Great comments on new #namethetrait video

[DrSinger]

I'm sorry, I think I may not be following this: surely (i) we need to explain why it matters that the argument is invalid, and (ii) how its invalidity works and creates problems is different on the natural interpretation and on the alternative interpretation. NO ONE WILL CARE that it is invalid if the suppressed premises are obvious and everyone agrees with them (or clearly identifies and then argues about them) anyway. Were that the case, were it so obvious to everyone what the suppressed premises were and what their merits are / how to talk about their merits, this REALLY WOULD be pretty unhelpful nit-picking.

I think we're misunderstanding each other.

What I mean is that it needs to be clearer that it is not an 'alternative interpretation' of NTT that's valid, and defeats the counterexample. It is a completely redesigned version with an additional premise. The way it comes across now is that we have chosen the natural interpretation so that we can give a counterexample, but that is not the case, without an additional premise the counterexample will still work. Even if we changed P2 to this

(P2) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀t ( T(t) ⇒ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ) ) ).

Also I don't think your proposed (P2)s solve the quantification issue. It needs to be something like

P2 - if an individual is an animal then there is no trait absent in the individual that if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless

rather than

P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.

I don't see how you can say the quantification issue is not present in the written version.

Edit: I really don't think we should be calling them the 'natural interpretation' and the 'alternate interpretation', it's as if you're saying there is an interpretation of P1, P2 & C that is valid, by that's not the case. What actually is the case is that by changing P2 and adding an additional premise, the argument can become valid.

I think we should just show the 'alternative interpretation', which includes essential properties, is invalid. I don't see any need for talking about the natural interpretation, since showing the alternative interpretation is invalid would make the natural interpretation invalid anyway.

[Daz]

So just to get your position clear, you are saying that "name the trait" does its job if someone actually names the trait (i.e. does what NTT is designed for, and what's necessary for NTT to be engaged in the first place). However, if someone refuses to name the trait (thus essentially refusing to engage in NTT), and in so doing bases their justifications on arbitrary distinctions, it doesn't do its job?

NTT's job, if it's a formal logical argument as it claims to be, is to prove its conclusion:

C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Animals are of moral value.

Which seems to be that "Animals are of moral value" or "Deeming animals valueless is a contradiction"

Neither are proved by NTT because without additional premises, it's a non sequitur, meaning the conclusion doesn't follow.

As an informal argument it could do its job if the person receiving the argument already implicitly accepts the hidden premises, but does not if people disagree with those premises (which would be shown by then naming an arbitrary trait or refusing to name one/claiming they don't need to).
The argument is vastly improved by just being made informally, but informal arguments don't need to state every premise.
It's not clear why Isaac will not accept that it is not formally valid, and just make it an informal one.

If they try to argue against arbitrary justifications, yet employ them themselves, there are a number of possibilities:

1. It IS possible that these people both generally believe and do not believe that arbitrary justifications are acceptable. That would be a contradiction, but this is unlikely,

Why is this unlikely? It is in fact very likely and usually the case when people assert arbitrary justifications as being acceptable, and it would be very easy to demonstrate that this is actually the situation they find themselves in (which would be logical contradiction).

Human psychology doesn't typically permit this, and any probe will likely yield #2 or #4. Somebody actually believing a contradiction is very rare (it happens sometimes, as some theists do it; trinitarian Christians believe god is three parts and one inseparable whole simultaneously, Catholics also believe that the Eucharist is literally the blood and body of Christ... but not). It is at least very rare outside of religion.

Yes, but the point is that these people don't realise they are making an arbitrary justification and what that actually implies. They are conditioned by societies dogma to think there is a justification for this arbitrary assignment, that there is some rationale and reasonable explanation for why humans may have moral value, and non humans don't.. however when probed they may become aware of their folly in assigning such distinctions based on arbitrary justifications, which would then place them in this 1. category above. Hence they are contradicting themselves. As already stated, if they wish to attempt to rationally justify the distinction based on a trait or multiple traits, then they can do this, however if they believe humans have moral value then they will logically expose a contradiction via the NTT argument. Do you agree that if someone actually attempts to name a non-arbitrary trait, then the argument holds up as a formal logical argument?
I would also like you to give an example of an arbitrary trait you think someone may use?

[Margaret Hayek]

I think we're misunderstanding each other.

What I mean is that it needs to be clearer that it is not an 'alternative interpretation' of NTT that's valid, and defeats the counterexample. It is a completely redesigned version with an additional premise. The way it comes across now is that we have chosen the natural interpretation so that we can give a counterexample, but that is not the case, without an additional premise the counterexample will still work.

No one is saying that the alternative version as presented by Isaac is valid, it is true that without adding II it is still prone to something like the same counterexample. The counterexample needs to be interpreted a little differently, however, because on the natural / original version the only traits P2 was talking about were accidental / non-essential traits, whereas the alternative version is talking about literally all traits of all kinds, including essential ones.

The alternative version needs II to be valid. But look, having II as a suppressed premise is NOT the main problem with the alternative version; the main problem is the question begging nature. The thing is, if the only problem with the alternative version was that it was invalid because it left out II, I'm worried that fixating on its invalidity would be nit-picking, because it's really hard for anyone who isn't a logician or metaphysician to care whether II is a substantive metaphysical position or a logical truth. This is unlike the invalidity of the natural version, which overlooks a substantive ethical position that actually comes up (or is such that something a lot like it comes up) a lot in debates and it's confusing to dismiss it as inconsistent, especially given what else is going on.

Even if we changed P2 to this

(P2) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀t ( T(t) ⇒ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ) ) ).

Also I don't think your proposed (P2)s solve the quantification issue. It needs to be something like

P2 - if an individual is an animal then there is no trait absent in the individual that if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless

rather than

P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.

I don't see how you can say the quantification issue is not present in the written version.

As I recently said in the wiki: I do not understand what this alleged additional quantification above and beyond its invalidity as shown by our counterexample is supposed to be ,or what it would be to solve it. We KNOW the natural / original version of the argument is invalid, because we've provided counterexamples. You are trying to raise some additional issue here which I still don't understand. I thought that I understood it in the context of the alternative version. But now that it's clear that it's supposed to be for the natural / original version, I really do not understand what is going on here. Can you please help me? Can you please clarify what this additional problem is supposed to be?

Even if you are right that P2* doesn't work (for whatever you do mean by doesn't work), and this thing is needed, it isn't obvious to me. Can you provide an explanation of why adding P2* doesn't work in the relevant sense (after explaining what working in the relevant sense would be)?

Even if you are right I don't think that it will be straying too much if it really is demanded to capture the English gist of the argument, which uses generics and I should also point out counterfactuals, in a FOL that has only existential and universal quantification and is kind of brute-forcing counterfactual stuff by including possible objects in the domain of quantification. Of course if there's another way to capture it that sounds more obviously like the English that's great too. But once more: I think that the key problem is that I do not understand what this additional problem with the natural reading, beyond being invalid for the reasons we've explained, is supposed to be. Please help.

Edit: I really don't think we should be calling them the 'natural interpretation' and the 'alternate interpretation', it's as if you're saying there is an interpretation of P1, P2 & C that is valid, by that's not the case. What actually is the case is that by changing P2 and adding an additional premise, the argument can become valid.

I think we should just show the 'alternative interpretation', which includes essential properties, is invalid. I don't see any need for talking about the natural interpretation, since showing the alternative interpretation is invalid would make the natural interpretation invalid anyway.

As I tried to explain above: the natural / original version is invalid because it overlooks the substantive ethical position of value narcissism which lots of carnists are actually tempted towards and comes up in debates and causes confusion. So there is a very clear case why the invalidity of the natural / original version is not a nit-pick.

The issue with why the invalidity of the alternative version really matters is a little more tricky. What makes it invalid is that it leaves out a substantive metaphysical premise (II), but no one apart from logicians and metaphysicians is going to care about the distinction between substantive metaphysics and logical form, and the denial of II sure as shit is not going to come up in debates or be any carnist's reason for objecting to the argument. The reason invalidity works as a problem related to the alternative version is that the alternative version + II is brought in by Isaac to try to make the argument valid / get around overlooking value narcissism or whatever, but by avoiding this problem in this way he creates a bigger problem: the alternative version is question begging because i's P2 just asserts that all sentient beings have moral value.

I say we call them the original version and the alternative version. Isaac clearly at first seemed to intend P2 to be talking about US having moral value if WE lost the traits we have & sentient non-human animals don't (like greater intelligence, etc.), while still being ourselves. This stuff about P2 considering losing traits / possessing different traits and becoming / being identical to non-human animals (and thus, although he may no notice it: not ourselves) seems clearly to be a later alteration and to go against the spirit of the original argument in order to try to make it valid in response to criticism. What he does not yet see is that this altered version is question-begging because P2 pretty much just asserts that all sentient beings, not really us but different from us, just have moral value, and this question-begging is the really bad problem with it.

I've added some clarifications to the wiki along these lines. I still need to add the main explanation after our main presentation of the alternative version about how, even if we add II as a premise, we can see that the really big problem with it is that its version of P2 is question-begging.

[DrSinger]

No one is saying that the alternative version as presented by Isaac is valid

You are not directly saying that, but that is the way it comes across when you say the counterexample is only for the natural interpretation. When actually the counterexample also shows the invalidity of the argument, even if traits were to include one's essential properties. Provided you exclude the identity of indiscernibles.

The reason invalidity works as a problem related to the alternative version is that the alternative version + II is brought in by Isaac to try to make the argument valid / get around overlooking value narcissism or whatever, but by avoiding this problem in this way he creates a bigger problem: the alternative version is question begging because i's P2 just asserts that all sentient beings have moral value.

I agree that this is probably what has happened, but now that he presents NTT in this way (and this is way people will understand NTT to be), I don't think there's much point talking about the 'natural interpretation', it will only confuse people. I think it is better to just introduce the counterpart from the outset and not require it to have one's essential properties.

The problem with the P2 you provided

In part 1 (P2)* ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ ¬ M(y) ) )

is that it would only lead to the conclusion there exists a single animal with moral value (provided you combine it with the identity of indiscernibles), not that all animals have moral value. This is relevant (1) because it makes the argument invalid, and (2) because we a changing the form of P2 in the alternate version to account for it.

Edit:

This is how I would have the steelmanning and summary section

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/DrSinger:_Summary

I think the current section in the main article would be very confusing to readers.

PV I would be interested to hear your thoughts on this matter.

[brimstoneSalad]

Yes, but the point is that these people don't realise they are making an arbitrary justification and what that actually implies.

That is very likely, but we aren't mind readers, and even when they realize this they need to be given a choice to defend themselves: #1, 2, 3 or #4 as I outlined earlier. Only one of those options involves believing in a true contradiction, and it is inappropriate (and not logically valid) to claim that this is the only possibility.

A formal logical argument typically lays out a kind of absolute conclusion, not a maybe conclusion (there are forms that do this, but that's not what #NTT is using).

P1. Bob is a transvestite
P2. Some transvestites are gay
C. Therefore Bob is gay.

This logic is invalid. The form is incorrect. See syllogism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism
All-Some-All is logically invalid.

I've demonstrated how only some, and not all, people who use arbitrary excuses are appealing to a true contradiction:

P1. Bob is using an arbitrary excuse
P2. Some people who use arbitrary excuses are contradicting themselves

So what is the appropriate conclusion?

1. C. Therefore Bob is contradicting himself
2. C. Therefore Bob may or may not be contradicting himself (we don't have enough information to determine this)

NameTheTrait makes the first kind of assertion. As such, it is logically invalid. The argument form is wrong. It's claiming for certain something that only might be true.

They are conditioned by societies dogma to think there is a justification for this arbitrary assignment, that there is some rationale and reasonable explanation for why humans may have moral value, and non humans don't.. however when probed they may become aware of their folly in assigning such distinctions based on arbitrary justifications, which would then place them in this 1. category above.

Maybe, maybe not. Maybe they'll rationalize it with fiat, maybe they'll say some arbitrary things are OK and others aren't (which is a ridiculous double standard, but not a contradiction).

Hence they are contradicting themselves.

No. Hence they may be contradicting themselves, since that is one of many possibilities.
You can not just claim something for certain as logical truth when it is not proved, and when in fact it is proved that it is NOT certain.

As already stated, if they wish to attempt to rationally justify the distinction based on a trait or multiple traits, then they can do this, however if they believe humans have moral value then they will logically expose a contradiction via the NTT argument. Do you agree that if someone actually attempts to name a non-arbitrary trait, then the argument holds up as a formal logical argument?

No, it can never hold up as a formal argument, the form is invalid. The argument is logically invalid; there's nothing you can do without changing the argument to make it valid.

P1. Bob is a transvestite
P2. Some transvestites are gay
C. Therefore Bob is gay.

We know that argument is invalid. What if Bob is actually gay? Does that make it valid in your view?

Because that's not the definition of validity.
If Bob were actually gay, that would make the conclusion TRUE, but the argument itself would still be invalid. Invalid does NOT mean it has a false conclusion, it only means the logic isn't correct to reach that conclusion.

I have linked you to this before, please read it so you understand the definition of validity:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

I would also like you to give an example of an arbitrary trait you think someone may use?

You mean which proves the argument invalid?

1. Being or having at some point been human (a trait logically impossible to change, unless you believe time travel is logically coherent)
2. Having the existential identity of being me or "us"
3. My arbitrary whim/fiat (because I say so, since I am the arbiter of morality in the universe)
4. Any non-natural quality as derived from an arbitrary religion or spiritual belief

[brimstoneSalad]

PV I would be interested to hear your thoughts on this matter.

From skimming, I think I am in agreement with you (90% sure). Can you summarize the issue? I've had trouble following.

[Margaret Hayek]

This is how I would have the steelmanning and summary section

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/DrSinger:_Summary

Here's my response to that page (which I make on that page as well):

==Steel-manning NTT==

Before proceeding we will rephrase the argument in the following way, to capture its intended meaning

(P1) All sentient humans have moral value<br>
(P2) There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which is such that, if the trait were absent in a counterpart to a sentient human, then they would be not have moral value.<br>
Therefore, (C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value<br>

Here we have introduced the notion of the counterpart to a sentient human, to mean a replica of a sentient human with the trait removed, that does not have to remain a sentient human.

I'm basically fine with this, and it was my original intention. But I still think that the argument as originally presented in English did require the counterparts to still be us / possess our essential properties; this version has some rational force and is not question-begging. I think that this really should be addressed SOMEWHERE in the wiki.

This is necessary because if we were to interpret P2 as;

: There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which is such that, if the trait were absent sentient humans, then they would be not have moral value

then P2 would be rendered vacuously true, since P1 says sentient humans always have moral value.

No; P1 is just saying that sentient humans as they actually are have moral value. It isn't committing at all to whether they would have moral value if certain changes were made to them - including only identity preserving changes or changes in accidental properties. The only reason to not put constraints on the counterparts is so you can consider the alternative version as well (which, again, was my original intentinon)

==Summary of Issues==

As we will see below, the reason NTT fails is that it is possible to show a counterexample in which, sentient humans have moral value, there exists a sentient nonhuman animal that lacks moral value, and that for all traits, human counterparts possess moral value with the trait removed.

I still think that we should AT SOME POINT in the wiki say that the natural interpretation of this counterexample is value narcissim, and it comes up in the debates, and it works against the argument as presented in ordinary English, which does require that the altered humans be us.

Here's a few edits I've made to the next paragraph, which I think is otherwise largely fine:

"Ask Yourself has argued that if one were to lose all of the traits that distinguish one from a non-human animal, then the resulting entity would be identical to that non-human animal, so P1 and P2 so interpreted [logically] entail C. The problem with this claim is that it presupposes something like [[#Identity of Indiscernibles| the identity of indiscernibles]]: that if two entities have all of the same properties, then they must be the self-same object. This is a substantive metaphysical thesis, to which certain philosophers have objected (for discussion see [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/]), so it must be added as an additional premise for the argument to be logically valid.

But as we will see below, the much greater problem with the argument so interpreted is that it has essentially no rational force. P2 so interpreted is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings, human and non-human, have moral value. The argument thus offers little if any reason to change the mind of someone who does not already find this view plausible, and the defense of its premises offers no guidance on how to persuade such an individual."

I agree that this is probably what has happened, but now that he presents NTT in this way (and this is way people will understand NTT to be), I don't think there's much point talking about the 'natural interpretation', it will only confuse people.

I really disagree: the English version, which isn't question-begging, requires that the changes be identity preserving, because the resulting entities which we're supposed not to deem valueless are still supposed to be us / ourselves. Isaac does not realize that by stepping away from this by letting the resulting entities NOT BE US he has altered the argument, robbed it of its rational force, and made it question begging. I think it will be very confusing not to address this AT SOME POINT in the wiki.

The problem with the P2 you provided

In part 1 (P2)* ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ ¬ M(y) ) )

is that it would only lead to the conclusion there exists a single animal with moral value (provided you combine it with the identity of indiscernibles), not that all animals have moral value. This is relevant (1) because it makes the argument invalid, and (2) because we a changing the form of P2 in the alternate version to account for it.

Oh, OK, I see what you meant now - thanks. Look, the original / natural version of the argument was never going to get combined with the identity of indiscernibles to get made valid. It was going to get combined with something like what brimstoneSalad was calling the suppressed 'golden rule' premise or what have you. The suppressed premise 3 or premises P3 and P4 were going to be such that if P1 and P2 were true, and those additional premises were true, then C would have to be true in virtue of LF - BY DESIGN.

This is still relevant: the reason NTT still seems convincing in many contexts is that P2 is interpreted as considering only identity-preserving changes in traits (what I was calling the natural version - e.g. one losing one's advanced intelligence or one's moral agency - e.g. one's being rendered profoundly intellectually disabled), and there is tacit agreement between the speaker and interlocutor that it's plausible that if counterparts of humans that share non-essential properties with sentient non-human animals (e.g. profoundly intellectually disabled humans, whose intellectual ability is comparable) have moral value, then sentient non-human animals should have moral value as well (although this can be questioned, and arguably is questioned in many debates: although confusion stems from its not being stated clearly as a premise, and its sounding to interlocutors like they are being accused of being inconsistent for rejecting this view, at least if they would resist being killed by aliens, which doesn't really bear on any of the premises).

I thus think that the suppressed premise in the natural / original version / version that corresponds to the actual English presentation of the argument (about us not deeming OURSELVES valueless if we the relevant traits were absent in US) is something like the conditional premise in the argument from less able humans, or:

"if counterparts of sentient humans that share non-essential properties with sentient non-human animals (e.g. profoundly intellectually disabled humans, whose intellectual ability is comparable), then sentient non-human animals should have moral value as well."

I thought we were still going to suggest that as a way of making the argument valid, as had been suggested in the correction of the initial NTT wiki.

Now if something like this is the suppressed premise, we can make sure to get the details right between the display of its logical form and the display of the logical form of P2 to make sure that the argument is valid. There is no need to worry about what would have happened if the identity of indiscernbles was going to be the suppressed premise.

I take it that P2 is really just supposed to say that:

"counterparts of sentient humans that share non-essential properties with sentient non-human animals (e.g. our profoundly intellectually disabled counterparts, whose intellectual ability is comparable to non-human animals) have moral value."

[Daz]

Yes, but the point is that these people don't realise they are making an arbitrary justification and what that actually implies.

That is very likely, but we aren't mind readers, and even when they realize this they need to be given a choice to defend themselves: #1, 2, 3 or #4 as I outlined earlier. Only one of those options involves believing in a true contradiction, and it is inappropriate (and not logically valid) to claim that this is the only possibility.

A formal logical argument typically lays out a kind of absolute conclusion, not a maybe conclusion (there are forms that do this, but that's not what #NTT is using).

P1. Bob is a transvestite
P2. Some transvestites are gay
C. Therefore Bob is gay.

This logic is invalid. The form is incorrect. See syllogism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism
All-Some-All is logically invalid.

I've demonstrated how only some, and not all, people who use arbitrary excuses are appealing to a true contradiction:

P1. Bob is using an arbitrary excuse
P2. Some people who use arbitrary excuses are contradicting themselves

So what is the appropriate conclusion?

1. C. Therefore Bob is contradicting himself
2. C. Therefore Bob may or may not be contradicting himself (we don't have enough information to determine this)

NameTheTrait makes the first kind of assertion. As such, it is logically invalid. The argument form is wrong. It's claiming for certain something that only might be true.

They are conditioned by societies dogma to think there is a justification for this arbitrary assignment, that there is some rationale and reasonable explanation for why humans may have moral value, and non humans don't.. however when probed they may become aware of their folly in assigning such distinctions based on arbitrary justifications, which would then place them in this 1. category above.

Maybe, maybe not. Maybe they'll rationalize it with fiat, maybe they'll say some arbitrary things are OK and others aren't (which is a ridiculous double standard, but not a contradiction).

Hence they are contradicting themselves.

No. Hence they may be contradicting themselves, since that is one of many possibilities.
You can not just claim something for certain as logical truth when it is not proved, and when in fact it is proved that it is NOT certain.

As already stated, if they wish to attempt to rationally justify the distinction based on a trait or multiple traits, then they can do this, however if they believe humans have moral value then they will logically expose a contradiction via the NTT argument. Do you agree that if someone actually attempts to name a non-arbitrary trait, then the argument holds up as a formal logical argument?

No, it can never hold up as a formal argument, the form is invalid. The argument is logically invalid; there's nothing you can do without changing the argument to make it valid.

P1. Bob is a transvestite
P2. Some transvestites are gay
C. Therefore Bob is gay.

We know that argument is invalid. What if Bob is actually gay? Does that make it valid in your view?

Because that's not the definition of validity.
If Bob were actually gay, that would make the conclusion TRUE, but the argument itself would still be invalid. Invalid does NOT mean it has a false conclusion, it only means the logic isn't correct to reach that conclusion.

I have linked you to this before, please read it so you understand the definition of validity:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

I would also like you to give an example of an arbitrary trait you think someone may use?

You mean which proves the argument invalid?

1. Being or having at some point been human (a trait logically impossible to change, unless you believe time travel is logically coherent)
2. Having the existential identity of being me or "us"
3. My arbitrary whim/fiat (because I say so, since I am the arbiter of morality in the universe)
4. Any non-natural quality as derived from an arbitrary religion or spiritual belief

Maybe i'm missing something that you could clarify, but your rationale here doesn't make any sense. It doesn't matter if they actually realise that they believe that sometimes arbitrary justifications are ok and sometimes they are not. We don't have to be mind readers. The point is that it is what it is. Who cares what they realise or believe, most of the time they are either stating completely irrational explanations as you have listed that they would never accept in any other context, or if used to justify injustice to them or their group, or they are being intellectually dishonest. It is irrelevant as to whether they can comprehend the logic or not, the fact remains that they are contradicting themselves, regardless of their comprehension. They wouldn't except someone saying "us" as in white people, anyone else is not of moral value. And when questioned about it they just say "meh, just my belief". So they can't appeal to this rationale when justifying something just as arbitrary. Who cares whether they acknowledge it or not? I think you are confusing the goal post here.

You haven't demonstrated at all how only some people who use arbitrary excuses are appealing to a true contradiction. The examples you have given (2,3 and 4) that you believe show people are not contradicting themselves by appealing to an arbitrary distinction, are merely based on what those individuals subjectively believe. However, from an objectively logical position it is clear that all those examples are not rationale or logical justifications for using arbitrary distinctions, therefore they are ALWAYS contradicting themselves if they wouldn't accept arbitrary distinctions as justifications in other contexts. They cannot appeal to an arbitrary distinction of moral value when it suits them, and at the same time reject an arbitrary distinction of moral value in another context or when it is detrimental to them, without creating a contradiction within their belief in the justification of using arbitrary distinctions of moral value. They can only allude this contradiction if they bite the bullet and say that, yes arbitrary justifications of moral value are ok in all contexts dependent on the subjective interpretation (which creates an extremely problematic set of circumstances as we know).

[brimstoneSalad]

Maybe i'm missing something that you could clarify, but your rationale here doesn't make any sense.

Can you answer my questions, so I can understand where your confusion lies?
I suspect it lies in a misunderstanding of what "validity" means in logic.

P1. Bob is using an arbitrary excuse
P2. Some people who use arbitrary excuses are contradicting themselves

So what is the appropriate conclusion?

1. C. Therefore Bob is contradicting himself
2. C. Therefore Bob may or may not be contradicting himself (we don't have enough information to determine this)

I need to know what you think the answer to this question is.

P1. Bob is a transvestite
P2. Some transvestites are gay
C. Therefore Bob is gay.

We know that argument is invalid. What if Bob is actually gay? Does that make it valid in your view?

Likewise, please answer this question.


Did you read the article I linked you to here?

I have linked you to this before, please read it so you understand the definition of validity:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

It doesn't matter if they actually realise that they believe that sometimes arbitrary justifications are ok and sometimes they are not.

If they believe sometimes arbitrary justifications are OK and sometimes they are not, they are employing a double standard, they are not contradicting themselves.

A double standard is not a logical contradiction. Do you understand and agree that these are different things?

Please answer that question so I can see where the misunderstanding here lies.

most of the time they are either stating completely irrational explanations as you have listed that they would never accept in any other context, or if used to justify injustice to them or their group, or they are being intellectually dishonest.

This is a double standard.

I said before if the first half of nameTheTrait were this:

P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we hold a double standard by deeming animals valueless

It would probably be valid.
But that's not the wording.

A logical contradiction is different from a double standard.
Do you understand how?

It is irrelevant as to whether they can comprehend the logic or not, the fact remains that they are contradicting themselves, regardless of their comprehension.

IF they think double standards are ALWAYS wrong, then they are probably contradicting themselves.
IF they think double standards are only wrong for other people, but OK for themselves, then they are not contradicting themselves.

They wouldn't except someone saying "us" as in white people, anyone else is not of moral value. And when questioned about it they just say "meh, just my belief". So they can't appeal to this rationale when justifying something just as arbitrary.

Of course they can: BY EMPLOYING A DOUBLE STANDARD. This is not a logical contradiction.

If they agree with an additional premise: "P3 - Double standards are ALWAYS wrong" THEN and only then is it demonstrated that they are contradicting themselves.

If they only believe double standards are wrong for other people but not for themselves, then there's no contradiction.

Who cares whether they acknowledge it or not? I think you are confusing the goal post here.

If you want to prove anything, you need more information.
You're confusing the purpose of a logical argument here. Logic is used to prove propositions. If you have failed to prove something, the logical argument has failed in being logical.

You haven't demonstrated at all how only some people who use arbitrary excuses are appealing to a true contradiction. The examples you have given (2,3 and 4) that you believe show people are not contradicting themselves by appealing to an arbitrary distinction, are merely based on what those individuals subjectively believe.

Yes, it's based on their subjective beliefs. ...That's pretty much what arbitrary is.

However, from an objectively logical position it is clear that all those examples are not rationale or logical justifications for using arbitrary distinctions,

Arbitrary distinctions don't have to be justified: if they were justified they would no longer be arbitrary.
Nothing in #NameTheTrait says the trait has to be rationally justified; it can be an arbitrary one.

therefore they are ALWAYS contradicting themselves if they wouldn't accept arbitrary distinctions as justifications in other contexts.

False. They are always employing a double standard. This is not a contradiction unless they agree with a "P3- Double standards are ALWAYS wrong".
Somebody CAN believe it's wrong for others to hold double standards and believe it's right for themselves to do it.
It's a completely ridiculous belief, but there has been no logical contradiction demonstrated there.

They cannot appeal to an arbitrary distinction of moral value when it suits them, and at the same time reject an arbitrary distinction of moral value in another context or when it is detrimental to them,

Of course they can, it's called using a double standard.

without creating a contradiction within their belief in the justification of using arbitrary distinctions of moral value.

They believe it's OK for them to do it, but not OK for others. There is no contradiction with that belief. Again, that's a double standard, not a contradiction.

They can only allude this contradiction if they bite the bullet and say that, yes arbitrary justifications of moral value are ok in all contexts dependent on the subjective interpretation (which creates an extremely problematic set of circumstances as we know).

That is the only way they can avoid it without appealing to a double standard.

There are two ways to avoid it:
1. Appeal to a double standard
2. Accept others doing it to them (as you said), which arguably invalidates their own assertions of moral value

So, in fact, people have three options when answering #NameTheTrait:

1. Logical contradiction
2. Appeal to a double standard which they accept for themselves only
3. Reject the double standard and accept arbitrary reasons for others too, which has those consequences as you say which nobody would accept and might contradict P1.

#NameTheTrait claims that 1 is the only possible outcome. That is incorrect, since arbitrary answers obviously work too. Thus #NameTheTrait is logically invalid.

If you made a couple tweaks to #NameTheTrait you could make it logically valid. For example, add the P3 I mentioned.

[DrSinger]

http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait#Invalid_Generalizations
(isn't explained as well as it could be yet)

This is relevant here. To use an 'arbitrary justification' in one context in and reject it in another is not a contradiction.

Friended actually did a decent job of explaining it in a vid. (he is not contradicting himself by naming the trait 'my group' and rejecting being killed by aliens etc.)

https://youtu.be/z4To_q8fQaE