Philosophical Vegan Forum

brimstoneSalad

I think you need to give some arguments, because that was one of my responses on this line of yours "Why not add additional criteria for mass, like abstract thought so that the thing with mass can understand what mass is?"

I already listed some of the things which are objectively true. What you are doing is presupposing that some of those things is not arbitrary, based on more presuppositions, and then you conclude how whatever other is picked is arbitrary.
As for your mass part...We also think that rocks, trees, etc, have some quality which give them mass....and yet, those things do not have moral value. Using mass does not go in your favor to support your claims, because it only shows special pleading. And also, I am not aware that you can get a moral ought from mass.
Now you are confusing me with late father and painting example....Should we be moral? And what do you mean by "good"?

And as for the abortion part and problems. First one, in short, is there to point out the absurdity of thinking that pile of tissue is something of the already mentioned things, but the unborn human is not.
And second problem is criticism of your reasoning. values/interests needs to be actualized (unborn didnt actualize it) for moral value, but any further actualization of those things is not required. Humans can be in coma, or dead, and there is no more actualization of those things, but moral value remains. That really looks like a double standard to me and something arbitrary.

It is irrelevant if it is arbitrary, i was giving an example and same follows with driver's license , drinking age, being a murderer, etc.
If quality of having interests gives moral value, then i dont see how more interests (it is still the same quality as before) gives more moral value.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 am I think you need to give some arguments, because that was one of my responses on this line of yours "Why not add additional criteria for mass, like abstract thought so that the thing with mass can understand what mass is?"

I did.
When considering any measurement, you can't just arbitrarily take on an unrelated quality as a condition.

Your claim for how it was related was tenuous, and applies equally to ANY measurement.

You said abstract thought is related to morality because it's required to understand morality. Well, it's required to understand mass too.
Some quality being required to understand another does not make it part of that latter quality.

You may be confusing moral value with moral agency.
You do need abstract thought in order to be a moral agent.

Is your claim that only moral agents can have moral value? That is the belief of Randian Objectivists.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amWhat you are doing is presupposing that some of those things is not arbitrary, based on more presuppositions, and then you conclude how whatever other is picked is arbitrary.

I'm not presupposing anything. I explained clearly why consideration of others' interests is a non-arbitrary basis for an objective value system.

What part of that explanation do you not agree with?

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amAs for your mass part...We also think that rocks, trees, etc, have some quality which give them mass....and yet, those things do not have moral value.

So you're just not following this conversation at all.

Some things have mass based on certain qualities. Some things do not have mass ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massless_particle )
Some things have moral value based on certain qualities (different qualities than those that give mass). Some things do not have moral value.

Do you believe it's objective to say rocks and trees have MASS? Or is it special pleading to say they have mass because it's not "independent of humans"?

That's the question.

This is what you claimed:

McLovin wrote:And if you dont support that with something independent of humans which corresponds with that quality, then there is special pleading.

Again: What is "Independent of humans"??

If that kind of claim can be used to dismiss the objectivity of mass or mathematics, then it's not a useful distinction. Explain how your claim is NOT applicable to dismissing the objectivity of mass if queried of it.

In order for you to make an argument you will need to show ONE claim that works to dismiss the objectivity of morality, but is not applicable to other things like mass or mathematics. That's the litmus test for whether your argument is valid or not.

Something having mass does not mean it has moral value obviously, but if not being "independent of humans" makes morality subjective and special pleading, then it does the same to mass and thus is obviously not a valid argument against morality.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amUsing mass does not go in your favor to support your claims, because it only shows special pleading. And also, I am not aware that you can get a moral ought from mass.

This just indicates that you didn't understand the argument at all.
You're the one using special pleading by making an argument against the objectivity of morality which you would reject against the objectivity of mass. See above.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amShould we be moral?

This has to do with binding force.
And that's actually a good question.

It's easy to say "If we want to be moral, we should do X"
Or "We [morally] ought to do X"

But what makes a person want to be moral in the first place?
This question, however, is not directly related to the topic at hand. The issue here is whether objective morality is something coherent at all as an evaluation (not that it has binding force).

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amAnd what do you mean by "good"?

Good consequences, as assessed by fulfilling interests.
You should look into preference utilitarianism if you don't understand what that means.

Here's a summary:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preference_utilitarianism

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amAnd as for the abortion part and problems. First one, in short, is there to point out the absurdity of thinking that pile of tissue is something of the already mentioned things, but the unborn human is not.

What?

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 am And second problem is criticism of your reasoning. values/interests needs to be actualized (unborn didnt actualize it) for moral value, but any further actualization of those things is not required. Humans can be in coma, or dead, and there is no more actualization of those things, but moral value remains. That really looks like a double standard to me and something arbitrary.

It could be a GOOD thing to bring a being into the world who will then appreciate your doing so and actualize the interest retrospectively.

However, you can't violate an interest that never was or never would become. If the fetus is aborted it will never be interested in existing, so again you can't violate an interest that never was and never will be.

So, the wrong of abortion is more of a failure to do something good, rather than an act of doing something bad. They're comparable in some ways.
If you have the ability to do something good, and it's not so hard for you, then you should.
For example, if somebody is drowning and you can throw a life preserver into the water to save them, you should do that. If you do nothing, or go out of your way to avoid helping the person, that's indicative of a bad character.

We can discuss this more if you want, but try not to make assumptions about my position.
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?t=2215

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amIt is irrelevant if it is arbitrary,

No, arbitrarity vs objectivity is the ENTIRE point. If something is inherently arbitrary, obviously it's not a viable consideration.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 ami was giving an example and same follows with driver's license , drinking age, being a murderer, etc.

Drinking age is arbitrary too. The others aren't.

There are various classes of drivers licenses which are based on skill and demonstrated proficiency.
Likewise with murder, there are lesser and higher degrees of murder based on malice and intent.

These things are categorized into discrete levels for pragmatic reasons, but they represent spectra of skill or wrongdoing respectively.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 08, 2018 5:26 amIf quality of having interests gives moral value, then i dont see how more interests (it is still the same quality as before) gives more moral value.

It's the interests we are concerned about, like with a drivers license it's the ability to drive we're concerned about.
If we are concerned with violating interests, then having more interests to violate would make something of more concern.

You kill a being with one interest, you violate that one interest. You kill a being with a hundred interests, you probably violate almost all of those interests (any that can't be fulfilled well being dead).

brimstoneSalad

it is required to understand mass, but not for mass. Abstract thinking is needed for morality, to be moral and immoral, to practice it, etc, unless, you think that non human animals can be moral and immoral and practice morality, have moral responsibility, etc.

You said when we talk about morality, we fundamentally talk about value systems. Define me value system and show me connection with that and quality to have interests/values/preferences.
Then....i never said that everything has mass, so i see no point to your link. You said "We think we have some quality which gives us mass. Can we support that with something independent of humans?" Humans are not needed for things to have mass, so mass of things is not dependent on humans, what makes some object have mass are not humans and their thinking about it, but something what exist independent of humans.
On the other hand, your whole case rests on the circularity....appeal to the qualities humans have, conclude that humans gain something (which does not exist as a thing in this universe, independent of humans) because they are humans.

I didnt ask you what should i do if I want to be moral, I asked you should I/we be moral?
So good would be both destroying the painting and not destroying the painting. Good would be also be raping someone.
You didnt show me how do you deal with conflicting interests, which obviously exists.

My friend, you are making assumptions about my position and me for some time and also throw some mention and comparison like Creationists. But other than that, I am not making assumptions, I am criticizing your reasoning, because you have double standard and arbitrariness there.
I will try again. for moral value, interests have to be actualized, must exist, it is not just enough to have potential for interests, there must be interests. And after some interest has been actualized, no further actualization of that interest is required, which you showed with examples of comatose and dead people.
And in your recent post your reasoning can be used for some ridiculousness, for example, if there exist some medical condition which prevents early humans to develop in the usual rate, like having sentience, and will be developed some time after the birth, lets say one month after the birth. then, by your reasoning, If the baby is killed it will never be interested in existing, you can't violate an interest that never was and never will be. Me driving a knife through the baby would be for you like me driving a knife through a potato.
There is also some possible categorical mistake fallacy going on, but I didnt think that through too much.

If me murdering someone makes me a murderer , then no matter how many people I murder, i am always a murderer.
If me turning 18 makes me older than when i was 17, then no matter how many years pass, I will always be older than when i was 17.
Do you agree with that?

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 am it is required to understand mass, but not for mass.

Right, the same thing with it being required to understand and practice morality, but not to have moral value.
You need abstract thinking to be a physicist who understands what mass is, can measure it, etc. You don't need abstract thinking to merely have mass.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amAbstract thinking is needed for morality, to be moral and immoral, to practice it, etc,

Again, I said moral agency is something different from moral value.

To BE moral or immoral (in terms of making character judgement meaningful) and to practice morality you need some sense of abstract thinking.
That's not the same as merely having moral value.

Animals, young children, etc. are frequently amoral because they do not understand morality. That doesn't mean you can just torture them and that's morally OK, because they still have moral value even though they are not capable of practicing morality as moral agents.

Moral value vs. moral agency. Two very different things.
Just like having mass vs. being a physicist who measures mass.

Being a moral agent is like being a physicist; you have abstract knowledge of the concepts and you put them into practice.
Having moral value is like having mass; it does not necessarily require any abstract thinking.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amunless, you think that non human animals can be moral and immoral and practice morality, have moral responsibility, etc.

I already told you that you were wrong about your belief that non-humans are not capable of abstract thought. Many species are capable of some primitive moral reasoning.

That fact of them having abstract thought is irrelevant, though. You don't need to understand what morality is in order to have moral value.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amYou said when we talk about morality, we fundamentally talk about value systems. Define me value system and show me connection with that and quality to have interests/values/preferences.

A value system is a system of reasoned rules that motivate learning and behavior; it's precisely the same kind of substance (just ordered within a rule framework; a system) as unordered interests/values/preferences of sentient beings.

Again, you can not measure a value system in terms of paperclips or "abstract thought", just as you can't measure the mass of an elephant in terms of hours.
Only like can measure like; the things have to share some fundamental property. You can measure a value system in terms of values, and you can measure the mass of an elephant in kilograms, beans, or anything else you can find a relatively consistent mass for.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amYou said "We think we have some quality which gives us mass. Can we support that with something independent of humans?" Humans are not needed for things to have mass, so mass of things is not dependent on humans, what makes some object have mass are not humans and their thinking about it, but something what exist independent of humans.

The same is true of moral value. Sentient beings have values whether humans are around to measure them or not.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amOn the other hand, your whole case rests on the circularity....appeal to the qualities humans have, conclude that humans gain something (which does not exist as a thing in this universe, independent of humans) because they are humans.

At no point did I say anything like that. You're either straw manning my position, or not reading what I'm telling you.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amI didnt ask you what should i do if I want to be moral, I asked you should I/we be moral?

I know. And it wasn't a relevant question. I answered explaining that's a question of binding force, and it's not related to the topic at hand.

It's an interesting question... but it's another topic.

Why do you think this is importantly related to this topic?

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amSo good would be both destroying the painting and not destroying the painting. Good would be also be raping someone.
You didnt show me how do you deal with conflicting interests, which obviously exists.

Which has more good and less bad? Consequentialists look at the end consequences and weigh them.
Only deontologists have trouble resolving conflict of interest. That you have to ask this question after what I've already said tells me you don't know the difference between the two.

In utilitarianism, it's a number game.
You prefer somebody getting two pleasure and one person getting one pain over somebody getting two pain and one getting one pleasure. Doesn't matter which person gets the pleasure or pain.

In preference utilitarianism, it's the same but with respect to preference satisfaction vs. frustration.

For altruists, good is putting the interests of others above your own (similar to utilitarianism, but taking your own interests out of the equation when you assess your actions).

Questions of moral judgement, like binding force, are interesting, but we can only get to those after we establish what general kinds of things are good and bad to begin with.

I'm happy to discuss how conflict should be resolved, and even binding force, if you can agree on what general sorts of things are good or bad to begin with.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amI am criticizing your reasoning, because you have double standard and arbitrariness there.

You are criticizing a straw man interpretation; an argument I'm not making.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amfor moral value, interests have to be actualized, must exist, it is not just enough to have potential for interests, there must be interests.

Where did you get this? That's not my claim.
There is no interest yet, but if there WILL BE in the future, that's something to consider.

What is "potential"?

"Blind potential" with no consideration for probability is not enough, but a very probable interest in the future has moral value then (in the future), and because our actions can affect beings in the future that's absolutely morally relevant to the consequences and to the moral judgement attached to the action.

And I explicitly said bringing a being into the world who could retroactively appreciate that action can be good.
I don't know how you completely ignored what I said and came up with this.

In consequentialism, what matters is the consequences. If those consequences are satisfying interests, it doesn't matter if you're helping people today, or setting something in motion that will help children in five years who haven't even been born yet. The act is still good -- as long as you know they WILL BE born.

By your reasoning, there's absolutely no good in creating a cure for some disease that affects young children (say, four year olds), because nobody yet exists who will benefit from that cure since it will take years to make and test and get to market.

Do you believe that?
I don't believe that.

Likewise, by your reasoning there's no bad in genetically engineering some terrible virus that reliably kills everybody under the age of ten years old but doesn't harm anybody else, and then setting a release mechanism with a time delay of eleven years.

Do you believe that?
I don't believe that.

IF an interest WILL come into being, it's good to do things to help that being before it even exists.
My point about abortion was that IF something will NOT come into being, there is no future interest to sabotage.

The fact that a fetus WILL be aborted is enough to seal its fate: it is not a potential interest, because it's scheduled to be aborted.

A pregnant woman who is smoking is doing something bad IF she will have the child, because there will be a being to suffer those consequences.
A pregnant women who is smoking is not doing anything bad to the child IF she is 100% certainly going to abort it, because there will be no being to suffer those consequences.

However, and as I said before, it can be a good thing to bring a being into the world. So failing to do that good thing is in some important ways comparable to doing a bad thing. We can assess them similarly (you can even call it relatively bad, which it is).

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amAnd in your recent post your reasoning can be used for some ridiculousness, for example, if there exist some medical condition which prevents early humans to develop in the usual rate, like having sentience, and will be developed some time after the birth, lets say one month after the birth. then, by your reasoning, If the baby is killed it will never be interested in existing, you can't violate an interest that never was and never will be. Me driving a knife through the baby would be for you like me driving a knife through a potato.

It's similar to abortion, yes.
If you have prevented that being from becoming sentient, you have stopped a good thing from happening.

That's not like driving a knife through a potato, unless the potato was about to turn into something wonderful if you just didn't stab it.

You seem to be ignoring every other thing I say.

Stopping a good thing from happening is in many very important ways comparable to doing a bad thing.

Where this would be worse than abortion is that the baby is already out of the mother, so it shouldn't interfere with her interests in the way that forcing a woman to carry a child to term would.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amIf me murdering someone makes me a murderer , then no matter how many people I murder, i am always a murderer.

That's just you being non-specific, and appealing to the fallacy of ambiguity.
You might as well say you're a criminal whether you stole or murdered. These are arbitrary terms that don't reflect serverity. They are ethical malpractice.

If you were specific, you could say you're guilty of manslaughter, or first degree murder, or second degree murder, or something else where by you also unlawfully killed somebody and that has a specific legal term that reflects its severity.

McLovin wrote: ↑Tue Jan 09, 2018 5:53 amIf me turning 18 makes me older than when i was 17, then no matter how many years pass, I will always be older than when i was 17.
Do you agree with that?

I agree that you can make any kind of arbitrary cutoff you want, but that doesn't make it valid or useful to anything. It's still arbitrary.

As I said, the fact that's its arbitrary makes it irrelevant to objective morality. It does not compare. Arbitrarity is forbidden in objective evaluation.
When we deal with morality, we deal with a spectrum of harm.

It's very difficult to just say somebody is a good or bad person like that; people are good and bad in different ways and to different degrees.

brimstoneSalad

Can you define me what do you mean by moral value? I think that will help.

I dont see the connection between the two (value system and just having interests/values/preferences). Can you be more explicit?
"Sentient beings have values whether humans are around to measure them or not." So moral value exist as a thing in the universe, which is independent of organisms?
"At no point did I say anything like that." So, you are not appealing to the certain quality (having interests,etc) which, for example, humans possess, and you are not concluding how they gain something (moral value), which does not exist independently of those humans?

It goes along with artist and late father talk. Not destroying the paining which artist didnt want to be destroyed is "good", but should I do "good"?
"n utilitarianism, it's a number game." How is that not arbitrary? And I am pretty sure how that has been heavily criticized.

Your claim is that not all organisms have moral value, your claim is that only those organisms with interests which either exist now, or which existed in the past, have moral value, it is your claim that you can't violate an interest that never was or never would become, it is your claim that when interest existed at some point, it continue to exist, even though subject is not aware of it, or is dead. Put that together and you get exactly what i said.
"My point about abortion was that IF something will NOT come into being, there is no future interest to sabotage." This makes no sense. Only way this can have any sense is to disregard biology and what we know about humans.
Potential is having or showing the capacity to develop into something in the future.
"That's not like driving a knife through a potato, unless the potato was about to turn into something wonderful if you just didn't stab it." Both things have no moral value and you cant violate the interest of the potato and when i decide to kill the baby, then baby is like a potato, i cant violate an interest that never was or never would become.


So you dont agree with those two examples? You dont agree that me turning 18, 19, 25, 55, 87 years, would always be higher than 17, or in other words, i will always be older than when i was 17?

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 am Can you define me what do you mean by moral value? I think that will help.

Probably something like: That which requires moral consideration.
I think we say sentient beings are of moral value as a shorthand to say we should work to respect their interests.

The interests, though, are what we're interested in.
That said, I don't know what a sentient being without any interests would look like: I don't think it would be sentient, due to the nature of what sentience is and how it's manifested.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amI dont see the connection between the two (value system and just having interests/values/preferences). Can you be more explicit?

I don't think I can be more explicit.
Maybe somebody else reading can think of a different way of explaining it.

Value system based on maximizing paperclips = arbitrary = not objective
Value system based on the sum of values = non-arbitrary = objective

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amSo moral value exist as a thing in the universe, which is independent of organisms?

I don't know what you mean by "oragnisms".
But yes, in so far as mathematics does.

If you're trying to make broad claims about complete "mind-independence", that's not what objectivity means. We can talk objectively about qualities OF minds, the same is true of psychology.

You should read this entry. Particularly the quote below.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Alternatively, one might argue that to be a realist about some area is to hold that the truths expressed by the relevant claims are not mind-dependent. And, the suggestion would be, to be an anti-realist is to think that if there are such truths, they are mind-dependent. This way of drawing the contrast risks ruling out as impossible realism about psychology, which seems draconian. And it would immediately count as anti-realist those metaethical views that treat moral facts as response dependent or in other ways dependent upon human thought and practice. So, again, it is unclear whether this contrast lines up properly with the main issues that have divided realists from anti-realists. Nonetheless, one might rely on either explanation or mind-independence to mark an important contrast between various metaethical views. Paying attention to the stand particular views take on explanation and mind-independence inevitably helps to keep them in focus and works to mark important questions.

Whatever one thinks of minimalism, of the importance of explanation, and of mind-independence, moral realism travels with the burden of making sense of the semantics of moral terms in a way that will support seeing claims that use them as genuinely truth-evaluable. Various features of the way in which people rely on such claims in their thought and talk support the idea that they are. At the same time, though, some aspects of the ways in which children acquire moral terms and the ways in which those terms are bound up with various emotions pull against seeing the terms as simply on a par with nonmoral terms. Working through the ways in which moral claims differ from, as well as the ways in which they are the same as, other claims that people make is essential to getting a full understanding of our moral thought and practice. Whether such a full understanding will involve seeing us as having moral beliefs (and not just moral reactions) that might be true, is not at all clear. Perhaps even less clear is whether and why we might reasonably hold that some of those beliefs are actually true. Yet it is pretty clear that people do generally regard their moral claims, and the moral claims of others, as purporting to report facts, and to the extent they themselves sincerely advance such claims they seem to be regarding at least some such claims as actually true. The burden is on the anti-realists about morality to argue that that this involves a mistake of some sort.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 am"At no point did I say anything like that." So, you are not appealing to the certain quality (having interests,etc) which, for example, humans possess,

I'm not appealing to anything because humans possess it. I'm talking about interests, and humans are not the only beings to have them.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amand you are not concluding how they gain something (moral value), which does not exist independently of those humans?

Of course it exists independently of humans.
We're not the only ones with minds in the universe.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amNot destroying the paining which artist didnt want to be destroyed is "good", but should I do "good"?

That's called binding force.
It is good, but you may or may not be persuaded to do it depending on whether you want to do the right thing or not.

You are not in any readily apparently way compelled to always do good. People are perfectly capable of evil deeds, even doing them knowingly.

It's possible that a rational person would be compelled to some significant extent to do good.

As I said, these are important questions, but they're not necessarily related to what good is.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 am"n utilitarianism, it's a number game." How is that not arbitrary?

There's nothing apparently arbitrary about preference utilitarianism (at least nothing you mentioned).
Do you think math is arbitrary?

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amAnd I am pretty sure how that has been heavily criticized.

Everything has been heavily criticized, the existence of criticism doesn't mean something is wrong.
Criticism has to be valid, not just people not liking something.
I tend toward effective altruism rather than preference utilitarianism, because morality is agent focused, but you can read extensively of utilitarianism (and it may be possible that the two are equivalent when evaluated properly). I reference it [utilitarianism] because it's pretty close and helps explain the application of reason to morality.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amYour claim is that not all organisms have moral value, your claim is that only those organisms with interests which either exist now, or which existed in the past, have moral value, it is your claim that you can't violate an interest that never was or never would become, it is your claim that when interest existed at some point, it continue to exist, even though subject is not aware of it, or is dead. Put that together and you get exactly what i said.

What do you think you get?

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 am"My point about abortion was that IF something will NOT come into being, there is no future interest to sabotage." This makes no sense. Only way this can have any sense is to disregard biology and what we know about humans.
Potential is having or showing the capacity to develop into something in the future.

Of course you're making that argument.

Does a skin cell have the potential to become a fully formed human being?
Yes, given the right circumstances.
Does a water molecule? Sure. Again, given the right circumstances (incorportated into DNA, or whatever).

Potential is meaningless without circumstance. Everything has the "potential" to be anything if it's put in the right circumstances. NOTHING has the potential to become a particular thing given the wrong circumstances.

A fetus requires very specific circumstances to become a fully formed human being. If those circumstances don't exist, it has no potential.

A fetus that is scheduled to be aborted does not have the potential to become a fully grown human being, because the circumstance of being aborted is not compatible with that outcome.

If we grant something the potential to be something on the grounds that different circumstances (no matter how improbable) would allow it, then "potential" is meaningless. You have the potential to be a whale, a coffee cup, anything, and a pebble on the sidewalk has the potential to be the next Einstein... it just needs the right circumstances (however improbable).

Things can be changed into other things. Even elements can be turned into other elements, rearranged into DNA through printing technology, put into an empty cell and grown into a living organism.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 am"That's not like driving a knife through a potato, unless the potato was about to turn into something wonderful if you just didn't stab it." Both things have no moral value and you cant violate the interest of the potato and when i decide to kill the baby, then baby is like a potato, i cant violate an interest that never was or never would become.

Neither have intrinsic value yet, but they both have instrumental value (or may have).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/

As I said before and you repeatedly ignored, it can be a GOOD thing to not abort because if you choose not to, then it can become a person who can appreciate existing. Beyond that, the person also may have instrumental value in the world (birth rates below replacement are a big problem in some developed countries).

It can be the wrong thing to terminate a pregnancy because of the investment into the pregnancy, and the relative good that you fail to do.

However, if you're terminating one pregnancy in order to help somebody, and give her the chance to get in a stable situation and get pregnant again later (when ready) with a child who will lead an even better life and have more instrumental value, then that can be the right thing to do.

McLovin wrote: ↑Wed Jan 10, 2018 5:33 amYou dont agree that me turning 18, 19, 25, 55, 87 years, would always be higher than 17, or in other words, i will always be older than when i was 17?

As I have said, all you're doing is talking about an arbitrary threshold.
I don't know what you don't understand about that. There's nothing magical about the number "17" that makes all larger numbers fall into a morally relevant higher category.

Why do you think this is remotely relevant to the discussion at hand?

Brimstone Salad

Are animals capable for moral consideration? Do animals even understand the concept of morality and other concepts which are tied to it?
And as for your second paragraph. If a being is sentient being, then it will still be sentient being even though it temporally lacks sentience.

Sheer existence of values does not necessarily give system of values, especially not reasoned system of rules.

You attempted to make a case for your position by using mass and i pointed out that objects have mass because of the things/matter which exist independently of those objects. But that is not same as for moral value, because moral value is not matter, right? Things are not made out of moral value?
"But yes, in so far as mathematics does." So, moral value is an abstract thing?

"and humans are not the only beings to have them." I mentioned before that for the sake of example and discussion we will talk about humans.
"We're not the only ones with minds in the universe." I dont see how is this related to the thing I said.
"As I said, these are important questions, but they're not necessarily related to what good is." It is related to the whole discussion of artist and my example of late father.
"Do you think math is arbitrary?" No, but application of it might be.

"What do you think you get?" The thing you said is a straw man.

":lol: Of course you're making that argument." I didnt make an argument. You asked me what is potential and and I answered you and what you just said is missing the point, by mile.

"Neither have intrinsic value yet, but they both have instrumental value (or may have)." So it is true that when I want to drive my knife through the baby from the hypothetical, the baby is like a potato then?

It is an analogy, what you think it is arbitrary is irrelevant, because I am using things in everyday life as examples to show something. Do me a favor and for a moment forget that we are talking about moral value and just imagine that I asked you the question i asked you. What would be the answer?

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm Are animals capable for moral consideration? Do animals even understand the concept of morality and other concepts which are tied to it?

Some may be. But it doesn't matter, because understanding morality is not a requirement for having your interests taken into account by others as those others practice morality.

Many humans also do not correctly understand morality. It doesn't make them valueless.

Is it permissible for me to torture and kill you just because you misunderstand morality? No.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmAnd as for your second paragraph. If a being is sentient being, then it will still be sentient being even though it temporally lacks sentience.

If it currently lacks sentience, it will not be sentient at that time.
If sense experience is what is valuable, then at THAT time it has no value.

That should be pretty obvious. In that moment it is not a sentient being, although it may be of the type of being that is normally sentient most of the time: what is typical is relevant to what we call things, but it's irrelevant to experience in those times that don't qualify.

A sentient being is not always sentient in the way a flying squirrel is obviously not always in a state of flying.
We're making generalizations for practicality.
You're trying to play word games here. I'm not going to play your word games.
If you can't understand this issue, you may not be able to have this conversation.

If sense experience is all that has value, then beings which are typically sentient have no value during the periods they are not sentient.
If you're talking about ability or potential, then that must be conditioned on the circumstances present, otherwise everything has that ability/potential.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmSheer existence of values does not necessarily give system of values, especially not reasoned system of rules.

It doesn't necessitate it on its own, but if you want to build a system of values you need to start somewhere.
If you want to build a house -- a physical structure -- you make it out of bricks -- a physical thing, and not from values. If you want to build a value system, you need to construct it from values, not bricks.

You build a thing out of the same category of substance or concept that thing it.
It makes no more sense to build a value system of bricks than to build a house from values.
Do you understand that?

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmYou attempted to make a case for your position by using mass and i pointed out that objects have mass because of the things/matter which exist independently of those objects. But that is not same as for moral value, because moral value is not matter, right? Things are not made out of moral value?

Things are not made from values of any kind.
Things of substance are made from other things of substance.
Value systems are made from values.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm"But yes, in so far as mathematics does." So, moral value is an abstract thing?

Somewhat, yes. It's a configuration of information. It does relate to physical reality through interests -- not from human minds specifically, but any mind which has an interest. Just as we can talk meaningfully of the mental or computational process of adding, subtracting, dividing, we can talk about pleasure, pain, and interests.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm"and humans are not the only beings to have them." I mentioned before that for the sake of example and discussion we will talk about humans.

If we talk only about humans, you'll make claims of "antropomorphism"
That's not what's happening here.

It has to do with minds, not human minds.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmIt is related to the whole discussion of artist and my example of late father.

Not really.
Why do you think it's related?

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm"Do you think math is arbitrary?" No, but application of it might be.

If somebody decides to use mathematics to determine the answer to a mathematical problem, and does it correctly, that person is mathematically right. If somebody arbitrary decides to guess at the answer instead, and guesses wrong, then that person is mathematically wrong.

Likewise, if you apply morality correctly and do the right thing, you are morally right. If you do the wrong thing, you're morally wrong. Like math, you can also be wrong to varying degrees (just a little off in your decimal places because you messed up a significant figure, or off by orders of magnitude).

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm"What do you think you get?" The thing you said is a straw man.

What was?

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm":lol: Of course you're making that argument." I didnt make an argument. You asked me what is potential and and I answered you and what you just said is missing the point, by mile.

You made claims about what potential is, and your claims are incoherent.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pm"Neither have intrinsic value yet, but they both have instrumental value (or may have)." So it is true that when I want to drive my knife through the baby from the hypothetical, the baby is like a potato then?

If it was a magical potato that was about to turn into a cure for cancer if you didn't stab it.
Yes, it's just like stabbing a magical potato, thus preventing some great thing from happening for no good reason.
Either way you'd be an asshole.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmIt is an analogy, what you think it is arbitrary is irrelevant,

It's not what I think is arbitrary. What is or is not arbitrary isn't a matter of opinion.
And what is actually arbitrary or not is the most important point of determining objective morality.

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmbecause I am using things in everyday life as examples to show something.

Magical potatoes and children who are born without brains and then suddenly develop them are part of every day life for you?

McLovin wrote: ↑Sun Jan 21, 2018 7:13 pmDo me a favor and for a moment forget that we are talking about moral value and just imagine that I asked you the question i asked you. What would be the answer?

What question? This whole conversation is about morality. I'm not really interested in derailing it and discussing cooking.

brimstoneSalad

Who can morally consider anything? Obviously not those which do not understand what is morality. Do you agree?

"If it currently lacks sentience, it will not be sentient at that time." it would not be able to actualize it, but it is still sentient being.
"If sense experience is what is valuable, then at THAT time it has no value." No. it makes no sense. " at THAT time" is arbitrary, it is something what is solely based on your ideology and has no persuasive power to anyone else who is not sharing your ideology.

So, for "building" system of values you need an agent who knows what it is doing and what it is "building". What, again, go in the direction of the abstract thought.

"Things are not made from values of any kind." I never said they were, I was pointing out that you made bad analogy with whole talk about mass.

"not from human minds specifically, but any mind which has an interest." How are you getting to that conclusion?

"If we talk only about humans, you'll make claims of "antropomorphism"" Nope. It is just an example.

"Why do you think it's related?" Because I was talking about it and making a case in response on your example.

"Likewise, if you apply morality correctly and do the right thing, you are morally right..." What this has to do with the thing i wrote?

"What was?" This:
"And second problem is criticism of your reasoning. values/interests needs to be actualized (unborn didnt actualize it) for moral value, but any further actualization of those things is not required. Humans can be in coma, or dead, and there is no more actualization of those things, but moral value remains. That really looks like a double standard to me and something arbitrary."

"You made claims about what potential is, and your claims are incoherent." What is incoherent in the definition of "potential" which i provided?

"If it was a magical potato that was about to turn into a cure for cancer if you didn't stab it. "
No where in my question, nor hypothetical, there is anything about "what if.....cure cancer", so whole "magical potato" misses the point of my question and why i mentioned it. You said that you cant violate an interest that never was or never would become, and same works for the baby from the hypothetical and so it works for the potato.

"Magical potatoes and children who are born without brains and then suddenly develop them are part of every day life for you?"
I think you should focus more. There were different paragraphs in my messages for a reason which separated certain topics.
I know that you know what is analogy and I gave you two, two messages ago, i think.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 am Who can morally consider anything? Obviously not those which do not understand what is morality. Do you agree?

You don't seem to understand that being able to "morally consider" things is irrelevant to whether something deserves moral consideration.

I have explained this multiple times.

I even gave the analogy that being able to understand and measure something's mass is not required for a thing to have mass.
And that just confused you.

I don't know how to explain this any more simply, and you keep asking the same question after I've answered it.

A property is not equated to understanding of that property.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 am"If it currently lacks sentience, it will not be sentient at that time." it would not be able to actualize it, but it is still sentient being.

No, it's not sentient at that time.

I already told you I wasn't going to play word games with you.

The meaning of sentient is being used differently there.
"sentient being" means roughly "usually sentient" or "commonly sentient", not always so.

Sentience, like consciousness and flying, is a process of actualization. Minus that there is none.

A flying squirrel is not always flying. If moral value were derived from flight itself, merely being a flying squirrel would not make you flying at all times and would not grant you moral value while not flying.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 am"If sense experience is what is valuable, then at THAT time it has no value." No. it makes no sense. " at THAT time" is arbitrary, it is something what is solely based on your ideology and has no persuasive power to anyone else who is not sharing your ideology.

What is wrong with you?
That is not my ideology. I already explained to you MULTIPLE times that I do not subscribe to hedonism.

I'm just explaining to you what the logically consistent implications of that ideology are.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amSo, for "building" system of values you need an agent who knows what it is doing and what it is "building". What, again, go in the direction of the abstract thought.

I know what you're trying to say, and it has nothing to do with the topic at hand.

It's relevant to culpability and character; it's relevant to what beings we would expect to practice morality and be accountable. It is not relevant to which beings deserve consideration.

It also takes an intelligent agent to discover and codify in comprehensible terms the laws of physics. That means we might not expect a chicken to understand how to calculate the relative velocity of astronomical bodies, but it doesn't mean a chicken doesn't have mass or can't move.

Understanding of a thing is not the same as the thing itself.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amI never said they were, I was pointing out that you made bad analogy with whole talk about mass.

It wasn't a bad analogy, you just didn't understand that or the point I was making. You still don't.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amHow are you getting to that conclusion?

I don't know what you're talking about.
That an intelligent mind has interests (which is how an intelligence works) is true by function of the mind.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 am"And second problem is criticism of your reasoning. values/interests needs to be actualized (unborn didnt actualize it) for moral value, but any further actualization of those things is not required. Humans can be in coma, or dead, and there is no more actualization of those things, but moral value remains. That really looks like a double standard to me and something arbitrary."

If it looks arbitrary to you by this point, you don't understand the point which is to avoid arbitrarity by not putting any arbitrary material restrictions on it.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amWhat is incoherent in the definition of "potential" which i provided?

I explained it in detail, it has to do with cricumstance.

Without consideration for circumstance, EVERYTHING has to the potential to be ANYTHING.
With consideration for circumstance, things have potential limited by determinism.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amNo where in my question, nor hypothetical, there is anything about "what if.....cure cancer"

That was in my response, when I said that no, a potato is not like a baby.

McLovin wrote: ↑Mon Jan 22, 2018 6:39 amYou said that you cant violate an interest that never was or never would become, and same works for the baby from the hypothetical and so it works for the potato.

Look into instrumental value and opportunity cost. I've already explained all of this... I don't know how to do it another way.