Are You a Verificationist?

[Soycrates]

(I’ve also posted this elsewhere, but decided it would also be good here)

Verificationism’s Key Principle: that only statements about the world that are logically necessary are cognitively meaningful - making theology, metaphysics, and evaluative judgements, such as ethics and aesthetics, as cognitively meaningless “pseudostatements”.

A claim is cognitively meaningful if and only if it’s either analytic (true because of logical connections and the meaning of the terms) or empirically verifiable (some conceivable set of experiences could test whether it was true or false).

Ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, theological truths or knowledge are, according to verificationism, impossible or factually unknowable. They are “cognitively meaningless”. To reason with others on these topics, eventually you have to appeal to emotional means and can no longer use reason.

Some simple questions to test whether or not you’d agree with verificationism:

1. Do you agree with the idea that statements which are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable are worth less consideration than statements which are? (These would be synthetic qualitative statements).

2, Do you disagree with the idea that even direct observations must be collected, sorted, and reported with guidance and are constrained by theory (like “cognitively meaningless” statements are), which sets a horizon of expectation and interpretation, how observational reports, never neutral, are laden with theory?

3. Do you disagree with the idea that metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic statements are often rich with meaning while also underpinning or fueling the origin of scientific theories?

(I originally asked because the concepts discussed within verificationist principles often relate to the ways by which atheists think about and discuss the accepted formulas for reason and logic, especially as they relate to what can and can’t be known about the creation of the universe, God, and the supernatural. But this also applies as a question to other philosophers, the scientifically literate, and anyone involved in the God debate).

[brimstoneSalad]

A claim is cognitively meaningful if and only if it’s either analytic (true because of logical connections and the meaning of the terms) or empirically verifiable (some conceivable set of experiences could test whether it was true or false).

Well, we disagree fundamentally here, because I only accept definitions of things that are useful. If a definition is not useful in the sense of coherently and consistently expressing a concept, I tend to reject it as being valid.

Like 'god', it's meaningless.

Ethics are not.

Ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, theological truths or knowledge are, according to verificationism, impossible or factually unknowable.

That's absurd, they're perfectly knowable if terms are defined coherently. The only issue is when people refuse to define the terms, appeal to them being undefinable or unknowable, or some other nonsense.

1. Do you agree with the idea that statements which are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable are worth less consideration than statements which are? (These would be synthetic qualitative statements).

I don't believe such statements exist. Although some statements contain undefined terms which need to be clarified in the context of the conversation -- that's just something not being complete.

3. Do you disagree with the idea that metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic statements are often rich with meaning while also underpinning or fueling the origin of scientific theories?

No, not if they are coherent.

[Soycrates]

A claim is cognitively meaningful if and only if it’s either analytic (true because of logical connections and the meaning of the terms) or empirically verifiable (some conceivable set of experiences could test whether it was true or false).

Well, we disagree fundamentally here, because I only accept definitions of things that are useful. If a definition is not useful in the sense of coherently and consistently expressing a concept, I tend to reject it as being valid.

Like 'god', it's meaningless.

Ethics are not.

Yeah, that's definitely where the appeal to analytic terms falls flat - though some may consider something like "God" to be an analytic term, it has no practical use. But you could say that's because God is a term that is not empirically verifiable. But people aren't consistent about their definition of ethics, either, and the only consistency comes from a set group of people agreeing on a perhaps temporary description in order to carry out a debate or discussion. Just like we could define God with a set meaning for the sake of an argument, so too could we define ethics with a set meaning. Although there appears to be a lot more wiggle room with how we can define God.

Ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, theological truths or knowledge are, according to verificationism, impossible or factually unknowable.

That's absurd, they're perfectly knowable if terms are defined coherently. The only issue is when people refuse to define the terms, appeal to them being undefinable or unknowable, or some other nonsense.

Again, defining the terms rather temporarily for the sake of a debate or discussion doesn't seem to make the terms "knowable", it just seems to make them something people can agree on for a short period of time. That's not knowable, that's simply useful - it doesn't appear that any term that isn't empirically verifiable really needs to be "knowable" in the way verificationists would suggest.

1. Do you agree with the idea that statements which are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable are worth less consideration than statements which are? (These would be synthetic qualitative statements).

I don't believe such statements exist. Although some statements contain undefined terms which need to be clarified in the context of the conversation -- that's just something not being complete.

You don't believe statements that are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable exist? If you definitely need to set a definition for a term which wasn't intuitive to most who know the word, then it's not an analytic concept.

[brimstoneSalad]

Although there appears to be a lot more wiggle room with how we can define God.

Which is the key point. When and if the term 'god' ever starts converging on something coherent, then I'll be glad to accept it as such.

I don't need unanimous agreement, just something that's pointing in a direction of a consensus general enough that most of a usage panel composed of theology experts could go "yeah, I guess that's fine" instead of creating an irreconcilable debate.

Again, defining the terms rather temporarily for the sake of a debate or discussion doesn't seem to make the terms "knowable"

I don't consider them defined temporarily.

We've been down this road before regarding what is philosophy or ethics, and what I've called pseudo-philosophy and pseudo-ethics.

The terms mean certain things because that makes them useful, and the alternatives are incoherent nonsense, and not just in the context of debates.

That's not knowable, that's simply useful

A term becomes useful by being knowable. Otherwise it remains incoherent or undefined in itself, and is not a complete statement.

Like saying "god exists", where 'god' has no definition, and the meaning of 'exists' is probably not really understood by the speaker.

You don't believe statements that are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable exist?

Any complete and consistent logical statement is inherently true.

Statements that are not complete are incomplete, and not full statements.

Statements that are internally inconsistent are false.

All other statements relate to the world and are on some level empirically verifiable.

If you definitely need to set a definition for a term which wasn't intuitive to most who know the word, then it's not an analytic concept.

I disagree. That most people are stupid doesn't change the meanings of words.

Atheist might mean baby eating devil worshiper to most people, but that doesn't make it so.