Arguing Sentience is a Naturalistic Fallacy?

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Lay Vegan
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Arguing Sentience is a Naturalistic Fallacy?

Post by Lay Vegan »

I received some criticism on a recent video of mine for deploying a naturalistic fallacy when arguing that because animals are sentient, they should included within the scope of moral concern. I do not believe my argument is fallacious, but it's possible that I used a poor or incomplete argument.

My argument;

(p1) If a being can experience harm then they deserve moral consideration
(p2) sentient animals can experience well-being or harm
(c) sentient animals deserve moral consideration

Derived from the argument of Relevance:

(p1)We should make our decisions on the basis of what is relevant to the effects they will have. (consequentialist ethics)
(p2) When we respect someone, we take into account how our decisions can harm them, and try not to harm.
(p3) What is relevant to someone being harmed is their capacity to be harmed.
(p4) We should respect those who can be harmed.
(p5) Sentient beings are the ones that can be harmed.
(C) We should respect sentient beings.

The person accused me of deriving "ought" (animals should be included within the scope of moral concern) from an "is" (animals are sentient). However, I don't believe nature to be totally disconnected from ethics. If the "is" has been combined with a principle (sentience is the only natural trait relevant to moral concern) followed by the "ought", then there is a relationship in the" is-ought" distinction. However, would this still be fallacious reasoning?

On the contrary, if argue that cats are not bipedal, therefore they should not be included within the scope of moral concern, this would be a naturalistic fallacy because this natural trait (bidepadalism) is irrelevant to ethics.

Is it ever rational to derive ethics from any natural traits? Is arguing sentience a naturalistic fallacy?

My criticism:
"I am pretty sure that is naturalistic fallacy, or that is-ought problem. You cant derive ought from "animals feel pain", or "animals avoid pain" and similar.
Sentience part is worthless when it comes persuading non vegans."


Video where I was criticized;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YC5vlh6OOk0&t=334s
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brimstoneSalad
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Re: Arguing Sentience is a Naturalistic Fallacy?

Post by brimstoneSalad »

Lay Vegan wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 8:55 pm My argument;

(p1) If a being can experience harm then they deserve moral consideration
(p2) sentient animals can experience well-being or harm
(c) sentient animals deserve moral consideration
That's a perfectly valid syllogism. You don't need "well-being" in there, but it's fine.

P1: A is B
P2: C is A
Conclusion: C is B

As to the criticism you received:

The "naturalistic fallacy" isn't a formal logical fallacy... it's not even a generally recognized informal fallacy.

Wikipedia has some very good responses in its articles on the topics. Here's a short one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalistic_fallacy
Some philosophers reject the naturalistic fallacy and/or suggest solutions for the proposed is–ought problem.

Ralph McInerny suggests that "ought" is already bound up in "is", in so far as the very nature of things have ends/goals within them. For example, a clock is a device used to keep time. When one understands the function of a clock, then a standard of evaluation is implicit in the very description of the clock, i.e., because it "is" a clock, it "ought" to keep the time. Thus, if one cannot pick a good clock from a bad clock, then one does not really know what a clock is. In like manner, if one cannot determine good human action from bad, then one does not really know what the human person is.[7][page needed]

Certain uses of the naturalistic fallacy refutation (a scheme of reasoning that declares an inference invalid because it incorporates an instance of the naturalistic fallacy) have been criticized as lacking rational bases, and labelled anti-naturalistic fallacy.[8][page needed] For instance, Alex Walter wrote:

"The naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s 'law' are frequently appealed to for the purpose of drawing limits around the scope of scientific inquiry into ethics and morality. These two objections are shown to be without force."[9]
The refutations from naturalistic fallacy defined as inferring evaluative conclusions from purely factual premises[10] do assert, implicitly, that there is no connection between the facts and the norms (in particular, between the facts and the mental process that led to adoption of the norms).
It's more of a fallacy to assert "naturalistic fallacy" or claim that "is-ought" is an unbreakable barrier.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has some more in-depth info, but this is a very good (and concise) summary:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is%E2%80%93ought_problem#Responses

The point is... so what if you're going from is to ought? Frankly you ought to, as it's the only way morality can be meaningful. And if you look into the complaint Hume made, it was really just about people jumping from Is to Ought without clear explanation.
He didn't even deny it was possible (although he didn't seem to believe it was from reason).
Hume wrote:In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.[1][2]
People who deny that it's possible at all are probably hardened relativists, and are going far beyond what Hume complained about.

I think our discussion in the other thread (and the links I gave you there) will probably provide more insight.

But as it's put, there's nothing wrong with your argument. You just may need to put in some work arguing for your premises.
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Re: Arguing Sentience is a Naturalistic Fallacy?

Post by emmanuela_7 »

I struggle to see how one can bridge the is/ought distinction.

Take the clock example quoted above from the Wikipedia entry. We can say that a clock "ought" to keep the time, but this is a very different ought than the moral ought. The clock only "ought" to keep the time because we have given the clock this function, i.e. the function of keeping the time. This is still a factual claim, as it is only concerned with objects and their assigned functions in the world. When we say that the clock "ought" to be keeping the time, we really mean that given that the clock is functioning properly in the way we have created it, it is keeping the time. The same cannot be said for moral oughts.

The naturalistic fallacy holds every single time we make any moral claim, however. Which is why it is not a great response by non-vegans. For example, if you ask someone why they think murdering humans is morally wrong, anything they say will be a factual claim (e.g. their loved ones will be sad, said person will lose out on future experiences, bodily autonomy etc). The same holds for any other moral claim people make.

Your argument is definitely valid. You just need to get people to agree to P1. In order to do that, you need to point out their inconsistencies when/if they try to maintain that murdering humans/rape/etc is morally wrong. It's either one or the other.
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brimstoneSalad
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Re: Arguing Sentience is a Naturalistic Fallacy?

Post by brimstoneSalad »

emmanuela_7 wrote: Thu Feb 08, 2018 4:29 pm When we say that the clock "ought" to be keeping the time, we really mean that given that the clock is functioning properly in the way we have created it, it is keeping the time. The same cannot be said for moral oughts.
The same can be said, but it hinges on the answer to an existential question.

We know what a clock is.
But what is the being we call "you"?

What purpose do you ascribe your being?
Is this being supposed good person? If so, we can talk very coherently about moral oughts.
Is this being supposed to be a bad person? If so, then we can talk coherently about immoral oughts.

We can also look directly at the mind and deduce some teleology based on function. For example, we can examine the paradox of hedonism to rule out certain purposes as functionally impossible (as if we claimed the purpose of a clock was not to tell time, but to be a flying machine). If we do this, we may be able to narrow down purpose to a moral one as we recognize the mind's function as being purpose driven machine, and we recognize superior objective purpose.
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