Some basic questions on morality

[brimstoneSalad]

So, should we say that the reason for being moral/altruistic is that it is better for you?

Some people may start out that way, but ultimately it is an end in of itself. Doing something selfless purely selfishly probably isn't going to yield the same results for you if you never end up caring.

I'm not sure if I can reconcile this idea with your belief that morality is objective. Do you mean that the system is objective but it works on people's own preferences?

Darl should treat Bob how Bob wants to be treated. Not how Darl wants to treat Bob.
Darl should treat Joe how Joe wants to be treated. Not how Bob wants to be treated (Joe and Bob are different), and not how Darl wants to treat Joe.

Do you mean that once we have established a moral system it is just a matter of finding the right answer within that system?

Basically.

So, for example, if somebody were to ask you 'If you think that killing a person is better than killing 100, would sacrifice your sister's life in order to save the lives of this group of people?'. You would reply that you think that it is the right thing to do, but, nevertheless, you are not going to do it. Correct?

Potentially, yes.

[Mr. Purple]

0 What is morality? Can people decide what's moral and what's not?

In my view, moral beliefs can't be chosen any more than any other belief can be chosen. I can't see the justification for arbitrarily deciding one moral system over another either. It should be based on intuitions about morality that you already have.

1 Why should we be moral?

For me, I should be moral because it brings me joy to do so. Helping my friend move or protecting someone who is being picked on for example makes me feel good. Assuming you are similar to me(not a psychopath), you should be moral because you will most likely feel good as well.

2 Isn't morality subjective/relative? Is it wrong to criticize, for example, a country that has different politics on, say, what women have to wear? Are there moral objectives?

Moral judgements are objective using deductive reasoning. Given a premise, the conclusion objectively follows. If a premise of your moral system is that suffering is bad, then kicking a puppy is objectively bad because it causes the puppy to suffer. This is all we need to reason about morality for the most part.

5 and the last one, since I guess that most of you are utilitarians ' What if a person's desire to harm someone else is greater than the desire of this person not to be harmed?'

I'm not exactly utilitarian, but under a utilitarian view, the morally correct action would be to let the person harm the other if it gives more net pleasure overall.

[DarlBundren]

Basically.

So what is your axiom on morality? the fact that sentient beings have interests that we should consider? If someone said that this axiom is incorrect you would simply show him the studies that prove that animals can actually feel?

Purple:

I can't see the justification for arbitrarily deciding one moral system over another either. It should be based on intuitions about morality that you already have.

i don't want to misinterpret you, but are you saying that morality should be based on what we know to be intuitively good?

you should be moral because you will most likely feel good as well.

I think that this question was important to ask because it shows how being moral or altruistic starts from a selfish perspective. I think I agree with Singer who says that this might have been true in the past, but now our being rational cannot be confined to ourselves and the people we love.

[brimstoneSalad]

So what is your axiom on morality? the fact that sentient beings have interests that we should consider?

Basically. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you: which is, you would have them consider your interests, as you should consider theirs (whether those interests are hedonistic or not: this is where Mr. Purple is wrong).

If someone said that this axiom is incorrect you would simply show him the studies that prove that animals can actually feel?

If somebody suggested animals can not feel or don't have interests, I suppose. Usually people have other reasons for rejecting morality, though, like believing morality is relative to opinion/subjective.
However, morality being relative to opinion/subjective makes it completely useless: like factual relativism makes any exploration of reality useless.

I think that this question was important to ask because it shows how being moral or altruistic starts from a selfish perspective. I think I agree with Singer who says that this might have been true in the past, but now our being rational cannot be confined to ourselves and the people we love.

Rationality itself can lead to moral behavior, but a person also has to be interested in morality in some sense; that is, to want to fundamentally be a good person. Rationality can show us what this means and how to achieve it.

Being a good person is often a part of existential identity. So, the feeling of cognitive dissonance can keep a lot of people in line, as long as the desire to be good remains strong and the rationalizations are avoided.

[DarlBundren]

However, morality being relative to opinion/subjective makes it completely useless: like factual relativism makes any exploration of reality useless.

Yes, this is my standard reply to the 'morality is subjective/relative to the place you live' assertion. Still, it's not a completely satisfactory answer. I want to read more on the concept of 'objective morality'. For now, I like the idea that morality is based on an axiomatic framework and can, thus, be considered analytical.

Just to make sure I understand you correctly, you think that morality is not subjective because it is based on a system and, consequently, an assertion can be proved to be true or wrong withing said system. (That is, if a person were to reply ' I have a different system' you could say that theirs is wrong). The system can be proved to be better ( and so more objective) than another. The system is based on interests, which are universal. Every person is entitled to their own interests, so it's not a matter of what you think is right, but what they want. Correct?

Rationality itself can lead to moral behavior, but a person also has to be interested in morality in some sense

Absolutely.

[brimstoneSalad]

Just to make sure I understand you correctly, you think that morality is not subjective because it is based on a system and, consequently, an assertion can be proved to be true or wrong withing said system.

In order to be useful, it must be. But, like any definition, some people may not agree with that notion, and this can be challenging to deal with because... people are stupid.

What is a chair? Is there anything that is objectively a chair, or is a chair dependent on use and intent? And if it's dependent on use, can I point to a ball of spun sugar and call it a chair? If a chair is a thing with the use of being sat upon and supporting the subject, and a ball of spun sugar is incapable of this, we can call it not a chair (or, at least a bad chair).

If somebody questions such a notion of morality, just start deconstructing all of the words that person uses and the concepts the person is appealing to. At a certain point, you should render your opponent speechless, or at least get the person to agree on certain ground rules that are needed to form and convey useful ideas.

(That is, if a person were to reply ' I have a different system' you could say that theirs is wrong).

More along the lines of how I would say the person is wrong when he or she refers to a chair as a hat and a hat as a chair.
Unless I can show that the system is internally inconsistent and useless, it may still be a valid system for something: but it is not proper to call it morality.

Which system is deserving of the label "morality" is a semantic issue.
Words in and of themselves have no meaning, so good doesn't have to be called "good". In an alternate reality, evil may be called good, and good may be called evil: this is no less valid in that reality. And in that reality, because good is called evil and evil called good, it would be wrong (right) to do evil (good).

To solve semantic issues, we have to look at the purpose and utility of language itself.

Why do we call a hat a "hat" and a chair a "chair" and not the other way around? Would it be acceptable to arbitrarily switch these around, and use personal definitions?

The system can be proved to be better ( and so more objective) than another.

Some can be.
A person, Bob, whose system is based around doing what Bob wants -- and in order to consider other people moral, they must also do what Bob wants -- has created a system that is not properly objective. It is inexplicably and unjustifiably Bob-centric and arbitrary in nature.

However, if we defined a system by which we should do unto others precisely what those others do not want done to them, that system would be objective.
Objective, in opposition to morality, and evil.
The reason we call that evil instead of good is only as complex as the reason we call a hat a hat and a chair a chair.

The system is based on interests, which are universal. Every person is entitled to their own interests, so it's not a matter of what you think is right, but what they want. Correct?

Basically (if I understand what you said). However, regard for interests can be framed negatively (as explained above) or positively.
One can also construct a Discordian system wherein whether somebody should consider another's interest negatively or positively in any given decision is based on a binary randomizer (like a coin toss).

[DarlBundren]

More along the lines of how I would say the person is wrong when he or she refers to a chair as a hat and a hat as a chair. Unless I can show that the system is internally inconsistent and useless, it may still be a valid system for something: but it is not proper to call it morality.

As you said, in order to have a meaningful conversation we have to agree at least on certain ground rules. For example, the rule that if I speak about a hat you know that I'm talking about a hat and not a chair, but with a concept as abstract as morality how can we do the same? Just by telling them that 'morality' as a word has its own history and people are not allowed to use it arbitrarily?

If somebody questions such a notion of morality, just start deconstructing all of the words that person uses and the concepts the person is appealing to.

Could you give me a brief example of this?

One can also construct a Discordian system wherein whether somebody should consider another's interest negatively or positively in any given decision is based on a binary randomizer (like a coin toss)

I like the idea. What would you say against such a system? Would you simply call it unreasonable (since – I guess – it couldn't be useful)? Or would you, instead, say that whatever that system is, we shouldn't call it morality?

Thanks.

[brimstoneSalad]

As you said, in order to have a meaningful conversation we have to agree at least on certain ground rules. For example, the rule that if I speak about a hat you know that I'm talking about a hat and not a chair, but with a concept as abstract as morality how can we do the same? Just by telling them that 'morality' as a word has its own history and people are not allowed to use it arbitrarily?

Basically.

"Morality" has a certain range of meanings. Some of those meanings are not coherent or useful to philosophical discussion, some are arbitrary or otherwise problematic.
When I say "useful", bear in mind that I do not mean "useful to a particular 'society'", or "useful to me", which is a very different standard, and one that is not objective. I mean useful as a system to understand an evaluation or claim. Philosophically useful as a term.

Determining what objective morality is, is more of a process of elimination, in whittling down the definition and removing the stuff that doesn't contribute to a coherent understanding of it or results in contradiction and thus is precluded from being a system.

Could you give me a brief example of this?

Like the chair thing.
What if I pick this chair up and put it on my head, is it now a hat? What is a hat? What is a chair? What makes them those things?
Just ask annoying questions that get at the meanings of words.

I like the idea. What would you say against such a system? Would you simply call it unreasonable (since – I guess – it couldn't be useful)? Or would you, instead, say that whatever that system is, we shouldn't call it morality?

The latter.

It is a useful system to talk about in philosophical terms, because if we have all of the relevant information (the outcome of the coin toss, the behavior, its effects on others relative to their wills) then we can evaluate the action. Being personally or socially useful is not pertinent.

[DarlBundren]

When I say "useful", bear in mind that I do not mean "useful to a particular 'society'", or "useful to me", which is a very different standard, and one that is not objective. I mean useful as a system to understand an evaluation or claim. Philosophically useful as a term.

Yes, of course.

(whether those interests are hedonistic or not: this is where Mr. Purple is wrong).

With this you meant that the notion of 'happiness' is not as useful for morality as the idea of 'interests'? Isn't something you are interested on, also something that makes you happy?

[brimstoneSalad]

With this you meant that the notion of 'happiness' is not as useful for morality as the idea of 'interests'? Isn't something you are interested on, also something that makes you happy?

Tends to be, but not always.

If I kidnapped you, strapped you to a table, drilled into your brain, and installed an electrode that stimulated your pleasure centers, and left you like that for a period equivalent to what would be expected of the rest of your natural life, there is no doubt that you would experience more pleasure than pain from this -- you would be in a perpetual state of euphoria -- however, would it be in line with your interests? Probably not.

The hedonistic concept of "morality" is purely experiential: experiencing more pleasure than pain. It does no regard non-hedonistic interests as valid, but dismisses them with claims that they are not properly informed or rational.