Getting back to the point about falsifiability, I'll draw an analogy:
Intelligent design asserts the concept of "irreducible complexity". It may very well be true that there's something, somewhere, that is irreducibly complex, but the problem is that there's no way to know it's not irreducibly complex until you find how it's reduced: it's basically an argument from ignorance. It should not be taken seriously as a theory, because it's not a theory, it's an unfalsifiable assertion (that something, somewhere is irreducibly complex; if you falsify one thing, they just move on to the next unknown).
In the case of certain versions of intersectional "theory", one of the key ideas being advanced is that only people subject to a particular oppression can understand that oppression, so if you claim there's no oppression going on, you're obviously not subject to the oppression so you just can't understand it. Kind of an "emperor's new clothes" thing. It can't be taken seriously, because there's no means of outside verification.
Volenta wrote:
The first sentence is actually about the theory, which is great. I'm not able to find a credible source that this victimization is indeed part of the theory (and I haven't researched the theory myself), but lets assume it's true.
I think this was kind of her first point too. I assume that not all people who regard themselves as intersectionalists believe this, but if there are multiple versions of intersectionalism (as there are of veganism), this is a strong argument (as I mentioned above) against the versions that hold this.
Volenta wrote:Does this part of the theory, assuming it is part of it, inherently lead to this behavior when accepted?
That's a good question, and I think it probably does. This isn't, of course, an argument against its validity, but may be a good one against it's practice if you're into pragmatic ethics. Kind of the same arguments that suggest rule consequentialism should be advocated, it might be an argument to NOT advocate this even if it were true.
E.g. even if law breaking has a good outcome, just don't do it because it usually won't and we don't have an individual ability to assess that properly.
Volenta wrote:
There are more possibilities (again, I don't know what the theory actually says), but the point is that she doesn't say what the theory actually says.
I think that's going to be a theme, and probably comes down to the "theory" not being well articulated. It is coming out of the "social sciences", of course, which have a lot of issues, and are very different from the natural sciences (i.e. actual science). I see similar problems in academic philosophy.
Volenta wrote:
One could agree with the theory, and yet dislike the behavior of these campus people. Again, she's not even trying to refute the theory.
Right, I think she only has one really solid refutation of the theory, which is half covered in the first point and half in the second, and then one refutation of the consequences of its advocacy as currently practiced. So, I'd say she has two real points which she broke down into three due to lack of careful examination, and it kind of confused her message. This would be the best criticism of the video, I think, but I don't believe it was deliberate on her part.
Volenta wrote:
But I think you are wrong to think this gets at the essence of, or is incompatible with, intersectional theory.
I'm not sure what you mean. Intersectional theory traces all social ills to some invisible oppressive ideology -- kind of how Christians trace all evils to the devil.
What I'm trying to say is that there are legitimate conflicts that arise not from malice, but from reasonable people disagreeing about what a non-obvious compromise should be.
Volenta wrote:
Isn't the theory about addressing illegitimate asymmetry in the real world in what is symmetrical in theory, and thus should be symmetrical in the real world as well?
I don't think so. At least, I've not seen intersectionalists limit themselves to this (which would basically be equality in property law, and other things that don't relate to sex or personal choice).
If somebody points out that men have more employment options because stupid men can do manual labor better than stupid women (construction, etc.), and that this difference influences income, or that employers are hesitant to hire women for other jobs because they may become pregnant and take a long maternity leave which costs the employer money, intersectionalists don't typically just respond "OK, that's fair then".
The fact is that there are so many asymmetries resulting from biological differences that it's nearly impossible to control for them to the extent of proving any kind of systemic sexism that isn't related to those differences. Proving illegitimate asymmetry becomes a nearly impossible task which the social "sciences" are not up to (being so reluctant to use scientific methodology, and considering it less important than political rhetoric).
Volenta wrote:Giving equal consideration to similar interests is though. So the question for me is: is the theory trying to address issues where the interests are the same, yet unequal consideration is given, or is it trying to give equal consideration to interests having significantly different weight?
Good question, but I don't think they even think about this.
It seems to be trying to give no consideration to some interests in favor of others; more of the deontological approach.
A good example is a man's interest in his unborn child, if the woman wants an abortion, and his interest in an equal opportunity to opt out.
Intersectionalists usually are not interested in the interests of the "privileged" class.
If we took an "equal consideration to equal interests" approach, or "proportional consideration based on interests" I think that would be a much more valid theory which maps better to morality.
Volenta wrote:And now you're making the same mistake as the woman in the video, focusing on the movement in dismissing the theory. That's not to say this isn't an important point, because I do agree with you fully on the substance itself.
Not at all. I'm not dismissing the theory with that. I'm dismissing the prescribed actions if they interfere with more important endeavors.
It may be that we shouldn't call people "blind" for ignoring the evidence, because this could be offensive to blind people -- maybe we should find better words. But this harm is probably very small relative to the overall utility of normal word usage.
I think this is basically the same as the Factual Feminist's second real argument (of the two), that the consequences aren't good of putting the theory into practice -- at least, how it's currently done.
I would ask for a more friendly and socially acceptable
intersectionality, in the same way I wouldn't want to pull a Freelee or Vegan Gains to advocate veganism.