Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[brimstoneSalad]

"(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no sentient non-human animals have the trait and if x is a sentient being and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value."

So this is false:
Sentient non human animals lack X trait(s)
& A sentient being lacking X trait(s) would lack moral value.

That's saying that there is no trait absent in sentient animals that, if absent in a sentient being, makes that being valueless. That's at least coming very close to simply asserting that there is no trait absent in sentient beings in general that makes them valueless - or simply asserting that all sentient beings have moral value

I think it is doing this.

(it isn't quite, because it could be that, e.g. the absence of not being morally culpable makes sentient beings lack moral value [although that isn't what even retributivists typically think], but that not being morally culpable is not absent in non-human animals (i.e. they are not morally culpable) - but it's getting close).

Aren't you just rejecting P2 on that basis? We're not tying to call P2 false, we're trying to show examples of how P2 could be true and the conclusion not follow (or be the same as P2 and make it a mere assertion rather than an argument).

That trait suggests this is true:
Sentient non-human animals lack moral culpability
& A sentient being lacking moral culpability would lack moral value

And that seems like a claim that the premise is false. Or am I missing something?
Surely there are many such traits we could claim, and which could be argued independently (I don't think Isaac has a problem with that).

So let me re-ask the question with this clarified: if you understand (P2) as I've suggested here, is the argument from (P1), (P2), and (P3) to (C) (above) valid?

I'm not sure that P3 is needed or useful here.

I think it's "valid", but in a useless way since it's no longer an argument, because P2 is equivalent to the assertion that not all non-human animals lack moral value, which is functionally the same as the conclusion.

If P2 were broken up into two statements, and phrased in a positive rather than negative way, and we dropped the unnecessary premises, I think the argumentative form would be more interesting, and be valid:

P1 - Some sentient non human animals HAVE X trait(s)
P2 - Any sentient being that HAS X trait(s) would HAVE moral value.
C - Some sentient non human animals have moral value.

Seems like a simple syllogism, an uncontroversially valid argument:

Some A are B
All B are C
Some A are C

Do you think Isaac would be willing to update #NameTheTrait to that?

[Margaret Hayek]

"(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no sentient non-human animals have the trait and if x is a sentient being and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value."

So this is false:
Sentient non human animals lack X trait(s)
& A sentient being lacking X trait(s) would lack moral value.

That's saying that there is no trait absent in sentient animals that, if absent in a sentient being, makes that being valueless. That's at least coming very close to simply asserting that there is no trait absent in sentient beings in general that makes them valueless - or simply asserting that all sentient beings have moral value

I think it is doing this.

(it isn't quite, because it could be that, e.g. the absence of not being morally culpable makes sentient beings lack moral value [although that isn't what even retributivists typically think], but that not being morally culpable is not absent in non-human animals (i.e. they are not morally culpable) - but it's getting close).

Aren't you just rejecting P2 on that basis? We're not tying to call P2 false, we're trying to show examples of how P2 could be true and the conclusion not follow (or be the same as P2 and make it a mere assertion rather than an argument).

That trait suggests this is true:
Sentient non-human animals lack moral culpability
& A sentient being lacking moral culpability would lack moral value

And that seems like a claim that the premise is false. Or am I missing something?
Surely there are many such traits we could claim, and which could be argued independently (I don't think Isaac has a problem with that).

So let me re-ask the question with this clarified: if you understand (P2) as I've suggested here, is the argument from (P1), (P2), and (P3) to (C) (above) valid?

I'm not sure that P3 is needed or useful here.

I think it's "valid", but in a useless way since it's no longer an argument, because P2 is equivalent to the assertion that not all non-human animals lack moral value, which is functionally the same as the conclusion.

Sorry; I don't think that I was very clear (and I think that, consequently, I'm having a hard time following some of the above).

Here are P1 and P2:

(P1) ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )
(P2) ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∀y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )

We can re-arrange P2 in a way that may be more clear for these purposes:

(P2) ∀t ( ¬T(t) V ∃x ( A(x) ∧ P(x,t) ) V ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ M(y) ) )

In English: for all t, either t is not a trait, or there exists an x such that x is a sentient non-human animal and x has t, or there exists a y such that y is a "counterpart" of a sentient human and it is not the case that y has t and y has moral value.

Now, even if we bear in mind that 'CP(x)' or 'a counterpart of a sentient human' now just essentially means that 'x is a sentient being', it seems very clear that these are not enough to logically entail

(C) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

We need something telling us that some of the relevant counterparts will be identical to any given non-human animal. For that I was proposing (following Isaac's suggestion) the identity of indiscernibles as applied to the relevant case:

(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)

Now I'm not sure that's even enough; since it seems that you might need something telling you that:

(P4) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y CP(y) ∧ ∀t (T(t) ⇒ (P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) )

i.e. for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then there exists a y such that y is a "counterpart" of a sentient human (i.e. a sentient being) and for all t if t is a trait, then x has t if and only if y has t. (Conceptually, it's clear that sentient non-human animals are sentient beings, but that isn't baked into the logical form. One could probably clarify the logical form to show that it is in there if, instead of building sentient non-human animals into one predicate, we had two predicates, and referred to x being a sentient humans as H(x)∧S(x) and x being a sentient non-human animals as A(x)∧S(x) (or even A(x)∧~H(x)∧S(x), but I don't see why that would be necessary).


Moreover, it also seems clear that P2, even as re-arranged and with CP(x) interpreted as meaning that x is a sentient being, does not just assert that all sentient being have moral value (although I think its substance is getting very very close to that). Do you have any ideas on how to clarify / bring that out? Maybe baking more into the logical form on sentient beings as I suggested just above could help with that?

If P2 were broken up into two statements, and phrased in a positive rather than negative way, and we dropped the unnecessary premises, I think the argumentative form would be more interesting, and be valid:

P1 - Some sentient non human animals HAVE X trait(s)
P2 - Any sentient being that HAS X trait(s) would HAVE moral value.
C - Some sentient non human animals have moral value.

Seems like a simple syllogism, an uncontroversially valid argument:

Some A are B
All B are C
Some A are C

Do you think Isaac would be willing to update #NameTheTrait to that?

That's interesting, but it does seem to change the structure and force of the argument. For instance, the intuitive force is supposed to come from thinking about whether one would continue to have moral value (or be such that at least other humans shouldn't harm one) if one lost the traits that separate one from non-human animals, where the intuitive answer is supposed to be "of course!" It's also supposed to be such that a lot of the action is on defending P2 by trying out various traits and seeing how they don't hold up to scrutiny. I don't see how this argument here is much like that.

Also since we're confined to sentient non-human animals, why wouldn't you just have this as

P1 - All sentient non human animals HAVE X trait(s)
P2 - Any sentient being that HAS X trait(s) would HAS moral value.
C - All sentient non human animals have moral value.
?

Finally: it seems pretty clear that the relevant trait here is just going to be sentience or the ability to be harmed / benefitted. For someone initially not inclined to agree with this I don't see how this is going to have much persuasive force.

Just to be clear: as we've been discussing, I think that the alternative version of NTT (i.e. that Isaac is now peddling in discussions with UV and you) that tires to appeal to the identity of indiscernibles also loses its persuasive force. It just seems to me that the argument you're talking about here loses its force in a rather different way.

[Daz]

They are of the same form, which is why I used that example.

As stated before, they can remain logically consistent, however their position will justify many extreme positions that they would either eventually not be willing to accept or be so far from any rational ethical and moral sphere that their position will be untenable.

I agree that a position like

(i) humans have rights
(ii) nonhumans do not have rights

is unlikely to be compelling, but it is logically consistent and demonstrates Ask Yourself's claim that

"veganism follows logically from universal human rights"

i.e. universal human rights logically entails veganism

is false

I'm trying to understand your line of thinking here. Yes, they are of the same form, however so is something as ridiculous as

(i) humans under the age of 40 have rights
(ii) humans not under the age of 40 do not have rights

I mean it is logically consistent, but exposes how ridiculous using this type of arbitrary logic is when discussing ethics, morality and how we should treat others. One would not accept this type of logic for justification in a myriad of other contexts, so why should they accept it in this particular instance? AY has stated, and it is true, that one can remain logically consistent in their beliefs and ethics and not end up at veganism, however end up at having to accept very extreme positions that noone, including themselves if being intellectually honest, would accept and in doing so have to accept violating some groups of human rights. Or alternatively, end up at having to accept very arbitrary logical justifications for pretty much any action one wishes to choose. They themselves (call them person A) certainly may remain logically consistent and not be vegan while still upholding universal human rights. However, person B would be able to use that same logical justification in killing off and enslaving all humans over the age of 40 (as per the example above) while person A could have nothing to say about the morality of this without creating a double standard and contradicting their own logical justifications and rationale. If person A wants to say, well there is a valid reason for why humans have rights and non-humans don't and it is not just an arbitrary distinction (which they would be compelled to do if they don't want to accept such ridiculous moral and ethical frameworks), well then name the trait and lets see if it is valid. You see? One cannot choose to employ and accept arbitrary distinctions in one context but not another without creating a double standard thereby rendering their argument unsound.

As I understand it, NTT is a tool used to expose such positions and in doing so, cut through the inherent dogma most people are shrouded in when discussing the morality and ethics of exploiting, killing and eating animals. It is a tool to help people see that they wouldn't accept the logic they are putting forward in their own context or for others, hence a double standard.

So in response to what you quote above, that
"veganism follows logically from universal human rights"
I would say that if one would like human rights to not be given or taken away for ARBITRARY reasons, then yes it does in the instance you are explaining, for one would not accept such an arbitrary distinction in other circumstances.

[Daz]

Hi Daz, welcome to the forum!

Yes, because if someone is willing to accept the validity of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, they are contradicting themselves and creating a double standard.

There are two main misunderstandings here.

1. The difference between validity and soundness.
2. The difference between logical contradiction and double standard.

If someone is willing to accept the validity of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, that person is not using logic correctly. BOTH are valid. However, both may not be considered sound, because that person may accept the premises in one context and deny them in another.

Here's an explanation:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

If someone is willing to accept the Soundness of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, they are creating a double standard by accepting one premise as true and rejecting the other on no basis.
This is absolutely a double standard, 100% correct on that. But by definition is it not a logical contradiction (or at least not demonstrated to be one by any of the arguments Isaac has put forward).

You can arbitrarily consider some arbitrary standards OK and others wrong (after all, this is what happens when people choose a religion). People appeal typically to intuition/faith, but unless they are subjectivists or believe all religions/beliefs are true, they are employing a double standard by rejecting the intuition/faith of others.
However, just using an arbitrary standard is not the same as declaring that ALL arbitrary standards are acceptable: just because you believe Christianity is true doesn't mean you can't declare Islam false, even if they are based on the same kind of evidence. It's a double standard, and it's even intellectually dishonest, but there's no demonstrated logical contradiction there. It's just an assertion that one thing is true and another false on poor or no evidence.

A double standard is very a serious problem, if we want to employ objectivity in our ethics we can not permit double standards, but we need to be clear and honest about what we're criticizing here. Losing objectivity is not uncontroversially the same as being illogical; there are some strong semantic arguments to be made for the necessity of objectivity in morality, but logical contradiction has a much higher burden and it's something that needs to be demonstrated.

So, the bottom line is:

Arbitrary reasons DO defeat the validity of the argument when it refers to "logical contradiction". If the argument were changed to refer to "double standards" instead, then it would be be much stronger.

Now let's look at some (arguably) non-arbitrary answers:

Let's say they name intelligence. This would then justify exploiting and killing mentally disabled, brain damaged humans, small children, etc.. They may bite the bullet and say they would be willing to kill and exploit said humans, hence remaining logically consistent and not contradicting themselves. However most people, if being intellectually honest, would realise they wouldn't accept such things, thus exposing the double standard and contradiction in their own beliefs, ethics and moral framework.

This is very different. Of course, Intelligence doesn't seem to be an arbitrary answer, and that would be a contradiction if somebody claimed that Intelligence was the exclusive moral giving trait, then denied moral value to animals but accepted it of humans at the same intelligence level.

This is basically Peter Singer's argument from marginal cases, or the argument from less able humans.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/Less_Able_Humans

If this were the extent of #NameTheTrait you would be right, however, the argument does not take that form.
Unfortunately, as explained earlier, Isaac claims there is a logical contradiction when there's only a double standard in the case of arbitrary arguments. It may be a subtle difference, but it's also the difference between being logically valid and logically invalid.

Remember, we're not saying we agree with these arbitrary arguments or that we think they are reasonable, but if we're being honest they DO defeat the argument and show it to be invalid in form.

Isaac has also made a number of other mistakes trying to defend the exact formulation of the argument (it's hard to understand why he won't just change a couple words to make the argument valid), but I'll leave it at that for now.

Again, welcome to the forum, and we're glad to explain if any of that is unclear.

Hi, and thank you! It's good to be here
The point I am making is a pragmatic one, noone wants or for that matter would accept, living in a world where arbitrary distinctions between groups are what determines their moral value and the ethics and morality adhered to. If one would not accept an arbitrary distinction in their own context, they contradict themselves using it in another. In this regard a double standard is exposed. We cannot live in a world where an infinite amount of arbitrarily valid axioms of moral framework exist, for these will create contradictions between themselves in that world. In this sense, NTT does expose a double standard, and the invalidity and unsoundness of using such an arbitrary justification within the context of a moral and ethical framework. Does that make sense?

[DrSinger]

If one would not accept an arbitrary distinction in their own context, they contradict themselves using it in another

This is only true if someone says they reject all arbitrary assignments of moral value. It is not true if they simply reject one e.g. someone can reject the moral system

(1) aliens are of moral value
(2) nonaliens do not have moral value

without rejecting all arbitrary moral distinctions.

just like someone can accept the moral system

(3) humans are of moral value
(4) nonhumans are not of moral value

and not have to accept all arbitrary assignments of moral value, or accept 'arbitrary tho' as a category. And for those people the 'consistency test' will only expose a double standard at best, not a contradiction. Ask Yourself is wrong when he says these people contradict themselves by both 'accepting and rejecting arbitrary'.

This is why PV said to add the axiom

P3 - Arbitrary assertions of moral value are not acceptable, moral value must be justified by some relevant non-arbitrary trait.

[DrSinger]

(P1) ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )
(P2) ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∀y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )
(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)
Therefore, (C) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

Margaret are you sure the conclusion to this is ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) ) not ∃x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )? I think it is the latter, but I may be wrong.

Isnt it essentially

¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ (∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t)) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )

i.e. there does not exist a trait absent in all sentient nonhuman animals such that if a sentient nonhuman animal lacked the trait it would not have moral value

which is equivalent to

for all traits, there exists a single sentient nonhuman animal such that if it lacks said trait still has moral value.

edit: I think this would cover it

(P4) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y CP(y) ∧ ∀t (T(t) ⇒ (P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) )

[brimstoneSalad]

The point I am making is a pragmatic one, noone wants or for that matter would accept, living in a world where arbitrary distinctions between groups are what determines their moral value and the ethics and morality adhered to.

Some people would accept it, or claim they would.
Otherwise, I 100% agree with this, and as a pragmatic argument it's excellent. If we allow arbitrary moral rules, then morality is useless (this is the root of the argument against moral relativism/subjectivism). We must insist on an objective non-arbitrary moral basis if it's to have any real meaning.

But in terms of pure logic (ignoring outcome) it's not a logical contradiction... it's kind of like suicide isn't necessarily a logical contradiction either despite how self destructive it is, or smoking, etc.
We can call these things irrational in some sense, in that they don't serve long term interests, but they're not true contradictions.

This is why I've argued for the importance of including a premise that requires a non-arbitrary basis for morality (which forces it to be a non-arbitrary trait). It's a very obvious premise and one that it's easy to get people to agree with, but without it the logic doesn't follow.

If one would not accept an arbitrary distinction in their own context, they contradict themselves using it in another.

Your own context is not logically identical to another context.
This is a double standard, not a contradiction. A contradiction only applies to the exact same context.

Logical contradiction:
I accept arbitrary for my context
I do not accept arbitrary for my context

Not a logical contradiction (this IS a double standard):
I accept arbitrary for my context
I do not accept arbitrary for another context

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
That's possibly compatible with the colloquial usage which makes certain assumptions, but that's not a logical contradiction.

Accepting arbitrary for their own context is In this regard a double standard is exposed.

YES, a double standard is exposed. A double standard is not by definition a logical contradiction. These terms don't mean the same thing.

It's like calling somebody gay when the person is a transvestite. He may or may not also be gay, but it's incorrect to equate the two.

It's possible, and maybe even likely, that somebody who expresses double standards DOES believe in a logical contradiction on some level, but this is not known or proven by the double standard alone. You could be perfectly logical and hold a double standard, and just be an asshole who likes making egotistical assertions (My arbitrary rules are law because I'm right, and your arbitrary rules are wrong because you're not me).

We cannot live in a world where an infinite amount of arbitrarily valid axioms of moral framework exist, for these will create contradictions between themselves in that world.

1. We can't live in a world where we commit suicide either. Is this a contradiction? No, of course not. It's just not very rational.

2. These different frameworks create conflict by contradicting each other (note that this is NOT internal contradiction), and this is very harmful, but even if it kills us all by starting world war 3, 4, 5, 6 etc. until we're all gone, it's still not necessarily a logical contradiction. It's just very stupid and short sighted.

In this sense, NTT does expose a double standard, and the invalidity and unsoundness of using such an arbitrary justification within the context of a moral and ethical framework. Does that make sense?

Some of the things you're saying are correct, but in other cases you're using the wrong terms.

100% the argument can expose a double standard. Totally true.

Invalidity and unsoundness of the ethical framework? Not necessarily. Although such an argument can be made given a few premises (that's another conversation).

NTT in itself doesn't even make an argument that such frameworks are irrational (that's an easy argument to make), it's an important point to make by adding such a premise regarding arbitrary justifications.
It's not hard to add a premise requiring a non-arbitrary basis to morality (in the form of a relevant trait, for instance). It makes it a much stronger argument, and IF you add a premise or premises kind of like that, THEN you can call it a logical contradiction, because any other conclusion using an arbitrary basis would contradict that premise.

Does that help?

[Margaret Hayek]

Hi all,

On the topic of clarifying the logical form of NTT so as to show that the alternate version is, if made valid, basically question begging, how about this:

Hx = x is a human
Ax = x is a non-human animal
Sx = x is sentient
Mx = x has moral value
Tx = x is a trait
Px,y = x has y (or a property of x is y)
AVx,y = an alternate version of x is y (i.e. y is a way that x could be / could have been and still have been the same individual in the ethically relevant sense; e.g. an alternate version of me is someone who had my exact history but who left the house 5 minutes earlier than I did today, while an individual who originated from different gametes would not be an alternate version of me)

(I’m leaving parentheses out of predicates and relations because I’m worried that things are getting too cluttered. To further cut down on parentheses I’m going to be using the standard grouping conventions that conjunction binds stronger than disjunction and conditionals; I think it should all be clear enough)

The logical form of NTT (part 1) on the natural reading is:
(P1) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)
(P2) ¬∃t( Tt ∧ ∀x(Ax∧Sx ⇒ ¬Px,t) ∧ ∀y(Sy∧∃z(Hz∧Sz∧AVz,y)∧¬Py,t ⇒ ¬ My) )
(C) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)

Or
(P1) For all x, if x is human and x is sentient, then x has moral value
(P2) There does not exist any thing t, such that t is a trait, and if x is a non-human animal and x is sentient then x does not have t, and for all y, if y is sentient, and there exists a z such that z is human and z is sentient and an alternate version of z is y, and y does not have t, then it is not the case that z has moral value
(C) For all x, if x is a non-human animal and x is sentient, then x has moral value

Now as we all know this isn’t valid, and one can coherently accept P1 and accept P2 by being a value narcissist who holds that if one lost the non-essential properties that one has and non-human animals lack (like rationality, or moral agency, or whatever – but here we’re blocked from considering originating from human gametes, since that’s an essential property) one would retain one’s moral value, but no non-human animals have moral value because they lack the essential properties which one has.

So now we want to move to the alternate version of NTT, on which P2 talks about “alterations” (or really just differences) from oneself that can change out one’s essential properties.

The logical form of NTT (part 1) on this alternative reading is:
(P1) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)
(P2) ¬∃t( Tt ∧ ∀x(Ax∧Sx ⇒ ¬Px,t) ∧ ∀y(Sy∧¬Py,t ⇒ ¬ My) )
(C) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)

Or
(P1) For all x, if x is human and x is sentient, then x has moral value
(P2) There does not exist any thing t, such that t is a trait, and if x is a non-human animal and x is sentient then x does not have t, and for all y, if y is sentient, and y does not have t, then it is not the case that z has moral value
(C) For all x, if x is a non-human animal and x is sentient, then x has moral value
(The difference between this and the natural version is that in P2 we just drop the conjunct about y being an alternate version of some sentient human)

So now we know this isn’t valid, but what’s supposed to make the inference from P1 and P2 to C a good one (according to Isaac) is the identity of indisernibles, which, restricted to this context, is:

(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( (Tt ∧ Sx ∧ Ay∧Sy ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)

Or
(P3) for all x, all y, and all t, if t is a trait, and x is sentient, and y is a non-human animal and y is sentient, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x is the self-same entity as y

OK, so now my first question is: is the alternate version with P3 added:
(P1) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)
(P2) ¬∃t( Tt ∧ ∀x(Ax∧Sx ⇒ ¬Px,t) ∧ ∀y(Sy∧¬Py,t ⇒ ¬ My) )
(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( (Tt ∧ Sx ∧ Ay∧Sy ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)
(C) ∀x(Hx∧Sx ⇒ Mx)

Valid?

As I said, it’s been awhile since I taught this stuff. Please tell me that someone else on this forum has more recently taught or taken a symbolic logic course, and can thus give a proof of this thing’s validity (or show a counterexample, and then maybe give a fixed up version that is valid, because I think this should be pretty close). I’m already spending too much time on this and I’d really hate to have to dig up and go over my materials on this.

Second, it seems to me that the alternate version of P2,

¬∃t( Tt ∧ ∀x(Ax∧Sx ⇒ ¬Px,t) ∧ ∀y(Sy∧¬Py,t ⇒ ¬ My) )

Is dangerously close to just question-beggingly asserting the moral value of all sentient beings. To see this it may help to simplify it to the logically equivalent:
∀t ( ¬Tt v ∃x(Ax∧Sx∧Px,t) v ∃y(Sy∧¬Py,t∧ My) )
Or
For all t, either t is not a trait, or there is an x such that x is a non-human animal and x is sentient and x has t, or there exists a y such that y is sentient and y does not have t and y has moral value

Can anyone help bring out how this seems very very close to saying that sentient beings have moral value?

Now I think that I can perhaps see Dr. Singer’s point about the relevant part of P2 just saying that there exists a sentient being with moral value. If we had wanted it to be able to say that all sentient beings have moral value, then perhaps the premise should initially be:

(P2*) ¬∃t( Tt ∧ ∀x(Ax∧Sx ⇒ ¬Px,t) ∧ ∃y(Sy∧¬Py,t∧¬ My) )

This simplifies to
∀t ( ¬Tt v ∃x(Ax∧Sx∧Px,t) v ∀y(¬SyvPy,t)vMy) )
Or
For all t, either t is not a trait, or there exists an x such that x is a non-human animal and x is sentient and x has t, or for all y, either y is not sentient, or y has t, or y has moral value

Does this version of P2 help make the argument in the alternate version valid? Does this version of P2 make it clear how P2 seems to be just asserting the value of all sentient beings, and thus make the argument in the alternate version circular?

Thanks,
Margaret

[Margaret Hayek]

Hi all,

Here is my explanation in the wiki so far of the relevance of the counterexample to (part 1 of) NTT on the natural reading. Any help filling in the citations or with more examples of this (assuming you of course agree with the assessment) would be most helpful:

'''The Relevance of the Counterexample:''' On the '''natural interpretation''' of NTT, P2 holds that if one (or other sentient humans) lost traits that one has and sentient non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.), and still retained one’s status as oneself, one would still have moral value. On this interpretation the counterexample is perfectly coherent: one can without any logical confusion hold that as long as sentient humans like oneself retain their identities, they have moral value, while sentient non-human animals lack it. One can coherently (if implausibly) embrace the '''value narcissist''' view that one has one's value in virtue of one's essential properties, which non-human animals lack, but which one cannot come to lack while retaining one's status as oneself.

Some individuals faced with arguments for veganism like NTT may well be tempted to embrace something like value narcissism. For instance, in Ask Yourself's debates / discussions with the Warskis, Friend Ed, and Patty Politics, Ask Yourself's conversants seemed tempted to the view that being human (which, if understood as originating from human gametes and such, is plausibly an essential property of humans like oneself) is necessary to for a being to have moral value - at least independent of other considerations like membership in a human community [citations needed]. It is certainly true that Ask Yourself argued substantively against this view by reference to aliens (see below). But if NTT is interpreted in the natural way, on which P2 cannot consider one's losing one's essential properties like species membership, it is difficult to see exactly which premise of NTT this aliens-response is defending. Moreover, some of these interlocutors seemed tempted to something like the following response, which seems reasonable unless much more is filled in about the psychology of the aliens (or more is done to show why membership in any species should be considered morally irrelevant):

:"Humans have a moral value that other humans should respect in virtue of their essential properties such as being human, and non-human animals lack such value. It is true that humans should not want to be killed by aliens and resist this, but this is perfectly consistent with non-human animals lacking moral value and has no clear bearing on why that view is untenable" [citations needed].

Although this view may not have been clearly articulated in the debates, Ask Yourself's response seems to be to insist that it is logically inconsistent, which it is not. In this way the invalidity of the coherence of the counterexample to NTT seems to interact with the problems with Ask Yourself's defenses of P1 and P2 to make the argument much more confusing and much less convincing than an argument of this sort should be.

Thanks,
Margaret

[Daz]

If one would not accept an arbitrary distinction in their own context, they contradict themselves using it in another

This is only true if someone says they reject all arbitrary assignments of moral value. It is not true if they simply reject one e.g. someone can reject the moral system

(1) aliens are of moral value
(2) nonaliens do not have moral value

without rejecting all arbitrary moral distinctions.

just like someone can accept the moral system

(3) humans are of moral value
(4) nonhumans are not of moral value

and not have to accept all arbitrary assignments of moral value, or accept 'arbitrary tho' as a category. And for those people the 'consistency test' will only expose a double standard at best, not a contradiction. Ask Yourself is wrong when he says these people contradict themselves by both 'accepting and rejecting arbitrary'.

This is why PV said to add the axiom

P3 - Arbitrary assertions of moral value are not acceptable, moral value must be justified by some relevant non-arbitrary trait.

Well the problem here is that by simply assigning a moral system such as
(i) humans are of moral value
(ii) nonhumans are not of moral value
And then refusing to name a trait/characteristic or reason to justify the distinction made, they are not actually naming any trait but simply saying "it's just what I believe, it may be arbitrary but I don't care". Well, noone would accept this in any other circumstance, and further they wouldn't accept this logic if it were the justification for a moral distinction that negatively impacts them. And further, they are refusing to even engage in NTT to begin with. They refuse to name a trait. So, as you say it is clear they already have a double standard they have to contend with, and further it is not an argument. Not a justification at all to kill non humans. It is simply them saying, well its just what I believe. How can you engage #namethetrait if someone is not willing to even engage in naming a trait? However they still are resting their entire moral system on an arbitrary distinction which poses a serious problem for them. From this point one doesn't even need NTT to show them how ridiculous it is to argue arbitrary assertions of moral value. It should be quite easy to illustrate this point. Further, I think most people wouldn't even believe they rest on arbitrary distinctions, and inherently believe that there are rational justifications for their distinctions that are not arbitrary and as such will attempt to actually name the trait/s they feel are relevant to the distinction.