Stefan Molyneux- Universally Preferable Behavior

[brimstoneSalad]

I thought this should be its own thread, since there might be a lot to say on the subject. The original post is here:
http://theveganatheist.com/forum/viewto ... f=15&t=175

@brimstoneSalad: You talked A LOT about morality in reply to me, but I'm not too sure how else I can respond other than directing you to the FREE book by Stefan Molyneux called Universally Preferable Behavior: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics. All his books are free and can be found on youtube as well as here: https://freedomainradio.com/free/

Did you read the criticism I referenced here?

http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=383

That is not to say that every argument in Molyneux's book is wrong, but he made a lot of crucial mistakes in his explanation, as well as in his premises (among other things, presenting false dichotomies). The criticism only barely touches on some of the more visible errors.

The importance of Stefan's book was to answer how it can be possible to convince people who are not moral, that morality is important in general, and this particular one is the answer.

Well, how to convince people, and how to prove it logically are very different things. I have no doubt that his argument is convincing for many people, but he makes some logical mistakes that make his conclusions not valid.

It is a noble goal, and parts of his arguments may be fine, but as a whole it doesn't support his conclusions.
The system he presents just doesn't work.

It inherits the same problems Kant's Categorical imperative originated, and that Rand failed to correct and expanded upon.
I'm familiar not only with Molyneux's argument, but also with the works he took inspiration from, and the Deontological philosophy those essentially mimicked- the issue is not the specific answer to the question, but that all of these works have taken a wrong turn, and are answering a question that is improperly framed.

The problem is in the question itself, which precludes the possibility of a rational answer. Kant, Rand, LaVey, and Molyneux are all chasing their tails by trying to answer a question which has illogical assumptions at its foundation.
Deontology just doesn't work, no matter how you frame it. Molyneux doesn't fix what Rand didn't fix what Kant buggered up upon inception- the fundamental premise of moral dictate, which was born in theism.

You can't make something right when it was not even wrong to begin with.

You have to back up, and approach the subject from a very different direction.

I don't think I can do it justice in my own words, but it starts with the premise that anyone who says something like: "you can't punish me because my particular action is not immoral under these particular or non-particular circumstances!" is already admitting they accept logic, consistency, and universality. It goes on from there. Not much else I can say though...

It's great rhetoric, and a fine start- There is no doubt that Molyneux has a way with words, and is persuasive to many people.
But if the reasoning is not valid between the premises and conclusions, the conclusion isn't by any means definitive- and that fails to achieve the stated goal of creating a proof.

I can't address Molyneux's whole book here, so we're going to have to pick a few parts.

To keep it simple, how about you read that criticism, and tell me which parts you disagree with (or if you agree with some). We can then focus on those aspects of Molyneux's argument first.

You mentioned Daniel Dennett; if you'd like to recommend a particular book, I'd appreciate it.

With reference to Dennett's views on free will and moral responsibility, compared with those of Harris, the shortest and most useful article may be his criticism of Harris' book:

http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/refl ... -free-will

That's a pretty quick read, and it helps a lot in comparing their views. The best articles for exploring what people believe are usually debates and criticisms.

The problem with books is that the author has a monopoly on format, and controls entirely what he addresses, and what he ignores- like the slight of hand of a magician. If you can find an exchange, that can be much more telling.
It's what makes the Socratic arguments so great (but it doesn't apply when somebody is arguing with a straw man as Molyneux does in his book by way of example).

The only other thing I want to reply to is your challenge that I can't point to where the self is... Seems obvious to me that the self is the flesh bag we call "body" which includes the brain. Things like fashion may be external and a defining characteristic of the self, but the choice, whatever you think that word means, exists in the brain and is responsible for the external expression.

Challenge that assumption with some questions. You will find that what "self" is may seem intuitive, but when you question it, it becomes very unclear.

If you lose an arm or a leg, are you no longer yourself? If somebody else gets one of your organs, is that person now yourself, or part yourself?
Or, perhaps is it only the brain that ultimately matters, as the seat of self?
What if somebody has a small piece of brain removed? What if behavior is unchanged? What if it is changed slightly?

Are memories part of the self? What if we forget something we once remembered? Are we a different self?
What if we obtain new memories? Are when then also a different self?

Is self only what is permanent about us, or can we fundamentally change and still be ourselves?
If it's only what's permanent, don't we lose our past selves every day? Aren't we a new person every time we change our minds?
If it can change, how much can it change? Can all of our memories be replaced? Can the parts of our brain that contribute to personality be radically altered? And if it can change entirely and still be our own self, then does self have any meaning at all? What's the continuity that makes it the same self, from before and after?

Is it because it's still contained in the same squishy pink mass? But the atoms that make up that mass are constantly cycling out and being replaced.
Is it just due to the continuum of awareness? Because we lose awareness constantly- consistency of consciousness is a retrospective illusion created by memory. Not only do we sleep, but we can lose conscious awareness under anesthesia too. Are you a different person when you wake?

What if you're downloaded into a computer? Are you no longer yourself, despite being exactly the same in thought and memory?
What if you're teleported, reconstructed at the other end from information. Are you not yourself anymore?

Those aren't all things we can currently do, but they are possible, and the answers to those questions can tell us a lot about what we think selfhood means.

The question is not always so simple.

It's more like asking "what is a chair?"

At first, it may seem simple, even childish, but when you start questioning what a chair actually is, it stops being so simple. Is a chair just anything people sit on? Is it something somebody made with the intent to be sat upon? What if it has multiple uses? What if the use changes? What if somebody changes it?

This is one of the most fundamental problems that persists in Deontology, from Kant onward to Molyneux, and the root of the problem is in the concept of a soul, which derives from theism.

When you have a soul, that offers a clear, magical explanation for what the self is. The self is the soul, plain and simple. It is the very Platonic archetype of the self, and it is considered real and actual.

But when you rely instead on empirical reality, you find fuzzy boundaries, and conceptual prototypes that never manifest perfectly as actual things, instead just generally and crudely categorizing something relative to fulfillment our expectations.

[GPC100s]

God dammit, man, you write so much! I must've missed that link to mises.org because I have to skim your replies to have the time to reply myself, as well as to avoid boredom lol. My replies to you are a constant struggle to simplify.

The importance of Stefan's book was to answer how it can be possible to convince people who are not moral, that morality is important in general, and this particular one is the answer.

Well, how to convince people, and how to prove it logically are very different things. I have no doubt that his argument is convincing for many people, but he makes some logical mistakes that make his conclusions not valid.

I meant logically prove using their own standards, not merely convince. My bad.


Ok, so my beef with the Mises review is with how dismissive it is about the proof Stefan makes about the importance of universality. This writer talks about how it may be moral to steal or rape some of the time even if doing so all the time is impossible. But if it's ok to do such things some of the time (like maximal amount of time) then what you're saying is one of 2 things: either you're saying it's always right to not always be moral (which I hope I don't have to explain how hypocritical that is), or you're saying that there's a logical excuse. Logical excuse is fine, that's why self defense is ok, but it's got to be universal or else it becomes universal to not be universal (that is if you complain about punishment).

The writer mentions how theft doesn't always have to be successful for theft to always be moral, but then that would be equivalent to no morals, right? I'm pretty sure Stefan addressed that in the book... I understand that you don't like the monopoly of format books have, but I'm tired and I've forgotten the argument he uses against nihilists so... Sorry lol.

Challenge that assumption with some questions. You will find that what "self" is may seem intuitive, but when you question it, it becomes very unclear.

Ok, you've given the questions, let me answer them:
You ask about pieces of body/brain removal, but I don't consider it a problem to say "A piece of me is in the next room". Do you?

You ask about memories, forgetting, gaining, and general changing of the mind. I don't consider this a problem because it's that change that defines you (at least in part). You can say that your past self is a different person, and that's true, but this you came from that you leaving no possible way for the past you to interject externally. The thought experiment of taking half a brain and putting in another body allows for that, but that's not problematic. If someone did that, then they act as two selves. What's the problem?

Similarly, you talk about atoms being swapped out. The structure is still the same so no problem there. No one's claiming exact atoms, are they?

You ask about what makes a chair a chair. It seems obvious to me what a chair is, and just because I can use a washing machine as a chair doesn't invalidate that. This is a semantics problem, because you can go look up the definition of chair and find out what it is. You;'ll find it uses the word "commonly" a lot, so why can't anyone uncommonly refer to washing machines as chairs? No one has a reason to tell me something is not a chair if I use it as such.

So does "self" mean anything? As a word, like chair, yes. We all recognize the phenomenon that is the self. Does it matter due to the changing nature of it? No, because our current selves replace the former. If it didn't, then we'd call that the best damn cloning ever lol. Joking aside, I don't see a problem with referring to my past self as me. I hesitate to say you're overthinking, but I think you are.

[brimstoneSalad]

God dammit, man, you write so much! I must've missed that link to mises.org because I have to skim your replies to have the time to reply myself, as well as to avoid boredom lol. My replies to you are a constant struggle to simplify.

You can take more time to reply, or read it in two sittings, if you want...
Better to read more carefully than miss stuff and have to repeat it.

This writer talks about how it may be moral to steal or rape some of the time even if doing so all the time is impossible.[...] Logical excuse is fine, that's why self defense is ok

I think you just answered your own question. If rape is the highest moral, to which everybody should aspire at all times, actual inability to do it at all times excuses not doing it when it's impossible.

You get a pass for not raping while sleeping (if you didn't sleep, you'd die, and then you couldn't rape)
You get a pass while eating (have to keep up your energy to rape)
You get a pass while stalking victims to rape.
You get a pass for not raping while there are a bunch of evil anti-rapists around who would kill you if they saw you doing it- once you're in the clear, you should resume raping.

This is his point.

but it's got to be universal or else it becomes universal to not be universal (that is if you complain about punishment).

I don't know what you mean here.

The writer mentions how theft doesn't always have to be successful for theft to always be moral, but then that would be equivalent to no morals, right?

No, that would be "I tried my best, and I failed"; e.g. a legitimate excuse, as you mentioned.

You ask about pieces of body/brain removal, but I don't consider it a problem to say "A piece of me is in the next room". Do you?

I do. It's a piece of my body, or a piece of my brain, but it is no longer a piece of me.

You ask about memories, forgetting, gaining, and general changing of the mind. I don't consider this a problem because it's that change that defines you (at least in part).

"at least in part" isn't useful for a definition. If the change defines you, what is it about that particular change that defines you?

You could say we have a mental trajectory. Like somebody is becoming a better person, or becoming a worse person.
If they change trajectory, do they become a different person? If you stop changing, then do you stop being you?

If it's not the change that defines you, then it is the existing structure that defines you, and that makes you a different person from moment to moment.

You can say that your past self is a different person, and that's true,

That's kind of my point. It's not fundamentally wrong to say that you're a different person when you change in some way- Every major milestone or state you go through in life changes you. Past you is not future you- they're different people in every practical respect.

but this you [the past you] came from that you leaving no possible way for the past you to interject externally.

What? No. You could do something in the past, and then change and become a different person, and then somebody could find out about what that past you did, and hold the now you accountable- but it wasn't you who did it, in the past you were an entirely different person.

See how this causes problems?

The thought experiment of taking half a brain and putting in another body allows for that, but that's not problematic. If someone did that, then they act as two selves. What's the problem?

Which half of the brain is you? Which half of the brain inherits responsibility for past actions?

So many problems.

Similarly, you talk about atoms being swapped out. The structure is still the same so no problem there. No one's claiming exact atoms, are they?

Structure changes constantly- memory and personality is bound in neural structure. The structure of your brain today is not the structure of when you were a child, and will not be the structure of your brain in ten years.

The only way the structure doesn't change at all, is if you're frozen in time.
Structure is inherently tied to information.

You ask about what makes a chair a chair. It seems obvious to me what a chair is, and just because I can use a washing machine as a chair doesn't invalidate that.

If you use a washing machine as a chair, does the washing machine then become a chair?
If I turn a trash can upside down, and I regularly sit on it, is that my chair? Is it now a chair?

How about if I put my computer on a chair, and I use it as a desk? At what point does it become a desk? Does it stop being a chair?

It seems simple, but it isn't necessarily so.

This is a semantics problem, because you can go look up the definition of chair and find out what it is. You;'ll find it uses the word "commonly" a lot, so why can't anyone uncommonly refer to washing machines as chairs?

They can refer to washing machines as chairs if they use them as chairs. What is or is not a chair depends on you, and how you use it. YOU define what is a chair for you, because a chair is not some fundamental archetype, but a matter of use.
But that also makes it subjective, and relative to the views of the user. I may see something as a chair, another person may see it as an upside down trashcan. We're both kind of right.

No one has a reason to tell me something is not a chair if I use it as such.

Bingo. That's my point.
And it applies to selfhood too. YOU define what makes you you. And you can change your mind about that too.

If you've lost your memories, and no longer feel like the same person, then you aren't.
If your views have changed so drastically- views you considered a central part of yourself- then as a consequence, you're a different person, because of those things YOU chose to identify with.
If somebody becomes a born again Christian, and decides that their entire purpose in life and the whole of their identity is now about Jesus, they are in many respects a different person- they have redefined what it means to be them.
If they come back to reality, they stop being the person they were when they were Christian- they might resume being the person they were before they were Christian- as if they were asleep, or watching through another person's eyes that whole time.

It gets even messier when we deal with psychological or neurological issues of personality- which breaks it down even further.

The point is, the whole thing is very fuzzy and subjective. "Self" only has the meaning we give it. And that's a big problem for those trying to construct a system of objective personal responsibility or autonomy by appealing to selfhood.

I don't see a problem with referring to my past self as me.

You can if you want, if you identify with your past self, and take ownership of it. But it's equally valid for you to not identify with it for some reason, and say "that's not me anymore, that was a different person".

The notion of self is subjective, so it can not be used to construct universals. Without the premise of a supernatural soul that cements the concept of self, and forces its continuity upon all people, these attempts are doomed to fail.

What matters about an action is whether it harms others, violating their wants- that's the only objective ill, and its magnitude is proportional to the magnitude of those wants that were violated.

Stealing is wrong if the other wanted the thing you stole, and could have otherwise had it.
Raping is wrong because the other didn't want to be raped- wanted not to be raped.
Killing is wrong because the other wanted not to die- assuming the other did want not to die (assisted suicide is ok).
Imprisoning is wrong because the other wanted to be free.
Insulting somebody is wrong because they didn't want to be insulted (assuming they didn't)
Etc. etc.

Some wants are bigger than others. I'd rather be insulted than stolen from, I'd rather be stolen from than raped, I'd rather be raped than killed. As such, the proportional wrongs are smaller for some things, and bigger for other things.

It doesn't suffer from the problems of vague definitions of 'self'- you can be whatever you want, and your wants should be respected (providing they aren't infringing on others' wants, in which case there's a conflict of interest).

[GPC100s]

I can take all the time I want to read and reply... but my time and attention is scarce. Please make effort to simplify. For example, you listed many examples in a row when one would suffice.

but it's got to be universal or else it becomes universal to not be universal (that is if you complain about punishment).

I don't know what you mean here.

Well, this is important so pay attention: If someone complains about punishment for, let's say, theft, and their argument is "I don't accept universal principles so it's ok for me to take stuff" then their objection to universal principles is universal. If their objection was not universal then they would have to accept that some people have universal principles and are right to punish offenders. The latter, is the same thing as no morals because people with no morals accept that other people have moral codes but choose to disregard them. If I'm wrong, tell me how those two concepts (someone with no morals and someone who rejects other people's morals) are different.

"at least in part" isn't useful for a definition. If the change defines you, what is it about that particular change that defines you?

You agree that the self exists. You said so. You think it's defined by the person themself. So, if a person create 2 criteria for defining themself (such as liking a particular music as well as liking a particular food) then one of those things defines that person in part, according to your standards.

I meant the fact of the change defines you. Unlike you, I don't let a person describe themselves. I look at them and report what I see. If I see a person who listens to a particular music, and they claim to like it, then that's a characteristic of their self... So when I look at humans and see that they change, that is a characteristic of their selves... It's important to note that not everything about the self can be seen by others, but no one can choose their identity, it's an objective fact that must be observed in some way or else you're lying (like if you get really annoyed every time you're exposed to Justin Beiber, you can't say you're a beleiber lol).

What? No. You could do something in the past, and then change and become a different person, and then somebody could find out about what that past you did, and hold the now you accountable- but it wasn't you who did it, in the past you were an entirely different person.

See how this causes problems?

Which half of the brain is you? Which half of the brain inherits responsibility for past actions?

I've actually heard this defense coming from a mtf transexual who most likely has multiple personalities (or lying) lol. The past self, as well as the two half brains, came from the former self. You can't treat each new second as a new set of people because people don't completely change overnight, they make little changes over time. So we must treat them as the same person until we can conclude that they really are changed (I care about rehab for inmates). The multiple personalities can't be separated so ditto for them.

Your moral dictatorial list doesn't seem to evade this inherently, so you need a clear definition for the self before you can punish anyone for their actions too. What happens if an inmate claims he's a changed man? He's allowed to walk, just like that? He's the one who defines himself, so you have to say yes.

I may see something as a chair, another person may see it as an upside down trashcan. We're both kind of right.

That's the nature of words, dude. People argue about what words mean all the time, but it's futile. Everyone is always right, but it's better to use commonly accepted definitions to get your point across. I could call this thing my keyboard is on a desk, but then you wouldn't be thinking of what is commonly referred to as "stool" and that is what you should be thinking about because that's what it is. It is what is commonly referred to as stool, but it's also a desk 'cause I use it as such.

[brimstoneSalad]

For example, you listed many examples in a row when one would suffice.

One might suffice for you, but this is a public conversation- other people may appreciate more examples. What I'll do is put additional information in gray so you can skim it more easily, but catch the essential stuff. And then optionally view the gray text at your leisure, or if you want more clarification on something.

Well, this is important so pay attention: If someone complains about punishment for, let's say, theft, and their argument is "I don't accept universal principles so it's ok for me to take stuff" then their objection to universal principles is universal.

I see what you are getting at. As I mentioned before, from Kant to Rand to Molyneux, there is a trend of conflating social contract and morality. The two aren't the same.

Social contract is based on Game theory. Morality is based on violation of others wants (in context for the potential for them to be realized).

Something might be Moral, but may still be Illegal because of its implications as a system.
Something might be Immoral, but may still be legal because of the implications as a system of making that kind of action illegal.
There are also many cases where things are both Moral and Legal, or both Immoral and Illegal. Plenty over overlap, but a lot of distinction too. Social contract is both minimal and crudely functional- in its raw form, it represents only the minimal agreement of amoral rational agents, which can be reached by nothing other than self interested cooperation. Morality goes far beyond social contract, representing a non-selfish ideal, and often clashes with raw social contract.

Incorrectly equating Morality and Social contract damages both of them (kind of like the arguments for separation of Church and State, except rational morality isn't illogical as religion tends to be). We have to understand them each in their own contexts.

Somebody who breaks the law needs to face consequences for that due to reasons of social contract, whether or not their actions were moral.

If you re-frame that as:

If someone complains about being criticized for harming another (as an immoral deed), and their argument is "I don't accept universal principles of morality so it's ok for me to harm others" then their objection to universal principles of morality is universal.

Then I agree.
That makes these kinds of people amoral (lacking in morals)- they can't then criticize other people for being immoral, for example, such as in the case of acting to harm them or something they care about.

Or:

If someone complains about being punished for a violation of social contract (like stealing, perhaps), and their argument is "I don't accept the universal applicability of social contract so it's ok for me to break the law" then their objection to application social contract is universal.

Then again, I agree, but on a different subject. Those kinds of people can then not criticize others for violating the social contract against them- but they could still criticize others for being immoral IF they accept moral universals, and only reject the universals of social contract.

Somebody could reject one category, but not the other. Indeed, people do so regularly.

If their objection was not universal then they would have to accept that some people have universal principles and are right to punish offenders.

Only with regards to social contract. This has little to do with morality.

If I'm wrong, tell me how those two concepts (someone with no morals and someone who rejects other people's morals) are different.

Rejecting universal morals makes somebody either without morals, or a moral relativist. And if that person is a relativist, he or she can't reject other people's morally motivated actions against him/her as wrong for those people.
If that's what you're saying, you're right- but that is only with regards to morality. This has little or nothing to do with social contract.

We reject immoral things on universal moral grounds.
We reject violations of social contract (and the punishment thereof) on grounds of the necessary universal applicability of social contract.

There are relationships between the two, and a lot of overlap, but they are still distinct concepts, and need to be understood as such.


I will respond to the rest a bit later.

[GPC100s]

Ok, you're telling me that my, Stefan's, and Rand's morals are actually "social contracts". That's fine, you probably read how I'm very flexible with words lol. But now I don't understand what you mean when you use the word morality.

Easy fix to avoid some long winded explanation of one of the toughest philosophical subjects: Answer the question: Why are social contracts insufficient in encapsulating the behavior that one ought to do?

[brimstoneSalad]

Ok, you're telling me that my, Stefan's, and Rand's morals are actually "social contracts".

Mostly, yes. Something like 80% social contract, 20% confused.

Easy fix to avoid some long winded explanation of one of the toughest philosophical subjects: Answer the question: Why are social contracts insufficient in encapsulating the behavior that one ought to do?

Social contract:

I have the power to kill you in your sleep.
You have the power to kill me in my sleep.
On that basis, let's agree not to kill each other in our sleep.

Raw social contract is always reciprocal, and it's always based on power.

I have the power to steal/kill your baby.
You have the power to steal/kill my baby.
Let's agree to not steal/kill each other's babies.

It also applies to things that are not you, but that both parties own/care about personally, as long as they have power to negotiate a reciprocal agreement.

My baby has no power to harm me.
I have the power to harm my baby.
--nothing--

The baby has no negotiating power in this contract. Babies are not part of, and can not be part of, social contract.


While I can't kill *your* baby, since it belongs to you, and you have power, I am perfectly entitled to kill my own baby, as you are entitled to kill your own baby.
You can even make a baby rape factory if you want- as long as you use babies that belong to you (either born or bought), and you do not release them into the environment to affect me.

Under raw social contract, you can do any immoral thing you want - including own slaves - as long as they don't directly affect your social neighbor.
However, you are responsible for the conduct of your slaves: if they escape and damage your neighbor or his/her property, then that's your fault.

Raw social contract only protects the powerful from the powerful. It does not protect the powerless or disenfranchised.
It doesn't prohibit rape- just rape of the powerful.
It doesn't prohibit killing- just killing the powerful.
etc.

It does arguably prohibit stealing, because only those with power can assert ownership- those who are owned (such as children, slaves, even wives, etc.) can not own property, or their property is the ultimate property of their owners (so it is not stealing for the ultimate owner to take it).

[GPC100s]

That's a pretty weird thing to say after Stefan used rape and murder as examples in his book lol.

But think about other powerful people who knew you raped and killed babies, what are they gonna think of you? What are they gonna want to do to you? What are they not gonna do with you that you'd want them to do? It's just like the air pollution argument I made in the other thread: if people care about that sort of thing, it'll happen, government or not; but if people don't care, then it won't be fixed.

Also, the argument that slaves would even exist is fallacious because slaves are people like everyone else. Free a slave as a part of a contract and you benefit from that freed slave who can now work for you. Bad contracts can even be renegotiated as someone else will always come along to get something from the slave than do nothing to help and get nothing from him. Not to mention that slaves are inefficient. It costs money to keep those slaves from running away, so why not pay the slaves instead of the slave hunters? The government (I think it was state level in the US) used to fund the slave hunters, so of course slavery was better for farmers!

[brimstoneSalad]

That's a pretty weird thing to say after Stefan used rape and murder as examples in his book lol.

No, it's not, because those arguments were demonstrated to be faulty.

But think about other powerful people who knew you raped and killed babies, what are they gonna think of you? What are they gonna want to do to you? What are they not gonna do with you that you'd want them to do?

They can ostracize you for running a baby rape factory, but they can not physically hurt you or stop you, because that would violate the social contract.
All of the people in favor of baby raping can get together and form their own community, and the people against it can make their community. They don't have to do commerce with each other. Simple. Under social contract, neither side is right or wrong- they just disagree on the matter of baby raping.

This fails to demonstrate how building a baby rape factory is morally wrong. If it is socially unpopular in one place, then it might be bad business there, if it's popular in another place, then it's good business there. This is social relativism.

It's just like the air pollution argument I made in the other thread: if people care about that sort of thing, it'll happen, government or not; but if people don't care, then it won't be fixed.

If 10% of people like baby raping, no matter what the 90% have to say, there's no way to stop them. Even if you boycott their goods, and don't do business with them, they can do business with each other and get along just fine, continuing to provide the baby raping services they want.

Also, the argument that slaves would even exist is fallacious because slaves are people like everyone else.

That's irrelevant to social contract. If you didn't understand this, I need to provide more examples. It matters NOT that they are people, but that they have POWER over you, and can reciprocate that protection that you offer them. It's basically a trade in a protection racket. If you can not offer protection from yourself, because you are not a threat (either in chains, or too weak), you can not negotiate protection for yourself.

Slaves are already slaves- they can not offer you freedom in exchange for their own.

It IS against social contract to abduct free people and turn them into slaves. But it is not against social contract to buy babies, or raise babies to be slaves- or to buy those who are already in slavery.

Free a slave as a part of a contract and you benefit from that freed slave who can now work for you.

Maybe, and maybe not- but that's irrelevant. It's also not for you to decide how other people should behave, or what they should do under social contract UNLESS it directly affects you. Other people owning slaves doesn't affect you, therefore it's not your business.

Social contract is not about maximizing efficiency- it's about maximizing liberty and mutual protection of the enfranchised (empowered) parties.
Not everybody will agree that freeing their slaves is better than keeping them as slaves. You can't take somebody's property (slaves) and make them free against the owner's will. That's against the raw social contract.

Bad contracts can even be renegotiated as someone else will always come along to get something from the slave than do nothing to help and get nothing from him.

What are you talking about?

Social contract isn't that kind of contract. Slaves are not part of the social contract. They are property. They have no negotiation rights.

You can no more take somebody else's slaves than you can take their children or their house because you think you can offer a better deal. If the person chooses to sell his or her slaves to you, that's fine. But if they do not choose it, then you can't buy them and you can not take them.

People are not 100% efficient. Some people will disagree, and choose to keep their slaves because they receive benefits from them- tangible and intangible. Some people just like owning other people, and they may keep slaves for amusement, even if it's less efficient than hiring people for the work.

However, you are also mistaken in the efficiency of slaves- slaves can be forced to do work through torture and with drugs, particularly very undesirable work, involving radioactivity, human waste, or violent sex acts and entertainment more cheaply than anybody can be paid to do it.
Slavery is alive and well in most parts of the world (even in the U.S.), and that is because for extreme and unfavorable working conditions, they are cheaper than hiring workers.

Slaves can be prevented from running away very easily by keeping a member of the family (particularly children), and killing them in the case of runaways or disobedience.
The institution of slavery in U.S. history was comparatively humane because of government regulation (of course not actually humane, but comparatively so to other countries and black market slavery). Take away the regulation, and it doesn't cease to be viable- it just becomes much more cruel.

Seriously, slavery is alive and well, and it is a booming a profitable industry. Do a little research on it; you won't be able to sleep.