Debunking Benatar

[brimstoneSalad]

The 'incomparable' position you outlined seems reasonable to me, and, as far as I can tell, it's compatible with a desire to prevent beings whose lives aren't going to be worth living from coming into existence.

Only if preventing something bad is good. But that also means that preventing something good is bad.

Every time such a being comes into existence, we would be obligated under plausible moral theories to end that being's life (putting them out of their misery, as it's sometimes termed)

Only if the good of that action outweighed the bad.

Assuming you are pursuing "good", then if you fail to regard the absence of a bad as good, then the two situations are incomparable on those grounds, and you are not compelled to so act to force the right column state rather than the left.

so preventing it from coming into existence in the first place prevents us from having to keep doing that.

If you regard ending a bad as good, but do not regard preventing a bad as good, then no.

Look at your assumptions, and identify where they are inconsistent. A large part of philosophy is just a matter of uncovering and laying out hidden assumptions.

Is initiating a bad good or bad, or neither?
Is ending a bad?
Is initiating a good?
Is ending a good?
Is preventing a bad?
Is preventing a good?

The trouble in assuming they're incomparable is you end up In a world in which we could do things instantly, there would be no obligation, on the 'incomparable' view, to prevent miserable beings from coming into existence, because we could just click our fingers and end their lives.

IF you do not assume that preventing is better than ending.

This doesn't entail that the absence of pain is a good thing when a being is not in existence, though: it's simply an acknowledgement that there's an opportunity cost if we keep having to end miserable lives.

It's not just that, though, because you're assuming that ending miserable lives is good. And you're also assuming that preventing miserable lives is good, which perhaps implies creating miserable lives is bad... so then why is creating good lives not good?

it doesn't entail that we have to bring happy beings into existence, even though we should prevent unhappy beings from coming into existence for the reasons above.

Why not? Seems like your assumptions do suggest that. Make sure to spell out all of your assumptions, and look at the consequences of them.

This seems awfully similar to Benatar's asymmetry, but I don't think it's equivalent to it for the above reasons. Or, am I overlooking something?

It's basically equivalent, due to hidden assumptions.

[viddy9]

Is initiating a bad good or bad, or neither?
Is ending a bad?
Is initiating a good?
Is ending a good?
Is preventing a bad?
Is preventing a good?

Neither. Good. Neither. Bad. Neither. Neither.

IF you do not assume that preventing is better than ending.

I don't: preventing miserable lives isn't good in itself, but instrumentally good. So, I believe that ending miserable lives might be good if we cannot improve miserable lives, but preventing miserable lives isn't good in itself, but instrumentally good.

As above, I believe that ending a bad is good, and that ending a good is bad. But, preventing a bad is neither good nor bad (however it can be instrumentally good); preventing a good is neither good nor bad; initiating a good is neither good nor bad; initiating a bad is neither good nor bad.

[brimstoneSalad]

Is initiating a bad good or bad, or neither?
Is ending a bad?
Is initiating a good?
Is ending a good?
Is preventing a bad?
Is preventing a good?

Neither. Good. Neither. Bad. Neither. Neither.

Based on that (and the suggestion you find those intrinsic goods):

If initiating a bad is neither good nor bad, but ending a bad is good, then initiating a bad and then ending it should be good.
Shouldn't we be breeding miserable creatures and then killing them to maximize good?

And shouldn't we be preventing the lives of happy creatures (which is neither good nor bad), in case they might be ended (which would be bad)?

IF you do not assume that preventing is better than ending.

I don't: preventing miserable lives isn't good in itself, but instrumentally good.

In what way is it instrumentally good? You're robbing yourself of the opportunity to do something good later.
Isn't it instrumentally good to create the conditions necessary for you to do an intrinsic good?
E.g. breeding into existence billions of miserable creatures in order to kill them.

Your premises seem to result in a ringing endorsement of factory farming as the highest good.


If instead you assume that no action is good in and of itself, but only instrumentally so, and that a good life is good and a bad life is bad, you'd have to come to some very different instrumental conclusions:

Is initiating a bad good or bad, or neither?
Is ending a bad?
Is initiating a good?
Is ending a good?
Is preventing a bad?
Is preventing a good?

Instrumentally: Bad. Good, Good. Bad. Good. Bad.
Intrinsically: None.

[viddy9]

Based on that (and the suggestion you find those intrinsic goods):

Thank you for your reply. I believe I may have been falling prey to the act-omission distinction, which I have believed to be a bias in every other case. I may have thought that we ought to end miserable lives, even before they come into existence, but because lives that are worth living are in a sense "left alone", I may have regarded this omission as being less important than the act.

Anyway, I've updated to the total view of utilitarianism now. Absence of pain is good, and absence of pleasure is bad.

[brimstoneSalad]

Thank you for your reply. I believe I may have been falling prey to the act-omission distinction, [...] because lives that are worth living are in a sense "left alone", I may have regarded this omission as being less important than the act.

I don't think that's the cause, or at least it doesn't follow from making such a distinction.
Creating a life is an act. Initiating and preventing are both as much acts as ending.

Anyway, I've updated to the total view of utilitarianism now. Absence of pain is good, and absence of pleasure is bad.

Hedonic systems have their own problems. I would recommend consideration for interests, and the satisfaction vs. violation of them. But that's another issue probably outside the scope of this topic.

You may like this topic: http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=2037

[viddy9]

I'm not sure, I feel as if that was one of the things that influenced me. Benatar's asymmetry also seemed especially plausible to me on a preference-based view, perhaps because I was (wrongly) thinking of preferences as being frustrated until they are satisfied (as you probably know, negative preference utilitarianism and antifrustrationism are views that are held by some philosophers).

Hedonic systems have their own problems. I would recommend consideration for interests, and the satisfaction vs. violation of them. But that's another issue probably outside the scope of this topic.

Incidentally, I've also just updated from the preference-based view that I long had to a hedonistic view, for a variety of reasons (I'd argue there are problems with a preference-based view too). Including having read Parfit's On What Matters. My moral views have been quite unstable in the past week or so, but I'm always open to updating them, so thanks for the link, I'll have a read.