The Nature and Importance of Rights (Tom Regan)

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The Nature and Importance of Rights (Tom Regan)

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ANIMAL RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS
An Introduction to Moral Philosophy
TOM REGAN

Segments from the table of Contents, Preface and The Nature and Importance of Rights


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CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PREFACE
From Indifference to Advocacy
2 Animal Exploitation
3 The Nature and Importance of Rights
4 Indirect Duty Views
5 Direct Duty Views
6 Human Rights
7 Animal Rights
8 Objections and Replies
9 Moral Philosophy and Change
NOTES
INDEX
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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PREFACE


Some people (and I include myself in this group) are passionate in their conviction that many nonhuman animals have rights; others are no less passionate in their conviction that they do not. The emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding partisans on both sides is reminiscent of other controversial moral issues-abortion and affirmative action, for example. For those people (the vast majority, as it happens) who do not have strong convictions concerning animal rights, one way or the other, it is hard to know what to think. I hope to provide some guidance in this regard.

Opponents of animal rights frequently describe proponents as irrational and emotional, antiscience and misanthropic. These characterizations may be true of a few, but they are not true of the vast majority of animal rights advocates. At least this is what my experience has taught me, after having been involved in animal rights advocacy for more than thirty years.

The argument I present in this book is one way to counter the stereotype of the irrational, misanthropic, more or less emotionally unbalanced animal rights advocate. The strategy is simple. We ask hard questions, explore the relevant possibilities, and look for the best answers. Then we see where these answers take us. When we follow this strategy, I believe logic leads us to a simple conclusion: many nonhuman animals have rights.

Some of the challenges we face arise in moral theory. Moral theorists ask many different kinds of questions, including two that are absolutely central: (1) What makes right acts right? (2)What makes wrong acts wrong? Different theories offer different answers. Despite these differences, every theory has something to say about who has moral standing (who counts morally). For example, some moral theories say that all and only human beings have moral standing. If true, the news is not good for nonhuman animals. If true, nonhu- man animals themselves count for nothing morally. Other moral theories say that all and only sentient beings (beings capable of experiencing pleasure and pain) have moral standing. If true, and if some animals (cats and dogs, say) are sentient, the news for these animals is better. If true, these animals them- selves count for something morally.

One thing we know. Both these ways of thinking cannot be true. It cannot be true that only human beings have moral standing, if cats and dogs have moral standing. And it cannot be true that cats and dogs have moral standing, if only human beings have moral standing. So, which of the two, if either, is true? When we give rational support for our answer to this question, we are doing moral philosophy. We will be doing a good deal of moral philosophy in the pages ahead.

Here are some of the hard questions we will be exploring:
Do all and only human beings have moral standing?
Do all and only sentient beings have moral standing?
What makes right acts right?
What makes wrong acts wrong?
What are moral rights?
Do all humans have moral rights?
Do any nonhuman animals have moral rights?
None of these questions has only one possible answer. This should not be surprising. Hard questions in physics or constitutional law, for example, do not have only one possible answer. Why would hard moral questions be any different? In addition to identifying competing answers to our questions, therefore, we will need to decide which ones have the best reasons, the best arguments on their side. The more fully we are able to do this, the richer our moral theory becomes. In this respect, our exploration of animal rights in particular serves as an introduction to moral philosophy in general.

Moral philosophy is not just theory; it is fraught with practical significance. This means that, in addition to asking questions of theory, we will also need to ask practical questions, including this one in particular:

What difference does it make whether or not animals have moral rights?

As we shall see, there is no more important question, judged from the animals’ point of view. If animals do not have rights, then none of the ways humans exploit them (as a food source or for clothing, for example) is wrong in principle, and no wrong need be done if we continue to exploit them in these ways into the indefinite future. On the other hand, if animals do have rights, then all forms of our exploitation of them are wrong in principle and each should be stopped immediately. The differences really are this stark, really are this fundamental, if animals have rights or if they do not. Which is why, judged from the animals’ point of view, there is no more important question than this one.

We should not minimize the importance of this question for us, either. If the rights of animals are violated when they are raised for food, trapped for their fur, or used as tools in research, then we will be duty-bound to change how we live, from the food we eat (or do not eat) to the clothes we wear (or do not wear). Nothing better illustrates, I think, how questions in moral theory spill over into how we live our daily lives than to ask about the rights of animals. True, issues like abortion and physician-assisted suicide have great practical significance; they force us to ask what we should do if we find our- selves having to make certain momentous decisions (to have an abortion or not to have an abortion, for example). By contrast, the issue of animal rights forces us to ask what we should do when we sit down to our next meal or when we go shopping for a new coat. Animal rights is an in-our-face kind of inquiry whose questions force us to make a moral inventory of our most common choices, our day-to-day way of living in the world.

As I said at the outset, I count myself among those who passionately believe in animal rights. But my passionate belief does not flow from blind emotion or a lack of respect for reason, let alone misanthropy. I believe in animal rights because I believe the moral theory in which their rights are affirmed is rationally a more satisfactory theory than are those theories in which their rights are denied. If true, then the heavy intellectual lifting moral theorizing requires ends with an even more daunting practical challenge: how can we live a life that respects the rights of other animals? I offer a partial answer in chapter 9. More complete responses will be found in Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights, which I have written as a companion volume to this book; in the relevant references in the notes for each chapter; and in the resources available at www.tomregan-animalrights.com.While moral philosophy can serve as part of the begin-all of animal rights thinking, information from other sources is needed as we move on to the task of animal rights living.


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THE NATURE AND IMPORTANCE OF RIGHTS


What makes right acts right? What makes wrong acts wrong? Some moral philosophers believe that the best answers to these questions require the recognition of moral rights. This is the position I favor and the one I will try to defend. This is also a position all the moral theories examined in chap-ters 4 and 5, despite their many differences, unequivocally reject. It will there-fore be useful to say something about the nature and importance of rights, the better to understand the work that lies ahead.

The idea of the “rights of the individual” has had a profound and lasting influence, both in and beyond Western civilization. Among philosophers, however, this idea has been the subject of intense debate. Some philosophers deny that we have any rights (moral rights, as they are commonly called) beyond those legal rights established by law; others affirm that, separate from and more basic than our legal rights, are our moral rights, including such rights as the rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. The framers of America’s Declaration of Independence certainly believed this; they maintained that the sole reason for having a government in the first place is to protect citizens in the possession of their rights, rights that, because they are independent of and more basic than legal rights, have the status of moral rights.


POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS

People can agree that humans have moral rights and disagree over what rights are. They can even agree that humans have moral rights, agree about what rights are, and still disagree when it comes to saying what rights humans have. For example, some proponents of moral rights believe humans possess only negative moral rights (rights not to be harmed or interfered with), while others believe we also have positive moral rights (rights to be helped or assisted). This is an important distinction we can illustrate as follows.


Violations of Negative Moral Rights: An Example

Some people, through no fault of their own, are systematically harmed by other people. For example, teenage girls in some parts of the world are sold into conditions of abject slavery where, on a daily basis, they are beaten and sexually assaulted. If these girls have a negative right not to be harmed or interfered with, their abusers violate their rights, which is wrong. As this example suggests, negative rights are violated because of what people do to the bearers of such rights. Violations are wrongs of commission.


Violations of Positive Moral Rights: An Example

Some people, through no fault of their own, have important needs they cannot fulfill. For example, young children born into poverty are unable to pay for adequate medical care. If these children have a positive right to be helped or assisted, then those people who have the means to help have an obligation to do so. If these people fail to help, they violate the children’s rights, which is wrong. As this example illustrates, positive rights are violated because of what people fail to do for the bearers of such rights. Violations are wrongs of omission.

Some philosophers (libertarians, as they are frequently called) do not believe in positive rights; for them, all moral rights are negative moral rights. Thus, while libertarians could agree that it would be a good thing for the children in the second example to receive health care, they would insist that these children do not have a right to receive it. More generally, no one has this right.

Other philosophers (those with socialist inclinations) believe in rights of both kinds; for them, some moral rights are negative, but some are positive too. Thus, because receiving health care is such an important good, these philosophers can be counted upon to argue that the children in the second example do have a right to receive it. More generally, everyone has this right.

As should be evident, these two ways of thinking about moral rights cannot both be true. If people have only negative moral rights, they cannot also have positive moral rights; and if people have positive moral rights, they cannot have only negative moral rights. So which (if either) view is correct? Both sides have presented impressive arguments. A fair, informed evaluation of the competing views would be long and difficult. Fortunately for us, these debates lie outside the scope of our present interest. Here is why.

Although the differencesjust remarked upon are important, so are the similarities. In fact, for our purposes, the latter are more important than the former. There is common ground among philosophers who find a place for moral rights in their moral theories. While there is disagreement over the validity of positive moral rights, there is unanimity concerning the validity of negative moral rights. For example, no advocate of human rights (at least none I know of) would brush aside the treatment of the teenage girls in the first example. Every advocate of human rights (at least everyone I know of) would see in their mistreatment a gross violation of human rights. This unanimity among these thinkers makes our work easier. For our purposes, we can table the divisive debate over positive rights for humans (the idea is broached again briefly in chapter 6) and instead concentrate on our negative moral rights. Among moral theorists in general, this is where the deep philosophical action is, the place where the fundamental questions concerning human rights arise.

The same is true concerning the debate over animal rights. The questions central to the animal rights debate also concern wrongs of commission (what people are doing to animals on factory farms and fur mills, for example). Fundamentally, what we want to know is whether the harm we visit upon them, and the freedom and life we take from them, violate their rights. As such, the central questions do not concern whether we are violating animals’ rights because of wrongs of omission (for example, whether the rights of park pigeons are violated if we fail to give them an annual veterinary checkup). Questions of this latter kind are relevant certainly, and a fully developed moral theory would address them. It remains true nevertheless that questions of the former kind are more central because more fundamental.

For these reasons, our inquiry will focus on negative moral rights (hence-forth “rights,” for reasons of linguistic economy). What do we mean when we affirm or deny moral rights? And why is possession of them so important? These are the questions to which we now turn.


MORAL INTEGRITY: NO TRESPASSING

Possession of moral rights (by which, again, unless otherwise indicated, I mean negative moral rights) confers a distinctive moral status on those who have them. To possess these rights is to have a kind of protective moral shield, something we might picture as an invisible No Trespassing sign. If we assume that all humans have such rights, we can ask what this invisible sign prohibits. Two things, in general. First, others are not morally free to harm us; to say this is to say that, judged from the moral point of view, others are not free to take our lives or injure our bodies as they please. Second, others are not free to interfere with our free choice; to say this is to say that others are not free to limit our choices as they please. In both cases, the No Trespassing sign is meant to protect those who have rights by morally limiting the freedom of others.

Does this mean that it is always wrong to take people’s lives, injure them, or restrict their freedom? Not at all. When people exceed their rights by violat- ing ours, we act within our rights if we respond in ways that can harm or limit the freedom of the violators. For example, suppose you are attacked by a mugger; then you do nothing wrong in using physical force sufficient to defend yourself, even if this harms your assailant. Thankfully, in the world as we find it, such cases are the exception, not the rule. Most people most of the time act in ways that respect the rights of other human beings. But even if the world happened to be different in this respect, the central point would be the same: what we are free to do when someone violates our rights does not trans- late into an unrestricted freedom to violate theirs.


MORAL WEIGHT: TRUMP

Every serious advocate of human rights believes that our rights have greater moral weight than other important human values. To use an analogy from the card game bridge, our moral rights are trump. Here is what this analogy means.

A hand is dealt. Hearts are trump. The first three cards played are the queen of spades, the king of spades, and the ace of spades. You (the last player) have no spades. However, you do have the two of hearts. Because hearts are trump, your lowly two of hearts beats the queen of spades, beats the king of spades, even beats the ace of spades. This is how powerful the trump suit is in the game of bridge.

The analogy between trump in bridge and individual rights in morality should be reasonably clear. There are many important values to consider when we make a moral decision. For example: How will we be affected personally as a result of deciding one way or another? What about our family, friends, neighbors, fellow Americans? It is not hard to write a long list. When we say, “rights are trump,” we mean that respect for the rights of individuals is the most important consideration in “the game of morality,” so to speak. In particular, we mean that the good others derive from violating someone’s rights (by injuring their bodies or taking their lives, for example) never justifies violating them.


MORAL STATUS: EQUALITY

Moral rights breathe equality. They are the same for all who have them, differ though we do in many ways. This explains why no human being can justifiably be denied rights for arbitrary, prejudicial, or morally irrelevant reasons. Race is such a reason. To attempt to determine which humans have rights on the basis of race is like trying to sweeten tea by adding salt. What race we are tells us nothing about what rights we have.

The same is no less true of other differences between us. Nancy and I trace our family lineage to different countries-she to Lithuania, I to Ireland. Some of our friends are Christians, some Jews, and some Moslems. Others are agnostics or atheists. In the world at large, a few people are very wealthy, many more, very poor. And so it goes. Humans differ in many ways. There is no denying that.

Still, no one who believes in human rights thinks these differences mark fundamental moral divisions. If we mean anything by the idea of human rights, we mean that we have them equally. And we have them equally (if we have them at all) regardless of our race, gender, religious belief, comparative wealth, intelligence, or date or place of birth, for example.


MORAL CLAIMS: JUSTICE

Rights involve justice, not generosity; what we are due, not what we want. Here is an example that helps illustrate the difference. I happen to want a fancy sports car, which I cannot afford. Bill Gates (as everyone knows) has more money than he knows what to do with. I write to him:

Dear Bill:
I want an Audi TT 3.2-litre six-cylinder sports coupe with a direct shift gearbox. I can’t afford the asking price. I know you can. So I would appreciate it if would send me a money order (by Express Mail, if you don’t mind) to cover the cost.
Your new friend,
Tom

One thing is abundantly clear. I am not in a position to demand that Bill Gates buy me an Audi TT.Receiving a car from him-any car-is not something to which I am entitled, not something I am owed or due. If my new-found friend Bill bought me the car of my dreams, his gift would distinguish him as uncommonly generous (or uncommonly foolish), not uncommonly fair.

When we invoke our rights, by contrast, we are not asking for anyone’s generosity. We are not saying, “Please, will you kindly give me something I do not deserve?” On the contrary, when we invoke our rights, we are demand- ing fair treatment, demanding that we receive what is our due. We are not asking for any favors.


MORAL RIGHTS: VALID CLAIMS

The preceding discussion helps explain the general characterization of rights as valid claims, an analysis of rights that is pervasive throughout the animal rights debate (for example, this is the analysis favored by Carl Cohen, the most influential critic of animal rights) and the one I will use throughout these pages. To say that rights are claims means that rights represent treatment that one is justified in demanding, treatment that is strictly owed, either for oneself or for others. To say that such a claim is valid means that the claim is rationally justified. Thus, whether a claim to a right is valid depends on whether the basis of the claim is justified. A question of great importance (to understate the case) asks: What justifies such claims?

The answer I will be defending ties the validity of claims to valid principles of direct duty. For example, our claim to a right to life is valid if others have a direct duty not to take our lives as they please (that is, if the duty not to take life is a valid principle of direct duty), and our claim to a right to liberty is valid if others have a direct duty not to interfere with our liberty as they please (that is, if the duty not to interfere is a valid principle of direct duty). Obvi- ously, this explanation itself stands in need of explanation. In particular, something clearly needs to be said about “direct duties.” And something more will be said about this and related ideas in the following chapters. We revisit the analysis of rights as valid claims in chapter 6, in the discussion of human rights, and in chapter 8, in the examination of Cohen’s objections to animal rights. Before ending this chapter, one final idea requires our attention.


MORAL UNITY: RESPECT

Trespass. Trump. Equality. Justice. These are among the ideas that come to the surface when we review the meaning and importance of moral rights. While each is essential, none succeeds in unifjrlng the core concept. By contrast, the idea of respect succeeds in doing this.

The rights discussed in this chapter (life, liberty, and bodily integrity) are variations on a main theme, that theme being respect. From the perspective of human rights proponents, 1 show my respect for you by respecting these rights in your life, and you show your respect for me by doing the same thing in my life. Respect is the main theme because treating one another with respectjust i treating one another in ways that respect our other rights. Froms this perspective, our most fundamental right, the right that unifies all our other rights, is our right to be treated with respect. When our other rights are violated, we are treated with a lack of respect.


ANIMAL RIGHTS?

It is when viewed against this larger moral backdrop that the importance of the debate over animal rights comes into sharper focus. If animals have rights of the sort mentioned (the rights to bodily integrity and to life, for example), then the way they are treated on farms and in biomedical research violates their rights, is wrong, and should be stopped, no matter how much humans have benefited from these practices in the past or how much we might benefit from having them continue in the future.

Philosophical opponents of animal rights agree. “If animals have any rights at all,” writes Cohen, “they have the right to be respected, the right not to be used as a tool to advance human interests . . . no matter how important those human interests are thought to be.” In particular, if nonhuman animals have moral rights, biomedical research that uses them is wrong and should be stopped. Cohen even goes so far as to liken the use of animals, in the development of the polio and other vaccines, to the use Nazi scientists made of Jewish children during the Second World War. “If those animals we used and continue to use have rights as human children do, what we did and are doing to them is as profoundly wrong as what the Nazis did to those Jews not long ago.”

Clearly, what is true of the morality of relying on the animal model in scientific research would be no less true when evaluating the morality of commercial animal agriculture and the fur trade. These, too, would be “profoundly wrong,” if animals have rights. On this point, without a doubt, even Cohen would agree.

But do animals have rights? More fundamentally, do human beings have rights? These are among the central questions to be addressed in the pages that follow. At this juncture I note only that my argument for animal rights cannot be made in twenty-five words or less. Why animals have rights can be understood only after critically examining moral theories that deny rights to animals and, sometimes, to humans, too. Once we understand the weaknesses of these theories, we can understand why human rights must be acknowledged; and once we adopt this latter position, then-but not before, in my judgment-we can understand why we must acknowledge animal rights as well.

In the nature of the case, therefore, as I indicated earlier and as I will have occasion to say again, my argument for animal rights is cumulative in nature, arising as it does in response to weaknesses in other ways of thinking about morality. What these other ways are, where some of their weaknesses lie, are explored in the following pages.
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