NameTheTrait

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Name The Trait, or #NameTheTrait is an argument for veganism formulated by vegan Youtuber Ask Yourself in 2015, and popularized during a series of Youtube debates in 2017 by Ask Yourself and Vegan Gains, a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber. The originally popularized version was widely criticized for syntactic or formal validity issues, but was revised or reformalized in 2018 to provide an uncontroversially valid argument which given the right definitions (discussed below) is also uncontroversially sound. Loosely speaking, NTT seeks to establish veganism from a personal belief in human moral value, somewhat similar to the well known argument from marginal cases. Some street activists report finding the argument effective, and anecdotal reports suggest is it useful in public debates to convince the audience of vegan ethics when the anti-vegan opponent "bites the bullet" on accepting various atrocities against humans in hypothetical situations.

History

The previous incarnation of Name The Trait had several issues (as discussed in that article) which led to us recommending strongly against its usage. The new formalization of Name The Trait (discussed here) has corrected for these issues and is formally valid ("informal validity" is subjective, and not a topic of this article). While a number of unofficial fixes have been recommended, this article covers the newest version (from 2 and up) recognized by the original author as authoritative.

Whether this formalization represents a new argument in terms of structure that replaces an invalid original argument or represents only a formalization of the original argument that corrects for informal semantic issues is moot. Arguments for the former appeal to early comments and original usage/presentation (discussed briefly in the old article), while arguments for the latter appeal to stated authorial intent. Given that the argument is valid now, its pedigree or relationship to the previous argument isn't particularly relevant to its current force or persuasive ability.

The formalization discussed here was authored by Isaac Brown (A.K.A. Ask Yourself) incorporating corrections/improvements offered by discord users Dr. Avi, _jhc, and Alex Malpass. The theory that they authored a new argument for which Brown then took credit is not supported by the evidence (e.g. _jhc disputes the claim he authored the argument), and is also insubstantial. Logic is not a scripture which derives authority only from authorship; even if you took the extreme view that _jhc did author the argument (then deny it) that would make no difference to its validity. It's also of no significance whether, subjectively, you want to describe this collaboration as them "fixing it for him" or as Brown formalizing the argument on his own in light of feedback.

While some practical limitations (in terms of audience) may still apply, this argument could serve as a compelling one for veganism within its niche (which is speculated to be most strongly applicable be non-theistic subjectivists who want to be generalists) and deserves some discussion.

Formal Argument

Version 5

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given

nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

P2) Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.

C) Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P

This argument is a simple Modus Ponens. Put simply: If A then B. A, therefore B. While the premises (P1 and P2) may be challenged, the conclusion must follow if both premises are true.

The first premise, P1, and the conclusion contain the phrase "on pain of P∧~P" which has confused some people, it is to be read as "if view denies the given nonhuman animal has moral value you are in contradiction." and not "You are in contradiction unless your view denies the given nonhuman animal has moral value" or "on pain of P∧~P (contradiction), your view can only deny (your view must deny) the given nonhuman animal has moral value".

The argument is designed so as to channel any meaningful challenge into P2, specifically encouraging the interlocutor to "Name the trait" which would cause human beings to lose moral value if changed. P1 is virtually impossible to challenge, although some specific (commonly theological) metaphysics may attempt to do so.

Improvements from previous versions

Version 5 of the argument eliminates unnecessary and potentially confusing wording around "category x" in Version 3 which caused issues that made the second premise arguably non-substantive:

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

Version 5 substitutes this for a substantive claim about the interlocutor's views, and in the process also avoids any potential challenges about the argument being question begging while simplifying the wording.

Because of these weaknesses in V3, it is important to use the most recent version of the argument.

Version 5 also substitutes "trait-equalizable" for the longer "reducible to a given animal (via trait switching)". The change does not seem to affect the logic of the argument except for those who take issue with the notion of non-human animals being reductions from humans. For most people, this update only makes the argument more compact. If confusion arises about the definition of "trait-equalizable", it can be said to mean reducible (or increasable) to a given animal (via trait switching).

Version 5 also clarifies "nonhuman" for the animal.

Attempted Refutations of P1

Refutation of P1 hinge on the details of what "trait" means. If "trait" is taken to have a certain meaning it appears to be irrefutable. Here we will examine why that is.

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

If "trait" means any and every conceivable and even inconceivable characteristic, natural or otherwise, inside or outside our universe or our reality, etc. then it also includes "has moral value" as a trait. Or to put it another way: there is a definition of trait so broad that it can't help but include moral value in it.

If we start with this information:

  • Animal Moral Value = ?
  • Human Moral Value = True

And the status of moral value is equalized between a human and animal:

  • Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value

And the Human still retains moral value despite this equalization.

  • Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value = True

Then animals must have moral value.

  • Animal Moral Value = True

Or in other words: If human moral value can be made identical to animal moral value and the result is that humans still have moral value, that reveals that animals had moral value all along.

Depending on your perspective, this claim is probably pretty obvious and not at all interesting. Indeed, it is meant to be obvious and uncontroversial.

However, there are issues with "trait" definitions that broad. Overly broad trait definitions would also include traits that are logically impossible to change.

trait-equalizability is impossible

Trait-equalizability can easily be impossible in reality where we have limited control. E.g. even if we could change a human's DNA to be the same as a non-human, we can not change the past, so the trait "being or having been human" can't be taken away.

The response to this is relatively simple, in that "trait-equalization" here refers to a thought experiment or hypothetical. We can imagine a world where a specific entity is human, and then we can imagine revising that world and all of its history to be the same except the entity isn't and never was human, or is like humans except for a particular difference.

However, the claim that trait equalizability is impossible is true if there are no limitations whatsoever to traits. This can be done by referring to essential features of the group that are logically impossible to change.

For example, the trait of "Having been conceptually derived from a reduced version of a human via trait switching" That is, despite never having been human within that hypothetical reality, the reality itself (and everything in it) derive traits from our conceptualization of them.

The given animal lacks that trait; it has always been conceived as that animal. But the given human has the trait, and it can not be taken away because it's the very distinction the argument itself uses to refer to the entity or concept under consideration.

It's unavoidable that traits that relate to how we're talking about these things in the argument are impossible to change because we create them by making the argument itself, and changing them would mean rewriting the argument such that no distinction is given... which might in the process make the argument incoherent.

It's arguably a paradox on the order of "this statement is a lie"; if true, it's not a lie, thus it's a lie, which makes it true, etc.

This relates back to the identity of indiscernibles issue discussed in the previous article, and the question-begging result of rewording the argument to account for it (See Here)

This version of the argument corrects for the more serious issues this caused in the earlier version by dealing with views rather than factual claims of reality. Views can be internally inconsistent, even conceive of otherwise impossible things and thus the existence of impossible to switch traits doesn't render the argument internally contradictory. The fact of these impossible to change traits existing thus doesn't even render P1 false, because the views could still exist (not unlike the views affirming the existence of square circles).

However, the existence of these impossible to change traits may provide an easy-out for those who find that they don't agree that those views represent their own and do not want to name a trait. The argument can even be made that accepting even in a hypothetical that "a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal" may in itself only be done 'on pain of P^-P'. Due to this, it could be argued that for anybody who is already invested in such a contradiction, the threat of any additional contradictions probably isn't very concerning and may be meaningless due to the principle of explosion. It's like the empty threat of killing a dead man.

Fortunately for users of #NameTheTrait, this issue is easily avoided in a couple different ways. One way, for example, is excluding those essential/impossible to change properties:

a given human is reducible in every morally significant way to a given animal (via non-essential trait switching) while retaining moral value

In this case, the only protest could be found in value narcissism (the belief that it's those essential/unchangeable properties that bestow morality). Value Narcissism is an atrocious belief system that's relatively easy to challenge, but would remain an "out" for the argument with a modification as above. See discussion on essential traits here for more.

Another means of avoiding this issue is a very specific definition of trait that limits traits to those within the reality being considered.

So, that is for the hypothetical reality, the fact that we outside of that reality are hypothesizing about it is not a trait of entities within that reality.

P1 and the Law of Identity

Some critics have claimed that "trait equalization" violates the law of identity on the basis that, in order for P1 to be true, it must take two objects and end up with one object.

The law of identity states, in short, that A=A. So the idea is that if we start with A and B (which we assume are not equal), and we end up with one object which we presume has the same identity as A and B, then either A or B must no longer equal themselves: for example, that now A is not A if it has been given the traits of B.

This misunderstanding equivocates a rigid logical "identity" which encapsulates every quality of something to a pointer or naming convention (informally "identity") in the sense of what we have labeled or called some entity to keep track of it or compare it in the hypotheticals within the argument.

A hypothetical entity Bob is still called Bob after removing his ability to speak to test a hypothetical trait challenge of speech, but the law of identity doesn't apply here because these Bobs exist in different hypothetical situations; they are not the same Bob. Bob1 does not necessarily equal Bob2. The important consideration as it relates to the argument is only whether the latter Bob is regarded to retain moral value -- and he may in fact not be, which is the whole point of them being *different* Bobs, they have different traits and moral value may or may not be one of those traits that is different.

A stronger criticism is that trait equalization is simply impossible, which is covered above, but is resolved by limiting consideration of traits to those within a reality.

Refutations of P2

Denying a view

The most simple refutation is "I don't know" or denying having a view on the matter.

Not much can be said about this beyond the fact that if somebody has made no assertions, that person does not inherently carry the burden of proof.

However, there are related claims that could generate the burden of proof, such as "I'm a good person" -- this would create a burden of proof based on the implicit claim that ones actions are moral (if being a good person has anything to do with actions) and thus the claim that (if coming from somebody who eats meat) eating meat is ethically permissible.

If a person claims to have no views on morality and does not claim to be a good person, another argument would have to be made for the burden to justify the morality of actions since this is not specifically about the burden of proof for claims.

Humans would lose moral value

The second way to reject the P2 in argument is to engage with the trait naming the argument strives for: it is to name a trait, which if true of humans, would cause them to lose moral value.

Getting the interlocutor to name traits, then addressing and debunking them or revealing them to be psychotic denials of human moral value, is the purpose of the argument. This is not exactly a point of criticism: The argument is working properly if the interlocutor is attempting to name traits.

However, if we are attempting to promote veganism with these arguments we should recognize that it's most effective for certain people where challenging those named traits is productive.

Niche

Assuming trait naming isn't avoided entirely:

First, this argument as formulated is most suited for those people who believe animals do not have moral value at all and that humans do. Most people already agree animals have at least some moral value, so for them it's probably more effective to argue from that assumption as to whether we should be eating them -- or modify the argument to say "retain sufficient moral value to not be eaten" or something along those lines.

While the logic still holds, if it's used to persuade people of veganism the argument is also ill suited to people who would name supernatural traits like "has a soul" because this is very difficult to argue. It's also an answer those theists who use it may feel very comfortable with even for humans. The question "If a human didn't have a soul would it be OK to kill him or her" can be answered "Yeah, that's a zombie or something, you should kill it! Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live!" etc.

So for the most part, the argument is more suited to non-theists or rational theists who will engage with reason and empirical justification.

Those who can name traits that would make them appear to be complacent moral monsters may also not be persuaded to veganism by the argument (for example those who would endorse raising, killing, and eating mentally challenged humans on the basis of an IQ trait). Such a rejection isn't useful for 1:1 conversation, but may be useful in convincing a less ego-invested audience of a debate to go vegan when the non-vegan is seemingly willing to bite such an abhorrent bullet in order to avoid veganism.

In 1:1 conversation, if the argument works as intended, it can go either way: accept veganism, or reject some level of human rights. This poses some risk of unintended consequences.

Worst case, most people exposed to the argument reject human rights for sake of eating meat, and the world becomes a worse place because of it. Best case, most people exposed to the argument accept veganism for sake of being consistent with human rights, and the world becomes a better place because of it.

The balance of these two inform whether the argument is good for the world or not. This is an empirical matter that's hard to assess, but it's important to keep in mind just as health arguments for veganism may lead people to reject beef (the worst offender) and eat more chicken as a "middle ground" despite the consumption of chicken leading to more animals being killed.

Thus: knowing your audience is important. If it's somebody who is very involved and dedicated to human rights, NTT may be a very safe bet. If it's somebody who you know leans a little on the psychopath side of the spectrum, it may be best to avoid it unless you have a public stage to convert audience members to veganism when they witness the deranged conclusions your opponent will support to avoid veganism.

Named Traits

Species maximum

Or belonging to a species with at least one member attaining some trait (intelligence or language or rationality at a certain arbitrary level)

It's ultimately an absurd claim in itself, but not very hard to counter.

To highlight the absurdity: So if we're looking for one individual who is 'smart' in the species, and there are two islands of 'stupid' people thousands of miles apart, on one Island somebody is born who has that arbitrary x level of higher intelligence to qualify as 'smart'. Suddenly the people on the other island thousands of miles away gain moral value where before that instant of realizing that arbitrary level of intelligence on the other island they had none?

It's a very silly claim that begs justification for both WHY that particular arbitrary level of intelligence, but also for why it grants other people moral value. I'll address the latter:

If the argument is that it grants others moral value because they can breed together as per the definition of species (and presumably are potential mates to spread that intelligent gene) why would it grant moral value to people on an island thousands of miles away who are not potential mates? It's also a fundamentally eugenic argument: people on average might have some moral value as potential mates, but people with genetic diseases or very low IQs who would dilute or damage the offspring of the intelligent people would actually have negative moral value.

That's probably enough to discredit the argument to most people's satisfaction. But if you want: What if a human who didn't reach that level of intelligence were transported to a parallel dimension with no humans. Would that human lose moral value? If not, then all remotely intelligent animals have moral value as per multiverse theory where every possible universe exists, so there are universes with pigs and cows and chickens (genetically the same species) with a couple different genes giving them that level of intelligence. There's a fair chance there are no universes in which something could be intelligent and have genetic composition making reproduction with a plant or bacterium possible, but anything with a brain it could. If the person admitted that somebody would lose moral value if transported to another universe if it made procreation impossible, that comes back to the island question, and a question of the elderly who can no longer procreate, and of those who are infertile, and of the eugenics issue.

Species Normalcy

This claim is similar to the Species Maximum claim, but asserts value of the entire species is based on what is normal for the species, or supposedly whatever represents more than 50% of the species. This claim suffers from the similar issues to that of Species Maximum, but the threshold for having or lacking moral value results in devaluation all of the beings that DO have that trait when they represent less than 50% of the species population. Thus, following from this, if somebody set up a factory farm on Mars and bred 8 billion humans with mental retardation to fall below the intelligence threshold (or whatever trait was associated with moral value for the species), then all of the humans on Earth would lose moral value because of this.

Reformulating the claim to Species Maximum is a common response to demonstrating this issue with the Species Normalcy claim.

Has moral value

The tautological trait "has moral value"

God's Permission

The named trait of difference between humans and non-human animals being that humans were given God's permission to harm other animals, is one of the examples why NTT is not always a very effective argument.
In this case, NTT is not an effective argument not because the named trait is logically sound, but because there isn't an easy way to now convince the interlocutor/s that their named trait is erroneous, and things will get more complicated.

Once this trait is named, engaging directly with it will often prove pointless and even counterproductive, as 'God' is undefined and requires an entire different discussion to be had - no matter the counterargument that is given to the named trait, they can easily fit their 'God's permission' trait to be sound and be able to withhold any reductio ad absurdum, by being able to twist it around however they prefer it to be.

For example, a reductio ad absurdum could be:

A (person naming the trait) would say:

P1. God dictates morality.
P2. God has given moral permission for humans to do how they please with non-humans.
C1. Humans are morally OK to do how they please with non-humans.

B (person challenging A to NTT) could then say:

P1. God dictates morality.
P2. God has given moral permission for humans to do how they please with non-humans.
C1. Humans are morally OK to do how they please with non-humans.
C2. Humans are morally OK to torture dogs to have a laugh.

A could then say:

P1. God dictates morality.
P2. God has given moral permission for humans to do how they please with non-humans.
P3. Harm for fun is an exception, as God doesn't condone it.
C1. Humans are morally OK to do how they please with non-humans, as long as it's not for fun.
C2. Humans are not morally OK to torture dogs to have a laugh.

And so on.

If, instead, B would try to challenge the premises, it would prove complicated and tedious to convince A that the premises are incorrect, derailing the discussion from being effective to the original goal: to convince the interlocutor/s to go vegan.

A would say:

P1. God dictates morality.
P2. God has given moral permission for humans to do how they please with non-humans.
C1. Humans are morally OK to do how they please with non-humans.

At which point, B would have to engage with the premises, and things would get complicated.

B could challenge P1., and say:

P1. If God is morally incorrect about something, he's not a moral authority.
P2. God expressed his moral commands through his word.
C1. For God to dictate morality, he should be able to always be correct with his word.
P3. There are examples where God's word lead to a morally bad outcome, causing more suffering and less happiness.
C2. God's word is morally inconsistent.
C3. Morality shouldn't be solely based on God.

A could then say:

P1. The words of God were misinterpreted during those instances where there was more suffering and less happiness as a result.
P2. The words of God need to be interpreted correctly for them to always be morally right.
C1. It was the humans' misinterpretations that led to those bad outcomes.
C2. Your conclusions are incorrect, as your P3. is incorrect, and my original P1. still holds.

And so on.

The conversation could easily spiral down in something unrelated, that would eventually lose interest of any onlookers and even the interlocutor/s themselves.

NTT works well when reductio ad absurdum is possible, but when the premises themselves are absurd (such as in this case) a reductio ad absurdum doesn't work because the consequences of the reasoning aren't really more absurd than the premise itself.
NTT is weak against supernatural trait naming since those aren't rational claims that can be examined without completely dismantling them.

Soul

Similarly to 'God's permission' (above), this is a supernatural claim where a reductio ad absurdum wouldn't work because the premise is already absurd itself.
This is another example where NTT is weak, as having to digress to argue in favor of 1. souls not existing and/or 2. morality not being contingent on souls, proves challenging and time consuming, likely losing the interlocutor/s attention to the original reason as to why NTT was even brought up to begin with.

A could say:

P1. For a being to have moral worth, such being has to have a soul.
P2. Humans have souls.
P3. Non-human animals do not have a soul.
C1. Humans have moral worth, animals do not.
C2. Humans can do with animals as they please.

At this point, B could take two roads:
1. attempt a reduction ad absurdum (draw a conclusion from the same premise/s that would be absurd, and therefore show how the premise/s are absurd themselves since they lead to something absurd)
2. challenge the premise/s' validity

By attempting a reductio ad absurdum, the interlocutor/s could simply add new premise/s to correct and twist the absurdity.

For example, B could say:

P1. For a being to have moral worth, such being has to have a soul.
P2. Non-human animals do not have a soul.
C1. Dogs have no moral worth.
C2. Torturing dogs is OK.

A could then say:

P1. For a being to have moral worth, such being has to have a soul.
P2. Non-human animals do not have a soul.
P3. Soulless beings that are cared for by beings with a soul, share some of the soul's moral worth.
P4. Dogs are cared for by humans (that have souls).
C1. Dogs have moral worth.
C2. Torturing dogs is not OK.

And so on.

Instead, by going through the second route, the same problem as the one shown in 'God's permission' would occur. B would have to convince A that the premises are wrong by directly challenging them and digressing, and since the premises are supernatural themselves, it would prove very challenging if even doable in a reasonable amount of time.

While it's possible to convince someone that their supernatural premise/s are bad because they lead to something absurd or because they're not sound themselves, the point is that it's not an effective way to convince someone to go vegan because of the difficulty and time required for such a task, and by using NTT you give the interlocutor/s the perfect chance to have whatever supernatural reasoning they want used as a justification.

Legality

Named trait: it's legal to kill animals for food, but not legal to kill humans for food.

Legality is a commonly named trait of difference used as justification.
There are two ways that can be used to show how bad 'legality' is as a trait difference used as moral justification.

1. Legality and morality are two different things, and conflating them with each other is erroneous.

While the legality of actions is somewhat correlated with and derived from morality, it's not the case viceversa. Laws are derived from morality, they are changed throughout time when we recognize something is immoral, and the very basis of a system of laws exists as an attempt to deter morally bad actions.
There are many examples throughout history, and even today, of actions that were legally allowed or forbidden and morally bad or good, respectively (i.e. lawful slave trade, banned abortion no matter the circumstances, lawful smoking of cigarettes in enclosed buildings full of people, lawful drinking and driving, lawful child labor and abuse, etc.).

Simply naming powerful examples of things that were lawful in the past such as slave trade and child labor and abuse (and even drinking and driving) should be a strong enough case to show the interlocutor/s that legality has no bearing on morality.

P1. The morality of an action is justified by the legality of it.
C1. If something is lawful, it's also moral.
C2. Anything lawful is morally good.
C3. Law and morality are equal.

It's pretty easy to show what absurd consequences such a premise would entail.

Did slavery stop being morally good the second after it was declared banned, and only in that spatial area?
Was drinking and driving harmful only after it became illegal?
And so on.

2. Naming the trait 'legality' to justify the harm and consumption of animals begs the question: would it be then morally OK to farm and eat humans if lawful?

There are cases of cannibalistic tribes that regularly kill and eat people, and it's not unimaginable to see a society where humans were/are considered food.
If a vote to pass farming humans as food was passed and it was now lawful, would it then be morally OK to treat them as livestock and eat them?

Once again, reductio ad absurdum would show how such a premise would lead to insane conclusions.

If the interlocutor/s then find another reason why such a thing wouldn't me moral, they then agree that 'legality' is not a moral justification for an action.

P1. Something lawful happens to not be moral.
C1. Not everything lawful is moral.
C2. Legality and morality are not equal.
C3. The morality of an action cannot be justified by the legality of it.

Social Contract

Social contract is an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for benefits.
It can easily be demonstrated how fallacious social contract is as a moral justification with 2 reductio ad absurdum.

1. Since not everybody has a social contract with you, would only the people that have a social contract with you have moral worth?

P1. Morality is contingent on social contract.
P2. X group of people has no implicit agreement with me, and doesn't care to cooperate for benefits, therefore they have no social contract with me.
C1. X group has no moral value.

There are many cases where people/groups of people are enemies and/or uncaring/indifferent towards each other. Does that mean you should treat them as if they had no moral worth, and were mere objects?

What if the sides are flipped? Should they treat you as if you had no moral worth?

Considering that people clearly do have moral worth, it's a contradiction and inconsistent to arbitrarily assign moral worth to them or not according to whether they subscribe to a social contract with you.

2. Social contract is contingent on repercussions if it's not abided by. Would it then be OK to harm people in situations were there would be no repercussions for the breaking of the social contract? And would it be somewhat less bad to harm people in situations where there would be little repercussions for the breaking of the social contract?

This, again, shows how inconsistent and absurd it would be to rely morality on the existence of a social contract.

P1. Morality is contingent on social contract.
P2. Homeless people hold somewhat of a social contract with you, but less than non-homeless people.
C1. Homeless people have less moral value than non-homeless people, because they hold less of a social contract (if any at all, in some cases).

P1. Morality is contingent on social contract.
P2. Social contract is contingent on repercussions if not abided by, otherwise there's no reason to abide to it.
P3. Mute people with no hands would have no way to hold you up to your side on the social contract with them, and you would have no repercussions from harming them with no witnesses.
C1. Mute people with no hands have less moral value than other people.

P1. Morality is contingent on social contract.
P2. There is no society, as you're stranded on an island with others, and it's a purely survival situation where there are no implicit agreements.
C1. Nobody on the island has moral value.

No Reciprocation

(Social Contract Reciprocation)

Group Membership

(general/specific?)

History/Tradition

The trait 'history/tradition' is very easy to show as absurd, as there are plenty of historic cultural tenets and traditions that are outright crazy.

A could say:

P1. Something that is done out of tradition is morally justified.
P2. Eating animals is done out of tradition, while eating humans is not.
C1. Eating animals is morally justified, while eating humans is not.

B could then then give any reductio ad absurdum examples that derives from P1.

For example:

P1. Something that is done out of tradition is morally justified.
P2. Burning Indian women alive after the husbands die is done out of tradition.
C1. Burning Indian women alive after the husbands die is morally justified.

Or:

P1. Something that is done out of tradition is morally justified.
P2. Forcing women to wear burqas is done out of tradition.
C1. Forcing women to wear burqas is morally justified.

Or:

P1. Something that is done out of tradition is morally justified.
P2. Child marriage is done out of tradition in certain places.
C1. Child marriage is morally justified in certain places.

And so on.

This argument usually leads person A to either completely admit that tradition has no relevance to morality (most cases), or to have to rationalize P1. into saying that morality is spatial *and* temporal (i.e. by taking one step over a national border something would be morally good, and by taking one step back it would be magically morally bad all of a sudden - something that is inane and makes no sense).

Person B wouldn't even have to create hypotheses to show how absurd relying on traditions to know what the morally right thing to do is, as there are plenty of examples right now and in the past of traditions that lead/led very clearly to a morally bad outcome.

Traditions have no bearing on morality, and are not even correlated. While relying on legality to know what's morally right is wrong (explained above), it would be even more insane to argue that traditions have a bearing on morality than legality has a bearing on morality, since laws sometimes correlated with what's morally right and are often derived from what's morally right, while traditions are simply expressions of societies' believes and customs - and are irrelevant with what someone ought to do or not.

Bred To Die

Being 'bred to die' is an argument that is often used as a justification for the slaughter of animals.
If the interlocutor/s name 'bred to die' as a trait, there are, yet again, absurd conclusions that follow from the premise.

X purpose given by someone =/= moral justification to do X - or that would implicitly imply that morality is dictated by that someone.

A could say:

P1. If a being is bred into existence for the purpose of dying, it's OK to kill them.
P2. Farmed animals are being bred into existence for the purpose of dying.
C1. It's OK to kill farmed animals.

B could then say:

P1. If a being is bred into existence for the purpose of dying, it's OK to kill them.
P2. I want to breed children into existence for the purpose of them being killed when they're old enough to run for their lives and make it fun.
C1. It's OK to kill said children.

It's very easy to show how psychopathic, incompatible, and inconsistent, conclusions entailed by such a premise would be.

Being brought into existence with an intended purpose for your existence, doesn't morally justify carrying out such purpose simply because it was intended to be so.

If the interlocutor/s do not agree to that, then even more absurd conclusions follow:

P1. If a being is bred into existence for a purpose, it's OK to carry out such a purpose onto them.
P2. X dogs are bred into existence for the purpose of dogfighting.
P3. Y dogs are not bred into existence for the purpose of dogfighting.
P4. X and Y dogs are at the same sentient level, and are equal.
C1. It's OK to make X dogs dogfight, but not Y dogs.

P1. If a being is bred into existence for a purpose, it's OK to carry out such a purpose onto them.
P2. X humans are bred into existence to be slaves.
P3. Y humans are bred into existence to be slave traders.
P4. X and Y humans are at the same sentient level, and are equal.
C1. It's OK for Y humans to make X humans their slaves.

And so on.

After a certain point, person A will either have to admit that P1. is wrong, or agree to absurd and psychopathic views that are inconsistent and make no sense.

Food Chain/Naturality

Naming 'food chain/naturality' to morally justify something is an appeal to nature logical fallacy.
Just because something is natural, doesn't make that something OK/good/ideal/optimal/justified.

There are many things that are natural that people do and that are not morally OK. Simply naming a few of them should be enough to demonstrate how 'natural' is irrelevant to morality.

Is raping OK, because it's natural?
What about fighting for territory? Out ancestors fought for territory.
Is making your child live in a cave without medicine good, because it's only natural to do so?
And so on.

If 'food chain' is a justification of the interlocutor/s' harm and consumption of animals, then they should also be fine with other animals eating us, and shouldn't want to intervene when a human is being eaten, nor be wanting to protect against predators that are above us in the food chain - which is obviously not the case.

P1. X being weaker/lower in the food chain than Y makes it morally OK for Y to eat/harm X.
P2. Humans are weaker and lower in the food chain in nature than lions.
C1. It's morally OK to allow lions to eat/harm humans in nature.

P1. X being weaker/lower in the food chain than Y makes it morally OK for Y to eat/harm X.
P2. Humans are weaker and lower in the food chain than super-intelligent aliens/AI.
C1. It's morally OK for super-intelligent aliens/AI to eat/harm humans.

'Food chain' often ends up being a case of 'might makes right', where actions are morally justified as long as a 'stronger' being inflicts harm upon a weaker one.

This is laughably absurd, as reductio ad absurdum shows how insane this argument is.

P1. X being weaker than Y makes it morally OK for Y to harm X.
P2. Baby humans are weaker than adult humans.
C1. It's morally OK for adult humans to harm baby humans.

Not Human

Species (General) Species (Specific)

Low Intelligence

There are 3 ways to go about dismantling how inconsistent this named trait is.

1. When having 'low intelligence' is named as trait to justify animals' farming and consumption, there's another reduction ad absurdum that can be easily done.

P1. It's OK to harm and slaughter beings with low intelligence, but not the ones with high intelligence.
C1. It's OK to harm and slaughter mentally handicapped people (low intelligence).

P1. It's OK to harm and slaughter beings with low intelligence, but not the ones with high intelligence.
C1. It's OK to harm and slaughter humans, but not super-intelligent alien/AI beings.

P1. It's OK to harm and slaughter beings with low intelligence, but not the ones with high intelligence.
C1. It's OK to harm and slaughter super-intelligent alien/AI beings, but not hyper-intelligent alien/AI beings.

This begs the question: when beings of higher intelligence are discovered, would it then suddenly classify the beings of previous highest intelligence (that were *not* morally OK to harm and consume) OK to harm and consume?

2. 'Low' intelligence is very vague, and it's arbitrary.

Low intelligence can be applied to pretty much anything, as intelligence is a very vague term and is best used in a comparative way to see who's more intelligence in what, rather than an objective view of who's of high intelligence and who's of low intelligence.
Low intelligence compared to what?

It could even be argued that humans are of low intelligence, since it doesn't have any comparison and it's arbitrary. And when there's something more intelligent than humans, humans could easily be considered 'low intelligence' in the same way.

P1. It's OK to harm and slaughter beings with low intelligence, but not the ones with high intelligence.
P2. High intelligence is determined by the current being of highest intelligence, and less intelligent beings are low intelligence.
C1. When super-intelligent alien/AI beings are discovered, it's OK to harm and slaughter humans, but not super-intelligent alien/AI beings.

P1. It's OK to harm and slaughter beings with low intelligence, but not the ones with high intelligence.
P2. High intelligence is determined by the current being of highest intelligence, and less intelligent beings are low intelligence.
C1. When hyper-intelligent alien/AI beings are discovered, it's OK to harm and slaughter super-intelligent alien/AI beings, and of course humans as well, but not hyper-intelligent alien/AI beings.

And so on.

'Low intelligence' is arbitrary, and so can't be used in an objective and consistent way.

3. While higher intelligence sometimes correlates with a higher level of sentience, what people would normally consider 'low intelligence' can still retain very significant levels of sentience. Intelligence =/= morality.

Basing morality on 'intelligence' (instead of sentience) leads to absurd conclusions.

Are plants of moral significance, because they have a level of intelligence, even though they have no sentience and therefore can't feel or subjectively experience?
Are non-sentient super-computers of higher moral significance than humans, because they have more intelligence?
And so on.

A reductio ad absurdum would be:

P1. Moral worth is based on intelligence.
P2. Current computers have a higher intelligence than humans.
C1. Current computers have a higher moral value than humans.

Instead it should be:

P1. Moral worth is based on the level of sentience (ability to feel, perceive and experience subjectively).
P2. Current computers have no sentience, while humans do.
C1. Current computers have no moral value (lower) than humans.

Civilization/Culture

Another named trait could possibly be 'civilization/culture', with the argument that it's OK to eat/harm animals because they have neither, while we do.
This is another arbitrary line that has no bearing on morality, and while a species being able to have a civilization would show that they are high on the sentience spectrum, the lack of it wouldn't entail lack of moral worth.

For civilization, A could say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have a civilization but X does.
P2. Humans have a civilization, but farmed animals do not.
C1. It's morally OK for humans to eat/harm farmed animals.

B could then say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have a civilization but X does.
P2. People in the west have a civilization, but tribes and a lot of third worlders do not.
C1. It's morally OK for people in the west to eat/harm tribes and a lot of third worlders.

For culture, A could say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have a culture but X does.
P2. Humans have a culture, but farmed animals do not.
C1. It's morally OK for humans to eat/harm farmed animals.

Culture is not a trait that is unique to humans - chimpanzees, for example, have developed quite strong cultural habits. Not only culture is present in animals, as a lot of species have some level of customs and learned traditions, but culture has no reason to be a moral line that determines what has moral value and what doesn't.

B could then say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have a culture but X does.
P2. Adult humans have a culture, but baby humans do not.
C1. It's morally OK for adult humans to eat/harm baby humans.

Or:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have a culture but X does.
P2. Chimpanzees have a culture, but some mentally disabled humans do not.
C1. It's morally OK for chimpanzees to eat/harm some mentally disabled humans.

The argument usually turns out to be, again, 'might makes right', which is easily shown as something absurd that doesn't hold by bringing in the context super-intelligent AIs/aliens and giving them dominion over humans for their 'superiority'.

Moral Agency

Moral agency is the ability of a being to be able to distinct between morally right and wrong, and make moral judgements.
While the majority of animals do not really have moral agency, some show very high levels of empathy similar to the level of humans, that make them act in the best interests of other animals - such as whales, elephants, and primates.

However, there's no reason why the ability to have moral agency should define moral value.

When moral agency is named as a trait, A could say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have moral agency but X does.
P2. Humans have moral agency, and farmed animals do not.
C1. It's morally OK for humans to eat/harm farmed animals.

B could then say:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have moral agency but X does.
P2. Elephants have some sort of moral agency, and human babies have no moral agency.
C1. It's morally OK to allow elephants to eat/harm human babies.

Or:

P1. It's morally OK for X to eat/harm Y, if Y doesn't have moral agency but X does.
P2. Humans have moral agency, and dogs to not.
C1. It's morally OK for humans to eat/harm dogs.
C2. Dogs have no moral value in respect to humans.
C3. It's morally OK for an infinite amount of dogs to be tortured to death on the whim of a person.

This is a similar argument to naming the trait 'intelligence' (above).

The quality of having moral agency is an arbitrary, unjustified line to determine whether something should be given moral consideration or not, as beings that do not possess moral agency are still sentient (ability to feel, perceive and experience subjectively).

This usually turns out to be another case of 'might makes right' (X has Z quality that is not present in Y = X>Y). If anything, having moral agency entails more responsibility in regards to morality, not a clean slate of doing whatever we want to the sentient beings that do not have an arbitrary quality.

No Personhood

'No personhood' is sometimes a trait given, which is essentially an arbitrary line drawn to give moral value to humans but not to non-human animals.
If any moral value at all is given to non-human animals, then lack of personhood isn't a sufficient enough justification to eat/harm non-human animals - as there are other consideration to be made beyond personhood.

There are 3 ways that this could be answered:

1. The usual reductio ad absurdum.

A could say:

P1. It's OK to eat/harm beings that are not people.
P2. Farmed animals are not people.
C1. It's OK to eat/harm farmed animals.

B could then say:

P1. It's OK to eat/harm beings that are not people.
P2. Farmed animals are not people.
P3. Chimpanzees are not people.
C1. It's OK to eat/harm chimpanzees *equally as much as* farmed animals, as they both do not have the only pre-requisite to have any moral value.
C2. Torturing to death 10^1000 chimpanzees is equally as neutral as pinching 1 pig, as they both do not have the only pre-requisite to have any moral value.

P1. can be shown to contradict stances that the interlocutor/s hold.

If person A then says that lack of personhood can still possibly entail moral value, then the trait makes no sense - as lack of personhood wouldn't necessarily entail moral justification to OK to eat/harm beings.

2. Questioning where exactly personhood begins, and reductio ad absurdum that follows.

Personhood is not well defined, and is quite controversial. There a few different possible answers that person A could give, when person B asks them how to classify a being as having personhood:

First possibility: X level of IQ.

A could say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the IQ is above 60.

B could then say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the IQ is above 60.
P3. Mentally disabled people can be below 60.
C1. Mentally disabled people have no moral value.

Second possibility: being part of the human species.

A could say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the being is part of the human species.

B could then say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the being is part of the human species.
P3. AIs and aliens on a higher sentience scale than us aren't part of the human species.
P4. A fetus is part of the human species.
C1. AIs and aliens on a higher sentience scale than us have no moral value, while a fetus does.
C2. A fetus has infinitely more moral value than AIs and aliens on a higher sentience scale than us.

Third possibility: resembling a human.

A could say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the being resembles a human.

B could then say:

P1. Moral value is dependent on personhood.
P2. Personhood is there when the being resembles a human.
P3. Certain deformed people do not resemble humans more than chimpanzees do.
C1. Deformed people have less moral value than chimpanzees.

And so on.

3. Challenging why morality would be depending on personhood, as it's arbitrary.

While personhood means sentience and it entails moral value by itself, the lack of it doesn't exclude sentience. Assigning moral value only to the current definition of personhood is completely arbitrary, and would entail that when the definition of 'personhood' is changed in time to fit humans that are of a higher sentience/smarter/more 'people-like than' us, we would hold no moral value anymore.
When morality is thought to be dependent on personhood - a definition that is dependent on what people are, which is in turn dependent on the current state of people - , it creates quite a paradoxical reality, where personhood is everchanging and morality depending on it would be ever-excluding of the present/current personhood.

Sapience

No Technology

Dignity

No Potential For X

If not having potential for an arbitrary thing is used as a moral justification to inflict harm, there are absurd consequences that follow.

1. What if a human has no potential for something that a being better/more intelligence than a human has potential for?

If a being having potential for a named thing (while another being doesn't), means that it's OK for the first being to eat/harm the second, it can be shown how it could be the case for other potentials to hold the first being as the one being morally OK to be eaten/harmed.

For example:

P1. X having potential for processing information Z fast at the same time as Y not having said potential, makes it OK for X to eat/harm Y.
P2. Humans have no potential for being able to process information Z fast, while an AI does.
C1. It's OK for AIs to eat/harm humans.

P1. X having potential for prolonged survival without water at the same time as Y not having said potential, makes it OK for X to eat/harm Y
P2. Camels have the potential to survive 15 days without water, while humans don't.
C1. It's OK for camels to eat/harm humans,

2. What about humans that have less potential for something than other humans?

If a being having potential for something that another doesn't have, means that it's OK for the first being to harm the second, it would follow that if a being has *more* potential than another, it would also mean that it's OK for the first being to harm the second (as the moral worth is contingent on potential).

P1. X having more potential than Y, makes it OK for X to eat/harm Y.
P2. Someone with prodigious ability to do mental calculations has more potential in math than the average person.
C1. It's morally OK for that someone to eat/harm average humans.

P1. X having more potential than Y, makes it OK for X to eat/harm Y.
P2. A child with genetical advantage has more potential to perform in sports than a child with lower genetical advantage.
C1. It's morally OK for the child with more genetical advantage to eat/harm the other child.

Utility

Nutrients

'Nutrients' may be used to try and justify eating animals, but it wouldn't even classify as a trait difference since human meat would have nutrients as well.
The 'nutrients' argument can factually be shown as wrong by explaining that all the nutrients a human requires can be found in plant-based foods, without the downsides of animal products.

A could say:

P1. X is justified in eating Y if it's needed for survival.
P2. Humans need nutrients to survive.
P3. Animals have the nutrients that humans require to survive.
C1. Humans are justified in eating animals.

B could then say:

P1. X is justified in eating Y if it's needed for survival.
P2. Humans need nutrients to survive.
P3. Other humans have the nutrients that humans require to survive.
C1. Humans are justified in eating humans.

The logical process isn't sound, and simply adding another premise would make it apparent as to why.

P1. X is justified in eating Y if it's needed for survival.
P2. Humans need nutrients to survive.
P3. Animals have the nutrients that humans require to survive.
P4. Animals are not the only food source that has the nutrients that humans require to survive.
C1. Animals as a food source are not needed for humans' survival, so P1. doesn't apply.
C2. P1. doesn't justify humans eating animals.

Simply explaining P4. will show how this argument makes no sense. If the interlocutor/s argue that survival/necessity doesn't matter and nutrients alone is a justification to eat anything, than a reduction ad absurdum (as shown above) can be made, and they'll have to admit that it's morally OK for humans to cannibalize.

Quality Of Life

Pleasure/Preference/Whim

The trait namer expresses that the trait is his or her own personal pleasure, preference, or effectively whim: that he or she prefers it or it pleases him or her to eat animals but not to eat humans.

Personal whim is absurd already as a moral claim (as an extreme form of relativism), but to clarify it further and demonstrate why you can ask if this person believes him or herself to be a god. If not, ask if the morality or immorality based on this trait which refers to things he or she arbitrarily likes only apply to him?

If the former is true and the person is asserting divinity via the belief that he or she alone dictates morality for the universe based on personal whim, then regarding the absurdity: QED.

If the latter and it's only personally applicable, ask if it's moral for another person to eat people if that person it's pleased by them/has a preference to do so. If yes, again, QED. If no, that's a contradiction given the above -- e.g. this person does believe himself to be some kind of god dictating morality for the entire universe based on his personal whim. This just comes down to the same criticisms you can find of confused advocates of relativism.

My Apathy/Nihilism

Futility

Some people may attempt to argue that because there are other problems, or that because going vegan by yourself wouldn't make a huge change, then there's no point in even trying - which is an appeal to futility logical fallacy.

A could say:

P1. Something is not worth doing unless it solves the entire problem.
P2. Going vegan individually wouldn't solve the issue of animals being farmed.
C1. Going vegan individually is not worth doing.

B could then say:

P1. Something is not worth doing unless it solves the entire problem.
P2. Abstaining from rape individually wouldn't solve the issue of rape existing.
C1. Abstaining from rape individually is not worth doing.

Or:

P1. Something is not worth doing unless it solves the entire problem.
P2. Drinking water when thirsty wouldn't solve the issue of biologically needing water constantly.
C1. Drinking water is not worth doing.

Or:

P1. Something is not worth doing unless it solves the entire problem.
P2. Voting individually wouldn't guarantee that the chosen candidate gets elected.
C1. Voting individually is not worth doing.

And so on.

P1. is very clearly absurd, as it's a stance that's disconnected from reality and is indicative of the interlocutor/s' (willful) ignorance of basic economics and supply and demand.

Each individual affects the entire economical system, as movements and large-scale changes in demand are made by singular individuals - when a large group of singular individuals change their demands, the market changes.

However, with veganism a large-scale change doesn't even have to happen for your singular individual choice to matter, as not participating in the buying of animal products will statistically save thousands of farmed animals from being bred into existence just to be harmed and slaughtered.

Mathematics

Mathematics, like most things, exists on a spectrum with most intelligent animals having the ability to count to low numbers (this is well demonstrated in many birds). Likewise, if specifying some arbitrary standard of advanced mathematics, many humans will fall below that standard.

Language

Verbal and non-verbal symbolic communication is widely recognized in social animals and even non-social ones. What precisely defines "Language" is hotly contested, but many if not most academic definitions are intentional ad hoc exclusionary definitions designed to include humans specifically and exclude non-humans which is a question begging definition:

the principal method of human communication, consisting of words used in a structured and conventional way and conveyed by speech, writing, or gesture

If what a person means is that the trait is "human" then that person should be honest enough to just say so instead of pretending it's something else that clearly defines itself relative to humanity.

More objective definitions of language clearly include non-human centric learned forms of symbolic communication that exist across a wide spectrum of animal species, including learning some human language as found in species capable of signing or speaking human language words (such as other apes and certain birds).

More importantly, with any specific syntactical requirement there tends to be exclusion of some human language, and with any requirement there is always a limit in terms of age or mental ability. Non-verbal autistics lack language in any recognizable sense, as well as young children -- such a claim would say these people all lack any moral value regardless of their emotional capacity.

Literacy

Most people are aware that literacy isn't universal in humans, but this "trait" has been asserted before. The consequence of this is that illiterate people lack moral value, from children to those not educated in reading and writing.

Another version of this claim is "literature" which refers to the species as a whole, and should be referred to a human species membership trait.

Unspecified Differences

Failing to specify a trait, or traits (individually or in any combination), that give moral value is simply failing to uphold the burden of proof you take on by making the positive claim that there exists such a trait that makes P2 untrue for you.

In short, the burden of proof follows from those who make claims.

A person who says "God exists" shoulders the burden of proof for that claim.
A person who says "God does not exist" shoulders the burden of proof for that claim.
A person who says "I don't know if God exists" does not.

Failure to specify a trait allows only two options:
1. Agnosticism of "I don't know if a trait exists or not" and "I don't know if I'm inconsistent or not"
2. Intellectual dishonesty.

Agnosticism also means either you must also not know if humans have moral value or not know if non-humans lack it. It's important to understand that ignorance doesn't amount to a justification. I.e. "I don't know if animals have moral value or not" doesn't justify treating them as if they do not (nor does the often misunderstood Null Hypothesis which assumes moral value is present or lacking in both groups). The bottom line is that beliefs are not magically consistent if you just don't think about them. Anybody who values reason and intellectual honesty is going to be compelled to do some introspection, or else end up in a position where he or she is unable to honestly criticize any mindset provided those holding the opinion have chosen not to think too deeply about the belief.

All Exact Traits

The person names the set of all of the exact traits of the being he or she wants to morally devalue.

This is all but an admission of a bad faith argument. It's Gerrymandering ethics to draw a line around every single individual cow, chicken, etc. in every moment in time, and it's doing it dynamically because these are all individuals with different traits that change over time. This claim includes every single hair (or feather), every single molecule and their exact positions, etc.

Plus or minus one genetic mutation the cow would suddenly have moral value? Short a leg? Then the cow has moral value? This molecule there rather than here? Now the cow has value?

It's a fragile state in the most extreme, and also an argument that must be updated every picosecond for the current trait set of every farmed animal who exists, has existed, or will ever exist. Even the most basic examination reveals the absurdity -- and dishonesty -- because in order to name such hypothetical trait sets there must be a meta trait set to identify what you're even talking about -- for instance, being a farmed animal. Any honest interlocutor will simply name that meta trait set rather than pretending it doesn't exist to avoid scrutiny.