OK, that's not the definition we use on this forum.
Contrast egoism and altruism for a better understanding. I do not contest that we act in accordance with our values, but those values can be purely self interested (as in creating pleasure [be it sensory or emotional/internal] for oneself) or directed outside (whether to others, or to general principles).
We're usually talking about psychological hedonism, since psychological egoism that isn't also psychological hedonism is very vague and poorly defined. Experienced pleasure/pain is pretty clear.
See also: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/
If you make egoism so broad as to include all desires, including altruistic ones, any distinction becomes meaningless. That's not how we use the word here.All forms of egoism require explication of “self-interest” (or “welfare” or “well-being”). There are two main theories. Preference or desire accounts identify self-interest with the satisfaction of one's desires. Often, and most plausibly, these desires are restricted to self-regarding desires. What makes a desire self-regarding is controversial, but there are clear cases and counter-cases: a desire for my own pleasure is self-regarding; a desire for the welfare of others is not.
If you want to argue over the definition of egoism, maybe you can start another thread on it?
Otherwise, how about we just agree that yes people act in accordance to their values, and some values are hedonistic, some non-hedonistically self interested, and some are other directed. The point is that altruistic interests are possible, and people don't just act that way by expecting a reward from it that optimally fulfills self interest.
You could try to stretch the definition of self interest to include an interest in fulfilling a concept of self as a good person or something, but that's not very useful again because it breaks down the distinction and other terms are subsumed by egoism being all encompassing. The important point for the sake of this conversation is only that not all interests are hedonistic (how we usually use it here) since other notions of self interest are pretty vague.
As long as you agree that you value your family actually being happy, and not just you believing your family is/will be happy.
If you don't think there's a difference between the two, that's a problem.
It usually means psychological hedonism, because anything outside that is very vague as I said and not clearly defined (or necessarily clearly definable).
But as I showed above, non-hedonistic psychological egoism vaguely excludes values that are not self-interested. It's not productive to define "self-interested values" so broadly as to incorporate all possible values.
Please either stick to meaning psychological hedonism when you say psychological egoism, or restrain the notion of those self-interested values to something plausible. At least on this forum (again, unless you want to make a thread arguing the details).
That's completely absurd.
How could you think that something like classical conditioning (e.g. salivating when a bell rings) is a stronger inference than operant conditioning?
I explained this in some detail. I will explain it yet again, but please take care to read carefully and engage with my argument this time.
In order to LEARN to use a device, the simplest explanation is that the creature has some notion of what the device is and what it does when acted upon in a certain way. This knowledge is consciousness (defined in any meaningful way), maybe not of anything else, but at least of that device and the limbs (or whatever) manipulate it. Further, when the creature chooses to manipulate the device to achieve certain ends, that is intentionality giving evidence for a desire -- at least for something that device does or is achieved by operating it, if not for anything else.
You could speculate that these actions don't give evidence for any of those things, but if you do then the same kind of speculation applies to all learned and complex behavior all the way up to learning language and writing this post. The difference is the same as that between "micro" and "macro" evolution, and the ignorance and hypocrisy of accepting the former and denying the latter is identical.
Denying the consciousness and interests of animals capable of operant conditioning is no less irrational than asserting solipsism and denying the same to humans because there's no reason to believe that whatever magical non-conscious process powers the lesser activity can't power the greater by just taking more steps.
The last statement there is just an unfalsifiable assertion based on magical thinking, and a magical notion of what you think consciousness is -- one completely inaccessible to reason or empirical analysis.
You're on par with bad theistic logic here, probably worse because you're using this as a justification to deny the fact of animal suffering and further promote it. Even most theists recognize the problems of animal suffering even if they don't believe they have "souls".
Look, you can be a consciousness denialist if you want, and as long as it's applied across the board that can be a reasonable position (maybe "consciousness" in the philosophical sense is just meaningless drivel and nobody is), but there's no reason to ascribe something magical to humans when the same basic properties operate in non-humans to lesser degrees.
I already explained this, please stop strawmanning my position.
You can see behavioral changes that could be purely reflexive through classical conditioning, like associating certain stimuli through simple associative learning (salivating when you hear a bell). Operant conditioning is more complicated and involves a link between behavior and consequence with feedback (lacking in classical conditioning) that promotes intentional action in so far as anything can be called intentional. It's the basis of true learning. We even have computer models for how this works, and there's no reason to believe that humans are anything magical beyond that.
You can try to deny that this is anything special too, but as I said unless you are using the same bad reasoning that magically differentiates micro and macro evolution then rationally such a denial applies across the board and negates human "consciousness" as meaningless too.
Without SOMEBODY to suffer the consequences, there is no ethical environmental argument.
Did you not understand that point?
Even just humans suffering the consequences can make an environmental argument, but something has to suffer the change.
The environmental argument relies on something suffering.
Have you tried the impossible burger? The Beyond Burger? Have you tried the non-dairy Ben&Jerry? Etc.ShadowStarshine wrote: ↑Sat Oct 06, 2018 11:33 pmIf it were truly the case there was a mock meat for every meat product that was better in terms of efficiency and that I truly couldn't notice the difference, then I can see the case for not eating the less efficient option. Heck, I'd even replace individual meats if truly there was no difference to be had and what you said was true, and it could be the case that I'm ignorant to these options, and my awareness of them would satisfy the environmental aspect for me.
Also, why do you need to not notice the difference? Different is not bad, and it's something we can adjust to very quickly. It doesn't mean sustained pain or discomfort.
Can't you just accept that the new option is also delicious, even if you can taste the difference, but that because it's also delicious you don't suffer a loss?
It's delicious so satisfies your hedonistic interests, and it's also rich in protein which satisfies nutritional needs. Why would you not choose this option? It's also very likely that these mock meat options and healthier and so you'll be less likely to experience pain or early death in the future.
It's more rational in every way to choose the better alternative.
Just because people can say they hold certain special positions doesn't mean those positions are consistent.ShadowStarshine wrote: ↑Sat Oct 06, 2018 11:33 pmHere's why the difference in meta-ethics and normative ethics matter:
They can entirely be mixed and matched. One can be a moral nihilist non-cognitivist and say "I think people have values and preferences, I think these values and preferences have conflicts, and I think there are better solutions than others." These may not be "better" in a moral sense, but more prefered (descriptive ethics). One may think the best path towards this would be deontological:[...]
A Christian can say he or she takes the bible literally (a literalist) and doesn't believe homosexuality is a sin. So many positions to mix and match!
Doesn't mean that particular combination is credible.
Certain kinds of normative ethics can be deduced from certain kinds of metaethical positions, and likewise the necessary metaethical foundation can be deduced from certain normative models.
It may not always be a perfect function for all positions (there might be two options one way or another, and sometimes there's no compatible option), but that doesn't mean there aren't positions that are necessary correlates and that have clear cognitive non-subjective definitions of morality that apply across the broad.
Then just talk about normative ethics, and we can work up from there (or down).
In that case, I think you mean to say you're an agnostic error theorist, not a non-cognitivist.
Non-cogntivism is more assertive about semantics, error theory is skeptical that there is a fact to the matter at all but is willing to trust people when they say they're trying to express facts (an error theorist is just doubtful that there is a fact to express).
The existence of values in the minds of others is an objective fact, not subjective. The state of values conflicting is also an objective fact.ShadowStarshine wrote: ↑Sat Oct 06, 2018 11:33 pmNow, that's not to say I think every value or preference is classified as a "moral problem". I think it's a particular subset of values, specifically, ones that cause confliction. Where as, no one has a problem with what icecream flavor I want, people will in fact find conflict if I wanted to steal their stuff. But I think these are all values and preferences in the end.
Subjective morals are more like "I feel this therefore this", and objective moral fact can be "Person A and person B have conflicting values" and the understanding that morality is quantified by degree of conflict. Value dissonance is negative on the moral scale, value harmony is positive. That's a perfectly objective moral system, and it's cognitive.
What do you think it is? Can you answer my question about wants? I think I asked first.