vegans and antropomorphism

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Lightningman_42
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by Lightningman_42 »

McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pm brimstoneSalad

If is-ought problem is ignored, what stops me to make an argument like this:
1.If plants are living things, then plants have moral value.
2.Plants are living things.
3.Therefore, plants have moral value.

Third question is about comatose beings. If those beings (lets say, humans), during the short therm coma, have no, interests, values, preferences, would they still be or moral value?
And fourth question.....If interests, values, preferences, and similar, gives moral value, how come then multitude of those things is more moral value?
Human beings still have moral value while comatose. Not because of interests that they hold while comatose (I'd assume people don't have any while comatose), but because of interests that they held before falling into comas. You currently value continuing to live. So if you fall into a coma tomorrow, then I'd do wrong to you if I kill you in that state, because I'd be denying you the opportunity to live further. It would also be wrong to kill you while comatose, due to other interests you hold, such as your interests in fulfilling your life goals. Goals which you might be able to fulfill if you recover from your coma, but not if I kill you before you can wake up.

Plants, having no brain or nervous system, are not sentient. They are not only incapable of having any interests right now, but also never had any, and never will (different in this respect, from people in comas, who used to have interests that mattered to them, and who might recover later on).

One could argue that simply being alive grants plants moral value. However, "being alive" is an arbitrary basis for moral worth to choose, because it's something that this person making the choice values, but is not something that the plant itself values.
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by McLovin »

Lightningman_42

isn't that an ad hoc? Dead people had their interests, preferences and values, in the past, also. And I assume that you dont think that dead people are of moral value? Dont see how past can have any relevance.
And I hardly see how my "currently value" can continue, when I have no values, etc, during the coma. And if appeal to the future values, then abortion would clearly be immoral, what would conflict with many vegans.

Being alive is prerequisite for being sentient organism. It is not really arbitrary. The point was, if one can derive moral value from a condition, or a quality which some being possess, then why not being alive?
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by brimstoneSalad »

McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pm Why not add additional criteria for moral value, like abstract thought and similar things, which is needed for understanding what morality could be?
Why not add additional criteria for mass, like abstract thought so that the thing with mass can understand what mass is?
McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pmThat also brings me to the thought I had. I think a solid case could be made that even if animals are of some moral value, killing then and eating them would be morally justifiable.
Not would, but could be depending on the circumstances.

It's the consequences of an act, all consequences (good and bad) that make an act right or wrong on balance.
In the trolley problem you flip the switch, and you're justified in killing one person to save five.

McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pm And if is-ought problem is ignored, what stops me to make an argument like this:
1.If plants are living things, then plants have moral value.
2.Plants are living things.
3.Therefore, plants have moral value.
You can make the argument, but it relies on your claim that moral value derives from being "alive", which is arbitrary. Might as well claim that moral value comes from being white, or male, or some other arbitrary criterion.

Moral value deriving from a being having values is a non-arbitrary/objective approach.

You can come up with any arbitrarily long list of "subjective moralities", from maximizing paperclips in the universe to only valuing white men, but all of those fail at being an objective morality, and they fail at being useful or persuasive as mere assertions.

McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pm Third question is about comatose beings. If those beings (lets say, humans), during the short therm coma, have no, interests, values, preferences, would they still be or moral value?
Yes, the same as while you're asleep or otherwise unaware.
Interests are persistent. We're also interested in what happens after we die, for instance. It could be wrong to parade somebody's naked dead body around the town in a humiliating way, because they wouldn't want that done.

This is where an interest based framework differs from a hedonistic one (only valuing experienced pleasure and pain).

I often use the example of the artist who puts his all into a painting and finishes it before he dies, and his dying wish was for you to not destroy the painting. It would be wrong to destroy the painting (at least if it wasn't terribly inconvenient to keep it around), and by fulfilling his wish you'd be doing something good... because you'd want the same for yourself, having your own dying wishes honored (from something like a painting, to taking care of a pet or loved one).

McLovin wrote: Fri Jan 05, 2018 8:02 pmAnd fourth question.....If interests, values, preferences, and similar, gives moral value, how come then multitude of those things is more moral value?
I don't understand the question.

If you mean "why are some preferences more valuable than others" it depends on the strength of the preference.
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by McLovin »

brimstoneSalad

Morality goes hand in hand with abstract thought.

Circumstances in my thought are benefit of the humans (and similar things), if humans are of more moral value than non human animals.

As I wrote in my previous message here, I hardly see how being alive is an arbitrary quality, considering that in order to have values, you need to be alive.
What we can establish objectively, considering humans, is that humans are living organisms, can engage in abstract thoughts, have high cognitive abilities, would rather avoid pain and suffering, have preferences, etc.
You pick one, and I pick another. If I am mistaken, as I can see, then it must be some fact. or something,out there, independent of us, which corresponds with the thing you picked.
Otherwise, as I can see, it is a special pleading to fish something out of the things we are and can do, but reject the other things.

If interests and values are persistent, even if subject is in coma, then those things "persist" only in the memories of other people, and not with the subject, and that is where it breaks down for me.
With your painting example we have conflicts of interests. Artist does not want for his painting to be destroyed, but i want and I dont see why his interests in the past would overweight mine which are actual.
Another problem I have with that reasoning is when people are for abortion and think that there is nothing wrong with abortion.

You said "Abstract thought probably means a being has a lot more moral value (because it has a multitude of additional values/interests/preferences deriving from that abstract thought)". If value/preference/interest is what gives moral value, then how more of those things equals more moral value?
If existence of value gives moral value, then how can you get more moral value of the same thing, when criteria is already met?
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by brimstoneSalad »

McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pm Morality goes hand in hand with abstract thought.
Thinking about and practicing morality goes hand in hand with abstract thought.
But so does thinking about and measuring an object's mass.

That does not mean that something without abstract thought necessarily has no moral value (it may be true that sentience necessitates SOME abstract thought in order to function, but that's not clear here), or that something without abstract thought has no mass.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmAs I wrote in my previous message here, I hardly see how being alive is an arbitrary quality, considering that in order to have values, you need to be alive.
Incorrect, non-living things can have values. Consider synthetic intelligence.
And not all living things have values because they don't all have minds to process them.

Even if we ignore synthetic intelligence, you might as well say "being made out of matter" is the source of moral value and that rocks have value at that point. See? It's arbitrary.

Made out of matter, alive, an animal, having a brain, having interests, having abstract thoughts, capable of calculus

Only one of those is non-arbitrary. The rest are either bars set arbitrarily "higher" or arbitrarily lower than the only necessary property.

Unless you're talking about the immediate or proximate quality (if the immediate quality is not available for assessment), you're just making arbitrary assertions.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pm You pick one, and I pick another. If I am mistaken, as I can see, then it must be some fact. or something,out there, independent of us, which corresponds with the thing you picked.
The fact is basing the decision on a non-arbitrary property that is essentially related to the assessment.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pm Otherwise, as I can see, it is a special pleading to fish something out of the things we are and can do, but reject the other things.
So, if we happen to be white, it would be special pleading to ignore that and grant black people value anyway?
If we happen to be men, it would be special pleading to ignore that and grant value to women?
If we happen to be 5 foot ten inches tall, it would be special pleading to ignore that and grant value to those who are taller or shorter than we are?

By ignoring the rational basis for assigning value to the property of having interests, and admitting any unrelated property, you take on a much more difficult burden of finding a way to deny racist, sexist, height-ist everything-else-ist moral solipsism.

Or are you saying you regard that as equally credible to your own value system?
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pm If interests and values are persistent, even if subject is in coma, then those things "persist" only in the memories of other people, and not with the subject, and that is where it breaks down for me.
The fact that something happened in the past remains a fact. Our access to it may be dependent on records (from memory, to a written will) for evidence, which means our fulfilling those interests is limited by our knowledge of them.

How does that break down?
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmWith your painting example we have conflicts of interests.
:lol: There are always conflicts of interest. Do you think a moral system fails unless it doesn't have any conflicts of interest in it?
The question is how those conflicts are resolved.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmArtist does not want for his painting to be destroyed, but i want and I dont see why his interests in the past would overweight mine which are actual.
Roofied girl does not want to be raped, but you want to rape her. She's unconscious so her interests aren't "actual", and your interests are "actual". Am I correct in supposing how you would resolve this conflict of interest?

If you just do what you want to do and don't care about anybody else's interests, that's just called being selfish.
If that's what kind of person you are, you have a problem with morality period.

A person who puts the interests of others above their own selfish desires, who abstains from harming the interests of others even when they would get hedonistic pleasure from it, is a better person. If you are not willing to do that, you could just honestly admit to not being a very good person, but you don't need to make up a special arbitrary morality that absolves you of the bad things you do based on all of this special pleading.

Lacking an objective standard, morality becomes useless because then anybody is moral just by saying so and making up new ad hoc rules and exceptions for themselves as they please.

I'm not a perfect person. I do things that harm others and the environment sometimes. But I can admit that, and I try to do better. I don't need to make up excuses for myself to make me believe I'm a better person than I am, I just change and try to do better.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmAnother problem I have with that reasoning is when people are for abortion and think that there is nothing wrong with abortion.
So... you have already decided that abortion is wrong based on faith, and any moral system which disagrees with that you will reject no matter how sound the logic is of that system?

That's pretty much the definition of closed minded, that's not you reasoning anything.
McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmYou said "Abstract thought probably means a being has a lot more moral value (because it has a multitude of additional values/interests/preferences deriving from that abstract thought)". If value/preference/interest is what gives moral value, then how more of those things equals more moral value?
Not just quantity, but also magnitude. That's why I said probably.
Multiply quantity by the respective magnitude and you get the total value.
A being with more interests is not necessarily going to be less interested in those other interests.

E.G. You were originally only interested in eating cookies, but now you learn how to paint rainbows and you're interested in that too. Does learning to paint rainbows make you less interests in eating cookies?

If yes, and there's some conservation of interests where a being only has a certain amount of interest and can allocate that, then having more interests would not increase total value.
If no, and having more interests just increased the total, then a being with more interests (deriving perhaps from more abstract thought) would have more moral value.

The evidence suggests that interests are not totally conserved.
A person who, due to abstract thought, values patriotism and would be willing to die for his country has not simply become disinterested in living and suicidal, but has found an interest much stronger and more valuable to him or her. He or she probably likes eating cookies just about as much as ever, but has something new that is much more than that.

McLovin wrote: Sat Jan 06, 2018 9:39 pmIf existence of value gives moral value, then how can you get more moral value of the same thing, when criteria is already met?
I think you're confusing deontological value systems with consequentialist ones.

It is the consequence (violating interests) which is negative, and it's negative relative to the strength and number of those interests being violated.

Deontological, or rights based, approaches claim that a being has inalienable rights of such description based on some qualification. These are impractical and logically incoherent.
Here's a notorious thread on the subject:
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?t=785
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by McLovin »

brimstoneSalad

But mass and morality do not go hand in hand much, if at all.

As i am aware, there is no synthetic intelligence, at least yet. But I dont even know is it possible to make. But that is beside the point, because I am talking mostly about humans.
I dont understand what you mean by this "The fact is basing the decision on a non-arbitrary property that is essentially related to the assessment."
it seems to me that you are appealing to the same thing you want to argue, but I might be missing something.
And I think you are missing the point with my special pleading mention, because both of us think that some quality which we possess give us moral value. And if you dont support that with something independent of humans which corresponds with that quality, then there is special pleading.

Yes, it is a fact that a painter didnt want his painting destroyed, but it is also a fact that what happens in the past does not need to dictate the present, nor future. Just because a late father wanted his business to continue, it does not mean how it should, it does not mean how children should not move away, or sell the business, or change it. I think that is pretty obvious.
I never said anything why I think abortion is wrong, I said that I have problem with the reasoning if people are for abortion. Lifeless pile of tissue is not a person, it is not a painter, it is not sentient, there is no him/her, his/hers, etc, but it is addressed as such and when it comes to the unborn humans, then people dont see persons, him/her, his/hers and some other things. There are some other problems I see with that, too.
One of those problems is that you think how actualization of values is what matters, but no further actualization is required, what seems like a doble standard to me and also it can lead to some ridiculous conclusions.

I think there is a misunderstanding.
if X gives you Y, then XX will also give you Y, so is XXX and XXXX, etc. Just like when a person turns 18, it gets the right to vote and no matter how much more years it turns, it will have the same right. That is basically my third question from the beginning. Why think that XX gives YY and XXX gives YYY, etc.
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

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brimstoneSalad wrote: Thu Jan 04, 2018 2:14 pm The question is not complicated, and it helps get at where you think moral authority (any authority) comes from (it in no way is saying humans and non-human animals are equal to answer the question), so go ahead and give a good faith effort at answering it:

If you can't, you can admit that or float away, but what you must not do is continue replying provocatively and evading having an actual discussion.
I think he decided to float away.
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by bigbossomni »

on the question of the child molesting question. I personally do not care. Don't come onto my property trying to harm me or my family or you'll face force thats where my morality pretty much extends . I care for us as a species overall but I personally don't care what people do outside my property I might not agree with it but i wont preach to them.
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by bigbossomni »

Most animals die a quick death when it comes to slaughtering so they don't suffer any pain in the process. Yes I imagine discomfort happens in some factory farms but thats not the case for all of them. I simply don't care that animals die for our benefit. I only care that the standards of their living are decent and their death is quick. but vegans make the claim they are in some sort of endless suffering the whole time they are alive. Which is silly if livestock were capable of thoughts as us they'd all choose life on a farm and a quick death than life in the wilderness dying often painful slow deaths. Nature is more cruel than humans could ever be
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Re: vegans and antropomorphism

Post by brimstoneSalad »

McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 am But mass and morality do not go hand in hand much, if at all.
Please elaborate and give some argument for this.

This is no different from a creationist arbitrarily excluding evolution from science as "historical" because there was no witness. Frankly worse, the creationist at least has some kind of argument.

You just can't dismiss an apt analogy without explanation.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amAs i am aware, there is no synthetic intelligence, at least yet.
There is, although it's not human-level.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amI dont understand what you mean by this "The fact is basing the decision on a non-arbitrary property that is essentially related to the assessment."
it seems to me that you are appealing to the same thing you want to argue, but I might be missing something.
It is objectively true that sentient beings have interests; they can be assessed through various means, particularly tests for operant conditioning.
It is objectively true that those interests can be harmed/frustrated.

These are objective facts, and they non-arbitrarily relate to morality by being composed of the same substance (value) in the way "abstract thought" as you described it can not.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amAnd I think you are missing the point with my special pleading mention, because both of us think that some quality which we possess give us moral value. And if you dont support that with something independent of humans which corresponds with that quality, then there is special pleading.
Independent of humans? What is that supposed to mean?

We think we have some quality which gives us mass. Can we support that with something independent of humans?

McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amYes, it is a fact that a painter didnt want his painting destroyed, but it is also a fact that what happens in the past does not need to dictate the present, nor future.
The question is not if it "needs to" whatever that means, but if it would be morally good for it to.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amJust because a late father wanted his business to continue, it does not mean how it should, it does not mean how children should not move away, or sell the business, or change it. I think that is pretty obvious.
Again, you're appealing to your personal faith.
Can you make an argument for this?

It's a good thing for children to carry on the wishes of their parents, assuming those wishes aren't destructive (due to consequences).
Whether it's keeping a painting, or keeping a family business alive. That is, all other things being equal.

Are children morally obligated to do it? No. Moral obligation is much more complex than simple assessment.
That doesn't mean it's not a good thing to do.

And your intuitions are clearly not obvious to the vast majority of people, given the emphasis we put on wills, and even respecting ancient burial sites.

McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amI never said anything why I think abortion is wrong, I said that I have problem with the reasoning if people are for abortion.
You're going to have to spell out what that problem is.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amLifeless pile of tissue is not a person, it is not a painter, it is not sentient, there is no him/her, his/hers, etc, but it is addressed as such and when it comes to the unborn humans, then people dont see persons, him/her, his/hers and some other things. There are some other problems I see with that, too.
What does this have to do with anything?
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amOne of those problems is that you think how actualization of values is what matters, but no further actualization is required, what seems like a doble standard to me and also it can lead to some ridiculous conclusions.
Again, what?

Do you mean the question of whether it's a good thing to bring new life into the world?

McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amI think there is a misunderstanding.
if X gives you Y, then XX will also give you Y, so is XXX and XXXX, etc.
Or XX can give you YY.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amJust like when a person turns 18, it gets the right to vote and no matter how much more years it turns, it will have the same right.
That's called a threshold, and guess what: it's arbitrary.
That's not viable in any objective moral system.

Deontology tries to do some things like that, but it's not credible.
McLovin wrote: Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:16 amThat is basically my third question from the beginning. Why think that XX gives YY and XXX gives YYY, etc.
Because that's how magnitude of interest correspond to indications of sentience.
We know something wants something because it modifies its behavior (through learning and intelligence) to get it. If an organism barely wants something, it will not do that reliably or will do it more slowly; there's a weaker pressure to learn and modify behavior.

A barely sentient thing that wants X with all its being manifests modification of behavior comparable to a highly sentient thing that just barely wants X.
The cup is full to the brim, but it's a very small cup, vs. the cup is almost empty but it's a very large cup. They can have the same amount of contents.
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