Why do animals have moral worth?
Posted: Tue Apr 20, 2021 7:05 am
I’ve been vegan for 3 years now but have come under fire from a friend (James) who is much better read on ethics than I am and so I’m struggling to defend my position. I feel that it’s the case that this is because he is so much better informed than I am, rather than because he is actually correct, so I’ll present his arguments here and I’d be really interested to hear if anyone had any insights.
A couple of clarifying points
1. We aren't debating veganism itself, rather the question of whether animals have any moral worth at all (we do debate veganism a lot too, and have often said ok lets just agree to disagree and assume animals do have moral worth, does veganism follow (no prizes for guessing I say yes and he says no), but I'd like to try and clear up this first question first and then move onto veganism specifically in a future thread)
2. James and I both picked up the term "moral patient" from Tom Regan in "A Case for Animal Rights", who uses it to refer to animals and severely handicapped humans that both lack the rationality of a moral agent. I'm not sure how ubiquitous this term is so given we both use it I thought I'd just clarify that.
My Position
The sticking point between me and James is basically this: I attribute moral worth to sentience without justification.
James' 1st response is to this point and why it isn't self evident to attribute moral worth to animals (or humans) just because they're capable of experiencing things.
His 2nd point is then defending the view that human moral patients have moral worth, but animals do not, and that this is not inconsistent.
In my welcome post it was suggested that I clarify whether or not we're talking in deontological or consequentialist terms. James is reasoning from a Kantian view however he does contest that even from a consequentialist perspective you don't end up attributing moral worth to animals.
If phrased as a question, I'm effectively asking "why should we attribute moral worth to animals (and human moral patients for that matter)?"
James' 1st point on animal moral value
- Qualia of pain is only known to be bad because of our own past experiences
- It would be more accurate to say this "feels bad" rather than "is immoral"
- Attributing universal statement of good/bad requires further reasoning
- Personal prejudicial aversion is as baseless as the qualia (i.e. we still need further reasoning)
- Collective prejudicial aversion comes from socialisation or evolutionary psychology
- Socialisation is fickle but can apply as a temporal contract (therefore can change as the contract participants see fit)
- Evolution is directed towards the end of procreation - animal compassion never helps but sometimes hinders this end
James' 2nd point on attributing moral worth to human moral patients
- Moral agents have faculty of moral language/understanding
- Quest for morality is ultimately directed towards universal moral statements
- Though moral constituency can be gerrymandered, non-universal moral statements exist on borrowed time unless assurance can be given that excluded parties will never join the included (e.g. moral patients will never have moral faculties even when given opportunity)
- Moral agents have an interest in promoting the "common good" because this is the only language that is applicable to all potential contract holders
- The exclusion of human moral patients will undoubtedly affect the treatment of moral agents - there are psychological as well as political dangers of deciding which humans get to live or die
- Human moral patients are immediately connected to many moral agents so the knock-on effects can also be felt acutely
- It is in the long term interests of the contract-holding constituency to not discriminate between humans
Conclusion
Thanks to anyone who takes the time to reply I really appreciate it. James is a top chap and I really enjoy talking to him about this even if we do completely disagree, but like I said I do feel very out of my depth when talking to him so I think the insights from some better informed people such as yourselves would be really interesting and helpful!
TL;DR
I have assumed sentient life has inherent moral value, James contests this fact and argues I must justify this from first principles. How would one go about doing this?
A couple of clarifying points
1. We aren't debating veganism itself, rather the question of whether animals have any moral worth at all (we do debate veganism a lot too, and have often said ok lets just agree to disagree and assume animals do have moral worth, does veganism follow (no prizes for guessing I say yes and he says no), but I'd like to try and clear up this first question first and then move onto veganism specifically in a future thread)
2. James and I both picked up the term "moral patient" from Tom Regan in "A Case for Animal Rights", who uses it to refer to animals and severely handicapped humans that both lack the rationality of a moral agent. I'm not sure how ubiquitous this term is so given we both use it I thought I'd just clarify that.
My Position
The sticking point between me and James is basically this: I attribute moral worth to sentience without justification.
James' 1st response is to this point and why it isn't self evident to attribute moral worth to animals (or humans) just because they're capable of experiencing things.
His 2nd point is then defending the view that human moral patients have moral worth, but animals do not, and that this is not inconsistent.
In my welcome post it was suggested that I clarify whether or not we're talking in deontological or consequentialist terms. James is reasoning from a Kantian view however he does contest that even from a consequentialist perspective you don't end up attributing moral worth to animals.
If phrased as a question, I'm effectively asking "why should we attribute moral worth to animals (and human moral patients for that matter)?"
James' 1st point on animal moral value
- Qualia of pain is only known to be bad because of our own past experiences
- It would be more accurate to say this "feels bad" rather than "is immoral"
- Attributing universal statement of good/bad requires further reasoning
- Personal prejudicial aversion is as baseless as the qualia (i.e. we still need further reasoning)
- Collective prejudicial aversion comes from socialisation or evolutionary psychology
- Socialisation is fickle but can apply as a temporal contract (therefore can change as the contract participants see fit)
- Evolution is directed towards the end of procreation - animal compassion never helps but sometimes hinders this end
James' 2nd point on attributing moral worth to human moral patients
- Moral agents have faculty of moral language/understanding
- Quest for morality is ultimately directed towards universal moral statements
- Though moral constituency can be gerrymandered, non-universal moral statements exist on borrowed time unless assurance can be given that excluded parties will never join the included (e.g. moral patients will never have moral faculties even when given opportunity)
- Moral agents have an interest in promoting the "common good" because this is the only language that is applicable to all potential contract holders
- The exclusion of human moral patients will undoubtedly affect the treatment of moral agents - there are psychological as well as political dangers of deciding which humans get to live or die
- Human moral patients are immediately connected to many moral agents so the knock-on effects can also be felt acutely
- It is in the long term interests of the contract-holding constituency to not discriminate between humans
Conclusion
Thanks to anyone who takes the time to reply I really appreciate it. James is a top chap and I really enjoy talking to him about this even if we do completely disagree, but like I said I do feel very out of my depth when talking to him so I think the insights from some better informed people such as yourselves would be really interesting and helpful!
TL;DR
I have assumed sentient life has inherent moral value, James contests this fact and argues I must justify this from first principles. How would one go about doing this?