Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[brimstoneSalad]

That water is H20 was a substantive discovery. Before 1750 they knew that things were water but they didn't know about H20. It is NOT simply a matter of formal logic / knowing logical form that they're the same thing.

I mean it can be a matter of dictionary definition of words.
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/H2O

I'm not quite anal enough to complain about switching around dictionary recognized synonyms, as long as nobody's pulling any monkey business with them in practice by exploiting some subtle ambiguity.
But of course it is an important piece of knowledge that may not be correct. All of these things need to be premises.

'(P1) 2+2 = 4; (C) 8 x 10 = 80'

No possible world in which (P1) is true & (C) is false (because both are necessarily true), but the argument isn't valid; (C) doesn't follow from the logical form of (P1)]

What does the operator "x" mean? I can very easily imagine a universe in which that operator means something completely different. Like that they use + for multiplication and x for division.
It seems like you would have to write in a premise about mathematics, otherwise we risk the same ambiguities as we do with language. The possible here is just disagreement on the meanings of these symbols.

Once we came to agree on how the mathematical operators work, and the definitions of numbers, you probably could pretty easily show that 8x10=80. And you wouldn't need = P1 to do it.

If Isaac thinks the bundle theory / identity of indiscernibles are true, he might reasonably think they're conceptual truths (if he were able to think in terms of these distinctions). But that doesn't mean that an argument that doesn't include the bundle theory as a premise is logically valid - it isn't. Conceptual truths can be needed among the premises for an arugument to be valid.

P1- A or B is true.
P2- B is not true.
P3- If A then C
C- C

Is this valid?

I'm sorry but I'm not quite following what you're saying here. I was just trying to give an explanation of why I think we need a clearer explanation of what logical validity is than 'the conclusion has to be true if the premises are true' because there is NO WAY that honest vegan advocates can clearly see that this isn't in some sense true of NTT

I know what you mean, and if you think we need that explanation in there that's alright... but it does seem a little complex and makes it look like this isn't as important as it is.
Like "Oh, it's just some weird rules about structure", because it isn't just that.

With that explanation, the followup for why it actually matters becomes more important.

Whereas if we explain the notion of what's actually "possible", I think why it matters is more obvious from that.

We can do it the way you suggest if you think that's the path of least resistance here.

I'm glad to see that it looks like we largely agree why NTT's logical invalidity matters - viz. in those contexts where there is confusion about the suppressed premises and what is going on with people who are in essence trying to challenge them. But I don't quite follow the rest.

I'm saying metaphysical beliefs, no matter how firmly held or believed, unless they are proved do not discount alternate "possibilities".

A Christian can not conceive of a possible universe without a god just as Isaac's followers can not conceive of a possible universe in which NTT premises are true but the conclusion is not.
Not being able to conceive it as possible does not make it impossible. They need to prove their metaphysics is logically necessary, otherwise it needs to be a premise.

If we want to be honest brokers and explain what is going on with why NTT is actually not valid (despite what Isaac has said), then I think that we need to very explicitly distinguish actual logical validity from this loosey-goosey "the conclusion has to be true if the premises are" because Isaac et al. have EXPLICITLY fucked around with different senses of 'has to' that are not clearly ruled out by the mere statement "conclusion has to be true if premises are true". If an honest advocate reads the existing description of validity I am deeply concerned that they are just going to get more confused, because they won't clearly see why that isn't supposed to apply to NTT given what everyone has been saying, and what is going on with the enterprise of digging up suppressed premises that they will agree are true and may think have to be true.

I see what you mean.
I would go about it explaining the notion of 'has to' and the manipulations being done rather than changing our definition of validity, but again if you think the way you suggested is the path of least resistance and a more specific definition of validity would help, I support trying it.

As to length: yes, to deal with that I'm suggesting a distinct technical appendix page and a distinct page on objections and replies.

I don't think we should chop it up. I only think something should be another page if it's a tangential issue (like why logic is important) which may be relevant to link to from other pages in the future.
I don't think objections would stand alone very well.

Maybe I should just ask, given what Dr. Singer said about not including all of the back and forth with Isaac: do you want the main entry to be

(a) an honest and accessible explanation of the problems with NTT that people can easily use who may want to know the problems with NTT without getting bogged down in the back and forth between Isaac and critics, or

(b) a point by point rebuttal of every ignorant and confused thing that Isaac has ever said about his argument, both because he doesn't understand things and to try to protect his ego (where the latter sometimes drives the former given the dynamics of cognitive dissonance)?

Because I really thought that everyone was on board with (a), but I think it's clear that (b) gets in the way of (a).

I don't think B needs to get in the way of A. B are defenses of the argument, and it doesn't seem appropriate to not address them (particularly since he is the creator of the argument and an authority on it). BUT they can be addressed after the substance of the argument. We can try not to interlace them as much.

If we start just addressing the thing in itself, then follow up with the confusions and contradictions Isaac has created, it should provide people who are just looking into the argument an easy read without having to know anything about what Isaac has said about it.

Do you think this would be a problem?

I'm sorry I couldn't follow: which other section?

Start with a clean section on A, then follow it up with refuting Isaac's claims about the argument in B.

How about I take a stab at this? I could add this into the wiki - or maybe I can just post my stab into this comment thread. That would help me out by increasing my number of posts to the point that I can use the PM-ing feature

That sound good. We can add it to the Wiki after.

I think I meant: to save on space for the main entry, move some of the back and forth into a separate entry that replaces / subsumes the one I started and Isaac and gets renamed as an objections and responses entry.

I'm of the "one page" mindset when something isn't going to be subject independent.

Like the page on why logic is important should be separate because we will inevitably have to link to that from other pages.
Anything that's general should be another page, but anything relating to NTT should stay on this page.

I'm concerned about length, but not enough to cut things up which would lose context by being broken apart (since the second page couldn't be read without knowledge of the first).

I think I've got an idea for this. I can include it in my proposal which I can post into this thread.

Sure.

Really important question for the later sections on why NTT's invalidity matters qua causing confusion / inability to respond to objections: can people give examples of debates in which Isaac's (or others') tacitly appealing to the suppressed premises without acknowledging them has caused confusion or error? Can you tell me which debates to watch for this? Do you have time-stamps?

Yes, the one with the Warkis (spelling?) NonZeroSum posted the transcript.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3457&start=10#p34384

Search "alien"

[Margaret Hayek]

Sorry for the confusion: you're here responding to a post that pre-dated my agreement with you about keeping everything (or at least as much as possible) in one entry, so don't worry: I think we're now on the same page about that.

That water is H20 was a substantive discovery. Before 1750 they knew that things were water but they didn't know about H20. It is NOT simply a matter of formal logic / knowing logical form that they're the same thing.

I mean it can be a matter of dictionary definition of words.
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/H2O

I'm not quite anal enough to complain about switching around dictionary recognized synonyms, as long as nobody's pulling any monkey business with them in practice by exploiting some subtle ambiguity.
But of course it is an important piece of knowledge that may not be correct. All of these things need to be premises.

It's an a posteriori truth that water = H20, it was big news in the 18th / 19th century. It is not helpful to regard a posteriori truths as synonyms. We do not know them to be true simply in virtue of knowing meanings. (What 21st century dictionaries do is quite irrelevant to all of this).

If you don't like that example take some other identity claim that you think science has recently shown to be true that many people didn't before know to be true and some perhaps still don't, and see how unhelpful it would be for someone to say that names for the two things were just synonyms. Do you think mental states are brain states? Then just use the example of 'I'm in brain state N; therefore |- 'I'm in mind-state x'.

If you want more on all of this just see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-truth/

'(P1) 2+2 = 4; (C) 8 x 10 = 80'

No possible world in which (P1) is true & (C) is false (because both are necessarily true), but the argument isn't valid; (C) doesn't follow from the logical form of (P1)]

What does the operator "x" mean? I can very easily imagine a universe in which that operator means something completely different. Like that they use + for multiplication and x for division.
It seems like you would have to write in a premise about mathematics, otherwise we risk the same ambiguities as we do with language. The possible here is just disagreement on the meanings of these symbols.

Once we came to agree on how the mathematical operators work, and the definitions of numbers, you probably could pretty easily show that 8x10=80. And you wouldn't need = P1 to do it.

Logicism about math is at least controversial https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logicism/, but I take your point.

For a detailed explanation of why you can't treat logical truth as necessary truth, again see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-truth/

If Isaac thinks the bundle theory / identity of indiscernibles are true, he might reasonably think they're conceptual truths (if he were able to think in terms of these distinctions). But that doesn't mean that an argument that doesn't include the bundle theory as a premise is logically valid - it isn't. Conceptual truths can be needed among the premises for an arugument to be valid.

P1- A or B is true.
P2- B is not true.
P3- If A then C
C- C

Is this valid?

Sure; A follows from P1 & P2 simply in virtue of their logical form, and C follows from A and P3 simply in virtue of their logical form. Right?

Were you just trying to see if I'd object to your not putting this as:

P1: A or B
P2: Not B
P3: If A then B
C: C

?

Yeah, my points were not that kind of nit-picking. Again, for elaboration on the points see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-truth/. And once again: the distinctions really do matter here because of what Isaac et al are doing.

I'm sorry but I'm not quite following what you're saying here. I was just trying to give an explanation of why I think we need a clearer explanation of what logical validity is than 'the conclusion has to be true if the premises are true' because there is NO WAY that honest vegan advocates can clearly see that this isn't in some sense true of NTT

I know what you mean, and if you think we need that explanation in there that's alright... but it does seem a little complex and makes it look like this isn't as important as it is.
Like "Oh, it's just some weird rules about structure", because it isn't just that.

With that explanation, the followup for why it actually matters becomes more important.

Whereas if we explain the notion of what's actually "possible", I think why it matters is more obvious from that.

We can do it the way you suggest if you think that's the path of least resistance here.

If you don't explain this then I think that no one has a chance in hell of seeing why NTT isn't valid and what is going on with the proof vs. Isaac's confused remarks. If you do explain it people can understand why it isn't valid, but yes, you need to explain why that matters. But that is EXACTLY what you face: people think you're either wrong or pointlessly nit-picking (I was essentially one of those people - who believed the completely pointless nit-picking disjunct - until I saw the connection between invalidity & how Isaac is trying to debate with people who want to take what I would call error theoretic metaethical positions). So I think we need to avoid the confusion and honestly explain why this matters, on pain of just sewing more confusion and MAKING IT SEEM like you're just trying to feel superior to Isaac and make him look stupid because he didn't happen to know what philosophers mean by things and you do, and you're angry that his arguments don't have nice pretty technical features that you like but no one has any reason to care about, and you told him to to make his arguments have these pointless and counterproductive features so you could feel helpful and powerful lording it over him, but he rightly rejected this because it's pedantic nonsense that is counterproductive from the standpoint of effective vegan outreach, and now you're just salty as all hell. That is the alternative hypothesis that I think you need to dispel if you want to get through to vegan advocates and genuinely help by showing the limits of the argument. And again, we in any event need at some point to ACTUALLY EXPLAIN WTF anyone should care if an argument is valid, and not just say 'because philosophers said so' or 'it looks like it's supposed to be valid' (to whom? to the young people who have no idea WTF this even means?) or 'the standards are very strict (whose standards? Oh, I guess the standards of salty butt-hurt people who fetishize technical conditions and want to feel superior because they've taken philosophy classes), and arguments that have one flaw are terrible, because I just said so and will now label it with pejoratives like 'non-sequitur, hahahah!). Again, that's what you really need to avoid - and forestall, so readers are patient with what is going on. Probably clearest if this is explained as openly and honestly as possible at the outset.

I'm glad to see that it looks like we largely agree why NTT's logical invalidity matters - viz. in those contexts where there is confusion about the suppressed premises and what is going on with people who are in essence trying to challenge them. But I don't quite follow the rest.

I'm saying metaphysical beliefs, no matter how firmly held or believed, unless they are proved do not discount alternate "possibilities".

A Christian can not conceive of a possible universe without a god just as Isaac's followers can not conceive of a possible universe in which NTT premises are true but the conclusion is not.
Not being able to conceive it as possible does not make it impossible. They need to prove their metaphysics is logically necessary, otherwise it needs to be a premise.

Yes, yes, all of this substantive stuff has to be premises if the argument is to be logically valid, and that's the point of making things logically valid: so you can get clear about all of your substantive assumptions and then go on to clearly assess / defend them - EVEN IF the premises / substantive assumptions are candidate necessary truths. But I think that is PRECISELY why we can't confuse logical validity with the necessary truth of the conclusion given the premises.

If we want to be honest brokers and explain what is going on with why NTT is actually not valid (despite what Isaac has said), then I think that we need to very explicitly distinguish actual logical validity from this loosey-goosey "the conclusion has to be true if the premises are" because Isaac et al. have EXPLICITLY fucked around with different senses of 'has to' that are not clearly ruled out by the mere statement "conclusion has to be true if premises are true". If an honest advocate reads the existing description of validity I am deeply concerned that they are just going to get more confused, because they won't clearly see why that isn't supposed to apply to NTT given what everyone has been saying, and what is going on with the enterprise of digging up suppressed premises that they will agree are true and may think have to be true.

I see what you mean.
I would go about it explaining the notion of 'has to' and the manipulations being done rather than changing our definition of validity, but again if you think the way you suggested is the path of least resistance and a more specific definition of validity would help, I support trying it.

Here's someone doing something like what you mention for his / her logic class: https://www.davidsanson.com/logic/supplements/0.3_logical-form.html; his / her formulation is "For an argument to be formally valid is for there to be no argument of its form—no argument that you can get by plugging in different terms—that has true premises and a false conclusion."

I myself find this a bit less clear that what I have which straight away talks about logical form, since to understand this formulation one needs to explain the relevant sense of form anyway, which mind does straight off, which my idea does hand in hand with illustrating validity & starting in on formalizing NTT right before giving the counterexample.


Again, I think we're agreed on the format now: separate main demonstration of invalidity from tangential technical issues & Isaac's confusions about invalidity, but move those other things into separate sections / sub[^n]sections in the main wiki, rather than move them into different pages.

[DrSinger]

For what it's worth, I watched the latest video of Ask Yourself Unnatural Vegan should defend/retract her odd claims. What he describes there and calls law of identity is not really law of identity. It looks more like some kind of axiom of extensionality from the set theory, which says that sets with the same elements are the same set. From what I've read you recognize it as identity of indiscernibles, which propably is a more "real life" version of the same thing.
What's important - anyone who wants to use it should assume it as a premise. It's somehow nice to see that Ask Yoursel tries to refine NTT, but he still fails.

We need to include something about this in the article. I have the clip already there in the 'steel-manning section'. btw do you have any suggestions regarding the article? I'd be interested to have another opinion (even if you haven't read all of it).

Margaret I've included your explanation of validity in the logical validity section, if you haven't seen that yet. I omitted some of the technical words though. I think we should just have another page for the technicalities if they're necessary to mention.

My concern with using Brown was whether or not it's appropriate to give someone's full name, when the wiki will be searchable via google. It would be problematic for other youtubers who prefer remain anonymous if that was the convention. But I guess in this case Ask Yourself isn't someone who's concerned.

[brimstoneSalad]

We do not know them to be true simply in virtue of knowing meanings. (What 21st century dictionaries do is quite irrelevant to all of this).

You don't have to know it, you can plausibly assume if it you believe those to be synonyms, in which case it's a nitpick.

P1- If Bob is allergic to chocolate, he shouldn't eat very much of it.
P2- Cocoa is one of Bob's allergies.
C - Bob aught not to consume a lot of chocolate.

So many different words and tiny ambiguities. Cocoa vs. chocolate? Much vs. a lot? Eat vs. consume? Allergic to vs. something being one of one's allergies? Shouldn't vs. aught not to?

Is this argument valid?

It's bad form to use all of these different words, for sure, but charitable interpretation could see it to validity pretty easily (unlike NTT)... yet at the same time, a different interpretation could easily make it invalid.

My point is that the water/H2O thing could be seen as a definition issue (where they are merely alternate words to each other), but that doesn't necessarily save it because it's true in a possible world that it doesn't follow where those things are not just defined as the same. The only words we can really take for granted are logical operators.

Anyway, this is all irrelevant to the topic at hand. My point was only that I agree with the "validity means there's no possible way the premises could be true and the conclusion false"; there are possible ways in the examples you gave, whether different understandings of ambiguous words, or the remote "possibility" of those things not being the same thing.

For a detailed explanation of why you can't treat logical truth as necessary truth, again see https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-truth/

That is a hours upon hours of posts that maybe we should save for another time.

Sure; A follows from P1 & P2 simply in virtue of their logical form, and C follows from A and P3 simply in virtue of their logical form. Right?

Were you just trying to see if I'd object to your not putting this as:

No, I just didn't write it like that.
I mean that it's missing something like this:

P1- A or B
P2- Not B
C1 - therefore A

P1- A
P2- If A then C
C2- C

Or even what might be seen as a missing premise to somebody for whom the logic of P1+P2 is not obvious:
P4- A

There's a question of how much work must be shown.
What if Isaac's metaphysical premises really are logically necessary? (They aren't, but just as an example)

If you don't explain this then I think that no one has a chance in hell of seeing why NTT isn't valid and what is going on with the proof vs. Isaac's confused remarks. If you do explain it people can understand why it isn't valid, but yes, you need to explain why that matters.

That is, perhaps worth the cost of the latter explanation.

And again, we in any event need at some point to ACTUALLY EXPLAIN WTF anyone should care if an argument is valid, and not just say 'because philosophers said so' or 'it looks like it's supposed to be valid' (to whom? to the young people who have no idea WTF this even means?) or 'the standards are very strict (whose standards? Oh, I guess the standards of salty butt-hurt people who fetishize technical conditions and want to feel superior because they've taken philosophy classes), and arguments that have one flaw are terrible, because I just said so and will now label it with pejoratives like 'non-sequitur, hahahah!). Again, that's what you really need to avoid - and forestall, so readers are patient with what is going on. Probably clearest if this is explained as openly and honestly as possible at the outset.

That seems like a difficult thing to explain.

Again, I think we're agreed on the format now: separate main demonstration of invalidity from tangential technical issues & Isaac's confusions about invalidity, but move those other things into separate sections / sub[^n]sections in the main wiki, rather than move them into different pages.

Is DrSinger on board with that? I just want to make sure all the major editors are OK with it.

[DrSinger]

Is DrSinger on board with that? I just want to make sure all the major editors are OK with it.

I agree with this structure, if that's what you're referring to

Part 1 - issues in words (somewhat brief)
Part 1 - symbolic debunk
Part 1 - AY defenses (emphasis on circular references, invalid generalisations and misunderstanding of logical contradiction )

Part 2 - issues
Part 2 - AY defenses

Correction
Conclusion

or something like that.

[brimstoneSalad]

We need to include something about this in the article. I have the clip already there in the 'steel-manning section'.

I finished watching it.

It's like the Bessie example. Best case, he's made the copy irrelevant and it's no longer a non-sequitur but now it's circular logic (if you take away the properties "is a copy" and "used to be human" etc. and make that second entity irrelevant).

Animals have lack no trait that lacking would make them valueless = animals are not valueless

P1 humans have moral value (irrelevant)
P2 Animals are not valueless
C Animals are not valueless

Useless circular argument, the conclusion is the same as the premise. No better than a bald assertion.


His metaphysical beliefs are absurd, though....

Assuming you're dealing with two "things", A and B, if you change the properties of item B to be the same as item A in ways he suggests (altering DNA, etc.), they don't magically fuse into one item.
If you force them to have the exact same position in space, too, you don't still have an animal -- you have an explosion.

In this case, if you made your copy exactly like Bessie in every way, and then put your copy in the same position as Bessie, you don't have two Bessies or even one Bessie, you have detonated H-bomb "every atom in your body exploding at the speed of light".

It is metaphysically impossible to put two identical objects in the same space at the same time and not suffer serious consequences that radically change the nature of those things.

That at least makes P2 pretty obviously false, unless you consider a non-sentient lifeless explosion to be of moral value.

My concern with using Brown was whether or not it's appropriate to give someone's full name, when the wiki will be searchable via google. It would be problematic for other youtubers who prefer remain anonymous if that was the convention. But I guess in this case Ask Yourself isn't someone who's concerned.

For other Youtubers we can use their Youtube names if full names are not known. Or just if they ask, I guess.
Isaac doesn't seem to care, his full name is public and I assume he made it so himself.

[DrSinger]

P1 humans have moral value (irrelevant)
P2 Animals are not valueless
C Animals are not valueless

either this or 'humans are of moral value' already includes humans that have the traits of a cow/are cows. Either is fairly ridiculous. I don't know if this is an adaptation based on the wiki or the original intention.

Do you think all the Bessie stuff should be in the steel-manning section together? Some of it relates to the written version and some of it relates to the explanations AY gives, so in the new format they would be separate?

I'm happy to use Brown then, if that's what is preferred.

[Margaret Hayek]

Is DrSinger on board with that? I just want to make sure all the major editors are OK with it.

I agree with this structure, if that's what you're referring to

Part 1 - issues in words (somewhat brief)
Part 1 - symbolic debunk
Part 1 - AY defenses (emphasis on circular references, invalid generalisations and misunderstanding of logical contradiction )

Just on this invalidity section: I think we're coming very close to agreement on its general structure, but just a few issues remain.

Mainly perhaps with the existing issues section: (1) I honestly just can't understand what is going on in it, or how it helps with the actual explanation of invalidity - and I am extremely confident that others won't understand this either, (2) it isn't all in words; there is bloody first order logic in there which is completely unexplained at this stage in the entry. It seems to me that this is at best a waste of space and at worst will be this and come across as nothing more than an attempt to just show off that you know FOL and the audience doesn't, (3) there is already in this section what I think is very unhelpful bringing in of Isaac misunderstandings / drama. Please tell the poor audience WTF is going on, before telling them how Isaac doesn't understand WTF is going on.

I'd strongly recommend starting with the explanation of what valid and invalid are. I can as I was planning post on here a brief foreshadowing of why this matter before going into formalizing the argument & explaining a counterexample. Or I can put it into the wiki if you'd prefer.

with the existing issues section or how
Part 2 - issues
Part 2 - AY defenses

Sure, something much like this, but I was actually thinking of this as section 3. Before this I was thinking of another section on the issues with defending P1 and P2 of the first part of the argument. This would look like:

1. Par1 of the argument
1.1. Invalidity
1.2. Confusions regarding invalidity
1.3. Making the argument valid

2. The Defense of P1 and P2 in Part 1
2.1. Issues
2.2. Confusions regarding these Issues (maybe we don't need this)

3. Part 2 of the argument
3.1. Issues (or maybe we could even start off before this with a brief explanation of invalidity, since it is invalid for much the same reasons as part 1, or maybe we could tack that on to the part on invalidity above
3.2. Confusions regarding these issues
3.3. A more helpful approach

But we could fold that the above proposed section 2 into Part 1, if you'd like. The main parts of the entry would thenlook like this:

1. Par1 of the argument
1.1. Invalidity
1.2. Confusions regarding invalidity
1.3. Making the argument valid
1.4. The defense of P1 and P2
1.5. Confusions regarding the defense of P1 and P2 (maybe we don't need this)

2. Part 2 of the argument
2.1. Issues (or maybe we could even start off before this with a brief explanation of invalidity, since it is invalid for much the same reasons as part 1, or maybe we could tack that on to the part on invalidity above
2.2. Confusions regarding these issues
2.3. A more helpful approach

Correction

Yes, but I was actually thinking of distributing the corrections into the different sections, as outlined with subsections 1.3. and 2.2 (on the second proposal). I suppose we could also pull it all together at the end - and perhaps compare it to other arguments and talk about how it fits into the best arguments for veganism in which contexts

Conclusion

Yes, and just to clarify I'd hope that we could pull enough of the concerns of myself and others into sections 1.4, 1.5, (possibly also 1.3), 2.2., 2.3 (all on the second model) and maybe the brought together corrections section so that we wouldn't even need to have a separate thing at the end of criticism of criticism.

[DrSinger]

Just on this invalidity section: I think we're coming very close to agreement on its general structure, but just a few issues remain.

Mainly perhaps with the existing issues section: (1) I honestly just can't understand what is going on in it, or how it helps with the actual explanation of invalidity - and I am extremely confident that others won't understand this either, (2) it isn't all in words; there is bloody first order logic in there which is completely unexplained at this stage in the entry. It seems to me that this is at best a waste of space and at worst will be this and come across as nothing more than an attempt to just show off that you know FOL and the audience doesn't, (3) there is already in this section what I think is very unhelpful bringing in of Isaac misunderstandings / drama. Please tell the poor audience WTF is going on, before telling them how Isaac doesn't understand WTF is going on.

I largely agree with this but think we should link to another article about FOL etc. Rather than explaining it in the article itself, it's already probably far longer than anyone would be willing to read

[Margaret Hayek]

Really important question for the later sections on why NTT's invalidity matters qua causing confusion / inability to respond to objections: can people give examples of debates in which Isaac's (or others') tacitly appealing to the suppressed premises without acknowledging them has caused confusion or error? Can you tell me which debates to watch for this? Do you have time-stamps?

Yes, the one with the Warkis (spelling?) NonZeroSum posted the transcript.

http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3457&start=10#p34384

Search "alien"

Thanks so much! I watched the full thing (I'd only watched small bits before) - fascinating debate! Especially with Andy Warski being an ex-vegan and (i) running into the all-or-nothingism problem hat Melanie Joy (et al) talks about, and (ii) thinking / rationalizing his way out of veganism with various things that a full-Monty argument might have addressed; as well as both of the Warskis asking questions that touched on where to prioritize the reasons to be vegan / plant-based.

It was also, of course, a nice illustration of how Isaac might not have been responding to the Warskis in a completely optimal way, including some confusion on all sides. That said, I wonder if this is really a problem with the invalidity of NTT or really just the way Isaac was trying to defend P1 and P2 - and in particular just failing to appreciate that resistance / justified resistance =/= others having moral reasons not to harm you. For instance, some of what went on could have happened exactly the same if Isaac had been appealing to the Argument from Less Able Humans, and had just done an imperfect job defending the premises given what was happening. E.g. I could imagine the Warskis responding in exactly the same way to the LHA argument P2*. if no/radically less moral concern for sentient non-human animals is justified, then no/radically less moral status for intellectually comparable humans is justified":

Warskis: "No, that's different, because they're still human,"
Isaac (here in defense of P2* in the otherwise valid argument): "I see you might think that, but species shouldn't matter, what if aliens wanted to holocaust you?"
Cleaned up Warskis: "We're not aliens, so we'd defend ourselves"
Isaac: "hunh? that's a double standard"
Cleaned up Warskis: "hunh, why is it?"
Everyone: "hunh? wtf is going on?"
If a philosopher had descended from heaven: "Warskis are saying that everyone within a species has reason to protect less able members of that species. Moreover, they are recognizing that just because they would be justified in defending themselves & less able humans from aliens, that doesn't mean that the aliens have any moral reason not to harm them - or at the very least no moral reason not to care too much, in a way that's different from how the Warskis currently feel about non-human animals"

So I'm not yet seeing how this has essentially to do with the invalidity of NTT as opposed to how Isaac tries to defend the moral irrelevance of species for the relevant roles, which is just as much a problem for defending the premises of a valid argument like that from LAH as it is for an invalid argument like NTT.

I am, incidentally, running things by a very nice and bright young gentleman in the comments section over on Isaac's recent video challenging UV, and I'm going to see if he helps me to see a distinct role for invalidity vs. just how to defend the premises.

Just on this invalidity section: I think we're coming very close to agreement on its general structure, but just a few issues remain.

Mainly perhaps with the existing issues section: (1) I honestly just can't understand what is going on in it, or how it helps with the actual explanation of invalidity - and I am extremely confident that others won't understand this either, (2) it isn't all in words; there is bloody first order logic in there which is completely unexplained at this stage in the entry. It seems to me that this is at best a waste of space and at worst will be this and come across as nothing more than an attempt to just show off that you know FOL and the audience doesn't, (3) there is already in this section what I think is very unhelpful bringing in of Isaac misunderstandings / drama. Please tell the poor audience WTF is going on, before telling them how Isaac doesn't understand WTF is going on.

I largely agree with this but think we should link to another article about FOL etc. Rather than explaining it in the article itself, it's already probably far longer than anyone would be willing to read

Here's one idea: I think that one can actually explain - or at least largely summarize - what's going on with the invalidity stuff in English, but in a clear way that people can follow, without getting into FOL. I could take a stab at that on here if you'd like. If that's acceptable then I think that could be our section 1.1 / issues section.

As to the explanation of the point of showing that NTT invalid, here is what I have so far on my draft for the introductory / issues subsection for the invalidity section:

"The main reason it helps to know whether an argument is logically valid is that it helps us to clarify if we have identified all of the substantive assumptions behind its conclusion. If we can see that an argument is valid, then we know that its conclusion follows from its premises simply because of their form, so we have identified and listed all of its substantive assumptions in its premises. If we can see that an argument is invalid, this helps us to know that it must be making further assumptions in order to be a good, rationally compelling argument. Knowing that an argument is making such assumptions, and determining what they are, can help us to understand why certain individuals may not find it compelling, and can spare us the confusion of failing to understand this. It can also put us in a better position to defend those assumptions forthrightly to those who might be inclined to challenge or fail initially to accept them.

As we will see below, NTT is invalid. Seeing why it is helps us to see how certain very plausible substantive assumptions can be added to its premises to make it valid. The making of these tacit assumptions by the presenter of NTT and the audience very likely explain why it is often a compelling argument. But as we will see below, the failure to acknowledge these assumptions can cause confusion, and inhibit a persuasive defense of its premises. As we will also see, the fact that to be compelling the argument must make such assumptions may help to dash certain hopes about the minimality of the argument’s assumptions (e.g. about the nature of value and ethics). Seeing that NTT is invalid will thus help us to appreciate the argument’s limits, and how other approaches may be helpful in defending the substantive ethical views that stand behind arguments like NTT."