I'm not a fan of intuitionism, I see it as comparable to spiritual gnosis in religion.
There are some brief arguments (dumpster fires) over the subject here between myself and Margaret Hayek, you should be able to find them with some Google searches with our user names and the relevant key terms if you want to suffer them.
I'll check out the other post.
Right, he's a very assertive Humpty Dumptyist.Frank Quasar wrote: ↑Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:10 am Just a note: This struck me to be weird, because he gets rather butt-hurt when people reject his definition of "murder" to be far-reaching in contrast to the standard definition of murder that is commonly used. He's doing something similar here and refusing to acknowledge the other existing definitions that people use.
He does the same thing on things like Feminism, etc.
What are mundane empirical dependencies?Generic Realism:
a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is (apart from mundane empirical dependencies of the sort sometimes encountered in everyday life) independent of anyone's beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on.
What are properties if not conceptual?
Is mathematics a conceptual scheme? Does "2" exist independent of those things or not?
But isn't having two eyes a property?
How can something HAVE those properties independent of conceptual schemes when those properties are dependent on conceptual schemes?
His notion of "trait" itself violates such a rigid and extreme definition.Frank Quasar wrote: ↑Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:10 amThe "conceptual schemes" caveat is important because he's referring to it as something beyond one's conceptual scheme, and he believes it to be inherently flawed because in order to justify it you would have to do so from within your conceptual scheme. It's circular.
If he thinks following from the laws of thought is a shallow claim, then sure, it's "shallow".Frank Quasar wrote: ↑Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:10 amOr is it a shallow claim, one that comports with respect to your axioms? He said it does depend on these, he is definitely not on board with robust moral realism because it adheres to the hard deep claim, but with minimal realism it depends on whether or not it is deep/shallow. With shallow I think he could be on board, who knows.
He's confusing non-cognitivism and error theory.Frank Quasar wrote: ↑Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:10 am25:12 -- AVI thinks there's like an overlap between a minimal moral realist and a non-cognitivist because when minimal moral realists reject non-cogntivism in respect to moral statement (true/false) it's a rejection on the basis of a "deep" claim. The kind of deep claim that is beyond axioms, or something, but then the minimal moral realist will say that it is true with respect to our axioms. AVI is trying to point out that a minimal non-cognitivist can do the same thing when they proclaim that moral statements do not report true/falsity beyond our axioms, but within our axioms they do. Essentially, if a robust/minimal realists can make this split, why can't the non-cognitivists? That's what he is trying to get at.
Error theory refers to whether there's a fact in the matter of morality or not, non-cognitivism is a semantic claim that says people aren't attempting to express fact statements.
Error theory admits people are trying to express facts, but are in error because there are no such facts. They're error theorists, not non-cognitivists.
You can pile on some extra bullshit to talk about "shallow facts" and "deep facts", and say you're a non-cognitivist to "deep facts" (you don't think people are trying to express those) but a cognitivist and realist to "shallow facts".
People would only be in error if they're trying to express a level of fact that doesn't exist.
There are many kinds of moral realists. What's his point?Frank Quasar wrote: ↑Tue Jul 31, 2018 7:10 amEssentially, they think if you press a moral realist hard enough on their meaning of truth they will then split into two different boot camps. The kind that mean truth with respect to axioms, as discussed, and the other types that engage in "magical" thinking, as AY puts it.
If he's trying to find a way to save face here that's fine, but he needs to realize that most realist philosophers aren't engaging in any kind of magical thinking here. That would be the small subset of presuppositionalist type theists.