DrSinger wrote: ↑Wed Dec 27, 2017 12:50 pm
To me it seems like the significance of moral, good etc. is lost when you express them in terms of natural facts and a hypothetical imperative e.g.
you should not torture innocent children
seems far more meaningful than
If moral means X, then if you want to be moral, you should not torture children
The main problem with "you should not torture innocent children" is it's not clear if you mean the act itself irrespective of the consequences, or "all other things being the same" that is with no other good or bad consequences. Or if you mean it as a general rule.
Assuming that, you can absolutely say "You should not do X"
The teleology of the claim already suggests "If moral means X, then if you want to be moral"; the claim is regarding a
moral ought, and the fact of it being made says certain things about morality (like we're talking about a prescriptive morality, rather than an anthropological descriptive morality; we're looking for an objective moral basis that would make the claim meaningful, otherwise its not saying anything).
Like saying:
"You should change your oil every 10,000 miles."
That's clearly not a moral should, but an automotive maintenance should.
We do not need to say:
"If automotive maintenance means keeping your car running well (or whatever), and you want to do that, then you should change your oil every 10,000 miles."
DrSinger wrote: ↑Wed Dec 27, 2017 12:50 pmThe SEP section on Cornell realism seems to suggest a way, but it is reliant on our intuitions about morality and how we intuitively refine those intuitions with thought experiments or 'reflective equilibrium'.
When we're asking how the mind works to process interests, it's not necessarily wrong to ask people what they want. It's imprecise, but sometimes it's all we have. It's also acceptable to probe what you would want in that situation when we have no better information, particularly with a very similar mind (like another human). It's important to discount that when there's evidence against it (e.g. somebody with an unusual mental illness), but that's because there is an objective fact in the matter, and this is just a crude way of assessing that.
None of that is intuition superseding fact or deductive reasoning, or merely guessing on a matter of reality (asking the mind about itself is more credible [not merely intuition about something else, but more of a survey] than asking the mind about metaphysics).
Anyway, that only works if we can get to the point of being interested in interests.
DrSinger wrote: ↑Wed Dec 27, 2017 12:50 pmHow would you say you arrived at the conclusion that the only good is the fulfilment of idealized preferences? Is it a matter of self evidence or reflective equilibrium, that can be known a priori?
A large part of it is teleology of language and the moral claims we make.
We could do the same thing with respect to "God", but it's much trickier due to all of the false empirical claims bundled into god-concepts.
Theists do certain things, like pray to their god.
Either they are in error (error theory), or there's something that fits the teleological bill of what they're doing.
Presumably this being exists, hears them, and can help manifest at least some of what they're asking for. A lot of what they ask for is "strength", so some aspect of their own personality that motivates them (exists in their minds) and can accomplish this feat would fit them bill.
But then they say things like god created the universe and completely foil that theory. Human psychology and placebo producing imaginary friends did not travel back in time and do something to the physical world.
The same problems do not exist for morality as a concept.