http://theveganatheist.com/forum/viewto ... f=15&t=175
Did you read the criticism I referenced here?GPC100s wrote:@brimstoneSalad: You talked A LOT about morality in reply to me, but I'm not too sure how else I can respond other than directing you to the FREE book by Stefan Molyneux called Universally Preferable Behavior: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics. All his books are free and can be found on youtube as well as here: https://freedomainradio.com/free/
http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=383
That is not to say that every argument in Molyneux's book is wrong, but he made a lot of crucial mistakes in his explanation, as well as in his premises (among other things, presenting false dichotomies). The criticism only barely touches on some of the more visible errors.
Well, how to convince people, and how to prove it logically are very different things. I have no doubt that his argument is convincing for many people, but he makes some logical mistakes that make his conclusions not valid.GPC100s wrote:The importance of Stefan's book was to answer how it can be possible to convince people who are not moral, that morality is important in general, and this particular one is the answer.
It is a noble goal, and parts of his arguments may be fine, but as a whole it doesn't support his conclusions.
The system he presents just doesn't work.
It inherits the same problems Kant's Categorical imperative originated, and that Rand failed to correct and expanded upon.
I'm familiar not only with Molyneux's argument, but also with the works he took inspiration from, and the Deontological philosophy those essentially mimicked- the issue is not the specific answer to the question, but that all of these works have taken a wrong turn, and are answering a question that is improperly framed.
The problem is in the question itself, which precludes the possibility of a rational answer. Kant, Rand, LaVey, and Molyneux are all chasing their tails by trying to answer a question which has illogical assumptions at its foundation.
Deontology just doesn't work, no matter how you frame it. Molyneux doesn't fix what Rand didn't fix what Kant buggered up upon inception- the fundamental premise of moral dictate, which was born in theism.
You can't make something right when it was not even wrong to begin with.
You have to back up, and approach the subject from a very different direction.
It's great rhetoric, and a fine start- There is no doubt that Molyneux has a way with words, and is persuasive to many people.GPC100s wrote:I don't think I can do it justice in my own words, but it starts with the premise that anyone who says something like: "you can't punish me because my particular action is not immoral under these particular or non-particular circumstances!" is already admitting they accept logic, consistency, and universality. It goes on from there. Not much else I can say though...
But if the reasoning is not valid between the premises and conclusions, the conclusion isn't by any means definitive- and that fails to achieve the stated goal of creating a proof.
I can't address Molyneux's whole book here, so we're going to have to pick a few parts.
To keep it simple, how about you read that criticism, and tell me which parts you disagree with (or if you agree with some). We can then focus on those aspects of Molyneux's argument first.
With reference to Dennett's views on free will and moral responsibility, compared with those of Harris, the shortest and most useful article may be his criticism of Harris' book:GPC100s wrote:You mentioned Daniel Dennett; if you'd like to recommend a particular book, I'd appreciate it.
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/refl ... -free-will
That's a pretty quick read, and it helps a lot in comparing their views. The best articles for exploring what people believe are usually debates and criticisms.
The problem with books is that the author has a monopoly on format, and controls entirely what he addresses, and what he ignores- like the slight of hand of a magician. If you can find an exchange, that can be much more telling.
It's what makes the Socratic arguments so great (but it doesn't apply when somebody is arguing with a straw man as Molyneux does in his book by way of example).
Challenge that assumption with some questions. You will find that what "self" is may seem intuitive, but when you question it, it becomes very unclear.GPC100s wrote:The only other thing I want to reply to is your challenge that I can't point to where the self is... Seems obvious to me that the self is the flesh bag we call "body" which includes the brain. Things like fashion may be external and a defining characteristic of the self, but the choice, whatever you think that word means, exists in the brain and is responsible for the external expression.
If you lose an arm or a leg, are you no longer yourself? If somebody else gets one of your organs, is that person now yourself, or part yourself?
Or, perhaps is it only the brain that ultimately matters, as the seat of self?
What if somebody has a small piece of brain removed? What if behavior is unchanged? What if it is changed slightly?
Are memories part of the self? What if we forget something we once remembered? Are we a different self?
What if we obtain new memories? Are when then also a different self?
Is self only what is permanent about us, or can we fundamentally change and still be ourselves?
If it's only what's permanent, don't we lose our past selves every day? Aren't we a new person every time we change our minds?
If it can change, how much can it change? Can all of our memories be replaced? Can the parts of our brain that contribute to personality be radically altered? And if it can change entirely and still be our own self, then does self have any meaning at all? What's the continuity that makes it the same self, from before and after?
Is it because it's still contained in the same squishy pink mass? But the atoms that make up that mass are constantly cycling out and being replaced.
Is it just due to the continuum of awareness? Because we lose awareness constantly- consistency of consciousness is a retrospective illusion created by memory. Not only do we sleep, but we can lose conscious awareness under anesthesia too. Are you a different person when you wake?
What if you're downloaded into a computer? Are you no longer yourself, despite being exactly the same in thought and memory?
What if you're teleported, reconstructed at the other end from information. Are you not yourself anymore?
Those aren't all things we can currently do, but they are possible, and the answers to those questions can tell us a lot about what we think selfhood means.
The question is not always so simple.
It's more like asking "what is a chair?"
At first, it may seem simple, even childish, but when you start questioning what a chair actually is, it stops being so simple. Is a chair just anything people sit on? Is it something somebody made with the intent to be sat upon? What if it has multiple uses? What if the use changes? What if somebody changes it?
This is one of the most fundamental problems that persists in Deontology, from Kant onward to Molyneux, and the root of the problem is in the concept of a soul, which derives from theism.
When you have a soul, that offers a clear, magical explanation for what the self is. The self is the soul, plain and simple. It is the very Platonic archetype of the self, and it is considered real and actual.
But when you rely instead on empirical reality, you find fuzzy boundaries, and conceptual prototypes that never manifest perfectly as actual things, instead just generally and crudely categorizing something relative to fulfillment our expectations.