Nakatu wrote: ↑Sun Mar 05, 2017 10:45 am
Is there any way I can find a more or less peaceful co existence in my internal inconsistency? I would love to read your thoughts about it!
Nietzsche does a really great job of asking what intermediary moral truth claims we have adopted to unify and make progress as civilisations through history, without as you say accepting the inherent rightness of these truth claims. In this way ethical nihilism suits really well with skeptical pragmatic consequentialism because you can't excuse unnecessary suffering by calling on an outdated moral truth claim like 'slave morality' that would keep us stuck in the past.
Where I think ethical nihilism holds more promise is if you get enough people to understand a Nietzschean-Foucoltean analysis of the insidious nature of power; when opportunities present themselves for abolition instead of just incremental welfare steps; people take it. Like self organised workers recuperating bankrupt factories in Argentina after the economic collapse, Brazil's landless workers' movement squatting unused/unproductive land, Zapatista spring building easy maintenance environmental solutions to bolster community autonomy etc.
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Cori Wong great philosophy lecturer and councilor in the Hellenistic and Nietzschean school:
Think for a Change (11): Freedom to Think Differently, or At All - youtube.com/watch?v=QZN4wI3ayck
Think for a Change (25): Truth Beyond the Status Quo - youtube.com/watch?v=C3Dh813S6Xg
coriwong.com/2010/10/17/the-problem-of-not-knowing-or-knot-knowing/
coriwong.com/2013/04/07/why-i-fear-a-fear-of-the-unknown/
Anarchism and animal liberation : essays on complementary elements of total liberation -
academia.edu/10663597/Do_Anarchists_Dream_of_Emancipated_Sheep_-_contemporary_anarchism_animal_liberation_and_the_implications_of_new_philosophphilosophy
Anarchist/Nihilist Ethics…
When we use the term “ethical” we’re never referring to a set of precepts capable of formulation, of rules to observe, of codes to establish…. No formal ethics is possible. There is only the inter-play of forms-of-life among themselves, and the protocols of experimentation that guide them locally.—Tiqqun.
In Its core is the negation (De Acosta), a response to Duane Rousselle’s After Post-anarchism (Rousselle), Alejandro De Acosta contrasts morality and ethics, arguing that the former, an example of the type of normativity many of us are rightly critical of, functions as a form of social control. More importantly, he also argues that any ethical universalism that emphasizes homogeneous ways of life in the name of a shared good is similarly problematic in its reification of this good—a rejection of transcendent morality that is reintroduced immanently. De Acosta also echoes Rousselle’s skepticism of ethical pluralism as retaining a type of universalism:
The relativist, when put to the test, must defend a universal dimension for relativism itself or else risk relativism’s own subsumption under the universalist framework. If, for example, I state that each individual builds his own ethical framework then I must account for the fact that each individual is united with others in his relative autonomy to construct an independent ethical framework. At the normative level, for example, if I claim that each individual ought to be capable of realizing his own ethical maxim then I must as a natural consequence also maintain that each individual ought to be protected against the imposition of another ethical maxim; this latter claim can only be accomplished with recourse to the universal dimension. When taken to its conclusion, then, relativism is always a cunning form of universalism [Rousselle].
In other words, the type of meta-ethical relativism invoked in discussions of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism is a subtle and insidious form of meta-ethical universalism. As anarchists, this will not suffice and so Rousselle and De Acosta advocate instead a form of ethical nihilism, what Rousselle articulates as a “belief that ethical truths, if they can be said to exist at all, derive from the paradoxical non-place within the heart of any place”
From Foucault's History of Sexuality:
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the eyes of some people it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity—the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge, if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?