Vỏ, a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and Chí Phèo, the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel Lão Hạc, the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.

The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique material conditions^[4], and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.

The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.

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Annotation 4

* See: Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175.

** In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.

The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.

*** Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.

Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.

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Annotation 5

Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:

Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:

In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”

This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.

The Chartist Movement in Britain:

Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.

In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.

Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:

In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.

In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.

It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.

- Theoretical Premises

The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the quintessence* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.

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Annotation 6

* In the original Vietnamese, the word tinh hoa is used, which we roughly translate to the word quintessence throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. Quintessence should not be confused with the universal category of Essence, which is discussed on p. 156.

German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel^[5] and Ludwig Feuerbach^[6], had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.

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Annotation 7

German classical philosophy was a movement of idealist philosophers of the 18^th and 19^th centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.

One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.

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Annotation 8

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.

But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.

Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.”

Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.

Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

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For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.

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Annotation 9

Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.

In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.

Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.

Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in Capital (Volume 1):

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

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Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.

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Annotation 10

In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.

Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues on page 48.

In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as empiricism. Empiricism holds that we can only obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).

One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the subjective idealism of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the skepticism of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.”

Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in A Treatise on Human Nature: “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.”

Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”

Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.

This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.

Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of social relations, which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in Capital Volume I:

(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.

In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the first basis for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.

It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected empiricism, they did not reject empirical knowledge nor empirical data which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from material processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section “Materialism and Dialectical Materialism” on page 48.

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Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.

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Annotation 11

* Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused humanist viewpoint.

Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.

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Annotation 12

Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.

Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in The Essence of Christianity: “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”

Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”

In his Collected Works, Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:

Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (absolut unmenschliches Wesen). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (von dir gedachte). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.

Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.”

“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:

The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the active subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are passive subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.

According to Marx, humans are simultaneously active in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and passive in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in The Holy Family.^[7]

Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from Theses on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

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The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith^[8] and David Ricardo^[9], also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].

Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.

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Annotation 13

* Historical Characteristic of Value

Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ahistoric view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in The Poverty of Philosophy:

Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.

** Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production

In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.

*** Duality of Commodity Production Labor

In Capital, Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:

First, there is abstract labor, which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is concrete labor, which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.

Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.

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Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.

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Annotation 14

* Commodity Production

Simple commodity production (also known as petty commodity production) is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. Simple exchange occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.

Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “C→M→C mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.

C→M→C stands for:

Commodity → Money → Commodity

So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.

In the C→M→C mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.

Capitalist commodity production and capitalist exchange, on the other hand, are based on the M→C→M’ mode of circulation.

M→C→M’ stands for:

Money → Commodity → More Money

Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money.

Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.

** Value-Form

This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in Appendix of the 1^st German Edition of Capital, Volume 1, but here are some of the fundamentals:

One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.

Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:

Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.”

Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s tangible form of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.

Value, or the Value-Form, is the social form of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see Content and Form, p. 147].

Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: 20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea

These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the social form because it embodies relational equivalencies:

1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.

2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.

As Marx explains in Appendix to the 1^st German Edition of Capital: “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”

Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.

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British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.

Annotation 15

* Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.

Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.

Annotation 16

* David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.

Utopianism' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18^th century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon^[10], François Marie Charles Fourier^[11] and Robert Owen^[12]. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism^[13] and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.

Annotation 17

The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19^th century drew up similar plans which also failed.

Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.

Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.

As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.

Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving too early. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.

In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into philosophical utopianism in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”

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The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.

- Natural Science Premise:

Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.

Annotation 18

Natural science is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.

Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:

• The law of conservation and transformation of energy scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.

• The theory of evolution offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.

• Cell theory was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.

These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.

Annotation 19

For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.

Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.”

Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.

As Engels wrote in On Dialectics:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework:

Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.

So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.

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These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.

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Annotation 20

Endlessness refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. Self-existence means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. Self-motivation and Self-transformation refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.

Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.

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In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.

b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism

Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.

Many famous works such as The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1844), The Holy Family (Marx and Engels, 1845), Thesis on Feuerbach (Marx, 1845), The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.

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Annotation 21

There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).

With works such as The Poverty of Philosophy (Marx, 1847) and The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.

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Annotation 22

According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.

In the book The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. The Manifesto of the Communist Party laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.

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Annotation 23

* Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current material conditions [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.

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Annotation 24

* The laws of movement in history are the core principles of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and social consciousness of a society.

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Annotation 25

Social consciousness refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.

By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.

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Annotation 26

* Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.

So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.

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Annotation 27

Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.

The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in Capital^[14] by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.

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Annotation 28

Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing Capital was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.

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Annotation 29

The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).

Marx viewed society as composed of an economic base and a social superstructure. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.

In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explained:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION

POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE

The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.

In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — determines the superstructure, while the superstructure impacts the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.

The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.

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Annotation 30

As Lenin explains in What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:

Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.

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Capital is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in Critique of Gotha Programme (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.

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Annotation 31

When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does not mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.

c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism

- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism

In the late 19^th century and early 20^th century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.

During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.

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Annotation 32

Imperialism

Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”

Subjective and Empiricist Idealism

In the late 19^th century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.

The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as empirical idealism or Machism)' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be subjective idealism because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially subjective in nature.

Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.

Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19^th century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.

Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.

Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:

The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?

Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.”

Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”

Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:

The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.

Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:

The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.

In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:

1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.”

2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”

3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”

4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.

At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.

In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.

- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.

Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.

From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists^[15]. His book What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894) criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.

Annotation 33

The populist philosophy was born in Russia in the 19^th century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19^th century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).

With the book What is to be Done? (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.

Annotation 34

In What is to be Done?, Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,” as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.

Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in A Talk With Defenders of Economism:

The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam, published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”

Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in What is to be Done?:

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.”

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The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.

Annotation 35

From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.

In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.

Lenin wrote Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution in 1905 in

Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.

In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.

Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.

Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.

It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.

In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.

From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19^th century and early 20^th century in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism (1913). He also talked about dialectics in Philosophical Notebooks (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book The State and Revolution (1919).

The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.

In a series of works including: “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder (1920),

Once Again on the Trade Unions, The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin (1921), The Tax in Kind (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.

Annotation 36

In Anti-Dühring, Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:

1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.

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Annotation 37

The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote:

This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.

So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:

Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.

Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution:

At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.

He continues later in the text:

The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.

With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.

d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement

The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.

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Annotation 38

The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.

During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.

In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.

In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].

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Annotation 39

* The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.

The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.

The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.

These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.

However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.

Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.

The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”^[16]

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Annotation 40

Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:

• The German Ideology, by Marx and Engels

• Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, by Marx and Engels

• Karl Marx, by Lenin

The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:

“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking^[17]. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”^[18]

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Annotation 41

Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.

There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.

It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.

The Renovation Era refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to the Path to Socialism Era which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.”

And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.”

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

The objects of study of this book, The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.

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Annotation 42

Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism:

Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism:

A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism

The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.

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In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:

• Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
• Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
• Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]

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Annotation 43

* Remember that Scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.

Thus, a scientific worldview is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.

In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Political Economics [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

• The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
• Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
• General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.

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Annotation 44

Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In the scope of Scientific Socialism [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

• The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.
• Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
• Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.

The purposes of studying The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism are:' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.

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Annotation 45

* The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto: “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:

First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.

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Annotation 46

Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.”

As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in The Proletariat and the Peasantry:

Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.

Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.

As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.

One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:

On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.

During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.

By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:

Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.

Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.

As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled A Nationwide Call for Resistance, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.

As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20^th century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.

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Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.

Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.

Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially^[19] the product of that history.

These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.

Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism

Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.

Methodology is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology.

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Annotation 47

Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:

1. Field Methodology

The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.

2. General Methodology

A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.

3. Philosophical Methodology

The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.

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Worldview and philosophical methodology are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.

Annotation 48

* In the original Vietnamese, the word lý luận is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, lý luận is a combination of the words lý lẽ, which means “argument,” and bàn luận, which means “to infer.”

The full meaning of lý luận is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.

The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism

Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.

Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:

Dialectical Materialism is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.

Historical Materialism is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.

Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of Materialist Dialectics, which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”^[20] Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”^[21] [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]

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Annotation 49

For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:

Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

Dialectical Materialism is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.

Materialist Dialectics is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.

Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.

As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.

It is also important to understand the nature of dialectical relationships.

A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in motion [see Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter, p. 59] and in a constant state of change, and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.

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Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.

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3. Excerpt From Modifying the Working Style By Ho Chi Minh

Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.

Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”

Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?

But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?

If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.

Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”

In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:

“From within the masses, back into the masses.”

No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.

Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.

Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.

Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.

Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being^[22].”

So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.

In philosophy, there are two main questions:

Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?

In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: Materialism, and Idealism.

Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?

In answer to this second question, two schools: Intelligibility — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and unintelligibility — which denies that capacity.

Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.

Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.

Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.

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Annotation 50

Cognitive origin refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.

Social origin refers to origination from social relations between human beings.

So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.

These origins are unilateral consideration and absolutization of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.

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Annotation 51

Unilateral consideration is the consideration of a subject from one side only.

Absolutization occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as always true in all situations without exception.

Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.

Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality only from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists absolutize human reasoning as the only source of truth and knowledge about our world without exception.

As Lenin wrote in On the Question of Dialectics: “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.”

Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.

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Annotation 52

Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.

This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.

Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in The German Ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.’

Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.

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In history, there are two main forms of idealism: subjective and objective.

Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.

Objective idealism also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.

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Annotation 53

Primary existence is existence which precedes and determines other existences.

Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.

Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.

Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.

The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.

Willful activity (willpower) is discussed in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

The key difference between subjective and objective idealists is this:

Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there is a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.

In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.

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Annotation 54

Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.

Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.

As Engels pointed out in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific: “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.”

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism, and Dialectical Materialism.

Primitive Materialism is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in Matter, p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.

Metaphysical Materialism is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17^th and 18^th centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.

Annotation 55

Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by mechanical philosophy, a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17^th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.

Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.

Dialectical Materialism is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.

By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.

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Annotation 56

* Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106.

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

a. Category of “Matter”

Matter is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.

Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were metal — wood — water — fire — earth; in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were Pradhana or Prakriti^[23]; in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were water (Thales’s^[24] conception) or air (Anaximene’s^[25] conception); Heraclitus^[26] believed the ultimate element was fire; Democritus^[27] asserted that it was something called an “atom,”' etc. Even as recently as the 17^th-18^th centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon^[28], Renes Descartes^[29], Thomas Hobbes^[30], Denis Diderot^[31], etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.

These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.

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Annotation 57

Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:

Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”

Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.

Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness

Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined by the material world.

As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is created by matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can influence the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.

As Lenin explains in Materialism and Empirio-criticism: “Consciousness in general reflects being—that is a general principle of all materialism... social consciousness reflects social being.”

Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the nature of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of Dialectics of Nature:

That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.

Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.

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As Marx explains in Theses on Feuerbach:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis

Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as social being, which stood in contrast with human society’s social consciousness. Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.

As Lenin wrote in Materialism and Empirio-criticism:

Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.

Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between social being and social consciousness. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.

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These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.

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Annotation 58

Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”

Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.

In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:

We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.

Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:

To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.

A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,” a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.

It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.

In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).

Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “modern materialism, which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible middle party in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”

Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.”

In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.

The development of natural sciences in the late 19^th century and early 20^th centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen^[32], Becquerel^[33], Thomson^[34] etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see Primitive Materialism, p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.

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Annotation 59

Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:

We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.

Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:

The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.

With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19^th and early 20^th century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:

“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:

First, we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).

Second, the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is objective existence, meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.

Third, matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.

Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.

First, by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.

Second, by asserting that matter was “objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,” and “copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,” Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].

b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter

According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, motion is the mode of existence of matter; space and time are the forms of existence of matter.

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Annotation 60

Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the mode of circulation refers to how commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; mode of production refers to how commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to how matter exists in our universe.

Form comes from the category pair [see Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics, p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.

- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter

As Friedrich Engels explained: “Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”

According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.

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Annotation 61

In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).

Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the mode of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the mode of motion. Over time, motion leads to development as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion^[35].

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Annotation 62

It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.

In Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:

The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.

In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:

To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.

So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.

To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his Philosophical Notebooks:

The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.

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Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: mechanical motion (changes in positions of objects in space); physical motion (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); chemical motion (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); biological motion (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); social motion (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).

These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png

The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]

Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]

By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.

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Annotation 63

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.

When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become frozen; however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium and freezing is relative and temporary.

Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.

Freezing is a relative phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.

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Annotation 64

Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed equilibrium as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, An Equilibrium of Forces:

1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.

2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.

3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.

4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.

The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.

The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.

For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.

5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.

This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.

Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?

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- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter

Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call space. [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]

On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call time. As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.

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Annotation 65

Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.

Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,

p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.

c. The Material Unity of the World

Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]

The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:

First, there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.

Second, the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.

Third, all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.

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Annotation 66

The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.

2. Consciousness

a. The Source of Consciousness

According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.

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Annotation 67

Consciousness arises from nature, and from social activities and relations.

Natural refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.

Social activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.

- Natural Source of Consciousness

There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are human brains and the relationship between humans and the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.

About human brains: consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.

About the relationship between humans and the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection: The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.

Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.

Reflection is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.

There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.

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Annotation 68

Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, traces of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called reflection.

The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.

Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.

The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:

This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.

Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.

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Physical and chemical reflection is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.

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Annotation 69

Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png

Reflection as Change in Position:

1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.

4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position reflects the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png

Reflection as Change in Structure:

1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.

4. These changes constitute structural, physical reflection.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png

Chemical Reflection:

1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.

2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.

3. This is a process of chemical reflection, in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A _CB a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).

As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.

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Biological reflection is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.

Biological reflection is expressed through excitation, induction, and reflexes.

Excitation is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].

Induction is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.

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Annotation 70

Unconditioned reflexes are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply induced physiologically.

Mental reflections are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.

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Annotation 71

Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.

Dynamic and creative reflection is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.

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Annotation 72

Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, reflected in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.

Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in Capital Volume I:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in The German Ideology, all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:

Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the life-processes of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain^[36] (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine how consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].

Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not determine the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in The German Ideology:

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.

In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,” and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).

Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.

As Marx wrote in The German Ideology: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:

The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.

Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:

Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.

What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.

Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a reflection of material reality which developed and results from life-processes of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.

This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.”

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.

LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.

1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.

Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.

2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.

Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive phenomena of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?

Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that practice allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.

Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses do accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:

3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.

Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:

That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.

Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in practice [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Notice that Engels is careful to use the words so far: “its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:

Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2^nd ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.

Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.

So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through practice in the material world.

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- Social Sources of Consciousness

There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are labor and language.

Labor is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].

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Annotation 73

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:

Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.

Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.

Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.

But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.

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Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.

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Annotation 74

We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical practice in the material world. See the discussion of practice in Annotation 211, p. 205.

All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.

Language is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.

The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.

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Annotation 75

From Dialectics of Nature:

It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.

Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.

First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.

So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.

This diagram is based on work from an article titled “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation[37].”Modern research has discovered strong evidence[38] that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in Dialectics of Nature.

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Annotation 76

It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language and social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature:

The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.

In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.

Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.

Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.

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b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness

- Nature of Consciousness

Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world. [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:

• The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
• The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
• The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.

Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world. Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”^[39]

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Annotation 77

In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism that consciousness is not a mirror image, or exact reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:

The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.

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Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4^th Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].

Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.

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Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature. Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.

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Annotation 78

Natural law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.

Social law includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.

Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

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Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.

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Annotation 79

The term material conditions refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base^[40] of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”

Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.

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Annotation 80

Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I:

At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

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- Structure of Consciousness

Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are knowledge, sentiment and willpower.

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Annotation 81

As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky? by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.

Knowledge constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.

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Annotation 82

Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in The German Ideology, explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:

From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.

The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.

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Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.

And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:

This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…

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Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.

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Annotation 83

Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.

It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.

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Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.

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Annotation 84

The following information is from the Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism, released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:

Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png

Daily Life Knowledge is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.

Scientific Knowledge arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.

Experience and Theory Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png

Experience Knowledge is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.

Theory Knowledge arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.

Emotional and Rational Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png

Less Developed More Developed

Emotional Knowledge is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.

Rational Knowledge arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.

Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.

See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.

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Sentiment is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings sentiment. Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.

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Annotation 85

As Marx explains in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”

Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.

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Annotation 86

Moral Emotion is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. (Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)

Aesthetic Emotion refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. (Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of

Education and Training of Vietnam)

Religious Emotion is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. (Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)

These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.

Willpower is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.

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Annotation 87

An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:

Nothing in this world must be difficult

The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart

We can dig up mountains and fill the sea

Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision

Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).

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Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.

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Annotation 88

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”

In Capital Volume I, Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.

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The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.

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Annotation 89

In “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder, Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.

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All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.

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Annotation 90

Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,” which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I, matter determines conscious activity:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical, and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.

a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness

Dialectical Materialism affirms that:

• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.

• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.

We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.

All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: matter comes first, consciousness comes after [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:

• Human brains

• Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections

• Labor

• Language

[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]

All of these factors also assert that matter is the origin of consciousness.

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Annotation 91

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The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:

• 1. The material structure of the human brain.

• 2. Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.

• 100. Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

• 500. Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

• 5. Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.

For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.

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Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore the content of consciousness is decided by matter [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws^[41] as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.

b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter

In relation to matter, consciousness can impact matter through human activities.

When we discuss consciousness we are discussing human consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.

The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.

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Annotation 92

“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.

From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.

Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:

• We must perceive reality accurately.
• We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.
• We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.

Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the positive outcome of human consciousness.

On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.

Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.

By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:

• Matter is the source of consciousness ^[42].
• Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness ^[43].
• Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness ^[44].
• Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality ^[45].

Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.

The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:

• The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness ^[46].
• Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity ^[47].
• The degree of organization of social activity ^[48].
• Material conditions in which human activity occurs ^[49].

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Annotation 93

The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in Capital Volume I [see Annotation 80, p. 81].

4. Meaning of the methodology

Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological^[50] principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:

• The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [matter comes first, consciousness comes after].
• The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness ^[51].
• The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness ^[52].

All cognitive and practical activities of humans originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws, however, our activities are capable of impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

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Annotation 94

The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.

From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.

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According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must simultaneously meet two criteria:

1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.

2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.

When we say that human activities originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws we' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.

This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.

When we talk about impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity, we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.

Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice^[53] in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint^[54] and willpower^[55] in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.

To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism^[56] and idealism^[57] through such errors as:

• Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
• Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
• Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
• Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.

On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism^[58], which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.

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Annotation 95

Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge

Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:

To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth^[59], reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.

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Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become real (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis^[60] in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [see Annotation 17, p. 18].

In Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:

Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.

Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of labor and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.

We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text Anti-Dühring. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:

Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.

Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:

What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?

No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.

Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”^[61]

[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic

In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.^[62]

There are two forms of dialectic: the objective dialectic and the subjective dialectic. The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].

According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”^[63]

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Annotation 96

Dialectics is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: subjective and objective dialectics.

Objective dialectics are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.

Subjective dialectics, or dialectical thought, is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].

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Subjective dialectics is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to metaphysics — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].

b. Basic Forms of Dialectics

Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.

Ancient primitive dialectics is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.

Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:

• “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
• The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: Primitive Materialism, p. 52]

In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,” and “predestination.”

An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.

Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”^[64]

Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”^[65]

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Annotation 97

Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.

Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.

Jumping forward to the late 16^th century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18^th century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.

The classical German idealist dialectics were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: “The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”^[66]

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Annotation 98

Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring. First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.

Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:

It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”

Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in On Dialectics and Dialectics of Nature, metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.

Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in On Dialectics:

Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.

The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from On Dialectics:

The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.

Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:

What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.

Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:

One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.

After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:

Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”

In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:

It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.

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These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.^[67]] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].

Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that dialectical thought served as the objective dialectics of the material world.]

According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.

Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”^[68]

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Annotation 99

In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:

First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.

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The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.

Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts.”^[69]

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Annotation 100

What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

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Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, citing another quote of Marx from the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”^[70]

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Annotation 101

In the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.

Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.

The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.

Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.

The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed materialist dialectics. This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.

Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”^[71]

2. Materialist Dialectics

a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.

Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”^[72]

Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.^[73] As John Burdon

Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to Dialectics of Nature: “In dialectics they

[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”^[74]

Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development^[75] (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.

Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”^[76]

b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics

There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:

First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.

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Annotation 102

Remember that scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that materialism in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism, p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that viewpoint is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].

Thus, a scientific materialist viewpoint is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.

Note: Materialist Dialectics contains Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories, Two Basic Principles and Three Universal Laws. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.

In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics^[77] (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).

Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.

Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.

Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:

1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.

2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.

By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.

This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.

With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics

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Annotation 103

The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.

The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:

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1. The Principle of General Relationships

a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship

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Annotation 104

The Principle of General Relationships describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships

The Principle of Development relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.

These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.

Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by

Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Engels began working on Dialectics of Nature in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on Anti-Dühring. He then restarted work on Dialectics of Nature in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4, and so stopped working on Dialectics of Nature once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.

What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in Dialectics of Nature and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.

Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: innern Zusammenhang, literally: “inner connections”) in Dialectics of Nature, but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: Bewegung) modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.

In materialist dialectics, the word relationship refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 105

Throughout this book, phenomenon/phenomena simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.

Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and within things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an external relationship. A relationship which occurs within a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an internal relationship.

These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:

When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png

The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:

Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.

This system of relationships (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).

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Relationships have a quality of generality, which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to general relationships, we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas.

The most general relationships are universal relationships: these are relationships that exist between and within everything and all phenomena, and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the Principle of Development; see page 119.]

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Annotation 106

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png

The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (unique relationships, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (universal relationships, which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas).

Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are universal relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].

Translation Note: In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.

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The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):

• Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). ^[78]
• Relationships between quantity and quality. ^[79]
• Relationships between opposites. ^[80]

Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.

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Annotation 107

Principle of General Relationships

According to Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the Principle of General Relationships.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

Diversity in Unity

There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.

The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.

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Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.

Unity in Diversity

When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought

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b. Characteristics of Relationships

Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.

- The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.

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Annotation 108

In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects

All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.

All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have objective characteristics.

Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.

Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.

The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.

As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.

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Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are inherent and objective properties of the pair.

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Annotation 109 Translation note:

In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is “khách quan.” This is a compound word in which “khách” means “guest,” and “quan” means “point of view.” Therefore, “khách quan” literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”

Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,” the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.

The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is “vốn có.” This is another compound word: “vốn” is a shortened form of the word “vốn dĩ,” which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” “Có” means “to have” or “to exist.” “Vốn có” thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.”

So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.”

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Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.

- The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships

According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.

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Annotation 110

Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of externality and objectiveness to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in isolation. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the Principle of General Relationships [see p. 107], all things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas.

Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an open system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.

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Annotation 111

As explained above, a systematic structure is a structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).

- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships

In addition to affirming the objectiveness^[81] and generality^[82] of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the diversity of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:

• All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.
• Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.

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Annotation 112

One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in Theses on Feuerbach, Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].

Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.

Characteristics refer to the features and attributes that exist internally within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.

Manifestation refers to how a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed externally in the material world.

For example, a ball may have the characteristics of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may manifest by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.

If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.

Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.

Characteristics and Manifestation correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of Content and Form, which is discussed in section page 147.

Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.

It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a comprehensive viewpoint.

Having a comprehensive viewpoint requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.

Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”^[83]

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Annotation 113

The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.

Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.

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The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.

Having a historical viewpoint requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.

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Annotation 114

While the comprehensive viewpoint focuses on internal and external relationships of subjects, the historical viewpoint focuses on the specific properties of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.

So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.

For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the exact same methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20^th century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20^th century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to adapt some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — exactly as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.

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In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.

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Annotation 115

A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.

The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.

Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.

The factory is also positioned among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.

These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.

In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a comprehensive and historical viewpoint — we must consider subjects both comprehensively in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as historically in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.

So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.

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Annotation 116

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

2. Principle of Development

a. Definition of Development

According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a quantitative increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for qualitative changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.

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Annotation 117

In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between quantity and quality.

Quantity describes the total amount of component parts that compose a subject.

Quality describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.

Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.

Example 1:

In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change

A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of a football player. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of a football team. This subject, football team, is composed of the same component parts as the subject football player, but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a football team.

The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:

If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of football team, but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a team. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full team and thus won’t be allowed to play.

Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a football team (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being on the same team).

Example 2:

Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water

DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE

All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.

The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.

A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the quantities of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the quality of water.

A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.”

When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.

In terms of temperature and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become steam. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”

Example 3:

AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES

The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.

As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.

Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change

Metaphysics only consider linear properties of quantitychange; Materialist Dialectics takes quantity changes and quality shifts into consideration when considering change over time.

Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only quantity is considered and quality shifts are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.

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In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, development refers to the motion of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.

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Annotation 118

In materialist dialectics, motion (also known as change) is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given motion/change leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.

The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.

This process, taken in total, is referred to as development. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a tendency to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word tendency is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”

For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of recession — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.

Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.

The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].

Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.

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It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of qualitative changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram Relationship Between Motion,

Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development, Annotation 119, below]

Development is also the process of creating and solving objective contradictions within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.

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Annotation 119

A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in equilibrium for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of quality. This process of overcoming is called negation. In short, development is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.

b. Characteristics of Development

Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,^[84] generality,^[85] and diversity.^[86]The characteristic of objectiveness of development stems from the origin of motion.

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Annotation 120

Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.

Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.

The Principle of Development states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.

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Annotation 121

The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.

Development has the characteristic of generality because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].

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Annotation 122

* In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.

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Development has the characteristic of diversity because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.

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Annotation 123

Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a development viewpoint.

According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”^[87]

This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation^[88], and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.

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Annotation 124

Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.

According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.

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Annotation 125

Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.

In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:

“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.”

Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”^[89]

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

Category* is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.

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Annotation 126

* Translation note: In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.

Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,” and “profit” categories.

Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.

Categories of materialist dialectics, on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see Private and Common, p. 128].

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Annotation 127

The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].

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As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.

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Annotation 128

Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as category pairs. So, a category pair is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.

Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.

1. Private and Common

a. Categories of Private and Common

The Private Category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common Category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.

Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.

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Annotation 129

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png

The Private category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.

The Common category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are private apples, and fall within the Private category.

However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are common attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the common category, based on these common attributes.

Apple A and Apple B will also have unique attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has unique properties.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

It is also true that every private subject contains within itself Unique attributes which it does not share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.

All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.

Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a unique relationship in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common and the Unique and has unique and common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.

This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of private information sources or data points to look for commonalities between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many private data points and pieces of evidence as possible.

For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the Common without examining enough Privates. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the Private for the Common which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.

Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png

“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).

In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.

At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common.

It was Unique because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was Private because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was Common — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.

Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common, with some slight developments:

It remains Private because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains Unique because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains Common because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares commonality with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer Unique for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.

If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the Private of that object would no longer exist — it would remain only as an idea, and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The Unique would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.

Translator’s Note: The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.

Example (from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is Common in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the Private — specific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their Unique properties.

Here are excerpts from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks discussing these concepts:

(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.

Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’

Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...

Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.

Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.

Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in Capital:

The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.

Here, “general form” refers to the commonalities of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in common with every other commodity.

The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the Private, Common, and Unique features and aspects of commodities:

The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.

We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying concepts which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.

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Annotation 130

The Common can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a private subject which has various features in common with other private things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the Common through observation and study of various private things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the Common of apples. Only by observing many private apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all private apples have in common.

The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.

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Annotation 131

No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist absolutely without commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares absolutely no features with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.

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Annotation 132

The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.

Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the relationships between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.

Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].

The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:

“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”^[90] [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.

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Annotation 133

Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].

Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.

It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.

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In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.

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Annotation 134

Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common

Dogmatism is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.

Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.

Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing

Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.

According to Vietnam’s Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought, the opposite of Dogmatism is Revisionism. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.

For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.

Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common

The metaphysical position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,

p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private and the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.”

In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas in relation to one another, which must include the analysis of Commonalities.

Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.

In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.

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Annotation 135

In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be unique to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into common knowledge.

Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.

2. Reason and Result

a. Categories of Reason and Result

The Reason category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.

The Result category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas.

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Annotation 136

Translation note: the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.

In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given effect is seen to have a single cause. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the mutual impacts which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.

In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of development (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.

In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.

This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.

In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these relations will become new reasons for new results through mutual impact.

In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).

So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.

b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result

The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.

Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.

A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.

When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.

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Annotation 137

As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.

Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):

Types of Reasons and Results

Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.

Direct Reasons are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.

For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.

Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.

Indirect Reasons are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.

For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.

In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.

Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.

Internal Reasons are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors within a subject.

For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure within the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an internal Reason for the collapse.

External Reasons stem from external relations.

External Reasons are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.

For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an external Reason for the collapse.

All of these roles and positions can be viewed relatively. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to the couple (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.

From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see Reason and Result, p. 138).

Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.

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Annotation 138

Primary Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.

Secondary Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.

For example, an earthquake may have primary Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. Secondary Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.

In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.”

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Annotation 139

With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?

As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.

Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”^[91]

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Annotation 140

In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.

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Annotation 141

In political activity, it is important to remember that every interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.

Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.

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Annotation 142

It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).

For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.

However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.

Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the actual Reasons and Results which drive development.

3. Obviousness and Randomness

a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness

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Annotation 143

In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.

The Obviousness category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way.

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Annotation 144

Obviousness can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper will burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper will catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will obviously burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.

The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome may occur or it may not occur; a Random outcome could happen this way or it could happen that way.

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Annotation 145

As we discussed above, paper will burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is obvious. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper will burn — that’s obvious. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates Randomness. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.

b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness

Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.

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Annotation 146

Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.

Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.

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Annotation 147

Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.

In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.”

In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.

As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [obvious] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [random] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”^[92]

Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.

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Annotation 148

Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.

Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.

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Annotation 149

We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.

A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically confirm that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.

Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.

4. Content and Form

a. Categories of Content and Form

The Content category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.

The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 150

Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.

Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.

Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.

Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are relatively stable, then it has a Form.

We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.

Stability itself is also relative: a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.

We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.

Inner form refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.

Outer form is how an object “appears” to human senses.

In this book, we are primarily concerned with the inner Form of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the outer Form plays a more prominent role.

Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.

Material vs. Ideal

When discussing the material — i.e., objective systems and objects^[93] — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.

Material

With material things and phenomena, the Content is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.

A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.

The inner Form of a material object refers to stable internal relations which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. Stability is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.

The outer Form of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.

Ideal

With the ideal — i.e., abstract ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism explains:

Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.”

With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].

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The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in Private as the Unique is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it that chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The outer Form of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the inner Form is what distinguishes one chair from the other.

However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.”

When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”

This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of freedom we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of freedom? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.

But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.

This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.

Content and Form in Art

Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.

This is because art concerns itself with abstract ideas expressed through various Forms of physical representations.

These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).

Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the stable inner relations of the ideas which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.

According to the Vietnamese art textbook Curriculum of General Aesthetics:

What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:

First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?

Second: how is it expressed?

Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.

So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the physical content of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the abstract content of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).

As for Form, the inner Form of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).

The outer Form of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.

The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png

Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media

Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:

Literature is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.

Painting is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).

Theater is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.

These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.

Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in Dialectics of Nature:

The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.

Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.

Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.”

Other Viewpoints of Content and Form

Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:

The law has internal and external forms:

The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.

The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.

According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.

If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.

There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the inner Form of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.

b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form

Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.

The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.

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Annotation 151

For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.

When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also influence the Content, but not nearly as much as Content determines Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.

The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.

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Annotation 152

Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the internal relations of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.

As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.

Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.

Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the change in Content which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.”

Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.

Content determines Form, but Form is not fully decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.

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Annotation 153

The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see Matter and Consciousness,

p. 88). Just as the material world determines consciousness while consciousness impacts the material world, the Content of a subject determines the Form while the Form impacts the Content.

Suitability describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).

We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.

If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.

Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.

In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.

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Annotation 154

In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.

Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in Capital Volume 1, as in this excerpt:

The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.

Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.

But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.

Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a commodity which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.

Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.

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5. Essence and Phenomenon

a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon

The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.

The Phenomenon category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.

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Annotation 155

Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.

Essence should not be confused with Form. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the synthesis of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which define the existence, motion, and development of a subject.

Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur in specific conditions.

The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, essentially, a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.

The Phenomena of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.

The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.

The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.

Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not essentially defined as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.

b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon

Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.

The unity between Essence and Phenomenon: Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.

When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”^[94]

The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon: Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.

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Annotation 156

Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.

Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is essentially a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what essentially make it a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).

The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.

With ideas and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his Philosophical Notebooks, beginning with a quote from Hegel:

Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.

Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:

The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).

This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.

This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.

Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.

In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.”

We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).

Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.

Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the Essence of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for contradictions within the subject (see Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.

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c. Meaning of the Methodology

If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.

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Annotation 157

With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.

This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.

According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, without end.”^[95] On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.

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Annotation 158

For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.

It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.

Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.

Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.

6. Possibility and Reality

a. Categories of Possibility and Reality

The Possibility category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.

The Reality category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality

Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.

Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.

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Annotation 159

Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism

Editor’s notes in [brackets]

Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.

[The categorization below draws a distinction between the obvious and the practical.

The obvious is that which will certainly occur. If you drop an object, it will obviously fall. The practical is that which we certainly could make occur through human will. If you are holding an object, you could practically drop it.]

Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].

Obvious Possibility refers to Possibility that will happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.

[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes obvious that a hurricane will form.]

Random Possibility is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, prepare for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]

Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:

Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:

Practical Possibility means that conditions in Reality which could make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you could make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]

Abstract Possibility is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.

[It is an abstract Possibility that you could make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. Near Possibility simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, far Possibility refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]

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In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to subjectively change possibility into reality, but only when the objective circumstances exist in the external world.]

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must base our perception and practice on Reality.

Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] only precisely and unquestionably demonstrated facts.”^[96]

However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.

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Annotation 160

This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.

There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: Private and Common, p. 128].

Private laws are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.

Common laws are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.

Universal laws are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.

If we classify laws based on the reach of impact, we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.

Laws of nature are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.

Laws of society are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.

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Annotation 161

We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.

Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an objective character — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.

Laws of human thought are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.

As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the universal laws that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.

These universal laws are:

• The law of transformation between quantity and quality.
• The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.
• The law of negation of negation.

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Annotation 162

Each of these laws is considered universal because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.

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Annotation 163

Remember that mode refers to how something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to how all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.

Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in Dialectics of Nature:

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

In other words, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to quality shifts.

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The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:

Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 164

Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.

Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have 1 dozen donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have 2 dozen.

Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.

Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.”

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.

a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity

- Definition of Quality

Quality refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 165

Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In Science of Logic, Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.

Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.

The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as differentiated. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as quality. For example, a human being’s quality refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) in unity. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a reflection of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.

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So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.

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Annotation 166

Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).

If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the total number of students.

The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.

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Annotation 167

Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.

Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.

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Annotation 168

It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see Content and Form, p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.

For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.

Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.

Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.

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Annotation 169

Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.

We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.

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Annotation 170

Remember that quality is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.

- Definition of Quantity

Quantity refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:

• The amount of component parts.
• Scale or size.
• Speed or rhythm of motion.

A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]

Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.

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Annotation 171

If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12^th donut, one “dozen” may represent the quality which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an order (quality) of three dozen donuts (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally twenty orders (quantity) as the day’s sales goal (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered relatively, based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.

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Annotation 172

In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.

This amount is called the threshold, which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).

With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the quantity range.

Quantity range is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.

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Annotation 173

The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.

Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “one donut” and “one dozen donuts,” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “one dozen donuts.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the quantity range between the qualities of donut and one dozen donuts. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.

Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the threshold.

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Annotation 174

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-57.png

Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.

When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a quality shift.

A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.

Quality shifts inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.

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Annotation 175

Quality shifts are inevitable because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.

Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.

The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.

Quality shifts mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.

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Annotation 176

The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion differs from quantity range because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur between quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.

For example, a period of motion for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The quantity range of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.

Quality shift represents discontinuity within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].

As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”^[97]

Annotation 177

Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief discontinuity in the sense that we perceive a definite and distinct transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can distinguish between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.

Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.

This is related to the historic perspective of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].

When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:

• Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.
• Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.

In summary, dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the quantity range] will eventually meet the threshold, which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through quality shift. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 178

Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.

So, it is important to understand that there is no material manifestation of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in stages of development. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.

There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.

Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.

There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.

We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from metaphysical categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).

Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.

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c. Meaning of the Methodology

Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.

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Annotation 179

We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.

For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.

Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.”

In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.

Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.

On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is inevitable that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.

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Annotation 180

“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can instantly transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.

“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the Vietnam Encyclopedia, published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:

Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:

Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.

Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.

Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.

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Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.

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Annotation 181

Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors^[98] (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors^[99] as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the Essence of dialectics [see: Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”^[100] According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 182

In other words, contradiction (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Contradiction is a fundamental driving force because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.

Contradiction is the originating driving force because all motion and development arises from contradiction.

Contradiction is the universal driving force because all things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.

a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction

- Definition of Contradiction

In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place within all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as between all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.

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Annotation 183

A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual negation of one subject and the synthesis of the negator and the negated into some new form.

The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.

In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.

Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.

In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.

The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.

Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see Negation of Negation, p. 185].

In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).

Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:

• Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
• Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].
• Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.
• Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.

Annotation 184

All of the above forms of contradiction drive motion and development. These processes exist in unity and opposition. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.

- The General Properties of Contradictions

Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”^[101]

Annotation 185

Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).

Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.

Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:

• Internal and external contradictions
• Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
• Primary and secondary contradictions

Annotation 186

Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist in the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations.

For example: a sports team might have internal contradictions between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.

A fundamental contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.

For example: the fundamental contradiction of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is non-fundamental, as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).

In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.

For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the primary contradiction to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many secondary contradictions which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all secondary contradictions which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.

On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine except for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.

Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.

Annotation 187

Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.

All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.

b. Motion Process of Contradictions

In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.

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Annotation 188

Contradictions are binding and inseparable because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply separate, then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.

Contradictions are said to be mutually impacting because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.

Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).

In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”^[102]

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Annotation 189

Here, Lenin is explaining that identity and unity are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we define it in terms of the opposition.

War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.

When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist between the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces between the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption within the economy.

In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is defined by the unity of the opposing sides with one another.

The concept struggle of opposites refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:

• The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.
• Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).
• Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].

The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a transformation between them. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.

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Annotation 190

Opposing sides, by definition, oppose one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do not oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, opposites. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to struggle against one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.

Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as equilibrium, but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article An Equilibrium of Forces.

[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]

Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, no equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.

According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”^[103]

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Annotation 191

“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.

So Lenin’s point is that unity exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, opposition is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.

In the same text quoted in the passage above, On the Questions of Dialectics, Lenin notes:

The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...

Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.

The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a dialectical relationship with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Relative unity refers to the nature of unity between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are unified in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are unified in contradiction. However, this unity is relative in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).

Absolute struggle refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are absolute because such struggle exists permanently; struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.

The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.

This applies to contradictions. The relative unity and the absolute struggle between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.

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The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”^[104]

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Annotation 192

Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.

For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.

An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).

Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.

For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.

Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the essence… of dialectics.”^[105]

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Annotation 193

In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.

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Annotation 194

The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.

For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?

It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.

3. Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through dialectical negation, forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.”

a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation

The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called negation.

All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called dialectical negation.

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Annotation 195

Negation refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.

An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.

Dialectical negation occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.

Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.

Translation Note: The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.

Replacement negation occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of replacement negation — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.

Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.

Terminal negation is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been terminally negated — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.

Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the terminal negation of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have replaced swords as the primary battlefield weapon.

Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a terminal negation — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.

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Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development

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Annotation 196

All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of dialectical negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.

Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is development which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].

From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.

This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.

The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.

In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.

Excerpt From Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:

Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.

Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.

Comparison Examples:

Metaphysical Negation	Dialectical Negation
The earthquake destroyed the house.	The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
Water eroded the mountain.	The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail.	The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant.	The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.

As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).

Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.

Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: objectivity and inheritance.

Dialectical negation is objective because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.

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Annotation 197

Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Therefore, every development is simultaneously an internal and an external process, depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place within a subject or between two subjects, but they are always external (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously internal to the relationship.

For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an internal process of development of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.

Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.

This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.

Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.

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Annotation 198

To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an external, objective process. From the perspective of the contradictory relationship, processes of development are internal processes of self-negation. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.

If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.

Dialectical negation also has an inheritance characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.

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Annotation 199

Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow reflected in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.

Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.

The factors which are adopted will be suitable with the present conditions. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.

As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].

Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:

“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”^[106]

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Annotation 200

The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:

Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.

In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.

Skepticism, here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.

Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

Eclecticism refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]

With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be negative in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a totally negative process.

A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.

In the chapter from Science of Logic which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as only negative — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.

The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.

In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis

We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).

A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) completely negates the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator always retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.

This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.

Eclecticism is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.

Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.

In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are inherited by the negating side.

Note: For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from Science and Logic in the cited notes above:

...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.

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Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

b. Negation of Negation

In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.”

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Annotation 201

The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.

Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development

The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.

In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.

This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development

The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:

1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.

2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., negation of the negation), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.

3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.

Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.”

In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.

The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.

The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.

The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.

This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.

Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.

In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a forward tendency of motion.

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Annotation 202

The forward tendency of motion describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.

As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.”

Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be more similar to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the exact characteristics of the Roman Empire ever again.

Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.

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Annotation 203

Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:

The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.

The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:

1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.

2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.

3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.

4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.

Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.

In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).

Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).

According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:

The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.

Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.

Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.

Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”^[107]

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Annotation 204

Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].

The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”^[108] The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.

In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”^[109]

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Annotation 205

In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”

c. Meaning of the Methodology

The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.

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Annotation 206

Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both scientific and revolutionary. Such a worldview is scientific because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a forward tendency, meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.

Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to impact motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a revolutionary worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.

According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage subjective factors as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.

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Annotation 207

Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have objective relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is external to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.

However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can impact. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is objective to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can impact the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.

Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are subjective factors. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on that which we are capable of changing, since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what can be changed and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.

As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.

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Annotation 208

Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by impacting processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.

Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include rigidity (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and conservativism (see Annotation 236, p. 233).

In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.

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Annotation 209

If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.

In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.

In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:

Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.

... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.

Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.

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Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.

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Annotation 210

Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”

Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.

Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material determines the ideal, while the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.

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1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis

Praxis includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.

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Annotation 211

In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — Praxis — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — thực tiễn — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”

One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality and consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is intention. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has purpose and historical-social characteristics might be considered praxis:

Purpose simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with historical-social characteristics are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.

In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: revolutionäre Praxis].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, writing:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.

Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is objective activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].

Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.

Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.

Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.

Socio-political activity includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.

Scientific experimental activity is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.

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Annotation 212

The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics.

Material production activity has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.

Socio-political activity has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.

Scientific experimental activity has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.

In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.

Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.

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Annotation 213

Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.

Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc

Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.

Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.

Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.

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b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness

The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.

This view stems from the following basic principles:

• The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
• The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
  • To perceive the objective world.
  • To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
  • To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48]

The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.

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Annotation 214

The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:

Hegel’s Absolute Idealism upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

Fideism, which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.

Positivism, or empiricist materialism, which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].

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The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216]

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Annotation 215

Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.

Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.

Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.

From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from empirical consciousness to theoretical consciousness; and from ordinary consciousness to scientific consciousness.

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Annotation 216

In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:

• Sense experience: observations of the external world detected by our senses.

• Knowledge: information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.

Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).

In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are abstractions of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.

Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active.

Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world empirical consciousness, and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world theoretical consciousness.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-79.png

Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-80.png

Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.

According to Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy, edited by T. J. Blakely:

Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...

The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.

An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.

Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).

Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.

Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.

Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).

Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ordinary consciousness. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as scientific consciousness.

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These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.

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Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in empirical knowledge.

Empirical knowledge has two types: ordinary empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and scientific empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.

Theoretical consciousness is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.

Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.

Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.

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Annotation 217

The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.

For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that more manure will help plants grow even more — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.

This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.

Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call theoretical knowledge].

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Annotation 218

Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is empirical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call theoretical knowledge.

Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ordinary or scientific in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.

Ordinary consciousness refers to perception that is formed passively and directly from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.

Scientific consciousness refers to perception formed actively and indirectly from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.

Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.

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Annotation 219

Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is scientific consciousness.

Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.

Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.

Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.

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Annotation 220

For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.

In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.

c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness

Praxis serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]

Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.

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Annotation 221

Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see The Source of Consciousness, p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.

Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.

Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.

Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.

Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].

Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the standard of truth. Reality also serves as the basis for examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”^[110]

Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”^[111]

The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.

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Annotation 222

Subjectivism occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is solipsism, a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Idealism has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.

Rigidity is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Bureaucracy arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.

On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.

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Annotation 223

In this context, pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.

Empiricism is a faulty form of materialism in which only sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness impacts the material world through conscious labor activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]

Thus, the principle of the unification of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Annotation 224

The section below outlines and explains the Universal Law of Consciousness, which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.

In his Philosophical Notebook, Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.

According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).

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Annotation 225

Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.

For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.

Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.

By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.

When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.

For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.

This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.

Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.

This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.

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Annotation 226

Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).

This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.

We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.

The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.

The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.

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- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness

Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, phenomena, as opposed to essence — see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: sensation, conception, and symbolization.

Human sensation of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — conception — is formed.

Conception is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., sensation]. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.

Symbolization is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.

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Annotation 227

Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:

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1. Sensation: Jessica senses a cake in the window of a bakery. She sees the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She smells the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.

2. Conception: Jessica begins to conceive of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.

3. Symbolization: The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.

Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, which is explained in more detail below.

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By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly interpret the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into rational consciousness.

Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process. It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: definition, judgment, and reasoning.

Definition is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.

Judgment is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.

According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.

Reasoning is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).

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Annotation 228

Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].

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1. Definition: Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of definition. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.

2. Judgment: Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”

3. Reasoning: Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”

Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the sensation phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final reasoning phase of the rational stage, and so on.

It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.

Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.

- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality

Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If emotional consciousness is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then rational consciousness, based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.

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Annotation 229

In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.

For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.

However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is truth [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.

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Annotation 230

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.

One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].

The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.

This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.

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Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.

The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].

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Annotation 231

The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:

The Law of Negation of Negation dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a quality shift in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”

The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of truth - the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.

b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality

- Definition of Truth

All cognitive processes lead to the creation of knowledge, which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.

Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of truth is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”^[112]

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Annotation 232

Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”

Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.

- The Properties of Truth

All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete.

The objectivity of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.

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Annotation 233

The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to idealism, which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].

This objectivity of truth also refutes skepticism, which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].

Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).

Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.

Truth is not only objective, but also absolute and relative. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.

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Annotation 234

Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.

Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.

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Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.

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Annotation 235

False consciousness is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.

Although the term “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the concept underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:

They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.

This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.

* Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in What the “Friends of the People” Are:

It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.

Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in Marx Myths and Legends:

Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.

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“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”^[113]

Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.

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Annotation 236

Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:

Metaphysics is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth at all. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a process, and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.

Conservativism includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.

Stagnation is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.

On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.

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Annotation 237

Relativism is the belief that human consciousness can only achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:

Subjectivism: which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.

Revisionism: a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see Private and Common, p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Sophistry: the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.

Skepticism: the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.

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In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has concreteness. The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call concreteness.

Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”^[114] Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.

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Annotation 238

In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.

- The Role of Truth in Reality.

In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.

The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.

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Annotation 239

Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.

Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.

A theory is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes false consciousness. Practice (or praxis) is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.

Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.

This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.

In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:

The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.

Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.

Marx also writes in Theses on Feuerbach that:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.

This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be proven through practice. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.

Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

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Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:

There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.

It is practice, according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.

Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:

The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.

Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.

This brings to mind another line from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach:

The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce action and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”

Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:

Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.

“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).

Afterword

If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!

The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:

Part 2: Historical Materialism

This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an applied field of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.

Part 3: Political Economy

This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of Capital by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:

1. The doctrine of value.

2. The doctrine of surplus value.

3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.

Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:

1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution

2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism

Moving Forward

We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.

We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is alongside other socialists.

Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory must be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”

To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for application in the real world. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”^[115]

As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical engagement. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through praxis. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Holy Family, such critical criticism is futile, as we will never think our way to revolution:

According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.

Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

Engels concludes by punctuating why he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.

Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.

Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book People’s War, People’s Army:

During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.

Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like scientists to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to change the world.

Advice on Further Study

As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:

First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the spirit of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”

Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to The Communist Manifesto:

The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in What is to be Done, Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”

Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:

Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!

In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:

Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.

As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through practice.

Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics

Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism creatively. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the spirit of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then apply what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.

We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.

In Closing

One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:

IskraBooks.org

InternationalMagz.com

If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:

BanyanHouse.org

We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:

Workers of the world, unite!

You have nothing to lose but your chains.

In Solidarity,

- Luna Nguyen, Translator & Annotations

- Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, & Annotations

“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.

[Appendices]

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.

Private	Common
A specific item, event, or process.	The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.

Private is commonly referred to in literature as Special/Specific while Common is commonly called General. Note: When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered Unique. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. See p. 128.

Reason	Result
Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change.	The change caused by a Reason.

Reason and Result may be referred to as Cause and Effect, respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. Note: Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. See p. 138

Obviousness	Randomness
Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure.	Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.

Obvious may be referred to as Necessary, while Randomness may be referred to as Accidental. See p. 145.

Content	Form
What something is made of.	The shape that contains content.

Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. See p. 145.

Essence	Phenomena
Features that make something develop a certain way.	The expression of the essence in certain conditions.

See p. 156.

Possibility	Reality
What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place.	What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.

See p. 160.

Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

The Principle of General Relationships This principle states that:

“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

The Principle of Development This principle states that:

“Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”

The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

The Characteristic of Generality of Development stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.

The Characteristic of Diversity of Development stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in Dialectics of Nature, and states that:

“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” See more on p. 163.

The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in Summary of Dialectics:

“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” See more on p. 175.

The Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in Anti-Dühring, it states:

“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” See more on p. 185.

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Consciousness refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216.

Knowledge is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.

Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.

Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.

Forms of Consciousness

Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-99.png

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-100.png

The Cognitive Process

The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth on page 219.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-101.png

Forms of Knowledge

For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-102.png

Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.

Objectivity: The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.

Absoluteness: Absolute truth^[116] is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.

Relativity: Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.

Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth: Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Concreteness: The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is concreteness.

Abstractness: Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in pure abstraction. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.

Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism

Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.

Bureaucracy: An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.

Conservativism: A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Dogmatism: A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.

Eclecticism: An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.

Idealism: A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.

Opportunism: A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.

Revisionism: A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Rigidity: An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Skepticism: The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Sophistry: The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Subjectivism: The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.

Utilitarianism: An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:

“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”

[Back Matter]

Glossary & Index

Absolute Truth	Absolute Truth can refer to: 1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234. 2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228. See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.
Absolutization	To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
Abstract Labor	The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output is taken into consideration, it is referred to as concrete labor. See p. 15, 17.
Adam Smith	(1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of political economy, which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
Ahistoric Perspective	A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
Base	Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and superstructure, the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
Biological Motion	One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
Biological Reflection	A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by excitation, induction, and reflexes. See p. 65.
Bourgeoisie	The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also: Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.
Bureaucracy	An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218. C→→M→→C C = A Commodity M = The Money Commodity The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’ Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.
Capitalism	The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. Referenced throughout.
Capitalist Class	See: Bourgeoisie
Capitalist Commodity Production	The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
Category	The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
Category Pair	A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on universal category pairs which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
Characteristics	The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
Chemical Motion	Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
Chemical Reflection	The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
Circulation	The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
Commodity	In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
Common	See: Private and Common
Common Laws	Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
Comprehensive Viewpoint	A viewpoint which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
Conception	A relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
Concrete Labor	The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as abstract labor. See p. 15, 17.
Conditioned Reflex	Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
Consciousness	The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
Content	See: Content and Form.
Content and Form (Category Pair)	Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas. Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.
Contradiction	A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
Consciousness	The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
Conservativism	Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
David Hume	(1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
David Ricardo	(1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
Deductive Inference	Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
Definition	The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
Development	The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
Development Viewpoint	A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics	In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
Dialectical Materialism	A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
Dialectical Negation	A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
Dialectical Relationship	A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
(Characteristic of) Diversity	The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
Diversity in Unity	The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
Dogmatism	An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
Duality of Labor	The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
Dynamic and Creative Reflection	The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
Eclecticism	An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
Economic Base	See: Base
Economism	Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
Eduard Bernstein	(1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
Emotional Consciousness	The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
Empirical Consciousness	Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
Empirical Knowledge	Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
Empiricism	A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
Empirio-criticism	A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
Epistemology	The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
Ernst Mach	(1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
Equilibrium	A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
Essence	See: Essence and Phenomena
Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair)	The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
Exchange Value	A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
Excitation	Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
External Contradictions	See: Internal and External Contradictions.
False consciousness	Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
First International	Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
(Basic) Forms of Motion	Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
Form	See: Content and Form.
Form of existence of matter	The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
Form of Value	See: Value-Form
Forward Tendency of Motion	The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
Friedrich Engels	(1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, & co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. Referenced throughout.
Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions	A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
(Characteristic of) Generality	A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
General Relationship	Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
Generality (of relationships)	Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (unique relationships — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (universal relationships — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
George Berkeley	(1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel	(1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor & objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
Historical Materialism	The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
Historical Viewpoint	A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
Idealism	A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
Immanuel Kant	(1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
Induction	The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
Inductive Inference	Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
Intelligibility	The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Internal Contradictions	See: Internal and External Contradictions.
Internal and External Contradictions	Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
Judgment	The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
Karl Marx	(1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Knowledge	The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
Labor Value	The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
Law of Negation of Negation	A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality	The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites	and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
Law of Development of Capitalism	Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
Laws	In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
Laws of Nature	Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
Laws of Society	Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
Laws of Human Thought	Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
Life-Process	Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
Ludwig Feuerbach	(1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
M→→C→→M’	The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for more money than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
Machism	See: Empirio-Criticism.
Manifestation	How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
Marxism-Leninism	A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
Material Conditions	The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
Material Production Activity	Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
Materialism	A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
Materialist Dialectics	A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
Matter	A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
Means of Production	Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
Mechanical Motion	Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
Mechanical Philosophy	A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
Mental Reflection	Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
Metaphysical Materialism	Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of mechanical philosophy, which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
Metaphysics	A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
Methodology	A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
Mode	The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
Mode of Existence of Matter	Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of motion. See p. 59.
Motion	Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
Motion in Equilibrium	Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will eventually lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
Narodnik	Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
Natural law	See: Laws of Nature.
Natural Science	Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
Negation	The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of dialectical negation. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
New Economic Policy	Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
Objective Dialectics	The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
Objective Existence	Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
Objective Idealism	A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
Objectiveness	An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
Obviousness	See: Obviousness and Randomness
Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair)	The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
Opportunism	A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
Opposites	Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
Ordinary Consciousness	Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
Period of Motion	Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
Perspective	See: Viewpoint.
Petty Bourgeoisie	Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
Petty Commodity Production	See: Simple Commodity Production.
Phenomena	Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
Physical Motion	Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
Physical Reflection	Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
Point of View	See: Viewpoint.
Populism	The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
Positivism	The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with empiricism in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
Possibility	See: Possibility and Reality.
Possibility and Reality (Category Pair)	The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
Practice	See: Praxis.
Pragmatism	Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
Praxis	Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
Prejudice	See: Conservatism.
Primary and Secondary Contradictions	In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
Primary Existence	Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
Primitive Materialism	An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
Principle of General Relationships	A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
Private	See: Private and Common
Private and Common (Category Pair)	The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
Private Laws	Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
Production Force	The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
Proletariat	The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
Quality	The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
Quality Shift	A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
Quantity	The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
Quantity range	The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
Quintessence	Original Vietnamese word: tinh hoa. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
Randomness	See: Obviousness and Randomness.
Rational Consciousness	The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
Reason	See: Reason and Result
Reality	See: Possibility and Reality.
Reason and Result (Category Pair)	The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
Reasoning	The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
Reflection	The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
Relative and Absolute	“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
Relative Truth	Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
Relativism	A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
René Descartes	(1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
Result	See: Reason and Result.
Richard Avenarius	(1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
Rigidity	An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
Robert Owen	(1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19th century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
Scientific	An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
Scientific Consciousness	Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered indirect because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
Scientific	Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
Activity	in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
Scientific Materialist Viewpoint	A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
Scientific Socialism	A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
Scientific Worldview	A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
Second International	Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
Self-motion	In the original Vietnamese, the word “tự vận động.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
Sensation	The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity	A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously active in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as passive in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
Simple Commodity Production	What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
Simple Exchange	When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
Social Being	The material existence of human society, as opposed to social consciousness. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
Social Consciousness	The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to social being. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
Social Motion	Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
Socialization	The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
Socialized Production Force	A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
Socio-Political Activity	Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
Solipsism	A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
Sophistry	The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
Stage of Development	The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
Stagnation	An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
Struggle of Opposites	The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
Subjective Factors	Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought	A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
Subjective Idealism	Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
Subjectivism	A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
Suitability	The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
Superstructure	The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
Surplus Value	The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
Symbolization	The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
Systematic Structure	A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
Theoretical Consciousness	The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
Theoretical Knowledge	Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
Theory	An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value	See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
Thing-in-Itself	The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, as it exists outside of our consciousness. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
Third International	Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
Three Component Parts	The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
Threshold	The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
Truth	A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
Unconditioned Reflex	Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
Unilateral Consideration	The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
Unintelligibility	A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Unique Relationship	The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
Unity in Diversity	A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
Universal Law of Consciousness	A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
Universal Laws	Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
Universal Relationship	The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with development, universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
Use Value	A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
Utopianism	1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
Value-Form	Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
Viewpoint	Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
Viewpoint Crisis	A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin	(1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Working Class	See: Proletariat
Worldview	The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.

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1. ↑ Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.
2. ↑ Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.
3. ↑ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.
4. ↑ Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.
5. ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.
6. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.
7. ↑ The Holy Family is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.
8. ↑ Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.
9. ↑ David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.
10. ↑ Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
11. ↑ Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
12. ↑ Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.
13. ↑ The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the M→C→M mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.
14. ↑ Das Kapital: Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing Das Kapital in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). Das Kapital I was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published Das Kapital IV, also known as Theories of Surplus-Value, in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.
15. ↑ Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.
16. ↑ Delegate Document of the 11^th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
17. ↑ Delegate document of the 9^th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
18. ↑ Delegate document of the 10^th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
19. ↑ See Annotation 6, p. 8.
20. ↑ The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
21. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
22. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
23. ↑ According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; Prakriti is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.
24. ↑ Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.
25. ↑ Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.
26. ↑ Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.
27. ↑ Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.
28. ↑ Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.
29. ↑ Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.
30. ↑ Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.
31. ↑ Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.
32. ↑ Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.
33. ↑ Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.
34. ↑ Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.
35. ↑ In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word self-motion throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”
36. ↑ Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, Scientific American, February 26, 2018.
37. ↑ Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in The Royal Society.
38. ↑ Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.
39. ↑ The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.
40. ↑ See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.
41. ↑ For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.
42. ↑ See: Annotation 72, p. 68.
43. ↑ See: Annotation 90, p. 88.
44. ↑ See: The Role of Matter in Consciousness, p. 89.
45. ↑ See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
46. ↑ See:Annotation 68, p. 65.
47. ↑ See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
48. ↑ See: Annotation 93, below.
49. ↑ See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
50. ↑ For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see Methodology, p. 44.
51. ↑ See: Nature of Consciousness, p. 79.
52. ↑ See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
53. ↑ See: Annotation 211, p. 205.
54. ↑ See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
55. ↑ See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
56. ↑ See: Annotation 222, p. 218.
57. ↑ See: The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48.
58. ↑ See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
59. ↑ See: Annotation 232 and The Properties of Truth, on p. 228.
60. ↑ See: Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness, p. 204.
61. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
62. ↑ See Annotation 9, p. 10.
63. ↑ Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
64. ↑ Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
65. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
66. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
67. ↑ Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.
68. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
69. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.
70. ↑ Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, Karl Marx, 1873.
71. ↑ Anti-Dühring, The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
72. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
73. ↑ See p. 107.
74. ↑ Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
75. ↑ See Annotation 117, p. 119.
76. ↑ The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
77. ↑ See Annotation 98, p. 100.
78. ↑ See Private and Common, p. 128; Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156.
79. ↑ See Annotation 117, p. 119.
80. ↑ See Annotation 190, p. 181.
81. ↑ See Annotation 108, p. 112.
82. ↑ See p. 108.
83. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
84. ↑ See: Annotation 108, p. 112.
85. ↑ See: Annotation 106, p. 109.
86. ↑ See: Annotation 107, p. 110.
87. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: Mode and Forms of Matter, p. 59.
88. ↑ See Annotation 62, p. 59.
89. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
90. ↑ On the Question of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
91. ↑ Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
92. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
93. ↑ See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.
94. ↑ Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
95. ↑ Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
96. ↑ To N. D. Kiknadze, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.
97. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
98. ↑ See Annotation 108, p. 112.
99. ↑ See Annotation 207, p. 202.
100. ↑ Summary of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
101. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1877.
102. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
103. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
104. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
105. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
106. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
107. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
108. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
109. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
110. ↑ Theses On Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 1845.
111. ↑ Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
112. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
113. ↑ Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
114. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
115. ↑ Revolutionary Ethics, Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.
116. ↑ Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.