Philosophical Vegan Forum

DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 9:27 am

Point is, if an arbitrary distinction is the trait, then when explored through the NTT argument, the invalidity of such a position will be exposed.

If you agree that such arguments are logically valid (i.e. if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true), how can the invalidity of such a position be exposed?

Of course people wont agree with them, but that is because they reject the premises, not because the arguments are logically invalid.

Yes, sorry I didn't mean to use the world "invalidity" in it's strict logical sense. I meant it in the context of exposing the failed position said person is taking from civilised society's perspective, and probably their own perspective if they hold that humans have moral value. As mentioned above, AY has never claimed one can't remain logically consistent and valid while taking some pretty extreme (and unacceptable to most) positions .. The point is that NTT exposes these positions as the unacceptable positions that they are. Noone would accept living in a world in which arbitrary distinctions can be made to determine what/who has moral value and what doesn't.

He often claims that someone is contradicting themselves when they make such arguments, surely you have seen this? I could probably dig up an example.

What is your take on the claim

Ask Yourself wrote: veganism follows logically from universal human rights

His explicit position for the patty politics debate. Would you agree that it is incorrect? Since I can easily present a case where humans have rights and animals do not, without contradiction.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3QbTOL4fis

DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 9:53 am He often claims that someone is contradicting themselves when they make such arguments, surely you have seen this? I could probably dig up an example.

Yes, because if someone is willing to accept the validity of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, they are contradicting themselves and creating a double standard. For example, someone justifies exploiting and killing animals but not humans based on an arbitrary distinction, stating that humans have moral value however non-humans do not have moral value for no other reason than they are non-human (arbitrary). However they wouldn't accept this logic if applied to themselves or other humans. For example blue eyed humans have moral value, non-blue eyed humans do not have moral value (arbitrary). Therefore I can kill and eat your brother for he has brown eyes and hence no moral value. I can also milk your mother because she has green eyes and thus does not have moral value. Obviously they wouldn't accept this logic, therefore creating a double standard within their own moral framework. However, they may want to take it too an extreme and accept this logic, thereby remaining consistent and logically valid within their own framework but taking on crazy positions in the process to hold consistency. Do you get what i'm saying? If they attempt to explicitly name the trait/s that justifies the mistreatment of animals and not humans, the same process will apply. Let's say they name intelligence. This would then justify exploiting and killing mentally disabled, brain damaged humans, small children, etc.. They may bite the bullet and say they would be willing to kill and exploit said humans, hence remaining logically consistent and not contradicting themselves. However most people, if being intellectually honest, would realise they wouldn't accept such things, thus exposing the double standard and contradiction in their own beliefs, ethics and moral framework.

It seems to me you're saying if someone holds the axioms

(i) humans are of moral value
(ii) nonhumans are not of moral value

then they have to accept the axioms

(iii) humans with blue eyes are of moral value
(iv) humans without blue eyes are not of moral value.

Which is not the case, they only have to accept what the axioms logically entail. Not some other variation of 'arbitrary'. The second set of premises is a completely different moral system the first, and is actually contradictory to the first.

If two different arguments have the same logical form then yes you have to say both are logically valid. But you do not have to say they are both true/sound i.e. If you believe the premises of one to be true, you don't have to believe the premises of the other to be true.

DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 10:39 am It seems to me you're saying if someone holds the axioms

(i) humans are of moral value
(ii) nonhumans are not of moral value

then they have to accept the axioms

(iii) humans with blue eyes are of moral value
(iv) humans without blue eyes are not of moral value.

Which is not the case, they only have to accept what the axioms logically entail. Not some other variation of 'arbitrary'. The second set of premises is a completely different moral system the first, and is actually contradictory to the first.

If two different arguments have the same logical form then yes you have to say both are logically valid. But you do not have to say they are both true/sound i.e. If you believe the premises of one to be true, you don't have to believe the premises of the other to be true.

Yes, however the distinction between humans and non humans is arbitrary. And they are willing to accept this as a justified position. I have my own version of arbitrary which entails eye colour. Someone else has a version that entails skin colour. Others may choose religion as an arbitrary distinction of moral value. They are willing to use an 'arbitrary' distinction in one context but not the other. They don't have to accept the second set of axioms, however based on their logic they have no rational reason not to unless they create a double standard. As stated before, they can remain logically consistent, however their position will justify many extreme positions that they would either eventually not be willing to accept or be so far from any rational ethical and moral sphere that their position will be untenable.

If you agree that I could hold (i) & (ii) and reject (iii) & (iv) without contradiction, then we don't have a disagreement there.

Do you think if I hold the axioms

(i) happiness is good
(ii) suffering is bad

then I'm creating double standard by not accepting;

(iii) suffering is good
(iv) happiness is bad

since they are the same 'logic'?

DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 10:56 am If you agree that I could hold (i) & (ii) and reject (iii) & (iv) without contradiction, then we don't have a disagreement there.

Do you think if I hold the axioms

(i) happiness is good
(ii) suffering is bad

then I'm creating double standard by not accepting;

(iii) suffering is good
(iv) happiness is bad

since they are the same 'logic'?

They are not the same 'logic' for there are many valid reasons or traits you can name as justifications as to why happiness is good and suffering is bad. This is certainly NOT an arbitrary distinction. Hence we are talking about something entirely different. You are not relying on an arbitrary distinction. Similarly with the premises:

(i) humans have moral value
(ii) non-humans do not have moral value

one can attempt to name the traits that justify these premises. However, up to this point in our discussion we haven't discussed traits but merely an arbitrary position of said axioms.

They are of the same form, which is why I used that example.

As stated before, they can remain logically consistent, however their position will justify many extreme positions that they would either eventually not be willing to accept or be so far from any rational ethical and moral sphere that their position will be untenable.

I agree that a position like

(i) humans have rights
(ii) nonhumans do not have rights

is unlikely to be compelling, but it is logically consistent and demonstrates Ask Yourself's claim that

"veganism follows logically from universal human rights"

i.e. universal human rights logically entails veganism

is false

brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Fri Dec 01, 2017 5:28 pm Sorry, I guess I missed or forgot to respond to this stuff:

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Wed Nov 29, 2017 7:44 pm (P1) All (sentient) humans have moral value

(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no (sentient) non-human animals have the trait and if x is an alteration of a (sentient) human and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value.

(P3) if an altered (sentient) human lacks the totality of differences between (sentient) humans and (sentient) non-human animals, then the altered (sentient) human is a (sentient) non-human animal. (This resembles, but is logically weaker, than the identity of indiscernibles)

Therefore, (C) all (sentient) non-human animals have moral value

Anyone want to translate into FOL and prove or find a counterexample? It's been awhile since I've taught logic, and I'm already spending just a bit too much time on all this...

That correction doesn't work. It only shows that some possible sentient animals (that were previously humans) must have moral value, not that all of them do.

The trait "used to be a sentient human" could be relevant here to call P2 false, but it's not clear that we're talking about such traits of prior identity. The wording of P2 suggests it's only talking about current traits that could be removed (since that's not something X could lack, else P2 contradicts itself).

Great: in terms of P2 sounding like it's talking about actually taking a human and changing them, that's exactly what makes NTT NOT sound like it is appealing to the alternative reading (I was thinking of saying this when saying more about the alternative reading). What the P2 is really saying in the alternate version (which uses the identity of indiscernibles) is:

"(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no sentient non-human animals have the trait and if x is a 'counterpart' of a sentient human - i.e. a sentient entity different in some way from a sentient human - and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value."

These differences can be differences of any kind - including origin, and lacking the essential properties of sentient humans, so the 'counterparts' here have no claim on being or even historically deriving from sentient humans. Since this covers all sentient beings, what P2 is really saying is

"(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no sentient non-human animals have the trait and if x is a sentient being and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value."

That's saying that there is no trait absent in sentient animals that, if absent in a sentient being, makes that being valueless. That's at least coming very close to simply asserting that there is no trait absent in sentient beings in general that makes them valueless - or simply asserting that all sentient beings have moral value (it isn't quite, because it could be that, e.g. the absence of not being morally culpable makes sentient beings lack moral value [although that isn't what even retributivists typically think], but that not being morally culpable is not absent in non-human animals (i.e. they are not morally culpable) - but it's getting close).

So let me re-ask the question with this clarified: if you understand (P2) as I've suggested here, is the argument from (P1), (P2), and (P3) to (C) (above) valid? Can anyone] prove it or provide a counterexample? Here it is in FOL (bearing in mind that here x such that C(x) or 'counterparts of sentient humans' really just are 'sentient beings different in some way from sentient humans):

(P1) ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )
(P2) ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∀y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )
(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)
Therefore, (C) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

Is Dr. Singer's worry about P2 saying that there's no trait (broadly construed to include totalities of differences & absences of robust properties) the absence of which makes all counterparts valueless, but that there could still be a trait that makes some counterparts valueless? Could that be corrected by making P2:

(P2)' ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∃y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ ¬ M(y) ) )

That is, there is no thing t such that t is a trait, and for all x if x is a sentient non-human animal then x does not have t, and there is no thing y such that y is a sentient "counterpart" of a sentient human, and y does not have t, and y does not have moral value.

DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 7:25 am http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait#Additional_Problems_with_Quantification

Re: Margaret

I think it's important to include something about the issue of quantification, since it is a problem with the validity of the argument, and has been overlooked imo. I think people should be aware of the importance of quantification generally (most people are not, see: many of the comments on Pavlov's Dog's video)

I dont think it's possible to avoid the nit-picking tag. I doubt anyone would be interested or compelled by the rest of the article but not interested in the quantification issue. Or think that the counterexamples are not nit-picking, but the quantification issue is.

If it is easy to correct, then why quibble about it? Why not just make the easy to make correction and move this discussion / leave this discussion in the 'getting to the most charitable version' section? Given the extreme danger of this all just coming across as pointless, butt-hurt nit-picking, I would think that nothing like this should be included unless it has some important relevance to actual, important confusions people have about the argument when interpreted in as charitable a way as possible...

That said, I still can't see what the point is of this consideration of ' even if NTT did establish that there is no moral value giving trait absent in all sentient nonhuman animals that would only imply that there is at least one sentient nonhuman animal with the moral value giving trait, not that all sentient nonhuman animals have the moral value giving trait'. The suppressed premise is going in essence to have to say that if the moral-value-giving trait would be present in us so long as we're sentient, then it is present in all sentient non-human animals. Since that suppressed premise just goes ahead and links the presence of the value giving traits in us to their presence in ALL non-human animals, I don't see what the point is of uncharitably considering this intermediate step of linking it only to some non-human animals.

Also remember, Isaac put the thing in terms of generics / general statements, so if we want to fairly capture the logical form in FOL, it's up to us in formalizing it to pick the universal and existential quantifiers in a way that is as charitable as possible.

As per above: are you concerned that P2 is saying that there's no trait (broadly construed to include totalities of differences & absences of robust properties) the absence of which makes all counterparts valueless, but there still could be a trait that make some counterparts valueless? If so then it should be up to us to fix this by translating P2 so it says that there's no counterpart such that the counterpart lacks the trait and the counterpart lacks moral value.

DrSinger wrote: ↑Fri Dec 01, 2017 3:39 am I've watched quite a few of them and they're all quite similar, the opponent will name a trait, then AY will claim it's not a valid trait by using an invalid generalisation e.g. 'you wouldnt accept aliens killing you because of species' etc. and claim they are contradicting themselves. Which is what I see as the most problematic aspect of this whole thing, the defenses of P2 as if it's logically impossible to name a trait.

When he's being more careful (e.g. in his new response video to this forum) he does note that P2 is a premise, and that one can reject the conclusion by rejecting P2. But there do seem to be other cases when he just says that the conclusion follows simply from P1; or P1 and logical consistency.

Would you agree that in our notation, this is the premise AY is introducing that's like the identity of indiscernibles

∃t ∀x ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ P(x,t) ) ⇒ A(x) )

edit: (forgot it has to me more than just an animal, it has to be the same animal)

∃t ( (T(t) ∧ ∀x (A(x)) ∧ ∀y (CP(y) ∧ P(y,t)) ) ⇒ x = y)

I just went ahead and addressed this on the wiki; as it now says there:

"In the notation we have been using, this [i.e. the identity of indiscernibles] could be expressed as

∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)

i.e. for all things x, y, and t, if t is a trait, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing."


The logically weaker form is as I put it above:

∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ A(y) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)

i.e. for all things x, y, and t, if t is a trait, and x is a sentient "counterpart" of a sentient human, and y is a sentient non-human animal, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing.

Hi Daz, welcome to the forum!

Daz wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 10:22 am Yes, because if someone is willing to accept the validity of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, they are contradicting themselves and creating a double standard.

There are two main misunderstandings here.

1. The difference between validity and soundness.
2. The difference between logical contradiction and double standard.

If someone is willing to accept the validity of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, that person is not using logic correctly. BOTH are valid. However, both may not be considered sound, because that person may accept the premises in one context and deny them in another.

Here's an explanation:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

If someone is willing to accept the Soundness of using an arbitrary distinction in one context but then simultaneously deny it in another, they are creating a double standard by accepting one premise as true and rejecting the other on no basis.
This is absolutely a double standard, 100% correct on that. But by definition is it not a logical contradiction (or at least not demonstrated to be one by any of the arguments Isaac has put forward).

You can arbitrarily consider some arbitrary standards OK and others wrong (after all, this is what happens when people choose a religion). People appeal typically to intuition/faith, but unless they are subjectivists or believe all religions/beliefs are true, they are employing a double standard by rejecting the intuition/faith of others.
However, just using an arbitrary standard is not the same as declaring that ALL arbitrary standards are acceptable: just because you believe Christianity is true doesn't mean you can't declare Islam false, even if they are based on the same kind of evidence. It's a double standard, and it's even intellectually dishonest, but there's no demonstrated logical contradiction there. It's just an assertion that one thing is true and another false on poor or no evidence.

A double standard is very a serious problem, if we want to employ objectivity in our ethics we can not permit double standards, but we need to be clear and honest about what we're criticizing here. Losing objectivity is not uncontroversially the same as being illogical; there are some strong semantic arguments to be made for the necessity of objectivity in morality, but logical contradiction has a much higher burden and it's something that needs to be demonstrated.

So, the bottom line is:

Arbitrary reasons DO defeat the validity of the argument when it refers to "logical contradiction". If the argument were changed to refer to "double standards" instead, then it would be be much stronger.

Now let's look at some (arguably) non-arbitrary answers:

Daz wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2017 10:22 amLet's say they name intelligence. This would then justify exploiting and killing mentally disabled, brain damaged humans, small children, etc.. They may bite the bullet and say they would be willing to kill and exploit said humans, hence remaining logically consistent and not contradicting themselves. However most people, if being intellectually honest, would realise they wouldn't accept such things, thus exposing the double standard and contradiction in their own beliefs, ethics and moral framework.

This is very different. Of course, Intelligence doesn't seem to be an arbitrary answer, and that would be a contradiction if somebody claimed that Intelligence was the exclusive moral giving trait, then denied moral value to animals but accepted it of humans at the same intelligence level.

This is basically Peter Singer's argument from marginal cases, or the argument from less able humans.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/Less_Able_Humans

If this were the extent of #NameTheTrait you would be right, however, the argument does not take that form.
Unfortunately, as explained earlier, Isaac claims there is a logical contradiction when there's only a double standard in the case of arbitrary arguments. It may be a subtle difference, but it's also the difference between being logically valid and logically invalid.

Remember, we're not saying we agree with these arbitrary arguments or that we think they are reasonable, but if we're being honest they DO defeat the argument and show it to be invalid in form.

Isaac has also made a number of other mistakes trying to defend the exact formulation of the argument (it's hard to understand why he won't just change a couple words to make the argument valid), but I'll leave it at that for now.

Again, welcome to the forum, and we're glad to explain if any of that is unclear.