Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[brimstoneSalad]

I'll wait for DrSinger's thoughts on the other part, but I'll clarify this:

accuracy of the extent to which anything Isaac is saying is really that extraordinary as opposed to just potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false once on certain disambiguations. (Again, I really don't think that Isaac's claims are that extraordinary especially given that it's VERY common for neo-Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, who is a famous professional philosopher, to make claims about substantive ethical claims following from only a very thin basis - in her case just the act of deliberating! - very much like Isaac's. It is true that the consensus among most philosophers is that this stuff doesn't work, but given that Isaac is by no means the first to do this, and he's got the excuse that professionals don't have that he hasn't learned about formal notions of consistency and validity and such, I think it's actually quite false to say that his claims are that extraordinary - again as opposed to potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false on certain disambiguations).

He is doing something they aren't doing, which is asserting not just that a certain meta-ethical and normative reasoning follows from logic, but asserting specifically that his conclusion is independent of those positions. He's avoiding all of the substantive arguments and saying it applies whether you're a realist, an irrealist, subjectivist, objectivist, whatever.

Philosophers making claims that morality follows from logic are narrowing the scope by making substantial commitments to things like realism and objectivism that Isaac explicitly claims are not necessary: that's the problem with his arguments, and what makes his claims extraordinary beyond run of the mill reason to morality arguments.

I agree morality probably can be reasoned, but not like that, and when you do so it is most certainly not broadly compatible with every conceivable meta-ethical and normative system.

[Margaret Hayek]

I'll wait for DrSinger's thoughts on the other part, but I'll clarify this:

accuracy of the extent to which anything Isaac is saying is really that extraordinary as opposed to just potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false once on certain disambiguations. (Again, I really don't think that Isaac's claims are that extraordinary especially given that it's VERY common for neo-Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, who is a famous professional philosopher, to make claims about substantive ethical claims following from only a very thin basis - in her case just the act of deliberating! - very much like Isaac's. It is true that the consensus among most philosophers is that this stuff doesn't work, but given that Isaac is by no means the first to do this, and he's got the excuse that professionals don't have that he hasn't learned about formal notions of consistency and validity and such, I think it's actually quite false to say that his claims are that extraordinary - again as opposed to potentially confusing, unconvincing, dubious, and false on certain disambiguations).

He is doing something they aren't doing, which is asserting not just that a certain meta-ethical and normative reasoning follows from logic, but asserting specifically that his conclusion is independent of those positions. He's avoiding all of the substantive arguments and saying it applies whether you're a realist, an irrealist, subjectivist, objectivist, whatever.

Philosophers making claims that morality follows from logic are narrowing the scope by making substantial commitments to things like realism and objectivism that Isaac explicitly claims are not necessary: that's the problem with his arguments, and what makes his claims extraordinary beyond run of the mill reason to morality arguments.

I agree morality probably can be reasoned, but not like that, and when you do so it is most certainly not broadly compatible with every conceivable meta-ethical and normative system.

I actually disagree; what neo-Kantians like Korsgaard do is argue, like Isaac, that normative commitments can be derived simply from something very minimal - in Korsgaard's case the act of deliberating - quite independently from any considerations of the advantages or disadvantages of various metaethical theories (non-naturalism, expressivist quasi-realism, or constructivism). They then turn around and say that this essentially makes true a version of constructivism (or "practical realism"), on which facts about ethics are facts about the (to their minds necessary) workings of deliberation, and that given the disadvantages of non-naturalism (or "substantive realism") and expressivist quasi-realism, and the way in which these would be redundant given the "for free" version of neo-Kantian metaethical constructivism, we should just go ahead and be neo-Kantian metaethical constructivists. To see how this works I would recommend Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity, and for reactions to it that I think are much like your reaction to Isaac, see e.g. Hussain & Shah's "Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism." Although Korsgaard is obviously much more sophisticated and informed about the issues, I think that what Korsgaard is doing is a bit similar to Isaac thinking that we can use reasoning to establish ethical claims, and then turning around and calling mind-independent realisms about ethics 'retarded'.

In any event I think that you and I largely agree on the main issues: good practical ethical arguments like the argument from less able humans really are neutral as to the main metaethical alternatives (non-naturalism, constructivism, expressivist quasi-realism), and the problem with Isaac (and Korsgaard, and AtheneWins) - unlike those who simply offer good meta-ethically neutral practical ethical arguments like this - is that he (and she, and he) essentially tries to show that substantive ethical claims follow simply from very minimal things like valuing oneself or deliberating. I agree that this is in a way fantastical / extraordinary, and Korsgaard's kind of neo-Kantianism is received as such by most philosophers. So I think I may be fine with the 'extraordinary claims' language - although what makes it less extraordinary (but more confusing) is that Isaac seems to use 'inconsistent' as synonymous with 'double standard'. I'm planning at some point soon to try to clarify this in the NTT wiki.

[brimstoneSalad]

I actually disagree; what neo-Kantians like Korsgaard do is argue, like Isaac, that normative commitments can be derived simply from something very minimal - in Korsgaard's case the act of deliberating - quite independently from any considerations of the advantages or disadvantages of various metaethical theories (non-naturalism, expressivist quasi-realism, or constructivism). They then turn around and say that this essentially makes true a version of constructivism (or "practical realism"),

Well, Isaac won't even commit to that. He claims it has no implications.

I would possibly agree that people like Korsgaard are making extraordinary claims too. Extraordinary in this context is pretty specific. Rationalwiki has a fairly good article on the phrase:

https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Extraordinary_claims_require_extraordinary_evidence

Extraordinary claims are not necessarily extraordinary in the sense that thy are rare or uncommon claims.

The evidence put forth by proponents of such things as gods, ghosts, the paranormal, and UFOs is highly questionable at best and offers little in the way of proof. Even if we accepted what evidence there is as valid (and it is highly debatable if we should), limited and weak evidence is not enough to overcome the extraordinary nature of these claims.

Nearly half of the population of the US believes in ghosts, and a significant part of them think they've seen ghosts. Despite the commonality, it's still regarded as an extraordinary claim in the way the claim to have seen a chair on somebody's roof isn't; the latter is composed of things we already know to be possible, even if not an ordinary event.

for reactions to it that I think are much like your reaction to Isaac, see e.g. Hussain & Shah's "Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism." Although Korsgaard is obviously much more sophisticated and informed about the issues, I think that what Korsgaard is doing is a bit similar to Isaac thinking that we can use reasoning to establish ethical claims, and then turning around and calling mind-independent realisms about ethics 'retarded'.

Well, Isaac won't even engage on what mind-independence means. I agree that there are some similarities.
I have not read much on Korsgaard beyond a few terrible arguments I've seen presented from her; I did not get the impression that she has contributed anything substantive that can't be addressed through referent to Kant directly.

Maybe we can get into this at more length when the article on deontology comes up.

In any event I think that you and I largely agree on the main issues: good practical ethical arguments like the argument from less able humans really are neutral as to the main metaethical alternatives (non-naturalism, constructivism, expressivist quasi-realism),

I don't think they have to be neutral, but if they claim to be and the user of the argument wants to avoid those discussions then they certainly need to be.
I don't think arguments from naturalistic realism are a problem since it's not that hard to argue for that position, and I would say that the strongest arguments are based on that; like arguments from sentience being the trait of moral value, and moral consideration being based on interests.

and the problem with Isaac (and Korsgaard, and AtheneWins) - unlike those who simply offer good meta-ethically neutral practical ethical arguments like this - is that he (and she, and he) essentially tries to show that substantive ethical claims follow simply from very minimal things like valuing oneself or deliberating.

If you're willing to commit to deliberation leading to naturalistic moral realism, that pretty clearly leads to consequentialism and some kind of preference based framework which necessitates valuing the preferences of sentient beings (as the only ones that have them in any meaningful sense).

I don't think it's a problem in itself, so much as claiming to be meta-ethically neutral while being nothing of the sort.

Korsgaard is just wrong. I'm not sure what AtheneWins does.

although what makes it less extraordinary (but more confusing) is that Isaac seems to use 'inconsistent' as synonymous with 'double standard'. I'm planning at some point soon to try to clarify this in the NTT wiki.

Just replacing that word would be a great way to improve the honesty and validity of the argument.

[DrSinger]

I agree with the counterexample regarding part 2 of the argument you gave Margaret, I also think it's worth mentioning in the article.

With regards to confusion relating to part 2, from what I have seen, most of the confusion seems to relate to the fact that AY and VG don't actually think it's moral to commit to nonexploitation at the cost of practicality, there's a clip in the issues in debates section from the warski debate. That's the best example I can think of.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php?title=NameTheTrait#C._Issues_in_debates

Regarding the article in general, Margaret I can see where you're taking the article and that's fine with me, so I'll withdraw any objections I had to you editing as you wish. I think there'll be philosophical jargon etc. that will need clarifying but I think that's easy to sort out afterwards. I think it would be good to finish the article soon.

[Margaret Hayek]

I agree with the counterexample regarding part 2 of the argument you gave Margaret, I also think it's worth mentioning in the article.

That's great - do you think it should be in the section on invalidity or in the section on part 2 of the argument? I was thinking of having it in the section on invalidity, which would allow us to avoid having to repeat the explanation of the notation (as we might if e.g. we put it in the section on part 2 of the argument). I just hope that doesn't clutter up the invalidity section too much. Maybe I can just put it in there you can tell me what you think.

With regards to confusion relating to part 2, from what I have seen, most of the confusion seems to relate to the fact that AY and VG don't actually think it's moral to commit to nonexploitation at the cost of practicality, there's a clip in the issues in debates section from the warski debate. That's the best example I can think of.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php?title=NameTheTrait#C._Issues_in_debates

Yeah; that does reinforce my worries about the extent to which anyone - including Isaac - is really making part 2 of the argument in practice. My sense is that in practice he and others let it be something sensible, like "the moral value sentient non-human animals have is such that it isn't OK to inflict enormous harm on them for relatively trivial benefits" and then they're willing to appeal to empirical considerations to substantiate that. But I have at least heard Isaac speak of "exploitation" a few times in debates, perhaps in ways that don't make it entirely clear that he's raising a worry about just inflicting serious harm - although given his general views I'm certain that that must be what he has in mind. I think that the general point that in most contexts (e.g. outside of messaging to adherents of Critical Theory) it won't be very convincing for vegan advocates to talk about "exploitation," and unless it's shorthand for inflicting serious harm (which many may not know it is, or know how to do a good job substantiating), it isn't a well thought out idea.

Regarding the article in general, Margaret I can see where you're taking the article and that's fine with me, so I'll withdraw any objections I had to you editing as you wish. I think there'll be philosophical jargon etc. that will need clarifying but I think that's easy to sort out afterwards. I think it would be good to finish the article soon.

That's great; thanks. I should be able to finish a lot of what I was thinking of doing this coming week end. I think that the main thing that would hold me back from finishing what I wanted to add at that point is that I haven't had time to review that many of the debates, and I think it would really help for me to review more of the debates - or ideally all of them. Maybe I can take stabs at certain things, and others who have watched more debates can fill in some examples and / or revise in light of what they take the balance of evidence from the debates to be.

[DrSinger]

That's great - do you think it should be in the section on invalidity or in the section on part 2 of the argument?

I agree that all the FOL invalidity stuff should be in the same section. I made a new page and added a bunch of the sections we intend to revise there, I think it's easier to work with that way.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/NTT_to_be_revised

I think it would really help for me to review more of the debates - or ideally all of them. Maybe I can take stabs at certain things, and others who have watched more debates can fill in some examples and / or revise in light of what they take the balance of evidence from the debates to be.
Top

I've watched quite a few of them and they're all quite similar, the opponent will name a trait, then AY will claim it's not a valid trait by using an invalid generalisation e.g. 'you wouldnt accept aliens killing you because of species' etc. and claim they are contradicting themselves. Which is what I see as the most problematic aspect of this whole thing, the defenses of P2 as if it's logically impossible to name a trait.

Would you agree that in our notation, this is the premise AY is introducing that's like the identity of indiscernibles

∃t ∀x ( ( T(t) ∧ CP(x) ∧ P(x,t) ) ⇒ A(x) )

edit: (forgot it has to me more than just an animal, it has to be the same animal)

∃t ( (T(t) ∧ ∀x (A(x)) ∧ ∀y (CP(y) ∧ P(y,t)) ) ⇒ x = y)

[brimstoneSalad]

We also need to answer his ridiculous metaphysical claim.

Ignoring quantum physics for the time being (which is another can of worms with respect to entanglement, and his suggestion may even violate relativity), in physics if you take two otherwise identical things which exist in different locations, and you force their locations locations to be equal too, it is true that they are indiscernible as separate things, but it also becomes something else altogether (probably an explosion).

At no point do you have a living cow which is indiscernible from your copy. You either have two otherwise identical things discernible by location (and thus at least history, one having been a human in the past and we have the ability to track that due to the different location), or you have a very dead double-cow-amalgamation that is effectively a detonated thermonuclear bomb.

I know that may look like splitting hairs, but it's very relevant to his metaphysical claims if he or his audience have any respect for actual physics.

There is no way in physics to make two distinct things truly indiscernible (even if just by just their positions) from each other without combining them in a way that fundamentally changes their natures... at least not for fermions that aren't in an exotic state.
I don't think you could even do that with a boson like light (where you'd have constructive interference of some kind), not that there's any reason to believe that there's bosonic sentience out there.

[NonZeroSum]

________

We also need to answer his ridiculous metaphysical claim.

Ignoring quantum physics for the time being (which is another can of worms with respect to entanglement, and his suggestion may even violate relativity), in physics if you take two otherwise identical things which exist in different locations, and you force their locations locations to be equal too, it is true that they are indiscernible as separate things, but it also becomes something else altogether (probably an explosion).

At no point do you have a living cow which is indiscernible from your copy. You either have two otherwise identical things discernible by location (and thus at least history, one having been a human in the past and we have the ability to track that due to the different location), or you have a very dead double-cow-amalgamation that is effectively a detonated thermonuclear bomb.

I know that may look like splitting hairs, but it's very relevant to his metaphysical claims if he or his audience have any respect for actual physics.

There is no way in physics to make two distinct things truly indiscernible (even if just by just their positions) from each other without combining them in a way that fundamentally changes their natures... at least not for fermions that aren't in an exotic state.
I don't think you could even do that with a boson like light (where you'd have constructive interference of some kind), not that there's any reason to believe that there's bosonic sentience out there.

________

Question about an alternative correction of the argument (the "Identity of indiscernibles" route)
http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/Talk:NameTheTrait#Question_about_an_alternative_correction_of_the_argument_.28the_.22Identity_of_indiscernibles.22_route.29

I was talking to Isaac, and he seemed to suggest an alternative way of thinking about the argument, that would lead to an alternative correction in order to achieve technical logical validity. Here is a mildly-regimented English language proposal for an alternative deductively valid correction:

(P1) All (sentient) humans have moral value

(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no (sentient) non-human animals have the trait and if x is an alteration of a (sentient) human and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value.

(P3) if an altered (sentient) human lacks the totality of differences between (sentient) humans and (sentient) non-human animals, then the altered (sentient) human is a (sentient) non-human animal. (This resembles, but is logically weaker, than the identity of indiscernibles)

Therefore, (C) all (sentient) non-human animals have moral value

Anyone want to translate into FOL and prove or find a counterexample? It's been awhile since I've taught logic, and I'm already spending just a bit too much time on all this...

Update: Isaac has now made a video invoking what I think is in effect the identity of indiscernibles to attempt to defend the validity of NTT [1]. Unfortunately he seems to be using 'validity' in his own sense and he doesn't seem to want to entertain the sense of 'validity' employed by those complaining about the argument's invalidity. So he's very resistant to there being a sense of 'validity' in which P3 must be added to make the argument valid. He also seems in the comment to be repeating a translation, with which I am not familiar, of something from Aristotle's metaphysics, and so far refusing either to explain what it means or accepting as relevant to his remarks explanations of how what he means by it (and clearly what he illustrates in the video) is a version of the identity of indiscernibles which is a substantive metaphysical thesis rather than a fact about the logical form of propositions employing the identity relation. But it's still the basic idea of bringing in the identity of indiscernibles to make the argument in some sense valid. As I explained on the phil vegan forum:

"Substantively all this really does (whether we take II as a suppressed premise or just go ahead and add it in there) is shift concerns about the validity of the old argument into concerns about the defensibility of premise 2. All an error theorist who (i) wants not to be harmed, and (ii) would want not to be harmed if intellectually disabled would have to do in order to respond to Isaac now is to say "yeah, if you changed out my traits in such a way that I'd be a non-human animal, then I'd have no value, even given the way in which you interpret having value. I wouldn't even be me in any relevant sense, so have at it and harm the crap out of the entity that isn't in any relevant sense m, I don't even desire that you not do so"."

______

If you value humans, and there is NO TRAIT, then you can switch ALL TRAITS, and the thing shouldn't be valueless.
Yet you decalre it is.
That is as fucking dead clear a contradiction as humanly possible.
IF there are no traits, then you can switch them all without rendering the thing valueless, but swtiching them all would MAKE IT A FUCKING ANIMAL...
Which you are now saying is valueless.
. . .
I'm not actually talking about taking 2 physical objects and cramming them into the same space molecule per molecule.
I'm talkig about hypothetical objects and the point at which you are referring to the same thing.

____

We should have a short centre of the debate summary for lurkers who come from Ask Yourself videos/discord; AY dismissing FriendEd with bull certainty, Brim highlighting the contradictions so could address the root implications of FriendEd's philosophy with him, since then AY portraying us as pushing absurdly complicated advocacy, when we're simply critiquing.

[brimstoneSalad]

Sorry, I guess I missed or forgot to respond to this stuff:

(P1) All (sentient) humans have moral value

(P2) There is no trait (broadly construed so as to include totalities of differences) such that no (sentient) non-human animals have the trait and if x is an alteration of a (sentient) human and x lacks the trait, then x lacks moral value.

(P3) if an altered (sentient) human lacks the totality of differences between (sentient) humans and (sentient) non-human animals, then the altered (sentient) human is a (sentient) non-human animal. (This resembles, but is logically weaker, than the identity of indiscernibles)

Therefore, (C) all (sentient) non-human animals have moral value

Anyone want to translate into FOL and prove or find a counterexample? It's been awhile since I've taught logic, and I'm already spending just a bit too much time on all this...

That correction doesn't work. It only shows that some possible sentient animals (that were previously humans) must have moral value, not that all of them do.

The trait "used to be a sentient human" could be relevant here to call P2 false, but it's not clear that we're talking about such traits of prior identity. The wording of P2 suggests it's only talking about current traits that could be removed (since that's not something X could lack, else P2 contradicts itself).

. . .
I'm not actually talking about taking 2 physical objects and cramming them into the same space molecule per molecule.
I'm talkig about hypothetical objects and the point at which you are referring to the same thing.

If they remain two separate objects with distinct traits like position, then you can still establish continuity and independent identity based on position.

I'm not sure how Isaac thinks this makes any sense.

Either they're two things made the same in every way (including cramming them molecule per molecule into the same space), in which case I would admit that he is correct that in terms of metaphysics it's impossible to distinguish them because they have fused, and we can no longer track them based on the property of which "used to" be human. But it's no longer the thing we were looking at because the fusion has formed something new.

Or there are still distinguishing traits which can be used to call one thing of moral value and other other thing not without any logical contradiction, even based on such dubious claims as "what once had moral value always has moral value regardless of transformation", perhaps adding to that "unless that transformation makes it non-sentient" so that moral value doesn't survive death and apply to the molecules themselves.

The only way this argument can be made valid at all is by removing the human transformation entirely and dealing only with the animal, in which case P2 is just an assertion that animals don't have any trait that makes them not have moral value/that they have moral value. As such, the argument is valid, but it's only this:

P2 animals are of moral value
C animals are of moral value

It's trivially so, and not of any meaningful reasoning. I would say it's no longer a real argument, it's nothing more than an assertion at that point.

We should have a short centre of the debate summary for lurkers who come from Ask Yourself videos/discord; AY dismissing FriendEd with bull certainty, Brim highlighting the contradictions so could address the root implications of FriendEd's philosophy with him, since then AY portraying us as pushing absurdly complicated reasoning, when we're simply critiquing.

Good idea.

[NonZeroSum]

New Ask Yourself video "responding" to the page:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i64UmDMlNBk

Could probably do with a pinned short summary/timeline of debate between you and AY if you're up to it Brim, to remind peeps of the central issues of the debate. Or can just ignore it, it's probably less than 100 people at this point that really feel invested in the flawed NTT argument anyhow and less than 10 who would use it as obnoxiously as AY does.