DrSinger wrote: ↑Sat Nov 11, 2017 4:25 am
Imagine a world where there exist three object: One is a human, one is an nonhuman animal without moral value and the other is a strange being which has the same traits as the human except being human and has moral value. t is "being human"
I think I've found an issue with this. Once you remove the trait 'human' the replica becomes a nonhuman animal, since all humans possess the trait of being an animal. I think we'll probably have to make humans and animals two distinct sets.
The distinct set is not all animals, but the creature or set of creatures being evaluated at this time. That's how Isaac uses it.
Oysters, do they have a trait? Non-sentience. OK, fine.
Sponges, etc.
There is an issue with not carefully specifying the group of animals under consideration (or the group of humans; those that
have moral value), but I think a legitimate steel-man can compensate for that in the formalization. Just as Isaac permits P1 to be changed (like to you, personally, rather than all humans), in P2 "all animals" can be subbed for any particular one we're evaluating.
So for example: a human does not necessarily become a
cow if that's what's being evaluated in this instance.
There is no trait absent in a cow that if absent in a copy of a human would cause the copy to have no moral value.
The only problem is that by specifying a group, meta-ethical assumptions may be implicitly introduced... which is why I think he wanted to keep that very general. The argument would really just need to be totally rewritten to something like "animal X has moral value if Y"... something he wouldn't do.
So do we hold him to the precise wording or not?
I think I see where this is going now... the trait is not a moral giving trait, because it's never claimed to be by a premise. And this establishes that...
There is a trait, and it abides by the rules of the premise by NOT devaluing the human copy.
So, maybe we consider both options:
The copy is a non-human animal, and that only proves that not ALL conceivable non-human animals lack moral value, but if this animal doesn't actually exists then it says nothing about the set of actual animals.
The copy is somehow excluded from the evaluated group (like by limiting it to cows), in which case P2 shows nothing at all. But how do we prove that?