Video Response to Our Letter To Dillahunty

[Red]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thRBVWSNO5A
I stumbled across this video on YouTube when watching some videos relating to moral systems and veganism and such.
I haven't watched the whole thing yet, and I'll offer my 2 cents when I do, but from what I've watched so far, I've gathered that he thinks that we've misrepresented deontology, and he thinks that consequentialism isn't the moral system we think it is.
If you get a chance to watch it, lemme know what you think.

[brimstoneSalad]

Thanks for sharing, that was pretty weird. I guess this guy is vegan, and is a Francione fan?
I'm going to also assume he's religious in some sense, given some of the other video titles he has.

Those are some pretty naïve arguments, but he's welcome to come here to discuss it (I don't understand why he didn't just do that if he had issues).

Anything you think I should address?

[Red]

Thanks for sharing, that was pretty weird. I guess this guy is vegan, and is a Francione fan?

I'm not sure. I haven't watched any of his other videos, but judging by his most recent video's title 'Why Animal Suffering Matters: Against Exploiting the Vulnerable' he's not a vegan, and if he is, he can't be a deontological one, which I'm pretty sure isn't the case.

Edit: I watched some of that video, and I'm pretty sure he's vegan. The title is just the name of a book that he responded to (quite well, I must say).

I'm going to also assume he's religious in some sense, given some of the other video titles he has.

He is, but I'm not sure what his religious affiliation is.

Those are some pretty naïve arguments, but he's welcome to come here to discuss it (I don't understand why he didn't just do that if he had issues).

I think it's because he still thinks we're TheVeganAtheist forum, and I guess he can't find it (then again TVA has the new forum linked on his channel), or maybe he feels alienated and doesn't want to discuss with us.

Anything you think I should address?

Hey man, if you feel like it. I still only have a basic understanding of deontology (I know the main principle, actions are wrong in and of themselves, regardless of the consequences, and I know that the whole system is arbitrary), so I may not be the best at refuting these arguments. Maybe some other forum members would like to take a look.

I'll ask him if he wants to discuss on the forum. Should I comment on his video so maybe some of his viewers can join in, or should I private message it?

[NonZeroSum]

I'll ask him if he wants to discuss on the forum. Should I comment on his video so maybe some of his viewers can join in, or should I private message it?

Both or eithers good, I just commented asking if they would release the script, but more people commenting sounding reasonable the better as the video might give the forum a bad rep, so the more people can see we're inviting a hand of openness to discussion the better.

[Red]

Both or eithers good, I just commented asking if they would release the script, but more people commenting sounding reasonable the better as the video might give the forum a bad rep, so the more people can see we're inviting a hand of openness to discussion the better.

The comment you posted was quite elaborate to say the least. I was thinking like a "Hey wanna discuss this" or something.

[NonZeroSum]

The comment you posted was quite elaborate to say the least. I was thinking like a "Hey wanna discuss this" or something.

Lol! Aye I might have got carried away, short and to the point is often better.

[Red]

Lol! Aye I might have got carried away, short and to the point is often better.

Ach, no worries mate. I think I'll PM him and we'll see what happens. I'm all for an open debate about deontology where I can be active in it.

[Red]

Is this good? Anything I should add/remove?

Yes Mr. indy, I have viewed your video that responded to TheVeganAtheist forum's response to Matt Dillahunty, and I have told members of the forum (which has now been rebranded to Philosophical Vegan) about said video, and they said that you're welcome to come and discuss it with us! Everybody is welcome to the forum, so don't feel alienated just because we disagree with you. I am genuinely curious about other things you have to say regarding the whole issue, and I also hope you join in on our discussions.

Another forum member has commented on your video, so maybe you can discuss his comment on the forum.

Thanks, hope to hear back from you soon!

[NonZeroSum]

Coolio, sounds good, I haven't really got into it in detail either. Here are a few past discussions to point as further reading if they come to the forum and your message is grand Red, honest and approachable

The Issue with Gary Francione and Deontological Veganism?
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=785
We’re all fake vegans. Except Francione. According to Francione.
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=2880
What if Deontology was more effective?
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=1869
Animal Use Focus (besides a few exceptions) vs Animal Suffering Focus
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=1723

Edit: Script incoming yo, they still may or may not respond, but I think they raise a number of interesting big philosophical concepts/thought experiments, so would be good to go over and see again in text with references.

[NonZeroSum]

Deontology, Consequentialism, and Animal Ethics: A Response to TheVeganAtheist
Introduction

This video is a response to a portion of TheVeganAtheist's video, which was authored by some members of his forum, entitled "Matt Dillahunty FAIL- Part 2 of 3." It's here that TheVeganAtheist (who will now be referred to as "T.VA") goes on a tangent to denounce rights and to praise consequentialism as Logical and Rational™ while decrying deontology, Gary Francione, and Immanuel Kant for... well, see for yourself.

And less deontologists like Gary Francione, who is a woo. All deontologists are woos because absolute deontological authority is inherently an appeal to woo. Look back to Kant on that one.

Yeah, he said that. The mischaracterization of deontology is bad enough, but the lack of arguments is really annoying as well. The purpose of my video is to correct T.VA's remarks and to show that he has presented a rather myopic view when it comes to ethics and specifically deontological ethics. In addition, I will give some critiques of consequentialism to further undermine T.VA's vacuous dismissal of a rival theory.

Matt Dillahunty's defense of animal exploitation

I should say, too, that I'm not here to defend Matt Dillahunty's arguments. I happen to think they're godawful. And the one that kicks off T.VA's video happens to be one of the worst offenders. In fact, I'll further delay my response to T.VA and give my take on it first.

What I am willing to do, though, is afford the same rights to eat me to the animals that I eat. When a shark decides to attack me because it's hungry and wants some food, I'm not going to say that it's immoral or unethical of the shark [to eat me]. It's the natural way that sharks are. I realize that to most ethical vegans that is a lame cop-out, but I'm fine with it, actually.

Matt Dillahunty circumvents and ignores any distinction between moral agents and non-agents. Of course the shark is subject to its nature, but the shark cannot deliberate about its actions like Dillahunty can. If Dillahunty killed and ate someone during a cruise, we would hold him morally responsible. Not only does he have alternatives to killing and eating someone in this scenario, he's also able to deliberate and reflect on his actions that far exceed the shark's abilities. Contrast this with a shark who kills and eats someone during a cruise. We would not ascribe malicious intent to it. We wouldn't, as Dillahunty himself points out, say it acted immorally. I think Dillahunty himself sees the problems with this argument as he's laying it out. At least I hope he realizes that, in addition to this, appealing to nature is bad, or that the idea of affording other beings the rights they afford you is bad too (and this is something that T.VA's video does get right). I don't think Dillahunty would say that he has the right to kill schizophrenic serial killer Richard Chase in order to drink his blood because Chase would do the same to Dillahunty.

Consequentialism and rights

On rights, T.VA has this to say:

First off, you talk about rights and this has to be gotten out of the way. Rights are a social convention, not a moral one. The notion of "moral rights" comes from deontology, not consequentialism, and is the dogmatic opposition to rational ethics that deals only in absolutes and which ignores the highly context-sensitive nature of ethics.

When it comes to T.VA's rejection of moral rights, or, more accurately, particular Vegan Atheist forum users' rejection of moral rights, I'm not really shocked by this, and I'm not here to take umbrage at this in itself. They will make it clear in T.VA's video that they are consequentialists or at least have strong consequentialist leanings, and I am aware of what's entailed by the theory. Talk of rights is, as Jeremy Bentham would have put it, nonsense on stilts, since any supposed right can easily be waived if it brings about the best consequences. It can be difficult for an ethical theory to hold that a person has a right to life if the theory can also permit or obligate grabbing an old, dying hermit to use him as a human shield to save a rare collection of baseball cards.

What I do have a problem with, however, is T.VA's forum user's portrayal of the issue, which can be characterized by, you guessed it, a lack of arguments for their rejection of moral rights. Instead their controversial position is taken for granted.

Lazy moral relativism or what's the objection?

Because T.VA's forum users are routinely unclear in their script, I'm not sure what they meant by "rights are a social convention and not a moral one." I initially took them to be raising some sort of moral relativist argument, even though they reject moral subjectivism at the end of their video. Notice that what they say about "moral rights" can easily be said about any ethical concept. "Oh, this idea of 'universal moral principles' is merely a social convention." "Oh, this idea of 'intrinsic value' is merely a social convention." "Oh, this idea of 'right and wrong'? It's merely a social convention." Much like most of the outlandish claims in T.VA's video, it's nothing substantive and more needs to be said. For starters, an argument would be nice.

I'm rational, but everyone else is irrational

Returning back to the prior quote, this is where T.VA's video goes full-blown BionicDance. They describe their opponents as dogmatic and their position as rational. Unless their opponents have actually rejected reasoning all together in place of dogmas (which, if they have, where's an example?), then this hyper, New Atheist rhetoric is pretty suspect.

Why they take deontology as dogmatic is possibly because they believe it "deals only in absolutes, and in which ignores the highly context nature of ethics." Here they might be talking generally about the theory—much in the same way people will raise objections to utilitarianism in the form of hedonistic act utilitarianism (granted, some objections to hedonistic act utilitarianism can extend to other variations of utilitarianism).

That said, even if they're speaking generally, I think it's still worth noting that deontology has received contributions that go beyond Immanuel Kant's centuries old biting of the bullet for the murderer at the door. In this case, Kant ate a warehouse of ammunition when he claimed it would be impermissible to lie to a murderer who's looking for his potential victim, who you happen to be hiding in your house. But even Kant's defense of this position could hardly be considered oafish, as much as T.VA likely believes this to be the case. I would suggest reading Kant's On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, in which argues as to why a duty of truthfulness is so unconditional. If we're not satisfied with Kant's alleged lack of sensitivity to context, we can turn to the work of contemporary philosophers and deontologists.

Ross' three dilemmas

One being W.D. Ross, who, funnily enough, offers a somewhat similar critique of consequentialism that T.VA tries to pin on deontology—that is, roughly, it ignores some important aspects of ethics. A large problem for consequentialism, W.D. Ross argues, is that it fails to take into account the past and our relations to others. He illustrates this by having us consider what we ought to do in a few moral dilemmas.

The first dilemma is set up as follows: You borrowed money from a friend, and you promised to pay him back as soon as you can. Well, the dilemma crops up when you later get enough money to pay back your friend, but you're also considering giving the money to charity instead. Whether you pay off your debt or give the money to charity, either act brings about the same amount of good. Given that each act would bring about equally good consequences, the consequentialist has no reason to prefer one over the other. But Ross, in building up his deontological theory, argues that we would have a prima facie duty to pay back our friend. This is to say that it's self-evident that we ought to keep our promise in this dilemma.

Ross continues with a different dilemma in which fulfilling a promise to a friend will give this friend 1,000 units of good. However, one could, once again, forgo the promise and instead give to the friend something that produces 1,001 units of good. If the latter act is chosen, a promise is broken and no promises are fulfilled. The question, then, is that even with the latter producing more good, would it still be the right choice to break the promise because of the one more unit of good it produces? Of course, Ross does not deny that producing good for others is a prima facie duty, but it's hardly the only one worth considering. Context much?

A third dilemma Ross poses is that of conferring either 1,000 units of good to person A, who is a very good person, or 1,001 units of good to person B, who is a very bad person. To clarify, there are no long term consequences that will give one the edge over the other, but giving the units of good to person B does maximize the units of good in the world, so is it the right act? Ross wagers that many people will intuitively reject the maximizing of good in these dilemmas, and, in addition, will recognize that there are prima facie duties such as promise-keeping and justice. In fact, given that Ross takes prima facie duties to be self-evident, a rational agent would be compelled to accept them.

Further adventures of the "rational" squad

Going back to the quote that kicked off this video:

And less deontologists like Gary Francione, who is a woo. All deontologists are woos because absolute deontological authority is inherently an appeal to woo. Look back to Kant on that one.

"All deontologists are woos"? That sounds an awful lot like a dogmatic absolute that's opposed to Rational Pragmatic Physical Evidential Scientific Freethinking Logic™. Perhaps I was too quick to think they were speaking generally earlier. I sound like a broken record at this point, but it's not clear what they mean. Honestly, what do they mean by the term "woo"? I'm guessing they mean something that is, "based on or involving irrational superstition." Or for another definition, "A person readily accepting supernatural, paranormal, occult, or pseudoscientific phenomena, or emotion-based beliefs and explanations."

The first formulation of the categorical imperative

A fundamental principle in Kantian ethics is the categorical imperative. The first formulation of which (also known as the Formula of Universal Law) states "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." To understand this, we need to know that a "maxim" is one's principle of action. In the first section of The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant gives the following example of a maxim: ". . . when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen." With that understood, the Formula of Universal Law prohibits any maxim that is contradictory. If it leads to a contradiction, then it cannot be a permissible or obligatory act for moral agents, but is, instead, an impermissible act. It would be an act that moral agents should not perform. Kant infers that the prior maxim leads to a contradiction, since, upon being universalized, one would fail to obtain one's aims. He does so by arguing that if everyone accepted this maxim as permissible (so, it being universalized), then "no one would believe what was promised him but would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses." The maxim, if willed, defeats itself.

Whether we accept Kant's reasoning here or not, this core principle of Kantian ethics shows the theory to be anything but "woo." Unlike T.VA's forum users who simply assert that consequentialism is the true rational theory, Kant actually attempts to ground morality in reason. I would love to see T.VA or his deontology critics attempt to do the same.

Acknowledging T.VA and company's only objection to deontological veganism/the moral rights of animals

As the section title implies, T.VA's writers took a break from insults to raise one sensible objection to deontological veganism/animal rights:

The deontological view is absolute. No justification no matter what. One mouse in a research lab to save billions of human lives is unacceptable to a deontological vegan.

Finally, we get something of substance from T.VA. Intuitively, not sacrificing a mouse to save a billion people is a problem for deontology, and it's one deontologists should address, but it is interesting that T.VA is entirely silent on the objectionable implications of consequentialism.

This isn't to say that I was expecting T.VA and his select viewers to refute their own ethical theory, but with their rosy, unexamined view of consequentialism and their weak yet confident dismissal of deontology, I'm left wondering if they understand either theory. Anyway, as I promised earlier, here are more problems with consequentialism.

Carl Cohen and consequentialist justifications of vivisection

Carl Cohen, in his paper The Case For The Use of Animals in Biomedical Research, argues against the notion that non-human animals have rights. Rather, only moral agents can possess rights. From this, Cohen argues that humans and non-human animals are not of equal moral worth or consideration. With humans having rights and non-human animals not having rights, he argues that it would be permissible to use non-human animals as means.

This all sounds Kantian and deontological with discussion of rights and Kant's own belief that it was permissible for moral agents to use non-human animals as mere means, so one might be asking what the relevancy is between Cohen's paper and the problems with consequentialism. Well, Cohen, in response to Peter Singer and his claims of speciesism (a prejudice that Cohen does not shy away from but rather endorses), argues that the utilitarian is committed to the use of animals for medical testing. Yet, such a conclusion does not seem to be a problem for T.VA's forum users, as they fully agree that medical testing on animals is permissible in certain cases, and it's a failing of deontology to not permit acts such as animal testing.

To help understand the reasoning underpinning the utilitarian or consequentialist's conclusion, here's Cohen's argument as to why they are committed to the use of animals in medical research.

Even if it were true – as it is surely not – that the pains of all animate beings must be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use, and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such research, rights being trump cards to which interests and advantage must give way. But an argument that is explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all over the long run must attend also to the disadvantageous consequences of not using animals in research, and to all the achievements attained and attainable only through their use. The sum of the benefits of their use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimination of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and animals) achieved through research using animals is so incalculably great that the argument of these critics, systematically pursued, establishes not their conclusion but its reverse: to refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally wrong.

If T.VA's script writers reject Cohen's conclusion, then they need to escape this problem that the utilitarian or consequentialist faces. But, once again, the authors of T.VA's video seem to find the wide use of animals for medical testing to be entirely permissible and perhaps even obligatory for similar reasons that Cohen mentioned, so they might not see any burden here.

Even with the prospect of permitting hundreds of thousands of dogs, cats, rabbits, monkeys, chimpanzees, farm animals, and millions of mice and rats to suffer and die in a laboratory yearly, there seems to be no pressure on T.VA's script writers, as they already seemingly embrace these practices and find rejection of their permissibility to be a problem for deontology. That said, the problems the consequentialist faces may become more apparent when we extend this reasoning until we find ourselves permitting acts beyond the use of animals in medical research.

Consequentialism and permitting human vivisection

In contrast to the Kantian, a problem for the consequentialist is that it is permissible to use a person merely as a means to an end. Cohen avoids this problem by taking the position that humans do have rights, but T.VA and his merry consequentialists cannot make the same move. In fact, if subjecting T.VA against his will to decades of painful medical experimentation led to better medical technology that improved many people's lives, then, so long as the good that was gained outweighed the harm that was created, it would be permissible (and even obligatory) to inflict pain upon T.VA in the name of medical pursuits.

In the words that T.VA used, it's weighing the "benefit" against the "harm" produced by a particular act. In making their case for the ethical treatment of animals, hedonistic utilitarians, for example, will stress the impartiality and intrinsic worth of experiencing pleasure. Pleasure is the one intrinsic good and pain is the only thing intrinsically bad, and it's of no moral importance who derives pleasure or pain. Pleasure and pain are experienced by both the affluent and the poor, and, as a matter of consistency, either one's pleasure is of equal moral worth in comparison to the other's pleasure. Likewise, it doesn't matter if the pleasure or pain is experienced by a human or a non-human animal. Both beings' experience of pleasure has an equal claim to be maximized as well as their pain to be minimized.

With this said, it should be clear as to why a human could so easily be substituted in the case of permitting the medical testing of non-human animals. The ends do not change. As for the moral implications of the means, they change insofar as the human could possibly receive more pain or be deprived of more pleasure than some non-human animals, so a utilitarian calculation would have to take this into consideration. But we cannot forget that there's also much pain to be avoided if forced medical experiments on humans yield great medical benefits. After all, both humans and non-human animals in great numbers could benefit.

The ends of sadists

With this treatment of humans in mind, we can return to the treatment of non-human animals considered under a consequentialist or utilitarian theory. For this, we can imagine a sadist who enjoys filming himself abusing non-human animals, and in one instance of abuse, he shares the footage for many sadists to enjoy over many years. The intensity and duration of the pleasure of the sadists eventually outweighs the pain inflicted on the non-human animal in the film as well as the deprivation of its pleasure. Is such an act permissible because it leads to the "best" consequences? An ethical theory that permits or obligates the torture of a non-human animal (especially for the ends of sadists) seems to be a theory with problems—especially for those who consider themselves in favor of treating non-human animals well.

Permitting the suffering of a cow for our ends

To further challenge the consequentialist justifications of T.VA and company's veganism, what about cases where animals suffer in the process of creating food for many people who all derive immense satisifaction from the animals' products? As in the case of medical experimentation, would it be permissible to subjugate animals to such treatment so long as the harm caused to it ultimately did not surpass the benefit it generated? For example, in order to produce more milk, many dairy cows are given bovine growth hormone and are kept pregnant. Of course, in order to maximize the milk for humans, the offspring of the dairy cows are taken away so that they do not drink any of their mother's milk. The fate of the offspring is determined by their sex, in which males are slaughtered for veal and the females are raised to replace their mothers. Once dairy cows begin to slow down in milk production, they are slaughtered for meat. Because of their cruel living conditions and their treatment of being mere objects of food production, these dairy cows will live short, painful lives (3-5 years of their normal 20-year life spans). With these vicious methods employed, dairy cows can produce ten times the milk they would normally produce.

Perhaps these conditions, as they are now considered, cannot be justified by consequentialism, but what if the technology becomes efficient enough to allow humans to extract an amount of milk to the point of serving so many people that a cow's preferences weigh considerably little under a utilitarian calculation? Much like Cohen's earlier point about medical experimentation, the utilitarian, at some point, will be committed to the permissibility of this treatment of cows. Yet I fail to understand how such appalling treatment of cows could ever be seen as permissible simply because of how efficiently and ruthlessly they're being used as a means to maximize our ends.

While issuing their complacent dismissal of Francione's position, which took the form of merely quoting him, T.VA's script writers seem completely unaware or uncaring of the thin philosophical ice that they are dancing on. I'm not saying that there are no thoughtful consequentialist or utilitarian justifications for veganism (and one could try to escape some of these problems by adopting a theory of value other than hedonism, which they very well may not subscribe to anyway), but this narrative of "consequentialism roolz and deontology droolz" is not as settled as T.VA's video implies.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative

Finally, returning to a prior quote, we have T.VA first quoting Gary Francione to then repeat some familiar ad hominem attacks. Apparently proponents of animal rights are on the "fringe," irrational, and seriously lacking in critical thinking. Certainly there's no projection here:

"We cannot justify treating any sentient nonhuman as our property, as a resource, as a thing we [c]an use and kill for our purposes." The deontological view is absolute. No justification no matter what. One mouse in a research lab to save billions of human lives is unacceptable to a deontological vegan. If you're judging veganism by what the deontological fringe say, you are indulging in a strawman argument. That's not what most people actually believe, and it's certainly not what's rational. If you want to discuss this at more length, we can, but suffice it to say that a lot of vegans are also confused on that point. Partially due to the popularity of non-rational advocates like Francione, and that only goes to show that veganism doesn't always mean atheism or critical thinking in itself. When you hear somebody talking seriously about "rights," and it's not either a political discussion or a mere turn of phrase, they are probably not representing the rational consequentialist view.

Yeah, damn that deontological fringe for trying to free non-human animals from their cages, rather than just making the cages bigger. To show how plagued deontology is with woo and dogma, I think it's worth bringing up the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which is essentially what Francione is employing in the quote T.VA presented earlier. The second formulation of the categorical imperative (also known as the Formula of Humanity), as Kant states it, is to, "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end." Clearly Francione diverges from Kant by extending respect to not just humanity but also to nonhuman animals.

Perhaps seeing nonhuman animals as ends in themselves is not held by most people, but I don't think it would be surprising to see many people—if not most—taking the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a decent moral principle. If slavery of a few brought about the most happiness, many of us would still find such an instance of slavery immoral. Or we can return to the case of forcing T.VA to endure years of painful medical experimentation. As a less extreme example, if someone faked a friendship in order to gain something, many people would find this impermissible as well. For these examples and many more like them, we can give consequentialist responses that might be able to address them, but the categorical imperative also gives a response, and it's worth acknowledging that it is one that many people are drawn toward. Rather than one's worth being tied to, for example, the happiness one can hold or produce, a more deontological or Kantian answer is that a being's worth is tied to the being itself. The late, great philosopher Tom Regan makes this point in The Case for Animal Rights with the following:

What has value for the utilitarian is the satisfaction of an individual's interests, not the individual whose interests they are. A universe in which you satisfy your desire for food, water, and warmth is, other things being equal, better than the universe in which these desires are frustrated. And the same is true in the case of an animal with similar desires. But neither you nor the animal have any value in your own right. Only your feelings do.

Here is an analogy to help make the philosophical point clearer: a cup contains different liquids, sometimes sweet, sometimes bitter, sometimes a mix of the two. What has value are the liquids: the sweeter the better, the bitterer the worse. The cup, the container, has no value. It is what goes into it, not what they go into, that has value. For the utilitarian you and I are like the cup; we have no value as individuals and thus no equal value. What has value is what goes into us, what we serve as receptacles for; our feelings of satisfaction have positive value, our feelings of frustration negative value.

Regan finds this unsatisfactory, as this theory of value leads to absurd results, such as some of the examples I gave earlier. Regan himself gives a thought experiment in which he has a cranky old aunt who will, upon death, pass along a large inheritance to him. To avoid paying a large amount of taxes for the inheritance, he plans on donating some of it to a children's hospital. This will bring about a lot of joy for many people, which includes the children, their relatives and friends, as well as himself; however, his aunt will likely outlive the children who are suffering, so it's asked whether it would be permissible to kill her. Also, he's done his hitman homework and has a very low chance of getting caught. With these considerations, murdering his aunt will bring about the greatest amount of satisfaction for all of those involved as well as minimize their frustrations. Regan takes it that most people would reject the permissibility of murdering her. Yet, as Regan affirms, utilitarianism would find her murder to be an obligatory act. You would have a duty to murder her.

I'm beating a dead aunt at this point, so let me just say that the idea that beings have inherent value cannot be so easily dismissed.


Works Cited

Definitions of "woo"
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/woo-woo
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/woo_woo

Immanuel Kant's On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy
http://bgillette.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/KANTsupposedRightToLie.pdf

Excerpt of W.D. Ross' The Right and the Good
http://bonevac.info/f325/Ross2a.pdf

Immanuel Kant's The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf

Carl Cohen's The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,SP08/cohen.pdf

Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights
http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3140/Regan.pdf