The Argument from Companion Animals

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Frank Quasar
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals

Post by Frank Quasar »

the argument from companions seems really good, and so does name the justification. i'm a bit confused on one aspect though, so i would like for a bit of clarity.

normally with NTT the point "if true of humans" is specified, i think this is the golden rule axiom embedded within the argument. i'm not picking up on that in the name the justification argument for example, would it still be a viable and good tool to deploy if one were to use it informally?

so, let's say somebody uses "intelligence" as a justification that they name in order to justify the radical difference in moral status, a common go-to point is to apply the golden rule axiom by switching it on the carnist with intelligence (if you had low intelligence would this justification be reasonable to radically differentiate the difference in moral status?). would this sort of thing be clarified within the informal presentation?

would like to get some extra clarity on some of my confusion, i plan to recommend this article to some of my friends because we do tend to discuss a couple of the ethical principles of veganism from time to time.

(also, i do not see a premise which rejects arbitrary traits/double standards in ntt 2.0 -- is it important to express this at all or is it something which can be reached through the new version?)
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brimstoneSalad
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Re: The Argument from Companion Animals

Post by brimstoneSalad »

Frank Quasar wrote: Tue Jun 05, 2018 10:19 am normally with NTT the point "if true of humans" is specified, i think this is the golden rule axiom embedded within the argument. i'm not picking up on that in the name the justification argument for example, would it still be a viable and good tool to deploy if one were to use it informally?
The problem with the "if true of humans" is that it just states it as fact and there is no normative compulsion attached to that. The natural response could just be "so what". Even the trait of moral value begs that question without definition.

The golden rule has two essential features, without the normative "Do unto others" command the "as you would have them do unto you" is without force. NTT basically only has the second half in it.
It's basically saying that you don't do unto others as you would have them do unto you, but it never demonstrates that this is a problem or shows any contradiction with that.

Name The Justification has a normative claim that a justification is required and it defines non-trivial moral status with normative requirements
"In the following 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure)."

And so does this argument in this change:
Margaret Hayek wrote: Sat May 26, 2018 3:20 am (P1) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

(P2) If we should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, but it's OK to (i.e. it isn't true that we should not) inflict massive suffering upon or killing sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, then there must be some morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.

(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.

Therefore

(C) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

And if you want to make this a more explicit argument for veganism we could add the empirical premise:

(P4) Consuming animal products instead of being vegan does inflict massive suffering upon and kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

Therefore

(C2) We should not consume animal products; we should instead be vegan.
I like it much better when it's in the argument itself rather than exported as a definition of a term that's in the argument; it's more transparent.

Always look for a should or a do or don't or something about requirement in the premises. Without having a should statement in the premises, you may be making an is-ought fallacy (not always a fallacy, but it can be when you have an unjustified jump from is to ought) if you have a should in the conclusion (or attempt the draw such conclusions).

The trouble I've been having with Isaac is that he doesn't want to make any normative claims, but he wants his argument to have normative force. Kind of a "have your cake and eat it too" situation.
I don't think it's impossible to do necessarily, but I don't think his argument succeeds at it, particularly since it doesn't follow given the structure of his premises and conclusion (these arguments at least DO follow).
Frank Quasar wrote: Tue Jun 05, 2018 10:19 amwould this sort of thing be clarified within the informal presentation?
It could be. We could say that a justification is morally relevant and important enough to justify the difference of moral status if it would also do so for a copy of a human minus those differences.

This doesn't defeat arbitrary standards, though.

@Margaret Hayek What do you think?
Frank Quasar wrote: Tue Jun 05, 2018 10:19 am (also, i do not see a premise which rejects arbitrary traits/double standards in ntt 2.0 -- is it important to express this at all or is it something which can be reached through the new version?)
The trick is that Isaac is trying to do two things.

One of them is relatively easy: compare a human to a being like a human but without those traits, and if it denies value to the latter being without the traits then it's relevant. You just have to be careful with your wording there to avoid internal contradictions. That's an easy fix though.

The other is hard: to eliminate arbitrary standards like "is human", Isaac has also appealed to alien species attacking humans on a similar but generalized basis of being "a different species" which is not the named justification. This appeal fails and would need a different argument. I'm not entirely sure what kind of argument, because it's hard to generalize a trait like that.

Or you can just forbid arbitrary standards... but then you have to define what is and isn't arbitrary, or make an entire argument to address that; how can we say what is morally relevant IN the argument? We could just say sentience, and then you couldn't get around it, but that's a very strong claim people might disagree with.

It doesn't have to be stated as long as the person making the argument recognizes that arbitrary traits or double standards can be appealed to for defeating the argument. If somebody really thinks moral value is arbitrary, it's very hard to make a normative argument for that person without first debunking that view and converting the person to some kind of realism or constructivism.
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