IslandMorality wrote:And then started a new sentence "Killing in and of itself is not wrong and does not need to be justified" and elaborated a little bit on why I think so with those "bald assertions".
Claiming a thing (rather than uncertainty) gives you the burden of proof.
That nobody has convinced you that killing is wrong is irrelevant though; not sure what the point of saying that was.
IslandMorality wrote:Those axioms dont come out of nowhere
Where do you think mathematical axioms come from? How about those of logic, where do they come from?
Is math or logic something we just "decide"?
They are deduced, not simply decided (as in something people just made up).
Morality itself isn't just something people randomly decide, it's a principle of behavior, in contrast to principles like selfishness or sadism.
People can decide TO BE moral, as in deciding upon actions that reflect the principle, but they can't just decide what's moral or what isn't. There is a necessary foundation and consistency to any axiomatic system people can't just redefine on a whim.
IslandMorality wrote:
I know that is what I was doing, and I meant not absolute in the sense of "it is in fact wrong and you cannot disagree with it", I meant not absolute as in the sense that you can reject this axiom if you so choose and live by other values, such as saying "in my opinion suffering is right and pleasure is wrong".
That would not be living by morality, but by a principle of immorality. A person can choose to value evil instead of good, but not to at whim redefine evil as good and good as evil.
An anti-capitalist can aspire to be poor instead of aspiring to be rich, but that doesn't make money into empty pockets or empty pockets into money.
IslandMorality wrote:
But then I would say (assuming they share my definition of what constitutes suffering) "Ok then, if you truly believe that, can I cut off your balls? Why not?"
Assuming they desire maximal suffering in the world, because those people would want to maximize suffering in the world using rational calculus. They could better maximize suffering by leaving each other alone in the short term and working together (because cutting off each other's balls would interfere with their ability to cause even
greater suffering to many more). Once all other suffering in the world was maximized, they could then begin cutting off each others balls or doing even more sustainable nasty things to each other to finish the process.
You have no means to argue against that, except by acknowledging that these people are valuing some arbitrary form of evil, and not good -- but you can't make that argument very effectively when the "good" you're advocating is just as arbitrary.
IslandMorality wrote:
I didnt say "killing is not wrong", I said "killing in and of itself is not wrong", which implies "killing is not always wrong".
If you're clear that violation of will is one of the potential consequences you aren't regarding as part of the killing alone, then as far as you are implying "killing is not always wrong" you are right, but you still have to substantiate how you came to that conclusion.
IslandMorality wrote:And I totally agree that it depends on the consequences, but I do not agree that violation of the interest of "will to live" is a bad consequence. I am of the opinion that only if suffering is induced by the action of killing, it is wrong.
Because you're only considering physiological consequences.
You have no means to assert that physiological processes have inherent value, though, so the assertion is still problematic since you can't support it.
IslandMorality wrote:Did you just basically use the "its natural therefor its good" argument, or am I misinterpreting it?
You misinterpreted it. I pretty explicitly said that wasn't what I was saying in the segment you quoted when I said evolution was philosophically irrelevant.
IslandMorality wrote:And no, that example of footstomping vs painless death is absurd as I have demonstrated multiple times.
It isn't, if you don't know it's coming. Again, people can agree in principle on something they "would prefer" in concept without having any fear of it happening, thus giving us a clear indication of their interests and preferences.
A more practical example occurs when we examine people who want to be lied to when they're dying (told they will get better or that everything will be OK), and people who would prefer to be told the truth, despite the suffering it will cause them.
If you were dying, would you rather be lied to so it happens without your knowledge, or told the truth?
Some people say "yes, lie to me, I don't want to know", other say "tell me the truth, I always want to know the truth even if it hurts".
Some people, in principle, want to know the truth even if it hurts them and they have no means to act on that truth.
If you lie to those people in that scenario, they'll have no way to know you lied to them because they'll be dead, you'll save them suffering, and yet you will have violated their wills to be told the truth -- you will have done wrong.
You will, of course, assert that it is RIGHT to lie to those people, since they have no way of knowing and it will prevent suffering. This goes to show you have no respect for the wills of others, only some notion of "suffering", even when others
choose to suffer you ignore their preferences and irrationally superimpose your own over theirs.
IslandMorality wrote:
No I am not proving that I have interests that transcend my awareness and experience. You are asking me if I think its wrong in principle. Aka if it is an acceptable action for anyone to take in my ethical framework.
No, I'm asking if you actually care about it -- if you care about principle itself, or you only care about your experiences.
Either you don't actually care about morality -- you just don't want to know about immoral things -- or you really do care about principles that go beyond your own experience. It's not that hard.
IslandMorality wrote:
That is a property of the framework, not my subjective experience.
What about this is difficult to understand?
It's very easy to understand -- wrong, but easy to understand -- however, it's not the question I'm asking.
You're misunderstanding the question entirely. How else can I word it?
IslandMorality wrote:
Ah so its a temporal sequence as in I get posed the question and afterwards my memory is erased? Odd that you asked me if I care "in principle", kinda made it seem like it wasnt a temporal sequence.
It matters in principle, because you never actually have the experience of dying.
Principle vs. Experience.
If you care about principle in and of itself without having the experience in any way, then you have values that transcend your personal experiences as other human beings and animals do.
If you don't care, in principle, about dying but only care about the experience of it, then you should answer (hypothetically) that you wouldn't mind if somebody killed you without your experiencing pain and without you knowing it's coming.
We can say your memory is erased.
We can say you're given a drug that prevents you from experiencing fear or panic.
We can say we ask the hypothetical question (and assure you that you won't actually be killed) and then kill you (breaking our promise not to kill you).
There are many ways around this seeming paradox of consent and fear/experience from the act of consenting.
But the bottom line is that you're contradicting yourself when you say you have values that transcend your own personal experiences and yet claim only experiences have value.
IslandMorality wrote:
How do you derive that? Ofcourse I care about my dog in principle. Im just saying me caring about her shouldnt hold any weight to anyone outside my subjective experience.
Why? Can you substantiate this "should"?
The artist cares about his painting, you care about your dog.
You die, and the artist takes care of your dog for you rather than letting it starve to death -- in principle, don't you appreciate that idea despite your being dead in this scenario?
The artist dies, and you hang up his painting so people can see it instead of burning it -- in principle, can't you understand that he would appreciate that idea despite him being dead in this scenario?
What's hard to understand about this? It's not that hard to hang the poor guy's painting up for him since he died. It's not that hard for him to keep your dog from starving for you since you're dead and unable to feed the dog.
You may say it's different, because the dog "suffers". Well, that means jack shit, because you can't substantiate that as having any value. The artist doesn't give a shit about your dog suffering -- he doesn't value suffering, he values art. Your arbitrarily valuing suffering is no different from the artist arbitrarily valuing art. He values art, you value suffering, same random shit -- neither of you can substantiate these values.
He should feed your dog for YOU because you valued it, just as you should hang up his painting for HIM because he valued it.
Value comes from ones interests (values being a form of interest), not from any arbitrary thing alone like art, suffering, life, death, fear, chaos, or randomly pickling things.
This infinite possible plurality of values is why in legitimate objective morality, it's
interests themselves that matter, not any single arbitrary thing somebody like you might have an interest in and declare it (due to being short slighted) THE ultimate metric of moral worth.
IslandMorality wrote:
No, thats just the way it is in your framework. In my framework both are acceptable.
Me: 2 + 2 = 4, not 6
You: No, that's just the way it is in your math. In my math both are acceptable.
Your framework is wrong.
This is the problem with all of the pseudo-philosophy and new-age nonsense today: people want to declare that everybody is right in his or her own way. That's just not how reality works.
IslandMorality wrote:
This point has been well addressed by now.
One you misunderstood.
IslandMorality wrote:
Build an actual argument with me saying its ok to destroy the painting as the premise and me lacking empathy as the conclusion, because Im having trouble making the connection.
If you empathized with the artist, you'd understand how he values his art in the same way you value preventing the suffering of your dog -- a value that transcends your actual experience, and moves into principle.
IslandMorality wrote:
Thats only if you have an ethical framework revolving around interests, which I dont agree with, as Ive stated repeatedly.
I'm trying to explain why you are wrong, I'm not sure how else to word it.
IslandMorality wrote:
Just for the record... if he feels that strongly about it and it would induce that much suffering in him, it is incredibly wrong for someone (with this knowledge) to destroy it while he is alive, or to tell him they will destroy it the moment he draws his last canvas so to speak.
Of course, and I would expect no less since you say you value experience. There's no miscommunication there. I understand what you think you believe, but you fail to understand what I do.
IslandMorality wrote:
And I said interests are only meaningful because having them met induces pleasure and seeing them fail induces suffering. (never pain by the way, suffering and pain are two very distinct things)
I have shown why this is incorrect: Interests can transcend personal experience. Even you say your interest in your dog's well being transcends your observations and knowledge of it. Why are you unwilling to recognize this?
IslandMorality wrote:
Why should they? There's an unanswerable question if I ever saw one
Then why arbitrarily value things like happiness or suffering, rather than art, if you can not answer the question of why one instead of the other?
How can you place your value of happiness/suffering over the artists' value of art/no art?
IslandMorality wrote:
I am totally aware of the fact that I have no such objective basis for judgement. There is no objective basis for any kind of value judgement.
The latter point is a false assertion. You don't understand or believe in one, but that doesn't mean one doesn't exist.
I am presenting one here, but you have yet to understand it.
The way you create an objective system of value is to ask the subject what it values, and respect that.
If you ask Bob "Bob, what do you value for yourself?" and Bob answers "I'd like not to suffer is all", then there you have it -- but only for Bob, and Bob alone.
It is wrong to make Bob suffer, because he'd like not to.
If you ask Tom the artist "Tom, what do you value for yourself?" and Tom answers "I don't mind suffering for my art, I just want it to survive me and be seen by others rather than destroyed on my death", then there you have it -- for Tom.
It's wrong to destroy Tom's art after he's dead. But probably fine to destroy Bob's art. And Tom doesn't all together mind suffering if it means his art will survive.
It's just like taste. Is Chocolate delicious? Well, perhaps to Bob, but not to Tom. Tom is an odd one, he doesn't like it. Even if 99.999% of people agree with Bob, Chocolate still is not objectively delicious. What is delicious is what is delicious to an individual. What holds objective value -- and what you should or should not do to a person -- depends on that individual too.
IslandMorality wrote:
When people say "you are an idiot with a fucked up sense of values", subjectivity is implied even though the words "in my opinion" are not present.
It's not my opinion. You're just wrong. Logically and empirically. There are objective values -- they just are not both static across all people and objective. What we should value for each individual depends on what the individual actually wants.
IslandMorality wrote:
Would end most of the things in the world 99% of people consider to be horrible
And yet as I said 99% of people agreeing that chocolate is delicious does not make it objectively so. Do you understand that?
IslandMorality wrote:
Jup that is why I get to decide to not prioritize interests over suffering in forming an ethical framework and therefor not being morally obligated to look after the well being of a painting someone else really wanted to live on after his/her death.
You don't get to decide the Earth is a flat and 5,000 years old. You don't get to decide 2+2=6. When you make claims about science, mathematics, or morality, you are making claims about reality. These are claims about things that have objective truth or falseness to them that your personal perceptions and opinions can not overwrite. Your assertions that morality is not objective are as meaningless as the same assertions made about math or any scientific fact. You have only claimed it, not substantiated it. And you are simply wrong.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euPiKKMsR8E
If you are prioritizing some arbitrary value system and pretending it's an ethical framework, you're behaving like a child who changes the rules to a card game as he or she is playing in order to always win. You basically just do whatever you feel like, and invent post-hoc rationalizations to define it as "good". It's not how reality works, and it's not how philosophy works.
The way it actually works is that every person's personal interests vary -- so do yours. If you personally don't care about your interests beyond experience, and only care about your own suffering, then for you I should only value your avoiding suffering, and I should have no qualms in killing YOU on your island because you don't care.
I agree, and never disagreed, that it could be moral to kill YOU on your island without you knowing it's coming, painlessly, since I'm not violating anything you claim to value. But that only applies to you.
For others who DO care about their lives in principle and value things beyond their own experiences, it would be immoral for me to kill them (island or not) because they want to not die at that time (although it could be moral in sum to kill them for a much greater good, that's another matter).
This is a problem of you being so caught up in your own values, and not empathizing with others who do value their own lives and don't even want to be killed painlessly or in ignorance. You fail to acknowledge that others value things beyond experience.
IslandMorality wrote:
Nope, its important because a majority agrees its important AND it is a cumulative system, as you can see in the increased prevalance of delinquent behavior (suffering inducing) in people having experienced a lot of suffering (abuse) in childhood.
The majority do not agree with human flourishing as good (we are outnumbered by cows and chickens in factory farms, who clearly do not benefit from it and wouldn't agree), but even if they did:
https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/bandwagon
It's irrelevant if 99.99% of people want it. That doesn't make it good.
IslandMorality wrote:
While the interests framework has both these things going for it aswell, the fact that it has elements that a lot of people wouldnt agree with makes it a worse choice imo.
So? If most people wouldn't agree that 2+2=4, that doesn't make it wrong.
A large number of people commonly (intuitively) disagree that 0.999... = 1
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/0.999...
Here are a few more common statistical puzzles that most people get wrong:
http://hubpages.com/education/Counterin ... Statistics
People are, broadly, idiots who do not understand basic logic or mathematics.
Is a new
mathematics that is more intuitive so that more people agree with it and yet significantly less useful and accurate preferable?
Why should the whim of the ignorant majority dictate philosophy any more? How about science? Is the Earth only a few thousand years old and made by god because most people think it is? Is that how you think science should work too?
There are good reasons why it's called the bandwagon fallacy and not the bandwagon argument.
The interests framework is objective and logically consistent -- not arbitrary like a framework based on suffering, or art, or life, or death, or chaos, or pickling things. Your framework, like a hypothetical mathematical framework that would respect the general mathematical ignorance of the public, is simply wrong.
IslandMorality wrote:
A significant amount of people, maybe even a majority, dont give a shit about trivial interests of dead people if they have no emotional connection to the person.
I'm not arguing this. It's irrelevant. You are making a bandwagon fallacy.
IslandMorality wrote:
So maintaining interests is not as universally valued as an aversion to suffering is, so to use it as an axiomatic framework for ethics over suffering is absurd.
What you think is absurd is irrelevant. Read that page on counter intuitive statistics. Is it absurd for mathematics and statistics to veer from public perception and be accurate and prescriptive of reality instead of simply descriptive of people's misconceptions and useless?
Morality is only useful as philosophy when it can tell us things that we weren't already predisposed to assume of prefer on a crude basis of emotional bias. Same with mathematics. We learn things from the study of it, and the application of logic and reason.
If the careful study of morality couldn't teach you something new you didn't already intuitively feel to be true, it would be useless.
IslandMorality wrote:
No Im being neutral. Selfishness in my framework is doing something that gives you pleasure while inducing suffering in another.
Your framework is wrong.
IslandMorality wrote:
Indeed, in your framework you have that obligation. Good luck with it!
It's not that difficult.
IslandMorality wrote:
You dont seem to understand what Im saying. Im critisizing your framework for bringing forth a moral dilemma where there would be none in mine.
Your framework is wrong. All you are doing is ignoring a REAL moral dilemma, and pretending it doesn't exist. This is about as useful as AIDS denialism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIV/AIDS_denialism
Pretending a problem doesn't exist and inventing an arbitrary ad-hoc system to rationalize that pretense does not solve the problem.
IslandMorality wrote:
Weighing happens in terms of interests. You said that interests are derived from asking the person. Bob has a bigger interest in not having that needle in his body than surviving the supervirus, all of his other interests combined thus.
And other people have an interest in not catching the supervirus from Bob. It's not just about Bob. The good of the many in stopping this virus outweighs Bob's interest in not getting a shot.
If Bob were on an island, then I'd agree with you; he can die if he would genuinely rather catch the virus than get pricked with a vaccine. However, if Bob's hesitancy is based on misinformation, we should inform him first.
IslandMorality wrote:
So unless Bob has a wife and 3 children that depend on him for their survival, which he doesnt, being the dazzling single familyless bachelor we know Bob to be, in your framework you cannot justify giving Bob the vaccine.
Maybe you don't understand pathology. Without the vaccine, Bob becomes a disease vector, and may infect others. Vaccines work on herd immunity, but viruses can evolve if given hosts.
IslandMorality wrote:
You dont get it. This is pretty much the exactly the same problem as your question of "would you mind if i swapped and killed your dog, provided you didnt know".
I get it, and it is the same issue I'm getting at. See earlier where I explained further. Your reply here doesn't make sense to me in context; please rephrase it if you think it makes a point relevant to that.
IslandMorality wrote:
And exactly what objective measuring rule do you employ in weighing those interests? And what happens if the interest of person A in raping person B is all encompassing (all they care about in life is raping person B), whereas person B has other things in life they care about.
That's a good question, and you'll see extensive discussion about that in the deontology thread along with the utility monster.
You should probably read that first.
That would be an interest based utility monster.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_monster
There are two very crucial points to understand here:
1. This applies to any consequential axiom in a direct comparison like this (by no means does it apply to interests more than anything else).
"What happens if the suffering person A experiences by not raping B is all encompassing, whereas the suffering of person B in being raped is only moderate?"
It applies to "utility", it applies to interests, it applies to suffering, happiness, etc.
You can always frame a hypothetical monster who will demand something apparently abominable to satiate its desires/happiness/utility, etc, no matter what terms those are framed in.
2. This tends to be resolved with altruistic framing (which you can see more of in the other thread, although it's irrelevant to the basis of moral value we're discussing here).
IslandMorality wrote:
Another reason why suffering is a better framework is because you cannot measure the severity of interests in an objective way. You can measure suffering by objective standards (all kinds of measureable stress indicators such as cortisol levels, blood pressure,...). Granted its relatively limited today, but it will only get better and better as technology improves.
You can measure them, actually, although it's not always simple. If I explain how, will you agree that interest based consideration is preferable?
What would be required to convince you? This post is already very long.
IslandMorality wrote:
No I wasnt. All I said was from an initial position of ignorance to which animal you would be you would not have a problem with a world where there is conscientious farming, because it wouldnt change your prospects in life. In no way whatsoever does this imply I wanna make every animal on the planet a farm animal.
If you got to choose which world you would live in, being randomly assigned, which would it be?
1. All humans, equally well off (and reasonably happy and with good lives)
2. Some humans, as above, and nonhuman animals in sanctuaries and as pets with medical care, who live their natural lives, the humans slightly less well off due to the resources needed to care for those animals.
3. Some humans, as in #1, and a substantial number of animals on farms living short lives with only as much medical care as is economically beneficial, and where the humans are much less well off due to the consequences of global warming and a waste of resources on animal agriculture, and the increase in heart disease and other chronic diseases cultural acceptance of meat consumption yields.
4. Some humans as in #1, with some animals being wild with whatever that entails, and the humans being only slightly less well off due to the loss of resources by leaving wild land in tact.
How would you rank them?
I'd take #1, then #2, then #4 (take my chances of being wild, for the chance of being better off as a human than in #3), then the last choice would be #3.
IslandMorality wrote:
A reduction in animal population is always environmentally preferable to a mere translation in animal population to a farmed context; farming is the worst of evils.
We need to use that farmland to feed our human population, and a waste of energy and resources on additional farming to raise livestock is not beneficial.
Except for the parts in bold, I totally agree with everything you said.
Why do you think being farmed (#3) is worse than being wild (#4)?
The average overall well being for humans and animals is lower in the farming scenario, since human well being is dragged down, and there's a much higher density of animals (higher chance of being a non-human animal rather than a human).
Even if you believe that living as a wild animal is worse than living on a farm (which it probably isn't), why would you choose the world with farming?
And why do you think we don't need to farm more efficiently to feed the growing number of humans on Earth?
The amount of meat human beings would have to eat in order for it to be actually sustainable would seem comically small to a Westerner. I believe you've talked about multiple steaks a week, which is an absurdly large amount of meat for seven billion people to be eating.
We could switch to something like insects, worms, or oysters. But steaks are not a realistic option.
IslandMorality wrote:
This supposed rational mind would also have to be ignorant of thermodynamics and biology.
Bald assertion
What do you not understand about thermodynamics and biology that you think meat is an efficient food source to feed the world on?
IslandMorality wrote:
Or if this society had unlimited resources so they could all afford to be so wasteful, they wouldn't allow farming of the animals at all; they'd just make sanctuaries.
Bald assertion
No it isn't, it's obvious. If you have unlimited resources, you don't take the chance of being a cow who will be fattened up and killed upon reaching maturity, you will at most take the chance of being a well cared for pet or animal on a sanctuary.
You're just ignorant if you think people don't mind being killed. Maybe you don't care about living, but others have an interest in it. Again: lack of empathy on your part. You need to put yourself in others' shoes and understand their interests.
IslandMorality wrote:
So let me ask again: Judged solely on the personal experience of pleasure and suffering from the points of view of an antilope in the african savanna and a cow on a conscientious farm, would you be indifferent to being either one?
First, your value judgment is simply wrong. Value is not judged by experience alone. I would rather not die at two years old, and most people would agree even if they don't know it's coming. You are the odd one out on that.
In terms of mere experience, I would rather be the antilope. But that's also irrelevant to the overall chance of experience. In that thought experiment, I also have a chance of being human, so I want the highest overall odds of happiness.
I'd rather take a 1% risk of being a little less happy and get a 99% chance of being substantially more happy. Those are good odds to gamble on.
IslandMorality wrote:
Its all about how you judge "worse off". You choose to view it from your own human perspective, where you are aware of time. You have future plans, dreams,... A cow and an antelope dont share those abilities.
Another false assertion from you. Animal behavioral science proves a notion of time in these highly sentient animals (it varies based on the type of animal and intelligence). Inator covered that a little. They show learning and planning (not as far out as some humans, but then some humans also only plan for the immediate future too).
Now if you were talking about something like krill, or some insects, only then you might be right.
Your notion of mammal cognition is more applicable to insects. Most large land mammals are closer to young human children in cognitive ability.
I think inator already addressed your faulty health claims pretty well. If you have any outstanding concerns on that, let me know. I'll just address this general issue of causality:
IslandMorality wrote:
No its really not (necessarily) the same. There are many substances that you can ingest safely in some quantities per certain time interval without it showing any negative effect in longevity/health, whereas larger amounts per certain timeinterval might go as far as to kill you instantly.
Some substances can be ingested harmlessly in smaller amounts. These kinds of substances are those with a
systemic or
cumulative effect.
Saturated fat, and its effect on heart disease, is an example of something you can eat a little of. That's something that has to build up over time. Cyanide, and its effect on blocking your cells from using oxygen, is another: you have to have enough of it to substantially reduce oxygenation of your nerves to cause death, and a small amount will be diffused in the body and nominally affect other cells or be bound up with serum B-12 or in other compounds.
Carcinogens are something else, and act on individual cells: it only takes one rogue cell with a small number of mutations to grow and to ultimately become cancer. It only takes one molecule to raise your risk of that (or one high energy particle/photon [radiation] or one virus).
Read up on cancer, how it's caused and formed and how it proliferates. It's not something to toy around with and advocate "moderate" exposure to.
IslandMorality wrote:
I advise you to read the last part in my next to last reply to EquaLlity earlier in this topic. (the one before the one where I taunt her with me crying about her not addressing my points)
I'll try to find it.
[found it] I don't see how what you said to her is relevant here.
IslandMorality wrote:
Completely agree, that is why Im advocating for a movement that spreads awareness of everything. A movement that tries to get people to think of their entire impact/contribution to suffering, and isn't just hung up on eating meat.
Advocate eat less meat over eat no meat.
Advocating less meat over no meat is not being honest, if no meat is better.
We should be clear that no meat is best, but that less meat is better than eating more meat (if a person is not willing to give up meat). That achieves the best effect (for those who will give it up, give it up, and keep working to improve other things too, and for those who won't give it up, become "reducitarians" instead, and keep working on other areas too).
IslandMorality wrote:
Like I told EquaLlity, me eating steak twice a week wastes less resources and has less of an environmental impact than her bringing a child into this world, all other things equal. (provided that child has what is to be considered a normal western vegan lifestyle, the vegan part not even being guaranteed despite how EquaLlity tries to raise it)
Depends. Steak twice a week is pretty wasteful, and IF her child is vegan, that child may encourage others to reduce meat consumption too, and have a larger positive effect by existing than not. Despite the thought experiment, no man is an Island, and we have influence on our fellow man for better or worse through our own behavior. An expressed idea can be almost as powerful as a silent action, or sometimes more so since it influences others' actions.
There are too many unknowns to make declarations like that about a child.
IslandMorality wrote:
How are you eliminating all the carnivores? (or if you are keeping them as pets or in sanctuaries, how are you feeding them?)
First, don't breed them beyond the number needed for pets or sanctuaries for educational purposes (for the good of humanity).
If kept as pets and in sanctuaries, for those who can eat vegan feed them formulated diets (this is easy for dogs and wolves), for those who can't easily eat vegan like cats, feed them on worms and things that are not sentient (or barely sentient). Oysters are a good option, and probably non-sentient (although need to be fortified like most food).
IslandMorality wrote:
Already talked about the problems with labels such as the bio-label in europe.
I don't know what you said about that, I just read what was addressed to me. But there are a lot of problems with organic agriculture, and anything you've mentioned is probably just the tip of the iceberg.
Are you familiar with the antibiotic dilemma?
IslandMorality wrote:
Aside from that I also advocate lowering demand tremendously by limiting meat intake to twice a week at the most. Those things are an intrinsic part of my solution being environmentally sustainable.
I understand, but that's not enough reduction. People would need to eat much less than that to make it really sustainable. Our population is still growing, and we're running out of farmland.
And why not switch meats instead, to more sustainable and less-sentient sources, like oysters (probably non-sentient), worms, or bugs?
IslandMorality wrote:
And aside from that: no, there is no need to wait till the animal reaches its natural lifespan, nor to give it complete freedom in taking care of its offspring. Thats just you moving from your deficient framework again.
I have shown why your framework is false. That's probably a discussion that needs to be resolved before it's possible to move on to how to fix things.