Seven Deadly Sins of Bad Vegan Activism
Posted: Fri Dec 15, 2017 7:05 pm
Philosophical Vegan Forum
https://philosophicalvegan.com/
Sounds good to me although I was recently told on a Facebook vegan page that I shouldn't discuss morality with regards to veganism because of the biblical connotations to morality. Her point was that vegan = good, and non vegan = bad so there's no point in sounding like a religious fanatic.brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Sat Dec 16, 2017 12:58 pm I don't think it'd be an issue, but I'd be curious if other people think so.
"Seven deadly sins" is used broadly in secular circles when there are lists of seven bad things.
Good idea!
I'd call those more gross-out arguments, since they're kind of subjective and mainly made to be disgusting. What's a ton? Etc. and shouldn't matter.
Yes, we see the same in religious circles with respect to Einstein quotes, etc.
First person stuff is probably a mistake.
Yes, re. this:brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Fri Dec 15, 2017 7:05 pm http://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/Seven_Deadly_Sins_of_Bad_Vegan_Activism
Any thoughts?
What exactly do you take to be an 'intuitionistic argument', and what exactly do you take to be the distinction between moral theories that require some appeal to intuition (or some ethical claim seeming to be true independent of inference) - which I think all substantive moral theories very clearly do - and other moral theories, which this passage seems to presuppose?There are also a lot of very bad intuitionistic arguments out there. These are a particularly big problem when they are meant to be rationally compelling, because these moral theories only follow from intuition you can not per se reason another person into them unless you get lucky and they happen to share your intuitions.
The vegetarian motivated by ethics, then, is the very rare person who has come to see all animals in the manner that we see some animals – pets – and in which we see all people. The ways in which this can happen are, as already mentioned, haphazard and many, but one way in which Diamond has shown us it does not happen, is by virtue of the ethical vegetarian having noticed that the animal in question has certain morally relevant characteristics and having concluded from that fact, that it must be inviolable. And having come into being in this sort of way, it also is hardly something that can be prescribed to others, which is why, among all the things that Diamond dislikes about the ethical vegetarian movement, its often “nagging, moralistic tone” is one of the things she dislikes about it the most, a feeling that I certainly share.
-Daniel Kaufman[1]
Intuitionistic and similar moral theories are thus not linked as functions to normative conclusions: it makes them as useless to rational activism as emotionally charged assertions. Some might agree with them by chance, but they aren't compelling arguments, and IF you use them and people reject them the very last thing you must be is insistent or offended.
Thus our focus on naturalistic realism: something that does provide functions for discussing and arriving and normative beliefs without the bias of variable intuition.
Every moral theory, or set of substantive ethical claims, has logical entailments, and thus yields conclusions by deduction - none don't; I'm sorry to have to tell you this. If you mean a non-obviously-fallacious way of arriving at a substantive moral theory without any appeal to uninferred seemings as of substantive ethical truths, then I'm very sorry to have to tell you this, but it just doesn't exist. I mean for Pete's sake just take the work of ANY philosopher arguing for ANY substantive ethical claim: e.g. Sidgwick, Singer, Parfit, Kagan, Norcross, whomever defending consequentialism; Ross, Quinn, McMahan, Jeske, whomever defending anti-consequentialism, Thomson or McMahan defending abortion (given the facts about fetal dependency & development), Don Marquis attacking the permissibility of abortion given these same facts, Wayne Sumner defending the permissibility of assisted death when it benefits the patient & she gives informed consent, David DeGrazia defending the view that death harms non-human animals substantially, Singer, DeGrazia, McMahan, Engel, Norcross, ANYONE defending the moral considerability of non-human animals. Etc. Etc. ad nauseam ad nauseam. I see that you like Stanford links (it is indeed a great resource). Just look at the entries on consequentialism, doing and allowing harm, the doctrine of double effect, well-being, the moral status of animals, voluntary euthanasia, or really any substantive ethical topic you like. EVERY PAPER (that isn't doing some obviously fallacious hard core neo-Kantian stufff) you will see cited that makes a substantive ethical case will be appealing to uninferred seemings as of substantive ethical truths - or what are commonly known as 'intuitions'."[If you're not very well versed in philosophy, and particularly if you don't understand the difference between moral theory that yields conclusions from deduction and one that can not, it's best to stick with empirical arguments (Like just talking about the facts of animal agriculture, or climate change, which are all strong on their own without any philosophical claims)."
I thought you might. We should really discuss this on Discord or some kind of real-time chat. There's going to be too much talking past each other here.
Shit; I was adding edits to the above after you replied - I just wanted to draw your attention to the fact that it got longer.brimstoneSalad wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:12 amI thought you might. We should really discuss this on Discord or some kind of real-time chat. There's going to be too much talking past each other here.
Thanks, I probably don't have time to respond at length point-by-point.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 am Shit; I was adding edits to the above after you replied - I just wanted to draw your attention to the fact that it got longer.
Yes, we can do that on Discord.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amYes, real time text chat would be fine; back in the day we used various kinds of IMs; would something like that work?
(i) Are you arguing a hard and objective line between idealization and reform?Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amWe're both on the same page that certain very specific metaethical views are a problem (but I can't imagine any vegans actually appealing to these - or any sane vegans really presupposing anything about metaethics other than their falsehood - in the course of arguing for veganism); these are:
(i) error theory + no reform or a reform that cuts non-human animals out (the latter of which is I think is present in or at least very much like Mackie & Gauthier), and
(ii) a simplistic version of non-cognitivism that cannot make sense of basic ethical inquiry or argument (as was arguably true of those like Ayer's, but is most certainly not true of contemporary expressivist quasi-realist metaethical views like those of Allan Gibbard)
Not on its own. But if I also reject the position of reform in favor of idealization (if there is a meaningful difference), and I reject expressivist quasi-realism and other nonsense, then it does lead that way.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amBut to reject (i) & (ii) is not to embrace Cornell Realism;
Non-naturalists who look very much like naturalists.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amIt really, really does not matter if one is a Sidgwick-Moore-Parfit-(present-day)-Singer style non-naturalist,
I really feel like I already explained that.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amI have absolutely NO idea what you mean by 'intuition' or how on earth you think that arguments for things like consequentialism [does not depend on intuition]
And I spoke on that a bit too, there are also several threads on it (including one active right now), but let's say for the sake of argument that it can't: let's say that reason can get us almost all of the way there, but then this final decision of preference vs. hedonistic consideration must be made on intuition.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amhedonism, the preference fulfillment theory of well-being
And I disagree.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 am- or really ANY substantive position in ethics does not depend upon intuition.
And I am arguing that you are wrong.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amI thought that I explained very clearly what I meant by intuition, exactly why all of these things depend upon intuition,
Which I have seen, and quoted, and even linked you to IIRC in the other thread.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amand I gave you ample references, including in the readily available Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
I am aware.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amBy the way, a locution often employed to get at these uninferred seemings is what 'makes sense'; thus, 'it seems to make sense to promote the well-being of others', 'it seeems that we ought to promote the well-being of others', 'it seems that there's moral reason to promote the well-being of others' may all be articulations of the same un-inferred seeming as of what we should / have reason to do - i.e. in my sense 'intuitions'.
I didn't have time to reply point by point before. Looks like I almost have this time (although I shouldn't have).Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amI am becoming DEEPY frustrated by the fact that you simply ignore my arguments are references,
Well that's not correct.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amand proceed to yap on WITHOUT ANY HINT OF ARGUMENT OR EVIDENCE OR ANY REFERENCE TO ANY ARGUMENT OR EVIDENCE about how e.g. consequentialism and hedonism don't depend upon intuition,
Right, and I disagree with the use of such arguments.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amwhen I have very clearly explained how e.g. consequentialism depends upon e.g. the uninferred ethical seemings that 'one ought all else held equal / has moral reason to omit harming others' and that 'one should all else held equal / has moral reason to promote others' well-being'; and how hedonism depends upon the uninferred ethical seemings that 'pleasure is good / beneficial / what one should want for someone out of care for her' and that 'suffering is bad / harmful / what one should want not to happen to someone out of care for her'.
I'm pretty sure I mean the same thing you mean by intuition.Margaret Hayek wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2017 3:47 amAs far as I can tell in these discussions about whatever you mean by 'intuition'
I've tried to discuss the meaning of naturalism with you. It was in the other thread, I believe. You didn't respond to it AFAIK.
No, I'm trying to not spend all day on replies when 90% of it is talking past each other.