It has nothing to do with quantum mechanics. It has everything to do with whether something can become nothing. Which is can't, obviously. Hence my - or rather, Descartes' - argument goes through. Deal with it.teo123 wrote: ↑Fri Feb 21, 2020 12:58 pmI mean, I haven't really studied quantum mechanics. I didn't even think this was related to quantum mechanics, I thought quantum mechanics was a study of the consequences of the wave-particle-duality. That with photons just popped into my mind when I read that "indivisible things can't be destroyed", I am not even sure I properly explained it. But the fact that somebody who was a good student at high school, and can get into the university to study philosophy, doesn't even seem to know that physics tells us that photons can be turned from particle into energy and vice versa, well, that's just weird.brimstoneSalad wrote:Other than giving you a lesson in Quantum Mechanics 101
You said he didn't use it as an argument for the soul. He did. Famously. It is one of the three arguments for the soul commonly attributed to him.
And he thought the mind was immortal due to it being immaterial. In other words, he thought the immortality followed from the immateriality and that the immateriality was entailed by its indivisibility. If you don't believe me, read the Meditations (and try reading the whole thing too - read the objections and replies).
No it isn't. I am not - and have not - argued that the mind is immaterial and immortal 'because Descartes said so'. I have said it is immaterial and immortal because it is indivisible and those qualities follow from that fact about it. Which is also what Descartes thought, as anyone who's actually read him knows.
I am presenting an argument and defending it in whatever way I see fit. But the argument I have presented is, in fact, one that Descartes made. So, again, this thread is not an exercise in Descartes scholarship (which is good news for you, as you clearly don't know your stuff). And I am not appealing to authority. I am appealing to some premises that appear to be self-evident truths of reason and showing that they entail that our minds are immaterial and immortal.
Here's the problem with you guys - you hear someone mention credentials or a big name and you automatically think 'er, dur, appeal to authority - fallacy! Fallacy! fallacy, fallacy' .
"Oh, dur, he's mentioned Descartes. Dur, so he must be saying that the mind is immaterial because Descartes said so. Yes, dur, that's definitely what he's saying, even if he isn't. Fallacy!! Fallacy!! Fallacy!!!!!! Mum - he's committed a fallacy. I've spotted a fallacy. Let me write it down in my fallacy book with a big jumbo crayon.
You don't actually think about what the person has said. You've just learnt a list of fallacies and you apply them to what someone has said just if they have mentioned some trigger word contained in a fallacy's description.
Well, you don't know much. He had several arguments, one of which is the argument I am presenting here - the argument from divisibility. There are umpteen arguments for the immateriality of the mind. I have 14 of them. This is just one.teo123 wrote: ↑Fri Feb 21, 2020 12:58 pm Words are abstract entities and it doesn't make sense to talk about half a word. Yes, written words are composed of letters, which are
res extensa and can be divided. Spoken words are composed of sounds, and they can also be divided. But when you say out loud "read" and when you write "read", it's still the same word. You can say words contain phonemes, but words aren't made only of phonemes any more than a mind is made only of memories. Many words can't be divided into smaller words, yet all the words are obviously mortal, and will disappear from a language sooner or later.
Descartes'es main argument for the existence of a soul was, as far as I know, the existence of qualia. That's also an argument with a questionable premise.
As for this 'word' talk, well, I assume that what you are referring to is the propositional content - the meaning - as opposed to the means of transmission or representation (so, as opposed to sounds and symbols).
Okay - so what? Note, I do not deny that there are indivisible things. So how does pointing to some potentially indivisible things in any way challenge my argument?
Extended things - material substances - are divisible.
Minds are indivisible.
Therefore, minds are not material substances.
Minds are objects. the only way in which an object gets to be indivisible, is if it is simple.
So minds are simple.
And simple things are indestructible.
So minds are indestructible.
Now, if propositional contents - or some propositional contents -are indivisible, that does nothing whatsoever to challenge anything above.
It doesn't, for example, show that there are some material things that are indivisible, for propositional contents are not material objects.
And it doesn't show that indivisibility does not entail simplicity, for the only kinds of propositional contents about which we can plausibly say that they are indivisible are simple atoms of content.
And presumably you'd agree that the idea of 'destroying' a propositional content makes no sense too.
So you have singularly failed to in any way challenge any premise of my argument.
I will get back to you about the problem of interaction and why it is shit later. Needless to say, everything you've said is wrong or confused.