Philosophical Vegan Forum

Margaret that's exactly what I was thinking but I am not confident in my logic enough to raise the issue. Clearly if p2 is interpreted the way Isaac is now seemingly wishing it to be interpreted the argument is trivial and begs the question.

Another issue I'm thinking of is whether Isaac himself follows the conclusions of part 2 of NTT:

Name the trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would allow us to kill more humans than we actually have to for our taste pleasure without calling it exploitation.

Ie for any nutritionally adequate vegan diet A that involves any and all vegan fooditems on the market there's a much more restrictive vegan diet B that's equally nutritionally adequate but which involves far less fooditems and for various reasons (different farming practices, less water usage, less farmland needed etc. etc) it involves less animal death overall. Yet Isaac doesn't choose B. Why? Here he says "I would accept that for myself", (which is interesting because typically he asks the carnivore if they would "like" or "want" the treatment when applied to them, which of coruse is different from accepting). Yet when a meateater says the exact same thing they're being a "dishonest retard". He has also stated that he thinks it's immoral to kill a squirrel even if it's for his own survival, which makes me wonder what the difference is between killing animals for vegan tastepleasure and killing the same animals for survival that makes the former ok but not the latter.

Under other circumstances a person understands that there's declining utility and that it's not necessarily fair to expect vegans to be perfect moral agents in order for them to criticise other people who are doing far worse, but isn't that what's demanded from NTT?

Another issue:

In his latest debate, AY claimed that if one accepts the morality of aliens killing humans for foods then one has effectively abandoned universal human rigths. Firstly it's not necessary for a proponent of human rights to even go there, they just have to claim that their subjective morality is in conflict with the aliens subjective morality. But even disregarding that, one could also claim that universal human rights are to humans and for humans, they are not for lions to follow nor would the necessarily be for aliens to follow; they are for humans to follow and uphold. One can maintain universal human rights without inconsistency as long as every actual human is covered "by humans and for humans" (and perhaps every possible human in this world, but this is not necessarily the case).

Since NTT doesn't just talk about actual humans but possible humans in general, when the omnivore is "backed into a corner" by having to choose between either including universal human rights for some hypothetical human or for abandoning them in favor of consistency, the looming contradiction is perhaps illusory. Why? Because it's certainly not obvious that proponents of universal human rights ever intended for them to extend across all possible worlds; only this world.

Another way of framing the issue is asking if there are possible worlds in which there are human rights similar to our world but which leaves out some additional set of humans. Would they be universal in that world? No, but they would still be universal in this world (world A is our world, the set of humans/possible humans in world A is set x, then there is a possible world B in which x have the same rights as in A but in which there's an additional set y which does not have those rights), and there's no reason to assume 'universal' includes all possible worlds. This would have to be argued for.

Anyways this is likely to confuse the omnivore, making them assume they simply have to resolve the "contradiction" by accepting one or the other, universal human rights that includes hypothetical humans and having those apply normatively not just to humans but also to aliens, or a rejection of universal human rights. But perhaps it's a bit of a cheap shot.

Honestly I feel like the persuasive power of NTT when used in debates largely depends on confusing the carnist.

The first reason it should be valid is that it claims to be, it takes a certain form, and even asserts "contradiction" in the conclusion.
I don't think Humpty Dumptyism is a defense against using technical terminology incorrectly: with those technical assertions comes a certain amount of responsibility.
It is wrong to present an invalid argument as valid. It is deceptive. Isaac has told people that if they value logical consistency and believe humans (or just themselves) have value that veganism necessarily follows from just that, and that #NameTheTrait proves it: it does not.

If they wanted to retract the claim that it is formally valid, wanted to call it an informal argument and remove the claim of "contradiction" (replacing it with "double standard") and probably change the labeling P1,P2,C from the format, then the most forceful ethical argument against it (the deception) would go away.

If any follower of #NTT highly values honesty, they are compelled to assent at least to that, even if they do not care about logic.

By analogy, it would be equally wrong to say the third commandment (of the Ten Commandments) is "Thou shalt be Vegan and abstain from the eating of the flesh of the animals of the earth or of the sea or the air". It doesn't matter if you don't care about the Bible or regard it as important, that statement is untrue and if you care about honesty you should care about at least that.

If they don't care about honesty at all, I don't think it's very likely we can reach them.
We can try to make pragmatic arguments, but without some kind of study on the matter to prove that valid arguments are more persuasive than invalid ones and that changing their tactics could make more vegans, I don't think they would be persuaded by our arguments in favor of valid logic.

To my knowledge, we have studies on violence, but I don't know of any on dishonesty or invalid reasoning's long term effects on a movement.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Nov 21, 2017 8:08 pmPlausibly, there are some traits or properties without which an entity cannot count as human, or us. These might be having human DNA, originating from certain parents, or originating with an initial set of experiences. [...] we are envisioning humans (or oneself) losing traits that they have and non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.) and still retaining their membership in the human species (or one’s status as oneself). But in this case the argument is invalid, because one could hold the view that we might call [...]

Yes, I think that was addressed in this comment: http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/File:VirtueVeganHDR.png

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Nov 21, 2017 8:08 pm Now one can interpret P2 in such a way that the traits to which it refers are allowed to include one’s essential properties. Then what P2 is really saying then is that, if we take all of the properties away from humans (or one) that they (or one) have and sentient non-humans lack, including their essential properties (and their not having the essential properties of others), then the resulting entities (not necessarily themselves) still have moral value. Ask Yourself has argued that if one were to lose all of the traits that distinguish one from each other non-human animal, then the resulting entity would be identical to that non-human animal, so P1 and P2 so interpreted entail C.

I think I covered that in my original Bessie analogy: http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3505&start=170#p34667
As well as here: http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3505&start=230#p35001

I think I know what you're saying, but I think it's a little difficult to parse, so I believe it probably works better by analogy.
Maybe we can find a way to streamline an analogy so the presentation is very clean.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Nov 21, 2017 8:08 pmBut as we will see below, the much greater problem with the argument so interpreted is that it has essentially no rational force. P2 so interpreted is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings, human and non-human, have moral value. The argument thus offers little if any reason to change the mind of someone who does not already find this view plausible, and the defense of its premises offers no guidance on how to persuade such an individual.

Right, it gains its persuasive force only by way of confusion and (in my view) dishonesty. If it were phrased honestly and transparently, it would have no persuasive force.
I don't think it's adequate or appropriate to trick people into assent.

But Isaac and his followers may disagree. If they don't care it's not valid but claim it is anyway, it doesn't seem like employing deceptive and confusing wording to trick people into thinking the argument has some real force behind it would bother them.

I don't believe most of these people regard honesty highly enough to be persuaded that a valid argument is better when an invalid but very confusing and deceptive argument may in practice be as persuasive (at least in the short term).

brimstoneSalad wrote:I think I know what you're saying, but I think it's a little difficult to parse, so I believe it probably works better by analogy.
Maybe we can find a way to streamline an analogy so the presentation is very clean.

Do you think we need the itemized issues section? imo the Summary and the interpreting/steelmanning/Bessie sections do (or can) pretty much cover it.

edit: Would everyone agree this is the statement Ask Yourself is claiming it a contradiction?

∃x∃y: ( (T(x) = T(y)) ∧ M(x) ∧ ¬M(y) )

there is an x,y with the same traits where x has moral value and y does not.

or

∃x∃y (∀P (P(x) ⇔ P(y)) ∧ M(x) ∧ ¬M(y) )

there is an x,y with the same properties where x has moral value and y does not

DrSinger wrote: ↑Wed Nov 22, 2017 2:24 am edit: Would everyone agree this is the statement Ask Yourself is claiming it a contradiction?

∃x∃y: ( (T(x) = T(y)) ∧ M(x) ∧ ¬M(y) )

there is an x,y with the same traits where x has moral value and y does not.

or

∃x∃y (∀P (P(x) ⇔ P(y)) ∧ M(x) ∧ ¬M(y) )

there is an x,y with the same properties where x has moral value and y does not

Sure. I would go with the first version, it corresponds better with the rest of the content.

I added subsection Switching one trait vs switching all traits, if it's incomprehensible, feel free to change it I tried to be precise since I can see that e.g. if I only wrote about removing, then AY could say that he meant switching, which is irrelevant, but still somebody could think he weaseled out.

BrimmstoneSalad, thanks

I added subsection Switching one trait vs switching all traits, if it's incomprehensible, feel free to change it I tried to be precise since I can see that e.g. if I only wrote about removing, then AY could say that he meant switching, which is irrelevant, but still somebody could think he weaseled out.

Thanks, I edited some of the english

@mkm something tells me you might wanna weigh in here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LK7kE8PDau8&lc=UgzzdpcxC2ve4x30Dp94AaABAg

Margaret, not to be rude, but can you please hold off on making major changes to the article until they are agreed upon. I do not agree that the value narcissism etc. section is better than the analogy or the old summary. If you have a section that you don't want to get lost on the forum post it to a new page on the wiki and link it.

For the near future I'm going to stick primarily to substantive things about the wiki; I can return to my arguments about why I think it is so important to avoid angry well-poisoning remarks and to avoid making the wiki sound like nothing more than an adolescent dick-measuring contest, and what more I think needs to be changed to avoid this, later. But I will for now just mention this:

Have you seen this guy, AtheneWins? (see e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e852G1gyWYE). Note:

(i) he is WAY more hard-core and confusing-sounding than Issaac on “logical consistency” by itself entailing all of morality, including not only strong duties of non-maleficence but extremely strong duties of beneficence (he’s expressing ideas a bit like those in Singer’s other marvelous and highly influential argument, from “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” as well as standard arguments against the idea that reasons not to inflict harm are in themselves stronger than reasons to prevent harm, but then he confusingly claims that intentions are all that matter and that all of this follows form logical consistency anyway; whew!). It is true that English is not this guy’s native language, but he seems extremely fluent, and I think that he knows what he’s saying at least as much as Isaac,

(ii) he has an astronomically greater number of subs than Isaac – and indeed more than twice VG’s 304,000 subs at 707,958 subs,

(iii) he is at least as arrogant as Isaac, although he does seem to have a rather less fragile ego, and his tone is indeed far less toxic than Isaac’s,

(iv) he is FAR more alienatingly all-or-nothing than Isaac; on his view, if you aren’t the most effective altruist you can be given your evidence, you really are “just as bad as / just the same” as a serial killer / mass murderer,

(v) he is doing FAR more scary cult-like shit on his channel, see e.g. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Va5KoYWtaCs).

Perhaps this AtheneWins guy can help keep Isaac in perspective. Isaac’s claims are rather mundane and attractive in comparison to those of this far more influential and cult-leader-like individual. If you’re worried that Isaac is dangerous in virtue of the properties that you have mentioned to me, I think that you should be FAR more worried about this guy.

For my money I believe, for the reasons I have given, that at least Isaac does far more good than harm. It doesn’t hurt to explain why these guys are wrong about stuff so that those who might find their arguments compelling can understand their limitations. But I don't see any reason to go overboard on claims about how they are as dangerous to veganism as its association with fad diets like Raw Til 4. I think they're for the most part getting at the essence of good philosophical ideas but in the sorts of imperfect ways that are only to be expected from people without formal philosophical backgrounds, who don't have unlimited time, but who still want to do something good and effective with their lives. It's consistent with its being good to explain the limits of their approaches that it is still a good that they're trying to popularize and to a reasonable extent are succeeding in popularizing the essence of good philosophical ideas with a broad audience. If anything it might be good to aid the popularization to make sure it takes a lest confused path, instead of trying to prevent any such popularization from taking place at all.

Best,
Margaret

Okay sure, I understand what you mean about tone. My disagreement is that I think it's better to explain NTT and our interpretations of it by analogy (like Isaac does), rather than in terms of new concepts like essential properties and value narcissism. Keep in mind, I'm not trying to devalue your contributions or anything like that, I completely agree with you about the FOL section and I think you have simplified it and explained it well.

Generally I do agree the tone should be less abrasive, probably in the intro as well.

Isaac has said he wouldn't kill a squirrel for survival. Why then is he ok with a vegan diet that's not as minimally harmful as possible? For any vegan diet A that involves most vegan fooditems there's a much more restrictive vegan diet B that's equally nutritionally adequate but which involves less animal deaths. Name the trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would make it acceptable with human deaths as collateral damage for vegan foodpleasure but which makes it unacceptable to kill those very same humans in a survival situation.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 am For the near future I'm going to stick primarily to substantive things about the wiki; I can return to my arguments about why I think it is so important to avoid angry well-poisoning remarks and to avoid making the wiki sound like nothing more than an adolescent dick-measuring contest,[...]

It's a bit odd to employ such a contemptuous tone yourself in criticizing the same.
I'm 100% open to evidence on optimal tone, but lacking it I don't think we should be too critical of anything short of the extremes (like how Vegan Gains used to behave, just angry out of breath yelling, or some of the extreme PETA or DXE stuff).
I don't even think Isaac's tone is really such a big deal (although he should stop using some words that sound childish like "retard"), it's more his inclination to say racist sounding things and not accept any criticism of his ideas that I think is the problem.
An asshole who accepts criticism may be pretty effective, given people's attraction to that kind of strong personality online.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 am Have you seen this guy, AtheneWins? (see e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e852G1gyWYE). Note:

(i) he is WAY more hard-core and confusing-sounding than Issaac on “logical consistency” by itself entailing all of morality, including not only strong duties of non-maleficence but extremely strong duties of beneficence[...]

Beyond pragmatic and virtue based considerations, I'm not extremely convinced of the difference.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 am (iii) he is at least as arrogant as Isaac, although he does seem to have a rather less fragile ego, and his tone is indeed far less toxic than Isaac’s,[...]
(iv) he is FAR more alienatingly all-or-nothing than Isaac; on his view, if you aren’t the most effective altruist you can be given your evidence, you really are “just as bad as / just the same” as a serial killer / mass murderer,

If he's just claiming the distinction is arbitrary, I'm not sure if that's alienating.
I'll have to look into precisely what he says and how he says it.

If he's less toxic than Isaac is with a less fragile ego, that seems good. From your summary I would say his beliefs are probably more consistent than Isaac's and may lack the more troubling implications.
I'll look into it and see if I can engage with him. The biggest question is how receptive to criticism he is; that's the main problem with people like Isaac.

Can you find a formal argument of his?

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 am(v) he is doing FAR more scary cult-like shit on his channel, see e.g. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Va5KoYWtaCs).

I watched the first ten minutes... I don't see anything wrong here, he seems to be apologizing for his prior methodology. Is there something deeper in?
It sounds like his comparing people to murderers for not doing maximal altruism is something he regrets.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amPerhaps this AtheneWins guy can help keep Isaac in perspective.

He seems more likable and civil, and more consistent. I'm not sure how this would be unfavorable comparison vs. Isaac.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amIsaac’s claims are rather mundane and attractive in comparison to those of this far more influential and cult-leader-like individual. If you’re worried that Isaac is dangerous in virtue of the properties that you have mentioned to me, I think that you should be FAR more worried about this guy.

I'll try to reach out to him, but I'm not terribly clear on what he may be getting wrong.
It just sounds like he's a very passionate effective altruist, and he realized he messed up by being overly harsh with people.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amFor my money I believe, for the reasons I have given, that at least Isaac does far more good than harm.

I don't know if he does or doesn't, but the argument he put forward is invalid, and there are some terrifying implications of his reasoning with respect to the second half. I think that's enough reason to criticize him.

The fact that he rejects criticism with such hostility (blocking, etc.) is more concerning than the mistake itself, and what makes me consider him intellectually dishonest.

If AtheneWins is incorrect about something specific we should criticize it, although my feeling is that he would be more likely to consider the criticism and respond with civility and discussion. Maybe not, but it seems more probable than Isaac (where we know the outcome from having tried: did you make it anywhere with him?).

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amBut I don't see any reason to go overboard on claims about how they are as dangerous to veganism as its association with fad diets like Raw Til 4.

Raw Til 4 may have made more vegans than it caused harm to the cause. We can't really know for sure.

Right now we're dealing with an environment containing a lot of low hanging fruit, so even bad arguments can be productive in the short term; my concern is long term success vs. harm.

To that end, I am concerned with cults that build up around pseudoscience and sophistry even if they seem effective in the short term. The strongest defining characteristic is poor response to criticism; Isaac displays it, and so far it doesn't seem like AtheneWins has such a hostile attitude. We'll see if/how he responds.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amI think they're for the most part getting at the essence of good philosophical ideas but in the sorts of imperfect ways that are only to be expected from people without formal philosophical backgrounds, who don't have unlimited time, but who still want to do something good and effective with their lives.

For some of those around Isaac who have picked up only the informal aspects of only part of the argument, that may be true.

It's worth mentioning the potentially good usage when it's informal as a conversation starter for some street activism.

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 amIf anything it might be good to aid the popularization to make sure it takes a lest confused path, instead of trying to prevent any such popularization from taking place at all.

Just take the name and repackage it, and cut Isaac out of it entirely and throw his problematic contributions out?
That might work. I'm not sure if there would be trademark issues with that, we'd have to contact a lawyer. Do you know any who could advise on this?

brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Sat Nov 25, 2017 3:27 pm

Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Thu Nov 23, 2017 4:01 am For the near future I'm going to stick primarily to substantive things about the wiki; I can return to my arguments about why I think it is so important to avoid angry well-poisoning remarks and to avoid making the wiki sound like nothing more than an adolescent dick-measuring contest,[...]

It's a bit odd to employ such a contemptuous tone yourself in criticizing the same.

Yes, you're quite correct, I'm very sorry for my tone there. I was just getting frustrated.

As I said, for now I'll just focus on substantive things and at some point later return to my arguments about tone / accuracy of the extent to which anything Isaac is saying is really that extraordinary as opposed to just potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false once on certain disambiguations. (Again, I really don't think that Isaac's claims are that extraordinary especially given that it's VERY common for neo-Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, who is a famous professional philosopher, to make claims about substantive ethical claims following from only a very thin basis - in her case just the act of deliberating! - very much like Isaac's. It is true that the consensus among most philosophers is that this stuff doesn't work, but given that Isaac is by no means the first to do this, and he's got the excuse that professionals don't have that he hasn't learned about formal notions of consistency and validity and such, I think it's actually quite false to say that his claims are that extraordinary - again as opposed to potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false on certain disambiguations).


So to actually make good on returning to substance: here are three general questions.

First: I was wondering if it might be good to include material on the invalidity of the second half of NTT in the wiki, and if so where would be best. I was thinking that it would be nice to include it in the "section 1: invalidity" section, after the parts that show that part 1 is invalid. We could then go on in "section 2: defending the premises of the first part" to discuss the issues with the substantive presuppositions of the premises of part 1, and then in "section 3: defending the premises of the second part" to discuss the issues with the substantive - and here, likely messed up or at least highly questionable - premises of the premises of part 2. Does that sound good?

If you think it might be helpful, here is the translation into FOL (to the extent that I can manage the notion here on the forum!) and presentation of the counterexample. If others approve I can include it in the invalidity section under the displaying of the logical form of part 1 of NTT and under the presentation of the counterexample to part 1 of NTT:

Isaac’s English statement of the argument:
“P1 - Animals are of moral value.
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by considering anything short of non-exploitation(veganism) to be an adequate expression of respect for animal moral value.”

Predicates & relations:
A(x): x is a sentient non-human animal
H(x): x is a sentient human
CP(x): x is a counterpart of a sentient human
M(x): x has moral value
RNE(x): we’re morally required to not exploit x
T(x): t is a trait
P(x,y) x has y; e.g. if x is a human and t is a trait, P(x,y) means human x has trait y, or ‘a property of x is y’

The Logical form of Part 2 of NTT in FOL
(P1) (all x)( (A(x) --> M(x) )
(P2)~(exists t)(T(t) & ( (all x)( A(x) --> ~P(x,t)) & (all y)( (CP(x) & M(x) & ~P(y,t))--> ~RNE(x) ) )
Therefore, (C) (all x)( ((A(x) & M(x) ) --> RNE(x) )

In English:
(P1) For all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x has moral value.
(P2) It is not the case that there exists something, t, which is such that t is a trait; and for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x does not have t; and for all y, if y is a counterpart of a sentient human, and y has moral value, and y does not have t, then it is not the case that we’re required not to exploit t.
Therefore (C) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, and x has moral value, then we’re morally required not to exploit x.


Counterexample:

(i) (all x)( (A(x) --> M(x) ); i.e. all sentient non-human animals have moral value
(ii) (exist x)( A(x) & M(x) & ~RNE(x) ); i.e. there is a non-human animal with moral value whom we are NOT morally required to not exploit (we could even make this (all x)( (A(x) & M(x) --> ~RNE(x) ); i.e. all sentient non-human animals are such that we are NOT morally required to not exploit them)
(iii) (all t)(T(t) & ( (all x)( A(x) --> ~P(x,t)) --> (exist y)( (CP(x) & M(x) & ~P(y,t)) & RNE(x)) ); i.e. for all traits which sentient non-human animals lack, there is a counterpart of a sentient human who lacks the trait whom we ARE morally required to not exploit


Second: do others have good potential examples of how the invalidity of the argument (whether part 1 or part 2) has caused confusion in debates? I think I have ideas about the Warski debate and the Friend Ed debate (the only two I've recently reviewed). I very much agree with what brimstoneSalad that so much can be getting confused in the debates that it's often difficult to pin-point how the invalidity of the argument and the absence of forthright defense of the suppressed premises is contributing to the confusion. But I think that it really will be most helpful if we can identify possible candidate examples of this happening - and the more examples, the more examples we can identify, the more potentially helpful will be the discussion of invalidity and its knock-on effects on providing a compelling defense of the argument's premises (both explicit and implicit).


Third: I think that the fact that the premises of both the first and second parts of NTT are named 'P1' and 'P2' is making and will continue to make communication about the argument potentially confusing and / or cumbersome - especially when we want to talk about the second part of the argument. I assume that these names are taken from Isaac's presentation. But would it be OK for us to re-number the premises of the second part of NTT as 'P3' and 'P4'? We could then refer to the suppressed premises as things like 'P2.5' and 'P4.5' - which might actually be good, as that will help them wear their suppressed nature on their sleeve whenever they are referred to.


Best,
Margaret