Animal Use Focus (besides a few exceptions) vs Animal Suffering Focus

[TheVeganDeist]

Since unnecessarily using sentient nonhuman animals will almost always lead to some form of suffering or exploitation, wouldn't a primarily deontological approach to activism be most effective since it establishes a clear, stable end goal? To me, dismissing a deontological based approach for animal use simply because there are a few circumstances where animal use can be justified is bizarre, I don't believe that a small list of uncommon exceptions should completely redefine the notion that unnecessary animal use is primarily unjustifiable.

[inator]

With deontology there's a problem of gradation. If animal use is bad in itself, then any action involving exploitation is bad in absolute terms, with no room left for less/more bad.

That's the difference between abolitionists and welfarists:
While welfarists do have the end goal of abolishing animal suffering, they consider any improvement in their treatment to be a step in the right direction, because at least it results in better (even if not perfect) consequences.

Whereas the abolitionist approach would see no real difference between an avid meat eater and a person who actively tries to reduce her meat consumption but still eats meat once a week. Or between this world and a world that has halved its animal product consumption.

[TheVeganDeist]

If animal use is bad in itself, then any action involving exploitation is bad in absolute terms, with no room left for less/more bad.

I'm not saying ALL unnecessary sentient nonhuman animal use is immoral, as I stated, there are a few exceptions. I just don't believe that these few exceptions are enough to outright dismiss a deontological approach to vegan activism.

While welfarists do have the end goal of abolishing animal suffering, they consider any improvement in their treatment to be a step in the right direction, because at least it results in better (even if not perfect) consequences.

Focusing solely on sentient animal suffering neglects sentient animal exploitation. For example, unnecessarily milking a cow can be done without inflicting any suffering, however it's inherently immoral to unnecessarily exploit the cow for it's byproducts.

Whereas the abolitionist approach would see no real difference between an avid meat eater and a person who actively tries to reduce her meat consumption but still eats meat once a week. Or between this world and a world that has halved its animal product consumption.

Not all abolitionist activists hold such a view -- that's a big misunderstanding. Most abolitionist activists don't advocate for half measures as they can theoretically distract people from the bigger picture, people will make their own temporary half measures naturally as they progress towards a more ethical lifestyle anyway.

I don't believe a primarily deontological form of vegan activism is inherently immoral.

[inator]

I'm not saying ALL unnecessary sentient nonhuman animal use is immoral, as I stated, there are a few exceptions. I just don't believe that these few exceptions are enough to outright dismiss a deontological approach to vegan activism.

Then you're actually advocating rule consequentialism, not deontology. Animal exploitation is bad, because on average (as a rule) it results in animal suffering.

Focusing solely on sentient animal suffering neglects sentient animal exploitation. For example, unnecessarily milking a cow can be done without inflicting any suffering, however it's inherently immoral to unnecessarily exploit a sentient animal for it's byproducts.

If it doesn't go against the interests of the cow and there are no other bad consequences involved, that would make it amoral at most, not immoral.

Milking a cow can be immoral because of consequences: because of how the cow is treated, or because of the consequences for the calf, or more indirectly because the habit of drinking milk creates more demand for milk - leading to negative consequences for other cows.

Not all abolitionist activists hold such a view -- that's a big misunderstanding. Most abolitionist activists don't advocate for half measures as they can theoretically distract people from the bigger picture, people will make their own temporary half measures naturally as they progress towards a more ethical lifestyle anyway.

I don't believe a primarily deontological form of vegan activism is inherently immoral.

Supporting half measures can distract people from the bigger picture, OR they can be an incentive for more people to make a moderate change in their behavior. We need more research on which form of activism has better results. I tend to believe that many moderate changes (while keeping the end goal in mind) are easier to attain and amount to more total change than a few complete changes.

But arguing deontologically instead of in terms of consequences makes it easy for even a moderately intelligent meat eater to discard the argument. And he should, because it's ideological. Rational consequentialist arguments are harder to find a flaw with.

If you're advocating an end to animal exploitation because animal exploitation usually leads to animal suffering, and not because it's bad in itself, then you're a rule consequentialist.

[TheVeganDeist]

Then you're actually advocating rule consequentialism, not deontology. Animal exploitation is bad, because on average (as a rule) it results in animal suffering.

So the exception redefines the rule?

If it doesn't go against the interests of the cow and there are no other bad consequences involved, that would make it amoral at most, not immoral.

Would it be immoral or amoral to unnecessarily squeeze milk from a mentally disabled woman's breasts, who can't effectively give consent?

Milking a cow can be immoral because of consequences: because of how the cow is treated

Why wouldn't you consider unnecessarily squeezing a cows mammary glands without any form of consent, purely immoral?

We need more research on which form of activism has better results.

I agree.

[inator]

So the exception redefines the rule?

There's no actual rule to begin with, the two (exploitation and suffering) were never intrinsically linked. There's just a very very high correlation between them, not an absolute one.
In popular terms you can say that, as a rule (in scientific-philosophical terms: with high probability), exploitation leads to suffering. But they're not the same thing.

Would it be immoral or amoral to unnecessarily squeeze milk from a mentally disabled woman's breasts, who can't effectively give consent?

The ability to give consent is not central here, interests are. Is it unnecessary and does it go against the interest of the woman or against the interests of the woman's family and attachments? Then it's wrong.

Why wouldn't you consider unnecessarily squeezing a cows mammary glands without any form of consent, purely immoral?

A cow also doesn't give clear consent to be petted or cleaned. Does that make petting her immoral? No, what makes it wrong is if it's against her best interest.

We need more research on which form of activism has better results.

I agree.

Then just remember that you're using consequentialism to assess the value of deontological activism.
(There's nothing wrong with that - it's actually good, since you aren't ideologically stating that this form of activism is best because potato).

[TheVeganDeist]

There's no actual rule to begin with, the two (exploitation and suffering) were never intrinsically linked. There's just a very very high correlation between them, not an absolute one.
In popular terms you can say that, as a rule (in scientific-philosophical terms: with high probability), exploitation leads to suffering. But they're not the same thing.

Ah. Makes sense.

The ability to give consent is not central here, interests are.

Why are interests more important than consent (in this scenario)? Shouldn't her consent be the focus since it's a clear expression of her interests? And how do you accurately determine one's interests without consent?

A cow also doesn't give clear consent to be petted or cleaned. Does that make petting her immoral?

There's an inherent difference between petting/cleaning a cow & squeezing her mammary glands. It's like comparing patting a human female on the back to grabbing her breasts.

No, what makes it wrong is if it's against her best interest.

And how do you determine her best interest?

Then just remember that you're using consequentialism to assess the value of deontological activism.
(There's nothing wrong with that - it's actually good, since you aren't ideologically stating that this form of activism is best because potato).

Unnecessarily using the word potato in a sentence without adequate consent from the potato is morally unjustifiable.

[inator]

There's an inherent difference between petting/cleaning a cow & squeezing her mammary glands. It's like comparing patting a human female on the back to grabbing her breasts.

Exactly. What differentiates the two actions is whether they have good, bad or no consequences for the cow. Not consent.

Consent is an expression of one's interests, but when that expression is not possible, it doesn't automatically mean an action is bad. It could also be good or neutral.

Why are interests more important than consent (in this scenario)? Shouldn't her consent be the focus since it's a clear expression of her interests? And how do you accurately determine one's interests without consent?

If verbal consent is not possible, then you determine it observationally - based on other physical forms of consent like writhing/drawing away, bunting, or no reaction.
If that's also not possible (as with highly mentally disabled people), then by pairing the level of sentience with the interests that one can have based on that.

And sometimes you just know better what's good for someone based on experience or by having access to more information - like knowing that it would be good for a child to brush his teeth even when he doesn't want to.

It's a fine line and it's easy to find justifications and cut corners when you profit from it, which is why I also tend to disapprove of exploitation in practice. But milking a cow doesn't always have to go against her interests and result in suffering, and saying that it absolutely does just makes us vegans sound irrational.

Unnecessarily using the word potato in a sentence without adequate consent from the potato is morally unjustifiable.

The potato is now famous, therefore using his name had good consequences.

[TheVeganDeist]

Consent is an expression of one's interests, but when that expression is not possible, it doesn't automatically mean an action is bad. It could also be good or neutral.

I agree, however in the case of unnecessarily milking a cow, it's not clear whether the cow would feel violated or not, and especially since there's no necessity to actually milk her (in this scenario), it'd be an ethical breach to just assume it's okay to do so.

But milking a cow doesn't always have to go against her interests and result in suffering, and saying that it absolutely does just makes us vegans sound irrational

It doesn't always result in suffering, I agree with that. However, as I stated above, it's not clear whether or not a cow cares about us pulling on her mammary glands, so we shouldn't just assume it's okay to selfishly benefit from the byproduct. I can't imagine any other justification other than necessity.

The potato is now famous, therefore using his name had good consequences.

We shouldn't just assume that the potato considers 'fame' as a good thing, perhaps this potato has similar opinions to Essena O'neill.

[inator]

It doesn't always result in suffering, I agree with that. However, as I stated above, it's not clear whether or not a cow cares about us pulling on her mammary glands, so we shouldn't just assume it's okay to selfishly benefit from the byproduct. I can't imagine any other justification other than necessity.

You only need a justification if the action results in any bad consequences. All in all we can say that milking does have bad direct or indirect consequences.

There are also some cows that overproduce milk, so suddenly stopping the milking would be bad for them. For the other cows, if they don't pull away, I think it's pretty safe to assume that they're not very interested. Though I suppose that could also be the result of being accustomed to the action rather than not caring....

We shouldn't just assume that the potato considers 'fame' as a good thing, perhaps this potato has similar opinions to Essena O'neill.

Perhaps. The extent to which the potato decides to continue self-promoting will determine whether that claim is true or false.
He could also just use fame as a platform for promoting breatharianism, which could have smashing consequences for himself and his kind.