Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[brimstoneSalad]

If you introduce the trait as being "humanity" then if the trait is absent in humans they will no longer be humans.

Sure, and I don't really see a problem with this. Or with the trait being "moral value". It's speculative, so it doesn't contradict the first premise.

P1 Humans have moral value
P2 If humans did not have moral value, then they wouldn't have moral value.

No contradiction there. It's just false that humans don't have moral value.

But what does "we" refer to in this case ?

We is a literal we, you and me, whatever that means to us.
What that means is inherently ambiguous, though. Our "consciousnesses"?

Ask Yourself thinks the "hard problem" of consciousness is actually a hard problem, and in one discussion seemed identify as a dualist.

If you consider the set of humans in the arguments and denote by "we" all the entities in it, removing the trait humanity introduce profound definition issues because the set you are left with is no more the set of humans.

It's whatever is left, mentally or physically, after taking away that trait whatever it is. "We" doesn't mean the set of all humans, it literally means us as we envision our existential selves.

He often uses that in arguments.
E.g. if your consciousness was transferred into a cow, or if your body/DNA was changed so you were no longer human.

In all of these cases, the assumption is that you stay you.

However, some people, like in the comments I posted here, call out that reasoning: if your mind was radically changed, such as your intelligence reduced to that of a cow and all of your memories gone, for many people they would not longer consider that new entity to be *them*, they (as they are) wouldn't mind being killed (as they would become) because they are essentially already dead already.

[Nightcell001]

We is a literal we, you and me, whatever that means to us.
What that means is inherently ambiguous, though. Our "consciousnesses"?

That's a red flag. You must be precise in how you define "we". A no ambiguous way of defining we would be : " The set containing you, me, and all the person I know of ". Then you can nitpick and define attributes to include other humans in your set.

It's whatever is left, mentally or physically, after taking away that trait whatever it is. "We" doesn't mean the set of all humans, it literally means us as we envision our existential selves.

That's a self referential definition : "we" means "us" ... As I understood it, "we" meant the humans.

E.g. if your consciousness was transferred into a cow, or if your body/DNA was changed so you were no longer human.

In all of these cases, the assumption is that you stay you.

And I don't agree with that. You need to define precisely what "you" is referring to. This is an other instance where AY is incredibly vague. If you define consciousness to be what's define a human so be it, but the trait "consciousness" can't be used in P2 then to avoid self referential statements.

However, some people, like in the comments I posted here, call out that reasoning: if your mind was radically changed, such as your intelligence reduced to that of a cow and all of your memories gone, for many people they would not longer consider that new entity to be *them*, they (as they are) wouldn't mind being killed (as they would become) because they are essentially already dead already.

I deeply agree with the fact that if your mind is changed in a definable way, the entity wouldn't be you anymore. Though I do not agree with the treatment that follows. I am more on the suffering part.

[DrSinger]

Yep, it's fine now. Thought you could remove the predicates H() and A() since they will evaluate to true all the time. Your statement becomes :

∄t∈T(∀x∈H ∀y∈A ((-T(y,t)^ -T(x,t)) -> -M(x)))

If we take the trait to be "have two hands" : "((-T(y,t)^ -T(x,t))" evaluate to False ( because humans have two hands ), which make the implication vacuously True once again.

I don't think this is a problem because a human can lack two hands i.e. a human could have their hands removed etc. I think it would only be an issue if you were using the trait 'human', something a human cannot lack.

What do you think of this formulation?

P1: ∀x∈H (H(x) -> M(x))
P2: ∄t∈T(∀x∈H (-T(x,t) -> -M(x)))
C: ∀y∈A (A(y) -> M(y))

H is the set of all humans
A is the set of all animals
T is the set of all traits absent in animals

I think this is better, though perhaps there are still issues. Would be interested to see you modify it to how you think it should be, if you have the time.

For anyone reading: in english

P1: for all x, if x is human then x has moral value
P2: there exists no trait absent in animals, that if absent in a human would cause them to have no moral value.
C: for all y, if y is an animal then y has moral value


edit: revised version 25th Oct (not all issues addressed)

P1: ∀x∈H: M(x)
P2: ∄t∈T(x∈H (-T(x,t) -> -M(x)))
C: ∀y∈A: M(y)

H is the set of all humans
A is the set of all animals
T is the set of all traits absent in animals

P1: All humans have moral value
P2: there exists no trait absent in animals, that if absent in a human would cause them to have no moral value.
C: All animals have moral value

[Nightcell001]

I don't think this is a problem because a human can lack two hands i.e. a human could have their hands removed etc. I think it would only be an issue if you were using the trait 'human', something a human cannot lack.

It is actually a problem, because you are quantifying universally on humans ( for all humans ) so unless all humans have no hands, we can always find one that will make the statement false.

What do you think of this formulation?

P1: ∀x∈H (H(x) -> M(x))
P2: ∄t∈T(∀x∈H (-T(x,t) -> -M(x)))
C: ∀y∈A (A(y) -> M(y))

This formula still have issues, syntactically and also semantically.

First, P1 should be of the form :
P1: ∀x∈H: M(x)
or
P1: ∀x: H(x) -> M(x)

Second P2 doesn't capture the idea of P2 in AY argument. Your P2 just means that there exist no trait which if absent in humans make the human valueless ( you need to include somehow the relation that animals lack the trait and that humans have it by default )

C should be of the following form :
C : ∀y: A(y) -> M(y)

P2 is the difficulty of translating NTT into formal FOL ( first order logic ). I can try to check at home if I still have the translation, though I went farther in making the translation match AY argument in debate ( when he maps the trait that the animal lack to humans ). By this I mean if you choose the trait to be human for example, and want to argue for an alien having the same argument against you, you need to somehow map the trait human to them. I did this by introducing a function :

F : Ts -> Ts

Where Ts is the set of all traits ( this is really sloppy because we can't effectively list the set of all trait unless demonstrated ). But sometimes you need to continue working with some assumption that seems reasonable and come back to prove what need to be proven.

If you do not care about how AY use the argument in talks/debate translating NTT is pretty simple.

[DrSinger]

I did include the fact that animals lack the trait by defining the set T as the set of traits absent in animals.

I'm not sure how I would address the rest of the critiques, so I'll wait and see what you or someone else comes up with.

Cheers for the responses, I have definitely learnt from them

[Nightcell001]

I did include the fact that animals lack the trait by defining the set T as the set of traits absent in animals.

My apologies, I glanced over the definition of the sets.

[brimstoneSalad]

That's a red flag. You must be precise in how you define "we". A no ambiguous way of defining we would be : " The set containing you, me, and all the person I know of ". Then you can nitpick and define attributes to include other humans in your set.

I agree that it's poorly formulated, but if it evaluates fine either way, that's not fatal to the argument.

That's a self referential definition : "we" means "us" ... As I understood it, "we" meant the humans.

It could, or the set you defined above. Or even just you.

And I don't agree with that. You need to define precisely what "you" is referring to. This is an other instance where AY is incredibly vague.

This probably stems from his belief in the "hard problem". He doesn't seem to have thought very carefully about existential identity.

The argument, as edited, works because sentient was added in, and it doesn't really matter how broad or narrow "we" is within "sentient humans".
If set X containing all sentient humans were changed such that the members of that set became non-sentient, set X would now contain only non-sentient humans (probably "human vegetables", whatever) and would be without moral value.

I deeply agree with the fact that if your mind is changed in a definable way, the entity wouldn't be you anymore. Though I do not agree with the treatment that follows. I am more on the suffering part.

Which is the biggest problem with the original argument. This was clarified by adding in more premises and noting that being without moral value means you won't attempt to defend your interests.

[Nightcell001]

I pretty much agree with your reply and just want to re-iterate my position on this :

If set X containing all sentient humans were changed such that the members of that set became non-sentient, set X would now contain only non-sentient humans (probably "human vegetables", whatever) and would be without moral value.

That's not quite right. If you define the set X of all sentient humans as "we", then removing the trait "sentience" to all members of the set doesn't make X contain non sentient humans. You will be talking about a different set. See : Axiom of schema replacement : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory#6._Axiom_schema_of_replacement. So that if the word "we" was referencing X, it can't be referencing the new set after altering X.

[brimstoneSalad]

That's not quite right. If you define the set X of all sentient humans as "we", then removing the trait "sentience" to all members of the set doesn't make X contain non sentient humans. You will be talking about a different set. See : Axiom of schema replacement :

Sure, rigorously set Y, defined as the members of Sex X minus trait Z, or what have you.

Or maybe X(sentient) and X(nonsentient) to maintain a coherent naming convention.

What we're talking about is everything being exactly the same except for one trait or one set of traits.
How would you translate that symbolically?

Maybe we should talk about Set X + Trait set (like sentience) vs. Set X alone (bare bones).

So that if the word "we" was referencing X, it can't be referencing the new set after altering X.

"We" would then be referencing every possible set containing every possible variation.

The question of when it stops being "We" is a good one. How wide is that net cast?
Existential boundaries are a problem, but in the fixed version we can ignore that wording and just look at the set of whatever results, and ask if it acts in self defense. We don't even need to ask what "we" are since there's a concrete behavioral premise to examine. We don't need to lean on subjective value systems.

[Nightcell001]

Sure, rigorously set Y, defined as the members of Sex X minus trait Z, or what have you.

Or maybe X(sentient) and X(nonsentient) to maintain a coherent naming convention.

What we're talking about is everything being exactly the same except for one trait or one set of traits.
How would you translate that symbolically?

Formally, without using set theory, I would deal with the traits on an instance basis. So that if humans have trait "X", you could find an instance "y" which doesn't have the trait ( no mention of it is a human or not ). That way you avoid this formal trap. Something like : ∃t: ∃x : t∉T(x) ^ ... ( Where T(x) is the set of traits of instance x)
The point is you could potentially define a new set using the axiom of schema replacement, but you wouldn't be talking about the humans provided you defined humans as having a certain set of traits.

To answer your question using set theory (ZFC) :
Y = {t | t∈X\B} ( this is a new set )

And using First order logic if you want to extract all members of the new set :
∀y: ∀t: t∈ T(y) U X ^ t∉B -> ... ( note the implication which will make "funny" case vacuously true )

The set B is the set of traits to exclude.
The set X is the set of all human traits.
T(x) is the set of traits for instance x.

"We" would then be referencing every possible set containing every possible variation.

Are you talking about the power set of the set of traits humans have ? If so it would mean "we" would reference many things and would be difficult to have it widely accepted.
Don't get me wrong AY's formulation of P2 is sloppy if I may give my judgment on it.

The idea of building axioms is to have them widely accepted if we want the argument to be accepted. If anybody can come along and says " Listen, your definition of "we" is not the same as mine so I will gracefully discard your argument " we would feel pretty terrible.

I still think a viable option here is to define human as having a certain set of traits X and let the user of the argument define his own set. Then proceed by "creating" an instance which doesn't have a particular trait or set of traits. No mention of "we" or "humans", those become irrelevant. ( the specific user of the argument would decide if he sees the instance as a human or not making sure it doesn't introduce definitions inconsistencies along the way ).

I would be curious to know what AY would answer to this. What does he define "we" to be exactly ? I do not know if he would be then pushed to remove this reference from the argument completely. He introduce P1 I think to not deal with metaphysical question of how human get to have moral value, but on the other end he hasn't provided any definition as far as I know of what he intend "we" to be. And all definitions provided here are easily refutable.