Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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brimstoneSalad
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

Post by brimstoneSalad »

Stijn wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2017 5:15 amMinimizing the total of valid complaints avoids the existence problem that antifrustrationism faces: would it be good if no-one was born?
It perhaps makes it morally neutral for the mode case; the problem is that bad luck cases where the person born would prefer not to be born reintroduces the issue as morally bad overall (the mean), so it doesn't solve anything in practice.

It also fails to provide strong arguments against farming, where the animals would not otherwise have existed at all, provided that these are more controlled environments where the animals live miserable lives, but not quite miserable enough to prefer non-existence.
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

Post by Stijn »

brimstoneSalad wrote: Sat Apr 15, 2017 2:26 am
Stijn wrote: Fri Apr 14, 2017 5:15 amMinimizing the total of valid complaints avoids the existence problem that antifrustrationism faces: would it be good if no-one was born?
It perhaps makes it morally neutral for the mode case; the problem is that bad luck cases where the person born would prefer not to be born reintroduces the issue as morally bad overall (the mean), so it doesn't solve anything in practice.
I don't see the problem, why it doesn't solve anything in practice.
If we can chossen between only two situations: non-existence versus existence, and if in the second situation a majority has strong negative preferences (prefer non-existence), the situation of non-existence is indeed the best.
It also fails to provide strong arguments against farming, where the animals would not otherrwise have existed at all, provided that these are more controlled environments where the animals live miserable lives, but not quite miserable enough to prefer non-existence.
I guess it is up to the animals to decide what they most prefer, but if they prefer existence (on a farm) and if complaining results in non-existence, those animals cannot complain if they exist. In real live, we do not know what the animals would prefer (being well-treated on a happy animal farm versus non-existence), so it is difficult to take their complaints into account. we simply don't know if they complain. In that case, we can still complain against that kind of happy farming, for example because we believe it is disrespectful towards those animals. Cfr. how we think about breeding and keeping happy human slaves. If we complain against that kind of slavery, we should also complain against happy animal farming. But in that case we are the ones who complain, not the happy slaves or happy animals. (With a happy existence I mean a live that is prefered to non-existence, i.e. a life with a positive preference, even if you call it a mliserable life)
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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Stijn wrote: Sun Apr 16, 2017 6:58 am If we can chossen between only two situations: non-existence versus existence, and if in the second situation a majority has strong negative preferences (prefer non-existence), the situation of non-existence is indeed the best.
Beings that do not exist have no preferences.
Your framework discourages (to some extent) the killing of those beings that do exist, but still recommends preventing existence in the first place. Because you don't place positive value on complements, and do place negative value on complaints, you arrive at an asymmetry which necessitates avoiding existence (not ending it for those who already exist).
Stijn wrote: Sun Apr 16, 2017 6:58 amwe simply don't know if they complain. In that case, we can still complain against that kind of happy farming, for example because we believe it is disrespectful towards those animals. Cfr. how we think about breeding and keeping happy human slaves. If we complain against that kind of slavery, we should also complain against happy animal farming. But in that case we are the ones who complain, not the happy slaves or happy animals. (With a happy existence I mean a live that is prefered to non-existence, i.e. a life with a positive preference, even if you call it a mliserable life)
So, majority rules, and dictates morality?
If more people complain about there not being farming of these animals, then we should be compelled to support the farming?
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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brimstoneSalad wrote: Sun Apr 16, 2017 2:16 pm Beings that do not exist have no preferences.
Your framework discourages (to some extent) the killing of those beings that do exist, but still recommends preventing existence in the first place. Because you don't place positive value on complements, and do place negative value on complaints, you arrive at an asymmetry which necessitates avoiding existence (not ending it for those who already exist).

but if those who can exist are not going to complain against their existence when they do exist, it is morally neutral and hence permissible for them to exist. So it doesn't recommend preventing existence, except when the people who can exist are going to complain and have a negative preference for existence.
Stijn wrote: Sun Apr 16, 2017 6:58 amwe simply don't know if they complain. In that case, we can still complain against that kind of happy farming, for example because we believe it is disrespectful towards those animals. Cfr. how we think about breeding and keeping happy human slaves. If we complain against that kind of slavery, we should also complain against happy animal farming. But in that case we are the ones who complain, not the happy slaves or happy animals. (With a happy existence I mean a live that is prefered to non-existence, i.e. a life with a positive preference, even if you call it a mliserable life)
So, majority rules, and dictates morality?
possibly, if that minimizes complaints.
If more people complain about there not being farming of these animals, then we should be compelled to support the farming?
indeed, but I don't consider it likely, because if one is allowed to support happy farming, one is also allowed to support breeding humans to keep them as happy slaves, and I don't think that would be considered acceptible.
But there is more: when the animal on the farm is happy, s/he will not complain against his or her existence. But then the animal is going to be killed prematurely, and then the animal might complain. If the animal considers that complaint as valid, there is a preference inconsistency: at one moment the animal does not complain, at a later moment s/he does. That means there are actually two animals or two persons involved, because a person is defined by his or her preferences. So, livestock farming means breeding two animals, one happy animal who does not complain, and one animal who complains. Now we have to take this complaint into account, and minimizing complaints means not breeding animals. The same goes for another example: giving birth to a twin, one child will live a healthy happy life (preference +20), the twin child will live a miserable life not worth living (preference -10). The total preference of the two children is positive (+10), but if you can choose between giving birth or not, not giving birth is preferred because that minimizes valid complaints.
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am but if those who can exist are not going to complain against their existence when they do exist, it is morally neutral and hence permissible for them to exist.
Most of them won't, which is morally neutral. But some of them will. Some of them will wish they were never born.

A billion people not complaining against their existence is neutral, no matter how happy they are, in your system.
But one single person complaining makes it all negative.

You can never be sure nobody will complain, given the diversity of human psychology and experience. There will always be somebody who would rather have not existed at all. Unless you plan to raise babies in a factory from specially bred stock so as to avoid variety.

Even then, there may always be inexplicable exceptions:
http://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=15&t=3035

Your system's failure to assign any positive value to the lack of complaints of billions of people would seem to make that one complaint in a billion easily tip the balance and recommend against existence.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am So it doesn't recommend preventing existence, except when the people who can exist are going to complain and have a negative preference for existence.
And that is the case: they are going to complain. At least, some of them will. And you can not know ahead of time which will complain and which will not. Since there is no positive value to existence in your system, any risk of complaint must be avoided.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am
So, majority rules, and dictates morality?
possibly, if that minimizes complaints.
So if white people are the majority, and they complain against the existence of black people because they don't like it, then genocide is recommended in your system?
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am indeed, but I don't consider it likely, because if one is allowed to support happy farming, one is also allowed to support breeding humans to keep them as happy slaves, and I don't think that would be considered acceptible.
Human slavery produced the problem of slave revolts, as well as free people being captured into slavery, which produced anxiety and complaints from free citizens.
There are some notable differences in practice, regarding practical application which produces greater immediate discomfort from human slavery for the free humans.

Human and non-human slaves may be equally miserable, but if you only care about the complaints of others because you can't ask the victims if they'd rather not have been born, you effectively negate concern for any suffering of those victims by calling those complaints invalid.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am But there is more: when the animal on the farm is happy, s/he will not complain against his or her existence. But then the animal is going to be killed prematurely, and then the animal might complain.
If the animal would not have been killed prematurely, then the animal would never have existed at all. The choice is between never having existed, and existing for a time then dying prematurely.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am The total preference of the two children is positive (+10), but if you can choose between giving birth or not, not giving birth is preferred because that minimizes valid complaints.
Which means the preference scores you are assigning are meaningless if they are infinitely overridden by any complaints.
As I explained earlier, because you can not guarantee the outcome and know that at least some few people will end up miserable enough to complain against being born, this commits you to opposing creation of new life.
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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brimstoneSalad wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 1:46 pm
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am but if those who can exist are not going to complain against their existence when they do exist, it is morally neutral and hence permissible for them to exist.
Most of them won't, which is morally neutral. But some of them will. Some of them will wish they were never born.
A billion people not complaining against their existence is neutral, no matter how happy they are, in your system.
But one single person complaining makes it all negative.
You can never be sure nobody will complain, given the diversity of human psychology and experience. There will always be somebody who would rather have not existed at all. Unless you plan to raise babies in a factory from specially bred stock so as to avoid variety.
Your system's failure to assign any positive value to the lack of complaints of billions of people would seem to make that one complaint in a billion easily tip the balance and recommend against existence.
1) If we are not allowed to procreate, a lot of people will complain and their total complaint can trump the complaints of those few one in a billion potentiel future people.
2) It is not clear whether those few potential people have complaints against our decision to procreate. Perhaps a third situation is possible where those people would not complain. Then we should procreate and choose that third situation.
3) I'm studying a variation of my theory, where people can decide for themselves whether they prefer complaints or gratitude (anticomplaints) in the calculation of the best situation. A complaint measures the difference in preference between your actual situation and your most prefered situation, and that complaint is added to the total complaints of everyone else. Then we have to minimize this total complaint to calculate the best situation. However, to fully respect autonomy, you may also be allowed to use anticomplaints in the calculation, measuring the difference in preference between your actual situation and your least prefered situation or another reference situation that you can choose. Some future people might prefer to use their gratitude, and that can compensate for the complaints of others.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am
So, majority rules, and dictates morality?
possibly, if that minimizes complaints.
So if white people are the majority, and they complain against the existence of black people because they don't like it, then genocide is recommended in your system?
The complaint of those white people is only valid if they are able to formulate a moral rule that justifies the genocice and they must be able to consistently want that everyone follows that rule. Such a rule could be: "you may kill others when you are in a majority that complaints against the existence of those other people." But if they do not want that they are killed by black people simply because those black people complain against their existence, they are not allowed to kill the black people. If they do not want that they are killed by a majority that hates them, they should not kill others when they are a majority that hates those victims.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am indeed, but I don't consider it likely, because if one is allowed to support happy farming, one is also allowed to support breeding humans to keep them as happy slaves, and I don't think that would be considered acceptible.
Human slavery produced the problem of slave revolts, as well as free people being captured into slavery, which produced anxiety and complaints from free citizens.
but what about breeding and enslaving mentally disabled humans who cannot revolt?
But I think I canged my mind: perhaps eating happy meat (from happy farm animals with lives worth living) is permissible. Suppose we discover that God exists, that he is responsible for our existence (the pregnancy of our mothers), and that he breeds us in order to use us for his sadistic pleasures. That is why we sometimes get sick (he uses us to experiment with his new viruses) and we die at age 80 instead of age 1000 (he intentionally kills us prematurely at age 80 by making us grow old). However, I consider my life as being overall positive, even with those diseases and that premature death at age 80. I do not complain against my existence. If I complain against god's choice to breed me, he would have decided that I do not exist. If I am against this kind of slavery of happy humans in the hands of God, if I'm against breeding happy slaves, I should be against our whole existence. I should prefer a situation where no-one exists even if no-one who does exist really complains against existence. So now my intuition says that God may breed us to use us when we do not complain, and to be consistent this implies we may breed happy people to use them if they do not complain. The latter seems counter-intuitive, but I can't find a moral principle that prohibits it.
Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am But there is more: when the animal on the farm is happy, s/he will not complain against his or her existence. But then the animal is going to be killed prematurely, and then the animal might complain.
If the animal would not have been killed prematurely, then the animal would never have existed at all. The choice is between never having existed, and existing for a time then dying prematurely.
or we can say that the animals that do already exist are able to complain, because their existence cannot be undone? But still that doesn't solve the above problem of the situation where god breeds us.
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 1) If we are not allowed to procreate, a lot of people will complain and their total complaint can trump the complaints of those few one in a billion potentiel future people.
I wasn't talking about force.
I'm talking about choice and ethics.
Is it morally a wrong act to choose to procreate?

Or are you saying a personal complaint against morality is enough to nullify it as a decision making factor?
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 2) It is not clear whether those few potential people have complaints against our decision to procreate. Perhaps a third situation is possible where those people would not complain. Then we should procreate and choose that third situation.
The point was the inevitability of some complaints. You are ignoring practical reality here; you can not absolutely control the future.

Besides, if it's neutral, why should we choose it?

Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 3) I'm studying a variation of my theory, where people can decide for themselves whether they prefer complaints or gratitude (anticomplaints) in the calculation of the best situation.
Do you only let them choose once, or on a case by case basis?
This is all so arbitrary.
Anyway, you do understand that this results in the exact same issues that utilitarianism had that you criticized, right?

You're basically adding corrections to your system until it is just Utilitarianism by another name.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am Some future people might prefer to use their gratitude, and that can compensate for the complaints of others.
That's fine, then you're a classical Utilitarian. Or a preference Utilitarian. We can discuss that.
No offense, but I don't really understand the need some people have to come up with their own systems.
It's just really unlikely that you're going to come up with something revolutionary that hasn't been worked out in hundreds of years. New forms of argument, maybe. But a radically different system? Probably not.

It's as if you reinvented the wheel as a square, then said people can round off the corners if they want to... that is, a wheel.
That's what this all sounds like, anyway.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 amThe complaint of those white people is only valid if they are able to formulate a moral rule that justifies the genocice and they must be able to consistently want that everyone follows that rule.
Now you seem to be coming up with another arbitrary constraint on validity.
It has to follow Kant's categorical imperative (logically broken, by the way) or perhaps the golden rule (which is not broken).

Why, then, not just throw the whole thing out and base your morality on the golden rule (Simple consideration for the interests of others)? Or if you think Kan't reasoning is sound, then the categorical imperative.

You seem stuck somewhere in between.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 amSuch a rule could be: "you may kill others when you are in a majority that complaints against the existence of those other people." But if they do not want that they are killed by black people simply because those black people complain against their existence, they are not allowed to kill the black people. If they do not want that they are killed by a majority that hates them, they should not kill others when they are a majority that hates those victims.
That's fine on its own (well, your reasoning has issues --it's the same mistake "ask yourself" makes -- but we can discuss those later). No need for this other stuff about complaints and validity and gratitude. You're just going to confuse others and yourself with all of this unnecessary complexity to preserve in name the idea that this is a unique theory. You may have a lot invested in this, but it's time to let go and apply a bit of Occam's razor.

Stijn wrote: Mon Apr 17, 2017 5:38 am indeed, but I don't consider it likely, because if one is allowed to support happy farming, one is also allowed to support breeding humans to keep them as happy slaves, and I don't think that would be considered acceptible.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am So now my intuition says that God may breed us to use us when we do not complain, and to be consistent this implies we may breed happy people to use them if they do not complain. The latter seems counter-intuitive, but I can't find a moral principle that prohibits it.
...And then you twisted yourself up in a knot.
Moral systems have the power to compel action through justification and dissonance. Don't imagine that we're dealing with descriptivism here. You just convinced yourself happy slaves are OK after rejecting it a day before. Others are no less easily swayed to their biases.

Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am or we can say that the animals that do already exist are able to complain, because their existence cannot be undone?
Then you are committed to an anti-procreation position for humans too. Unless you let the good outweigh the bad by tacking on ad hoc gratitude, but then you're back at some form of utilitarianism -- and a bizarre attempt to mix it with deontology (the two do not mix, this is an insoluble problem in philosophy). I don't know what you're trying to do with the categorical imperative sounding stuff.

I realize you've worked a lot on this, but it's a very confused and self contradicting amalgamation.
Perhaps it would help to discuss how you think your system differs from utilitarianism, deontology, and consequential altruism?
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

Post by Stijn »

brimstoneSalad wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 4:39 am
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 1) If we are not allowed to procreate, a lot of people will complain and their total complaint can trump the complaints of those few one in a billion potentiel future people.
I wasn't talking about force.
I'm talking about choice and ethics.
Is it morally a wrong act to choose to procreate?

Or are you saying a personal complaint against morality is enough to nullify it as a decision making factor?
I'm saying that we have to take all complaints into account, including the complaints when one is not allowed to procreate. If you procreate, you have to be able to give a moral rule that justifies procreation, of which you can want that everyone follows that rule. The rule can be for example: procreation is allowed if the probability of an offspring complaining against it is sufficienty low. If you can consistently want that everyone follows that rule (i.e. if you agree with the condition "sufficiently low"), then you are allowed to procreate, and if you were forbidden to do so, your complaint against procreation prohibition is valid.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 2) It is not clear whether those few potential people have complaints against our decision to procreate. Perhaps a third situation is possible where those people would not complain. Then we should procreate and choose that third situation.
The point was the inevitability of some complaints. You are ignoring practical reality here; you can not absolutely control the future.
suppose you procreate and you have two children. One of them, the big brother, steals everything from the other, making his live not worth living. The other child complains, but the complaint is not necessarily directed at you, it can be directed at the brother. Your choice to procreate is a choice for two situations, one with both children that are happy (no stealing), and one with both children of which one is unhappy. The unhappy child cannot complain to you. However, if you procreate and know that there will be only one situation, for example a happy child and an unhappy, disabled child, then I tend to be against procreation, unless your complaint when you can't procreate is bigger than the complaint of the unhappy child.
Besides, if it's neutral, why should we choose it?
because you might have a strong preference to do so.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 am 3) I'm studying a variation of my theory, where people can decide for themselves whether they prefer complaints or gratitude (anticomplaints) in the calculation of the best situation.
Do you only let them choose once, or on a case by case basis?
they can only choose once, because there is only one choice. A person P at a time T in situation S can only make one choice about how his or her complaint or gratitude is calculated.
This is all so arbitrary.
for the people involved it can seem arbitrary, because they have to make the choices. But the theory itself is far from arbitrary, because it maximizes autonomy. The rule "let the people decide" is not arbitrary, but the choices of the people can be arbitrary in the sense that perhaps they cannot generate a rule that explains their choices. Perhaps they simply pich a choice arbitrarily.
Anyway, you do understand that this results in the exact same issues that utilitarianism had that you criticized, right?
yes, but this time I leave it up to the people to decide. If they all prefer a total utilitarian view and they all accept the repugnant sadistic conclusions in population ethics, then so be it.
You're basically adding corrections to your system until it is just Utilitarianism by another name.
it is utilitarianism with a few extra degrees of freedom. Total utilitarianism means we have to maximize the total of utilities U(P,Si,Si), summed over all persons P, where U(P,Si,Si) is the utility or preference of person P in situation Si for situation Si. Critical level utilitarianism maximizes the sum of U(P,Si,Si)-C. My theory maximizes the sum of U(P,Si,Si)-U(P,Si,Sr), where U(P,Si,Sr) is the preference of person P in situation Si for a reference situation Sr. That reference situation can be the most prefered situation, which results in the minimum complaint theory. It can be the least prefered situation, which results in the maximum gratitude theory. It can be the situation for which person P in situation Si has a preference 0 or C. If all persons in all situations choose as a reference situation a situation for which they had preference 0, then we have total utilitarianism. But in my theory nothing prevents them from choosing other reference situations, and those reference situations can be different for different persons and different situations Si.
Basically that means: if everyone is a total utilitarian, then we should maximize total utility.
Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 3:48 amThe complaint of those white people is only valid if they are able to formulate a moral rule that justifies the genocice and they must be able to consistently want that everyone follows that rule.
Now you seem to be coming up with another arbitrary constraint on validity.
It has to follow Kant's categorical imperative (logically broken, by the way) or perhaps the golden rule (which is not broken).
this constraint can be arbitrary, in the sense that other constraints are possible. But it is not an unwanted arbitrariness; everyone can consistently want to add this constraint. It is an improvement of Kant's categorical imperative and the golden rule.
Why, then, not just throw the whole thing out and base your morality on the golden rule (Simple consideration for the interests of others)? Or if you think Kan't reasoning is sound, then the categorical imperative.
In a sense that's what I'm doing. But Kants imperative is too vague; it is not always clear what it implies. Also "consideration for the interests of others" is too vague.
That's fine on its own (well, your reasoning has issues --it's the same mistake "ask yourself" makes -- but we can discuss those later). No need for this other stuff about complaints and validity and gratitude. You're just going to confuse others and yourself with all of this unnecessary complexity to preserve in name the idea that this is a unique theory. You may have a lot invested in this, but it's time to let go and apply a bit of Occam's razor.
I consider it a s ahierarchy; on top we have the most fundamental ethical principle, the principle that we have to avoid all kinds of unwanted arbitrariness. Next, as a special example of this principle, we have a nice rule of thumb: if you do something, you should be able to formulate a moral rule that justifies your act, of which you can consistently want that everyone follows that rule. Next, a level lower, we are faced with a choice for a moral theory such as utilitarianism. If I may formulate such a theory, then so are you, following the same rules that I follow in formulating my theory. I follow the rules of coherence (completeness, accurateness, simplicity, no contradictions,...), That means we have to choose coherent moral theories. Then I look for a coherent theory that has the least complaints against it, one that maximizes respect for autonomy and still looks at people's preferences. So I end up with this kind of minimum complaint theory.
Compare it with physics. At the most fundamental level, we have the basic principle that a physical theory should be written in the language of mathematics, i.e. no avoidable arbitrariness. So the fundamental claim is that mathematics is the basis. At a lower level, we have to condition that the physical theory of our universe should correspond with the data, contain no contradictions, etc...
...And then you twisted yourself up in a knot.
Moral systems have the power to compel action through justification and dissonance. Don't imagine that we're dealing with descriptivism here. You just convinced yourself happy slaves are OK after rejecting it a day before.

that's right. With new data, new thought experiments, I can change my mind, my moral theory. The god thought experiment was pretty convincing to me. So what do you think about it?
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Re: Moral illusions and wild animal suffering

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Stijn wrote: Wed Apr 19, 2017 8:57 am ...
Wouldn't you still have to work out relations between complaints, build abstract complaint scales and "complaint functions"? In which case all that would be doing would be to offer a model that simply mirrors existing utility theories.

There'd hardly be any difference, except for the angle from which we look at preferences. Basically just turning the coding scale on its head - say, "lowest complaint" as 1 and "highest complaint" as 5, from a set of 5 situation options (assuming preferences are ordinal and transitive). With lower values being normatively preferable to higher values in this case. Just negative utilitarianism.

Or do you want to keep the model as simplistic as the binary "complaint/no complaint"? Would that have any real descriptive power? From my understanding you'd still end up having to talk about preference scales.
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