2 Questions About Logical Inconsistency & Morality

[AMP3083]

@ Zero

Oh ok. I thought he meant conversation in general.

@ brimstoneSalad

Fair enough.

[brimstoneSalad]

I'd like to backtrack to this question.

Do you believe reality is subjective? Is the sky only blue if everybody agrees it is blue?

What if the sky is really not "blue"? Isn't the sky only blue because that's the label we applied to it? Then what we're actually agreeing on is the color blue.

"Blue" itself is a meaningless sound, but there is meaning attached to it, which represents a range of the color spectrum, roughly clustered around 475 nm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visible_spectrum#Spectral_colors
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffuse_sky_radiation#Color

The sunlit sky is blue because air scatters short-wavelength light more than longer wavelengths. Since blue light is at the short-wavelength end of the visible spectrum, it is more strongly scattered in the atmosphere than long-wavelength red light. The result is that when looking toward parts of the sky other than the sun, human eye perceives them to be blue.[3] The color perceived is similar to that obtained by a monochromatic blue of a wavelength of 474–476 nm mixed with white light, i.e., an unsaturated blue light.[4]

The sky is usually pretty well situated on blue. By no means is it typically green nor violet based on RGB color theory.
There are vague and more "subjective" ways to talk about things, and then there are more precise ways to do it which can (when applied with scientific methodology) yield imperfect but objective data.

[brimstoneSalad]

@Brimstone

I do not accept the accusations you've made, but I will do my best to conform the direction of my replies to suit your preference while I am a guest in your house.

Thank you.

On what basis do you assert that it is immoral to eat meat? I don't see how you can do this without first establishing a moral code which I am logically bound to accept, and so I fear the conversation will retread over old ground.

You are not logically bound to abide by a moral code. An evil person can none the less be logical.

You may be logically compelled to accept that it is immoral to eat meat as a fact, but that would not compel you to accept it as a basis for your behavior and to stop doing so. That would remain a choice, and the outcome of that choice would depend on whether you value being a moral person more, or value eating meat more.

I see no logical inconsistency in holding to a moral code that permits the slaughtering of animals while denying the slaughtering of human beings. What's the difference between the two objects of slaughter? One is human, the other is not.

This was discussed on this first page of this thread. This deals with Ask Yourself's #NameThatTrait.
Here's a direct link to the post: http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3168#p31103

One being "human" would be an arbitrary difference. You should read that post in full, as well as those that follow, but I will quote a segment:

1) Does a logical inconsistency exist in the non-vegan system of morality, as Ask Yourself proposes, or has JJ sufficiently demonstrated that no such inconsistency exists?

Yes, but you first have to understand what makes a moral system.
The moment somebody asserts a moral claim by which others are to be judged, that person has made a couple of implicit assertions about the system being referenced.
1. That the system being appealed to is non arbitrary (otherwise all that person is saying is "I don't like what you're doing", not "what you're doing is [morally] wrong", since the opposing party negating it by nothing but counter-assertion would make the latter claim meaningless).
2. That the system is consistent, otherwise it suffers death by logical explosion and is incapable of making claims.

Both of these assumptions rely quite simply on the utility of the act of judgement. It's meaningless to say "what you're doing is wrong" if you do not already believe those two things about the system you're referencing.

These are both implicit, but they are very strong.
Denying them would be like saying, "hey you in the red hat!", and then when the only person around in a red hat asks what you want, you reply "Nothing, I was just saying words without intended meaning, it has nothing to do with you."

You could make the claim that when you use language of moral judgement you don't mean anything by it, but that's bullshit. Whether you think anything else in the universe does or not, language has a purpose, and people who make socially meaningful claims and then weasel out of them by saying they're meaningless are just dishonest.

2) Is morality utterly bereft of an objective standard, thus making it mere preference, and if it is preference, is it obligated to demonstrate logical consistency at all?

See above. If you believe that, then you should avoid making moral claims. As long as you make no claims of any kind, you can't be accused of inconsistency.

That said, there is an objective standard. I want to make sure there's agreement on what I explained so far before moving on.

The burden of proof actually lies on the person advancing a moral system, because that is where the claim lies:
1. The claim that you're a moral person, thus implying your actions are in accordance with that
2. The claim (implicit or explicit) that an action you engage in is moral
3. The claim (implicit or explicit) that the actions others engage in are immoral (such as claiming somebody who is killing humans is wrong to do so).

If you say that it's wrong to kill a human, you adopt the burden of proof. If you say it's right to kill a non-human, again you adopt that burden.
And to satisfy that burden, you need to show why the trait "human" is non-arbitrary, or else such a "moral system" has no meaning and you were out of place to make moral claims using it.
Moral claims are not made as opinions; this comes down to language and usage. If they were, there would be no contradiction (like taste claims).
When somebody makes a moral claim, is it on that person to show how that claim is objectively true (if the person can not do so, the claim shouldn't have been made).

Only by avoiding moral claims entirely and sticking to opinion claims can you avoid this burden of proof.
The claim "I don't like it when people kill humans, but I don't mind non-human animals being killed" does not require further evidence. That's a statement of opinion.

Any difference is enough to justify a differentiation in treatment in the absence of a moral standard which prohibits it,

No, in the absence of the existence of any applicable moral standard justification is simply unnecessary. You don't even need a difference. You could arbitrarily do one thing and then tell somebody else not to do that same thing.

However, if you claim that you don't need to justify something, again you adopt the burden of proof; the extension of that claim is that there is no applicable moral standard.
A statement which would not trigger the burden of proof is something like "I do not accept the claim that justification is required for killing" -- essentially an agnostic position, not saying it is or is not, just that you don't accept the claim that it's required.

There's very little you can say about morality without taking upon a burden of proof.
You can say plenty about your opinions, but when people speak about morality they're making value judgements which apply broadly.

Morality is not "I choose to arbitrarily abide by this heuristic", morality is "This heuristic is right".

because there is no logical fallacy if animals and humans are not demonstrated to be the same.

This is a misunderstanding of morality. A morally irrelevant difference is not adequate to relieve burdens associated with moral claims.
And if there were no objective moral standards, then even demonstrating them to be the same would mean nothing at all.

Morally relevant differences must be substantiated within an objective moral framework. And outside of that, it doesn't matter at all.

What prohibits me from establishing a moral system that says "killing pink pigs is wrong, but killing black pigs is fine"? I am still a moral person, living in full adherence to a moral code.

What prohibits it for a rational person (if you endeavor to be one) is that you have failed to substantiate those things. Why is it wrong to kill pink pigs, but not black ones?
Following an arbitrary set of commands doesn't make somebody a moral person.
Somebody like that may think he or she is a moral person, but somebody saying "2+2=5" may think he or she is a mathematician. It doesn't make it true. The person is mistaken.

Either we can make meaningful moral claims, in which case substantiation is required, or we can't, in which case any claim involving morality is irrational.

Unless you can demonstrate why a particular moral code compels my assent by logical necessity, we're all just wagging our opinions around, shouting "mine is better than yours!" ... and this sort of behavior is at the root of all major conflicts, often with disaterous results.

Objective morality is non-arbitrary and logically substantiated; there's only one. It's arrived at by deduction. There's no opinion involved.

I agree that theistic attempts at morality fail and result in arbitrary systems that often create conflict. This is because they are only backed up by faith, which is not useful for establishing consensus among rational parties.

[DarlBundren]

This would be on a case-by-case basis, but generally, yes; I will take the opinion of science in the absence of a more compelling option. Consequently, I hold the belief that the sun will arrive tomorrow at the appointed time. I would never assert this belief if pressed, however, as it is subjective, being faith-based.

If you adopt a weak form of solipsism and accept science because is the most compelling option you have got, then you should do the same with ethics. What we are arguing for, here, is that when it comes to food, veganism is the most ethical option you have and a true skeptic should adopt it. If the world turns out to be real, you have helped to save billions of sentient animals, you've helped the planet and have helped yourself to avoid cardiovascular problems; if the world is not real you have just accepted a minor incovenience (eating a veggie burger instead of a real one).

I have described all human action as being motivated by a desire to move toward an improved emotional state. I feel better when acting in accordance with my conscience, and my conscience balks at the idea of killing someone

That's not what morality is about, though - it is not the equivalent of the fact that the sun will raise tomorrow. There are all sort of people in the world whose conscience doesn't 'balk at the idea of killing'. It's also possible to immagine a situation when you yourself are not directly affected by the death of someone else. Again, you don't have to believe these things, you just have to accept the possibility of them being true, as you accept the possibility that being stabbed might kill you. A true skeptic should be vegan, being it the most 'compelling option' when it comes to ethics.

[BrianBlackwell]

@Brimstone

Ok... I want to try streamlining the conversation, because we both say so much that the counterpoints will require responses that increase in length exponentially.

It seems to me that this whole moral claim is a mind game designed to justify your personal preference. As far as I can tell, objectivity is not present in the moral code, and the logic being used, though very tidy, is founded on invalid premises.

I am reminded of the contracts which Native Americans were made to sign when being robbed of their land. This was a masturbatory act by Europeans, as the natives didn't even understand European law. If you're going to rip people off, at least have the self-respect to just rob them blind without beating around the bush with all the bullshit. The parallel to veganism would be to just say you find carnism revolting and stop acting like there's sound objective principles in place that make it anything more substantial than mere opinion. But I digress...

Let's try to ask and answer questions in one or two sentences, if you're willing.

1. What is a "moral person"? (Since your argument seems to be dependent upon choosing to be one)

2. What grants a given moral system the status of "non-arbitrary"?

3. What are the valid moral premises that grant a given moral system the status of "objectivity"?

[BrianBlackwell]

@DarlBundren

This is all quite sound, but hinges upon assumptions about the nature of ethics that I do not accept, as they have not been established in a way that compels necessarily via valid logic.

(Brim took issue with the terminology "compels necessarily" in regard to logic, but I only mean that it compels if one seeks to act in accordance with logic; not that logic compels necessarily in the absence of this consent.)

What is the basis of the prescribed ethical code that compels one necessarily? How is it anything more than sheer pragmatism or personal preference? If it is preference, we may dismiss it out of hand as quickly as any differing opinion. If it is pragmatism, one must accept the idea that practicality necessarily compels, in which case I would ask on what grounds must we accept this notion?

This would equate the term "impractical" with "unethical", which does not seem to jibe with the fervent call for change employed in the vegan's argumentation. If this were the case, why would vegans be so stuck on this one issue? Why not attack impracticality in all its forms?

How is the vegan argument anything more than "hey, adopt our way of thinking because it's right and others are wrong!" just as Christians, Republicans, and any number of other ideological sects have been screaming since the beginning of time?

There seems to be an assumption that causing harm or killing is inherently "wrong", but how is this notion of right and wrong established in a way that is logically superior to any other?

[AMP3083]

"Blue" itself is a meaningless sound, but there is meaning attached to it, which represents a range of the color spectrum, roughly clustered around 475 nm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visible_spectrum#Spectral_colors
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffuse_sky_radiation#Color

The sunlit sky is blue because air scatters short-wavelength light more than longer wavelengths. Since blue light is at the short-wavelength end of the visible spectrum, it is more strongly scattered in the atmosphere than long-wavelength red light. The result is that when looking toward parts of the sky other than the sun, human eye perceives them to be blue.[3] The color perceived is similar to that obtained by a monochromatic blue of a wavelength of 474–476 nm mixed with white light, i.e., an unsaturated blue light.[4]

The sky is usually pretty well situated on blue. By no means is it typically green nor violet based on RGB color theory.
There are vague and more "subjective" ways to talk about things, and then there are more precise ways to do it which can (when applied with scientific methodology) yield imperfect but objective data.

I see a blue sky. If you also see a blue sky then do you agree that we're both having a shared (subjective) experience?

Do I believe reality is subjective? This begs the question - what is Reality? Well, we can't determine that reality is Objective based only on the consensus that the sky is blue, because this excludes all other things -- emotions, education, religion, food, movies, attraction to one another, hobbies, fear, etc. -- these are all part of "reality" and everyone falls into subjectivity in each category.

[brimstoneSalad]

I see a blue sky. If you also see a blue sky then do you agree that we're both having a shared (subjective) experience?

In so far as all of the emotional connotations, no, I don't think we share the same subjective experience. I feel different things about a blue sky than you do. The subjective experience isn't shared at all.

In terms of our cone receptors reporting a blue hue to our brains, no, I think this is a mostly shared but also mostly objective experience, provided neither of us are hallucinating or color blind. There are differences in eye function, but they aren't great and the margin of error for such a simple observation allows us huge variation with no change in accuracy.
There are times where color requires more interpretation, like the dress. But there are also times, like without other context when we perceive a solid color and do not need to report precise results, that our eyes are much more reliable and will fairly accurately report objective truth to the precision required.

It would be even better if we only saw the color, and didn't know it was the sky (that would go much further to eliminate bias).

Now, if the sky were bluish green and we were asked for a very precise reply: is it closer to blue or closer to green? Then that demand for precision would likely be overwhelmed by perceptual biases. Knowing it's the sky, I might be tempted to believe it is more blue than it really is (for example). We aren't that good with such precision, and bias can tip the scale to create inaccurate results.

It's a question of signal to noise.

For a clear blue sky, the signal is strong, and there's little context to create bias.
For a more complicated issue, like the dress, there's a weak signal and there's a lot of context to create bias and error.

Does that help?

When we're looking for an objective experience, we want the signal to be so much stronger than the noise that the noise could not reasonably be expected to throw the results outside the bounds of precision we've been asked to report on.

I'm not sure if you're familiar with the difference between accuracy and precision, but that's relevant here.

Do I believe reality is subjective? This begs the question - what is Reality? Well, we can't determine that reality is Objective based only on the consensus that the sky is blue, because this excludes all other things -- emotions, education, religion, food, movies, attraction to one another, hobbies, fear, etc. -- these are all part of "reality" and everyone falls into subjectivity in each category.

Chocolate is delicious: this is a subjective claim/opinion.
Bob thinks chocolate is delicious: this is an objective claim/fact.

The trouble is some people don't understand reality, and they think that subjective claims have truth value to reality. In fact, every subjective claim, once associated with its subject, becomes objective.

This is scary: subjective claim, opinion, no truth value. There is no quality of "scariness" that "this" possesses. It's not substance or a consistent conceptual quality that can be evaluated.
Bob thinks this is scary: Objective claim, fact, possesses objective truth value. Now that we have the subject, we could experiment on him if we wanted to prove it.

[brimstoneSalad]

(Brim took issue with the terminology "compels necessarily" in regard to logic, but I only mean that it compels if one seeks to act in accordance with logic; not that logic compels necessarily in the absence of this consent.)

That's not really it.

If you seek to act in accordance with logic, you can be compelled to accept the truth that eating meat (in the current context vegans argue against) is immoral. But that does not compel you to stop eating it; only to recognize the fact.
In order to be compelled to stop eating it, you would also have to seek to act in accordance with objective morality.

If you only want to act in accordance with logic, then that only compels you to believe certain things: rejecting contradictions and accepting sound logical argumentation as at least as true as the premises.
You could do anything else, from jumping off a bridge to going to a Nickelback concert -- things some people might call "illogical", but which really aren't. There's nothing inherently illogical about masochism or suicide, although it may go against self preservation, that's an entirely different priority.

What is the basis of the prescribed ethical code that compels one necessarily?

It doesn't compel, it only does so if you want to act in accordance with objective morality.
You could do the precise opposite if you wanted to be evil instead of good.

If it is preference, we may dismiss it out of hand as quickly as any differing opinion.

You may dismiss the preference to be moral as a difference of preference, sure. But you would still have to acknowledge the facts of objective moral standards. You would have to accept, if you are to act in accordance with logic, that some people are more or less moral than others, and some actions are right or wrong to varying degrees. You can completely ignore those variables and not let them influence your behavior, but the truth would have to be recognized.

If it is pragmatism, one must accept the idea that practicality necessarily compels, in which case I would ask on what grounds must we accept this notion?

Practicality only compels if you want to be practical.
Most people do, so this is usually a convincing argument.

If you aspire neither to morality or practicality, nor anything else that could be used to compel your actions, then you are beyond compulsion. You could run around naked and bite people if you wanted. You'd probably be arrested and thrown into a mad house, but nothing of it would be innately illogical as long as you had no motivations it conflicted with.

This would equate the term "impractical" with "unethical", which does not seem to jibe with the fervent call for change employed in the vegan's argumentation. If this were the case, why would vegans be so stuck on this one issue? Why not attack impracticality in all its forms?

Impracticality is a large part of it, which magnifies the harm. And Vegans do attack other issues that cause harm unrelated to meat consumption. However, not all "vegans" are vegans for moral reasons. There are "dietary vegans" who only follow it for health reasons, and they are generally less interested in the moral issues.

How is the vegan argument anything more than "hey, adopt our way of thinking because it's right and others are wrong!" just as Christians, Republicans, and any number of other ideological sects have been screaming since the beginning of time?

It's substantiated by science and logic. So, there's a big difference.
Christians, Republicans, and others usually do not back up their claims with arguments, but with appeals to faith.
As long as we are dealing with logical argument, the battle can occur in words rather than through any kind of physical violence, and logical people can come to terms. The same can not be said of faith.

There seems to be an assumption that causing harm or killing is inherently "wrong", but how is this notion of right and wrong established in a way that is logically superior to any other?

We're not saying that. Killing somebody who wants to die could be right. The question is how the act violates, either directly or by consequence after the fact, the interests of others.

Those who claim absolutes are usually of the deontological sort, and their arguments are not logical (despite "logical" being in the name, it isn't anything of the sort).

It seems to me that this whole moral claim is a mind game designed to justify your personal preference. As far as I can tell, objectivity is not present in the moral code, and the logic being used, though very tidy, is founded on invalid premises.

Premises can be true or false. Logic is valid or invalid.

Which premise do you believe is false?
That would get right at it.

Did you understand the points I made about arbitrarity, etc?

I am reminded of the contracts which Native Americans were made to sign when being robbed of their land. This was a masturbatory act by Europeans, as the natives didn't even understand European law.

To me, this seems like you saying you do not understand logic. If you don't, then there's no way for you to evaluate the argument, and it's fair to be skeptical of it. But, if you're a logical person (or endeavor to be, or endeavor to participate in logical arguments) you should try to understand the arguments and address them directly. Like by, for example, identifying a false premise, or identifying an invalid step in the deduction.

1. What is a "moral person"? (Since your argument seems to be dependent upon choosing to be one)

Your question is unclear.
It depends on your metric. Generally speaking, a person working at doing better by the standards of morality.

We could try to measure ethical-"penis"-length, but that's usually a bullshit endeavor, because it discounts where people started from. That's if you're asking about something meaningful to personal character.

A person born and raised vegan who abandoned some of his or her more ethical behavior and started eating eggs and dairy is a worse person than one raised on steak and hunting who has improved and is now a reducitarian.

You can also ask in absolute terms, but then all you can do is plot people on a spectrum from worst possible person to best possible person (some kind of saint in practice, but not necessarily in character). This would be based on the good vs. harm they each do. That's pretty useless to judging character, though.

2. What grants a given moral system the status of "non-arbitrary"?

I'm not sure what you're asking.

In practice, it should lack arbitrary inputs, receiving inputs from as objective and reliable sources as possible (science), and evaluating them in a way that avoids arbitrary bias.
Perfection of data and avoiding bias completely is unattainable; practicing morality means getting as close as practicable and possible.

3. What are the valid moral premises that grant a given moral system the status of "objectivity"?

2 and 3 are basically related. Arbitrarity is related to subjectivity; objectivity is avoiding those.
It must be done as much as possible in practice, and for the system itself it must avoid arbitrarity in derivation.

So, there are two matters:
1. Practice (I answered above)
2. Derivation:

I use proof by contradiction, or the process of elimination.
Take all proposed non-arbitrary "moral systems" and show that all but one or a narrow range of them have contradictions.

For example, we could start with the question of deontology vs. consequentialism. These are mutually exclusive systems. By proving deontology contradictory, we show the correct method is consequentialist.

I believe I linked to this thread already: http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?t=785
I've also demonstrated elsewhere the problems in deontology, but you could also just read the Wiki page on it or some philosophy encyclopedia entries.
If you're curious, I could give you more links.

Either Consequentialism or Deontology is true
If Consequentialism is true, Deontology is false
If Deontology is true, Consequentialism is false
Deontology is false (by contradiction)
Therefore: Consequentialism is true.

[DarlBundren]

...

I see Brimstone has already replied to your questions and since the thread is pretty chaotic I'll leave you to discuss the matter with him. Brimstone is explaining morality in its most logical and rigorous definition, something – of course – that has not been made up by the users of this forum (it could not be compared, as you did, to a contract) but has a long philosophical tradition – it goes back to ancient Greece. The only thing I'd like to point out is that people don't necessarily have to understand philosophy in order to be vegan. The argument itself is pretty straight-forward and relies on very little metaphysics. You have two options, the former entails the killing of sentient beings (beings that would like to keep on living), the latter don't. All things being equal, ethics 'asks' you to choose the latter option; it asks you to choose the veggie burger instead of the real one. As simple as that. If you are a solipsist you can compare it to choosing between stepping on a box that could contain a baby or avoid doing it. If you are interested in being a good person, the answer should be obvious. I think that different people need different reasons to do the same thing. Seeing what's going on in the meat industry is usually enough for most people. I don't know how interested in logic and mathematics you are, but keep in mind that if you hadn't questioned the logical nature of morality, this explanation would hardly have been necessary. As it is usually not necessary to point out that raping a woman is unethical.