Quantifying Sentient Life?

[DaRock]

Most people, including vegans, want to make the most educated decisions based upon the most accurate and available information. Such educated decisions are hard to make, however when such information is not available. The information I am writing about is how to assign value to sentient life. As philosophical vegans we try to minimize unnecessary suffering to the best of our ability by not consuming animal products and yet we too, sadly, inflict suffering, albeit what we deem as necessary suffering, when we consume plant-based products which are raised in farm fields. Such farm fields require plowing and harvesting which kills a number of small insects and animals while also taking up space for what could be a natural ecosystem. Yet it must be asked if what we deem as necessary suffering is really ethical. By what standard or method do we claim that that the numerous lives of the insects and small animals who die for our plant-based protein are less valuable than the life of say 1 grass-fed cow or 100 crickets raised in an enclosed and controlled environment. I leave you, my fellow philosophical vegans, with the following question: Is there a way to quantify the value of a sentient life? Do: 20 chickens=5 dogs=1 human=100,000 crickets? If there is a way to quantify such lives (quantification of pain, capability to improve the life of others, etc..)? Could it perhaps be more ethical to raise insects as a source of protein than to grow less protein-dense soy or other plant-based proteins?

[NonZeroSum]

Is there a way to quantify the value of a sentient life? Do: 20 chickens=5 dogs=1 human=100,000 crickets?

Yes in a burning building scenario we can probably quantify it in cold hard numbers like this based on the parameters you layer out below, or to convince carnists to at least reduce their killing, more generally though it's how to manage systems to support the most life's interests, paying more attention to the hardships of more sentient life.

If there is a way to quantify such lives (quantification of pain, capability to improve the life of others, etc..)? Could it perhaps be more ethical to raise insects as a source of protein than to grow less protein-dense soy or other plant-based proteins?

It's best to support the plant industry to becoming more productive and less harmful till you have flourishing no till, no compacting farms. We can reduce the number of insects caught up in the process of cultivation to negligible during their wild lives, whereas insect farming will always be a direct cause of suffering and perverting their interests.

[brimstoneSalad]

I don't think insects are a source of protein, farmed insects have to be fed plant matter that contains protein. The conversion is just much more efficient than for mammals or birds, and more of the body is edible, so it's less harmful than most other meat.
Now rope grown oysters are different; they're actually filter feeding, and using resources we otherwise can not practicably use with little to no environmental cost (and possibly a benefit); as such, they are somewhat of an exception as a novel protein source.

Aside from oysters, the answer is pretty simple due to the resources that have to be put into growing the animal. This applies to grass fed beef, too. Those grazing lands are managed, they have to be to prevent them from overgrowing and turning into more of a forest, and grazing cattle is a leading cause of deforestation and desertification (in itself, it degrades the land and prevents growth). Grass-fed is not a viable solution, and it requires more land. That's one thing Cowspiracy got right.

Anyway, the point is that thanks to thermodynamics, it's a question we don't have to ask because eating vegan ends up better all around. Or, at least ostrovegan, and oysters probably aren't sentient at all so no comparisons are necessary (no amount of 0 adds up to anything at all).

As to the topical questions of comparing sentience (if we wanted to for another reason), you can look at neuron count as a ballpark figure, but there's also a lot of overhead for basic functions and only a small amount of that count is devoted to intelligence. Brain to body mass ratio may occasionally be more useful, but there are massive differences between more distantly related animals (such as bird brains being much more efficient). An understanding of class-specific neuroanatomy is probably necessary, and we'd have to find correlations that hold up in behavioral tests of intelligence and learning. In terms of dedicated neuron number and intelligence/sentience, it probably scales exponentially for a while and then tapers off, and there may be several thresholds at which it does this.

[inator]

I'm actually curious as to how likely it is that insects are sentient. There doesn't seem to be much research on it as of now (Here's a summary of the literature: https://was-research.org/writing-by-others/reducing-suffering-amongst-invertebrates-insects/#Studies_on_invertebrate_pain).

György Buzsáki, one of the big shots in neuroscience at the moment, has this to say about invertebrates:

Animals predict the future. In invertebrates, signals trigger appropriate responses within the time frame of the biophysical properties of typically non-spiking neurons, the connections made by which are genetically imprinted. In vertebrates, ever-increasing loops of neuronal networks are added to the basic circuits to improve prediction of events of higher complexity and longer temporal separation by deploying action potentials for fast and distant signaling. The connections within the loops are strongly shaped by the outside world. At some level, the loops learn to disengage their reliance on external cues, a fundamental difference from invertebrates and a necessary condition for cognition. Thus, if your goal is to study cognition, choose a mammal.

What seems strange is 1. that he puts all invertebrates in the same boat, even though cephalopods have been deemed sentient and are even protected by legislation, and 2. the last sentence - "choose a mammal" - as if there's isn't a whole spectrum of sentient beings between invertebrates and mammals.

Maybe he's particularly strict in the differentiation between cognition and sentience?

[brimstoneSalad]

I'm actually curious as to how likely it is that insects are sentient. There doesn't seem to be much research on it as of now (Here's a summary of the literature: https://was-research.org/writing-by-others/reducing-suffering-amongst-invertebrates-insects/#Studies_on_invertebrate_pain).

Pain isn't really a measure of sentience. We actually had a forum member here with congenital analgesia.
For research relevant to sentience, you want to look into operant conditioning/true learning. That indicates some kind of mind at work, and subjective experience/wants.

Whether they experience pain when removed from their legs is one thing, whether they have interests (unrelated to pain) is another.

At some level, the loops learn to disengage their reliance on external cues, a fundamental difference from invertebrates and a necessary condition for cognition.

It sounds like he's talking about some kind of metacognition, or some higher level of cognition beyond basic sentience.
I'd be interested to read more of what he's said on the topic if he has anything online. I tend to be very interested in what highly regarded scientists have to say on the topic. But as you said...

What seems strange is 1. that he puts all invertebrates in the same boat, even though cephalopods have been deemed sentient and are even protected by legislation,

Right, octopus clearly have advanced cognitive abilities, impressive even for a monkey. It's very difficult to imagine those would somehow be nearly hardwired first degree conditioned responses. Occam's razor here would prefer sentience and consciousness as an explanation.

2. the last sentence - "choose a mammal" - as if there's isn't a whole spectrum of sentient beings between invertebrates and mammals.

It's a bizarre recommendation, given that birds tend to be more advanced than most small mammals one might study.

Maybe he's particularly strict in the differentiation between cognition and sentience?

That's the only thing I can think of, or it could be a case like Hawking?

P.S. Please register on the Wiki. I'd love to see if you have anything to add on the table of contents.
http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/Table_of_Contents

[DaRock]

Pain isn't really a measure of sentience.

Whether they experience pain when removed from their legs is one thing, whether they have interests (unrelated to pain) is another.

I am confused as to why you, as a philosophical vegan, choose not to eat animal products. Do you choose to eat a vegan diet to reduce unnecessary suffering or to promote the interests of other sentient organisms? Is the answer a combination of the two (I understand that not suffering is an interest of other sentient organisms) and what other interests of sentient animals do you propose we acknowledge other than their basic right to life (reproductive rights, aesethic pleasure, etc...)?

Also how can pain be quantified between different species? If say a fish experiences more pain in its death than a pig but the pig is by far more sentient (as quantified through a method such a brain to body size ratio) is it more ethical to eat a pig who is slaughtered painlessly or to eat a fish, a lower sentient lifeform, who supposedly has less important interests due to its brain to body size? In short when life must necessarily be taken, should such life be taken based upon sentience (and hence interests) or should it be taken based upon the ability to suffer?

Also in relation to my original question for this post I would like to know if it is more ethical to eat 20 chickens or one cow as a source of protein for non-vegans as it would appear a decision based solely upon sentience would lead to the conclusion that it is more ethical to eat a cow than 20 chickens.

[brimstoneSalad]

I am confused as to why you, as a philosophical vegan, choose not to eat animal products. Do you choose to eat a vegan diet to reduce unnecessary suffering or to promote the interests of other sentient organisms? Is the answer a combination of the two (I understand that not suffering is an interest of other sentient organisms) and what other interests of sentient animals do you propose we acknowledge other than their basic right to life (reproductive rights, aesethic pleasure, etc...)?

Not suffering is one of many interests, yes.

I try to avoid grossly violating the interests of other sentient beings for no good reason, and it goes even more so when it's a lose-lose proposition as is the case of consuming animal products which will likely harm your own health in the process of violating the interests of other sentient beings.

It should be noted, though, that pain and suffering are not the same thing. Beings can suffer emotionally or even physically without it necessarily being "pain" in the proper sense.
You can be, for example, cold or hot without it being painful. You can be confined or strapped down and suffer immensely without any pain at all. Pain has a pretty limited definition.

Other interests are usually things like not dying. You wouldn't want to be killed painlessly and instantly without your knowledge, because you have an interest in continued living.

Also how can pain be quantified between different species? If say a fish experiences more pain in its death than a pig but the pig is by far more sentient (as quantified through a method such a brain to body size ratio) is it more ethical to eat a pig who is slaughtered painlessly or to eat a fish, a lower sentient lifeform, who supposedly has less important interests due to its brain to body size? In short when life must necessarily be taken, should such life be taken based upon sentience (and hence interests) or should it be taken based upon the ability to suffer?

I'm not as concerned with the pain of death as I am of the fact of an untimely death itself.
I would prefer to experience the momentary pain of being shot and then not die, vs. die without experiencing any pain.

As to which life you should end if you must, all other things being equal, choose the less sentient.

Also in relation to my original question for this post I would like to know if it is more ethical to eat 20 chickens or one cow as a source of protein for non-vegans as it would appear a decision based solely upon sentience would lead to the conclusion that it is more ethical to eat a cow than 20 chickens.

There are too many variables there. Cows, for example, contribute more to global warming, and because they have lower FCRs they also contribute to more wild animal deaths and waste in general.
Chickens, on the other hand, are often treated with more cruelty in agriculture, so even if a chicken is less sentient, the much greater level of cruelty the animal experiences may weigh more heavily than the lesser level for the more sentient being.

Assuming their interests were all violated to the same extent, and that the 20 chickens (cumulatively) did the same amount of damage as one cow to the environment, and even that the health effects were the same, then we could start to ask those questions based on sentience alone.
A cow is almost certainly more sentient than a chicken, but how differences in sentience scale is less clear. It could be regarded as more linear or more exponential, or based on thresholds where there are exponential spikes and plateaus (the latter is probably the case for degrees of sentience).

[Jamie in Chile]

Not sure if you're trolling vegans here or seriously interested, but it's a fair and interesting question anyway, so I'll bite.

Yes, you can quantify - very loosely. Most people would deny this I suspect, but I also suspect most people would accept 1 human > 2 ants and 1,000,000 dolphins > 1 human. If you accept that, you accept that you can quantify at least to some extent.

However I'd argue such quantifying might be useful in some areas but is not helpful with most or all of our eating choices, for a number of reasons.

1. Most meat is fed more plants than if you eat plants directly, so all of these arguments are irrelevant to the general question of whether it's morally better to be a vegetarian or a meat eater, and irrelevant to questions about most meat. You could probably cobble together an argument about grass-fed cows (a tiny minority of the meat that would eat) as Steven Davis did (google it or ask me for the link) but it's probably false since grass fed cows are inefficient in land use, cause a lot of destruction to biodiversity. Someone has tried to do the maths to show it's probably false and it's prone to huge errors but I can share it with you if you like. Or google Gaverick Matheny.

2. Deliberately killing x amount of sentient life is not the same as indirectly killing the same amount, it's not morally equivalent, even if you know that indirect deaths will occur. When the US military embarks on a military campaign that it knows will lead to some collateral damage including child deaths, that is just not the same as if they deliberately targeted children with drones in a school. No-one would claim so, and so saying or implying that x animals killed in field where plants are grown is morally equivalent to deliberately killing and eating x animals is false.

3. Studies have shown that the common belief that growing plants kills small animals in the fields is largely false. People have literally tagged all the animals in a field, ran a combine harvester through it, and found that nearly all of them got away. I can check to see if I can find the links if you want.

4. The cows vs chickens question is somewhere between tricky and impossible. It's true that it makes more sense to eat cows if you only care about animal suffering and don't care about environmental issues like pollution and global warming but that makes little sense morally as a complete strategy since it amounts to saying you don't care about the humans and animals killed by global warming (amongst other negative effects of cows), which is likely a very large amount and hard to quantify. It therefore makes sense not to eat both.

5. I haven't addressed the insects question, I am not too sure about eating insects, but I will point out that this entirely a hypothetical thought experiment. Insects are rarely sold as food today, and so irrelevant to anyone right now who is wondering whether to go vegan or not.

[brimstoneSalad]

Not sure if you're trolling vegans here or seriously interested, but it's a fair and interesting question anyway, so I'll bite.

I think he is vegan, he's just asking to spark discussion and learn.

People have literally tagged all the animals in a field, ran a combine harvester through it, and found that nearly all of them got away. I can check to see if I can find the links if you want.

They only tagged a few animals, as a representative sample. They were looking for statistics.
As it turns out, most animals who are killed are killed after harvest by predators (mostly predatory birds, after the cover has been removed), not by the harvesting.

[DaRock]

Thx for the feedback and, for the record, I am not a troll.