Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[Daz]

The point I am making is a pragmatic one, noone wants or for that matter would accept, living in a world where arbitrary distinctions between groups are what determines their moral value and the ethics and morality adhered to.

Some people would accept it, or claim they would.
Otherwise, I 100% agree with this, and as a pragmatic argument it's excellent. If we allow arbitrary moral rules, then morality is useless (this is the root of the argument against moral relativism/subjectivism). We must insist on an objective non-arbitrary moral basis if it's to have any real meaning.

But in terms of pure logic (ignoring outcome) it's not a logical contradiction... it's kind of like suicide isn't necessarily a logical contradiction either despite how self destructive it is, or smoking, etc.
We can call these things irrational in some sense, in that they don't serve long term interests, but they're not true contradictions.

This is why I've argued for the importance of including a premise that requires a non-arbitrary basis for morality (which forces it to be a non-arbitrary trait). It's a very obvious premise and one that it's easy to get people to agree with, but without it the logic doesn't follow.

If one would not accept an arbitrary distinction in their own context, they contradict themselves using it in another.

Your own context is not logically identical to another context.
This is a double standard, not a contradiction. A contradiction only applies to the exact same context.

Logical contradiction:
I accept arbitrary for my context
I do not accept arbitrary for my context

Not a logical contradiction (this IS a double standard):
I accept arbitrary for my context
I do not accept arbitrary for another context

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
That's possibly compatible with the colloquial usage which makes certain assumptions, but that's not a logical contradiction.

Accepting arbitrary for their own context is In this regard a double standard is exposed.

YES, a double standard is exposed. A double standard is not by definition a logical contradiction. These terms don't mean the same thing.

It's like calling somebody gay when the person is a transvestite. He may or may not also be gay, but it's incorrect to equate the two.

It's possible, and maybe even likely, that somebody who expresses double standards DOES believe in a logical contradiction on some level, but this is not known or proven by the double standard alone. You could be perfectly logical and hold a double standard, and just be an asshole who likes making egotistical assertions (My arbitrary rules are law because I'm right, and your arbitrary rules are wrong because you're not me).

We cannot live in a world where an infinite amount of arbitrarily valid axioms of moral framework exist, for these will create contradictions between themselves in that world.

1. We can't live in a world where we commit suicide either. Is this a contradiction? No, of course not. It's just not very rational.

2. These different frameworks create conflict by contradicting each other (note that this is NOT internal contradiction), and this is very harmful, but even if it kills us all by starting world war 3, 4, 5, 6 etc. until we're all gone, it's still not necessarily a logical contradiction. It's just very stupid and short sighted.

In this sense, NTT does expose a double standard, and the invalidity and unsoundness of using such an arbitrary justification within the context of a moral and ethical framework. Does that make sense?

Some of the things you're saying are correct, but in other cases you're using the wrong terms.

100% the argument can expose a double standard. Totally true.

Invalidity and unsoundness of the ethical framework? Not necessarily. Although such an argument can be made given a few premises (that's another conversation).

NTT in itself doesn't even make an argument that such frameworks are irrational (that's an easy argument to make), it's an important point to make by adding such a premise regarding arbitrary justifications.
It's not hard to add a premise requiring a non-arbitrary basis to morality (in the form of a relevant trait, for instance). It makes it a much stronger argument, and IF you add a premise or premises kind of like that, THEN you can call it a logical contradiction, because any other conclusion using an arbitrary basis would contradict that premise.

Does that help?

So addressing your point about logical contradiction above, what about if someone accepts an arbitrary distinction for their context however when someone else applies an arbitrary distinction to their context that effects them negatively, they don't accept it. Is that a contradiction?

In regard to your response to me saying we can't live in a world with infinite arbitrary moral distinctions, I meant from a pragmatic sense, but from a strict logical sense one cannot both commit suicide AND live in the world. Of course this would be a logical contradiction. Point is that if one is willing to accept random arbitrary distinctions as rationale for moral and ethical actions against some, then they cannot argue with people using the same rationale when applying arbitrary distinctions to them that may effect them negatively. Otherwise they create a double standard. And I would say a logical contradiction within their own justification of their ethical and moral framework. Ie it's ok to use arbitrary distinctions in my context when applied to them, but not when they are applying it to me in my context.

On your last point, yes, as I understand it NTT in itself isn't an argument against such frameworks but it is designed to expose logical inconsistencies and double standards in one's own ethical framework. Isn't that the point? If someone isn't willing to actually name the trait and engage in the process, how can it expose anything? If someone just refuses to name the trait, and merely say that there is no trait and that they rest their entire ethical and moral system on arbitrary distinctions, then this can be argued against without even using NTT. And I would say if you had got someone to that stage of admitting that, NTT has done it's job and it will not be difficult to show them how ridiculous that position actually is. Does that make sense?

[Margaret Hayek]

For the issue I was talking about on the alternative version of (part 1 of) NTT, I think that what Dr. Singer suggested in his newly created page on this may be very helpful:

DrSinger: This is how I would formalise his animated version
(P1) ∀x (Hx ⇒ Mx)
(P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ( ∃y ( CPy ∧ My ∧ ∀t ( Tt ⇒ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t )))))
(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( Tt ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)
Therefore (C) ∀x( Ax ⇒ Mx )

If we bear in mind that CPy in this version really just means that y is a sentient being, then this formulation of P2 seems to me to make it very clear that P2 is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings with all and only the traits of a non-human animal have moral value. This is of course very close to simply asserting that all sentient non-human animals have moral value, and unless I'm mistaken, P2 and P3 entail this (and on this version P1 plays no role in explaining why C follows from P1-P3 simply in virtue of logical form).

My only main questions are: (1) am I correct that this is valid? and (2) is the fact that P2 so formulated looks so different from the versions of P2 we've so far been discussing a problem? Is there a way to bring the description of the LF of P2 on the natural reading and P2 on this understanding of the alternative reading together so that (i) they're as similar as possible, and (ii) they naturally fit the ordinary English presentations of P2 as closely as possible?

I mean I suppose that you could just use P2 as formulated here as the description of its LF in the argument on the natural reading, bearing in mind that CPy there has to be a genuine alternate version of a human. But this does look pretty differnt from P2 as formulated in the original presentation of NTT.

[DrSinger]

If we bear in mind that CPy in this version really just means that y is a sentient being, then this formulation of P2 seems to me to make it very clear that P2 is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings with all and only the traits of a non-human animal have moral value. This is of course very close to simply asserting that all sentient non-human animals have moral value, and unless I'm mistaken, P2 and P3 entail this (and on this version P1 plays no role in explaining why C follows from P1-P3 simply in virtue of logical form).

This is pretty much how I see it too, and based on previous discussions we've had I think PV would agree. P1 is irrelevant since us/ourselves/the counterpart isnt required to be a human in the way AY uses it.

As to whether it's a problem that it looks different to the original. I think it isn't ideal, but it closely matches the animation and it fixes the quantification issue, so I would be fine with it. I wouldn't change the original FOL version we have, since it matches the written form, I don't think we should be expected to fix a quantification issue present in the written form.

Regarding your paragraph about the relevance of the counterexample. I'm not sure it's necessary, since without the identity of indiscernibles or fixing the quantification issue, the counterexample still works, no matter what the counterpart is and whether it possesses ones essential properties.

[brimstoneSalad]

So addressing your point about logical contradiction above, what about if someone accepts an arbitrary distinction for their context however when someone else applies an arbitrary distinction to their context that effects them negatively, they don't accept it. Is that a contradiction?

That is not a contradiction.

It's a different arbitrary distinction and at a different time and with a different outcome. It has to be exactly the same to be a contradiction.

Even saying X is OK today but not OK tomorrow or five minutes from now is not a contradiction.

Contradiction:
X is OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.
X is not OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.

Not a contradiction:
X is OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.
X is not OK two seconds from now in nearly this exact context with very similar consequences, etc.

Any change, however, small, makes it no longer a logical contradiction.

A double standard is more lax; that survives any changes which are arbitrary or that an't appropriately justified.

Point is that if one is willing to accept random arbitrary distinctions as rationale for moral and ethical actions against some, then they cannot argue with people using the same rationale when applying arbitrary distinctions to them that may effect them negatively. Otherwise they create a double standard.

They can argue with them, but the argument will not be very compelling due to the double standard, particularly if the argument is honest and straight forward.
As carnists do, they can make up any number of excuses to try to deflect and change the subject of conversation from their arbitrary value system.

Also, just like an atheist can pick up a Bible and argue against wearing clothes made from mixed fabrics, they may make arguments that have nothing to do with what they actually believe.
Maybe they'll be able to convince somebody to not eat babies while still eating meat themselves.

I would agree that they are at a disadvantage to argue for any kind of coherent secular ethical framework when in practice they're appealing to arbitrary justifications which is the very thing that threatens the foundation of any such framework.

And I would say a logical contradiction within their own justification of their ethical and moral framework. Ie it's ok to use arbitrary distinctions in my context when applied to them, but not when they are applying it to me in my context.

If they try to argue against arbitrary justifications, yet employ them themselves, there are a number of possibilities:

1. It IS possible that these people both generally believe and do not believe that arbitrary justifications are acceptable. That would be a contradiction, but this is unlikely,
2. It's more likely that they believe (and I've seen something like this before; FriendEd believes something like this) that sometimes arbitrary justifications are acceptable and sometimes they are not, and use some arbitrary rule to decide when they are or are not. This is a ridiculous belief, and in practice it just removes the problem of whether arbitrary justifications are acceptable to a "meta" position. This is much like a Christian claiming everything has to have a creator... except god, he gets an arbitrary exception. It's pretty easy to demonstrate that this is a double standard, but hard to show it's a contradiction.
3. They may also just be lying when they argue against arbitrary moral standards. A subjectivist is perfectly capable of deciding it's OK to lie and argue for objective morality despite not believing it if it will save his or her skin from an alien horde (or whatever). Just like atheists could argue from the Bible for why not to kill them if beset by a crusade.
4. They may just be potentially intellectually dishonest, and subscribe to something like intuitionism (morality coming from magical intuition that everybody has, or even that just they have as the chosen ones), and deny that there's anything arbitrary about their beliefs by appealing to that magical gnosis which gives them direct knowledge of good and evil... so what would have been arbitrary whim is actually some kind of cosmic knowledge backed by faith but that can not be justified with reason or evidence.

Unless we can establish that they are engaging in #1 instead of #2 #3 or #4, we can not say it's a logical contradiction.

This is just as, in my example before, we can't just say a transvestite is gay (not that there's anything wrong with that). We need more information.
Making a strong assertion like "logical contradiction" when we don't know that is incorrect, and the other options make the #namethetrait argument invalid (it could be a double standard of a more general kind).

On your last point, yes, as I understand it NTT in itself isn't an argument against such frameworks but it is designed to expose logical inconsistencies and double standards in one's own ethical framework.

It can only expose double standards, not logical inconsistencies... but it claims to expose logical contradiction. That's a problem.
It could do that if there was another premise or two added to deny arbitrary exemptions and require justification based on traits of some specific type.

If someone just refuses to name the trait, and merely say that there is no trait and that they rest their entire ethical and moral system on arbitrary distinctions, then this can be argued against without even using NTT.

You could use another argument, sure. But NTT claims to demonstrate that on its own. That's a problem.

You need an additional argument to address that. NTT only gets you to double standard. You need another argument to narrow that down to logical contradiction by determining what reasoning is behind it if any.

And I would say if you had got someone to that stage of admitting that, NTT has done it's job and it will not be difficult to show them how ridiculous that position actually is. Does that make sense?

It's not difficult.
But NTT hasn't done the job it says it does. NTT makes the claim of proving a logical contradiction, but it doesn't. It does an entirely different job.

It's like if you hired somebody who advertised himself to be a plumber, and then he came into your house and fixed your electrical wiring. Maybe you needed your wiring fixed, but that wasn't what was advertised.

If NTT would be honest about what it does (in the first part anyway), and say "double standard" instead of "logical contradiction" then it would probably be more or less valid (you might need to tweak another word or two to make sure there are no loopholes, but it wouldn't be hard).

If you change a couple words, NTT (the first half of it) may be a good argument to demonstrate double standards. But claiming it demonstrates logical contradiction is just false, and by that standard it is a bad argument because it fails to accomplish that.

The second half of the argument has other problems.

[Margaret Hayek]

If we bear in mind that CPy in this version really just means that y is a sentient being, then this formulation of P2 seems to me to make it very clear that P2 is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings with all and only the traits of a non-human animal have moral value. This is of course very close to simply asserting that all sentient non-human animals have moral value, and unless I'm mistaken, P2 and P3 entail this (and on this version P1 plays no role in explaining why C follows from P1-P3 simply in virtue of logical form).

This is pretty much how I see it too, and based on previous discussions we've had I think PV would agree. P1 is irrelevant since us/ourselves/the counterpart isnt required to be a human in the way AY uses it.

As to whether it's a problem that it looks different to the original. I think it isn't ideal, but it closely matches the animation and it fixes the quantification issue, so I would be fine with it. I wouldn't change the original FOL version we have, since it matches the written form

Cool; that sounds good - I agree then that we should work with this (i.e. keep what we've had for the LF of the natural interpretation, and use your account of the LF of the alternative version); at the very least for now.

, I don't think we should be expected to fix a quantification issue present in the written form.

Isaac's English statement of NTT uses generics. We want to try to interpret this in FOL using existential and universal quantification. It is under such circumstances ABSOLUTELY incumbent upon us to pick a translation that is as charitable as possible, since the generics DIDN'T face this issue; the issue is an artifact of using only existential and universal quantification. So as people trying to display the LF of something written in generics in FOL, that is OUR issue, and NOT the original English statement of the argument's issue.

Regarding your paragraph about the relevance of the counterexample. I'm not sure it's necessary, since without the identity of indiscernibles or fixing the quantification issue, the counterexample still works, no matter what the counterpart is and whether it possesses ones essential properties.

I'm sorry, I think I may not be following this: surely (i) we need to explain why it matters that the argument is invalid, and (ii) how its invalidity works and creates problems is different on the natural interpretation and on the alternative interpretation. NO ONE WILL CARE that it is invalid if the suppressed premises are obvious and everyone agrees with them (or clearly identifies and then argues about them) anyway. Were that the case, were it so obvious to everyone what the suppressed premises were and what their merits are / how to talk about their merits, this REALLY WOULD be pretty unhelpful nit-picking.

Maybe I should have been clearer in the summary of issues section, but essentially NTT faces a dilemma: EITHER:

Horn 1: it goes with the natural reading, and is invalid because it overlooks a substantive ethical position to which many carnists may be tempted in thinking about these issues (i.e. value narcissism), and overlooking this position and simply trying to rule it out by calling it inconsistent creates confusion and makes the argument unconvincing, perhaps in large part because it combines with other ways in which Isaac has caused confusion in trying to defend P1 and P2

Horn 2: it goes with the alternative reading, which makes invalidity less of a substantive problem, but this version essentially packs an assertion of the value of all sentient beings into P2 and is thus question-begging. This version isn't technically valid, but it can be made so by adding something like a version of the identity of indiscernibles, and that seems to be the charitable thing to do. I don't think this is a problem because no one is going to reject the argument by rejecting the identity of indiscernibles - especially the very weak version of it that Isaac needs to appeal to (although perhaps brimstoneSalad means to disagree); it is annoying that Isaac insists that II doesn't need to be added as a premise to make it valid and keeps insisting that II and the bundle theory are the same as the law of identity because he read some strange ancient sounding version on wikipedia, but that doesn't get to the heart of the issue about the merits of the argument. The real problem, again, is that this version has, in the course of avoiding the natural reading's problems with invalidity (in terms of overlooking the actual ethical position of value narcissism), been made question-begging.

Do you think that there's a different way in which NTT's invalidity is important and this can be convincingly explained to others? I can't emphasize enough how unconvincing and unhelpful it is to simply say 'stuffy nit-picking overly pedantic professional philosophers have arbitrarily asserted that all arguments presented in premise-conclusion form must be technically logically valid (and actually professional philosophers haven't ever done this - when the suppressed premises are obvious charity demands simply filling them in, and where there's no controversy over them there is no reason to make any big deal about this), and I hereby appeal in a completely unseasoned way to their unquestioned authority." THAT is precisely what it will sound like to everyone unless some clear and accessible explanation of why NTT's invalidity is practically important, such as what I was attempting above, is presented.

[Margaret Hayek]

We also need to answer his ridiculous metaphysical claim.

Ignoring quantum physics for the time being (which is another can of worms with respect to entanglement, and his suggestion may even violate relativity), in physics if you take two otherwise identical things which exist in different locations, and you force their locations locations to be equal too, it is true that they are indiscernible as separate things, but it also becomes something else altogether (probably an explosion).

At no point do you have a living cow which is indiscernible from your copy. You either have two otherwise identical things discernible by location (and thus at least history, one having been a human in the past and we have the ability to track that due to the different location), or you have a very dead double-cow-amalgamation that is effectively a detonated thermonuclear bomb.

I know that may look like splitting hairs, but it's very relevant to his metaphysical claims if he or his audience have any respect for actual physics.

There is no way in physics to make two distinct things truly indiscernible (even if just by just their positions) from each other without combining them in a way that fundamentally changes their natures... at least not for fermions that aren't in an exotic state.
I don't think you could even do that with a boson like light (where you'd have constructive interference of some kind), not that there's any reason to believe that there's bosonic sentience out there.

I guess I'm not sure what's going on in this comment; can you clarify? Is this supposed to be an argument against the identity of indiscernibles from contemporary physics, of the kind that Steven French discusses in his SEP review article on Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/qt-idind/)? I'm not sure how this would be relevant to Isaac's appeal to II, since, given how (rightly) open he means to be about what counts as a 'trait' in this context, he only needs a very weak version of the principle to be true, and to be true for sentient beings (which are medium-sized and are such that their identity conditions are probably a normative matter, which we can think through in the strange circumstances given by modern physics, but in a way that will take ethical reflection to get at anyway).

As I've said, I think that charity demands just adding II in as a suppressed premise on the alternative reading of NTT, and I don't think that there's any reason to challenge II so added. The real substantive problem for the alternative reading of NTT is that, in avoiding the natural reading's problems with invalidly overlooking a substantive and potentially not that uncommon ethical position (value narcissism), it makes P2 essentially assert that all sentient beings have moral value, which deprives the argument of persuasive force / renders it question-begging.

[brimstoneSalad]

Is this supposed to be an argument against the identity of indiscernibles from contemporary physics, of the kind that Steven French discusses in his SEP review article on Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/qt-idind/)?

I didn't want to go into quantum mechanics, but that article sounds interesting (haven't read that one). If I have time, I'll skim it later and give my impressions if you think that's useful. I don't know what French's background in physics is, quantum physics is an easy thing to get wrong if you don't have some physics background but the gist seems very plausible so my guess is he's on the money with that argument.

I'm just saying it's not just metaphysically possible, but overwhelmingly likely, that it's actually impossible to make one thing the same as another by changing the traits of the other until they are identical because in doing do you fuse them and create something fundamentally different from either original item.

Now in a perfect digital metaphysics, that wouldn't happen. The 0s would remain 0s and the 1s would remain 1s. However, there is a question as to HOW item 2 was moved into the same memory location as item 1, and it it were copied there, did it just overwrite the original? In which case, is item 1 gone, and now we just have an item 2 that's indistinguishable from item 1?

It's quite plausible to me that not only is what Isaac seemed to be describing in his former video impossible in our real physics, but it may actually be impossible in any conceivable metaphysics.

The only way you end up with one entity that remains as it is, is to in some sense nullify the other.

I'm not sure how this would be relevant to Isaac's appeal to II, since, given how (rightly) open he means to be about what counts as a 'trait' in this context, he only needs a very weak version of the principle to be true,

I noticed on watching that he also counted things like "used to be human" as traits; retroactive qualities of something's history.
He mentioned this with respect to the glass of water becoming a computer monitor, that it had been (in the past) manufactured by apple as a trait.

The very idea that such traits in themselves could be changed is arguably a violation of logic in the context of any coherent metaphysics that involves temporal causality. Time travel stuff: can you go back in time and kill yourself? But then you wouldn't be alive to go back in time to do that. It creates a paradox which probably can not be resolved.

I think Isaac would need to appeal either to:

1. The ability to change traits which are logically impossible to change in any coherent metaphysics (time travel nonsense), like changing the trait "used to be human". It doesn't seem meaningful for Isaac to ask somebody "If you were a cow and never used to be human", because then we're just asking about cows that are really not you in any way. Begging the question/circular logic/not an argument.

2. Regardless of ability to change such traits (above), we could talk about the ability to make it impossible to discern one entity from another in any way so as to make those traits irrelevant or applicable.
E.g. putting them in exactly the same place and making all other things equal so it's metaphysically impossible to identify one part that "used to be human". This issue here is as I mentioned: it makes them something else altogether. This actually seemed more sensible, so was my charitable interpretation.

and to be true for sentient beings (which are medium-sized and are such that their identity conditions are probably a normative matter, which we can think through in the strange circumstances given by modern physics, but in a way that will take ethical reflection to get at anyway).

That's another issue; to people's ability to plausibly say "that's not me/human" and so avoiding contradiction with P1. Of course, if they deny P2 on this basis that doesn't show the argument is invalid, but just unsound to those people and unconvincing.

As I've said, I think that charity demands just adding II in as a suppressed premise on the alternative reading of NTT, and I don't think that there's any reason to challenge II so added.

You mean this one?

(P3) if an altered (sentient) human lacks the totality of differences between (sentient) humans and (sentient) non-human animals, then the altered (sentient) human is a (sentient) non-human animal. (This resembles, but is logically weaker, than the identity of indiscernibles)

We could still speak of how it used to be a human. We would not have to admit any animals have moral value in reality unless it were established that any such animals used to be human.
So, that weaker version doesn't fix the invalidity. It does provide that it's possible for an animal to have moral value, but not that any actually do unless we prove such altered humans exist. If he also changed the conclusion to say that it's possible for an animal to have moral value, that could work (that is, of course, a very weak argument for veganism if somebody considers whether any of the meat they're eating used to be humans).

The real substantive problem for the alternative reading of NTT is that, in avoiding the natural reading's problems with invalidly overlooking a substantive and potentially not that uncommon ethical position (value narcissism), it makes P2 essentially assert that all sentient beings have moral value, which deprives the argument of persuasive force / renders it question-begging.

I don't think the weaker premise solves the invalidity, but assuming we add in a strong version of the identity of indiscernibles (which may be metaphysically impossible in any conceivable coherent universe), sure; then it's technically valid, although now it's only begging the question and has no persuasive power... and it's tied to a highly suspect premise.

It's kind of a choose your poison situation.

Sorry I'm behind, I haven't replied to your last post yet (is that still necessary, or does this pretty much cover it?).

[Daz]

So addressing your point about logical contradiction above, what about if someone accepts an arbitrary distinction for their context however when someone else applies an arbitrary distinction to their context that effects them negatively, they don't accept it. Is that a contradiction?

That is not a contradiction.

It's a different arbitrary distinction and at a different time and with a different outcome. It has to be exactly the same to be a contradiction.

Even saying X is OK today but not OK tomorrow or five minutes from now is not a contradiction.

Contradiction:
X is OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.
X is not OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.

Not a contradiction:
X is OK right now in this exact context with these exact consequences, etc.
X is not OK two seconds from now in nearly this exact context with very similar consequences, etc.

Any change, however, small, makes it no longer a logical contradiction.

A double standard is more lax; that survives any changes which are arbitrary or that an't appropriately justified.

Point is that if one is willing to accept random arbitrary distinctions as rationale for moral and ethical actions against some, then they cannot argue with people using the same rationale when applying arbitrary distinctions to them that may effect them negatively. Otherwise they create a double standard.

They can argue with them, but the argument will not be very compelling due to the double standard, particularly if the argument is honest and straight forward.
As carnists do, they can make up any number of excuses to try to deflect and change the subject of conversation from their arbitrary value system.

Also, just like an atheist can pick up a Bible and argue against wearing clothes made from mixed fabrics, they may make arguments that have nothing to do with what they actually believe.
Maybe they'll be able to convince somebody to not eat babies while still eating meat themselves.

I would agree that they are at a disadvantage to argue for any kind of coherent secular ethical framework when in practice they're appealing to arbitrary justifications which is the very thing that threatens the foundation of any such framework.

And I would say a logical contradiction within their own justification of their ethical and moral framework. Ie it's ok to use arbitrary distinctions in my context when applied to them, but not when they are applying it to me in my context.

If they try to argue against arbitrary justifications, yet employ them themselves, there are a number of possibilities:

1. It IS possible that these people both generally believe and do not believe that arbitrary justifications are acceptable. That would be a contradiction, but this is unlikely,
2. It's more likely that they believe (and I've seen something like this before; FriendEd believes something like this) that sometimes arbitrary justifications are acceptable and sometimes they are not, and use some arbitrary rule to decide when they are or are not. This is a ridiculous belief, and in practice it just removes the problem of whether arbitrary justifications are acceptable to a "meta" position. This is much like a Christian claiming everything has to have a creator... except god, he gets an arbitrary exception. It's pretty easy to demonstrate that this is a double standard, but hard to show it's a contradiction.
3. They may also just be lying when they argue against arbitrary moral standards. A subjectivist is perfectly capable of deciding it's OK to lie and argue for objective morality despite not believing it if it will save his or her skin from an alien horde (or whatever). Just like atheists could argue from the Bible for why not to kill them if beset by a crusade.
4. They may just be potentially intellectually dishonest, and subscribe to something like intuitionism (morality coming from magical intuition that everybody has, or even that just they have as the chosen ones), and deny that there's anything arbitrary about their beliefs by appealing to that magical gnosis which gives them direct knowledge of good and evil... so what would have been arbitrary whim is actually some kind of cosmic knowledge backed by faith but that can not be justified with reason or evidence.

Unless we can establish that they are engaging in #1 instead of #2 #3 or #4, we can not say it's a logical contradiction.

This is just as, in my example before, we can't just say a transvestite is gay (not that there's anything wrong with that). We need more information.
Making a strong assertion like "logical contradiction" when we don't know that is incorrect, and the other options make the #namethetrait argument invalid (it could be a double standard of a more general kind).

On your last point, yes, as I understand it NTT in itself isn't an argument against such frameworks but it is designed to expose logical inconsistencies and double standards in one's own ethical framework.

It can only expose double standards, not logical inconsistencies... but it claims to expose logical contradiction. That's a problem.
It could do that if there was another premise or two added to deny arbitrary exemptions and require justification based on traits of some specific type.

If someone just refuses to name the trait, and merely say that there is no trait and that they rest their entire ethical and moral system on arbitrary distinctions, then this can be argued against without even using NTT.

You could use another argument, sure. But NTT claims to demonstrate that on its own. That's a problem.

You need an additional argument to address that. NTT only gets you to double standard. You need another argument to narrow that down to logical contradiction by determining what reasoning is behind it if any.

And I would say if you had got someone to that stage of admitting that, NTT has done it's job and it will not be difficult to show them how ridiculous that position actually is. Does that make sense?

It's not difficult.
But NTT hasn't done the job it says it does. NTT makes the claim of proving a logical contradiction, but it doesn't. It does an entirely different job.

It's like if you hired somebody who advertised himself to be a plumber, and then he came into your house and fixed your electrical wiring. Maybe you needed your wiring fixed, but that wasn't what was advertised.

If NTT would be honest about what it does (in the first part anyway), and say "double standard" instead of "logical contradiction" then it would probably be more or less valid (you might need to tweak another word or two to make sure there are no loopholes, but it wouldn't be hard).

If you change a couple words, NTT (the first half of it) may be a good argument to demonstrate double standards. But claiming it demonstrates logical contradiction is just false, and by that standard it is a bad argument because it fails to accomplish that.

The second half of the argument has other problems.

So just to get your position clear, you are saying that "name the trait" does its job if someone actually names the trait (i.e. does what NTT is designed for, and what's necessary for NTT to be engaged in the first place). However, if someone refuses to name the trait (thus essentially refusing to engage in NTT), and in so doing bases their justifications on arbitrary distinctions, it doesn't do its job?

[Daz]

If they try to argue against arbitrary justifications, yet employ them themselves, there are a number of possibilities:

1. It IS possible that these people both generally believe and do not believe that arbitrary justifications are acceptable. That would be a contradiction, but this is unlikely,

Why is this unlikely? It is in fact very likely and usually the case when people assert arbitrary justifications as being acceptable, and it would be very easy to demonstrate that this is actually the situation they find themselves in (which would be logical contradiction). They may not even realise it, or they may just be being intellectually dishonest, but regardless it is easy to expose this through a few basic examples. If they wanted to justify their position further, and hence not rely on arbitrary justifications, then they would have to.... name the trait. And then it is again easy to demonstrate logical contradiction, using NTT, with the traits they use to attempt to justify the distinction.

[brimstoneSalad]

So just to get your position clear, you are saying that "name the trait" does its job if someone actually names the trait (i.e. does what NTT is designed for, and what's necessary for NTT to be engaged in the first place). However, if someone refuses to name the trait (thus essentially refusing to engage in NTT), and in so doing bases their justifications on arbitrary distinctions, it doesn't do its job?

NTT's job, if it's a formal logical argument as it claims to be, is to prove its conclusion:

C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Animals are of moral value.

Which seems to be that "Animals are of moral value" or "Deeming animals valueless is a contradiction"

Neither are proved by NTT because without additional premises, it's a non sequitur, meaning the conclusion doesn't follow.

As an informal argument it could do its job if the person receiving the argument already implicitly accepts the hidden premises, but does not if people disagree with those premises (which would be shown by then naming an arbitrary trait or refusing to name one/claiming they don't need to).
The argument is vastly improved by just being made informally, but informal arguments don't need to state every premise.
It's not clear why Isaac will not accept that it is not formally valid, and just make it an informal one.

If they try to argue against arbitrary justifications, yet employ them themselves, there are a number of possibilities:

1. It IS possible that these people both generally believe and do not believe that arbitrary justifications are acceptable. That would be a contradiction, but this is unlikely,

Why is this unlikely? It is in fact very likely and usually the case when people assert arbitrary justifications as being acceptable, and it would be very easy to demonstrate that this is actually the situation they find themselves in (which would be logical contradiction).

Human psychology doesn't typically permit this, and any probe will likely yield #2 or #4. Somebody actually believing a contradiction is very rare (it happens sometimes, as some theists do it; trinitarian Christians believe god is three parts and one inseparable whole simultaneously, Catholics also believe that the Eucharist is literally the blood and body of Christ... but not). It is at least very rare outside of religion.