do you manage to make friends with non vegan people?

[eloine]

I haven't been vegan for a long time , but I've been looking for the truth for many years and I've always been pretty solitary because in the end when you start to know people a bit too much you realise you don't like many of the things they believe in and their vision of the right and wrong is too depressive.
So does it mean that we must accept things that are unacceptable to us to build friendship with other people and so that there is no ultimate truth since everyone as a different version of it ? or is being vegan the answer that will make everyone seeing the truth in the same way?

[miniboes]

If I understand correctly your question is whether or not we should accept immoral beliefs and behavior in order to be able to build friendships. I struggle with this question too. There is obviously a line we can't cross somewhere; none of us would befriend a nazi or jihadist, but some of us do befriend carnists. What is the difference here, and where is that line?

I honestly can give you a great answer, and someone else might do it far better. Maybe the answer is that you should not befriend carnists at all. I would argue that, since loneliness is a great impediment on your well-being, you should make friends with carnists in any case if there aren't any veg*ns around.

I do think it's important to realize that you do not need to turn a carnist vegan in order to have a positive impact in that friendships. Every single one of my friends is a carnist, but I have seen many of them reduce their animal product consumption over time, and the friends that are closer to me do so more than others.

If you have trouble socializing because of your veganism, here are a few things I've learned:
- Try to see the good in people. It sounds extremely cheezy, I know, but it does have some value. All of my carnist friends try to be good people. They care deeply about other people and try to make their lives better. Their carnism is not born out of an apathy for the suffering of animals, but rather ignorance and cognitive dissonance. Realize that there are many different ways of excercising morality and altruism, even if one is less effective than the other.
- Don't wear veganism on your chest. Try to establish that you are a fun and interesting person to converse and hang out with first. People will be more open to whatever you have to say about veganism once they discover you're vegan.
- Ask questions. Don't lecture. You can show you've done your homework, but let them do the thinking. You can look into socratic questioning or street epistomology; it's an effective method for convincing people without being the preachy vegan.
- Be friendly and positive. A doom-and-gloom atitude will turn anybody's open-mindedness off. Smile.
- Talk about why you are vegan, not why others should be. Make a little story out of it. For me, I talk about how at first I wanted to lose weight, and over time I also learned that animal agriculture is very bad for the environment and how much of a problem the suffering of animals is. Don't go on too long though; keep it short and sweet, let the other respond, and then politely answer or use socratic questioning.

[eloine]

hi!
thank you yes,
well my veganism is very recent, I used to be carnist too so I am not judging people because they consume meat but what I am trying to say is that, when I was consuming animal products, I was trying to find a morality in human's life and everything felt to me purposeless because every human beings has different values, of course there are some things everybody agrees to be bad, like pedophilia, or murder, because the law is against it, but sometimes I feel that many people only agree it to be bad because of the law, but they don't feel it in their guts so they do other subtle things to bypass the law. (like for instance the modeling or cinema industry where they hire very young 12 years old girls to pose almost naked with lots of make up or actresses that make plastic surgery and lie about their age, or horror gore movies that show murders and independant movies that show rape scenes ) To me it feels immoral, but to other people it is acceptable because the law is not against it...and so my problem is not really that they are carnist but I wonder if this is the fact that they eat animal products which make them think some immoral things are ok , so my question is : if everybody were vegan ,will everybody see the truth in the same way? or will some people still disagree on morality between humans?

[miniboes]

If everybody were vegan ,will everybody see the truth in the same way? or will some people still disagree on morality between humans?

No, unanimity is basically impossible until mind control is invented. Even vegans disagree; one vegan thinks being a vegetarian is basically the same in terms of morality as being a carnist, whilst another vegan thinks being a vegetarian is most of the time a huge improvement on being a carnist. It will be hard to find any set of two people that agree on every single moral issue. Even if you've subscribed to the same moral theory (e.g. utilitarianism) there are still differences of opinion. For instance; if you had to kill chicken to save a human, how many chicken would you have to kill for it to be immoral? You'll find disagreements here. One utilitarian might say just one, another would say five and another would say a hundred.

There are people, like Sam Harris and I, that think an objective morality exists, where we can base our moral decisions on scientific research. If this is true, and everybody were to subscribe to this moral theory, then we might see some sort of unanimity. However, it is very unlikely for everyone to do so, and people will still interpret the science differently.

[AlexanderVeganTheist]

Being friendly towards people, even if you consider them to do bad things, is ethical. You would like to be treated in a friendly manner, so treat others similarly. This is based on the universality of consciousness and aversion to pain. In terms of effective activism, being friendly is also better. Pre-vegans are more likely to go vegan if they associate veganism with friendliness.
I personally have a lot of friends who are not vegan or vegetarian, but some have said I have taken away a lot of their prejudice about vegans, and about vegan food even. I like cooking for large groups and showing them that vegan food can be cheap, healthy and delicious. Inspiring people to eat less animal products, is already moral terrain gained. So of course, be friendly.

I see myself as a friend to everyone. But perhaps the word "friendship" has deeper connotations for other people. I feel intimately connected to people that are carnists and consider them friends on this deeper, long term connection, level. Whether you would be able and willing to do the same thing, is up to you.

Also, I think Gary Yourofski has a point about the people being closest to you are the hardest to influence towards veganism. I wonder how that works psychologically.

[AlexanderVeganTheist]

There are people, like Sam Harris and I, that think an objective morality exists, where we can base our moral decisions on scientific research. If this is true, and everybody were to subscribe to this moral theory, then we might see some sort of unanimity. However, it is very unlikely for everyone to do so, and people will still interpret the science differently.

The axiological assumptions that drive ethics would still be a-rational. While science may teach us the best ways to provide the maximum amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people, or teach us the best ways to prevent (unneccessary) suffering, the idea that happiness or suffering have value is still a-rational. Intrinsic values are always assumed. They cannot be reasoned for, beyond the point of their 'intrinsicness'.
E.g. A nationalist might say the continued existence of a strong nation with ethnic cohesion or whatever, is the thing that is most important in life. If you ask the nationalist 'why?', he might say: "This is what I choose to value", or "this leads to the greatest happiness for the most people". If you ask, "then why is happiness something valuable?" one can only say "it just is". I.e. it is an a-rational assumption. Values can never be facts.
For more on this I recommend Wittgensteins Lecture on Ethics: http://sackett.net/WittgensteinEthics.pdf
Intrinsic values always escape rational discussion.

[brimstoneSalad]

We should strive to be as friendly as we can to everybody, since this is the best way to reach them and change their hearts, and it's also a kind thing to do as AlexanderVeganTheist mentioned.
That doesn't mean enabling their bad behavior though. E.g. it is not good to buy meat for somebody; we should encourage them to do good, not help them do bad just because we're friendly with them.

We have to make a distinction: Who people are, vs. what they do.
There's a fairly famous expression "Hate the sin, love the sinner"; it's important to remember that people mainly want to do good, but are weak and may be ignorant of what they do.

Otherwise good people can do bad things, and most of the time they do those things because of ignorance (which may be the greatest force of evil in the world). Most people just need knowledge to do the right thing, and deep down want to be good people.

none of us would befriend a nazi or jihadist

Of course I would be friendly to a nazi or jihadist: those are some of the most important people to be friendly too, since they're powder kegs. If they are cut off from others, that will just isolate them and make them stick to others of their beliefs, making their beliefs more radical and dangerous.

The axiological assumptions that drive ethics would still be a-rational.

No, they're semantic.

We connect the concept of "morality" to certain axioms by understanding of the definition, like consequentialism, altruism, the golden rule. The word "morality" is arbitrary, it could be called "almority" instead (the sounds we use to make words are not inherently meaningful, just become meaningful by consensus), but the concept itself is rational as long as it's coherent.

The better question is what compels people to be moral instead of armoral or immoral -- and that is a matter of choice.
We can choose to be good or evil, to do good or evil, and we may have any number of reasons for making those choices.

[EquALLity]

Well, there's a difference between being friendly and actually being friends with a person.

I think we should generally be friendly with everyone and be friends with people who make us better people or who are more susceptible to becoming better people (open-minded to veganism etc.).

For people who are clearly closed minded and/or selfish (only really care about things that impact themselves), then I think it makes sense to not be friends with them. I don't think that's most meat-eaters, though. I think most people who eat meat just eat it because that's how they were raised, and they just never questioned it.

[AlexanderVeganTheist]

The axiological assumptions that drive ethics would still be a-rational.

No, they're semantic.

To say something is valuable, to say something is worth doing, worth striving for, is not making a semantic claim. It's making an axiological claim, i.e. a claim of value, in the absolute sense. Rationality is the proportionality or logic which guides reasoning and arguments (all nouns in this sentence are translated as logos in Greek, by the way). Assumptions, and incidentally perceptions as well, have to happen before going through the rational, deterministic calculations of reasoning. To say pain is bad and pleasure is valuable is to make axiological claims, value-claims. This has to happen before and independent of any further reasoning steps that can be taken. You can not underbuild these assumptions further. Why is pain bad and pleasure good? The intrinsic value of these phenomena is an assumption, and as such a- or pre-rational. If you don't believe me, try to give a reason(ing) why pleasure is worth striving for. You can't, you can only circularly point to the fact that it is pleasure(able), i.e. point to its intrinsic value. Since claims of intrinsic values cannot be falsified or even properly argued for or against, they surpass the realm of factuality and are non-rational. I purposefully do not use the word 'irrational', because that in my opinion is reserved for counter-logical, counter-rational.
I'd say ethical claims, value-claims are in fact so non-rational, that it is hard to even explain what we mean when we say something is "good". We "should" do it. What does the word "should" even mean, in these absolute terms? Clearly in relative terms, it is a means of signifying a necessity to achieve a specified goal. But to say something is intrinsically, absolutely a goal? It is borderline nonsense. We can jump between synonyms, but in the end, there's an elusive, transcendent quality to axiological claims, that language does not get a precise hold of.

I highly recommend the Wittgenstein lecture I posted above to miniboes, it's a very entertaining short read and touches upon the fundamental distinction between facts and values, which is related to the is/ought split.

We connect the concept of "morality" to certain axioms by understanding of the definition, like consequentialism, altruism, the golden rule. The word "morality" is arbitrary, it could be called "almority" instead (the sounds we use to make words are not inherently meaningful, just become meaningful by consensus),

Naturally the forms (spelling, sounds, etc.) of words are to an extent contingent. Their forms arrived in modern times through an age long history of usage. They are not meaningful by consensus, but by their history of use. Their history of usage is what has formed the current state of language. There never was a vote. The agreement people have on words is brought on by this history and things like dictionaries. To disagree from 'consensus' is to make yourself unintelligible of course. It's a historically arrived at consensus, with which no reasonable disagreement is possible, so the word 'consensus' seems misplaced.
We can speculate about whether in general the forms connected to meanings are really completely contingent, or connected to the meanings through either onomatopoeia (which happens relatively often) or through some kind of emotional or sensational synesthesia. The Booba-Kiki experiment (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bouba/kiki_effect) comes to mind, where, I believe, the reason people associate the Boobah sound with a round figure is because of a type of synesthetic, tempo-spatial if you will, similarity between roundness and the elongated, bubbling sound of the B. And similarly for the spikiness of the K-sound (and corresponding figure). To state the indo-germanic roots of European languages all have some kind of this sort of synesthetic onomatopoeia seems too speculative and frankly untrue, there is a sense of arbitrariness to most etymological roots. 'Morality' of course comes from Latin 'mos', meaning 'disposition', 'custom' or 'habit'.

but the concept itself is rational as long as it's coherent.

What does coherence mean in this context? Morality is transcendent, it adds a layer of judgments of value to the physical.

The better question is what compels people to be moral instead of armoral or immoral -- and that is a matter of choice.
We can choose to be good or evil, to do good or evil, and we may have any number of reasons for making those choices.

I agree these are important questions, but the choice does not only lie in the doing, but also in what assumptions you base your ethics on.

[brimstoneSalad]

To say something is valuable, to say something is worth doing, worth striving for, is not making a semantic claim.

A value is basically an interest, that's a matter of choice: your idealized self interests help define what those are.
What is moral is a matter of definition of moral. It is having some respect for the values of others, and acting in some way to help realize those with respect to the consequences of what you do.

What you happen to value is not a matter of semantics, but a matter of choice. But MORAL values, if you choose to value morality, are a matter of definition.

You may value being moral.
You may value being immoral.
You may value something entirely different and arbitrary.

It's making an axiological claim, i.e. a claim of value, in the absolute sense.

Not at all. Moral values are a kind of value. A person could alternatively value evil, if he or she so chose.
There are people who do not value morality.

Assumptions, and incidentally perceptions as well, have to happen before going through the rational, deterministic calculations of reasoning.

With respect to the sounds we connect to the concept to make a word, sure.

But we can reason morality in the same way we can reason pi. It is the relationship of our behavior or values to those of others', just as pie is the relationship of the diameter to the circumference of a circle. The relationship of internal to external values, in a sense.

To say pain is bad and pleasure is valuable is to make axiological claims, value-claims.

I'm not saying that. Hedonists say that, and they are making an arbitrary claim. I'm not a hedonist.

Why is pain bad and pleasure good?

They aren't. What is good is consideration for the interests of others. Empirically, most others prefer to avoid pain and seek pleasure, so that's an important thing we can learn about how to take into consideration those interests.

The intrinsic value of these phenomena is an assumption, and as such a- or pre-rational.

It would be if I were making such assumptions, but I am not.

If you don't believe me, try to give a reason(ing) why pleasure is worth striving for. You can't, you can only circularly point to the fact that it is pleasure(able), i.e. point to its intrinsic value.

Pleasure is not inherently worth striving for.
IF others seek pleasure, then we should have some consideration for their interests in those respects. However, I don't believe that is the strongest driving interest in most people, since it's easily defeated by the pleasure pill thought experiment.

Since claims of intrinsic values cannot be falsified or even properly argued for or against, they surpass the realm of factuality and are non-rational.

False. Claims about the value of values can be spoken of in purely logical terms. We can ignore the values of others. We can regard them positively. Or we can regard them negatively. These are the relationships we can have with others' values. Those are amoral, moral, and immoral respectively -- when we put words to them.

I'd say ethical claims, value-claims are in fact so non-rational, that it is hard to even explain what we mean when we say something is "good".

I don't find that hard. I did it several times above.

We "should" do it. What does the word "should" even mean, in these absolute terms?

IF you want to do good (the goal being good), then you should follow such behavior as results from positive consideration of the interests of others.
IF you want to do evil, on the other hand, your goal being different, your ought statements would be different too.

Should is relative to one's goals and values. Valuing good is a choice. But we don't get to decide what good and evil are.

But to say something is intrinsically, absolutely a goal? It is borderline nonsense.

You can have the goal to be evil or good. I didn't say one was intrinsic over another. But you can not arbitrarily redefine good and evil at whim. And good is not merely defined as whatever your arbitrary goal happens to be. Good is good and evil is evil, and it's a matter of choice which one we pursue.

They are not meaningful by consensus, but by their history of use.

Historical usage can influence that consensus if people are aware of it, but they don't have to be. A new word could be beamed into everybody's minds today and it would be just as much a word as any other. Without consensus on their meanings, no amount of history can make language useful.

Words should mean what they mean because of the utility language holds: the implicit goal of language is communication, and if the definition of a word does not properly serve that purpose then it is wrong since it has failed in the goal of communication.

Unlike the values people hold (which may be good, evil, or something else), the collective goal of language is much clearer and more unanimous, so a true "should" is pretty non-controversial with semantics within a certain spectrum of meaning and usage. We need only assume you are not attempting to deceive and confuse others, but rather to communicate, and we can make claims about how you should use language.

There never was a vote.

I didn't say there was, and that's irrelevant. But look into usage panels to understand better how authorities on word usage in an open language work.
Descriptivism is very important to the utility of language. Ultimately I am a prescriptivist, but a major factor in that prescription is common usage.

To disagree from 'consensus' is to make yourself unintelligible of course. It's a historically arrived at consensus, with which no reasonable disagreement is possible, so the word 'consensus' seems misplaced.

Consensus on words changes over time as their usage changes. The fact that deviating makes you unintelligible is the point, though: that's why words should mean what they mean. There IS a goal to language. We can say just as much a word is wrong as we can a gear in a clock is wrong if it doesn't keep time.

'Morality' of course comes from Latin 'mos', meaning 'disposition', 'custom' or 'habit'.

Ancient peoples did not have secular moral philosophy as we do now: it means something quite different now in a secular context, and its roots are irrelevant (they had a hard time understanding the difference between tradition and actual morality as the pure concept indicates; likewise, their grasp on mathematics was rudimentary: are you going to insist that the integral of a function is just the function, because integer, from which it comes, breaks down into roots meaning "not" and "to touch", so you shouldn't do anything to the function?).
Don't be the annoying kind of prescriptivist who is obsessed with the history of words: down that road lies madness, because nothing you say is intelligible if you insist on deriving the meanings of everything down to their primitive constituents.

What does coherence mean in this context? Morality is transcendent, it adds a layer of judgments of value to the physical.

Coherent, logical and consistent, united and forming a whole (system) in a sense of its usefulness. It is coherent in conveying a clear idea of a well defined relationship of known things that doesn't contradict itself.

You can judge actions in a moral context, as right or wrong, just as you can judge shapes in a geometrical context, as round or not to varying degrees.

I agree these are important questions, but the choice does not only lie in the doing, but also in what assumptions you base your ethics on.

This is absolutely incorrect, and dangerously so because it endorses nihilism and relativism.

The choice is in what you will value: and that may or may not be valuing morality.
You can't arbitrarily define morality as doing whatever you want to do, or as harming others if that's what you like. That's just dishonestly twisting the meanings of words, and that violates the purpose of language.

Morality is right, doing right by others, positive consideration of others' interests.
Immorality is wrong, doing wrong by others. negative consideration of others' interests.

You can value whichever you choose, or make up something new if you want -- like valuing chaos (the flip of a coin).
What you can NOT do (not without being as dishonest as to redefine math to your liking to cheat somebody) is redefine principles like these at a whim based on however you happen to feel one day.

Morality is set in stone as positively considering the interests of others -- in terms of values, valuing what others value (those who can hold values, which are sentient beings) in some meaningful sense and acting accordingly.

You can value that or not, but you can't redefine it based on your arbitrary personal preferences.