Difference between revisions of "Argument from potential"

Revision as of 06:11, 24 April 2021

Argument from potential refers to the philosophical stance that the moral worth of X is derived from and tied to its potential.
While 'potential' can be part of a sound argument, it is often used inconsistently and/or in a fallacious way.

'Potential' is meaningful only when assigned specific boundaries and limits, outside which it has to be considered negligible--otherwise it leaves open endless possibilities when it comes to moral worth, that have to be considered for any existing being or object, since everything has the potential for anything

The moral value of a being is equal to that of its potential

It is often misused this way, with the deontological premise that something/someone's moral value is equal to its potential.

P1. X's moral value is equal to X's potential.
P2. Rocks have the potential to be sentient with the right random arrangement of atoms, even if it might only happen once in a googleplex to the googleplex power lifetimes of the universe.
C1. Rocks' moral value are equal to that of sentient beings.

That is a reductio that shows glaringly the obvious problems with such a premise--leading to conclusions where everything and anything has inconceivable amount of moral value.
However, it is often used in more subtle ways that are not so obviously absurd, such as:

P1. X's moral value is equal to X's potential.
P2. Early fetuses have the potential to become babies.
C1. Fetuses have moral value equal to that of babies.

But you can push it a step further:

P1. X's moral value is equal to X's potential.
P2. Sperm have the potential to become babies.
C1. Sperm have moral value equal to that of babies.

And even further:

P1. X's moral value is equal to X's potential.
P2. Food has the potential to become sperm, which has the potential to become babies.
C1. Food has moral value equal to that of babies.

And so on.

'Potential' is an arbitrary value that is meaningless unless tied to a non-arbitrary moral basis (such as interests of sentient beings).

For example, if it was about potential to experience a good future (and therefore happiness), it could be said:

P1. Early fetuses have Y amount of potential to become babies and experience a fulfilling and happy future growing up.
P2. By killing a fetus, as a consequence you would deprive the Y amount of potential for that happiness to happen, leaving an -Y amount of potentially less happy future (Y amount of potential for happiness taken away). C1. Killing the fetus is -Y amount of potentially wrong.

In this case potential takes the meaning of probability, and therefore relies on another value system to have meaning. While before, potential was itself the value system, which is meaningless.

Potential as the bases of morality being an arbitrary and meaningless value system can sometimes be tricky to see, as people relying on 'potential' for their argument often use it in a context where potential could make sense, and their statement makes sense at face value, since the stance taken would be sound if 'potential' was used with the meaning 'probability' for another value system--but it is ultimately not, as potential by itself is arbitrarily used to make any conclusion happen without actually taking probability into account as a factor that matters.

A being's potential to be/become something is reasonable probability that it is/will be, and therefore it has to be given the benefit of the doubt that it is/will become that something

Another way people use the argument from potential, that is not equating the moral value of something with its potential, is by giving something reasonable probability to meet its potential (whichever potential that may be), and therefore assigning it the benefit of the doubt that follows.

For example:

P1. If X has the potential to be/become Y, X has reasonable probability that it is/will be Y, therefore X should be given the benefit of the doubt that it might be/become Y when considering X's moral value.
P2. Rocks have the potential to be/become sentient with the right random arrangement of atoms, even if it might only happen once in a googleplex to the googleplex power lifetimes of the universe.
C1. Rocks have reasonable probability that they are/will be sentient, therefore rocks should be given the benefit of the doubt that they are/will be sentient when considering the moral value of rocks.

This reasoning is inherently inconsistent, since the reasonable probability threshold required to give something the benefit of the doubt has to be defined and reasoned for the potential to have any meaning, or anything applies to 'reasonable probability' and should be given the benefit of the doubt.

If the line is drawn at 1% chance for the potential to be true, then C1. does not follow, as rocks being/becoming sentient has an astronomically lower chance of being true than 1%.

If the line is drawn at 10^-googleplex to the googleplex power lifetimes of the universe, then rocks should be given the benefit of the doubt to be/become sentient, as well as a universe of magical dragons existing inside each of your cells should be given the benefit of the doubt for it to be true, as well as anything whatsoever--since anything is scientifically possible.

When people say 'potentially' they are often setting up an arbitrary threshold of what they consider reasonable probability, but ultimately an undefined and moving goal post that suits their position.